IMBONG VS COMELECG.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19,1997)25APRMIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),respondents.SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN),petitioners-intervenors.Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.FACTS:Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition)wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2)Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3)Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.ISSUE:Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .HELD:NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted.The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitutionare declared void.RATIO:Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sittingen banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition;(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;(3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.SEPARATE OPINIONS:PUNO,concurring and dissentingI join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.(MELO and MENDOZA concur)VITUG,concurring and dissentingI vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under theponenciashould be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.FRANCISCO,concurring and dissentingThere is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.(MELO and MENDOZA concur)PANGANIBAN,concurring and dissentingOur distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other rulings.

TOLENTINO VS COMELECG.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS DigestedManila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:

Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end,a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional provision?

CASE DIGEST

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum:One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate,Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011Facts:In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?Ruling:1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

>NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO.183591Posted onMay 7, 2010bykrizsexzy>FACTS:The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).ISSUE:Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutionalHELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.REASONING:The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.Article III (Bill of Rights)Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article IISec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.Article VII (Executive Department)Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.Article X. (Local Government)Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1. Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional LawAmendmentto the ConstitutionOn 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutionalamendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they proposeamendmentsto the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to proposeamendmentsto the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.ISSUE:Whether or not Marcos can validly proposeamendmentsto the Constitution.HELD:Yes.The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals ofamendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to proposeamendmentsto the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to proposeamendmentsbecomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal ofamendmentsand submitted the proposedamendmentsthru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure foramendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.This petition is however dismissed. The President can proposeamendmentsto the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.