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Social Influence

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Political identity, preference, and persuasion

Claire Heeryung Kim, DaHee Han, Adam Duhachek & Zakary L. Tormala

To cite this article: Claire Heeryung Kim, DaHee Han, Adam Duhachek & Zakary L. Tormala(2018) Political identity, preference, and persuasion, Social Influence, 13:4, 177-191, DOI:10.1080/15534510.2018.1518786

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2018.1518786

Published online: 12 Sep 2018.

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ARTICLE

Political identity, preference, and persuasionClaire Heeryung Kima, DaHee Hana, Adam Duhachekb and Zakary L. Tormalac

aDesautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; bKelley School ofBusiness, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA; cStanford Graduate School of Business, StanfordUniversity, Stanford, CA, USA

ABSTRACTThe current research examines how political identity shapes pre-ferences for objects and messages that highlight either equality orhierarchy. We find that liberals show a greater preference for anobject associated with less as opposed to more hierarchy, whereasconservatives do not exhibit such a preference (Study 1). We alsofind that liberals are more persuaded by persuasive appeals thatendorse equality rather than hierarchy, whereas conservatives areless sensitive to this distinction (Study 2). Finally, we identify themoderating role of political identity salience: When one’s politicalidentity is made salient, liberals show an increased preference formessages highlighting equality, whereas conservatives becomemore persuaded by messages highlighting hierarchy (Study 3).

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 28 April 2017Accepted 24 August 2018

KEYWORDSPolitical identity; hierarchy;equality; values; matchingeffect

The influence of political identity on judgment and behavior has been a topic of increas-ing importance in numerous domains of psychological research. It is now known thatpolitical identity is reflected in individuals’ core values and motives and, thus, that it canplay a role in guiding people’s preferences and behaviors (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &Sulloway, 2003a; Jost et al., 2007). Indeed, recent work suggests that political identity caninfluence individuals’ preferences and choices in contexts that have little or nothing to dowith politics per se, such as preferences for novel experiences over traditional life events(Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), brand choices (Kwan, Chiu, & Leung, 2014), productchoices (Fernandes & Mandel, 2014), and charitable giving (Winterich, Zhang, & Mittal,2012). The current research takes a step in this direction and examines how liberals andconservatives differ with respect to their preferences for objects or messages that highlightequality versus hierarchy, a theme theoretically linked to political identity.

Hierarchy is prevalent in social life (Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman, & Blanchar,2015). Indeed, status and hierarchy are dominant features of most societies (Ridgeway,2001) and hierarchy is thought by some to be an inevitable catalyst for coordinatinghuman effort (Mazur, 2005). Others view hierarchy as a lingering byproduct of a moreinequitable past and seek to eliminate it from contemporary society (Boehm, 1999).Individuals also frequently encounter hierarchy in their daily lives. For instance,companies offer extended benefits to preferred individuals and websites give special

CONTACT Claire Heeryung Kim claire.kim@mcgill.caThis article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

SOCIAL INFLUENCE2018, VOL. 13, NO. 4, 177–191https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2018.1518786

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

access to important members. Given the prevalence and importance of hierarchy andthe fact that views toward hierarchy fundamentally differ as a function of politicalidentity, the current research examines how appeals to hierarchy versus equality canaffect preference and persuasion in contexts that have little or nothing to do withpolitical content per se.

Political identity and values

Political identity represents one’s beliefs about how a political system should work(Grove, Remy, & Zeigler, 1974), and is linked to differences in values (Winterich et al.,2012). Most germane to the current concerns, political identity can lead individuals tointernalize a set of general attitudes regarding equality versus hierarchy (Jost et al.,2008). Hierarchy values and political conservatism are often closely associated (Jostet al., 2003), and a preference for the preservation of traditional structures withinsociety is one of conservatism’s key dimensions (Wilson, 1973). Indeed, Jost et al.(2008) argued that rejecting versus accepting social hierarchy is a core value distinctionbetween liberals and conservatives, respectively (see also Jost et al., 2003a).

For instance, previous research has shown that, compared to conservatives, liberalsare more sensitive to violations of principles of equity and display a stronger aversion tohierarchies (Ho et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2008; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Moral foundationstheory (e.g. Haidt & Joseph, 2004) suggests that conservatives may find value inhierarchy as a means of respecting authority, whereas liberals disavow hierarchybecause those with low status in the hierarchy are more likely to be harmed and treatedunfairly (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2008; Kugler, Jost,& Noorbaloochi, 2014; McAdams et al., 2008). Thus, liberals are more likely thanconservatives to disapprove of hierarchical systems in social, economic, and politicalinstitutions and arrangements (Jost et al., 2008). Accordingly, Jost et al. (2008) foundthat liberals tend to support remedies for social injustices based on inequality.

Attitudes and behaviors can vary as a function of values (e.g. Bardi & Schwartz, 2003;Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Morgan, 2009; Maio & Olson, 1995; Schwartz, 1994). Inaddition, a substantial literature suggesting that a match (as opposed to mismatch) betweenindividuals’ psychological orientations and the frame or content of a persuasive messagecan result in greater persuasion (e.g. Cavazza, Graziani, Serpe, & Rubichi, 2010; Fabrigar &Petty, 1999; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer,2005). For example, Mayer and Tormala (2010) found that people were more persuaded bythe exact same arguments when the frames of those arguments (i.e. thoughts vs. feelings)matched rather than mismatched recipients’ processing orientations (i.e. cognitive vs.affective). Feinberg and Willer (2015) found that people became more persuasive whenthey were reminded to couch their arguments in terms of values that aligned with thepolitical orientation of their target audience.

Extending these findings to the domain of equality versus hierarchy, we hypothe-size that liberals will be more attracted to objects linked to equality rather thanhierarchy, and will be more persuaded by a message that describes an object withequality-related words (e.g. equal, fair) rather than hierarchy-related words (e.g.unequal, exclusive), because equality messages are more consistent with their under-lying values. Our predictions regarding conservatives are more complicated. On one

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hand, conservatives may be more attracted to objects linked to hierarchy rather thanequality, and may be more persuaded by a message that describes an object withhierarchy-related words rather than equality-related words for the same reason asliberals. On the other hand, conservatives may be less sensitive to this distinctionbecause, despite having a more favorable disposition toward hierarchy, on average,they have learned to suppress this preference (Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000;Van Berkel et al., 2015). Hence, conservatives may not actively prefer objectsdescribed in hierarchical terms, but rather discriminate less between equality andhierarchy messages and objects.

Political identity salience

In the media, workplace, and daily social interactions, political cues abound. Thus, thesalience of one’s political identity can be increased when one least expects it. We suggestthat the salience of one’s political identity will strengthen the disparity between liberalsand conservatives by further accentuating the importance of underlying values asso-ciated with one’s political identity. We draw on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,1986) in making this prediction. Social identities are defined as social categories such asethnicity or gender that define the self for an individual (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).

Social identity salience is the activation of the conceptual structure of social identityin one’s self-concept through spontaneous self-categorization in response to socialcontexts and stimulus cues (Reed, 2002). A salient social identity leads group membersto define themselves using their social group to a greater extent (e.g. Haslam, Oakes,Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Rijswijk, Haslam, & Ellemers, 2006). In doing so, individualsdescribe themselves interchangeably with other group members (Haslam et al., 1999)and adopt attitudes and behaviors that are more stereotypical of their group (Turner,1987). One implication is that individuals who possess a particular social identity willjudge events or objects that are congruent with that identity more favorably, especiallywhen the identity is salient (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Reed, 2002; Reed, Lange,Ketchie, & Clapp, 2007; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Indeed, self-categorization theorysuggests that a salient social identity leads one’s behavior to shift more towards thenorms associated with that identity (e.g. Callero, 1985; Nuttbrock & Freudiger, 1991;Stryker & Serpe, 1982). This perspective has been extended to the political domain (seeHuddy, 2001). Previous research has found that the salience of political identity affectsjudgments of political ingroup and outgroup members (Kelly, 1989; Morton, Postmes,& Jetten, 2007). For instance, Morton et al. (2007) demonstrated that those high (vs.low) in political identity more strongly supported a normative candidate over a deviantcandidate. In Cohen’s (2003) research, highly identified Democrats and Republicanswere more likely to support a welfare policy that was endorsed by the majority ofmembers in their party.

Based on this perspective, we posit that individuals’ preference for objects andmessages that align with their values will be particularly likely to emerge when theirpolitical identity becomes salient. Specifically, we predict that the matching effect will beamplified under conditions of political identity salience.

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Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 is to provide an initial test of our hypotheses in a choice context.Importantly, this study presents an exploratory analysis regarding the predictions of con-servatives’ responses to equality versus hierarchy. Study 1 tests this relationship in a context inwhich inequality is frequently observed – namely, airline loyalty programs (i.e. frequent flyerprograms). It is well known that airlines provide individuals with unequal treatment as afunction of their status within the airline’s frequent flier program. One way that suchprograms can be distinguished relates to the levels of hierarchy within the program: Moreegalitarian programs would have flatter structures (i.e. fewer levels) whereas more hierarch-ical programs would draw more distinctions between members according to their statuswithin the program (i.e. more levels). Thus, we hypothesized that liberals would prefer aloyalty programwith fewer rather thanmore levels, whereas conservatives would either preferone with more rather than fewer levels or show no preference.

Material and methods

Two hundred forty participants (38.8% males, Mage = 41.40) from Amazon’s MechanicalTurk participated in the study in exchange for $1. As noted, to manipulate relative equalityversus hierarchy, we varied the type of frequent flyer program participants evaluated.Program type was manipulated within-participants such that participants evaluated aloyalty program with five tiers (relatively more equality) against a loyalty program witheight tiers (relatively more hierarchy). Participants were asked to imagine that they wereinterested in signing up for a frequent flyer program and were given the followinginstructions: ‘As you know, each airline offers different frequent flyer programs by varyingthe number of tiers. Please see below for examples of two different frequent flyer programs.Airlines are interested in finding the optimal number of tiers so that they can attract morecustomers.’ After receiving the instructions, participants were shown a table that providedinformation regarding two different frequent flyer programs (see Appendix A). The airlineswere referred to as Airline A (option with five tiers) and Airline B (option with eight tiers)to induce participants to focus on the information given and remove potential brandeffects, and participants were told that airline names would be disclosed at the conclusionof the study. After viewing the table, participants indicated their likelihood of signing up forthe frequent flyer program offered by Airline A (M = 6.13, SD = 2.10) and Airline B(M = 5.35, SD = 2.29) on consecutive 9-point scales (1 = not at all likely, 9 = very likely).

Next, participants answered a question regarding their political identity. Politicalidentity (M = 5.14, SD = 3.03) was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal)to 11 (extremely conservative) (adopted from Jost et al., 2007, Study 2). Finally, participantsprovided demographic information and were debriefed regarding the real brand names ofthe two frequent flyer programs. Suspicion probes indicated that no participants identifiedthe brand names of the frequent flyer programs or recognized the purpose of the study.

Results and discussion

First, we ran a repeated measures multiple regression, treating mean-centered politicalidentity as the between-participants factor and program type as the within-participants

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factor (i.e. likelihood of signing up for Airline A [relative equality], likelihood of signing upfor Airline B [relative hierarchy]). This analysis yielded a significant effect of program type,F (1, 238) = 15.88, p < .001, suggesting that in general participants showed a greaterpreference for Airline A (relative equality). There also was an interaction between politicalidentity and program type, F (1, 238) = 7.10, p = .008, suggesting that political identitymoderated the effect of program type on the likelihood of joining.

In addition, we created a difference score between the two likelihood ratings (like-lihood of signing up for Airline A – likelihood of signing up for Airline B) and ran aregression with political identity as the independent variable and difference scores asthe dependent variable. On this index, higher scores indicate a greater preference forAirline A (relative equality) over Airline B (relative hierarchy), lower scores indicate lessdifferentiation between hierarchy and equality options, and negative scores indicate apreference for the hierarchical option. The results revealed a significant negative rela-tion, b = – .17, SE = .07, t = −2.67, p = .008, suggesting that conservatives exhibited lessdifferentiation, as shown in Figure 1.

Additionally, we reran the analyses controlling for demographic characteristics suchas age and gender that may be associated with the inclination for equality versushierarchy to isolate the unique effects of political identity on preferences. All of theseresults were replicated when demographic characteristics were included as covariates inthe analyses. This result was also true in Studies 2 and 3 and is not discussed further.

As predicted, liberals were sensitive to the difference between loyalty programs as afunction of their degree of equality or hierarchy. Conservatives, however, were insensitiveto differences in equality versus hierarchy. Interestingly, although previous research sug-gests that conservatives are more likely to accept hierarchy than liberals, it is not clearwhether conservatives would explicitly prefer objects that endorse hierarchy over equalityin their daily life. Hierarchical systems at the individual and group levels are the default(Boehm, 1999; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), but many societies value egalitarianism andhave adopted resource and power distribution as stated societal ideals (e.g. Hirschman,1991; Lipset & Raab, 1978; Nosek et al., 2009). Thus, individuals (e.g. conservatives) maylearn or seek to suppress attitudes explicitly favoring hierarchy over equality (Sears et al.,2000; Van Berkel et al., 2015). Based on these arguments, we can interpret our findings such

Figure 1. Likelihood of joining as a function of political identity in Study 1.

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that conservatives might be less likely to discriminate between equality and hierarchy thantheir liberal counterparts, but not necessarily that they would explicitly prefer hierarchy toequality. As a counterpoint to this argument, it could be that their indifference in Study 1stemmed from the fact that both loyalty programs were relatively hierarchical (e.g. five vs.eight tiers). Perhaps conservatives’ preferences would be stronger in instances in which thechoice context included a true egalitarian option. Thus, in the next study, we examinewhether these values can shape the impact of persuasive messages, and we consider howconservatives respond to messages referencing true equality. Furthermore, the manipula-tion in Study 1 might seem to vary the number of ranks in a hierarchy, rather than the gapbetween the highest and lowest ranks. By presenting a clearer manipulation of hierarchy,we attempt to resolve this potential ambiguity in Study 2.

Study 2

In Study 2, we extend our analysis to a persuasion context. More specifically, we investi-gate the persuasiveness of messages referencing equality or hierarchy among liberal andconservative recipients. In addition, we attempt to replicate the findings in Study 1 inwhich conservatives did not show a preference for hierarchy over equality. We posit thatliberals will be more persuaded by a message containing equality- rather than hierarchy-related words, whereas conservatives will be less sensitive to these differences.

Material and methods

Two hundred sixty-one respondents (52.5% males, Mage = 32.86) from Amazon’sMechanical Turk participated in the study for $1. Participants were randomly assignedto one of two message conditions in which they were shown an ad for an airlineemphasizing either equality or hierarchy (see Appendix B). In the hierarchy condition,participants received the following message: ‘Not all seats are created equal! 3 classes ofservice.’ In the equality condition, the message read: ‘All seats are created equal! 1 classof service for all seats.’ Whereas most airlines do not offer a single class of service as wemanipulated, we did so in order to provide a clean manipulation of hierarchy.Following the message, participants were asked to report their behavioral intentionson three items (adapted from Keller, 2006), M = 4.74, SD = 1.76; α = .91, anchored at‘not at all likely (1),’ and ‘very likely (9).’ The items read: ‘I intend to use this product/service’; ‘I intend to buy this product/service’; ‘I intend to get more information on theadvantages of this product/service.’ Next, participants’ political identity was measuredwith the same scale used in Study 1 (M = 4.74, SD = 2.78). The message content did notaffect participants’ responses to the political identity item, Mequality = 5.01, SD = 3.01,Mhierarchy = 4.47, SD = 2.51; F (1, 259) = 2.50, p = .12. Finally, participants provideddemographic information and were thanked and debriefed.

Results and discussion

Following the recommendations of Aiken, West, and Reno (1991), we ran a regressionanalysis with behavioral intentions as the dependent variable and mean-centeredpolitical identity, message content (0 = equality, 1 = hierarchy), and their interaction

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as predictors. This analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of message content,such that participants reported more favorable behavioral intentions in the equalityrather than hierarchy conditions, b = –.37, SE = .22, t = −1.71, p = .09, and anonsignificant effect of political identity, b = –.05, SE = .05, t = −1.00, p = .32. Mostimportantly, as shown in Figure 2, we found a significant interaction, b = .16, SE = .08,t = 2.02, p = .04. Simple slope analyses revealed that compared to liberals, conservativeshad marginally more favorable behavioral intentions toward the messages referencinghierarchy, b = .11, SE = .06, t = 1.79, p = .07, but did not show any differences towardthe messages referencing equality, b = –.05, SE = .05, t = −1.00, p = .32. From a differentperspective, the spotlight analysis revealed that liberals (−1 SD; lower than 1.96)displayed more favorable behavioral intentions when the message emphasized equalityrather than hierarchy, b = –.81, SE = .31, t = −2.66, p = .008. Interestingly, as in Study 1,conservatives (+ 1 SD; higher than 7.52) showed no difference across conditions,b = .07, SE = .31, t = .24, p = .81.

The results from Study 2 conceptually replicated those from Study 1, such that amatch between the political identity and message content led to greater persuasion.Specifically, liberals showed more favorable intentions when they received an equalityrather than hierarchy message, whereas conservatives showed no difference acrossconditions. Indeed, the results suggest a stronger association between liberals andpreference for equality as compared to the link between conservatives and preferencefor hierarchy. Viewed differently, although conservatives did not significantly prefer ahierarchical message over an equality message, they appear to be more tolerant ofhierarchy than are liberals, replicating the patterns shown in Study 1. Study 2 revealsthat this difference has implications for persuasion.

Study 3

In Study 3, we assess moderation by identity salience. That is, we examine whether theeffects observed in Study 2 are amplified under conditions in which one’s politicalidentity is made especially salient. In this study, we primed the salience of politicalidentity by making one’s party identification salient. We measured partisanship of

Figure 2. Behavioral intentions as a function of political identity and message content in Study 2.

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voting instead of political identity in this study for two reasons: (1) to establish that thepredicted results are not contingent upon our use of a particular political identity scale,and (2) because the manipulation of political identity salience that we used in this studyis more related to one’s party preference than to how one evaluates one’s generalpolitical orientation.

Material and methods

One hundred sixty-seven undergraduate students (67.1% males, Mage = 20.49) at a large U.S. University participated in the study for course credit. Participants were randomlyassigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (identity-salience: salient vs. control) × 2 (messagecontent: equality vs. hierarchy) between-participants design.

At the outset of the study, participants were randomly assigned to either a controlcondition in which political identity was not made salient or an experimental condition inwhich political identity was made salient. To do so, we manipulated the salience of partyidentification. This manipulation was adapted from previous literature (Shih, Pittinsky, &Ambady, 1999). In the control condition, participants were asked questions unrelated toparty identification such as ‘Please list five reasons for and/or against subscribing to cable.Don’t think too hard about these; just tell us whatever comes to mind first.’ Participantsin the salient condition answered questions related to their party identification such as‘Please list five words/brief phrases that you associate with the political party that yousupport. Don’t think too hard about these; just tell us whatever comes to mind.’

After this task, participants were randomly assigned to an equality or a hierarchymessage condition. This manipulation was identical to that employed in Study 2.Following the message, participants were asked to report behavioral intentions on thesame three items as in Study 2 (M = 4.58, SD = 1.61, α = .92). Next, partisanship ofvoting was measured with a single item (‘In general, who do you usually vote for innational elections?’ 1 = almost always the democrat, 7 = almost always the republican;M = 3.98, SD = 1.71; Kugler et al., 2014). The message content did not affectparticipants’ responses to the partisanship of voting item, Mhierarchy = 4.01,SD = 1.77, Mequality = 3.95, SD = 1.67; F (1, 165) = .05, p = .82. Finally, participantsprovided demographic information and were thanked and debriefed

Results and discussion

We regressed intentions on identity-salience (0 = control, 1 = salient), message content(0 = equality, 1 = hierarchy), mean-centered partisanship of voting, and all possibleinteractions among these variables (Hayes 2013; Process Model 3, BootstrapSamples = 5,000). This analysis revealed that participants reported significantly morefavorable intentions in the equality (vs. hierarchy) condition, b = –.88, SE = .33,t = −2.66, p = .009, and marginally significantly less favorable intentions in the salient(vs. not salient) condition, b = –.61, SE = .32, t = −1.88, p = .06. Partisanship, however,did not predict intentions at the main effect level, b = –.16, SE = .15, t = −1.09, p = .28.Importantly, we found a marginally significant interaction between partisanship andmessage content, b = .38, SE = .20, t = 1.93, p = .05. In addition, we found a marginallysignificant three-way interaction, b = .47, SE = .27, t = 1.71, p = .09 (all other

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interactions were nonsignificant, ps > .3). The three-way interaction revealed that theinteraction between partisanship and message framing was greater in the identitysalient, b = .85, SE = .19, t = 4.40, p < .001, rather than control, b = .38, SE = .20,t = 1.93, p = .05, condition.

We next examined the results separately in the control and identity salient conditions.In the control condition, spotlight analyses revealed that liberals (−1 SD; lower than 1.96)had more favorable intentions in the equality (vs. hierarchy) condition, b = −1.64,SE = .46, t = −3.59, p < .001. Again, conservatives (+ 1 SD; higher than 5.32), showedno difference, b = –.37, SE = .46, t = –.81, p = .42. This pattern replicated the findingsfrom Study 2. In the identity salient condition, liberals (– 1 SD; lower than 2.63) againexhibited more favorable intentions in the equality (vs. hierarchy) condition, b = −1.93,SE = .46, t = −4.17, p < .001. Interestingly, though, conservatives (+ 1 SD; higher than6.01) now showed marginally more favorable intentions in the hierarchy (vs. equality)condition, b = .93, SE = .46, t = 2.02, p = .05, consistent with the notion that makingconservative identity salient can induce a preference for hierarchy over equality, perhapsin line with the value of respecting authority (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Ho et al., 2012; Jostet al., 2008; Rai & Fiske, 2011).

We also decomposed the three-way interaction in terms of the equality andhierarchy conditions. In the equality condition, identity salience (relative to control)had a negative effect on intentions among conservatives (+ 1 SD; higher than 5.62),b = –.93, SE = .43, t = −2.16, p = .03, but no effect among liberals (– 1 SD; lowerthan 2.28), b = –.29, SE = .42, t = –.68, p = .50. This finding is consistent with theidea that conservatives’ respect for authority, and thus hierarchy, can foster a distastefor equality when their conservative identity is salient. In the hierarchy condition,there was a marginally significant negative effect of salience among liberals (– 1 SD;lower than 2.24), b = −1.01, SE = .52, t = −1.94, p = .06, but no effect amongconservatives (+ 1 SD; higher than 5.78), b = –.03, SE = .51, t = –.05, p = .96. Thisresult suggests that liberals’ aversion to hierarchy is amplified when their identity ismade salient.

In sum, the results of Study 3 replicate and extend the findings from Study 2whereby a match between the partisanship and message content led to greaterpersuasion. Here, we found that the effect becomes even stronger when one’spolitical identity is salient. Furthermore, unlike Studies 1 and 2, in which conserva-tives showed no general preference for equality or hierarchy, Study 3 revealed thatmaking political identity salient resulted in an outright preference for hierarchyamong conservatives. One interesting result from Study 3 is that identity saliencedid not enhance people’s reactions to the message that was consistent with theirpartisanship of voting, but rather undermined their reactions to the message that wasinconsistent with that partisanship. That is, salience appeared to amplify liberals’ andconservatives’ aversion to hierarchy and equality, respectively. Although we did notexplicitly predict this outcome, it suggests that polarized political identities maybreed stronger resistance to opposing messages rather than greater preferences forsupportive messages. Lastly, these results show that our findings are robust usingdifferent measures related to identity.

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General discussion

This research explores the implications of political identity for preference and persua-sion. We found that political identity can shape preference for options with relativelygreater equality or hierarchy, and that it can moderate people’s responses to persuasivemessages framed in terms of equality versus hierarchy. Our studies thus underscore theimportance of considering political identity in research on persuasion and decisionmaking more generally, and offer an initial step toward understanding what the role ofpolitical identity might be in these contexts.

The current research contributes to the existing literature on the effect of politicalidentity on behavior by identifying a key value – preference for equality over hierarchy– that shapes individuals’ preferences and responses to persuasive messages. Pastresearch has shown that political identity can be an important determinant of persua-sive outcomes. For example, Nelson and Garst (2005) found that individuals were morepersuaded by messages whose sources shared the same political orientation. Morerecently, Feinberg and Willer (2015) demonstrated that matching messages to thepolitical values of message recipients enhances persuasion. In the marketing literature,Winterich et al. (2012) demonstrated that when the moral foundations of a charity,expressed in the charity’s management processes or mission, match with a donor’spolitical identity, donation increases. Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty (2013) found thata match between moral foundations embedded in individuals’ political identity and thepersuasive appeals they receive promoted recycling behaviors in response to thoseappeals. However, scant research has looked at how specific political values – forexample, preference for equality versus hierarchy – influences preference formationand persuasive outcomes. Thus, the present research enriches the literature on politicalidentity, preference, and persuasion by identifying new values that can play an impor-tant role in these domains.

Furthermore, the current studies add nuance to this literature in finding that con-servative individuals do not explicitly prefer options that endorse hierarchy or messagesdescribed in hierarchy terms. This constitutes a departure from previous research,which has shown that conservatives are prone to prefer hierarchy over equality (e.g.Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001;Wilson, 1973). It could be that conservatives’ seeming indifference to equality versushierarchy reflects a combination of their older, more implicit favorable attitudes towardhierarchy and their newly learned responses that are intended to be more egalitarian innature (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; see also Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler,2000). Alternatively, perhaps liberals (compared to conservatives) were processing theinformation presented in the stimuli in a more systematic fashion or were moreinvolved with the message, thereby showing greater sensitivity to the framing manip-ulations. We did not empirically test these possibilities in the current studies, but itwarrants attention in future work.

Additionally, this research suggests that political identity may be more sensitive tovalue-inconsistent messages. Indeed, under identity salience conditions in Study 3,we observed a relatively stronger aversion to values associated with the opposingidentity rather than preference for values associated with one’s own identity.Consistent with this finding, some previous literature suggests that social identity

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salience can promote aversion rather than preference (Benjamin, Choi, & Strickland,2010). For instance, Asian-American identity is presumed to involve a norm for riskaversion. Benjamin, James, and Strickland (2010) fond that when Asian identity wasmade salient (vs. not salient), Asian-Americans showed stronger aversion to risk butdid not show a stronger preference for safe options. Other work seems to demon-strate that the salience of political identity increases preference for value-consistentoptions while not affecting preference for value-inconsistent options (e.g. Mortonet al., 2007). Thus, there is some inconsistency in the literature around this issue.Although not central to the current concerns, these asymmetries would be worthexploring more deeply in future work.

Finally, although we demonstrate these findings across multiple measures of identity,future research is needed to identify both similarities and differences in effects relatingto distinct measures of political identity. For instance, previous research has shown thatpolitical identity and related constructs like Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) areoften strongly correlated (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), although this may not alwaysbe the case. Future research examining how activation of varying forms and sources ofpolitical identity impact judgment and behavior would expand our understanding ofpotentially unique roles of political ideology, partisanship, and their core psychologicalfoundations (such as SDO and authoritarianism) in shaping people’s responses topersuasive messages.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Blakeley B. McShane for helpful guidance on key analyses. Allcorrespondence should be directed toward the first author.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Appendix A Frequent Flyer Programs in Study 1

Airline A Airline B

Membership tiers Miles accumulated Membership tiers Miles accumulated

Tier #1 Over 25,000 Tier #1 Over 25,000Tier #2 Over 50,000 Tier #2 Over 50,000Tier #3 Over 100,000 Tier #3 Over 100,000Tier #4 Over 1,000,000 Tier #4 Over 200,000Tier #5 Over 2,000,000 Tier #5 Over 500,000

Tier #6 Over 1,000,000Tier #7 Over 1,500,000Tier #8 Over 2,000,000

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Appendix B. Messages Used in Studies 2–3.

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