POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN KOSOvO - Amsterdam Social …socialscience.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Volume-3-Issue-1... · POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN KOSOvO ... In Kosovo, segmen-tal

21

Steffen Eckhard graduated in 2007 with a BA in Political and Administrative Science from the University of Konstanz, where he is currently completing his graduate studies in ‘Public Adminis-tration and Conflict Management’. Since 2008, he has been a member of the Research Group ‘Conflict Generators’ at the Centre of Excellency in Konstanz. During 2009, he undertook two field trips to Kosovo to gather data for his MA thesis. As a postgraduate, Steffen Eckhard aims to continue his scientific career as a PhD student in international public administrations.

Steffen Eckhard

LESSONS FROM CONFRONTING INSTITuTIONAL ThEORy AND

PRACTICE

POLITICAL ENGINEERINGIN KOSOvO

Contemporary Kosovo is a post-conflict society. As such, most of the country’s current problems - be they economic, social, or political in na-ture - can be traced back to the Serb-Albanian conflict that arose during the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. It eventually erupted into the Kosovo war in the late 1990s before the NATO-led military intervention in 1999 compelled the Serbian army and adminis-tration to retreat from the territory. In 1999, as a medium-term solution to the emerging vacuum of governance, the United Nations Security Council deployed a transitional administration mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) in or-der to install “provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (S/RES/1244: para. 10). The population of Kosovo consists of several ethnic communities, including the former warring parties: Albanians (88%), Serbs (7%), and others (5%).i Their violent past constitutes the primary challenge for the emerging society and the building of democratic institutions.

The central focus of this paper is already referred to in the above-cited resolution 1244: an association between political institutions and societal

AMSTERDAM SOCIAL SCIENCE

22

i ‘Others’ consist out of the following ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Turks, Ashkali, and Egyptians. The figures are estimates since the last official census dates back to the pre-war period.

peace within a country. Scientific and practical approaches in this context came to be known under the term ‘political engineering’. This strand of literature draws on an instrumental understanding of political institu-tions. Depending on the socio-political environment, certain respectively adapted settings of political institutions can foster inter-group cooperation and minimise the risk of civil conflict, even encouraging reconciliation after violent conflicts. However, the link between societal environment, politi-cal institutions, and long-term peace and stability is built upon a complex causal chain, and researchers have come to different conclusions concern-ing exactly which political institutions foster societal peace.

In this paper, I will draw upon two such approaches to political engineer-ing: consociationalism, which harkens back to Arend Lijphart (1977, 1984, 1995, 1999) and centripetalism as suggested by Sisk (1993, 1995, 1996) and Reilly (1997a, 1997b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006). The approaches can be differentiated by their proposition of ethnic group separation or inclu-sion, respectively. Thus, political institutions in the first case are designed to provide maximum political freedom to each segment of society, whereby admittedly the ethnic reality is cemented into the political system. In con-trast, centripetalism seeks to reduce the salience of divisions by avoiding an ethnically branded political system. It is hoped that such a design will help avoid ethnicity as a potential source of conflict and foster inter-group cooperation.

After introducing the case and the actors involved in political engineer-ing in the UN protectorate Kosovo, and presenting and delimiting the two theoretical perspectives, two phases of political engineering are identified and analysed. The first phase refers to provisions made by UNMIK between 1999 and 2008, the second to the Ahtisaari Plan that accompanied the uni-lateral declaration of independence in 2008. Based on the analysis, I will show that the contemporary political system in Kosovo neatly fits the con-sociationalist approach. However, drawing on the centripetalist position, I will argue that the current approach is misleading with respect to the long-

23

Political Engineering in Kosovo

ii The SFRY existed until 1992 when it was resolved and succeeded by the Federal Republic of Yu-goslavia (FRY). The FRY again ceased to exist in 2003, succeeded by the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006 the two entities split up, the Republic of Serbia remaining today as the legal successor of the SFRY.

term goal of societal peace and stability. Last, taking into consideration international short-term political demands, I will also argue that the in-ternational community, at the latest with the Ahtisaari Plan, left the path of theory-based engineering. As a consequence, the current development renders further institutional changes fostering long-term societal recon-ciliation highly unlikely.

THE STATUS QUESTION AND THE AHTISAARI PLAN

In June 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to construct an interim administration pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244). It consisted of four pillars: the United Nations (UN) was responsible for civil administration and the rule of law (Pillar I and II), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for democratisation and institution building (Pillar III), and the European Union (EU) for eco-nomic reconstruction (Pillar IV). Even though UNMIK was authorised to exert all legislative, executive and judicial power in Kosovo for a tran-sitional period, the status of the territory was not altered by the resolu-tion – Kosovo remained part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)ii, while the status question was subjected to a political process in-tended to result in a political settlement (S/RES/1244: para. 11). Thus, be-tween 1999 and 2008 UNMIK fulfilled its task of transitional administra-tion and governance. In 2001, Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were established under a Constitutional Framework, subsequently bringing about the gradual transfer of responsibilities and powers to local actors in administrative and governmental institutions. Throughout this process, the OSCE was responsible for designing these democratic political institutions and the system itself.


24

iii Both are staffed and financed by the international steering group (ISG), a group of countries that initially backed Kosovo’s declaration of independence. As members of the ISG, the Comprehensive Proposal Settlement lists: France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Europe-an Union, European Commission, and NATO. The international civilian supervision is especially focused on critical areas, such as community relations. It has the power to overrule any legislation or executive act that violates the provisions of the Settlement (ibid. para. 2).

Meanwhile, the UNSC was not able to issue any further resolution on Kosovo’s status question, paralyzed by the veto-power of some permanent members, most often Russia. This set Kosovo in a ‘state of limbo’ (cp. Ches-terman 2001; Yannis 2001); the Kosovars demanding further status conces-sions while UNMIK was unable to gain authorisation to initiate a political process.

However, in 2005 Martti Ahtisaari was appointed Special Envoy to the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status. In his 2007 report, he made clear that UNMIK had done what it could but that the “uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic devel-opment, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation” (S/2007/168: para. 4). However, he was unable to negotiate a solution based on mutual agreement by the Serbian and Kosovar party, the first demand-ing Kosovo’s autonomy within the Republic of Serbia, the latter accepting nothing short of independence. On the international level, the UNSC fur-ther proved incapable of reaching an agreement, and Kosovo, backed by its international supporters, unilaterally declared its independence in Febru-ary 2008. Doing so, the country committed to fully implement the “Com-prehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CP)” (S/2007/168/Add.1) into its constitution, remaining for an initial period under interna-tional supervision, performed by the International Civilian Representative (ICR) and his office (ICO)iii. The CP, also referred to as the Ahtisaari-Plan, reads like a constitution, providing for all aspects of a functioning democ-racy. This includes the particular design of system and the horizontal and vertical distribution of political power.

As Ahtisaari himself puts it, the CP is designed to provide the founda-tions of a Kosovo “that is viable, sustainable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence” (S/2007/168:

25


iv Since not all of these measures are yet adopted into Kosovo law, I will rely on the Ahtisaari-Plan’s wording for the analysis in chapter 4, instead of analysing respective Kosovo legislation.

para. 5). Thus, it seeks to provide institutional mechanisms that are in-tended to foster peaceful societal co-existence, especially with respect to Kosovo’s inter-ethnic violent past. It does so by defining specific representa-tion features for key institutions, specific voting procedures in parliament if legislation is related to minority issues, and by transferring a high degree of political authority to communities in areas of their exclusive concern. Partly, these features have been adopted from those institutions developed by the OSCE within the scope of PISG since 2001; partly new measures have been designed, especially concerning the CP’s provisions on decen-tralisation and protection of minority rights. A more detailed discussion on these measures is provided below.

For the moment, these examples serve to illustrate that Kosovo’s insti-tutional framework is actually the work of political engineers. Regardless of whether the designer was the OSCE or Ahtisaari’s team, Kosovo’s po-litical institutions intend to “foster good governance at the central and lo-cal levels” and to “stimulate civic participation and reconciliation” (OSCE 2005: 1). Therefore, the designers implicitly relied on causal mechanisms and theoretical expectations that guided them in their institutional choice – the CP representing the final document assembling all Kosovo related at-tempts of political engineering. The following section shall serve to clarify these theoretical expectations. Two partly competing approaches to politi-cal engineeringv are presented, illuminating the theoretical realm of inter-action between state structure, political institutions and deeply divided societies.

THEORIES OF POLITICAL ENGINEERING

Literature on conflict resolutions argues that structural initiatives and institutional change can be the means of resolving societal conflict. Hence, “innovations or alterations in systems of governance and societal struc-tures (...) are the tools of the structural approach” (Bloomfield 1997: 24).


26

v His work relies on the classics of (rational-choice) institutionalism in this realm: Downs (1957) and Cox (1990).

The structural approach constitutes the core of the literature on political engineering (e.g. Norris 2004; Zittel 2007): an instrumental understanding of political institutions which can be adapted to societal conditions and can have an effect on the coexistence of communities in a society. ‘Societal conditions’ in post-conflict states often refers to plural or heterogeneous societies. They are divided by ‘segmental cleavages’, which “follow very closely, and especially concern lines of objective social dif-ferentiation, especially those particularly salient in a society” (Eckstein 1966: 34). In Kosovo, segmen-tal cleavages are constituted by ethnicity. In other countries they might be of racial, cultural, region-al, linguistic, ideological, or religious nature.

Scholars of political engineering in divided societies assess the function-ing of political institutions through the possible outbreak of violent con-flicts in a society: the absence of conflict is treated as a necessary condition for the functioning of democracy. In their quantitative comparative analy-sis on determinants of civil conflict, Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Fish and Kroening (2006) were able to show that socio-political tensions deriving from segmental cleavages in divided societies fall short as a sole explana-tion for the failure of democracy. Thus, there must be other explanations why some of these countries manage to avoid domestic conflict. Building upon this point, Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) have shown that some political institutions, such as proportional representation, significantly re-duce the risk of conflict in heterogeneous countries. Consequently, state institutions can be considered to intervene in the causal chain of divided societies and the outbreak of civil conflict.

Assessing this point on the micro-level, Norris (2004: 3-25) reaches clari-fication on how individual and political actor behavior can be influenced by political institutionsv. Building upon the assumptions of rational-choice

Socio-political

tensions deriving

from segmental

cleavages in divided

societies fall short

as a sole explana-

tion for the failure

of democracy.

27


vi Consociationalism at large equals what Lijphart calls “consensus democracy” in his later book “Patterns of Democracy” (1999). While in his earlier book Lijphart emphasizes consociationalism as a solution for plural states where the system of traditional majoritarian democracy might not work, he presents his modified version of “consensus democracy” as the superior system of govern-ance in any state. Here, the term consociationalism is used to emphasize his earlier work on this kind of democracy as a means to solve problems arising in plural societies.

institutionalism, he shows that the choice of the electoral system, the type of the ballot structure, the presence of quotas and thresholds, and other in-struments, influence the strategy adopted by individual political actors in order to maximise their political support – which eventually is the number of votes gained in an election. For example, proportional representation (PR) systems allow for political actors to adopt voter-bonding strategies, which concentrate on issues dispersed throughout the ideological system. In contrast, majoritarian systems set higher electoral hurdles, forcing vote seekers’ need to concentrate on the most salient issues in society. In het-erogeneous countries such as Kosovo, the most salient issue coincides with ethnic identity. Thus, PR systems foster cooperation and mutual under-standing for two reasons: first, attention is distracted from the cleavages, and second, broad-based coalitions are necessary for a governmental ma-jority. I will further draw on the micro processes below, when presenting next the two main perspectives of political engineering, both relying on the multiple party PR system.

The major difference between the consociationalist system, as promot-ed by Arend Lijphart (1977, 1984, 1995, 1999) and the centripetalist system which harkens back to Sisk (1993, 1995, 1996) and Reilly (1997a, 1997b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006), is that the design of political institutions in the first case is intended to provide maximum political freedom to each seg-ment of society, thereby institutionalising the ethnic reality. Whereas in the latter case, institutions are designed to reduce the salience of divisions in order to minimise their potential as a source of inter-ethnic conflict.

CONSOCIATIONALISM

The theoretical framework of consociationalism as a distinct form of


28

democracy in plural societies goes back to its primary advocate Arend Li-jphart (1977) and his book “Democracy in Plural Societies”vi. Consociation-alism was originally presented as consisting of two aspects: the condition of a plural society with segmental cleavages, and the aspired cooperation of the respective segmental elites through consociational structures. Put dif-ferently, the approach embeds ethnic reality, in terms of the structure of a given ethnic division, into the political system. This underlying idea is crucial since it constitutes the distinguishing element with the alternative approach presented below.

In his profound comparative analysis of four divided European states (Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands), Lijphart, after ruling out other societal explanations, identified the design of their political sys-tems as the sole explanation for the lasting peaceful co-existence of their societal groups. He specified four defining characteristics, together consti-tuting what he labelled “consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1977: 25ff.):

1. The “grand coalition” characteristic captures the idea that parlia-ments do not only form a “minimum winning coalition” – the coalition holding the minimum number of seats necessary to constitute a major-ity in parliament – but rather create coalitions that include additional segment-representing parties in the cabinet (ibid. 25-36). However, the presumption is that a high degree of organisation of segmental cleav-ages, and thus, a consequently segmental party system exist.

2. The “mutual veto” refers to the ability of all societal groups to block decision processes in the assembly (negative minority rule). Lijphart ar-gues that such a feature is not going to lead to a “minority tyranny” since the segments anticipate the danger of a deadlock resulting from unrestrained use of the veto (ibid. 36-38).

3. The claimed “principle of proportionality” refers not only to the pro-portional conversion of votes into seats in parliament (election system), but also to the allocation of civil service appointments and financial resources. Lijphart advocates proportionality in sharp contrast to the “winner-take-all principle of unrestrained majority rule” ensuring a ba-sis for political decisions according to the proportional segmentation of society (ibid. 38-41).

29


vii The idea of transferring particular powers on the basis of an asymmetric decentralisation model has also been called “functional government”, meaning that sub-state units do not necessarily need to be territorial and that governance can also operate on the basis of a functional premise of control (cf. Stroschein, 2008). An example is the non-territorial federalism practiced in Belgium with regard to linguistic and religious-ideological communities (cf. Lijphart 1977: 41-47).viii It is important to note that the territorial structure of an election system’s setup does not neces-sarily have to coincide with the territorial structure of administration or with the distribution of political power in a state. However, in most countries, such as Germany, they do.x For further reading on the critics of consociationalism, see Andeweg (2000).

4. Last, a high degree of segmental authority by means of “federal-ism” implies that segments should rule themselves in the area of re-spective minorities’ exclusive concern (especially religion, culture and education). Other matters of common interest should be decided by all segments together, following the principle of proportionality (ibid. 41-47).vii

Some clarifying remarks on federalism and proportionality are neces-sary. First, the process of transferring power from central governments to local communities is captured by the term “decentralisation”. For analyti-cal reasons, it will be necessary to further subdivide the term into territorial and functional decentralisation, capturing the structure of local units and the transfer of governmental functions to them, respectively. If the setup of units follows ethnic boundaries (e.g. by rearranging municipal territories in order to obtain homogenous entities) as claimed by consociationalist theory, this process will hereafter be denoted ‘ethnic decentralisation’, or for the result ‘ethnic federalism’.

Second, an electoral system is highly complex and it is not sufficient to classify it according to the allocation rule. Its main effects also flow from two other attributes: the district magnitude and the ballot structure. The first, according to Lijphart, is crucial since it directly influences the number of parties in the political system. While Duverger (1959) has shown that PR systems always coincide with a multi-party system, Lijphart adds that the average district magnitude (M) influences the effective number of parties. His point is that the “electoral system may be manipulated in an attempt to (…) ensure the expression of all the major cleavages in society through sepa-


30

ix For further reading on the critics of consociationalism, see Andeweg (2000).

rate political parties”. Furthermore, if “more parties are to be given repre-sentation or perfect PR is to be approximated, M must be greater” (Lijphart 1984: 113-114). In effect this means that the most proportional result is achieved in a single countywide constituency.viii

The consociational approach faces severe critics. First, it has been ar-gued that proportionality and the minority veto are undemocratic because votes are not weighted equally. Furthermore, the approach assumes that the societal segmentation is based on a territorial segmentation and it does not go into detail concerning the function of divisions (bi- or multipolar, equal size or minority segments). Last, Lijphart’s case for consociational-ism is based on an analysis of European societies with rather long demo-cratic traditions and does not necessarily hold for societies with an endur-ing history of ethnic conflict and discrimination (Sisk, 1996; Reilly 2002a, 2006).ix

CENTRIPETALISM

The second approach introduced here has been labelled ‘centripetal-ism’. The term was first used by Sisk (1995), covering a design of political institutions which encourages cooperation of societal segments and cen-trist policies, countering extremism and conflict behaviour. It focuses on the electoral system as the chief agent of inter-segmental complaisance be-cause of the incentives preferential election systems provide (Reilly 2002a, 2006; Reilly and Reynolds 1999). Its central mechanism, as proposed by Horowitz (1985, 1990), rests upon the need “to make politicians recipro-cally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own” (Horowitz 1990: 471). Thus, centripetalism, as opposed to consociational-ism, attempts not to cement the given segmental reality within a state into its political system but seeks to create mutual dependency among societal segments and a state structure that does not follow conflicting lines.

This effect theoretically is achieved by electoral rules such as ‘vote-pooling’ or ‘preference swapping’, which create incentives for politicians to

31


x The AV system is majoritarian, thus, as argued above, it is not appropriate for post-conflict sce-narios and is only listed here for the sake of completeness.

campaign for the votes of members of rival segmental groups. Preferential electoral systems such as the alternative vote (AV, majoritarianx) or the sin-gle transferable vote (STV, proportional) require voters to declare not only their first choice of candidate on a ballot, but also their second, third, and subsequent choice from all candidates standing (cp. Reilly 2002a). Under the assumption that they are rational actors who will do what is needed to win the election, this feature presents politicians who intend to maxi-mize their electoral prospects with strong incentives to attract the second preferences of voters from the other group(s). The effect is not only inter-segmental cooperation but also accommodative behavior of political ac-tors and a shift of policies towards a moderate centre of a deeply divided political spectrum, rather than towards extremist positions (Reilly 2002a; Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Sisk 1993). One constraint, however, is that this system will only provide incentives for inter-ethnic accommodation if con-stituencies are sufficiently heterogeneous and are not made up of one large dominating fraction. Hence, depending on the geographical distribution and size of communities in a country, vote-pooling might be more useful of the municipal or regional level.

In deeply divided societies, parties tend to form around segmental lines for the same reasons that attract politicians to campaign exclusively along cleavages – issue salience and easy mobilisation of the electorate. Thus, re-searchers have consistently advocated the need for broad multi-segmental parties as a key factor in managing segmental conflict (Horowitz 1991). In this respect, the extent to which political parties are capable of conflict moderation depends on their level of institutionalisation. This level con-sists of the depth of parties’ roots in society, their internal organisation, the regularity of party competition, and the extent to which parties are widely accepted as the means of determining who governs (Reilly 2003: 6-8). In their analysis, Gunther and Diamond found that ethnic parties tend to have low levels of ideological coherence and programmatic commitment, lack a well-developed organisational structure and membership base, and depend on segment mobilisation for their electoral success (ibid. 2001: 23-


32

xi In several (comparative) case studies, Reilly has identified examples of centripetalist constitu-tional designs. The vote-pooling election system is argued to have contributed to rather peaceful in-ter-ethnic behavior in the cases of Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. Addition-ally, Australia has successfully applied the vote-pooling electoral system at varying levels for ap-proximately 150 years (cp. Reilly 1997b, 2006).

24). Thus, the “development of centrist, aggregative, and multi-ethnic polit-ical parties or coalitions of parties that are capable of making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of policy options to the electorate” (Reilly 2006: 816) is the focus of centripetalist theory.xi

Last, centripetalism also takes another stance towards the persuasive consociationalist feature of ethnic federalism that allows communities to govern themselves in areas of their exclusive concern. Centripetalism also argues for federalism as a means of proliferating political power. However, in order to reduce the salience of ethnicity, devolution must particularly avoid ethnic boundaries (Reilly 2006: 816).

POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN KOSOVO

Political engineering in Kosovo can be distinguished according to two phases. Preceding the UN protectorate, a decent democratic political cul-ture was not present. After the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status within the FRY in 1989, the majority of Kosovo-Albanians were excluded from both public administration and political power and organized them-selves in underground parallel structures. After the NATO intervention the situation reversed, the former majority now being in the minority. Thus, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was assigned the difficult task of set-ting up an institutional system to meet these societal requirements. The first part of this section deals with provisions that were designed under the direction of OMIK in the frame of PISG – the election system and the party system. Both have, almost without changes, been adopted into the 2008 constitution.

The preceding period to Kosovo’s independence constitutes the second phase. As becomes evident in documents related to the constitutional pro-

33


cess, there was an agreement that the design of institutions related to de-centralisation and minority protection was exclusively dealt with within the status negotiations in Vienna (OSCE 2006: 7). Hence, the second part focuses on those institutional features that have been added to the institu-tional framework only recently, designed by Ahtisaari’s team in the context of the status negotiations – minority related decentralisation and protec-tion features.

In an initial attempt to ensure local ownership of institution building in Kosovo, UNMIK created a Central Election Commission (CEC) in 2000 to lay down the rules of governing elections (UNMIK/REG/2000/21). It was deliberately designed as a technical, regulatory body and was shielded from political interference (Everts 2001: 247). However, Taylor reports se-vere attempts of local political lobbying; the major Kosovar political par-ties LDK and PDK attempting to assert a majoritarian system that would have squeezed out minor parties (ibid. 2005: 443). Yet, as Daan Everts, then head of OMIK, puts it, the major recommendations for the PISG electoral institutions eventually originated solely with OMIK, acting through the CEC. Thus, he reports, the PR system was adopted for national elections, explicitly “to encourage a more moderate political climate; to prevent the formation of a bi-polar political reality; and to assure small and minority parties (a chance) of achieving some representation without needing a large share of the vote” (ibid. 2001: footnote 28). Furthermore, the non-Albanian minorities, although they were not granted veto powers, were given 20 set-aside seats out of 120 in the Assembly (on top of the seats they can win in an election) to ensure their representation.

In terms of district magnitude, two basic possibilities were discussed: a single district system (Kosovo-wide constituency) and a mix between a national district and municipal constituencies (parallel-system). For its de-centralising feature and the close bonds between voter and constituency delegate, the latter system was preferred by the Albanian political parties (ICG 2002: 5). However, since it is also administratively complex and prone to errors in post-conflict societies, OMIK opted for the alternative single district solution that was subsequently implemented (Taylor 2005: 449). This option was intended to nurture the evolution of a multi-party system that allowed for proportional representation of all societal communities in


34

xii Two of the new municipalities were inhabited by a majority of Serbs (Gracanica and Partesh), two predominantly by Albanians (Hani i Elezit and Junik) and one by Turks (Mamusa).xiii The municipality names are according to Albanian spelling. A complete list of all municipalities in Albanian and Serb spelling, as well as reference to territorial changes is provided in Annex I.XV According to an interview with an official from the ICO in Pristina, Kosovo, on December 07, 2009.

the Assembly.

State power in democracies can principally be concentrated with the central government or can be dispersed throughout the territory, subject to locally elected representatives according to the principle of subsidiarity (cp. the European Charter of Self-Government, in: Council of Europe 1985). De-pending on the size of a country, several intermediate levels are possible. In Kosovo, local autonomy and self-management have historically always been emphasised. Under the SFRY, Kosovo was granted the status of an autono-mous province in 1960. After the forceful abolition of this status in 1989 and the subsequent concerted suppression of the Albanian community, parallel institutions evolved, entailing quasi local-authority. Under UNMIK and the PISG structures, the established local administrative structures have been retained and consolidated, resulting in 5 administrative districts and 30 municipalities. The constitutional framework for the PISG stated that “Kosovo is composed of municipalities, which are the basic territorial units of local self-government with responsibilities as set forth in UNMIK legislation in force on local self-government and municipalities in Kosovo” (UNMIK/REG/2001/9: para 1.3). These responsibilities have initially been rather weak as for practical reasons UNMIK adopted a strong centralised administration. However, under the gradual transfer of competences to lo-cal institutions, the PISG structures have constantly been altered and local self-government has been strengthened under what came to be known as the “decentralisation process” (cp. OSCE 2008: 4). In 2005, UNMIK attempted to advance territorial decentralisation by setting up 5 new pilot municipali-ties within the borders of existing municipalities, thereby reorganising the territorial subdivision (UNMIK/DIR/2005/11).XII However, due to a lack of local cooperation, two of those pilot-municipalities (Gracanica and Partesh; both with a Serb majorityxiii) were not implemented until 2009XV. In terms

35


of functional decentralisation, UNMIK concluded its previous measures by means of Regulation 2007/30, conceding the right to issue legal acts which refer to matters of their exclusive concern at the municipal level.

Summarizing the early efforts made by UN-MIK and OMIK during the PISG structures, the election system, the district magnitude, and the respective party system are modelled according to consociationalist theory. The one district PR system allows for the most proportional conver-sion of votes into the assembly, thus, theoretically fostering segmental cooperation. Furthermore, as shown by the 2007 national elections, in which five political parties gained more than 10 percent of the votes and are present in the Assembly, the multi-party system emerged as predicted (CEC 2007). The distribution of state structure clearly tends towards a strong federalism, although, since not modelled exclusively according to ethnic bor-ders, it is not the strongest form of ethnic federal-ism with respect to consociationalist logic.

However, ethnic federalism has been further advanced in the second phase of political engineering, when Kosovo declared its independence and agreed to the CP’s provisions. Annex III of the CP foresees the creation of five new municipalities (including the two failed municipalities according to UNMIK/DIR/2005/11) and the extension of one already existing (Novo Brdo), raising the final number of municipalities to 38 (cp. Annex II). In the new municipalities, the Serb community would be the majority and enjoy a maximum of local autonomy, including cross-border cooperation with Ser-bia. This major measure of political engineering clearly corresponds with the consociationalist claim of ethnic federalism. However, the CP even goes further. According to Annex V, protective zones are to be erected around 44 Serb cultural and religious heritage sites, prohibiting most activities around these areas, such as agricultural urbanisation; thus, effectively making these areas useless to the members of the Albanian community. Last, the CP foresees measures of minority protection in central and local

In the new municipalities, the

Serb community would be the

majority and enjoy a maximum of local

autonomy, including cross-

border cooperation with Serbia.


36

government institutions. Minorities are guaranteed an over-proportional number of 20 seats in the Assembly (Art. 3.2) and a double-majority voting mechanism requires a majority of the minority representatives to vote in favour of any alteration of a specified set of minority-vital issues (Art. 3.7). This feature also is in line with consociationalism. Although it is no actual veto, the double-majority requirement is a significant aid for safeguarding minority interests.

At the local level, in municipalities where at least 10% of the residents belong to communities not in the majority in that municipality, the post of Vice-President of the municipal assembly is reserved for a member of the minority communities. This position allows for the direct referral of legal cases related to minority discrimination or the like to the constitutional court, without going through the official channels.

In summary, all major political instruments as claimed by Lijphart have at some point been implemented in Kosovo, resulting in full-fledged democratic structures engineered according to consociationalist theory. The cementation of eth-nic realities into the political system is reflected in the distribution of powers between central and local state levels, transferring a maximum of pow-ers to local administration. Furthermore, the ter-ritorial structure of Kosovo’s municipal basic level has been altered in order to ensure that as many minority communities as possible enjoy this au-tonomy. Their individual strength in relation to the Albanian majority is conveyed in the central

representation chamber according to a PR voting system, even exceeding that percentage in guaranteeing 20 seats for minorities. Currently, minori-ties hold 20% of all seats in the assembly (24 out of 120) while only having received 5.4% of all votes (CEC 2007). The double-majority vote required for an alteration or adoption of laws related to community subjects offers suf-ficient protection from future constitutional interference. And last, the cul-tural and religious heritage protection zones further enlarge Serb territorial influence in Kosovo. This last measure even exceeds the features suggested

There are not many

other states where

ethnic minorities

enjoy comparable

constitutional

safeguarding, as

they do in Kosovo

37


xv As one Kosovo-Serb interview partner during a field trip in Kosovo put it: “We used to live to-gether, we know how to live together, but somehow we forgot over night” (Interview with Radio KiM in Pristina, 24 June 2009).xvi Interview with the major of Mitrovica, Kosovo on 25 June 2009.xvii These are Mitrovica North and Partesh; according to a report in the newspaper Koha Ditore that was outlined by UNMIK media monitoring (UNMIK, 16 September 2009).

by consociationalism. Surely one is on the safe side claiming that there are not many other states where ethnic minorities enjoy comparable constitu-tional safeguarding, as they do in Kosovo.

However, on the other side of the coin, there also might not be many more states where ethnicity is emphasised and manifested in the reality of the territorial state structure and power distribution in such a marked way. Since political institutions, especially when protected by double-majorities, are generally quite resistant to change, these measures will continuously re-emphasize the Kosovo’s violent inter-ethnic past for years to come. The same has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the salience of ethnic differences has been maintained by ‘ethnic’ political institutions that on the one hand, cripple the efficient functioning of the state through their mutual blockade potential, and on the other hand continue to “reinforce the very ethnic division that had helped to fuel the conflict” (Caplan 2006: 113). For Kosovo, the same fate seems possible; the current institutional design does not exploit political systems’ long term potential of promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation.

Even worse, the spatial separation of ethnic groups at the local level, currently promoted by the ICO in its endeavour to implement the CP’s decentralization provisions, will deprive communities of their arena of day-to-day interaction and communication. This is precisely the arena where default mechanisms of long term reconciliation apply since individuals, for practical reasons, are eventually forced to cooperate.XV For a Serb in a fully decentralized Kosovo as proposed, there are not going to be many reasons left to enter ‘Albanian territory’.

Furthermore, the intrusive character of external top-down decentraliza-tion evoked significant resistance within Kosovo. For example, two Alba-


38

xviii These are Mitrovica North and Partesh; according to a report in the newspaper Koha Ditore that was outlined by UNMIK media monitoring (UNMIK, 16 September 2009).

nian villages issued a petition in April 2009, expressing a strong opposition to decentralisation (ICG 2009: 24) and an Albanian major condemned the process as bringing along many unpractical and irrational results in munic-ipal reality.XVI In northern Kosovo, the local resistance to decentralisation brought about the postponement of the two new municipalities foreseen in the CP.XVII However, it is not entirely clear to what extent resistance is in line with functional reasons or is connected to the still pending status ques-tion – the Serbs reject it for its origin in the Ahtisaari Plan which in turn is connected to independence, and the Albanians reject it for its autonomous provisions for the Serb communities who repudiate an independent Ko-sovo (ICG 2009: 24 ff.).

CONCLUSION

Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings: the first is based on theoretically rested alternatives to the current proceeding in Kosovo, the second concerns (international) politics and its impact on political engi-neering.

Currently, most political attention in Kosovo is concentrated on the is-sue of international recognition of the country’s independence which di-verts decision-makers’ attention away from societal problems. However, the status question will eventually be solved. Both Kosovo and Serbia strive for membership within the European Union, the latter has only recently sub-mitted its application.xviii Although the EU’s principal presence in Kosovo (the EULEX mission) works under the general framework of resolution 1244, the current development of Kosovo’s institutions links its success inextricably to the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile, Serbia (through Russia) can be considered the main obstacle to a new UNSC resolution on Kosovo’s status and the resolution of UNMIK. Hence, since the EU’s flagship mission is at stake, it seems likely that neither Serbia nor Kosovo will be granted membership while the status question is still pending. Thus, given the political interests of all parties involved, a

39


medium-term solution seems realistic. However, a resolved status question will finally return attention to the whole endeavour’s point of departure: the unresolved societal problem of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo.

For societal reconciliation, ethnic federalism as outlined above is going to be a major obstacle. Thus, implications of centripetalist theory provide the means for a long-term process of social convergence, rather than sepa-ration. Focusing explicitly on the local level, it is argued that a decentraliza-tion process based on a functional (not territorial) premise would retain the heterogeneous nature of municipalities and foster daily interaction. In the absence of the status issue and the presence of emerging policies on local matters (such as in-frastructure investments, etc.), a vote-pooling elec-tion system in heterogeneous municipalities would provide the necessary incentives for politicians and voters to avoid extremist positions, even if this process were to last years. This bottom-up style of convergence does not deny the need of minority protection mechanisms at the central level. Thus, the present PR system and the mechanisms of minority protection in the assembly should be maintained (also bearing in mind the restrictions to vote-pooling related to the size of ethnic groups).

Without being able to provide an in-depth analysis of the outline of a centripetalist political system in Kosovo within the scope of this article, the points outlined above provide a basic understanding of the existence of a few realistic alternatives to the current situation in Kosovo. Alternative po-litical institutions should, contrary to consociationalism, be based on an inclusive logic of institutional aim and foster cooperation rather than divi-sion among ethnic communities. This point is confirmed by other scholars as well. For instance Rothchild (2001: 1ff; 2005) and Roeder and Rothchild (2005) differentiate between phases of short-term security-building and long-term confidence-building in the context of peace agreements and institutional design after civil wars: their logic coincides with consocia-tionalism and centripetalism respectively. Thus, after an initial phase of community separation, the goal of long-term societal reconciliation and

For societal

reconciliation,

ethnic federalism

as outlined above

is going to be a

major obstacle


40

xiv This perception is confirmed by interviews with two UNMIK officials and two USAID consult-ants in Pristina in June and November 2009.xx Interview with members of the grassroots organization ‘Vetevendosje’ in Pristina in June 2009.

peace increasingly requires institutional mechanisms that foster coopera-tion. However, in Kosovo international politics provide a major obstacle to any serious consideration of institutional alternatives, be it based on sound scientific foundations, or not.

This brings me to the second point. Even though OSCE institution building during the PISG can be considered a mainly technical process, taking into consideration scientific insights on how to create a functioning, appropriate political system for the unique Kosovo situation, the status ne-gotiations in Vienna entailing the draft of the CP are far from technical. In fact, their content and implications bear the marks of political bargaining without compromises. Even though the result appears similar to consocia-tionalism, in fact most of the Ahtisaari Plan’s features can be understood in two ways. First, as an attempt to legalize the actual situation in Kosovo as it evolved up to 2007, with Serbian parallel structures and a low acceptance of the central state institutions. And second, as the result of political con-cessions towards the Serb side, reasoning with them to recognize Kosovo’s independence.xiv Overshooting measures, such as the cultural and religious heritage protection zones, amplify anti-Serb societal protest, posing a ma-jor obstacle to both reconciliation and stability and are not in line with either theoretical concept presented here.xx Furthermore, for the interna-tional salience of the Serb position in Kosovo, other minority communities’ concerns have tended to be overlooked. Hence, an examination of the gen-eral picture raises serious doubts whether Kosovo’s current political system can provide long term stability – especially if conceived in isolation from the international military and civil presence.

Summarizing this assessment, as in many other dimensions of the Ko-sovo case, it seems that the open question of Kosovo’s status attracts the lion’s share of political attention that is desperately required elsewhere. Thus, it is only to hope that the prospect of European integration brings a solution to Kosovo’s status, puts an end to this organized hypocrisy and finally allows for functional solutions to practical problems.

41


Annex I: List of municipalities in Kosovo (Albani-an/ Serb name) with references to territorial changes

Annex II: Southeast Kosovo, Map illustrates ter-ritorial changes of municipal boundaries ac-cording to the CP (S/2007/168)


42

REFERENCES

Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. “Consociational democracy.” Annual Review of Political Science 3: 509-536.

Bloomfield, David. 1997. Peacemaking strategies in Northern Ireland building complementarity in conflict management theory. Basingstoke [u.a.]: Macmillan.

Caplan, Richard. 2006. International governance of war-torn territories rule and reconstruction. Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press.

CEC. 2007. “Official Results of the 2007 Kosovo Assembly Elections.” Prishtina: Central Election Commission of Kosovo.

Chesterman, Simon. 2001. Kosovo in Limbo. State-building and “Substantial Autonomy”. New York: International Peace Academy.

Council of Europe (15 October 1985). European Charter on Local Self-Govern-ment. European Treaty Series No. 122.

Cox, Gary W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34(4): 903-935.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper.

Duverger, Maurice. 1959. Die politischen Parteien. Tübingen: Mohr.

Eckstein, Harry. 1966. Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Everts, Dan W. 2001. “The OSCE Mission in Kosovo Two Years into Insti-tution Building.” Helsinki Monitor 12(4): 245-256.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Co-operation.” American Political Science Review 90(3): 715-735.

Fish, M. Steven, and Matthew Kroening. 2006. “Diversity, Conflict and Democracy: Some Evidence from Eurasia and East Europe.” Democratiza-tion 13(5): 828-842.

Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. 2001. “Types and Functions of

43


Parties.” Pp. 3-39 in Political Parties and Democracy, edited by L. Diamond and R. Gunther. Baltimore [u.a.]: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press. ------. 1990. “Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management.” Pp. 451-475 in Conflict and peacemaking in multieth-nic societies, edited by J. V. Montville. New York [u.a.]: Lexington Books. ------. 1991. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press.

ICG 2002. Kosovo: Landmark Elections. Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group. ------. 2007. Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan. Belgrade/Brus-sels: International Crisis Group. ------. 2009. Serb Integration in Kosovo: Taking the Plunge. Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democrarcy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explorata-tion. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. ------. 1984. Democracies patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries (6 ed.). New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press. ------. 1995. “Electoral Systems.” Pp. 412-422 in The Encyclopedia of Democ-racy, edited by S. M. Lipset. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. ------. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral engineering voting rules and political behavior. Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press.

OSCE. 2005. “Factsheet Democratization.” Pristina, Kosovo: Organiza-tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ------. 2006. “Parliamentary and Expert Roundtable on Constitutional Issues, 20.-22.06.2006.” Skopje, Albania: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. ------. 2008. “Relationships between Central and Local Authorities in Kosovo.” Pristina, Kosovo: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.


44

Reilly, Benjamin. 1997a. “The alternative vote and ethnic accommodation: New evidence from Papua New Guinea.” Electoral Studies 16(1): 1-11. ------. 1997b. “Preferential voting and political engineering: A comparative study.” Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 35(1): 1-19. ------. 2002a. “Electoral systems for divided societies.” Journal of Democracy 13(2): 156-170. ------. 2002b. “Social choice in the south seas: Electoral innovation and the Borda count in the Pacific Island countries.” International Political Science Review 23(4): 355-372. ------. 2003. “Political Engineering of Parties and Party Systems.” Paper pre-sented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-tion, August 28 - August 31. ------. 2006. “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies.” Democratization 13(5): 811-827.

Reilly, Benjamin, and Andrew Reynolds. 1999. Electoral systems and conflict in divided societies. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Rothchild, Donald. 2001. Assessing Africa’s Two-Phase Peace Implementation Process: Power Sharing and Democratization. Expanded and revised version of a Chapter in Volume 27 of Africa Contemporary Record. ------. 2005. Reassuring Weaker Parties after Civil Wars: The Benefits and Costs of Executive Power-sharing Systems in Africa. Ethnopolitics 4(3): 247–267.

Roeder, Philip G., and Donald S. Rothchild (eds.). 2005. Sustainable Peace. Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Schneider, Gerald, and Nina Wiesehomeier. 2008. “Rules that matter: Po-litical institutions and the diversity-conflict nexus.” Journal of Peace Research 45(2): 183-203.

Sisk, Timothy D. 1993. “Choosing an electoral system: South Africa seeks new ground rules.” Journal of Democracy 4(1): 79-91. ------. 1995. Democratization in South Africa : the elusive social contract. Princ-eton: Princeton University Press. ------. 1996. Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts. Wash-ington, D.C.: United States Inst. of Peace.

45


Stroschein, Sherrill. 2008. “Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control.” Perspectives on Politics 6(4): 655-674.

Taylor, Andrew. 2005. “Electoral systems and the promotion of ‘conso-ciationalism’ in a multi-ethnic society. The Kosovo Assembly elections of November 2001.” Electoral Studies 24(3): 435-463.

Yannis, Alexandros. 2001. “Kosovo under international administration.” Survival 43(2): 31-48.

Zittel, Thomas. 2007. Participatory democracy and political participation can participatory engineering bring citizens back in? London [u.a.]: Routledge.

UN DOCUMENTS

A/RES/63/3. 8 October 2008. “Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.” New York: United Nations.

S/2007/168. 26 March 2007. “Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.” New York: United Nations.

S/2007/168/Add.1. 26 March 2007. “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.” New York: United Nations.

S/RES/1244. 10 June 1999. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.” New York: United Nations.

UNMIK. 16 September 2009. “Media Monitoring Headlines.” Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK.

UNMIK/DIR/2005/11. 22 July 2005. “On Pilot Projects: Implementing Regulation No. 200/45 On Self-Government of Municipalities in Koso-vo.” Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK

UNMIK/REG/2000/45. 11 August 2000. “On Self-Government of Mu-


46

nicipalities in Kosovo.” Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK.

UNMIK/REG/2001/9. 15 May 2001. “On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.” Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK.

UNMIK/REG/2007/30. 16 October 2007.”Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo.” Pristina, Kosovo: UNMIK.

Documents

POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN KOSOvO - Amsterdam Social …socialscience.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Volume-3-Issue-1... · POLITICAL ENGINEERING IN KOSOvO ... In Kosovo, segmen-tal