Political Appl Flu Social Power

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Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social PowerAuthor(s): Bertram H. RavenSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 493-520Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791662Accessed: 24/06/2009 14:44

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Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1990

Political Applications of the Psychology ofInterpersonal nfluence and Social Power1

Bertram H. Raven2

A Power/Interaction model of interpersonal influence and social power ispresented with particular attention to its applicability to the analysis of con-frontation between major political figures. The analysis follows a series ofsteps, both from the perspective of the influencing agent and the target: First,it examines the motivations to influence and to resist influence, motivationswhich are often much more complex than the immediate extrinsic goals.These, in turn, determine the choices

of influence strategies,the selection

of the bases of power (reward, coercion, legitimate, expert, referent, or in-formation) or more complex strategies, the manner or mode in which thepower is exercised or resisted, and the stage-setting or preparatory devicesto influence or resist influence. The degree and form of compliance are de-termined by all of these factors. Following the influence attempt, successfulor unsuccessful, there is a reassessment of the interpersonal relationship byboth the target and the agent, with the stage set for different strategies ofinfluence and resistance in the next go-round. For illustration, the model isapplied to the analysis of confrontations between Hitler and von Schusch-nigg and between Truman and MacArthur.

KEY WORDS: social power; interpersonal influence; political behavior; interpersonal conflict,dominance.

INTRODUCTION

In the latter part of 1950 there was increasing evidence that U.S. Gener-al, and commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, Douglas MacAr-

'Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the International Society ofPolitical Psychology, Amsterdam, June 1986.

2Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90024.

4930162-895X/90/0900-0493$06.00/1 ? 1990 International Society of Political Psychology



thur, flush with victory in driving the North Korean forces out of SouthKorea, was planning a major American and United Nations offensive acrossthe 38th

parallelnto North Korea in order to end the

war,once and for

all, by Christmas. n this action, he was also inclined o accept military up-port offered by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Chinese governmentin Taiwan. President Harry Truman had supported he use of South Koreantroops in North Korea. However, he foresaw the possibility of disaster inthe event hat the People's Republic f China would hen enter he war, whichhe thought ikely f American roops crossed nto North Korea, particularlyif accompanied by Nationalist Chinese. He also foresaw serious effects onU.S. foreignpolicy n Europe and throughout he world. Truman met MacAr-

thur on Wake Island on October 15, 1950,determined o influence MacAr-thur on this very ssue. Though he felt that he had been persuasive, t appearsthat in fact he had failed. Despite the restrictions n his activities, MacAr-thur, on November 24, issued a special communique announcing his finaloffensive to end the war and unify all of Korea. Within 48 hours, ChineseCommunist forces, with over 200,000 fighting men, attacked the SouthKorean, United Nations, and United States forces. The events following heWake Island meeting then affected not only the war in Korea but interna-

tional relations hroughout he globe for many years o come (Lowitt, 1967).There have undoubtedly been many major political events which havehinged on the successful r unsuccessful ttempts f one major political igureto influence nother. One can readly peculate n alternate utcomesof majorencounters uch as Stalin's arious attempts o influenceRoosevelt,Churchill,and Truman; Churchill's ttempts o influence de Gaulle; Hitler's nfluenceover Chamberlain t Munich, or over von Schuschnigg with regard o theAustrian Anschluss; Robert Kennedy's nfluence over J. Edgar Hooverregarding he role of the FBI in civil rights activities; and Woodrow Wil-son's attempts o influence Clemenceau or Lloyd George after World WarI. To be sure, all of these confrontations occurred within a larger politicaland historical context, the importance of which should not be minimized.Nonetheless, an understanding f the basic interpersonal nfluence process-es in such events would seem to have major theoretical as well as practicalsignificance. Over he years, social psychology has produced a very substan-tial literature which examines he dynamics of interpersonal nfluence andsocial power relationships. n this paper, I shall present one such theoretical

model, which I believe to be helpful, and shall further attempt o illustrateits applicability. We will be focusing particularly t the interpersonal evel,though, as we shall see, some of the processesdescribed erein will also haveapplicability o intergroup and international nteraction.

As our analytical ool, we will utilize a Power/Interaction model ofinterpersonal nfluence on which I and others have been working over many

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Political Power

years. This model originated with the bases of power taxonomy which JohnR. P. French and I developed a number of years ago (French and Raven,1959). There has, however, been considerable xpansion and developmentover the years, bringing n much of the work on interpersonal nfluenceprocesses arried out by various social psychologists see Raven, 1965, 1983,1988). Though originally developed o understand he ways in which a su-pervisor n a work situation nfluences a worker, he bases of power analysishas since been expanded o a number of other areas of social interaction(Raven, 1988), ncluding a very preliminary xamination f social influencein political conflict (Raven and Kruglanski, 1970).

We had defined social influence as a change n the belief, attitude, or

behavior of a person (the target of influence) which results rom the action,or presence of another person (the influencing agent). Socialpower was de-fined, simply, as the potential or such influence. Essentially, our approachproposes that there are six bases of power, resources which an influencingagent can utilize n changing he beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors of a target;promise of reward, hreat of punishment coercion), egitimacy, expertise,reference (or identification), and information (persuasion). The pow-er/interaction model then also considers he motivations or the use of pow-er by the

influencing agentand for resistance and

compliance bythe

target;the various stage-setting and preparatory eviceswhich each might use toinfluence or resist nfluence; and the subsequent ffects of the use of poweron the influencing agent, the target, and on further attempts at influenceand resistance or compliance. In most of our writings, we considered heinfluencing gent and target as individuals. However, t is frequently he casethat the agent can be a group, an organization, or even a nation, and suchmight also be the case for the target. In presenting he bases of power analy-sis, I shall use the Truman/MacArthur ncounter or illustrative purposes.

BASES OF POLITICAL POWER: AN EXAMPLE IN TRUMANAND MacARTHUR

In discussing Truman's ttempts o influence MacArthur, we cannot,of course, present the full disagreement n all of its nuances. Our purposehere s primarily o illustrate how an analysis n terms of the social psychol-

ogy of power and interpersonal nfluence might be applied.Suffice it to say that President Truman, as commander-in-chief f theU.S. armed forces, was faced with some particularly ifficult problems nattempting o influence the commanding general of the U.S. Army of theFar East, who was then also the designated ommander of the United Na-tions forces in South Korea. There were a number of critical issues of

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disagreement involved. One was MacArthur's belief in the necessity of a full-scale American invasion of North Korea, in concert with the armed forcesof South Korea. The other was MacArthur's desire to accept Chiang Kai-

Shek's offer of Chinese Nationalist troops from Taiwan in support of suchan invasion. A third closely related issue was Truman's concern thatMacArthur not give press interviews and public statements which attackedor undermined the administration's positions. Truman's motive for influenc-ing MacArthur not to exercise these options is spelled out in his memoirs(Truman, 1956):

"Every decision I made n connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim inmind: o prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction t would bring o thecivilizedworld. This meant hat we should not do anything hat would provide heexcuse to the Soviets and plunge he free nations nto an all-out war...." (p. 345)

Up until that point, the armed forces of the People's Republic of Chi-na were not formally involved in the Korean conflict. Truman felt that ifU.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, or if Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist army troops were involved, then the broadening of the con-flict would become quite likely, with disastrous results.

Thus Truman was determined to influence MacArthur not to attempteither of these options. How might the bases of power which we had presentedin our earlier writings apply to an analysis of such influence attempts?

THE SIX BASES OF SOCIAL POWER

Informational Power

Informational power, or persuasion, is based on the information, orlogical argument, that the influencing agent could bring to bear on the tar-

get in order to implement change. Truman exercised informational powerin his direct communications with MacArthur, at their meeting on Wake Is-land, and through information communicated through his emissary, AverillHarriman, whom he sent to meet with MacArthur. Truman tried to con-vince MacArthur that an offensive into North Korea would be disastrous,that Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, wasnot bluffing when he announced that PRC troops would enter the combatif the American and United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel into NorthKorea. There was also the

possibilitythat involvement of

troopsfrom Tai-

wan would trigger an invasion of the Chinese Nationalist stronghold by thePRC. Presumably, Truman could draw on intelligence reports of the mass-ing of Chinese troops, and detail the dangers of committing all of the U.S.forces in Korea, thus inviting attacks in other parts of the world. He couldalso point to the serious impact on U.S. foreign policy. The advantages ofsuccessful use of informational power are that the target of influence ac-

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Political Power

cepts the changed behavior privately, here s less danger of distrust, ess needfor surveillance, nd more wholehearted ooperation. However, f the tar-get is extremely ommitted o an alternative position, has deeply ingrained

values which oppose such action, or cannot understand r accept the argu-ments, then informational power will prove ineffective. It seems clear thatsuch was indeed he case with MacArthur, s documented n several reports.

In response o intelligence reports, according he Harriman, MacAr-thur said that "his ntelligence and photographs how no undue concentra-tion of forces, although hey are building airstrips" Lowitt, 1967,pp. 7-8).The general emained onvinced hrough he Wake Island meeting hat therewas very ittle chanceof interference n Korea rom either he People's Repub-lic of China or the Soviet Union (Lowitt, 1967,p. 20). MacArthur lso con-cluded hat Truman's oncern about assistance rom Taiwan was colored bya major blind spot: "President Truman had conceived a violent animositytoward Chiang Kai-Shek; . . . anyone who favored the generalissimo mightwell arouse he president's isfavor" MacArthur, 964,p. 341). The generalalso remained onvinced hat only a show of strong force would be effectivein countering he aggression n the Far East, as he stated to the presidentof the United Press, "If the fight is not waged with courage and invincibledetermination o meet the challenges here, it will indeed be fought, and pos-sibly lost, on the battlefields of Europe" Lowitt,1967, p. 29). "...To pursueany other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory toa potential enemy" MacArthur uoted n Lowitt, 1967, p. 10). At the closeof the Wake Island meeting, Truman realized hat he had been unsuccessfulin his use of informational power: "I had hoped and tried to convince himthat the policy he was asked to follow was right. He had disagreed. He wasopenly critical" Truman, 1956, p. 441ff.).

Coercive Power

This basis of power nvolves hreat of punishment, mediated by the in-fluencing agent. President Truman ould threaten o reprimand MacArthuror to relieve him of his command. This may have been implied n some oftheir communications. However, coercive power can be effective only if thetarget believes that the threatened punishment s likely. Given the implica-tions of firing a general with very strong popular upport, and the likelycriti-

cismsin

Congressor

being"soft on

Communism," MacArthur must haveconsidered t unlikely hat he would be fired or reprimanded or failing toheed Truman's equests. Coercive power, of course, requires urveillance-if the target of influence complies only because he is concerned about hisbeing punished or not complying, hen there would be no reason o complyunless the influencing agent could determine he nature of his compliance.Surveillance might appear to be simple in this case, but the commanding

497



general can surreptitiously ngage n a number of escalation activities whichare not readily discernible, nd, in fact, there s some evidence hat such didindeed occur.

Immediatelyfter the Wake Island

meeting,MacArthur

be-gan to countermand Truman's order by secretly ordering American roopsacross the Yalu River Miller, 1973,p. 298). There s the additional cost forthe use of coercive power-the target willvery ikely develop negative affecttowards he influencing agent, which might undermine he effectiveness ofother bases of power. There s no direct evidence hat Truman overtly hrea-tened to reprimand r remove MacArthur f he continued o disobey orders,but it should have been clear that such a possibility did exist, and was consi-dered. The firmness of some of Truman's orders o MacArthur learly m-plied the posibility of dire consequences f these were not obeyed, leavingMacArthur with his face "as red as a beet" Miller, 1973,pp. 294-295).Tru-man says that he was restrained rom reprimanding MacArthur after theChinese roops invaded and pushed the United Nations troops back southof the 38th parallel because "I have never believed n going back on peoplewhen uck is against hem, and I did not intend o do it now. Nor did I wantto reprimand he general..." (Truman, 1956, pp. 383-384).

Reward Power

The influencing agent can promise some sort of reward f the targetcomplies. There s the question as to what reward President Truman couldhave offered to General MacArthur f he complied. A promotion might bean effective reward under some circumstances, ut the General n this casewas probably about as high as he could possibly go. A special commenda-tion or medal? Perhaps. At the end of the Wake Island meeting, Trumandecorated MacArthur with a fourth oak-leaf cluster to his DistinguishedService Medal, and presumably here could be other such honors in thefuture a smallreward, perhaps, but one not lacking n symbolic ignificance.But General MacArthur might have been more impressed by an offer to al-low him greater reedom n some of his other military adventures, r at leastto give him firm support for his overall policies. Perhaps his is what wasintended by a communication ia Secretary f Defense George C. Marshallto MacArthur n November 1950:"Everyone ere, Defense, State, and the

President s intensely desirous of supporting ou in the most effective man-ner within our means. At the same ime, weare faced with an extremely raveinternational ituation..." (Whitney, 1956, p. 409). Reward, ike coercion,requires urveillance. However, f it is used successfully, he aftereffects arelikely to be more positive than with coercion.

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Political Power

Though we usually hink of coercion and reward power n terms of tan-gible rewards and real physical hreats, we should recognize hat the possi-

bilityof

personal approvalrom someone whom we

like can result n quitepowerful reward power; rejection, or disapproval rom someone welike, canprovide considerable oercive power. Ingratiation s one means for estab-lishingpersonal eward nd coercivepower Jones, 1964;Mitchelland Liden,1988). Perhaps t was in part to build such a personal reward relationshipthat Truman went to great engths n congratulating MacArthur n his suc-cess in occupying all of South Korea n the summer of 1950:"...I send youmy warmest congratulations n the victory which has been achieved underyour leadership n Korea.. I salute you and say to all of you from all of usat home, 'Well and nobly done"' (Lowitt, 1967, p. 13).

MacArthur eports hat at their nitial meeting on Wake Island, he wastaken aback by Truman's amiability. He had been led to believe that Tru-man had a violent temper, and was, it appears, prepared or coercive pow-er. Instead, Truman "...radiated othingbut courtesy nd good humor duringour meeting. He has an engaging personality, a quick and witty tongue, andI liked him from the start" MacArthur, 1964,pp. 361-362).Might this nothave been an attempt by Truman o establish personal reward power and

referent power?Ingratiation can also build a basis for personal coercive power.MacArthur's tatement hat Truman would disappove of anyone who wassupportive f Chiang Kai-Shek uggested n awareness f such personal oer-civepower. Unfortunately or Truman, t is unlikely hat MacArthur aluedTruman's approval sufficiently or this basis of power to be effective, northat ingratiation ontributed o MacArthur's cceptinghis recommendations.As a side effect, the lavish praise and the authorization or invasion mayhave had an unintended ide-effect n that it helped convinceMacArthur ur-ther of his superior knowledge and skills, and further essened his relativerespect or President Truman's xpertise. MacArthur might have felt morerewarded by the authorization o cross the 38th parallel, hough with SouthKorean troops only.

Legitimate Power

This method of influence s based on a structural elationship betweenthe influencing agent and the target. Implicitly, or explicitly, he agent says,"I have a right to ask you to do this and you have an obligation o comply."Thus terms such as "obliged," "should," "ought," "required o" may signalthe use of legitimate power. In the military, egitimate power of superior

499



officers is expected o be so firmly ngrained hat an emphatic uture state-ment from a superior officer conveys egitimate power, with perhaps a tingeof coercive power. ("As of 1800 hours on July 15, troops in this commandwill no

longersmoke n the

latrine,"which

mayor

maynot be followed with

"By order of the Commanding Officer.") Legitimate power s most obviouswhen t is based on some formal structure a supervisor r a higher-rankingmilitary officer influencing a subordinate. Truman, as commander-in-chiefof the U.S. armed orces, could then be seen as having egitimate power overMacArthur. As an old solider, MacArthur might have been expected torespect such authority, and indeed he had said that such was the case. Tru-man felt that such egitimate owerwould be in effect n any case, and MacAr-thur even reassured Truman's missary, Averill Harriman, hat "he would,as a soldier, obey any orders hat he received rom the president" venthoughhe implied that he did not accept the rationale or some such orders (Tru-man, 1956,pp. 351-353).However, here are other forms of legitimate pow-er which may be more subtle, which draw on generally ccepted ocialnorms,such as (a) The legitimate power of reciprocity "I did this for you, so I ex-pect that you should do this for me."] (Gouldner, 1960); (b) equity ["Youdid something o harm me, so I have a right to ask you to do somethingto make up for it."] (Walster t al., 1978); (c) responsibility r dependence,

a norm which says that we have some obligation o help others who cannothelp themselves, others who are dependent upon us (Berkowitz, 1972).Thusthe weak may have a legitimate power over the strong. (In the height of adispute over fishingrights, celandonce appealed o Britain o accept celand'slimited resources nd their dependence pon fishing or their ivelihood. TheLondon Daily Mirror ditorialized Icelandmust stop exploiting he fact thatshe is a small and weak country up against a large and powerful one.")

When legitimate power can be effectively mplemented, t does havean advantage over coercion and reward, n that surveillance would not berequired, and, as compared o coercion, it might invoke less personal eel-ing on the part of the target. Truman's egitimate power as President of theUnited States over a military commander would seem quite unambiguous.Truman might have relied on the general's ongtime dedication o a militarycode which recognized he power of superior officers. The legitimacy wasnot so unambiguous n this case, sinceMacArthur was also acting as supremecommander of the allied forces and commander-in-chief f the United Na-tions Command. Yet MacArthur xplicitly recognized uch legitimate pow-er, according o Averill Harriman-even though he appeared not to acceptthe logic of Truman's equest, "he answered hat he would, as a soldier, obeyany orders hat he received rom the President....He accepted he President'sposition and will act accordingly ut without ull conviction" Truman, 1956,pp. 351-353).

Despite such verbal declarations, Truman might have had some cluethat MacArthur might not have really respected Truman's egitimate power:

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Political Power

The military has quite well-defined protocol regarding the manner in whicha military officer receives a superior officer, in terms of behavior, dress,posture, etc. Certainly, a superior officer is not kept waiting for his appoint-ment with a subordinate. It is also

customaryfor the subordinate officer to

come out to greet a visiting superior officer. Yet when the presidential planelanded for their meeting on Wake Island, Truman noted that the generalwas not among the welcoming party. As he later described the event toMerle Miller in typically salty fashion,

... So I just sat there. I just waited. I'd have waited until hell froze over if I'd hadto. I wasn't going to have one of my generals mbarrass he President f the UnitedStates.Finally, he son of a bitch walked out of one of the buildings near he runway here.He was

wearinghose damn

sunglassesf his and a shirt that was unbuttoned nd

a cap with a lot of hardware. never did understand. . an old man like that anda five-star general o boot, why he went around dressed ike a nineteen-year-old e-cond lieutenant.I tell you this. If he'd been a lieutenant n my outfit going around dressed ike that,I'd have busted him so fast he wouldn't have known what happened o him. (Miller,1973, p. 294)If MacArthur had expected this strategem to reduce Truman's sense

of legitimate power, his expectations were rapidly corrected. Indeed, Tru-man used this event to emphasize both his legitimate and coercive power:

When he walked n, I took one look at him, and I said, Now you look here. I'vecome halfway across he world o meet you, but don't worry about that. I just wantyou to know I don't givea good goddam what you do or think about Harry Truman,but don't you ever again keep your Commander n Chief waiting. Is that clear?His face got as red as beet, but he said (sic) ... he indicated hat he understood whatI was talking about, and we went on from there. (Miller, 1973,pp. 294-295)

Once he was aware of his obvious violation of military protocol withregard to the commander in chief, MacArthur appeared to experience guilt.He apologized for that, and also apologized for publicly disagreeing with

Truman's policy in his statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and thenhe apologized for allowing his name to be put forward as a potential con-tender for the presidency in 1948. One might have expected that he wouldhave been ripe for Truman's use of legitimate power based on the equity norm(Walster et al., 1978). Perhaps so, but it appears that in the long run thedegree of such power was not sufficient.

Expert Power

This base of power depends upon the target's attributing superiorknowledge or ability to the influencing agent. That knowledge, per se, is notused to persuade the target, however. Rather the target is expected to havefaith that the influencing agent really knows what is best. When expert pow-er is used effectively, it certainly has advantages over coercion or reward pow-

501



er, and it may even avoid some of the problems with legitimate power.Truman could claim to have the advantage of certain careful intelligencereports and estimates, or superior knowledge and insight based on his ex-

periencend contact with

mportantworld eaders and seasoned nternational

strategists n Washington. He referred o such intelligence eports and indi-cated that he had read widely and studied he history and politics of the FarEast quite carefully. Truman also could cite the expert advice which he wasreceiving rom his own military and political advisors.

MacArthur learly did not respect Truman's xpertise. He had his ownintelligence reports which he considered uperior. His meeting with Harri-man "left me with a feeling of concern and uneasiness hat the situation nthe Far East was little understood nd mistakenly owngraded n high circlesin Washington." MacArthur elt that he personally had a much greater n-sight nto Asian mentality: "those who advocate appeasement nd defeatismin the Pacific...do not understand he Orient..." MacArthur, 954,p. 341).Truman's ttempts o establish his expertisewere singularly nsuccessful.As-sessing Truman ollowing the Wake Island meeting, MacArthur oncluded"he seemed to take great pride in his historical knowledge, but, it seemedto me that in spite of his having read much, it was of a superficial haracter,encompassing acts without he logic and reasoning dictating hese facts. Of

the Far East he knew little, presenting a strange combination of distortedhistory and vague hopes..." (MacArthur, 964,pp. 361-362). As to Truman'sadvisers, MacArthur ad serious questions: "Were his political advisersplay-ing strategist, and his military advisers playing politics?" pp. 341-342). Heconcluded hat criticisms f his strategy ame mainly rom "lay circles"whilehis own viewswere supported by the true experts, "by practically very mili-tary leader concerned with the Korean campaign, ncluding our own JointChiefs of Staff" (MacArthur, 1951).

Truman, drawing on his own military experience, ater commented nreturn: "Of course every econd ieutenant nowsbest what his platoon oughtto be given to do, and he always thinks the higher-ups are just blind whenthey don't see it his way. But General MacArthur and rightly, oo - wouldhave court-martialed ny second ieutenant who gave press nterviews o ex-press his disagreement..." Truman, 1956, pp. 383-384).

Even though Truman understood hat a subordinate fficer might notalwaysaccept he expert power of his superior, he superior's egitimate owershould still hold sway, with coercive power always at the ready o help rein-

force it.

Referent Power

This basis of power stems from a sense of mutual dentity, from thetarget feeling a sense of oneness with the agent and feeling, thereby, that

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he/she wishes to see things similarly. Truman might have appealed to suchmutual identification with MacArthur-they were, after all, both patrioticcitizens of the same nation; both have had military backgrounds, including

service in the First World War; both have similar roots in the middle of theAmerican continent, etc. Wouldn't they then be expected to see things simi-larly? Again, it is possible that, at one time or another, Truman might haveattempted to use referent power. He might also have realized that MacAr-thur did not feel any real sense of identity with Truman. They were clearlyso different in style and in manner. Though both had a history of militaryservice, there was a sharp difference between MacArthur's long-term com-mitment to the military and his very high rank and Truman's relatively briefservices as a lower-level officer. If he could not rely on his own referent power,perhaps he might instead invoke the referent power of others in the adminis-tration. His choice of Averill Harriman as his emissary was likely quitedeliberate. MacArthur did, indeed, seem to feel some communality with Har-riman: "Harriman and I were friends of long standing. While superinten-dent at West Point I had hunted ducks on his preserve near Tuxedo"(MacArthur, 1964, p. 341).

The secretary of defense, General George C. Marshall, in support ofTruman, may have been attempting to establish referent power by com-

municating a sense of mutual understanding and common outlook:We all realize your difficulty n fighting a desperate attle 11 mountainous egionunder winter conditions and with a multinational orce in all degrees of prepared-ness. I also understand, think, the difficulty nvolved n conducting uch a battleunder necessarily imiting onditions . . However, his appears, o be unavoidable,but I want you to know I understand our problems. Everyone here, Defense, State,and the President, s intensely esirous f supporting ou in the most effectivemannerwithin our means .... (Whitney, 1956, p. 409)

There is no evidence that any of these attempts to use referent power

provedeffective.

Other Less Direct Methods of Influence

The six bases of power are not the only means which people use in in-fluencing one another. There are several other approaches which are lessdirect. One form is environmental manipulation, or what Cartwright (1965)

has called "ecological control": Rather than influencing the target directly,the agent may change the situation so that the target is pressed to comply.A high barbed-wire fence may have more influence on habitual trespassersthan a sign threatening prosecution. Such a device was once used by Theo-dore Roosevelt when he wished to send the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific andto Japan as a show of force. Congress controlled the purse strings and itappeared that they might thus limit his ability to engage in such a venture.

503



Roosevelt, however, ordered the fleet to the Pacific and Japan nonetheless-he had sufficient funds for such a movement there, but he indicated thathe would need additional funds to bring them back. Needless to say, suchfunds became available

(Neu, 1967, p. 150).MacArthur did not receive nearly the military resources that he felt thathe needed to carry out a full-range aggressive campaign. His requests forfurther reinforcements were denied even while General Eisenhower was receiv-ing additional troops in Europe. Was this one means of restricting MacAr-thur from escalating the war? This is not clear. However, MacArthur laterused such limitations as means of explaining defeats and attacking the ad-ministration for its lack of support. The final form of environmental manipu-lation was eventually resorted to by Truman - in removing MacArthur from

his command, he, in effect, eliminated the possibility of MacArthur's carry-ing out military actions with which Truman was not in agreement. Thus suchaction served the dual purpose of severely restricting MacArthur's behavioras well as following through on the threat implied in the use of coercive power.

Invoking or Reducing the Power of Third Parties

Sometimes an influencing agent can bring about change in a target byinvoking the power of third parties. We have already suggested that Tru-man may have attempted to invoke the referent power of Harriman andperhaps Marshall. Marshall's etter also invoked the expert power of the JointChiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, and the State Department. If Tru-man had sufficient political influence, he might also have invoked the legiti-mate power of both houses of Congress, provided they could be persuadedto pass a joint resolution opposing escalation of the war. It appears that Tru-man did not find this option to be very feasible. In a somewhat parallelmethod, the agent may determine what other persons support the action whichthe influencing agent opposes and to attempt to undermine their legitimate,expert, or referent power. Truman was particularly concerned that ChiangKai-Shek might have some influence on MacArthur's stance with regard tothe People's Republic of China and North Korea. He clearly indicated thathe felt that Chiang had his own personal agenda and could not be trusted.Again, this method would not appear to have been very applicable to thecurrent situation.

THE POWER/ACTION MODEL OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Now that we have examined the six bases of power and some alterna-tive methods of influence, let us next examine a more encompassing modelof power and influence.

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Political Power

From the Perspective of the Influencing Agent

Figure 1 presents a model of power/interaction rom the perspectiveof the influencing gent. We note in the upper middle box, the bases of powerand methods of influence which are available o the influencing agent. Weare assuming a rational agent, who is attempting o determine what basisof power or method of influence he/she wishes to utilize in implementingchange. But to understand uch choices, it is also useful to examine whatmotivates the influencing agent to exert influence.

The Motivation to Influence

The motivation o influence s sometimes quite obvious, if it is direct-ed to the attainment of some extrinsic goal. As the quotation cited earlierindicates, President Truman clearly had such goals, to restrain MacArthurfrom ordering American roops into North Korea and from accepting as-sistance from the Chinese nationalists, and thus avoid a number of otherunfavorable utcomes the invasion of Chinese orces, escalation nto a full-scale world war, avoiding difficulty with other allies of the United States....

However,other

motives,ess

obvious, mightalso

operate. Perhaps he satis-faction of some personal needs: A need for power? A need to enhance hisself-esteem? A need to demonstrate his own independence? t is clear thatTruman was very concerned about the legitimate power of the presidencyand the civilian administration ver the military, as it had been spelled outin the Constitution maintaining his power relationship would then havebeen an extremely mportant end in itself, over and above the specific in-fluence situation. Perhaps he wanted o demonstrate o others-to Congress,to the U.S. citizenry, o the leaders of other nations-that he was really heboss. To the extent that this was true, his communications o MacArthur,subtle or overt, might have emphasized egitimate power, and even coercivepower, at the expense of informational power. If Truman had been espe-cially concerned with punishing General MacArthur, with evening he scorefor some previous lights such as taking ssue with Truman n unauthorizedpress nterviews), uch a motivation would be reflected n his choice of pow-er strategy and in the manner or mode in which t was presented. For exam-ple, even f he had felt that he could reason with MacArthur, ould convince

MacArthur hat there were good reasons not to escalate the war, Trumanmight then have chosen not to use informational nfluence, but instead usecoercivepower, thus in part humiliating is target whileexercising nfluence.Coercivepower would also show others hat he, Truman, was really he boss.Indeed, nfluencing agents have been known to use coercive power when n-formational power would be even more effective in influencing a change nbehavior, hoping and expecting hat the target would not comply so that the

505



Assessment fAvailablePower Bases

1. Reward esources2. Coercive esources3. Legitimacy4. Expertise5. Reference identification)6. Information7. Manipulationossibilities1. tain xbinic goals 8. Indirectnfluence ossibilities2. Satisfyinterni eeds- 9. Invokingrdiminishing ower

pOr, status, security, of thid partiesse-esteem3. Role quirements, igher Assessme,i ofAailable Bases -

authorty inRelationoTarget4. Motivaion the nfuencee-

deire to benefit r harm5. Desired tatus n ye PowerPrefereocesansel, ltwg, hird aties obhibitins

4A^~~~~ 1. Costsand efforts2. Secondary ainsand osses

1 3. Norms and values1 4. Relation oself-perception

5. Timeperspective

. . . . . ......_

12.

3.4.

1.2.

3.

PoP

Si

Fig. 1. Model of power action from perspective f influencing age



Political Power

agent could follow through with the threatened punishment, to set an exam-ple for the future. On the other hand, an appeal to legitimate power of de-pendence ("I really must depend on you for seeing to it that things are done

properly here") mightfor the same reason be

avoided,even if it

mightbe

effective, since it would appear to emphasize the agent's weakness.

Assessment of Available Power Bases

Having determined what bases of power might be available, the targetmust assess these alternative courses to action in terms of whether they wouldbe effective in implementing change. What is the likelihood that he wouldbe successful or unsuccessful? Thus referent power, deemed ineffective inthis case, would be set aside, as would personal reward or personal coer-cion; expert power; informational, and legitimate power would be utilizedinstead. A rational influencing agent assesses his/her power bases in termsof the situation and the nature of the target upon whom influence wouldbe attempted.

Assessment of the Costs of Differing Influence Strategies

The agent must also examine the costs of the influence. Truman mighthave considered that he could be successful in influencing MacArthur witha very severe threat of punishment for noncompliance. He indicates that heat least considered earlier the extreme form of ecological manipulation-removing MacArthur from his post (Lowitt, 1967, p. 10; Miller, 1973, p.301). But the use of these influence strategies might have led to serious hostilitynot only from MacArthur, but from many of MacArthur's supporters n Con-gress. Thus they would have to be implemented with great caution. Infor-mational power might have been more effective if Truman had moreopportunity to talk to MacArthur and present his rationale. Truman mighthave carefully weighed this factor in deciding whether to try this strategy.He might also have weighed the choice of influence strategy against his valuesystem-there are those who would avoid the use of coercive power, simplybecause they feel that no decent person should threaten another. If so, theninformational power, or persuasion, might be more consistent with our values

of rationality.

Preparing for the Influence Attempt

Often an influencing agent may select an influence strategy, but deter-mine that some prior preparations may be necessary. Is informational pow-

507



er the choice? Then the agent might carefully rehearse his/her speech, examinethe logic, practice the delivery. Is it coercion? Then it may be important todemonstrate to the target that not only are the means available for coercion,but that the agent is ready and willing to pay the costs that coercion implies.(Truman might have indicated more explicitly that he had serious intentionof removing MacArthur from command, that he had support of the JointChiefs of Staff, and that he was prepared to accept or deal with any censureor reprimand from Congress.) Is it reward power? Then, again, the availa-bility of rewards must be stressed. If it is personal reward or coercion-offering approval or threatening rejection-then the agent may first attemptto ingratiate her/himself with the target, with well-placed compliments, flat-

tery, etc. In preparation for either reward power or coercive power, the in-fluencing agent would want it clearly understood that surveillance of thetarget's behavior could and would be carried out. Similarly for referent power,the communality with the target must be demonstrated (Truman might havemade more specific reference to the fact that both MacArthur and Trumanfought in World War I, that he like MacArthur had the well-being of theirnation at heart, or have emphasized that he too had taken a firm role in deal-ing with opponents in the Cold War). For expert power, a few choice demon-strations of one's superior knowledge would be useful (emphasizing accessto secret intelligence information which he could not yet share even with thegeneral). He did try to impress MacArthur, making reference to his readingand studies of the Far East. As we noted, such preparatory devices provedunconvincing and therefore unsuccessful. Legitimate? Then the basis forlegitimacy should be stressed (e.g., a reference to the laws governing the rela-tionship of a general to his commander-in-chief). Preparations can also beestablished for other forms of legitimate power. The target might be remindedof other times in which he has not complied or has embarrassed the agent(invoking guilt), or of times when the agent had done a favor for the target.In this way there would be preparation for legitimacy based on equity andreciprocity norms. Thus Truman did remind MacArthur of the embarrass-ment he had caused Truman by MacArthur's press interviews and speechesin which he openly expressed his disagreement with his commander-in-chief.

An influencing agent may sometimes enhance his/her power by the lo-cation and form of the influence encounter. There is evidence for a "homecourt advantage" in interpersonal confrontation, as there is in athletic con-tests

(Conroyand

Sundstrom, 1977). One can also enhance one's influenceby setting a proper scene for the encounter (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980;Varela, 1971). Truman might have been somewhat more effective if he couldhave arranged his meeting with MacArthur within the imposing setting ofthe Oval Office in Washington, giving him a home court advantage, so tospeak, and with all of the paraphernalia which emphasizes the legitimate pow-

Raven08





If the first influence attempts are unsuccessful, hen it is likely that theagent willtry again. But this time his motivations may change: Whereas revi-ously he had merely wanted o achieve he extrinsic goal, he now may havedeveloped ome hostility oward he target, which n turn will affect his choiceof influence strategy he second time around. The agent's success or failurewill also lead to a reassessment f the available bases of power and the de-velopment of a quite different strategy Kipnis, 1976; Shaw and Condelli,1986). Perhaps t was his realization hat referent power was not effectivethat led Truman o sign his later communications o MacArthur s "Presi-dent of the United States," emphasizing egitimate power, rather han "Har-ry" as he might have signed communications o others. The manner of such

communications was clearly noted by the general MacArthur, 964,p. 341).Later, Truman's nability o persuade MacArthur hrough egitimate, refer-ent, and informational power may have led him eventually o the threat ofmore extreme coercion the threat to relieve MacArthur f his command.More than threat, t appears hat eventually Truman esorted o the ultimateecological manipulation, he force of which might also have helped o estab-lish for Truman's ater encounters both the legitimate and coercive powerof the presidency. Such a choice of strategy was, apparently, also dictatedby Truman's

angerand frustation with MacArthur.

Of additional nterest s the manner n which MacArthur was removedfrom office. The social psychology of attribution heory s particularly ele-vant here, particularly hose aspects which deal with the attribution f causal-ity and locus of control (Jones et al., 1972; Kelley, 1972). An influencingagent who feels that his power s threatened s especially oncerned hat anychange which he/she successfully brings about in the target is attributableto the agent, and not to the target. It is for this reason hat coercion s some-times preferred o information, since change which results rom coercion smore likely to be attributed o the agent. Change following information smore ikely to be attributed o the target's wn choice (Kipnis, 1976;Litman-Adizes et al., 1978;Raven and Kruglanski, 1970).Thus in cases of confron-tation, it is more pleasant for the agent to feel responsible or the change,more pleasant or the target o feel or demonstrate o others hat the changewas really voluntary.

From such theorizing, t would follow that once Truman had decidedto fire MacArthur, he would be especially concerned about one possible

outcome-MacArthur might hear about such a plan and might resign be-fore he was fired. Thus, when Truman was told that somehow the opposi-tion newspaper he Chicago Tribune had heard the rumor and was aboutto publicize the news that Truman might fire MacArthur, he immediatelysummoned General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.When he recalled hat event for biographer Merl Miller many years later,

510 Raven



Political Power

Truman was 77 years old and seemed rather "fragile," but "at that momenthis blue eyes blazed with fury": "And I told Bradley, I says, 'The son of abitch isn't going to resign on me, I want him fired."' And so the order wasimmediately drawn up, signed, communicated o MacArthur, and immedi-ately thereafter a press conference was hastily called (Miller, 1973,p. 305).

From the Perspective of the Target

We have thus far examined he Power/Action model from the perspec-tive of the influencing agent. We can also examine t from the perspective

of the target of influence. We willnot dwell so much on this part of the anal-ysis in this presentation, but we can see the parallel analysis n Fig. 2. Wemay initially assume hat the target resists he influence attempt because hehas a commitment o his previous pattern of behavior, because he tends tocontinue a state of behavior o which he has become accustomed, r becauseother influencing agents have already pressed him to behave n his currentfashion. MacArthur's ersonal ommitment o his position s presented uiteforcefully n his message o the Joint Senate Committee on Armed Servicesand Foreign Relations (Lowitt, 1967,

p. 10),and in his memoirs

(MacAr-thur, 1964).His conviction hat a failure o take strong action against com-munist forces in the Far East would lead to ultimate disaster was every bitas strong as Truman's ommitment o his positions.

There may, however, be other more subtle reasons for resisting n-fluence. A need for independence, or power, for self-esteem, o present astrong mage to other observers, may mitigate against nfluence, even if therequest may be reasonable. There may also be a desire o harm he influenc-ing agent, to not give him the satisfaction of compliance MacArthur, bvi-ously, had neither ove nor respect or Harry Truman). The target may alsobe concerned bout his appearance efore third parties. How would MacAr-thur's devoted subordinates eel about him if he surrendered oo readily oa civilian (even though that civilian was also the commander-in-chief)? nother instances, there may be reasons for compliance with the request forpersonal reasons other than being convinced hat such compliance s in theservice of a desirable xtrinsic goal: acceptance of role relationship, or per-sonality endencies, uch as a need for deference Murray, 1938),or a strong

personality endencyoward

conformity Comrey et al., 1978).Such wouldnot seem to be true in this particular ase.Just as the influencing agent prepares he stage and scene for an in-

fluenceattempt, he target may prepare o resist nfluence, o set a stagewhichwill forestall various nfluence strategies, perhaps o use ingratiation o asto make the agent feel more restrained rom using coercive power, etc. In

511



Si

.r.......... 1.

2.

Assesnsent of Self in Relation - - 3.I tLoAgoeDt-

4.

PercergtiQn t Power Bases of

Assessweot of Likelihood fImplementtiQro of Threatnd._

PromisesMotivations f Tamaet

1. Maintain urrt state or 4oppe state .2. Satisfaction f internal needs--

power, ntpetKenceself-esteem, depemdence

3. Role requirements4. Motivation f the agent- desire Altn atpin of Influence Atenlit

to benefitor harm5. Desired status in eyes of self, 1. Preparatory cceptance Evaluation

agent, thirdparties a. bargainingb. negotiation 1. roprie2. Preparatory esistance 2. Effectoa. developing counter-arguments 3. Views o

vLC ~~~ b. defenses against oerciol 4. Costsox,- c. re-evaluation f other rr..u...:~.sl

d. tyingone's hands"e. recruitment f defenders

Fig. 2. Model of power action from perspective of influence tar

.0 %AV XYIII



Political Power

anticipation f the influence attempt, MacArthur might well have marshalledhis personal resources n preparation or the verbal assault. His counterin-

fluence might have been more effective if he could have arranged o meetwith Truman at his headquarters n Tokyo, but, failing that, he could stillclaim some home court advantage on Wake Island, which was in his Pacifictheater of operations. He might have tried o anticipate what bases of powerTruman would attempt to use and have prepared o counter these one byone. He might even have used third parties, have committed himself firmlyand strongly o his previous course of action so as to make "surrender" oTruman ven more difficult. Truman observed hat MacArthur urroundedhimself with yes-men "ass kissers"), who would always agree with whateverposition MacArthur might take (Miller, 1973,p. 291). He would, of course,not give Truman he satisfaction of the president's uccessfullyutilizing ex-pert power, egitimate ower, certainly ot referent power, and he might haveconvinced himself hat Truman would never dare o accept he consequencesof using the ultimate coercive power. When coercion was threatened, andresisted, Truman's hand was forced. He had to fire MacArthur.

Having suffered he humiliation of being removed rom his high com-mand, what then did MacArthur do? He had to justify to himself the fact

that he had endured what was for him a very severe punishment; he had toreduce ognitivedissonance. He also had to justify his actions o other Ameri-cans, to firmly establish his place in history. The result was an even firmerconviction that he was absolutely correct n his judgments. As with the in-fluencing agent, there s, again, a feedback oop-the aftereffects of the in-fluence attempt eed back to change he relationship f target o agent, affectthe commitment of the target to his earlier position, and lead to differingforms of resistance or, sometimes, to greater malleability or a second in-fluence attempt. Unsuccessful coercion, followed by punishment, an leadto further rejection of the influencing agent, and even greater ntractibilityin the face of later influence attempts.

The removal of MacArthur rom his command was not only pushing,it also was, as we pointed out, a form of "ecological ontrol," making t im-possible for MacArthur o continue his policies as commander of the U.S.and United Nations forces in the Far East. However, it also had a furtherside effect: It removed whatever egitimate or coercive power Truman mighthave had over him. Truman could no longer insist that MacArthur efrain

from public statements attacking he administration's olicies. MacArthur,thus freed, certainly poke quite openly and forcefully, both to justify him-self and to help steer the nation in the direction which he felt was criticallynecessary. The damage which this caused o Truman and his administrationwas quite substantial, ndeed contributing o a political limate uch that Tru-man would not seek reelection n 1952.

513





Political Power

state, he said, next to a big one, and is willing o listen to Hitler's omplaints.An appeal to the legitimate power of dependence? But it did not work. Hi-tler would not hear t. After all, he knew hat Austria was fortifying ts borders

with Germany, he said. von Schuschnigg denied it, but Hitler had his evi-dence. The result was to put von Schuschnigg n the defensive, to give Hi-tler yet additional egitimate basis for demands, n terms of the legitimacyof reciprocity. n addition, Hitler was demonstrating is ability o maintainalmost complete surveillance ver what was happening n Austria-an es-sential element of coercive power.

Gradually, Hitler began to set the stage for the exerciseof the most ex-treme coercive power. But first he tempered his threats with reward power.After

emphasizinghis own

importancen the German

nation,Hitler

added,"I am giving you, Herr Schuschnigg, he unique opportunity f having yourname recorded s well n the roll of great Germans. That would be an honora-ble deed and everything would be settled." But then Hitler reverted o coer-civepower. He emphasized his ability o bring he full weight of the Germanarmed forces against Austria. The SA and the Legion would just tear theAustrians apart, he said, if Austria did not bend to Hitler's demands.

The mode of influence also became more strident, more shrill. Hitlerranted ike a maniac, waved his hands with excitement. At times he musthave seemed completely out of control. What was his strategy? t may wellhave been part of the stage-setting evicefor coercive power. Extreme oer-cive power can be most threatening provided he target believes that theagent has both the means and the will to exert such coercion. Most of usare not willing to pay the price of the most extreme orms of coercion. Bybehaving ike an uncontrolled madman, Hitler may then have made his mostextreme oercive hreats eem credible. Honorable tatesmenwould not deignto take into custody he visiting chancellor of another nation. But Hitler be-

gan to make credible he possibility hat he could do just that. At one point, heshouted a command for General Keitel to enter the conference room. Heinsisted that von Schuschnigg ign an agreement o accept every one of hisdemands, or he would immediately order a march into Austria.

von Schuschnigg was clearly affected. He began to see extreme dangerto himself and to his nation, and eventually he succumbed and agreed toall of Hitler's demands: an economic union with Germany, a lifting of theban on the National Socialists n Austria, general amnesty or National So-cialist prisoners, and appointment f National Socialists o key governmentministries interior, war, and finance. The Anschluss was not yet complete,but it was soon to follow.

As to the aftermath f this encounter, learlyvon Schuschniggwas vir-tually destroyed nd could offer no real resistance o any of Hitler's demands.Hitler had had real regard for the Chancellor, and his contempt was nowcomplete. Hitler, on the other hand, felt more powerful han ever, and hav-

515



ing completed the annexation of Austria, he was now prepared to exert hispower on ever stronger adversaries. It is a particularly clear example of thepotentially negative effects of the use of power on the powerholder (Kipnis,1976).

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In this paper, I have attempted to present a basic model for interper-sonal influence and social power, and to show how such an analysis mightbe applied to the understanding of political behavior. I have illustrated theapplication of six bases of power: coercion, reward, legitimacy, expertise,reference, and information, and a power/interaction model as these mighthave applied to President Harry Truman's confrontation with DouglasMacArthur, and in Adolf Hitler's confrontation with Austrian ChancellorKurt von Schuschnigg, as he laid the groundwork for the Austrian Ansch-luss. The analysis of interpersonal influence can be examined as series ofsteps, both from the perspective of the influencing agent and the target. Wecan examine the motivations to influence and to resist influence, motivationswhich are often much more complex than the immediate extrinsic goals. These

in turn determine the choices of influence strategies, the selection of the basesof power, the manner or mode in which the power is exercised or resisted,the stage-setting or preparatory devices to influence or resist influence. Thedegree and form of compliance is determined by all of these factors. Fol-lowing the influence attempt, successful or unsuccessful, there is a reassess-ment of the interpersonal relationship by both the target and the agent, withthe stage set for different strategies of influence and resistance in the nextgo-round.

Having gone through these two exercises in preparing this paper, I feela greater sense of understanding of these two critical interactions. However,though I have obviously studied several sources of information in this anal-ysis, I accept Holsti's admonitions for psychologists attempting to be politi-cal historians (Holsti, 1989)-I do not claim to be a political scientist orhistorian, and hesitate to suggest that I have fully and accurately analyzedthese events. This was not my purpose in this paper. Rather, I hoped to pointout how a rich resource of theory and empirical evidence, developed by so-cial psychologists, could be utilized in the analysis of major political con-

frontations. I further hope that others who are more skilled in this importantfield will find these tools useful. My presentation then speaks to Robert Jer-vis's concerns about social psychology playing a greater role in the analysisof political behavior (Jervis, 1989a, 1989b). By the same token, I would seethis approach as in line with the concerns expressed by David Sears (1986,1989) that social psychologists test their theories beyond the restrictions ofthe experimental laboratory.

516 Raven



Political Power

Unfortunately, n most historical presentations f political confronta-tions, there s not the sort of detailed nformation which allows us to makea complete analysis. From a simple statement hat Lyndon Johnson met witha

given congressmannd

persuadedhim to lend his

supporto passage of

the Civil Rights Bill, we cannot determine whether he influence stemmedfrom coercion, reward, expert, legitimate, referent, or informational pow-er. If the tools of the Power/Interaction model are indeed useful, I wouldhope that it might provide some guidelines so that political and historicaldiarists might provide more sensitiveand complete descriptions f such con-frontations.

There are several other limitations which should be considered n theanalysis which I have presented:

First, he model as discussed bovepresents he agent and target as large-ly rational participants n the confrontation, as they each carefully assesstheir respective ctionsand their outcomes. We assume ome rationality venwhile we accept that some of these assessments may be affected by motiveswhich may not be appropriate, r which may be dictated by less than ration-al considerations. We have not allowed or rash, spontaneous actions whichare taken without due regard or their consequences. Perhaps such actionsshould receive more consideration, and indeed these may account for some

failures n the confrontation on the part of the agent, target, or both.Second, for illustration, we tended to assume a unidirectional owerrelationship. We did not fully consider he likelihood that MacArthur wasattempting o influence Truman ven while Truman was influencing MacAr-thur. We only briefly noted the possibility hat von Schuschniggwas attempt-ing to influence Hitler. In part, such a limited presentation was deliberatefor our purposes of illustration-the unidirectional ower relationship wascomplex enough; a bidirectional nalysis would have been much more com-plicated. Yet a full understanding hould consider power n both directions.In a much earlier paper, Arie Kruglanski nd I (Raven and Kruglanski, 970)attempted ust such an analysis, though in a very preliminary orm.

Third, we must be sensitive o the fact that in examining he validityof the model, we are drawing on reports rom persons who themselves wereactive participants n the events which we are analyzing. As Jervis (1989)points out, there are serious questions f misrepresentation, elf-presentation,and strategic behaviors p. 486) in such reports. Indeed, we did note somedifferences n the manner n which events were described by Truman n his

memoirs Truman, 1956)as compared o his reports o biographer Merl Miller(1973)some seventeen years ater. (An interesting dditional analysis mightbe carried out on the operations of dissonance heory or other social psy-chological processes n the reporting of the same events by political figuresat varying imes after these events occurred.) Here, again, we would hopethat the political scientist and historian who are accustomed o working withsuch resources will be more skilled n evaluating and interpreting uch data.

517



Yet there are also a number of advantages o such an application ofa model. The model provides a framework o use in gathering nd reviewinginformation on political confrontations. It also provides political scientistsand historians with an entree for the application of a large and rich bodyof literature rom the social psychology of interpersonal nfluence and so-cial power. I should think it would be useful to have a series of case studiesof major political confrontations, analyzed n terms of the power strategiesutilized by the respective nfluencing gentsand the targets, which might henprovide or some general conclusions about what sorts of strategies re like-ly to lead to specific outcomes. Of particular nterest would be case studiesof confrontations which led to undesirable utcomes because of a misper-

ception of the power relationships nd strategies y the two parties nvolved.For example, consider an influencing agent who feels that he or she is usinginformational nd expert power, but the target nstead perceives oercivepow-er. For social psychologists, he model offers an additional means of testingthe validity of concepts and theories n that area, an alternative o the morerestrictive aboratory approach. I would like to think that it would providea tool whereby such critical confrontations could be evaluated, therebyproviding ome means of suggesting o policy-makers ow such confronta-tions could be dealt with more

effectivelyn future encounters. Just as mili-

tary strategists tudy past battles and examine how their outcomes might havedeveloped differently, f one or the other had adopted alternative trategies,similar attention might thus be directed o the analysis of important politi-cal encounters, which may have been more momentous han battles n theirultimate results. Only further xercises n applying he model to case studiesof a number of differing confrontations will determine ts true value.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful o Peter Clapham or his assistance n library esearchon the Hitler-von Schuschnigg confrontation, and Benjamin Karney andDavid Levy for their assistance with regard o the Truman-MacArthur on-frontation.

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Political Power

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