Polirev Digest

8/12/2019 Polirev Digest

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Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17,2012

Facts:In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth memberwas added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress begansitting in the JBCone from the House of Representatives and onefrom the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, theJBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decidedto allow the representatives from the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives one full vote each. At present, Senator FrancisJoseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of thelegislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in thispetition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is thephrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the twohouses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, arepermanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that theabsence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning asexpressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system ofchoice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise theirrespective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which isto legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution

speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean onerepresentative each from both Houses which comprise the entireCongress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no realinterest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs currentcomposition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filingof the petition.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of thepower of judicial review have been met in this case; and(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform itsfunctions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members ofCongress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987

Constitution.

Held:(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to severallimitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversycalling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challengingthe act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personaland substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or willsustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question ofconstitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of thecase. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when theseconditions sine qua non are present, especially when theconstitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is putin issue.The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitionerlost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for thepost of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on thecase is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that onlyofficial nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Courtand question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. TheJBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary.

Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at alllimited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. Avast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may beaffected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of thevery process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the

nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of theJBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just fora nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right toseek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of theConstitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusionwhatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only asingular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is,to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In thepassage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of therole of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congressnon-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses isnecessary in the realization of these powers causing a vividdichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaisonbetween the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislativedepartment. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composedof seven (7) members only.Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the currentcomposition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonethelessvalid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to thedeclaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are notnullified.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to theprivatization program of the Philippine Government under

Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell throughpublic bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares ofthe Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, aMalaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid forthe same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more thanthe bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard asthe winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of thenecessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid priceof P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSISdated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers

check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused toaccept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS hasdisregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated withRenong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court onprohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XIISection 10, are self-executing.Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as thosefound in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomesoperative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, orthat which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right itgrants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus aconstitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent ofthe right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by theconstitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examinationand construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating thatthe subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executingconstitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation tofacilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to beused for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the

protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or placereasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The merefact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe apenalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provisiondoes not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of suchlegislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provisionfor a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily anindication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule isthat a self-executing provision of the constitution does notnecessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but anylegislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further theexercise of constitutional right and make it more available.


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Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that thesubject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Asagainst constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have beengenerally drafted upon a different principle and have often become ineffect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon thepeople in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and thefunction of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more likethat of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided thata legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, thepresumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiringlegislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have thepower to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of thefundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII ofthe 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which iscomplete in itself and which needs no further guidelines orimplementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very wordsthe provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains toheritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, itrefers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as theConstitution could have very well used the term natural resources,but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to

Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the presentcase, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial ofPhilippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel whenit first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since thenbecome the venue of various significant events which have shapedPhilippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, andconcessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony,when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and aqualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation,the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the GovernmentCorporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Shareof the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of

Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute thenecessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue thenecessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as maybe necessary for the purpose.

Aquino v EnrileMartial LawHabeas CorpusPower of the President to OrderArrests

Facts:Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order ofMarcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individualsincluding Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against JuanPonce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and specialaffirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcosdeclaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance tothe declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion,insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, whenpublic safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereinunder Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguingthe country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and

imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercisepursuant to the Presidents order.

Javellana v Exec. Sec.Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973ConstitutionRestriction to Judicial Power

Facts:In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter soughtto enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries fromimplementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said

constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president.He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratificationby the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, theelection held to ratify such constitution is not a free election therebeing intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar.Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they wereconcluded by the ascertainment made by the president of thePhilippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, therebeing no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidationduring the election, it is to be assumed that the people hadacquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of thevalidity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was leftto the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratificationof the same had shown such acquiescence.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC140 SCRA 455January 7, 1986

FACTS:11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986(Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of thePhilippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows thePresident to continue holding office after the calling of the specialelection.Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditionalresignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,

Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding ofa special election for President and Vice President earlier than theregular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that thePresident is: irrevocably vacating the position of President effective

only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed andqualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after hisproclamation.The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with thecited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actuallyresign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of theBatasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearershave not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose norrepudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted thatPresident Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean,fair and honest.

ISSUE:Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court thereforestop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for theissuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding theelection on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than therequired 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court didnot issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a politicalquestion (from the purely justiciable issue of the questionedconstitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of thePresidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people intheir sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no

issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in theway of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give theincumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issuedProclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurelwere taking power.


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On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office ofelective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitionerscontinued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the ProvisionalConstitution and not because their term of six years had not yetexpired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing theterm of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed tohave been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of theProvisional Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitionerswas validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25,1987.

Ruling:Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondentOIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as BarangayCaptain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987,therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to havesuperseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could

no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents tothe elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x xx."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined byaw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in theBarangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Lambino v. Comelec

Fact:The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiativepetition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition withComelec to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c)and Sec. 7 of RA 6735.

The proposed changes under the petition will shift the presentBicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form ofgovernment.

Comelec did not give it due course for lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant toSantiago v. Comelec ruling.

Issue:w/n the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revisionw/n the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with theconstitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

Held:Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on directproposal by peopleSec. 2, Art. XVIIis the governing provision that allows a peoplesinitiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While thisprovision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth thefull text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the

framers of our Constitution clearly show that:a. the framers intended to adopt relevant American

jurisprudence on peoples initiat ive; andb. in particular, the people must first see the full text of theproposed amendments before they sign, and that the people mustsign on a petition containing such full text

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the peoplethrough initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on itsface is a petition by the people. This means two essential elementsmust be present:

a. the people must author sign the entire proposal. No agentor representative can sign on their behalfb. as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must beembodied in a petition

These essential elements are present only if the full text of theproposed amendments is first shown to the people who express theirassent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full textof the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of thepetition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state thefact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of theseveral millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text ofthe proposed amendments beforenot aftersigning.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signingof the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to doso is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a singleword, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in thesignature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the textof the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merelyasks a question whether the people approve a shift from the

Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system ofgovernment. The signature sheet does not show to the people thedraft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign thesignature sheet. This omission is fatal.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitutiondisallowing revision through initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amendingthe Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through aconstitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoplesinitiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. Incontrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, appliesonly to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction wasintentional as shown by the deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution appliesonly to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. Incontrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose bothamendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of theConstitution?Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from aBicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolitionof one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mereamendment.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause allows amendments but notrevisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts havedeveloped a two-part test:Quantitative testasks whether the proposed change is so extensivein its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of theconstitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existingprovisions. The court examines only the number of provisionsaffected and does not consider the degree of the change.

Qualitative testinquires whether the change will accomplish suchfar reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan asto amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structureof government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in thenature of the basic governmental plan includes change in itsfundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. Achange in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includeschanges that jeopardize the traditional form of government and thesystem of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the LambinoGroups initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.


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Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul twoarticlesArticle VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive

affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic planof government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from abicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revisionA change in the structure of government is a revision of theConstitution, as when the three great co-equal branches ofgovernment in the present Constitution are reduced into two. Thisalters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from thepresent Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging thelegislative and executive branches is a radical change in thestructure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of thePresident as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation ofpowers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system ofchecks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revisionof the Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between

amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance.The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts andproposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes arecalled revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, whenproposed through an initiative, are called amendments because thechanges are made by ordinary people who do not make anoccupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC,however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plainlanguage of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory.Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitutionare clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from suchcategorical intent and language.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELECG.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amendConstitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by peoplesinitiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise saidpeoples initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. Theproposition is: Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all electivegovernment officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of

Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of ArticleX of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative willfirst be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12%total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filedwith the COMELEC.

COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition.Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petitionon the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizableby the COMELEC.a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend theConstitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitleon initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

This deliberate omission indicates matter of peoples initiative wasleft to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to provide rulesand regulations for the exercise of peoples initiative. Only Congressis authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.d.Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not torevision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes arevision.e. Congress nor any government agency has not yetappropriated funds for peoples initiative.

ISSUE:Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to theConstitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of ArticleXVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735

It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative on amendmentsto the Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover suchintiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing foramendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While theConstitution has recognized or granted the right of the people todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the peoplecannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not providefor its implementation.

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Actdoes not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayedafterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent asto amendments of the Constitution.

SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Actdoes not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on theConstitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of theConstitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on theConstitution.

THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. Thisconspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the mainthrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and locallaws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to theConstitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle onNational Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope

of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.National initiativewhat is proposed to be enacted is a national law,or a law which only Congress can pass.Local initiativewhat is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of thegovernments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,municipalities, and barangays can pass.Potestas delegata non delegari potest

What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognizedexceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to thePresident; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3]Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to localgovernments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.

COMELEC

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasijudicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form ofdelegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissibledelegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth thereinthe policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by thedelegate; and (b) fixes a standardthe limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate and determinable to which the delegate must conformin the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed tosatisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation

of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELECcannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement theexercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments tothe Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have thatpower under Republic Act No. 6735.


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Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdictionover, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the timeand dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal electionofficers to assist Delfins movement and volunteers in establishingsignature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of theunsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

DELFIN PETITION

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFINPETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a fullcompliance with the power of Congress to implement the right toinitiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested uponthe COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and thatCOMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC actedwithout jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertainingthe Delfin Petition.

The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the requirednumber of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannotbe deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction overa petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the

initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by theCOMELEC, sitting en banc.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained orgiven cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merelyentered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than amere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by theOrder of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, andthe order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memorandato file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, theCOMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutionalamendment.

TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER CTACase No. 4702 April 28, 1995

Facts:Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC) is a domestic corporationexpressly granted a permit by the government via an operatingcontract to explore, develop and utilize mineral deposits found in aspecified portion of a mineral reservation area located in Surigao delNorte and owned by the government. In exchange, TMC is obliged topay royalty to the government over and above other taxes. DuringJuly to December 1989,TMC removed, shipped and sold substantialquantities of Beneficiated Nickel Silicate ore and chromite ore andpaid excise taxes in the amount of Php6,277,993.65 incompliancewith Sec.151(3) of the Tax Code. The 5% excise tax was based onthe amount and weight shown in the provisional invoice issued byTMC. The metallic minerals are then shipped abroad to Japanesebuyers where the minerals were analyzed allegedly by independentsurveyors upon unloading at its port of destination. Analysis abroadwould oftentimes reveal a different value for the metallic mineralsfrom that indicated in the temporary/provisional invoice submitted byTMC. Variance is in themarket values in theprovisional invoice and that indicated in the final calculation sheet

presented by the buyers. Variances occur in the weight of theshipment or the price of the metallic minerals per kilogram andsometimes in their metallic content resulting in discrepancies in thetotal selling price. It is always the price indicated in the final invoicethat is determinative of the amount that the buyers will eventually payTMC. TMC had no quarrel with the price they would receive from theclients for the metallic mineral ssold, but claims that there has beenoverpayment of excise taxes already paid to the governmentdeclaring that the 5% excise tax were based on the amount indicatedin the provisional invoice, and if the excise tax would be based on thefinal invoice, they would be paying less.TMCs contention:

TMC is entitled to a refund because the actual market value thatshould be made the basis of the taxes is the amount specified in theindependent surveyor abroadCommissioner defense:

(1) claim for refund is subject pending administrativeinvestigation; (2) tax was collected in accordance with law;(3) burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to establish theright to refund;(4) mere allegations of refundability do notipso facto merit refund claimed; (5) claims for refund oftaxes are construed strictly against claimant, it being in thenature of an exemption; (6) TMCs right to claim forrefundis already barred after failing to file it within the 2 yearprescriptive period, which should be counted from the timespecified by law for payment and not on the date of actualpayment.

ISSUE:1. WON TMC is entitled to refund2. WON the actual market valuethat should be used should be the market value after the assessmentabroad was conductedHELD:

1. NO. Tax refund partake of the nature of an exemption, and assuch, tax exemption cannot be allowed unless granted in the mostexplicit and categorical language. Taxes are what we pay for civilizedsociety. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lackof the motive power to activate and operate it.2. NO. use marketvalue right after removal from the bed or mines. Sec. 151(3) of theTax Code1: on all metallic minerals, a tax of five percent (5%) basedon the actual market value of the gross output thereof at the time ofremoval, in the case of those locally extracted or produced: or thevalue used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff andcustoms duties, net of excise tax and value-added tax, in case ofimportation. The law refers to the actual market value of the mineralsat the time these minerals were moved away from the position it

occupied, i.e. Philippine valuation and analysis because it is in thiscountry where these minerals were extracted, removed andeventually shipped abroad. To reckon the actual market value at thetime of removal is also consistent with the essence of an excise tax.It is a charge upon the privilege of severing or extracting mineralsfrom the earth, and is due and payable upon removal of the mineralproducts from its bed or mines (Republic Cement vs. Comm, 23SCRA967). The law is clear. It does not speak of actual market valueat the time the mineral products are unloaded at the country ofdestination neither does it speak of the selling price as the basis ofthe excise tax. The law even requires payment of excise taxes uponthe removal of the mineral product or quarry resources from thelocality where mined or upon removal from customs custody in thecase of importations (Sec. 151 of the Tax Code). It would thennecessitate an analysis of these metallic minerals upon its removal tobe able to accomplish the payment of excise taxes as required bylaw. Furthermore, it would be impossible for one to comply with thedate prescribed by law for payment of excise taxes if one has to waitfor the final analysis to be done in the country where it is to beshipped and certainly impractical. This set-up established by thepetitioner is contrary to the principle of administrative feasibility whichis one of the basic principles of a sound tax system. Tax laws shouldbe capable of convenient, just and effective administration which iswhy it fixes a standard or a uniform tax base upon which taxesshould be paid. In the case of excise taxes on mineral and mineralproducts, the basis provided by law is the actual market value ofthese minerals at the time of removal.

MAGALLONA VS ERMITA

Facts:The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing ofRepublic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate themaritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be anarchipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congressamended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened onebaseline and determined new base points of the archipelago.Moreso, it has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and theScarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own


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The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or formerGovernment officials, employees (including contractors), or militarypersonnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not,absent the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any internationaltribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been establishedby the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity orthird country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose ofsurrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless suchtribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers aperson of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree tothe surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to anyinternational tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established bythe UN Security Council, absent the express consent of theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers aperson of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to thesurrender or transfer of that person by the third country to anyinternational tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established bythe UN Security Council, absent the express consent of theGovernment of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the dateon which one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the

Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to applywith respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before theeffective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayoon the status of the non-surrender agreement, AmbassadorRicciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that theexchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreementunder international law; and that, under US law, the said agreementdid not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion torespondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and praysthat it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared aswithout force and effect.

Issue:Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is voidab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral orotherwise at variance with universally recognized principles ofinternational law.

Ruling:The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, itsthreshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a validmedium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargonsisuntenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, asexpressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein thePhilippines adopts the generally accepted principles of internationallaw and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land andadheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with allnations. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted formof international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that hasmany similarities with the private law contract. The agreementconsists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties beingin the possession of the one signed by the representative of theother. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats thetext of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of theletters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmentalheads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to,either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid theprocess of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executiveagreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notesbeing considered a form of executive agreement that becomesbinding through executive action. On the other hand, executiveagreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form ofexchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documentsdenominated agreements or protocols. As former US HighCommissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in hiswork, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other

governments ends and agreements whether denominatedexecutive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin,may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x xIt is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03

be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as anintegral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound

is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding internationalwritten contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variancewith Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio

for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance withallegedly universally recognized principles of international law. Theimmoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, aspetitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibilityfor unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience ofhumanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an Americancriminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlierposition, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, byentering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and inthe process undermined its treaty obligations under the RomeStatute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that thenon-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the SolicitorGeneral, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try andpunish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is arecognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciaryto try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justicefairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression thatthe Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing highcrimes of international concern to escape criminal trial andpunishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may havecommitted acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted

and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent ofthe RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that allthe formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statutehave been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextuallyprohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to internationaltribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, whichmay desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With theview we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative ofinternational law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assumingcriminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over anoffense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the RomeStatute.


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OPOSA VS. FACTORANG.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993

FACTS:The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joinedby their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stockand non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of ourenvironment and natural resources. The original defendant was theHonorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and allegesthat the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."This instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of allexisting timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and tocease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing orapproving new timber license agreements.

Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license

constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resourceproperty and violates their constitutional right to a balanced andhealthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution) and theprotection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Petitionerslikewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthfulenvironment.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint aspecific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which anyrelief is provided by law.

HELD:1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suitbecause they represent their generation as well as generations yetunborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeedinggenerations can only be based on the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecologyis concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world inits entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, interalia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal andconservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end thattheir exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessibleto the present as well as future generations. Every generation has aresponsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for thefull enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a littledifferently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environmentconstitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation toensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that theplaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legalright involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that thecomplaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions basedon unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right theright to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time inour nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in thefundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be foundunder the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any ofthe civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a rightbelongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concernsnothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and

fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which mayeven be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it thecorrelative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. EO 192and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of DENR,under whose authority and office the complaint falls. The petitionersright to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENRs dutyto protect and advance the said right. The petitioners personality tosue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations behalfcan only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibilityinsofar as the said right is concerned.

Tanada v. Angara

Facts:On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by itsSecretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final

Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respectivecompetent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization)

Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994,Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify theWTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreementas it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a selfreliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,

Article XII, providing for the Fi lipino first policy.

Issue:Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreementis unconstitutional

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is notunconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor ofFilipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it

recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the worldon the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection ofFilipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practicesthat are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend topursue an isolation a list policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policyof a self-reliant and independent national economy does notnecessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods andservices. It contemplates neither economic seclusion normendicancy in the international community.The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to theWTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. TheSupreme Court gave due respect to an equal department ingovernment. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faithunless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to thecontrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits orrestricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is nota mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on theparties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations isbound to make its legislations such modifications as may benecessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE PHARMA

WEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358,

Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly

or impliedly. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does

not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On

the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the

state may not be sued without its consent; its clear import then is

that the State may at times be sued. The States consent may be

given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made

through a general law or a special law. x x x Implied consent, on the

other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,

thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.

In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the

level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its


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sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without

qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government

operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made

between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign

function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents,

either expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is

express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides.

On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state enters

into a contract or it itself commences litigation. However, it must be

clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not

automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will

be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has

entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.

[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental

capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. Statutory provisions

waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver

of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.

China National Machinery v. Santamaria

Facts:On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery &Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson,Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with theNorth Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by itspresident, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study ona possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (theNorthrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank)and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered intoa Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China

agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippinegovernment to finance the Northrail Project.3 The Chinesegovernment designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while thePhilippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the

Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceedingUSD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines,Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary JoseIsidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEGsdesignation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract

Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the NorthLuzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis(the Contract Agreement).7 The contract price for the NorthrailProject was pegged at USD 421,050,000.On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bankentered into a counterpart financial agreement Buyer Credit Loan

Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the LoanAgreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Creditin the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippinegovernment in order to finance the construction of Phase I of theNorthrail Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulmentof Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearingto Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifyingthe Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and MandatoryInjunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the ExecutiveSecretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, theNational Economic Development Authority and Northrail. The casewas filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital JudicialRegion, Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the Complaint,respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan

Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b)Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as theGovernment Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No.

1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d)Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the AdministrativeCode.On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denyingCNMEGs Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for summaryhearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for shouldbe issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, whichwas denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus,CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer forthe Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4

April 2008.

the appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which wasdenied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Petitioners Argument: Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bankextended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank wasmandated by the Chinese government, and not because of anymotivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from theforegoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercialtransaction.

Respondents Argument: respondents alleged that the ContractAgreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to(a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184),otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known asthe Administrative Code.

Issues:Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the sovereignPeoples Republic of China.Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executiveagreement between two sovereign states.

Ruling:The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery &Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and theContract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEGs prayer forthe issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIEDfor being moot and academic.

The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity inHoly See v. Rosario,to wit:There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, eachwidely held and firmly established. According to the classical orabsolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, bemade a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. Accordingto the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign isrecognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperiiofa state, but not with regard to private acts or actsjure gestionis.(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suithas been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jureimperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended tocommercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it iscrucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether theentity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed toproprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into betweenEXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract

Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the ContractAgreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of thetransaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which isan inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal theintention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the wholeventure as commercial or proprietary in character.

Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of theContract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14
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September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1 October 2003, and theLoan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct theLuzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performedin the ordinary course of its business.

IMMUNITY OF STATE

Q A judgment was rendered against the National Electrification

Administration to settle the claims of some employees to extend to

them the benefits and allowances to which they are entitled to. Uponits becoming final and executory, a motion for execution was filed

which was granted. A writ of execution was issued and thereafter,

there was garnishment of funds of the NEA to the extent of P16,

581,429.00. There was a motion to quash the writ which was denied,

but ordered the suspension of its implementation. Later on, the RTC

denied the Motion for an Order to Implement the Writ of Execution.

The CA upon petition for certiorari reversed the order ruling that it is

subject to court processes like levy or garnishment. Is the ruling

correct? Why?

ANS: No. Without question, NEA is a GOCC, a juridical personality

separate and distinct from the government, with capacity to sue, and

be sued. (PD 269, Sec. 4). As such, it cannot evade execution; its

funds may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment

rendered against it. However, before execution may proceed against

it, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with

the COA. (Parreo v. COA, G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007).

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section

26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to

examine, audit and settle all debts and claims of any sort due from

or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies andinstrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims

arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or

disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of

appeal by petition for certiorari to the Court.

The rule is that, the funds of NEA cannot be proceeded upon

pursuant to the decision because the decision sought to be satisfied

is not a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of

execution by garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioner

to settle the claims of respondents in accordance with existing

regulations of the COA. (Rule 39, Sec. 9(c), Rules of Court; NEA v.Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007).

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of

those provided in the military bases agreement between phils. and

the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by

the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely

awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific

preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue:

Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise

governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being

sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This

rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence

and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not

petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities

of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them

between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial

and proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends

only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign

sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may

be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed

to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into

business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the

exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral

part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US

and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest

order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or

business purposes.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF

APPEALS

G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from

the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs

real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of

levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The

Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auctionthe Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real

estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for

prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or

temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of

Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and

auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Codeexpressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-

owned and-controlled corporations upon the effectivity of the Local

Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of

statutory construction is that the express mention of one person,

thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among

the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government

Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the

Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.

MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the

Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax

exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to anypublic advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax

creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real

estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax

assessments issued by the City of Paraaque, and all proceedings

taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.


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Held:

1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled

Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an

instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from

local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stockdivided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no

members. A non-stock corporation must have members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers

to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any

other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is

vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate

powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless

the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock

corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not

only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises

the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the

levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all

the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as

these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this

Executive Order.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the

Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public

dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the

Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in

Article 420 of the Civi l Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports

and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The

term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands

and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under

Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings

are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the

Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because

they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and

transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and

other charges from the public does not remove the character of the

Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character

of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of

the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended

for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as

well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk

of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection

of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for

public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing

those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of

taxing all the public including those who never use the particular

public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of

Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being

outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction

sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject tolevy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any

encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of

public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential

public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to

encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the

City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the

600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust

for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the AdministrativeCode allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties

owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee

of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its

executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the

Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of

conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a

Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of

Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficialownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose

was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air

Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic

remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings.

MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any

ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the

Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except

when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for considerationor otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from

payment of the real property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA

leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For

example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to

private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

Heirs of Pidacan v ATO

Facts:

Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo had acquired parcel of land about

22 hectares in San Jose Mindoro Occidental with original title

certificate and issuance of land TCT No. 2204, patent No. 3383.

The ATO (Air Transportation Office) used a portion of land and

constructed an air base new terminal building property upon the

death of the Pidacan spouses.

The heirs of the late Pidacan spouses as represented by Pacita

Pidacan de Zubiri filed a petition for issuance of owners duplicate


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because the old copy (original) was lost and later executed a judicial

settlement for them, unfortunately it was cancelled and TCT was

issued in favor of heirs.

The heirs presented the death certificate of their parents to the ATO

but the latter still refuses to pay; the former allege that the

respondents must pay the rentals plus the value of property to them.

However, ATO insisted that the title was still under their parents

name and it was formerly sold to its predecessor, although they failed

to claim the property because it was just for taxation purposes.

The heirs filed a subsequent complaint for payment of rentals and

property to the respondent on the other hand respondents filed a

complaint for expropriation.

The trial court dismissed the respondents petition and promulgated a

decision that respondents should pay the amount of 6, 249, 645.40

php per month with 12 % interest per annum until same is fully paid,

and 10 % amount must need for expenses of attorneys fees and

litigation.

The heirs moved for reconsideration and were denied; afterwards theformer filed an instant petition alleging the honorable Court of

Appeals grave error and abuse of discretion, disregarding the law in

reversing the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs shall successfully claim the said payment of rentals

and property value from the assailed respondents ATO.

Ruling:

The CA set aside or reversed the trial courts decision knowing that

there was no contract of lease to allege competent evidence among

both parties.

Director of Department of transportation and Communication had a

letter that endorse a person named Parales for immediate payment

rentals but it was a considered a hearsay and still doesnt have any

proof of lease of contract between each parties negotiation.

The petition was GRANTED, the assailed decision was set aside.

However, the RTCs decision was AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION

with regards to the actual area of occupation by the respondent to

the heir petitioner that reckons 304.39 php per square meter of area

expropriated plus the appropriate interest rate of 6% per annum from

this total of 65, 668, 183. 43 until fully paid.

The court decision was deemed pursuant to Article VIII of Sec. 13 of

the constitution.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and

Equity

Facts:

In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS

Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a

government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in

Pasig

The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with

Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter

undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145

housing units

By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with

petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction,

World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon

Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units

Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered

only around "2/3 of each housing unit"

Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional

constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the factthat there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by

the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be

available and forthcoming

Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to

P5,918,315.63

Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988,

DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners'

money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has

earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)

In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated

December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released

for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of

Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303

In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew

the money claims to the DPWH

In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio

Vigilar denied the subject money claims

Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for

Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money

claims plus damages and attorney's fees.

Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997

Issue:

Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners

and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld.

Whether or not the State is immune from suit.

Holding:

Yes.

No.

Ratio:

While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts

are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and

lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition

The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express

declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality

"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to

be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit

Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their

compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment

of the money claims


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2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak

of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to

certain settled exceptions.

The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating

injustice

Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November

11, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security

Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by

the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their

arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in

the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a

complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month

pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, andovertime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security

agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and

severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money

claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security

agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final

and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to

enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and

the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution

the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the

case

Held:

The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may

not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a

recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express

affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the

jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty.

A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical

ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that

makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may

not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be

sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly.

Express consent may be made through a general law or a special

law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State

itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or

when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is

deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party

and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a

waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one

which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and

another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said

to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be

deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it

enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract

relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity

apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the

questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act

proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards

clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent ofthe State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability

arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to

Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim

must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61

and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the

Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by

the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises,

Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land

consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of

Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was

contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the

Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A.

Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his

rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private

respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the

responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.

Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of

Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation

(Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the

three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against

petition

Documents

Polirev Digest