POLICYFOCUSTHE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM NUMBER NINE DECEMBER 1988

WChemical Weapons in the Middle East

BYW. SETHCARUS

The spread of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East has ominous implications forthe United States and its allies. Six countries in the Middle East have the ability to wage chemicalwarfare: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. In contrast, only two countries had more thanlimited capabilities a decade ago. Today, Iraq and Syria have extensive programs, Egypt and Israelappear to have revived largely dormant programs dating to the 1960s, and Iran and Libya haveundertaken major initiatives that will give them extensive capabilities within a few years.

This dangerous proliferation was unleashed by Iraq's extensive employment of poison gasduring the eight year Gulf War: the Iraqis demonstrated that chemical weapons can be of somemilitary importance, that the benefits of using such weapons outweigh the costs, and that the world

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East is an accomplished fact It is too late toprevent the spread of either type of weapon. This poses a potential threat to the United States and to its allies in the region.Fortunately, there are operational constraints that reduce the dangers posed by these weapons and retaliatory policies can reducethe incentive to use them. More specifically:

• At least six Middle East countries manufacture chemical weapons — Syria, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—and the latter four have probably used them. In addition Iran, Syria, and Iraq are reportedly working on chemical warheadsfor ballistic missiles.

• At least five countries in the region have, or are working to acquire, a biological warfare capability: Egypt, Iran,Iraq, Israel, and Syria. Iraq and Syria appear to have the most advanced programs.

• West European and Japanese companies and individuals have played a key role in the construction of facilitiesto manufacture chemical agents, throughout the Middle East.

Efforts to slow the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons must become a high priority of the United States.Among its options are to continue hindering the transfer of production technology, promoting international agreements tostrengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol as well as sanctions against its violators, assisting U.S. allies to acquire defensive gear,and assuring them that the United States will actively support any ally under chemical or biological attack.

-2-

community is unwilling to punish widespreadviolations of international agreements that for-bid the use of chemical weapons.

The growing availability of chemical weap-ons in the Middle East, and the demonstratedwillingness of countries in the region to employpoison gas, justifiably concerns the United Statesand its allies. U.S. military forces stationed inthe area are obviously endangered by chemicalagents. If our forces have to conduct military op-erations in the Middle East, it is increasinglylikely that they would be fighting an enemyarmed with chemical and biological weapons.*Countries friendly to the United States, includ-ing Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, arepotential targets of chemical weapons, a factthat also should worry policy-makers in Wash-ington.

The United States has attempted to deal withthese problems but its policies have been fraughtwith contradictions. Positive steps have includedefforts, under the auspices of the "Australiangroup" - an informal association of Westerncountries - to contain the proliferation of chemi-cal warfare capabilities.

In addition, the United States has supportedinternational efforts to strengthen the GenevaProtocol of 1925 that prohibits the use of lethalchemical agents. The existing agreement doesnot include sanctions against countries thatemploy chemical agents. In January 1989, aninternational conference will be held in Paris toexplore means of strengthening this agreement.

Unfortunately, the beneficial effects of theseinitiatives were more than offset by the failure ofthe United States, the Soviet Union, and othercountries to respond effectively to Iraq's exten-sive use of chemical weapons against the Irani-ans and the Kurds. This inaction resulted from

* See the glossary on page 14 for explanationsof the terms.

a concern that Iraq might lose its war with Iran.The United States deplored Iraq's conduct butnevertheless continued to provide tacit and someovert assistance to the Iraqis. Similarly, effortsby the Congress to impose sanctions on Iraq forits use of chemical weapons were opposed by theadministration.

THE PROLIFERATION OFCHEMICAL WEAPONS

The use of chemical weapons was prohibitedby the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It did not banthe production or possession of chemical agents.Most countries in the Middle East are signato-ries to the agreement, including Egypt, Iran,Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia,and Syria. Kuwait, Libya, and Syria attachedreservations to their ratification indicating thatthis "does not constitute recognition of or in-volve treaty relations with Israel."

Six countries in the Middle East are activelyseeking to enhance their chemical warfare capa-bilities. Although the following accounts arebelieved to be accurate, it is difficult to obtainreliable information on chemical warfare pro-grams.1

Egypt: The Egyptians first acquired chemicalweapons in the early 1960s, and used them dur-ing their intervention in North Yemen. Accord-ing to some U.S. estimates, they are believed tohave mounted 32 attacks involving the use ofpoison gas, possibly including the use of nerveagents, between 1963 and 1967. It appears thatthese munitions were provided to the Egyptiansby the Soviet Union but some of them couldhave come from British stocks of mustard gasabandoned in Egypt after the Second WorldWar.

The Egyptians were never condemned fortheir use of chemical weapons in Yemen. Mostcountries tolerated the Egyptian actions becausethey were unwilling to jeopardize their relations

-3-

with Egypt. The United Nations refused to getinvolved, despite complaints by Saudi Arabia tothe Secretary-General. Indeed, many expertsrefused to accept reports that Egypt had usedchemical weapons. This failure to act by theinternational community set an unfortunateprecedent that presaged the lack of response toIraq's use of chemical weapons in the 1980s.

During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptianforces deployed in the Sinai were well-providedwith personal protection gear and decontami-nation equipment. A facility for filling aircraftbombs with chemical agents may have beencaptured by Israel at the forward Egyptian airbase at El Arish. Reports that chemical agentsalso were found there have never been con-firmed.

By the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,Egyptian chemical warfare capabilities had grownconsiderably. The entire Egyptian army wasequipped with protective gear, much of it ofconsiderable sophistication. In addition, theEgyptian army had aircraft bombs and probablyartillery ammunition, including short-rangerockets, for the delivery of chemicals.

Analysts in the United States believe that theEgyptian chemical program was not intendedfor offensive purposes. One school of thoughthas argued that Egypt acquired the chemicals toprotect against a decisive defeat like that suf-fered in 1967. Egyptian chemical capabilitieslimited the kinds of military operations thatIsrael could conduct. In addition, possession ofchemical weapons reduced Israel's ability tomount retaliatory strikes in the event Egypt didwell on the battlefield.

Whatever the rationale for the program,Egypt has not used chemical weapons since1967. Significantly, it has never used themagainst Israel despite suffering military defeatsin 1967, 1970, and 1973 at the hands of theIsraeli military. This strongly suggests that thepotential benefits of employing chemicals did

not match the probable costs of Israeli retali-ation.

Egypt continues work on its chemical pro-gram. Currently, it is manufacturing chemicalagents, probably including nerve gas and mus-tard gas. Egypt may be producing precursorchemicals needed to make poison gases. It isalso able to make the munitions needed todeliver chemical agents, including aircraftbombs, short-range artillery rockets, and artil-lery shells. The Egyptian army continues tostage chemical exercises on a regular basis.

It is possible that the Badr 2000 (also knownas the Condor-2) surface-to-surface missile beingdeveloped by Egypt and Argentina may be in-tended to carry chemical munitions. This sug-gests that the Egyptians may want to keep openthe option of acquiring a strategic chemicalwarfare capability.

Israel: The development of a chemical war-fare capability in Israel was a response to theEgyptian program in the 1960s. According toU.S. officials, by 1973 the Israeli military had anoffensive chemical warfare capability. There issome evidence that during the past few years theIsraeli military has upgraded its offensive chemi-cal warfare capabilities. It is believed that theIsraelis have stocks of mustard gas and that theyprobably make nerve gases of the V-agent family.The Israelis are reported to have manufacturingcapabilities for chemical agents in the Negev.

The Israeli military appears to consider of-fensive chemical capabilities to be an essentialdeterrent. Israel is the only country in theregion to have a comprehensive program toprotect their civilian population from gas at-tacks.

Iraq: The Iraqis are believed to have at leastfive chemical warfare facilities. The best knownis the extensive complex at Samarra, which hasstorage bunkers and production plants designedto make two nerve agents (Tabun and Sarin at

the rate of 50 tons per year for each) andmustard gas (720 tons per year). In addition, theIraqis have a research and development facilityat Salman Pak which may be working on devel-opment of more lethal nerve agents like VX. Aplant at Falluja is believed to make precursorsnecessary for the production of chemical agents.There may be additional facilities in the easterndeserts of Iraq. The Iraqis also may be workingon a chemical warhead for their existing surface-to-surface missiles, or for the Badr 2000 missilebeing developed by Egypt and Argentina withIraqi funding.

The first confirmed use of chemicals by theIraqis against the Iranians took place in March1983. Since then, about 45,000 Iranians andKurds have been killed or wounded by Iraqichemicals, according to Iranian estimates. Bothcivilians and soldiers were targets of the chemi-cal attacks. Iraq's use of chemical agents hasbeen amply confirmed by several U.N. investiga-tions carried out since 1984.

Taha Yasin Ramadan, a member of Iraq'sRevolutionary Command Council and its FirstDeputy Prime Minister, when asked to react tointernational condemnation of Iraq's use ofchemical weapons, expressed the followingopinions to an Egyptian newspaper in May 1988:

We cannot rely on the idea that the interna-tional community will end the war, and we alsoreject any move by the international communityto ask us not to use certain weapons. I agree thatthe international community is weak.2

The Iraqi attitude toward chemical weaponswas reflected in a statement made by a seniorIraqi military official, Maj. Gen. Maher AbdulRashid, to the Western press in 1984: "If you gaveme a pesticide to throw at these swarms of insectsto make them breathe and become extermi-nated, I'd use it."8

Iran: The current policy of the Iranian gov-ernment concerning chemical and biologicalweapons was articulated by Hojy at ol-Eslam Akbar

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranianparliament and acting commander-in-chief ofits military forces, in the fall of 1988:

Chemical and biological weapons are poorman's atomic bombs and can easily be produced.We should at least consider them for our defense.Although the use of such weapons is inhuman,the war taught us that international laws are onlydrops of ink on paper.4

The first documented use of chemical agentsby Iran only took place in 1988. According toIraqi accounts, 110 of their soldiers fell victim tosuch attacks. It is generally believed that addi-tional small-scale attacks may have taken placepreviously. Some of Iran's first supplies of chemi-cal agents may have come from unexplodedIraqi ordnance.

The Iranians are currently able to manufac-ture limited quantities of poison gases, mainlymustard gas but probably also nerve agents.They have embarked on a major effort to signifi-cantly upgrade their manufacturing capabili-ties. According to British reports, in early 1988a German chemical company agreed to build alarge pesticide plant for the Iranians which willprobably be used to make nerve agents. Thereis some evidence that the Iranians are trying todevelop chemical warheads for some of theirsurface-to-surface missiles.

Syria: The first supplies of chemical muni-tions arrived in Syria in 1972, when Egypt pro-vided artillery ammunition filled with chemicalagents. In addition, by the time of the 1973Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet Union had provideda considerable quantity of chemical defensegear. According to one report, the Syriansacquired additional chemical warfare capabili-ties from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakiain the subsequent decade.

During the past five years, the Syrians haveconsiderably expanded their chemical warfarecapabilities. The Soviet Union refused to supplyproduction facilities but the Syrians were able to

-5-

obtain the necessary technology from compa-nies in Western Europe. At least one WestGerman company supplied some of the equip-ment needed to set up a chemical weaponslaboratory in the early 1980s. By 1986, theSyrians were able to manufacture chemicalagents, reportedly concentrating on the nerveagent Sarin.

The Syrian chemical warfare program oper-ates under the auspices of CERS, a researchorganization located near Damascus. Additionalfacilities of an unknown type may be located inHorns, a city north of Damascus.

Although the Soviet Union is not known tohave been involved in Syria's efforts to manufac-ture chemical agents, it has maintained a closewatch over the Syrian chemical warfare pro-gram. Col. Gen. Vladimir Pikalov, commanderof Soviet chemical warfare forces, visited Syria inMarch, 1988. At the time, the Syrians claimedthat he was "boosting the Syrian Armed Forces'combat ability to confront the imperialist-Zion-ist aggression against the Arab nation."5 In Sep-tember, after such reports were mentioned inthe Western press, the Soviets stated that "theseassertions are not in accordance with reality ...The U.S.S.R. does not transfer chemical weap-ons to other countries and does not teach themhow to produce such weapons."6

Libya: In mid-1987, Libyan aircraft attemptedto attack Chadian soldiers with chemical agents.The planes missed the intended targets and nocasualties resulted. It appears that this capabil-ity may have been provided by Iran. Reportedly,the Iranians supplied the Libyans with nerveagents in 1987 in return for naval mines andSCUD B surface-to-surface missiles.

The first indications that Libya intended tobuild chemical warfare plants surfaced in 1986.By late 1988, it was believed that the Libyanswere ready to start production. According toWilliam Webster, Director of the Central Intelli-gence Agency, the Libyans have built one of the

largest chemical weapons complexes in theworld. Reportedly, it is located approximately80 kilometers south of Tripoli.

Construction of the chemical weaponscomplex is believed to have been the work ofJapanese and West European companies. JapanSteel Works reportedly built a factory to manu-facture aircraft bombs capable of being filledwith chemical agents. European companieswere apparently responsible for the construc-tion of the plant making the chemical agents.Significantly, even though the Soviet Unionprovided Libya with defensive equipment, itrefused to provide agents in the quantitiesneeded for operational use or to assist Libya inthe production of chemical weapons.

THE PROLIFERATION OFBIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND TOXINS

The spread of biological weapons and toxinsis a growing concern for the United States.According to CIA Director Webster, 'The moralbarrier to biological warfare has been breached.At least 10 countries are working to producebiological weapons."7 Some of these nations arelocated in the Middle East.

Biological agents and toxins are substan-tially different from chemical weapons. Biologi-cal weapons are living organisms that causedisease, killing or incapacitating the victims.Among the organisms known to be used for bio-logical warfare are bacteria like plague, anthrax,and cholera. All are highly lethal. Production ofsuch agents is relatively simple, although ex-treme precautions need to be taken againstinfection.

Large quantities of bacteria can be grown inrelatively short periods of time so that it is notnecessary to maintain large stocks of infectiousmaterial in order to maintain a biological war-fare capability. The U.S. government estimatesthat only 96 hours are required for the entireprocess involved in the production of anthrax.

-6-

Toxins are poisons. They are not biologicalagents, although in many cases they can be pro-duced easily using biological means, typically us-ing bacteria cultures. Unlike biological weap-ons they are not self-reproducing. Thus, there isless risk of unintended consequences with tox-ins than with biological agents. They are usedlike chemical weapons. Relatively little is knownabout the military use of toxins but it is com-monly believed that they are potentially moredangerous than chemical agents.

Fifteen years ago, officials in the UnitedStates were convinced that biological weaponswere too dangerous to be used. Excessively viru-lent agents could be as much a threat to friendlyforces as to the foe. This explains the willingnessof the United States to accept the 1972 treatybanning the use and possession of biologicalagents and toxins.

Advances in biology, however, are leadingmany experts in the U.S. government to reassessthis comfortable conclusion. It may now bepossible to modify existing organisms or to cre-ate new ones that might be militarily useful. Anumber of countries in the Middle East may becapable of conducting such research.

The possession and use of biological agentsand toxins was prohibited by the 1972 BiologicalWeapons Convention. The treaty was signed byseveral countries in the Middle East includingEgypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, SaudiArabia, and Syria. However, Egypt, Iraq, andSyria have not ratified the agreement, so are notnecessarily bound to follow its provisions. Thesecountries are among the states in the region thatmay have developed a capability to produce bio-logical weapons.

Egypt, Iraq, and Syria are all thought topossess biological agents, and Iran and Israelhave the capability to produce them. It is likelythat work is being done on toxins in severalcountries, including Iraq.

Egypt is believed to have worked on acquir-ing biological weapons during the 1960s. In theearly 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar Sadatsaid that "we have the instruments of biologicalwarfare in the refrigerators." However, hestressed that **we will not use them unless they[the Israelis] begin to use them."8 The Egyptiansmade no use of biological agents during the1973 war with Israel.

The Iraqis are believed to have been work-ing on biological agents for several years andnow are believed to have biological weapons intheir inventory, possibly including toxins. Re-ports from Iran that the Iraqis have used biologi-cal agents against the Kurds have not been con-firmed and should be considered of doubtfulaccuracy.

Syria is known to have an active biologicalwarfare program. It appears that the Syrianshave stocks of biological agents that could beused against an enemy, but it is not known if theyhave acquired any sophisticated delivery sys-tems. It is possible that Syria has received someassistance from North Korea which has a long-standing biological warfare program.

Two other countries have the ability to pro-duce biological agents, but there is no firmevidence that they have the ability to use them incombat. The Iranians have said that theyintend to acquire biological weapons but little isknown of their capabilities. Knowledgeableobservers believe that Israel has the ability toproduce biological agents, although it may notcurrently have a biological warfare capability.

OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ONCHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons are horrifying and poten-tially devastating. About a milligram of nervegas is sufficient to kill a man: this implies thatabout a kilogram would be enough to kill onemillion people. For these reasons, efforts have

-7-

been made to ban chemical weapons since thebeginning of the century.

However, it is important to recognize thatthe real effectiveness of chemical weapons islikely to be considerably less than their theoreti-cal effectiveness. Less than a teaspoon of mus-tard gas can kill a man if it is inhaled quickly intothe lungs. Nevertheless, during the First WorldWar, more than 60 pounds of mustard gas wereused for each man killed or wounded. More-over, only2% of the people who were affected bymustard gas died.

There is no reason to believe that the situ-ation is any different today. According to theIranians, through April 8,1987, out of a total of27,571 victims of Iraqi chemical weapons only262 died. In other words, more than 99% of thevictims of poison gas survived. On the otherhand, when the Iraqis used substantial quanti-ties of chemicals against the Kurdish town ofHalabja, which was unable to defend againstIraqi aircraft dropping chemical bombs andwhich lacked the most rudimentary chemicaldefenses, several thousand people died.

The difference between the two experiencescomes from several factors. Chemical agents arehighly unpredictable. They are very sensitive toweather conditions, including temperature,wind, and atmospheric pressure. Even with highquality weather forecasting it is difficult to ascer-tain accurately the specific conditions that willexist at a particular place.

Effective chemical attacks require the use ofsubstantial quantities. This is evident in the fol-lowing estimates, which assume contaminationof a one square kilometer area so that 50% of thepeople present are killed or injured. It assumespeople are not wearing chemical defensive gear.If the agent is in the air, 21 tons of phosgenewould be needed, 4 tons of mustard gas, 2 tonsof Tabun, or 0.5 tons of Sarin. If spread on theground, 19 tons of mustard gas would be neces-sary, 14 tons of Tabun, or 2 tons of VX. In com-

parison, total Iraqi production of Tabun andSarin was only 100 tons per year in 1986.

Use of defensive gear, however, can signifi-cantly reduce casualties. According to one esti-mate made by the Swedish military, a unit wear-ing gas masks when attacked from the air bySarin might suffer only 5% light casualties.However, if its countermeasures were ineffec-tive, 80% of the people affected would die or beseverely incapacitated and the remaining 20%would become light casualties. Although othercountries have developed slightly different esti-mates, they all demonstrate that casualties aresignificantly reduced when people are protectedby the appropriate defensive gear.

Among the standard defensive systems aregas masks and protective clothing to preventinhalation of chemicals and to guard againstphysical contact. Vehicles can be designed toprevent the penetration of gases. Decontamina-tion systems are available to neutralize chemicalagents on equipment and on the ground. Inaddition, the danger from nerve gas can bereduced by ingesting certain medicines prior toexposure. Soldiers can be supplied with anti-dote substances to be given after exposure tonerve agents that will reduce the lethality of thegas. Devices are also available that can detect thepresence of chemical agents, even over longdistances. Such equipment can significantlyreduce the danger posed by chemical attacks.

These defenses are not perfect, however,and the operational costs of defending againstchemical agents can be quite high. Soldiers canspend only limited periods of time in protectivesuits. This is especially true when temperaturesare high, a common condition in the MiddleEast. For example, the standard Soviet chemicalsuit, which is made of a rubber compound, canbe worn for only 15 to 20 minutes in tempera-tures of more than 86° F. As a result, it is highlyunlikely that sustained, intensive military opera-tions could be conducted if troops were re-quired to wear a full panoply of defensive sys-

-8-

tems. An additional problem, also acute in theMiddle East, is the requirement for large quan-tities of water to decontaminate equipment.

For this reason the United States believesthat it is necessary to rely on deterrence as wellas on defense in the chemical arena. An adver-sary who knows that his forces will be attacked bychemical agents is unlikely to be the first toinitiate the use of chemicals. The impact on op-erational effectiveness, especially when attempt-ing to conduct offensive operations, is simplytoo great to be sustained.

Conditions are considerably different for airforces than for ground units. Aircraft are notparticularly vulnerable to chemical agents whenin the air but can easily be contaminated whileon the ground. However, air bases are generallyamong the best protected installations main-tained by most military forces. Air bases aredesigned to operate even when under enemy airattack.

In the best protected air bases, like those op-erated by the Israeli Air Force, most critical in-stallations are located underground. Aircraftand personnel have to leave the protection ofthe hardened facilities only when taking off andlanding. By adding appropriate chemical de-fenses to air bases it is possible to continueoperating aircraft even if the airfields are at-tacked with chemical weapons.

The most serious threat to air bases fromchemical attacks may stem from the need to sus-tain operations over a long period of time.Operating continuously in an enclosed environ-ment is likely to affect performance and toreduce the number of aircraft missions that canbe flown.

Several years ago, a U.S. Air Force official es-timated that an air base contaminated with per-sistent chemical munitions would have its abilityto generate aircraft missions reduced by half.However, it appears that it is possible to reduce

significantly the impact of chemical attacksthrough proper training and the use of appro-priate defensive equipment.

The greatest impact of chemical munitionsis on ground forces forced to wear defensivegear for prolonged periods due to the threat ofa chemical attack. This can significantly reducefighting power and provides a major incentive touse chemical agents. However, the incentive issignificantly reduced if the opponent has theability to retaliate with poison gas.

Ultimately, chemicals are most effective whenused against people who have no protective gearand who are unable to retaliate with their owngas weapons. It is civilians who are most vulner-able to chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL WARFARE ANDTHE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

Recent initiatives by Syria to strengthen itschemical warfare capabilities, coupled with Iraq'smassive use of chemical weapons, have intensi-fied concern that chemical weapons might beused in a future Arab-Israeli war. At present, themain focus is on the possibility that Syria mightlaunch chemical attacks against populationcenters. In the future, however, the problem islikely to become more acute as Libya and Iraqacquire long range ballistic missiles armed withchemical warheads.

Syria may be tempted to employ chemicalweapons against Israel in an effort to overcomethe disparity in conventional military powerbetween the two countries. According to awidely espoused point of view, the massive em-ployment of chemical munitions in the openingstages of a war could provide Syria with substan-tial military benefits.

Chemical strikes against Israeli air bases,equipment storage facilities for reserve forma-tions, and other critical installations, would thor-

-9-

oughly disrupt Israeli military activities in theopening stages of a war. Contamination of airbases, according to this argument, would pre-vent Israeli aircraft from operating during thecritical opening hours of the conflict. Attackson equipment sites would inhibit mobilizationof reserve units and keep them from reinforcingforces at the front. According to this school ofthought, chemical weapons might thereby pro-vide Syria with the margin needed to achieve avictory.

The Syrians also may believe that they couldbenefit from employment of chemical weaponsin circumstances in which they did not expect toinflict a total defeat on Israel. For example, theycould launch an attack to capture the GolanHeights and then use chemical agents to stop anIsraeli counterattack. Alternatively, they mightchoose to use chemical weapons against popula-tion centers to spread panic and to underminethe morale of the Israeli people.

Israel, however, has taken steps to reducesignificantly the danger from chemical weaponsattacks. Three initiatives are involved in thiseffort. If fully implemented they will signifi-cantly reduce the potential effectiveness of Syria'suse of chemical weapons.

First, the Israelis have acquired gear to pro-tect soldiers and civilians against chemical agents.Special efforts have been made to protect criti-cal military installations. Israeli air bases areamong the best protected in the world, and canoperate even after a chemical attack by provid-ing environmental protection systems for air-craft shelters and hangars.

Israel is one of the few countries in the worldto provide chemical defense gear to its entirepopulation and drills are conducted periodi-cally to train civilians to respond to chemicalattacks. Although civil defense capabilities arenot perfect, Israeli civilians have access to a levelof protection found nowhere else in the region.

Second, the Israelis have the ability to mountretaliatory chemical strikes. Syrian militaryoperations against Israel are therefore likely tobe severely impeded if Israel uses poison gas. Al-though the Soviets have provided the Syrianswith a considerable amount of protective gearagainst chemicals, it is unlikely that the Syrianscould mount offensive operations under chemi-cal conditions. Even their ability to conductdefensive operations would be called into ques-tion. Missile batteries and radar sites contami-nated by chemical agents may be difficult tooperate and repair.

Third, Israel has made it clear that Syrian useof chemical weapons, especially against civiliantargets, is likely to result in massive retaliatoryconventional attacks. Israel is one place wherethe outside world is likely to know very quickly ofpoison gas attacks. Images of civilians killed orwounded by chemical agents are likely to have adramatic impact and would provide a compel-ling justification for severe Israeli reprisal raidsagainst Syria. Hence, the use of chemicals wouldmake sense only if Syria thought that it couldprevent such retaliatory strikes from taking place,which is not now a very likely prospect.

Equally important, the current strategic en-vironment tends to mitigate against Syrian useof chemical weapons. Syria's leaders believethat they must achieve strategic parity beforethey will be able to launch an all-out militaryattack against Israel. They recognize that theyhave not yet achieved strategic parity with Israel.As a result, most military experts agree thatduring the next few years a Syrian attack onIsrael is most likely to have limited objectives.

So long as the Syrians fight for limited objec-tives, they are unlikely to employ chemicalweapons. Launching chemical attacks on popu-lation centers would automatically convert anominally limited war into a total war, under-mining the intended strategic result. Certainly,Israel's leaders have made it quite clear that theywould retaliate harshly in response to any use of

-10-

chemical weapons against civilians. Even achemical attack aimed at tactical or strategicmilitary targets that caused civilian casualtieswould provoke massive Israeli retaliation. GivenIsrael's small size, it would be difficult to containthe effects of a chemical strike. Israel's sensitiv-ity to the loss of life, together with the associa-tion of chemical weapons with the Holocaust,would ensure a swift, disproportionate response.

Even if no civilian casualties result from theuse of chemical agents, it is not clear that Syriawould benefit from the introduction of chemi-cal agents on the battlefield where ground forcesare engaged in combat. Although the effective-ness of Israeli troops is likely to be reduced ifthey are subjected to chemical attacks, the use ofchemicals in a constricted area like the GolanHeights poses problems for the Syrians as well.Even if Israel did not retaliate with its ownchemical attacks, Syrian troops would inevitablybe affected by their own poison gases and wouldhave to don their chemical protective gear. Thiswould make it harder for Syrian troops to sustainan offensive.

More ominously for the Syrians, should Is-rael retaliate by launching chemical attacksagainst advancing armored columns, support-ing artillery units, and air defense units, it islikely that the Syrian offensive would grind to ahalt. Israeli chemical attacks on radars, surface-to-air missile batteries, and antiaircraft artillerycould open the way for devestating Israeli airstrikes on Syrian ground forces.

Syria is most likely to employ chemical weap-ons at the start of an all-out war intended toinflict a decisive military defeat on Israel. Yet,even under such circumstances, the Syrians arelikely to attack cities only to disrupt the mobili-zation of reserves. Until they have neutralizedcritical military targets, and especially air bases,they have little reason to divert their chemicalattacks onto population centers. Massive attackson civilian areas might kill a great many people,but will not by themselves win a war.

At the same time, restraint would benefit theSyrians. So long as Syria could threaten Israelwith the use of poison gas, Israel would havepowerful incentives to prevent a limited warfrom escalating out of control. By threateningto use chemical weapons the Syrians can con-strain Israeli action, preventing attacks on criti-cal strategic installations in Syria's heartland.

Syria's chemical weapons program is also ananswer to the Israeli nuclear capability. It is aguarantee against total Syrian defeat. So long asIsrael has to worry about the Syrian use of chemi-cal weapons, Damascus will not be in jeopardy.Hence, the chemical weapons in essence limitIsraeli freedom of action and ensure Syria againstmilitary defeat. The availability of chemicalagents to the Syrians will force Israeli decision-makers to act in ways that take account of thepossibility of chemical warfare breaking out.

In the next few years, however, this equationwill be altered as a growing number of countriesacquire ballistic missiles armed with chemicalwarheads. Such missiles can be made opera-tional in a short period of time and can fly longdistances in only a few minutes. When Iraq andLibya have weapons of this type it will becomeconsiderably more difficult to maintain stabilityin the region.

THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

The United States has adopted initiatives oftwo kinds in its efforts to stop the spread ofchemical weapons. First, it has joined with otherWestern nations in a cooperative effort to pre-vent countries in the Third World from acquir-ing chemical warfare capabilities. This has in-volved controls on the sale of manufacturingequipment and the supply of the chemical pre-cursors required in the production of chemicalagents. Second, it has proposed arms controlinitiatives that would eliminate existing stock-piles of chemicals.

-11-

Operating under the auspices of the "Austra-lian group," which has 16 members, the UnitedStates has made efforts to prevent countries likeIraq from obtaining manufacturing equipmentand precursors. These countries have adoptedregulations to control the export of materialsthat could be used in the production of chemi-cal weapons. For example, the United States hasissued regulations that prohibit the transfer ofcertain precursors to Iran, Iraq, or Syria. Simi-larly, attempts have been made to stop the flowof manufacturing equipment to these countriesthat could be used in the production of chemi-cal agents.

These efforts to control the proliferation ofchemical weapons have failed. At least threecountries in the region, Iran, Iraq, and Syria,have acquired a significant ability to manufac-ture chemical agents in the past five years and afourth country, Libya, is on the verge of doingso. Intensive efforts by the United States and itsallies have not kept these countries from acquir-ing the specialized production equipmentneeded to make poison gases.

Attempts to limit production of chemicalagents through restrictions on the flow of chemi-cals needed to make poison gases have alsofailed. In addition, even if it were possible toprevent proliferating countries from obtainingprecursors, this would not matter since they canmake the precursors themselves.

To a certain extent, the failure of the UnitedStates and its allies to prevent the spread ofchemical weapons results from the intractabilityof the problem. Much of the technology andmany of the chemicals have legitimate uses. Forexample, the production of phosgene gas forcommercial purposes in the United Statesamounts to one million tons a year.

Because of the substantial legal market forthe chemicals used to manufacture chemicalagents, it is difficult to prevent countries likeIraq and Libya from obtaining them through

subterfuge. The profits involved in these trans-actions are substantial and many brokers arewilling to violate export laws.

Moreover, because the technology is similarto that involved in the manufacture of otherchemical substances it is difficult to detect chemi-cal production facilities. Indeed, a factory mak-ing nerve gases may look identical to one mak-ing pesticides. The only difference evident tothe outside observer might be the high securityassociated with a chemical weapons plant.

Despite the difficulties, more could havebeen done to prevent the transfer of productionfacilities and chemicals to proliferating coun-tries. Most of the technology used to makechemical agents originally came from WesternEurope or Japan. Even after it was widely knownthat countries in the Middle East were activelyseeking to acquire chemical agents, companiesand individuals in Western Europe and Japancontinued to provide equipment and chemicalsto Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

The failure of some of our closest allies tomonitor the activities of their own nationals inthe past few years is a scandal of major propor-tions. This was suggested recently by Tariq 'Aziz,Iraq's Foreign Minister:

If Iraq or Iran or any other Third World state issuddenly in a position to produce chemical weap-ons, it is clear that the raw materials and facilitieswere obtained from industrial countries. Europe isthe main source in this respect. For Europe to beoutraged and shed crocodile tears is pure hypoc-risy.9

The prospects for arms control in the area ofchemical weapons are equally poor. Existingarms control agreements in this area have notbeen successful. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, andLibya are all signatories to the Geneva Protocolsof 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical agentsbut that did not stop them from making use ofchemical weapons.

-12-

Several of the chief proliferators are coun-tries that are not generally considered respon-sible members of the international community.Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have all been identi-fied by the United States as nations that sponsorinternational terrorism. Under the circum-stances, it is difficult to believe that any countryin the region would implement arms control re-gimes requiring them to destroy their invento-ries of chemical weapons.

It also should be stressed that the ability ofthe United States to induce countries in theregion to abandon poison gas is limited at best.Several countries, including Iran, Libya, andSyria, are hostile to the United States, and ourrelationship with Iraq is brittle at best.

Even our friends in the Middle East are un-likely to be receptive to efforts to ban chemicalmunitions. Both Egypt and Israel appear to relyon chemical weapons to provide a retaliatory ca-pability and as long as other countries in theregion possess such weapons they are likely to bereluctant to abandon one of their chief re-sponses to chemical attacks. Moreover, thebehavior of the international community dur-ing the Iran-Iraq War provides little reason foreither country to believe that countries initiat-ing the use of poison gas are likely to be pun-ished.

The effectiveness of an arms control regimeis dependent on its enforceability. Monitoringchemical inventories is difficult at best so thatmuch would depend on the willingness of coun-tries in the region to accept intrusive examina-tion of suspected stockpiles. It is unlikely thatany country in the area would willingly acceptsuch an agreement.

Arms controls also depend on the effective-ness of the sanctions imposed against violators.Experience over the past 25 years provides littlereason to believe that the international commu-nity would take serious steps to punish a countryfound to be stocking or using chemicals. It will

probably be difficult to convince anyone in theregion of the worth of an arms control agree-ment dependent on the effective enforcementof international sanctions.

These observations suggest that we shouldhave a realistic attitude about what could beachieved through such efforts. Under the bestcircumstances it will not be easy to negotiatewith countries in the region to obtain a verifi-able and acceptable chemical arms agreement.

At the same time, there are important bene-fits to be gained from arms control initiatives.The effort involved in negotiating treaties canproduce valuable benefits, even if no agreementis reached, by molding international attitudestoward the use of such weapons. The mostpowerful potential disincentive against the useof chemical and biological weapons is the hostil-ity of the international community. Sanctionswill be effective only if there is a widespreadwillingness to enforce rules and regulations.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

Stopping the proliferation of chemical andbiological weapons will be a major focus of U.S.foreign policy. George Bush emphasized that"one of my highest priorities as president will beto deal with this terrible scourge."10 A firm com-mitment from the president and other highofficials is a prerequisite if progress is to bemade.

First, efforts to hinder the transfer of pro-duction technology and of chemical precursorsto countries making chemical weapons shouldbe continued. Factories deteriorate especiallywhen making substances as corrosive as chemi-cal agents. Hence, countries making chemicalagents will remain in the market for the special-ized equipment and for chemicals. This will notprevent countries from making chemical weap-ons. However, by making it difficult to acquiresuch materials the rates of production can beslowed and the costs can be increased.

-13-

Second, the United States should continueto promote international agreements tostrengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Theprocess of negotiating such accords helps de-fine international opinion and it is in everyone'sinterest that chemical and biological weaponscontinue to be outlawed.

At the same time, we should be realisticabout the difficulties of achieving a verifiableban on the production and the use of chemicalweapons. A treaty that shields potential viola-tors, by allowing them to conduct activities underthe protective cover of an arms control agree-ment, may be worse than no agreement at all.The difficulties inherent in efforts to identifyproduction facilities are well known but it maybe even harder to prove the use of chemicalweapons.

Third, the United States should assist itsallies in the Middle East to acquire defensesagainst chemical weapons. Since defensive gearcan substantially reduce the effectiveness ofchemical agents, its availability will diminish thetemptation to use poison gases against our friendsin the region. These efforts should focus oncountries that do not possess chemical agents inorder to reduce the incentives for those nationsto acquire such weapons.

Fourth, the United States should provideassurances that it will militarily support friendlycountries attacked by chemical or biologicalweapons. This would reduce the incentives forthe use of such weapons against our friends. Inaddition, we should make it clear that the UnitedStates will not restrain conventional retaliationby any of our allies subjected to chemical orbiological attacks

Fifth, the United States should assign a highpriority to bilateral negotiations with the SovietUnion intended to enhance efforts to controlthe proliferation of chemical weapons. TheSoviet Union has repeatedly expressed alarmover the spread of such weapons. This could

indicate a willingness by the Soviets to work withthe United States to address this problem. Thecountries in the Middle East most likely to usechemical weapons, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, main-tain close relations with the Soviet Union andmay be susceptible to pressure from Moscow.

Sixth, the Congress should increase its over-sight of the issue. It should require mandatoryreporting from executive agencies, on a classi-fied basis if necessary, of developments in theproliferation of chemical and biological agents.In addition, to inhibit the future use of theseweapons strict sanctions should be legislatedagainst countries known to be using chemical orbiological agents. These sanctions could besimilar to those imposed on countries involvedin terrorism.

Seventh, the United States should continueto promote efforts to hinder the proliferation ofmissiles that could be used to deliver chemicalor biological agents at long ranges. This re-quires continued enforcement of the provisionsof the Missile Technology Control Regime andbilateral negotiations. In addition, the Con-gress should consider enacting legislation toimpose sanctions on Western companies withaccess to American technology that are involvedin the proliferation of ballistic missiles. W

W. Seth Cams is a Fellow at The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy. This is his third PolicyFocus. Dr. Cams has written extensively on modernwarfare.

The views expressed in this research memorandumare those of the author and should not be taken asnecessarily representing the opinions of the Board ofTrustees of the Washington Institute.

-14-

END NOTES GLOSSARY

1. The account that follows is based on a variety of sources.Background is provided by a five volume work produced bythe Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare (NewYork: Humanities Press, 1971). The Christian ScienceMonitor provided an excellent survey of the current trendsin a series of articles that appeared December 13-16,1988.The best single source of information on chemical warfarein the Middle East is a BBC documentary, "The Secrets ofSamarra," released in 1986 but never shown in the UnitedStates, and a related story by Herbert Krosney, "Poison Gas:Iraq's Deadly Weapon of Last Resort."

2. Interview in Cairo AlMusawwar (Arabic), May 20,1988,as translated by FBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia,May 20, 1988, pp. 18-19.

3. "Is Baghdad Using Poison Gas?," Newsweek, March 19,1984, pp. 39-40.

4. Tehran IRNA (English), October 19,1988, as reported inFBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, October 19,1988, pp. 55-56.

5. Damascus Television Service (Arabic), March 23,1988, andDamascus SANA (Arabic), March 24,1988, as translated byFBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, March 29,1988,pp. 49-50.

6. Argumenty IFakty (Russian), September 3-9,1988, p. 2, astranslated by FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, September 2,1988, pp. 6-7.

7. Bill Gertz, Washington Times, December 13,1988, p. A5.Webster made a similar statement on October 25,1988, asreported by David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, October 25,1988, p. A2.

8. SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol.II, p. 241.

9. Interview in Der Spiegel (German), November 14,1988, astranslated in FBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia,November 15, 1988, p. 21.

10. Speech given at the University of Toledo (Ohio) on Oc-tober 21, 1988.

• Biological Warfare — The use of bacteria and vi-ruses to incapacitate or kill people or animals. Among theorganisms known to be used for biological warfare arebacteria like plague, anthrax, and cholera. Some biologi-cal agents, like anthrax, are lethal in small doses, killingthe victims in a short period of time if they are notpromptly given medical treatment. Many biological agentsbecome ineffective soon after they are released into theenvironment, but others may not disappear for decades.

• Chemical Warfare — The use of chemical sub-stances to kill or incapacitate people or animals. Amongthe chemical agents that have been used are mustard gas,nerve gas, and phosgene.

• Mustard Gas — A chemical agent, first used inWorld War One, that causes severe blistering. In severecases it can cause death. Normally spread in small drop-lets, it can persist for extended periods of time. It is stillconsidered highly effective and most countries with chemi-cal agents possess at least some stocks of mustard gas. Iraqused it extensively during the Gulf War.

• Nerve Gas — These substances interfere with thefunctioning of the nervous system, causing death in amatter of minutes. Nerve agents include substances likeSarin (GB), Tabun (GA), and VX. The first nerve agentswere developed by Germany before the Second WorldWar.

• Phosgene — This is produced for legitimate com-mercial purposes, but also can be used as a chemicalagent. When used as a gas it causes choking, nausea, andfatigue. It can be lethal.

• Sarin — A type of nerve gas. It evaporates rapidlyand is therefore considered to be non-persistent.

• Tabun -than Sarin.

A type of nerve gas. It is more persistent

• Toxins — Poisons, produced either chemically orbiologically, capable of incapacitating or killing.

• VX — A type of nerve gas, usually used in a liquidform. It persists for an extended period of time.

-15-

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES IN

Country

EGYPT

IRAN

IRAQ

ISRAEL

LIBYA

SYRIA

Chemical

Acquired an ability to usechemical agents in theearly 1960s. By 1973 it wasproducing weapons. Effortsto enhance operationalcapabilities continued afterthat and it still produceschemical agents.

Initiated development of achemical warfare programin response to Iraq's useduring the Gulf War. It isworking to expand itsability to manufactureagents.

Initiated efforts tomanufacture chemicalagents in the mid-1970s,and achieved a productioncapability in the early1980s. It has the capacity tomake 1,000 tons ofchemical agents per year.

A chemical program wasstarted in the 1960s inresponse to Egypt's use ofchemical agents in NorthYemen. By 1973, it had anoperational capability.Currently, it has mustardgas and is producing nerveagents.

Obtained chemical agentsin 1987, apparently fromIran. Construction of alarge chemicalmanufacturing facility isnearing completion.

Received its first chemicalagents from Egypt justbefore the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Currentlymanufactures nerve agentsand other chemicals. Itpossesses chemicalwarheads for its SCUD Bballistic missiles.

Biological /Toxins

By the early 1970s, arudimentary biologicalwarfare capability was inplace.

Appears to be developingbiological agents inresponse to Iraq's program

Believed to have anoperational biologicalwarfare capability. Itprobably has a program tomake toxins and should beassumed that it isresearching advancedbiological agents.

No known biologicalwarfare capability, but isgenerally presumedcapable of developing onein a short period of time.

No known capability.

Believed to possess anoperational biologicalwarfare capability. It maybe researching advancedbiological agents andtoxins.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Use

North Yemen (1963-1967):Chemical agents were usedagainst Royalist forcesduring Egypt's interventionin North Yemen.

Gulf War (1987-1988): Itappears that by 1987 the

. Iranians were employingsmall quantities ofchemical agents, possiblycaptured from the Iraqis.

Gulf War (1983-1988):According to the Iranians,as many as 45,000 Kurdsand Iranians were killed orinjured by Iraqi use ofchemical agents, the mostextensive use of them sincethe First World War.

Israel has never usedchemical agents.

Chad (1987): It usedchemical agents againstChadian military forces atonce.

Syria has never usedchemical agents.

-16-

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTEfor Near East Policy

A private, educational foundationsupporting scholarly research and informed debate

on U.S. interests in the Near East

Executive Committee Board of Advisors

PresidentVice Presidents Barbi WeinbergCharles AdlerMichael Stein Secretary/TreasurerDavid Steiner Walter P. Stem

Adjunct ScholarsJoshua MuravchikDaniel PipesHarvey SichermanJoyce Starr

Senior Research FellowBarry Rubin

AdministratorCarole Stern

Assistant AdministratorLaura Goldberg* on leave

Islam in the Palestinian UprisingBy Robert Satloff

Army and Politics in Mubarak fs EgyptBy Robert Satloff

Members Lawrence Eagleburger Stuart EizenstatRichard Borow Alexander Haig

Robert Goldman Samuel LewisFred Lafer Walter Mondale

Bernard S. White Richard Perle

Institute Staff

Executive DirectorMartin Indyk

Senior FellowDennis Ross*

Strategic FellowHirsh Goodman

Visiting Fellows, 1988Joseph Alpher

Zeev SchiffAvner Yaniv

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Policy Focus Series

Jeane KirkpatrickRobert C. McFarlane

Martin PeretzMortimer Zuckerman

FellowsW. Seth CarusJohn Hannah

Robert Satloff*

Senior Research AnalystJonathan Stern

Senior Research AssistantDouglas Pasternak

Research AssistantJeremy Benjamin

Missiles in the Middle East: The PLO - A Declaration of Independence!A New Threat to Stability

By W. Seth Cams

Policy Paper Series

Changing the Balance of Risks:U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict

By Harvey Sicherman

Presidential Study Group Report

By Barry Rubin

Formalizing the Strategic Partnership:The Next Step in U.S.-Israel Relations

By Stuart E. Eizenstat

Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East

50 F STREET, N.W. SUITE 8800 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 TEL: (202) 785-0226 FAX: (202) 785-2769