52
Management today Fire Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001 FIRE POLICY UPDATE FIRE POLICY UPDATE United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service

POLICY INITIATIVES IN WILDLAND FIRE

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Severe fire seasons and evolving insights into land and resource management have generated a series of recent initiatives for wildland fire management.

Citation preview

Management today

FireVolume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

FIRE POLICY UPDATEFIRE POLICY UPDATE

United States Department of AgricultureForest Service

2 Fire Management Today

Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.The Secretary of Agriculture has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction ofthe public business required by law of this Department.

Fire Management Today is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,at:Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: 202-512-1800 Fax: 202-512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/firenote.htm>.

Ann Veneman, Secretary April J. BailyU.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager

Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D.Forest Service Managing Editor

Jerry Williams, Director Madelyn DillonFire and Aviation Management Editor

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis ofrace, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or familystatus. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means forcommunication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Centerat (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building,1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is anequal opportunity provider and employer.

Disclaimer: The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience ofthe reader. Such use does not constitute an official endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Department ofAgriculture. Individual authors are responsible for the technical accuracy of the material presented in FireManagement Today.

3Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

CONTENTSOn the Cover:

A hand crew utilizes a rockyarea for additional safetyand fireline effectiveness.Our first priority, recon-firmed by the 2001 FederalFire Policy (see the executivesummary on page 7), isfirefighter and public safety.Photo: Ravi Miro Fry, USDAForest Service, Boise Na-tional Forest, Boise, ID.

Firefighter and public safety isour first priority.

Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001Management today

Fire

The FIRE 21 symbol (shown below and on thecover) stands for the safe and effective use ofwildland fire, now and throughout the 21stcentury. Its shape represents the fire triangle(oxygen, heat, and fuel). The three outer redtriangles represent the basic functions ofwildland fire organizations (planning, operations,and aviation management), and the three criticalaspects of wildland fire management (prevention,suppression, and prescription). The black interiorrepresents land affected by fire; the emerginggreen points symbolize the growth, restoration,and sustainability associated with fire-adaptedecosystems. The flame represents fire itself as anever-present force in nature. For more informa-tion on FIRE 21 and the science, research, andinnovative thinking behind it, contact MikeApicello, National Interagency Fire Center,208-387-5460.

Policy Initiatives in Wildland Fire Management ............ 4Hutch Brown

Review and Update of the 1995 Federal WildlandFire Management Policy ........................................... 7

Executive Summary

Tabular Crosswalk Between the 1995 and 2001Federal Fire Policies .............................................. 11

An Agency Strategy for Fire Management ................ 14Executive Summary

Protecting People and Sustaining Resources inFire-Adapted Ecosystems: A Cohesive Strategy ......... 16

Executive Summary

Reducing Fire Danger: Is Current Policy on Course? .. 18Hutch Brown

Fires 2000: Fact vs. Fiction ................................... 26Stephen W. Barrett

A Consistent Wildland Fire Risk TerminologyIs Needed! ........................................................... 28

Andreas Bachmann and Britta Allgöwer

Fighting the Pumpkin Fire—Indirect Attackand Aerial Ignition ................................................. 34

Allen Farnsworth

Six National Fire Use Awards Presented for1998 and 1999 ................................................... 39

Dave Bunnell

The 1910 Fires: A New Book by Stephen J. Pyne ..... 45Hutch Brown

First Annual Photo Contest (Correction) .................. 48

SHORT FEATURES

Guidelines for Contributors..................................... 44

Websites on Fire................................................... 47

Before Helicopters: Blimps for WildlandFirefighting? ......................................................... 50

Hutch Brown

Annual Photo Contest ............................................ 51

4 Fire Management Today

ires in recent decades havegrown in size and severity onnational forest lands. In 1987,

POLICY INITIATIVES IN WILDLAND FIREMANAGEMENT

Hutch Brown

Hutch Brown is the managing editor of FireManagement Today, USDA Forest Service,Washington Office, Washington, DC.

F Severe fire seasons and evolving insightsinto land and resource management have

generated a series of recent initiativesfor wildland fire management.

for only the first time since 1919,fires burned more than a millionacres (400,000 ha) on the NationalForest System. More than a millionacres burned again in 1988, 1994,and 1996. In 2000, more than 2million acres (800,000 ha) burned.Suppression costs have climbedaccordingly, reaching a record $1.6billion across all ownerships in2000 (ACPP 2000).

Planning RevisionsThe trend toward larger fires andhigher costs became clear in 1994,generating a series of reports underthe rubric FIRE 21 (see sidebar).New research and insights havegenerated a second series of reports,linked to the Forest Service’sstrategic direction for land andresource management planning.

Strategic Direction. The NationalForest Management Act of 1976requires the Forest Service toestablish a rule to guide localmanagers in preparing land andresource management plans for theNational Forest System. The firstplanning rule, adopted in 1982, wasdue for revision by the 1990s. Aftermore than 10 years of preparation, anew planning rule was proposed inOctober 1999 and promulgated inDecember 2000 after extensivepublic hearings. Based on a March1999 report by the second Commit-

tee of Scientists (COS 1999), thepromulgated rule confirms theprinciple of ecological, social, andeconomic sustainability.* Land andresource management are to bebased on cooperatively developedlandscape-level goals followingscientific regional assessments.

2001 Federal Fire Policy. The2000 Cerro Grande Fire,** anescaped prescribed burn that spreadto Los Alamos, NM, triggered areview of fire policy. The findingsstrengthened the 1995 Federal FirePolicy (NWCG 1995), replacing it inJanuary 2001 with a new inter-agency policy for managing wild-land fire (NWCG 2001). The newpolicy calls for using “the full rangeof fire management activities … toachieve ecosystem sustainability,”including fire use. The policystresses the need to complete orrevise fire management plans thatare “more effectively and directly”integrated “with other naturalresource goals.”

Agency Strategy. In January 2000,the Forest Service released An

** For more on the Cerro Grande Fire, see Jim Paxon,“‘Remember Los Alamos’: The Cerro Grande Fire,” FireManagement Today 60(4): 9–14.

Agency Strategy for Fire Manage-ment, a report addressing majorlong-term issues such as adeclining workforce and the grow-ing number of large fires (S&PF2000). The report recommendsrestructuring the fire organization,partly for “improved integration offire into ecosystem management,planning, and decisions.”

The Rabbit Creek Fire, part of the IdahoCity Complex on Idaho’s Boise NationalForest in 1994. The fire was enormous,burning 146,400 acres (59,250 ha) in 73days. Photo: Karen Wattenmaker, USDAForest Service, Boise National Forest,Boise, ID, 1994.

*Although the new rule was under review as this issuewent to print, its implications for fire management arelikely to remain about the same.

5Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Cohesive Strategy. In October2000, the Forest Service releasedProtecting People and SustainingResources in Fire-Adapted Ecosys-tems: A Cohesive Strategy (F&AM2000a) in response to a report toCongress by the General Account-ing Office (GAO 1999). Building onthe Agency Strategy, the CohesiveStrategy calls for “sustainingnatural resources in short-interval,fire-adapted ecosystems” throughadaptive management. The reportrecommends specific actions forrestoring and maintaining fire-adapted ecosystems, including fireuse.

National Fire Plan. In September2000, the Secretaries of Agricultureand the Interior released Managingthe Impact of Wildfires on Commu-nities and the Environment: AReport to the President in Responseto the Wildfires of 2000 (USDA/USDI 2000). The report and associ-ated materials are known as theNational Fire Plan. In fiscal year2001, Congress funded the NationalFire Plan, including $1.1 billion forthe Forest Service. The plan is ablueprint for implementing theAgency Strategy based on the 2001Federal Fire Policy, taking actionsrecommended in the CohesiveStrategy. The plan calls for:

• Providing sufficient firefightingresources for the future;

• Rebuilding communities andrehabilitating fire-damagedecosystems;

• Reducing fuels in wildlandsat risk from uncharacteristicfire effects, especially nearcommunities;

• Working with local residents toreduce fire risk and improve fireprotection; and

• Ensuring accountability.

The 2001 Federal Fire Policy calls for using“the full range of fire management activities …

to achieve ecosystem sustainability.”

FIRE 21FIRE 21 was conceived by theUSDA Forest Service to capturethe synergy among the reportsthat emerged following the 1994fire season.* In that year, 34firefighters perished, by far themost in any single fire seasonsince 1990. In addition, some1.4 million acres (570,000 ha)burned on the national forestsand grasslands, only the thirdtime since 1919 that more than amillion acres had burned on theNational Forest System.

FIRE 21 projected a new direc-tion for Forest Service wildlandfire management in the 21stcentury, including these goals:

• Improving firefighter andpublic safety;

• Restoring, maintaining, andsustaining ecosystem functionfor healthier forest ecosystems;

• Increasing accountability at allagency levels;

• Enacting a safe and cost-effective Fire and AviationManagement program; and

• Integrating wildland firemanagement concernsand the role of fire intoall agency resourcemanagementprograms.

The FIRE 21 symbol reflects theForest Service’s ongoing commit-ment to the safe and prudent useof fire in managing naturalresources in the 21st century. Itwas developed in 1996 by MichaelG. Apicello and Rodney C. Kind-lund, USDA Forest Service.

The symbol’s overall shape repre-sents the fire triangle—the com-bination of oxygen, fuel, and heatneeded to generate fire. The threeouter red triangles stand for thebasic functions of the Forest Ser-vice’s fire organization: planning,operations, and aviation. Thetriangles point inward to the baseof the flame, representing thethree faces of fire management:prevention, suppression, andprescription.

The black interior symbolizesland affected by fire. The threeemerging green tips representgrowth, restoration, andsustainability of fire-adaptedecosystems. The flame, the firewithin, reminds us that fire is anever-present force in nature. The

FIRE 21 inscription stands forthe Forest Service’s commit-

ment to the safe andprudent use of fire in all

fire managementactivities.

* See Michael G. Apicello, “FIRE 21—FireManagement in the 21st Century,” Fire Manage-ment Notes 56(3): 4–5.

6 Fire Management Today

Large-Fire Costs. A report releasedin 2000 by the Forest Service’sStrategic Overview of Large FireCosts Team assessed the factorscontributing to rising suppressioncosts and made recommendations(F&AM 2000b).*

Focus on ResultsThe new initiatives are intercon-nected in a planning hierarchy forwildland fire management on theNational Forest System. Theagency’s strategic direction outlinesobjectives for healthy lands andcommunities through sustainableforest management. Fire manage-ment plans are an integral part oflocal land and resource manage-ment planning. The 2001 FederalFire Policy guides fire managers inapplying the new planning rule tofire management plans. The Agencyand Cohesive Strategies formulatestrategic approaches for integratingwildland fire management into landand resource management plan-ning. This issue of Fire Manage-ment Today presents summarymaterials from the 2001 FederalFire Policy, Agency Strategy, andCohesive Strategy.

As always, the challenge will be totranslate policy directives andstrategic initiatives into cost-effective, on-the-ground results.The National Fire Plan outlinesprograms for working with localcommunities to improve fireprotection and restore ecosystemhealth. For the executive summaryof the National Fire Plan, see FireManagement Today 61(2): 9–11.

ReferencesACPP (Andrus Center for Public Policy).

2000. The fires next time. Conferencereport: The Fires Next Time; 7 Dec 2000;Boise, ID. Boise, ID: ACPP and The IdahoStatesman.

The new initiatives areinterconnected in a planning hierarchy

for wildland fire management onthe National Forest System.

* For more on large fire costs, see the related articles inFire Management Today 61(3).

Prescribed fire on Montana’s Lewis and Clark National Forest. From 1992 to 1998, thenumber of fuels treatments on the National Forest System, including prescribed fire andthinning, more than quadrupled to about 1.5 million acres (600,000 ha) per year (F&AM2000). The National Fire Plan calls for even more fuels treatments. Photo: USDA ForestService, 1991.

COS (Committee of Scientists). 1999.Sustaining the people’s lands: Recom-mendations for the stewardship of thenational forests and grasslands into thenext century. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Agriculture.

F&AM. (Fire and Aviation Management).2000a. Protecting people and sustainingresources in fire-adapted ecosystems: Acohesive strategy. Washington, DC: USDAForest Service. [Website <http://www.fs.fed.us/pub/fam/Cohesive-Strategy-00oct13.pdf>.]

F&AM. 2000b. Policy implications of largefire management: A strategic assessmentof factors influencing costs. Report bythe Strategic Overview of Large CostsTeam. Washington, DC: USDA ForestService. [Website <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/Large–Fire–Mgt.pdf>]

GAO (General Accounting Office). 1999.Western national forests: A cohesivestrategy is needed to address catastrophicwildfire threats. GAO/RCED–99–65.Washington, DC: GAO.

NWCG (National Wildfire CoordinatingGroup). 1995. Federal wildland firemanagement policy and program review.Boise, ID: National Interagency FireCenter.

NWCG 2001. Review and update of the 1995Federal wildland fire management policy.Boise, ID: National Interagency FireCenter.

S&PF (State and Private Forestry). 2000. Anagency strategy for fire management: Areport from the National ManagementReview Team. Washington, DC: USDAForest Service. [Website <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/USDA_Report.pdf>]

USDA/USDI (U.S. Department of Agricul-ture/U.S. Department of the Interior).2000. Managing the impact of wildfires oncommunities and the environment: Areport to the President in response to thewildfires of 2000. Washington, DC: USDI,2000. [Website <http://www.na.fs.fed.us/nfp/>] ■

7Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)Editor’s note: On June 27, 2000, following the Cerro Grande Fire (an escaped prescribed burn) near Los Alamos,NM,* the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior requested a comprehensive review of the interagencywildland fire management policy established in 1995. The review and update were released in January 2001. Theexecutive summary is reprinted here, lightly edited. The full report is posted on the World Wide Web at <http://www.nifc.gov/fire_policy/index.htm>.

* See Jim Paxon, “‘Remember Los Alamos’: The CerroGrande Fire,” Fire Management Today 60(4): 9–14.

The 1995 Federal Fire Policyis generally sound and continues to provide

a solid foundation for wildland fire management.

he Interagency Federal Wild-land Fire Policy Review Work-ing Group, at the direction ofT

the Secretaries of the Interior andAgriculture, reviewed the 1995Federal Wildland Fire ManagementPolicy and Program Review and itsimplementation. The WorkingGroup found that the policy isgenerally sound and continues toprovide a solid foundation forwildland fire management activitiesand for natural resources manage-ment activities of the FederalGovernment.

In this Review and Update of the1995 Federal Wildland Fire Man-agement Policy, the Working Grouprecommends selected changes andadditions to the 1995 FederalWildland Fire Management Policyto clarify purpose and intent and toaddress issues not fully covered in1995.

The Working Group further foundthat implementation of the 1995Federal Fire Policy remains incom-plete in many areas, especially thosethat involve collaboration, coordi-nation, and integration acrossagency jurisdictions and acrossdifferent disciplines. The WorkingGroup recommends a number ofstrategic implementation actions toensure that Federal wildland firemanagement policy is successfully

implemented in all applicableFederal agencies in a collaborative,coordinated, and integrated fashionas quickly as possible.

In summary, the Working Groupfinds and recommends that Federalfire management activities andprograms are to provide forfirefighter and public safety, protectand enhance land managementobjectives and human welfare,

Water drop on the May 2000 Cerro Grande Fire in Santa Clara Canyon near Los Alamos,NM. The fire, an escaped prescribed burn, triggered a comprehensive Federal fire policyreview, resulting in the 2001 Federal Fire Policy. Photo: W.R. Fortini, Jr., USDA ForestService, Cibola National Forest, Mountainair Ranger District, Mountainair, NM, 2000.

integrate programs and disciplines,require interagency collaboration,emphasize the natural ecologicalrole of fire, and contribute toecosystem sustainability.

The 2001 Federal Fire Policycontained in this report replaces the1995 Federal Fire Policy. It shouldbe adopted by all Federal agencieswith fire-management-relatedprograms and activities, as appro-

8 Fire Management Today

priate, through directives, manuals,handbooks, and other documents.

Subsequent to the initiation of thisReview and Update, the Secretariesof the Interior and Agricultureprepared a report, Managing theImpact of Wildfires on Communi-ties and the Environment: A Reportto the President in Response to theWildfires of 2000,* and the Con-gress provided substantial newappropriations and guidance in theFiscal Year 2001 Interior andRelated Agencies AppropriationsAct. The activities resulting fromthe Secretaries’ report and thecongressional action are generallyknown as the National Fire Plan.Although this Review and Updatesupports and complements theNational Fire Plan, the two effortsare different. This Review andUpdate, with its findings andrecommendations, provides a broadphilosophical and policy foundationfor Federal agency fire managementprograms and activities, includingthose conducted under the NationalFire Plan. In contrast, the NationalFire Plan and similar interagencyactivities focus on operational andimplementation activities. A majorfeature of the National Fire Plan isthe interagency (especially betweenFederal and non-Federal entities)aspect of risk reduction planningand implementation. In summary,the 2001 Federal Fire Policy con-tained in this report is focused oninternal Federal agency strategicdirection for a broad range of fire-management-related activities,whereas the National Fire Plan is amore narrowly focused and tacticalundertaking involving both Federaland non-Federal entities.

BackgroundThe 1995 Federal Wildland FireManagement Policy and ProgramReview produced the first singlecomprehensive Federal fire policyfor the Departments of the Interiorand Agriculture. That review wasstimulated by the 1994 fire season,with its 34 fatalities, and growingrecognition of fire problems causedby fuel accumulation. The resulting1995 Federal Fire Policy recog-nized, for the first time, the essen-tial role of fire in maintainingnatural systems.

In the aftermath of the escape of theCerro Grande Prescribed Fire inMay 2000, the Secretaries of theInterior and Agriculture requested areview of the 1995 Federal FirePolicy and its implementation. Theydirected the Working Group to:

• Review the implementation statusof the 1995 Federal Fire Policy.

• Address specific issues related tointeragency coordination, coop-eration, availability, and use ofcontingency resources.

• Provide recommendations to theSecretaries for strengthening theorganizational structure ofwildland fire management pro-grams to ensure effective imple-mentation of a cohesive Federalwildland fire policy.

• Provide any other recommenda-tions that would improve Federalwildland fire management pro-grams.

• Recommend a managementstructure for completing imple-mentation of the recommenda-tions.

As a result of fire exclusion,the condition of fire-adapted ecosystems

continues to deteriorate.

* For the executive summary of the report to thePresident associated with the National Fire Plan, see FireManagement Today 61(2): 9–11.

The Cerro Grande Fire approaching an incident command post. Thousands were safelyevacuated from in and around Los Alamos, NM; no injuries resulted from the fire. Underthe 2001 Federal Fire Policy, firefighter and public safety remains our first priority. Photo:W.R. Fortini, Jr., USDA Forest Service, Cibola National Forest, Mountainair RangerDistrict, Mountainair, NM, 2000.

9Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Principal ConclusionsThe Working Group reached thefollowing principal conclusions:

• The 1995 Federal Fire Policy isstill generally sound and appro-priate.

• As a result of fire exclusion, thecondition of fire-adapted ecosys-tems continues to deteriorate; thefire hazard situation in theseareas is worse than previouslyunderstood.

• The fire hazard situation in thewildland–urban interface is morecomplex and extensive thanunderstood in 1995.

• Changes and additions to the1995 Federal Fire Policy areneeded to address importantissues of ecosystem sustainability,science, education, and commu-nication; and to provide foradequate program evaluation.

• Implementation of the 1995Federal Fire Policy has beenincomplete, particularly in thequality of planning and in inter-agency and interdisciplinarymatters.

• Emphasis on program manage-ment, implementation, oversight,leadership, and evaluation atsenior levels of all Federal agen-cies is critical for successfulimplementation of the 2001Federal Fire Policy.

ImplementationEach of the departments or agen-cies participating in the reviewshould adopt the guiding principles,2001 Federal Fire Policy state-ments, and implementation actionsin this Review and Update. AllFederal fire program activities

should take place in cooperationand partnership with State andother organizations.

Full implementation of manyspecific action items from the 1995Federal Fire Policy remains criticalfor the successful implementationof the 2001 Federal Fire Policy. TheReview and Update contains adetailed listing of the status of thoseaction items, along with appropri-ate future actions based on the 2001Federal Fire Policy and associatedimplementation actions.

Guiding PrinciplesThe 2001 Federal Fire Policy and itsimplementation are founded on thefollowing guiding principles:

1.Firefighter and public safety is thefirst priority in every fire manage-ment activity.

2.The role of wildland fire as anessential ecological process andnatural change agent will beincorporated into the planningprocess.

3.Fire management plans, pro-grams, and activities support landand resource management plansand their implementation.

4.Sound risk management is afoundation for all fire manage-ment activities.

5.Fire management programs andactivities are economically viable,based upon values to be pro-tected, costs, and land andresource management objectives.

6.Fire management plans andactivities are based upon the bestavailable science.

7.Fire management plans andactivities incorporate publichealth and environmental qualityconsiderations.

8.Federal, State, tribal, local,interagency, and internationalcoordination and cooperation areessential.

9.Standardization of policies andprocedures among Federalagencies is an ongoing objective.

All Federal fire program activities shouldtake place in cooperation and partnership

with State and other organizations.

Homes destroyed by wildland fire in the wildland–rural interface on the American River inCalifornia. “The fire hazard situation in the wildland–urban interface,” notes the 2001Federal Fire Policy, “is more complex and extensive than understood in 1995.” Photo:USDA Forest Service, 1992.

10 Fire Management Today

Key ThemesEcosystem Sustainability. The1995 Federal Fire Policy recognizedthe role fire plays as a criticalnatural process. This Review andUpdate builds on the 1995 FederalFire Policy Review to includepolicies recognizing the role of firein sustaining healthy ecosystems,the restoration and rehabilitation ofburned lands, and the importanceof sound science in fire manage-ment activities.

Fire Planning. The 1995 FederalFire Policy requires fire manage-ment plans for all areas withburnable vegetation. Significantwork remains to complete theseplans for many areas. Many plansneed updating and integration withunderlying land management plans.Agencies such as the Departmentsof Defense and Energy need tocoordinate their planning effortsbased on the 2001 Federal FirePolicy. Fire management plans thataddress all aspects of fire manage-ment activities remain the founda-tion for implementing the 2001Federal Fire Policy and must becompleted as promptly as possible.

Fire Operations. The 1995 FederalFire Policy statements on opera-tional aspects of fire management,including safety, protection priori-ties, preparedness, suppression, use

of wildland fire, prevention, andwildland–urban interface roles andresponsibilities, are carried forwardin the 2001 Federal Fire Policy. The2001 Federal Fire Policy clearlystates that response to wildland fireis based on the fire managementplan, not the ignition source orlocation of the fire. The Review andUpdate recognizes the need to reachagreement on the requirements forweather products and services, andthe best means to meet thoserequirements.

Interagency Coordination andCooperation. A key theme of the1995 Federal Fire Policy is theimportance of standardization andinteragency cooperation andcoordination among Federalagencies and between Federalagencies and non-Federal organiza-tions. The Review and Updaterecognizes the importance ofincluding additional Federal land

Fire managementplans that addressall aspects of fire

management activitiesremain the foundationfor implementing the2001 Federal Fire

Policy.

managing agencies (e.g., theDepartment of Defense and Depart-ment of Energy) and agencies withsupporting or related programs(e.g., the National Weather Service,Environmental Protection Agency,U.S. Geological Survey, and FederalEmergency Management Agency) asfull partners in wildland fire man-agement activities and programs.The Review and Update also adds aspecific policy on communicationand education to ensure that the2001 Federal Fire Policy is wellunderstood inside the fire manage-ment agencies and by the public.

Program Management and Over-sight. The Working Group foundthat there is no effective means ofoverseeing and evaluating imple-mentation of fire policy, especiallyacross agency and program lines. Anew policy on evaluation is there-fore included in the 2001 FederalFire Policy. The need for a mecha-nism for coordinated interagencyand interdisciplinary fire manage-ment program leadership andoversight is included in the imple-mentation actions. Other actions toimprove program managementinclude analyses of workforcerequirements and of fire manage-ment and suppression organiza-tional structures. ■

11Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

TABULAR CROSSWALK BETWEEN THE1995 AND 2001 FEDERAL FIRE POLICIESEditor’s note: The table below, based on the 2001 Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Manage-ment Policy, shows changes in Federal wildland fire management policy from 1995 to 2001.

Policy element 1995 Policy 2001 Policy

Safety Firefighter and public safety is the firstpriority. All fire management plans andactivities must reflect this commitment.

Firefighter and public safety is the firstpriority. All fire management plans andactivities must reflect this commitment.

Ecosystemsustainability

— The full range of fire management activitieswill be used to achieve ecosystemsustainability, including its interrelatedecological, economic, and social compo-nents.

Response to wildland fire Fire, as a critical natural process, will beintegrated into land and resource manage-ment plans and activities on a landscapescale, across agency boundaries, and will bebased upon the best available science. Alluse of fire for resource managementrequires a formal prescription. Manage-ment actions taken on wildland fires will beconsistent with approved fire managementplans.

Fire, as a critical natural process, will beintegrated into land and resource manage-ment plans and activities on a landscapescale, and across agency boundaries. Re-sponse to wildland fires is based on ecologi-cal, social, and legal consequences of thefire. The circumstances under which a fireoccurs and the likely consequences forfirefighter and public safety and welfare,natural and cultural resources, and values tobe protected dictate the appropriate responseto the fire.

Use of wildland fire Wildland fire will be used to protect,maintain, and enhance resources and, asnearly as possible, be allowed to function inits natural ecological role.

Wildland fire will be used to protect, main-tain, and enhance resources and, as nearly aspossible, be allowed to function in its naturalecological role. Use of fire will be based onapproved fire management plans and willfollow specific prescriptions contained inoperational plans.

Rehabilitation and restora-tion

— Rehabilitation and restoration efforts will beundertaken to protect and sustain ecosys-tems, public health, and safety; and to helpcommunities protect infrastructure.

Protection priorities Protection priorities are (1) human life and(2) property and natural and culturalresources. If it becomes necessary toprioritize between property and natural andcultural resources, this is done based onrelative values to be protected, commensu-rate with fire management costs. Oncepeople have been committed to an incident,these resources become the highest valueto be protected.

The protection of human life is the single,overriding suppression priority. Settingpriorities among protecting human commu-nities and community infrastructure, otherproperty and improvements, and natural andcultural resources will be done based on thevalues to be protected, human health andsafety, and the costs of protection. Oncepeople have been committed to an incident,these human resources become the highestvalue to be protected.

12 Fire Management Today

Fires are suppressed at minimum cost,considering firefighter and public safety,benefits, and values to be protected, consis-tent with resource objectives.

Fires are suppressed at minimum cost,considering firefighter and public safety,benefits, and values to be protected,consistent with resource objectives.

Suppression

Preparedness Agencies will ensure their capability toprovide safe, cost-effective fire manage-ment programs in support of land andresource management plans throughappropriate planning, staffing, training,and equipment.

Agencies will ensure their capability toprovide safe, cost-effective fire managementprograms in support of land and resourcemanagement plans through appropriateplanning, staffing, training, equipment, andmanagement oversight.

Fire management plans and programs willbe based on a foundation of sound science.Research will support ongoing efforts toincrease our scientific knowledge of biologi-cal, physical, and sociological factors.Information needed to support fire manage-ment will be developed through an inte-grated interagency fire science program.Scientific results must be made available tomanagers in a timely manner and must beused in the development of land manage-ment plans, fire management plans, andimplementation plans.

—Science

Every area with burnable vegetation musthave an approved fire management plan. Firemanagement plans are strategic plans thatdefine a program to manage wildland andprescribed fires based on the area’s approvedland management plan. Fire managementplans must provide for firefighter and publicsafety; include fire management strategies,tactics, and alternatives; address values to beprotected and public health issues; and beconsistent with resource managementobjectives, activities of the area, and environ-mental laws and regulations.

Every area with burnable vegetation musthave an approved fire management plan.Fire management plans must be consistentwith firefighter and public safety, values tobe protected, and land and resourcemanagement plans and must addresspublic health issues. Fire managementplans must also address all potentialwildland fire occurrences and include thefull range of fire management actions.

Planning

The operational role of Federal and Stateagencies as partners in the wildland–urbaninterface are wildland firefighting, hazardfuels reduction, cooperative prevention andeducation, and technical assistance. Struc-tural fire suppression is the responsibility oftribal, State, or local governments. Federalagencies may assist with exterior structuralprotection activities under formal fireprotection agreements that specify themutual responsibilities of the partners,including funding. (Some Federal agencieshave full structural protection authority fortheir facilities on lands they administer andmay also enter into formal agreements toassist State and local governments with fullstructural protection.)

The operational role of Federal agencies asa partner in the wildland–urban interface iswildland firefighting, hazard fuel reduction,cooperative prevention and education, andtechnical assistance. Structural fireprotection is the responsibility of tribal,State, and local governments. Federalagencies may assist with exterior structuralsuppression activities under formal fireprotection agreements that specify themutual responsibilities of the partners,including funding. (Some Federal agencieshave full structural protection authority fortheir facilities on lands they administer andmay also enter into formal agreements toassist State and local governments with fullstructural protection.)

Wildland–urbaninterface

Policy element 1995 Policy 2001 Policy

13Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Policy element 1995 Policy 2001 Policy

Prevention

—Fire management programs and activitieswill be based on economic analyses thatincorporated commodity, noncommodity,and social values.

Economic efficiency

Agencies will develop and implement asystematic method of evaluation to determineeffectiveness of projects through implementa-tion of the 2001 Federal Wildland FireManagement Policy. The evaluation willassure accountability, facilitate resolution ofareas of conflict, and identify resourceshortages and agency priorities.

—Evaluation

Agency administrators will ensure that theiremployees are trained, certified, and madeavailable to participate in the wildland fireprogram locally, regionally, and nationally asthe situation demands. Employees withoperational, administrative, or other skillswill support the wildland fire program asnecessary. Agency administrators areresponsible and will be held accountable formaking employees available.

Employees who are trained and certifiedwill participate in the wildland fire programas the situation demands; employees withoperational, administrative, or other skillswill support the wildland fire program asneeded. Administrators are responsible andwill be accountable for making employeesavailable.

Agency administrator andemployee roles

Agencies will enhance knowledge andunderstanding of wildland firemanagement policies and practicesthrough internal and externalcommunication and education programs.These programs will be continuouslyimproved through the timely andeffective exchange of informationamong all affected agencies andorganizations.

—Communication andeducation

Fire management planning, preparedness,prevention, suppression, fire use, restorationand rehabilitation, monitoring, research, andeducation will be conducted on an inter-agency basis with the involvement ofcooperators and partners.

Fire management planning, preparedness,suppression, fire use, monitoring, andresearch will be conducted on an inter-agency basis with the involvement of allparties.

Interagency cooperation

Agencies will use compatible planningprocesses, funding mechanisms, trainingand qualification requirements, operationalprocedures, values-to-be-protected method-ologies, and public education programs forall fire management activities.

Agencies will use compatible planningprocesses, funding mechanisms, trainingand qualification requirements, operationalprocedures, values-to-be-protected meth-odologies, and public education programsfor all fire management activities.

Standardization

Agencies will work together and with theirpartners and other affected groups andindividuals to prevent unauthorized ignitionof wildland fires.

Agencies will work together and with otheraffected groups and individuals to preventunauthorized ignition of wildland fires.

14 Fire Management Today

ver the past 10 years, severalsignificant programmaticreports have highlighted

AN AGENCY STRATEGY FOR FIREMANAGEMENT (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)Editor’s note: In 1999, the USDA Forest Service commissioned a National Management Review Team to reviewchronic problems related to wildland fire management (see sidebar). On January 12, 2000, the team released AnAgency Strategy for Fire Management. The executive summary is reprinted here, lightly edited. The full report isposted on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/USDA_Report.pdf>.

Opersistent and recurrent problemsin wildland fire management. Majorcultural and demographic changesin the workforce and significantprogrammatic changes in theagency have resulted in increasedcosts and a significant reduction inagency workforce participation onlarge fires. Without a significantorganizational change, the overallability to manage large fires will becompromised.

Strategic ReviewThis report is a comprehensive andstrategic examination of pastreviews, policies, and direction forthe fire management program.

The National Management ReviewTeam consisted of representativesfrom Forest Service line officers,the National Fire Protection Asso-ciation, the National Association ofState Foresters, the National ParkService, the Brookings Institution,and Forest Service Fire and AviationManagement staff. A full range ofalternatives (pathways) weredeveloped, including designating aFederal fire service, an outsourcedfire service, and a “national” large-incident management organization.

The primary finding of this reviewis that the current level of dedicated

and available staffing for large-incident management is diminish-ing. Therefore, the followingrecommendations were developedto address this and other issuesconcerning large-incident manage-ment:

1.Develop and implement a na-tional Large Incident Manage-ment Organization, dedicated andprofessional, to more effectivelymanage large-fire operations andnatural disasters. The recommen-dation is predicated on building astrong local initial- and extended-attack fire program and imple-menting an aggressive ecosystemrestoration program. This repre-sents a significant departure fromtoday’s operation and will requirea major commitment of peopleand resources.

2.Clearly articulate to the field thatan independent Federal FireService will NOT be pursued orentertained. The linkage to theagency’s land managementmission is simply too importantto divorce aspects of fire manage-ment and fire use from theagency.

Without a significant organizational change,our ability to manage large fires

will be compromised.

3.Establish an ImplementationTeam comprised of a representa-tive cross-section of interagencypartners and interests. Oversightfor implementation would beprovided by the Forest Service’sDeputy Regional Foresters forState and Private Forestry.

4.Establish a continuous monitor-ing process with annual reportson progress.

5.Assign an appropriate group toresolve issues raised by the StateForesters concerning the 1995Federal Wildland Fire Manage-ment Policy and Program Review.

Pathway to ChangeThe recommended pathway isconceptual in nature. There aremany actions necessary to success-fully implement this pathway.Without a fundamental change inthe way large fires are managed, wecan expect to experience the prob-lems of today well into the future,including a perceived lack of ForestService capability to manage bothwildfire and prescribed fire. ■

15Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

CHRONIC PROBLEMSCALL FOR ACHANGE

Editor’s note: The followingexcerpt from the introductionto An Agency Strategy for FireManagement highlights thestrategic challenges facingwildland fire management inthe USDA Forest Service.

The Chief of the Forest Servicecommissioned a review team tolook into several unresolvedand lingering problems relatedto the fire managementprogram. The Forest Servicefire and fuels program is notwell integrated with the landmanagement program of theagency. In some instances lineand staff officer relationshipsregarding fire management areineffective. The ForestService’s ability to provideadequate support to large firesis diminishing. Many coopera-tors and partners think theForest Service is ineffectiveand inefficient in fire manage-ment. These four problems arechronic. They have beenidentified over and over inmany reviews in the 1990s.These four problems needimmediate resolution.

It is time for a change.Cover of the USDA Forest Service report An Agency Strategy for Fire Management (January2000). Changes in the agency workforce, coupled with a rising number of large fires inrecent decades, have triggered new strategic directions for wildland fire management.“Without a fundamental change in the way large fires are managed,” warns the report, “wecan expect to experience the problems of today well into the future.”

We need a strong local initial-and extended-attack fire program and an

aggressive ecosystem restoration program.

16 Fire Management Today

PremiseThis strategy is based on thepremise that sustainable resourcesare predicated on healthy, resilientecosystems. In fire-adapted ecosys-tems, some measure of fire use—atappropriate intensity, frequency,and time of year—should be in-cluded in management strategiesintended to protect and sustainwatersheds, species, and othernatural resources over the longterm.

The strategy is also based on thepremise that, within fire-adaptedecosystems, fire-maintained forestsand grasslands are inherently saferfor firefighters and the public thanecosystems in which fire is ex-cluded.

PurposeThe strategy establishes a frame-work that restores and maintainsecosystem health in fire-adaptedecosystems for high-priority areasacross the interior West. In accom-plishing this, it is intended to:

• Improve the resilience andsustainability of forests andgrasslands at risk;

• Conserve high-priority water-sheds, species, and biodiversity;

• Reduce wildland fire costs, losses,and damages; and

PROTECTING PEOPLE AND SUSTAININGRESOURCES IN FIRE-ADAPTED ECOSYSTEMS:A COHESIVE STRATEGY (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)Editor’s note: On October 13, 2000, the USDA Forest Service released Protecting People and Sustaining Re-sources in Fire-Adapted Ecosystems: A Cohesive Strategy. The report responded to a study by the General Ac-counting Office under the title, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed To Address CatastrophicWildfire Threats. The executive summary of A Cohesive Strategy is reprinted here, lightly edited. The full reportis posted on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/pub/fam/Cohesive-Strategy-00oct13.pdf>.

• Better ensure public andfirefighter safety.

PrioritiesWildland–urban interface. Wild-land–urban interface areas includeareas where flammable wildlandfuels are adjacent to homes andcommunities.

Readily accessible municipalwatersheds. Water is the mostcritical resource in many WesternStates. Watersheds affected byuncharacteristic wildfire effects areless resilient to disturbance andunable to recover as quickly asthose that remain within the rangeof ecological conditions characteris-tic of the fire regime under whichthey developed.

Threatened and endangered specieshabitat. The extent of recent firesdemonstrates that in fire-adaptedecosystems few areas are isolatedfrom wildfire. Dwindling habitat formany threatened and endangeredspecies will eventually be affected bywildland fire. The severity andextent of fire could eventually push

declining populations beyondrecovery.

Maintenance of existing low-riskcondition class 1* areas. This isespecially important in the South-ern and Eastern States, where highrates of vegetation growth caneliminate the effects of treatment in5 to 10 years. Recent droughts havecaused severe wildland fire prob-lems in Florida and Texas.

ElementsFor the purposes of this report,these are the elements of a cohesivestrategy:

• Institutional objectives andpriorities,

• Program management budgetsand authorities, and

• Social awareness and support.

The strategy is based on the align-ment of these institutional, pro-gram management, and constitu-

In fire-adapted ecosystems,fire-maintained forests and grasslands

are inherently safer for firefighters and the public.

* Condition classes signify fire risk to ecosystem healthbased on departure from the historical fire regime due tohuman interventions such as fire exclusion. Risk rangesfrom class 1 (low risk), to class 2 (moderate risk), toclass 3 (high risk).

17Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

ency elements. The cohesion of thisstrategy stands on the collectivestrength of these three core ele-ments.

Open ponderosa pine forest with Douglas-fir understory before (left) and after (right) a prescribed fire (Lick Creek drainage, BitterrootNational Forest, MT). By reducing ladder fuels, the burn diminished the danger of an uncharacteristically severe fire. Photos: Robert C.Szaro, USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, Portland, OR, 1990.

Dwindling habitat for threatened and endangered specieswill eventually be affected by wildland fire.

Within the Forest Service, ecosys-tem management concepts con-tinue to evolve into practice. Thisreport describes a cohesive set ofactions from which the Forest

Service may choose to initiaterestoration and maintenanceobjectives within fire-adaptedecosystems. ■

Water is the most critical resource in many Western States.

18 Fire Management Today

ire-related forest health prob-lems in the United States are agrowing national concern.

REDUCING FIRE DANGER:IS CURRENT POLICY ON COURSE?Hutch Brown

Hutch Brown is the managing editor of FireManagement Today, USDA Forest Service,Washington Office, Washington, DC.

FToday, millions of acres are at riskfrom fires that could threaten lives,communities, and wildland re-sources. Most people agree that fuelbuildups after decades of fireexclusion are at the root of theproblem—but here the agreementends.

The USDA Forest Service, sup-ported by extensive scientificassessments (COS 1999; ICBEMP2000; OAHS 1999; SNEP 1996;Thomas 2000), is taking a balancedapproach to restoring forest health,one that focuses on ecologicalsustainability and a desired futurecondition for the land (Dombeck2001a; Forest Service 2000).Depending on location and siteconditions, treatments includesilvicultural thinning and fire use(Dombeck 2001b). The goal is torestore the composition, structure,and processes associated withhealthy forest ecosystems, includ-ing historical fire regimes.

Critics charge that the ForestService is pursuing the “tinderboxpolicies” of letting forests “rot andburn” (AF&PA 2001; Nelson 2001).They blame the Forest Service’s“policy of passive management andecological preeminence” for putting“our national forests in theirpresent condition” (AF&PA 2001).They accuse the agency of an illicit“‘mission shift’ away from a focus

Open ponderosa pine forest with Douglas-fir understory before (top) and after (bottom)mechanical low thinning. The understory ladder fuels constituted a fire hazard, makingfire use unsafe before their removal. Photos: Tom Iraci, USDA Forest Service, PacificNorthwest Region, Portland, OR, 1992.

The goal is to restorehealthy forest ecosystems,

including historical fire regimes.

19Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Pinchot’s approach to conservationhelped to inaugurate the extractivemodel of forestry prevalent inpublic land management from the1890s to the 1970s (Kennedy andDombeck 1999). Fire control waskey. Pinchot and his successors asForest Service Chief “never doubtedwhat to his generation of Americanforesters seemed the most funda-mental of precepts: Without firecontrol nothing else mattered”(Pyne 2001). For forestry to suc-ceed, land managers believed, thetree crop would have to be pro-tected from every fire (Greeley1920). Fire protection becamecentral to the agency’s mission; fireexclusion remained, in one form oranother, the prevalent agencydoctrine until 1977.

Through a decentralized organiza-tion, the early Forest Serviceworked closely with local home-steaders and communities to meettheir needs. The agency’s earliestUse Book instructed forest officersto provide settlers, schools,churches, road districts, and coop-erative associations with goods andservices for free or at a nominalcharge but to require full paymentfrom commercial enterprises(Pinchot 1947). In the 1930s, theagency reaffirmed its commitmentto the common good by giving workon conservation projects to thou-sands of unemployed Americansthrough the Civilian ConservationCorps (CCC).

The CCC, followed in the postwarperiod by aircraft and otherfirefighting technologies, providedthe means to extend fire controlinto the backcountry (Pyne 1982).The number of acres burnedannually nationwide declined froman average of 39 million in the1930s to less than 5 million by the1960s. For decades, the Forest

For decades, the Forest Servicetreated all fire, regardless of type or site,

as a threat to forest health.

Fire prevention poster from 1941. DuringWorld War II, the Forest Service conflatedits fire control mission with nationaldefense, reinforcing the traditionalapproach to wildland fire management as“the moral equivalent of war.” Illustration:USDA Forest Service.

on multiple outputs” (AF&PA 2001;Sedjo 2000), demanding a return to“a clear utilitarian goal” of manag-ing public lands “as valuablesources of wood, recreation andother outputs” (Nelson 2001). Thesolution to our forest health prob-lem, critics claim, is to boost timberharvest to “remove much of theexcess fuels by mechanical means”(Nelson 2000a, 2000b).

Is the Forest Service policy wrong?Are land managers practicing thevery treatments that caused foresthealth to decline? Are increasedtimber outputs the answer?

Origins of Fire ControlAmericans have long struggled withconflicting notions of sustainableforest management. One of the firstto wrestle with the problem was

Gifford Pinchot, the first ForestService Chief. Pinchot’s conserva-tionism was born of profligateabuse by preceding generations.“When the Gay Nineties began,” herecalled, “the common word for ourforests was ‘inexhaustible.’ To wastetimber was a virtue and not acrime” (Pinchot 1947).

Most early lumbermen clearcutvirgin forests for the best sectionsof bole, leaving huge mounds ofslash on cutover lands. Lightning orartificial flames often ignited theslash, causing enormous wildfiresthat swept the countryside. Forloggers, the trick was to harvest thenext virgin stand before flames“roared out of the slash and leftnothing for them to mill,” in thewords of the historian Stephen J.Pyne (2001). Under such circum-stances, “only a madman [would]consider replanting the cutover.”

One such “madman” was Pinchot.Recognizing the abuse, Pinchotresolved to end the waste by pio-neering sustainable forestry onpublic lands—the national for-ests—as a model for the nation.Influenced by European industrialforestry, Pinchot maintained thatintensive land management forcommercial resource extraction wasthe cornerstone of conservation.“Forestry is handling trees so thatone crop follows another,” hedeclared (Pinchot 1947). Forestbenefits such as soil and waterconservation were, in Pinchot’sview, “other products on the side”—byproducts of growing “trees as acrop.”

20 Fire Management Today

Service enjoyed such high levels ofpublic confidence that it was largelyable to regulate itself through theUse Book and other administrativeguidelines.

Timber BoomThings began to change after WorldWar II, when the Forest Servicedelivered vast quantities of old-growth timber to the mills to helpsupport the postwar housing boom.In the process, local ties gave way tocorporate connections. A timberboomlet in the 1920s foreshadowedevents to come.

In 1915, a logging company fromKansas City, MO, built a mill inEnterprise, OR, a small town on theedge of the Wallowa NationalForest. Citizens welcomed the newjobs and related business, confidentthat the Forest Service wouldprovide long-term resource protec-tion. The Forest Service fed the millthrough timber sales, consistentlyoffering the highest allowable salequantities.

By 1928, the prime timber was goneand the mill had closed. “What is sodepressing is that there was noth-ing at all unusual about this story,”remarked the historian NancyLangston (1995). “A small townpinned its hopes on a single naturalresource, and soon that resourcewas exhausted. The capital fordevelopment came from somewhereelse, and that company pulled outafter the lumber was cut and theinvestments met. The locals wereleft holding an empty bag.”

Initially, such cases were rare,because the timber industry usuallytried to keep national forest timberoff the market to help sustain highprices for private timber (Williams2000a). But after World War II, withprivate stocks depleted, the industry

clamored for national forest timber.The Forest Service obliged, consis-tently offering the greatest annualallowable cut (Fedkiw 1999). An-nual harvests quadrupled, from lessthan 3 billion board feet in the early1940s to more than 12 billion boardfeet by the mid-1960s. Long-termplanning was for still higher out-puts: The 1961 DevelopmentProgram for National Forestsprojected annual harvests of 21.1billion board feet by the year 2000.

Ninety percent of the increase innational forest timber harvests from1950 to 1970 came from westernold-growth forests (Fedkiw 1999).Forest Service managers regardedold growth as “decadent” or“overmature” and welcomed itsremoval for replacement by fastergrowing stands, thought to be acontinuous crop of timber thatcould support local businessesforever. “But this formula neverworked,” concluded Langston(1995). As in the case of Enterprisein Oregon, mills closed and futurescollapsed as soon as the localresource was exhausted or marketswere saturated (Hirt 1999).

Undeterred, the Forest Servicecontinued to collaborate with thetimber industry. The revenue flowwas habit forming, even when saleswere below cost. Timber harvestsdrove forest development; forestsupervisors overcame budgetlimitations by using new roads andtimber funds for other managementpurposes (Fedkiw 1999). Con-versely, values and activities thatfailed to generate revenue were seen

as constraints. Long-term benefitssuch as watershed integrity wereoverlooked in favor of short-termbenefits from timber receipts.

In 1964–65, slope failure on Idaho’sBoise and Payette National Forestssent 1.5 million cubic yards(1.1 million m3) of soil slumpinginto the South Fork Salmon Riverand its tributaries, degrading waterquality and salmon habitat in muchof the Columbia River basin. Thecause was roadbuilding and loggingon steep slopes weakened by de-cades of abuse through mining andgrazing (Fedkiw 1999). Clearly, thebyproducts that Pinchot hadexpected from growing “trees as acrop”—clean water and abundantsoils—could no longer be taken forgranted.

New Model ofSustainabilityBy the 1970s, the extractive modelfor managing the land was discred-ited (see sidebar). The ForestService was embroiled in a nationalcontroversy over clearcuts on theBitterroot and MonongahelaNational Forests, further stainingthe agency’s now tarnished reputa-tion. Broad sectors of the publicdemanded a return to a bedrockForest Service principle firstformulated by Gifford Pinchot(1947): “In free use, as in timbersales, the welfare of the forest mustcome first.”

In the 1930s, the great ecologistAldo Leopold had recognized theneed and set the stage. German-speaking by birth, he visited Ger-

“In free use, as in timber sales,the welfare of the forest must come first.”

–Gifford Pinchot, 1947

21Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

many to study the origins of whathe called “the wood factory con-cept” of forestry (Leopold 1936a).Germany’s new, holistic approachesto land management, designed toreverse some of the worst damageswrought by industrial forestry,impressed Leopold. “The Germansnow realize,” he observed, “thatincrement bought at the expense ofsoil health, landscape beauty, andwildlife is poor economics as well aspoor public policy.”

Based in part on Leopold’s insights,a new resource management modelbegan to emerge. In 1970, ForestService Chief Edward Cliff called for“an ecosystem approach to mul-tiple-use management” (Fedkiw1999). In the years that followed,researchers laid the groundwork forecosystem-based managementthrough ecoregional mapping and“new forestry” approaches.

Chief F. Dale Robertson, speakingbefore Congress in 1992, renewedthe call for an ecosystem-basedapproach to multiple-use manage-ment. In 1993, following a regionalForest Conference convened byPresident Bill Clinton in Portland,OR, the Northwest Forest Plancreated the first blueprint forecosystem-based managementacross jurisdictions on a landscapelevel. By protecting old-growthhabitat for the northern spottedowl, the plan slowed a stream oflawsuits that had paralyzed publicland management in the PacificNorthwest.

Robertson’s successor as ForestService Chief, Jack Ward Thomas,echoed the call for an ecosystem-based approach. He defined its goalas ecosystem sustainability: Landand resource use must not beallowed to undermine the health,

A large Douglas-fir toppling on the 1949Iron Creek Timber Sale, Gifford PinchotNational Forest, WA. Postwar timberharvest on the national forests soared tosupport a housing boom. Ninety percent ofthe increase from 1950 to 1970 came fromwestern old-growth forests. Photo: Courtesyof USDA National Agricultural Library,Special Collections, Forest ServicePhotograph Collection, Beltsville, MD(Leland J. Prater, 1949; 456997).

A LAND USE REVOLUTION

The postwar period saw a revolu-tion in public land use. In 1946,our national forests and grass-lands hosted just 18 millionvisitor-days. By 1965, that figuretopped 160 million; by 1996, itwas 341 million, an 18-foldincrease in just five decades.Recreational use eclipsed com-mercial resource extraction onpublic lands. By 1996, some 1.7million recreational vehicles wereusing roads on the nationalforests every day—about 117times more than the 15,000logging vehicles sharing the sameforest roads.

The public land use revolutionreflected changing demographics.In Gifford Pinchot’s day, theAmerican population was aboutevenly divided between rural andurban citizens, with relatively few

city dwellers venturing onto publicwildlands (Fedkiw 1999). The goalimplicit in the USDA ForestService’s early Use Book of manag-ing public lands primarily to meetthe homesteading needs of ruralcitizens therefore made sense. By1990, however, that goal wasobsolete. Four-fifths of all Ameri-cans were now urban and mostwere driving. Many spent weekendsor vacations on public lands, wherethey expected to find pristineconditions for adventure, relax-ation, and spiritual renewal. Publicland managers would ignore theirexpectations at their own peril.

Discontent began to build in the1950s. As more Americans visitedtheir public lands, protests grewagainst clearcuts, mining scars, andwatershed degradation. Increas-ingly, the public perceived a collu-

sion between Federal agenciesand commercial interests indegrading the land for the profitof a privileged few. In response,Congress passed a series of lawsin the 1960s and 1970s providinggreater environmental protec-tions and requiring a morecomprehensive approach tomanaging public lands, includingincreased public participation.

Public land managers wereinitially slow to respond, but anew approach to land manage-ment gradually emerged. Today,based on the principle ofsustainability, the Forest Servicefocuses on maintaining andrestoring healthy ecosystems as afoundation for all the values andbenefits that Americans obtainfrom their public lands.

22 Fire Management Today

diversity, or productivity of ecosys-tems on which future generationswill depend for a continuous flow ofresource benefits.

In 1997, the Secretary of Agricul-ture appointed a Committee ofScientists to guide the ForestService in revising its planning ruleunder the National Forest Manage-ment Act of 1976. The committeevalidated the principle of sustain-ability, including conservative use(see sidebar). “[P]lanning for themultiple use and sustained yield ofthe resources of the national forestsand grasslands,” the committeeadvised, “should operate within abaseline level of ensuring thesustainability of ecological systemsand native species. Without ecologi-cally sustainable systems, otheruses of the land and its resourcescould be impaired” (COS 1999).Based on the committee’s report,the Forest Service drafted a newrule for national forest manage-

ment planning, promulgated inDecember 2000.

What exactly is sustainability?Sustainability replaces an emphasison commodity extraction with abroader, more multiple-use focuson all the benefits and values thathealthy lands provide. It up-endsthe old extractive model: Instead oftrusting that soil and water conser-vation will emerge as a byproduct ofgrowing “trees as a crop,” sustain-ability focuses directly on restabi-lizing soils and waterflows—onrestoring the function, structure,and composition of historical eco-systems. The trees that will theninevitably grow, including thoseremoved and used for wood fiber,are the byproducts of healthy forestecosystems.

Sustainability is based on a simpletruth: On healthy lands, Federalland managers can meet theirstatutory obligations to deliver afull range of uses, including com-mercial outputs; on degraded lands,they cannot. In the best tradition ofProgressive-Era conservation,sustainability serves the long-terminterests of all Americans—or, asGifford Pinchot (1947) put it, “thegreatest good for the greatestnumber for the longest time.”

Shift in FireManagementThe ecosystem approach to landmanagement signaled a parallelshift in wildland fire management.Long before, fire exclusion had beenformally adopted by the Forest

“Without ecologically sustainable systems,other uses of the land and its resources

could be impaired.”

–Committee of Scientists, 1999

Northern spotted owl. Rapid postwarharvest of old-growth timber in the PacificNorthwest reduced habitat for the owl,leading to its listing as threatened. In themid-1990s, the Northwest Forest Plancreated the first blueprint for ecosystemmanagement across jurisdictions on alandscape level, protecting remaining old-growth habitat for the owl. Photo: USDAForest Service.

Service through the 10 A.M. Policypromulgated in 1935. Nevertheless,the agency had continued toconduct prescribed burns in theSouth, and support for fire use hadlingered (Brown 2000; Williams2000b). From the 1930s to the1960s, research by the ForestService’s Southern and Southeast-ern Forest Experiment Stationssupported the independent findingsof E.V. Komarek and the TallTimbers Research Station, demon-strating the ecological role playedby wildland fire in ecosystems.

By the 1960s, the exponentialgrowth of fire suppression costs andthe persistence of occasional severefire seasons were raising newdoubts about the viability of fireexclusion as a national policy(NWCG 2001). Promoted by passageof the Wilderness Act in 1964,which limited human interventionin wilderness areas, an alternativepolicy began to emerge. In 1967,the Forest Service relaxed controlson early- and late-season fires; ayear later, the USDI National ParkService abandoned fire exclusionaltogether. In 1977, the ForestService followed suit, replacing the10 A.M. Policy and its variant, the10-Acre Policy, with a flexible policythat allowed local fire managers toconsider alternatives to full sup-pression, including the use of fire.

The 1988 Yellowstone Fires and the1994 fire season, with its 34 fatali-ties, placed fire management policyunder renewed scrutiny. Each time,review teams reconfirmed a flexiblepolicy incorporating fire use. In

23Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

1995, an interagency wildland firemanagement policy emerged tohelp coordinate activities acrossjurisdictions. The 1995 Federal FirePolicy was based on the insight thatfire was “a critical natural process”that should be “integrated into landand resource management plansand activities on a landscape scale”(NWCG 1995). In 2001, despite ahigh-visibility prescribed fire escapenear Los Alamos, NM, in May2000,* a top-level interagencypolicy review and update recon-firmed the wisdom of carefullyplanned fire use, generating the2001 Federal Fire Policy (NWCG2001).

Today, wildland fire management onour national forests and grasslandsserves the overarching goal ofsustainability. “The full range of firemanagement activities will be usedto achieve ecosystem sustainabil-ity,” declares the 2001 Federal FirePolicy, “including its interrelatedecological, economic, and socialcomponents” (NWCG 2001). Landmanagers are to use all the tools attheir disposal, including fire sup-pression and fire use, to achievea desired future condition forthe land. Outcomes, not outputs,are key.

Difficult Course AheadUltimately, policy is meaningfulonly if practiced. Fire use to sup-port sustainable forest managementmust overcome a powerful legacy offire control (see sidebar on page25). The course ahead will notbe easy.

Ecosystem-based land managementprecipitated a parallel shift

in wildland fire management.

CONSERVATIVE USE:A PRINCIPLE OFSUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability means, amongother things, conservative use tokeep options open for futuregenerations. For example, weknow from experience that fireuse can be a sound method fordiminishing fuels, reducing firedanger, and restoring foresthealth. We are far less certainabout commercial timberharvest as a forest health treat-ment.

Some research suggests thatchanges in forest structure andcomposition associated withroadbuilding and timber harvestcan increase the risk of unchar-acteristic fire effects (Thomas2000). Moreover, we do not fullyunderstand the impacts of tim-ber removal on forest health,particularly on nutrient cyclesand on species interrelationshipsin forest soils and canopies.

We do know that roadbuildingand logging operations, espe-cially if best managementpractices are ignored, candisrupt fire cycles; compact anderode soils; increase runoff andstream siltation; alter forestcomposition and structure; andeliminate valuable habitat forthreatened and endangeredspecies. For these reasons,timber harvest on public lands iscontroversial. Conservative usetherefore dictates caution inapplying mechanical timberremoval as a method for restor-ing forest health.

Fire exclusion is deeply ingrained inthe culture of wildland fire manage-ment. The Forest Service wasfounded on an extractive model offorestry and, by corollary, a policy offire exclusion. For decades, theagency focused on maximizingresource extraction, based on “theuncritical assumption,” as AldoLeopold (1936b) put it, “… that thepractice of forestry in and of itself,regardless of what kind or howmuch,” promotes conservation.

The grand experiment ended infailure. Today, some 71 millionacres of national forests are at riskfrom wildland fires that couldcompromise ecosystem integrityand human safety (F&AM 2001).Our fire problem stems in good partfrom the policy of fire exclusioninaugurated by the early ForestService to make public lands safefor growing “trees as a crop.”

Stephen J. Pyne, America’s leadingwildland fire historian, has fre-quently chronicled the “ecologicalpandemonium” associated withEuropean settlement and theremoval of indigenous burningfrom America’s landscape. Fireexclusion greatly exacerbated thedisruption of historical fire regimesand ecosystem health. The celebra-tion of fire control through thecultivation of epic tales of firefight-ing, beginning with the Big Blowupof 1910, has troubling implicationsfor the long-term effectiveness offire protection in the United States(Pyne 2000, 2001).

Pyne (2001) observes that theForest Service’s long obsession withfire control has created forests that

* See Jim Paxon, “‘Remember Los Alamos’: The CerroGrande Fire,” Fire Management Today 60(4): 9–14.

24 Fire Management Today

cannot “readily accept light fires,”leaving managers caught in a bind:If they set fire or let burn, they riskdestroying what they would protect;if they suppress fire, fuel conditionswill further deteriorate, increasingthe fire danger. For fire managers,the necessary task of navigatingbetween the Scylla of a fire escapeand the Charybdis of spiraling fuelbuildups will not be easy.

ReferencesAF&PA (American Forest and Paper

Association). 2001. Attempt by U.S.Forest Service to change its multiple-usemission. [Website <http://www.afandpa.org/legislation/legislation.html>.]

Brown, H. 2000. How did Fire ControlNotes become Fire Management Today?Fire Management Today. 60(1): 8–14.

COS (Committee of Scientists). 1999.Sustaining the people’s lands: Recom-mendations for the stewardship of thenational forests and grasslands into thenext century. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Agriculture.

Cordell, H.K.; Teasley, J.; Super, G.;Bergstrom, J.C.; McDonald, B. 1997.Outdoor recreation in the United States:Results from the National Survey onRecreation and the Environment.Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service.

Dombeck, M. 2001a. How can we reduce thefire danger in the Interior West? FireManagement Today. 61(1): 5–13.

Today, wildland fire managementon our national forests and grasslands

serves the overarching goal of sustainability.

Fire in an intensively managed area with evident past clearcuts. Overstory removalstimulates vigorous regeneration (foreground); young trees are often less fire resistantthan mature forest and more likely to fuel a severe fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

Dombeck, M. 2001b. A National Fire Planfor future land health. Fire ManagementToday. 61(2): 4–8.

F&AM (Fire and Aviation Management).2000a. Land categories burned, fireseason 2000. Unpub. rep. to Congress(September 2000) on file at the USDAForest Service, Washington Office,F&AM, Washington, DC.

F&AM. 2001. What basis does the ForestService have for evaluating fire risks?Unpub. rep. on file at the USDA ForestService, Washington, DC.

Fedkiw, J. Managing multiple uses onnational forests, 1905–1995. Washington,DC: USDA Forest Service.

Forest Service. 2000. Protecting people andsustaining resources in fire-adaptedecosystems: A cohesive strategy. Wash-ington, DC: USDA Forest Service.

Greeley, W.B. 1920. “Paiute forestry” or thefallacy of light burning. The Timberman.March. [Reprinted in Fire ManagementToday. 60(4): 21–26.]

Hirt, P.W. 2000. Predicting the future byunderstanding the past: A historianconsiders the Forest Service. In: Sedjo,R.A., ed. A vision for the U.S. ForestService: Goals for its next century.Washington, DC: Resources for theFuture.

ICBEMP (Interior Columbia Basin Ecosys-tem Management Project). 2000. InteriorColumbia Basin Final EnvironmentalImpact Statement. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Agriculture and U.S.Department of the Interior.

Kennedy, J.J.; Dombeck, M.P. 1999. Theevolution of public agency beliefs andbehavior toward ecosystem-basedstewardship. In: Johnson, N.C.; Malik,A.J.; Szaro, R.C.; Sexton, W.T. Ecologicalstewardship: A common reference forecosystem management. Volume III.Oxford: Elsevier Science: 85–96.

Langston, N. 1995. Forest dreams, forestnightmares: The paradox of old growth inthe interior West. Seattle, WA: Universityof Washington Press.

Leopold, A. 1936a. Deer and Dauerwald inGermany: II. Ecology and policy. Journalof Forestry. 34(5): 460–466. [Quoted inMeine, C., and Knight, R.L., eds., Theessential Aldo Leopold. Madison, WI:University of Wisconsin Press.]

Leopold, A. 1936b. Deer and Dauerwald inGermany: I. History. Journal of Forestry.34(4): 366–375. [Quoted in Meine, C., andKnight, R.L., eds., The essential AldoLeopold. Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press.]

Nelson, R.N. 2000a. Fires by design. TheWashington Post (Washington, DC).August 9.

Nelson, R.N. 2000b. A burning issue: A casefor abolishing the U.S. Forest Service.Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield.

Nelson, R.N. 2001. Forest Service tinderboxpolicies. The Washington Times (Wash-ington, DC). January 29.

NWCG (National Wildfire CoordinatingGroup). 1995. Federal wildland firemanagement policy and program review.Final report. Boise, ID: National Inter-agency Fire Center.

NWCG 2001. Review and update of the 1995Federal wildland fire management policy.Boise, ID: National Interagency FireCenter.

OAHS (Ozark–Ouachita HighlandsAssessment). 1999. Ozark–OuachitaHighlands Assessment. Report 1:Summary. Gen. Tech. Rep. SRS–31.Report 2: Air quality. Gen. Tech. Rep.SRS–32. Report 3: Aquatic conditions.Gen. Tech. Rep. SRS–33. Report 4: Socialand economic conditions. Gen. Tech.Rep. SRS–34. Report 5: Terrestrialvegetation and wildlife. Gen. Tech. Rep.SRS–35. Asheville, NC: SouthernResearch Station.

25Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Pinchot, G. 1947. Breaking new ground.Washington, DC: Island Press.

Pyne, S.J. 1982. Fire in America: A culturalhistory of wildland and rural fire. Seattle,London: University of Washington Press.

Pyne, S.J. 2000. A story to tell. FireManagement Today. 60(4): 6–8.

Pyne, S.J. 2001. Year of the fires: The storyof the great fires of 1910. New York, NY:Viking.

FIRE CONTROL LEGACY

In recent decades, the USDA ForestService has embraced a long-termcommitment to ecological sustain-ability. However, decades of firecontrol have made it difficult forlocal managers to introducealternatives to fire exclusion.• Fire use constraints. Managers

might have no alternative to fireexclusion. Fuel buildups haveleft many ecosystems prone toexplosive fire conditions. In suchareas, fire use could pose unac-ceptable risks.

• Planning inertia. In 2000, some63 percent of the acres burnedon the National Forest Systemwere in roadless and wildernessareas (F&AM 2000a). Remoteareas are often in the standreplacement fire regime, wherealternatives to full suppressionare desirable and arguablyinevitable. But alternatives areavailable only with an approvedfire management plan.

• Thinning constraints. Mechani-cal thinning, often necessarybefore fire can be safely applied,is expensive and controversial.The small-diameter materialsthat need to be removed fromour vegetation-choked forests

usually have little or no commer-cial value. The ecological effectsof mechanical treatments aresometimes adverse or poorlyunderstood; proposals formechanical removal thereforeface frequent public opposition.

• Obsolete measures. Standardsfor measuring fire managementsuccess are based on the old firecontrol policy of suppressing allfires within 24 hours.– Number of fires and acres

burned. All fires are not equal.The Forest Service is workingon plans to use new technol-ogy to detect fire severity inrelation to fire regime andcondition class. Future firereporting might distinguish,for example, between charac-teristic and uncharacteristicfire effects, for a more realisticassessment of fire seasonseverity.

– Fires controlled during initialattack. Nominal success—upto 98 percent of fires con-trolled during initial attack—can be misleading. For ex-ample, many fires might goout on their own without everendangering lives, communi-ties, or wildland resources.

• Fire use risks. Fire use carriessocial and political risks.– Escapes. Escaped prescribed

fires have destroyed thou-sands of homes and cost atleast one life (on the 1980Mack Lake Fire on Michigan’sHuron–Manistee NationalForest). High-visibilityescapes such as the 2000Cerro Grande Fire in NewMexico have a political falloutthat can dampen land manag-ers’ willingness or ability totake the risk again.

– Smoke. Lingering smokefrom fire use can carry healthrisks, contribute to trafficaccidents by reducing visibil-ity, and adversely affectincomes in resource-depen-dent communities by discour-aging recreational visits.However, wildfires have thesame effects without thebenefits associated withplanning, such as timing,predictability, and mitigation.

– Public antipathy. Thepublic, weaned on a diet offire control, often fearswildland fire and opposes itsuse.

Sedjo, R.A. 2000. Does the Forest Servicehave a future? In: Sedjo, R.A., ed. A visionfor the U.S. Forest Service: Goals for itsnext century. Washington, DC: Resourcesfor the Future.

SNEP (Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project).1996. Status of the Sierra Nevada: SierraNevada Ecosystem Project, final report toCongress. Wildl. Res. Ctr. Rep. No. 37.Davis, CA: University of California–Davis,Center for Water and Wildland Resources.

Thomas, D. 2000. Forest Service RoadlessArea Conservation Final EnvironmentalImpact Statement: Fuel management andfire suppression specialist’s report.Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service.

Williams, G.W. 2000a. The USDA ForestService—The first century. Washington,DC: USDA Forest Service.

Williams, G.W. 2000b. Wildland firemanagement in the 20th century. FireManagement Today. 60(4): 15–20. ■

26 Fire Management Today

* This article is derived from an op-ed column thatappeared in the Montana Wilderness Association’snewsletter Wild Montana, Fall 2000.

Steve Barrett, a consulting fire ecologist inKalispell, MT, has studied fire historythroughout the Northern Rockies since1979.

n 2000, about 2.3 million acres(930,000 ha) burned in Idaho andMontana alone. Many wondered

FIRES 2000: FACT VS. FICTION*

Stephen W. Barrett

Iwhy the fire season in the northernRocky Mountains was so severe. Amedley of conflicting opinionsemerged, often grounded in folkwisdom:

• “The fires were big and thereforeunnatural.” … or … “The fireswere natural and therefore big.”

• “The fires were unprecedented inhistory.” … or … “Such burninghas always occurred.”

• “This was the worst fire season in50 years.” … or … “This was thebest fire season in 50 years.Everyone knows fire is natural, sowhat’s the problem?”

What does the science show?

ComplexCircumstancesIn fact, there are no easy scientificanswers. One must evaluate notonly possible changes from histori-cal fire regimes, but also climaticvariables, daily fire weather, topog-raphy, land use history, and a hostof other factors. Some forestsburned in 2000 were still on anatural fire cycle (see sidebar); forthem, forest health was not anissue.

However, many low- to mid-eleva-tion stands have undergone a seachange since 1900, most notably

For some forests burned in 2000,still on a natural fire cycle,

forest health was not an issue.

the ponderosa pine type. In theory,a region increasingly dominated bysevere fires will suffer a reductionin biodiversity. Forest mosaics—thevery lifeblood of ecosystem diver-sity—are drastically simplifiedwhen large crown fires occur onterrain previously subject to patchynonlethal and mixed-severity fires.

I think today’s large wildfires aresimply nature’s way of lurchingback to equilibrium after a century

Fire scar on a ponderosa pine in thenonlethal fire regime (Idaho City Experi-mental Forest, Boise National Forest, ID).Historically, low-severity fires every 10 to20 years kept such forests open and“parklike” without killing the big trees.Photo: Karen Wattenmaker, USDA ForestService, Boise National Forest, Boise, ID,1994.

of fire suppression and bad logging.Unfortunately, the healing processcould be lengthy and might gener-ate some “casualties” in nativeecosystems. For example, how willgoshawks fare in today’s overlydense ponderosa pine forests? Howmuch longer will the 500-year-oldtrees themselves persist?

No Easy SolutionsWhat can be done about the “fireproblem?” Not much. Although Igenerally support plans for moreprescribed fire, most prescribedburning occurs on “easy ground”such as open slopes and shrubfields.Prescribed burning in heavilystocked stands, besides being athreat to lives, communities, andwildland resources, actually couldincrease the likelihood of severefires in the near term by producingheavy mortality.

Moreover, “restoration logging” hasbecome a political football akin tothe infamous “Salvage Rider”—the1995 Rescission Act, which tempo-rarily suspended environmentalprotections to foster widespreadsalvage sales on national forest landburned in 1994. In my view, thegrowing clamor for large-scale,indiscriminate thinning only harmsforesters’ credibility. Open, parklikestands historically were common indry forest types, whereas otherforests were naturally dense.Thinning the latter would destroy

27Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

valuable habitat and could increasefire danger by promoting fueldrying.

If ecosystem restoration were theonly goal, there could be no univer-sally applicable model of parklikestands. Unfortunately, other objec-tives, such as fuel hazard reductionand crop tree protection, have oftenbeen lumped into the now amor-phous term “forest restoration.” Ithink managers (and politicians)should clearly spell out the pur-poses of proposed thinning projects.But where true restoration is thegoal, converting stands into simpletree farms—akin to steep corn-fields—would be a big mistakeecologically and politically.

Healthy BackcountryGiven the politics, the massive scaleof fire exclusion in the NorthernRockies, and the limited potentialfor bona fide restoration throughprescribed burning and low-impactlogging, I have to conclude thatecosystem restoration is unlikely tohappen beyond a few demonstrationprojects. So let’s thank our luckystars for the wild backcountry—stillsome of the least impacted land onthe planet! ■

FIRE ECOLOGY PRIMER*

Fire-prone ecosystems are adaptedto certain “fire regimes”—typicalcombinations of fire severity andfire return intervals. Changes infire regime can disrupt fire-adaptedecosystems. In the NorthernRockies, six fire regimes areprevalent:

Nonlethal fire regime. Historically,“nonlethal” fires averaged every 10to 20 years, producing many open,“parklike” stands of ponderosa pine.Data from my extensive fire historyresearch suggest that 80 years ormore have passed since the lastnatural light underburns. Theheavily disrupted fire pattern is adirect result of long-term fireexclusion; therefore, many standswill die during the next event.(Presumably, the same fate befellmost old-growth ponderosa pinestands that burned in the 2000fires.)

Mixed-severity (MS) I fire regime.The MSI fire regime is a variant ofthe nonlethal regime, but fires wereoccasionally more severe. Examplesare stands dominated by ponderosapine, Douglas-fir, and western larchin western Montana; and dryDouglas-fir stands in southwesternMontana. Fires averaged every 25 to40 years on such sites, but have notoccurred during the past 100 years,on average. Consequently, futurewildfires will likely be more severeand perhaps larger.

MSII fire regime. This is a variantof the “stand replacement” regime(described below). Fires were often

relatively severe, but some fire-resistant species such as oldwestern larch and Douglas-firusually survived. Such standsburned about every 75 years, onaverage, but many have notburned for 100 years or more.These stands are still natural, butlong-term fire exclusion haspushed many fire intervals towardthe upper end of the historicalrange. Modern fires will thereforebe large and hot.

Stand replacement (SR) I fireregime. In the stand replacementfire regime, relatively long inter-vals occurred between severe firesthat killed most trees in the stand.In the SRI fire regime, fire inter-vals usually ranged between 100and 150 years long. Although fireexclusion has not affected moststands, the practice of continuallyextinguishing ignitions over abroad area has adversely affectedsome large landscapes.

SRII fire regime. In this fireregime, fire intervals usuallyexceeded 200 years in length. Agood example of the SRII fireregime is Yellowstone Park’slodgepole pine forest.

MSIII fire regime. This fireregime type occupies the uppertree line, where historical fireintervals, severities, and sizesexhibit extreme variation. Forexample, some alpine larch andwhitebark pine stands have gonemany centuries without fire,whereas nearby trees sometimescontain multiple fire scars. Conse-quently, high-elevation communi-ties show no measurable effectfrom long-term fire exclusion.

*Some fire regime classification schemes differ slightlyfrom the one presented here. For the scheme used bythe USDA Forest Service, see Protecting People andSustaining Resources in Fire-Adapted Ecosystems: ACohesive Strategy (Washington, DC: USDA ForestService), p. 70.

28 Fire Management Today

ven a casual familiarity with theliterature related to wildlandfire risk will reveal the inconsis-

* This article is an abbreviated version of a paperpublished in the proceedings of the Joint Fire ScienceConference and Workshop, 15–17 June 1999, Boise, ID.

Andreas Bachmann is a research assistantand Ph.D. student at the Institute ofGeography, University of Zurich, Zurich,Switzerland; and Britta Allgöwer is aresearch associate at the University ofZurich and leads the geographic informa-tion system for the Swiss National Park.

A CONSISTENT WILDLAND FIRE RISKTERMINOLOGY IS NEEDED!*Andreas Bachmann and Britta Allgöwer

Etent and confusing use of the terms“danger,” “hazard,” and “risk.” Lackof clear definitions can be anobstacle to sound research andmanagement. For example, com-puter models and simulations of“fire danger” or “fire hazard,” ifbased on fuzzy definitions, aredifficult to validate; a comparison ofresearch results can be impossible ifdifferent researchers are reallytalking about different things.Moreover, unless firefighters on thefireline base their actions onprecisely understood conditions,the consequences might be fatal.The success of any organizationdepends on a clear understanding ofterms, rules, limits, and conditions.

Quantitative risk analysis in thecontext of wildland fire manage-ment requires a solid basis in asound terminology that is under-stood and shared throughout thewildland fire community. First, let’slook at another form of risk man-agement—the field of technical riskengineering—for terminologicaloptions and alternatives to ourcurrent definitions (see sidebar).Then let’s see if they can be usefullyapplied to wildland fire research.

Based on definitions used in technical risk engineering, we propose toredefine the following terms used in wildland fire risk analysis:

Danger: Obsolete. Danger is an abstract concept based on perception.Danger per se does not exist. It is defined by subjective human andsocietal perceptions and assessments of events and outcomes that areconsidered harmful. The concept is useless for wildland fire researchand management.

Hazard: A process with undesirable outcomes.

Wildland fire hazard: A wildland fire with undesirable outcomes.

Risk: The probability of an undesired event and its outcome. Anundesired event is a realization of a hazard.

Wildland fire risk: The probability of a wildland fire occurring at aspecified location and under specific circumstances, together with itsexpected outcome as defined by its impacts on the objects it affects.

NEW DEFINITIONS

“Risking” RedefinitionsCurrent wildland fire glossariesillustrate problems with the defini-tions of “fire danger,” “fire hazard,”and “fire risk.” The field of technicalrisk engineering offers alternatives.

Fire Danger. Current glossariesdefine the term “fire danger” verybroadly. For example, the NationalWildfire Coordinating Group’sGlossary of Wildland Fire Terminol-ogy (NWCG 1996) defines firedanger as the “sum of constantdanger and variable danger factors

The success of any organizationdepends on a clear understanding

of terms, rules, limits, and conditions.

affecting the inception, spread, andresistance to control, and subse-quent fire damage.” This definitionconflates fire danger “factors” thatare really quite different. Forexample, a fire’s inception has to dowith the probability of its occur-rence, whereas resistance to controlis related to the fire’s outcome. Itmakes more sense to treat eachfactor separately to determine itsrelative contribution to the risk offire. The term “danger” is tooabstract and subjective to be usefulfor research and management.

29Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Fire Hazard. Current glossariesdefine the term “fire hazard” verynarrowly. For example, the Cana-dian Interagency Forest FireCentre’s Glossary of Forest FireManagement Terms (CIFFC 1999)defines fire hazard as “potential firebehavior” based on “physical fuelcharacteristics (e.g. fuel arrange-ment, fuel load, condition ofherbaceous vegetation, presence ofladder fuels).” In this definition,hazard is a set of fuels precondi-tions for wildland fire behavior.

By contrast, in the domain oftechnical risk engineering, hazardis more broadly defined as “aphysical situation with a potentialfor human injury, damage toproperty, damage to the environ-ment or some combination ofthese” (Allen 1992). The broaderdefinition has the advantage ofapplicability to any process that canlead to damage. In this case, thehazard is wildland fire itself, notsome subset of preconditions thatmight or might not lead to firedamage.

Fire Risk. The term “risk” gener-ally has two distinct areas of mean-ing: (1) chance and probability; and(2) loss, harm, and injury (Landau1999). Current wildland fire glossa-ries focus on the former area,neglecting the latter. For example,the United Nations Food andAgriculture Organization’s WildfireManagement Terminology (FAO1986) defines fire risk as “thechance of fire starting, as affectedby the nature and incidence of

causative agencies.” This definitionfocuses on fire cause (the probabil-ity of ignition), ignoring fire effects(the likelihood of damage).

By contrast, in the field of technicalrisk engineering, risk comprisesboth the likelihood and the out-come of an event (Jones 1992;Gheorghe and Nicolet-Monnier1996; Merz and others 1995). Forexample, Hall (1992) refers tostructural fire risk as both “ameasure of the expected severity(e.g., how many deaths, injuries,dollars or damage per fire)” and “ameasure of the probability ofoccurrence.” Hall’s definition hasthe advantage of including bothcomponents of fire risk—probabil-ity and damage.

New Definitions. We base ourwildland fire risk analysis andassessment on proposed newdefinitions:

• We drop the term “fire danger” asuseless for wildland fire researchand management.

• We use the term “fire hazard” as asynonym for the process ofwildland fire itself.

• We make “fire risk” our centralterm. Specifically, we address“quantitative wildland fire risk,”embedding the concept of risk ina risk management process,where risk analysis and riskassessment are important steps(Bärtsch 1998). Moreover, we usethe value-free term “outcome” todescribe fire effects, which are notalways negative.

Quantitative WildlandFire RiskFor a quantitative analysis, we mustoperationalize the term “risk” bydescribing the mathematicalrelationships between probabilityand outcome and by definingindicators that can be used tomeasure their value. Generally, riskr is defined as the product of theprobability p and the expectedoutcome d (Jones 1992; Kumamotoand others 1996; Merz and others1995), as follows:

r = p × d (1)

The probability p, according to theaxioms of Kolmogorov (1933), isdefined for a given time period; forexample, the occurrence probabilityof a wildland fire in the next yearmight be 0.8. Kolmogorov’s axiomsdo not prescribe how probabilitiesare determined but define proper-ties and calculation rules that haveto be satisfied. For example, amethod resulting in an index of fuelmoisture with an arbitrary scale canbe transformed into an ignitionprobability with any appropriatefunction. The expected outcome d isa measure or description, such as“100 acres [40 ha] of highly produc-tive timber stands burned down” or“increased biological diversity afterdisturbance.”

Risk deals with future events, whichcannot be predicted in a determinis-tic way. Scenarios must be con-structed to represent possiblerealizations of a hazard (in thiscase, a wildland fire). The scenariosdefine all relevant preconditionsand causes of an event and thusenable the quantitative determina-tion of risk.

Risk can be seen from two perspec-tives, subjective and collective. The

Wildland fire risk assessmenttakes into account not only the area burned,

but also the value of properties, such as homesin the wildland–urban interface.

30 Fire Management Today

subjective perspective is from asingle object exposed to risk, the so-called risk acceptor. The objectmight be affected by many scenariosinvolving various types of hazards.The collective perspective is from aparticular scenario, the so-calledrisk donor. Each scenario mightaffect many risk acceptors. The twoperspectives both play a role inassessing risk. For example, al-though the collective risk might beacceptable, the subjective riskmight not be, either because thedamage is too great or because theprobability of one object is too high.This case can occur when individualoutcomes and/or probabilities areunequally distributed.

Two problems are specific towildland fire risk analysis: spatiallocation and impact indicators. Thefirst problem is identifying thelocation. Whereas most technicalhazards have fixed locations (forexample, a road or power plant),wildland fires can, in principle, startin any location covered by combus-tible vegetation. In assessingwildland fire risk, analysts mustaccount for an infinite number ofpotential locations.

The second problem is selectingrelevant impact indicators forvarious types of affected objects,such as timber or endangered-species habitat. Merz and others(1995) maintain that damagesshould, whenever possible, bequantified to permit their discus-sion and assessment. Taking theproblems of spatial location andimpact indicators into account, wedefine wildland fire risk as theprobability of a wildland fireoccurring at a specified locationand under specific circumstances,together with its expected outcomeas defined by its impacts on theobjects it affects.

Calculating RiskLet’s apply our definition to a givenstudy area (fig. 1) with a certainnumber of objects O

i and scenarios

Sj. For every relation between ascenario S

j and an object O

i, the

individual probability of impact eij

and the individual expected impactd

ij at the object is calculated. The

risk of a given scenario—that is, thecollective wildland fire risk—isthen:

Figure 2 maps the fundamentalrelations in the collective risk of ascenario. The collective risk is theproduct of probability pj that a firewill start at a given location andexpected outcome d

j. The expected

outcome is a weighted sum of theimpacts of the fire on all objects.This method takes into account notonly the area burned, but alsovaluable properties, such as build-

ings—especially important in thewildland–urban wildland interface,where the value of burned timber isoften negligible compared to thevalue of destroyed homes(Alexandrian 1997).

The weighting is done through theimpact probability—that is, theprobability that a fire will reach andaffect an object. The impact prob-ability is determined through firespread. After the fire perimeter of agiven scenario is known, an indi-vidual impact probability of 1 isassigned to all objects within theperimeter. Objects outside theperimeter have an individual impactprobability of 0 and do not contrib-ute to the sum of impacts.

In a comprehensive risk analysis,several scenarios are usually con-structed to reflect all relevant cases.The risk for the whole area is thenthe sum of all individual scenariorisks.

rj = p

j ⋅ e

ij ⋅ dij

(2)n

i=1Σ

Wildland fire risk analysis focuses ontwo general areas: a fire’s probability

of occurrence and its outcome.

Figure 1—Hypothetical study area showing relationships between objects and scenarios.For every relation between a scenario S

j and an object O

i, the individual probability of

impact eij and the individual expected impact dij at the object can be calculated. Thecollective risk of the scenario can then be computed.

31Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121

Probabilityof Scenario

pj

Expected Outcomeof Scenario

dj eij ⋅ diji=1Σn

Collective Riskof a Scenario

pj ⋅ dj

IndividualImpact Probability

eij

IndividualExpected Outcome

dij

Figure 2—Collective risk of a scenario, the product of the probability pj of a fire starting ata given location, and its expected outcome dj. The expected outcome is a weighted sum ofthe impacts of the fire on all objects. The weighting is done through the impact probabil-ity—that is, the probability that a fire will reach and affect an object.

pj = pignition × pprecondition (3)

Risk

Met

hodo

logy

Wild

fire

Rese

arch

Wildfire Risk

Probabilityof Occurrence Outcome

WildfireOccurrence

WildfireBehavior

WildfireEffects

Figure 3—Risk methodology and wildland fire research. Through its focus on fire outcomeand probability of occurrence, quantitative fire risk assessment integrates each of thethree major areas in wildland fire research.

Research IntegrationWildland fire risk analysis focuseson two general areas: a fire’s prob-ability of occurrence and its out-come. These are the focal points forthe three main wildland fire re-search areas: fire effects, firebehavior, and fire occurrence (fig.3). Risk analysis can thus stimulateinterdisciplinary approaches.

Probability of Occurrence. Flamedepends on three factors (Pyne andothers 1996): fuel, a heat source,and oxygen. Oxygen can usually be

taken for granted as a constant.Fuel is the essential precondition;the heat source is the immediatecause. Fire cause and fuel condi-tions are the subject of fire occur-rence research and fire behaviorresearch, respectively. Because thespatial pattern of natural fire causesis very unpredictable, most fireoccurrence research focuses onhuman activities. Fuel complexresearch has two main components:fuels classification and fuel mois-ture estimation.

When used in wildland fire riskanalysis, any approach to fireoccurrence or fuels complexesshould deliver a probability as aresult. The probability of occur-rence can be expressed as:

where pignition

expresses the probabil-ity that any cause starts the wild-land fire and pprecondition is the prob-ability that the fuel complex andfuel moisture permit a fire to start.The product of both probabilitiesassures that if one is zero, theoccurrence probability will also bezero.

Outcome. The outcome of awildland fire is determined by aweighted sum of the impacts oneach affected object, with theweighting done through impactprobability (eq. 2). In determiningimpact probability, we are especiallyinterested in the rate of spread(Viegas and others 1998) and theease of suppression. Accessibility,now a standard functionality ingeographic information systems,can give a useful measure of sup-pression effectiveness, permittingthe overall performance of thefirefighting organization in a givenregion to be integrated into the riskanalysis. The impact of wildlandfires on objects is at the core of fireeffects research, which focuses onsuch areas as tree mortality (Ryan1998), erosion potential (Marxerand others 1998), and structuralignition (Cohen and others 1991). Afire’s impact on an object is afunction of fire behavior and thesusceptibility of the object to flame.

When used in wildland fire riskanalysis, all impacts must beconverted into monetary terms topermit a collective comparison.Monetary conversion is often

32 Fire Management Today

difficult for impacts such as erosionpotential or destruction of naturalresources such as wildlife habitat.However, economists are increas-ingly exploring ways to assign valueto nonmarket objects (Cabán 1998).

An AnalyticalFrameworkBased on the terminology presentedhere, Schöning and others (1997)and Bachmann and Allgöwer (1998)developed a framework for analyz-ing the spatial distribution ofwildland fire risk using a geo-graphic information system. Inaddition to scenarios and objects,“situations” are used to capture allrisk-relevant parameters (fig. 4),such as weather, fuels, precipita-tion, and holiday activities. Situa-tions help to group scenarios. Inany given area, a wildland firemight start at an infinite number oflocations. Some spatial discretiza-tion (usually rasterizing) is neededto obtain a finite number ofscenarios.

Based on fire occurrence researchmethodology, a probability ofignition is assigned for each loca-tion in the study area, given aparticular situation. The probabilityis then determined for each objectaffected under a given scenario,using appropriate fire behaviormodels. Finally, based on fire effectsresearch, the amount of damagesuffered by each object is estimatedunder each scenario. The resultingparameters are combined in a riskmatrix depicting the relationsamong all scenarios and objects fora given situation. The matrixpermits the calculation of riskcharacteristics pertaining to sce-narios, objects, and the situation asa whole. For example, figure 5shows the expected damage byscenario and object (buildings).

When used in risk analysis, all impactsmust be converted into monetary terms

to permit a collective comparison.

123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121123456789012345678901234567890121234567890123456789012345678901211234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012112345678901234567890123456789012123456789012345678901234567890121

Risk caused byeach Scenario

Total Risk for eachSituation

Risk for eachObject

Fire Occurrence Fire Behavior Fire Effects

Risk Matrix

Scenarios Situations Objects

Figure 4—Framework for a quantitative wildland fire risk analysis. Scenarios, objects, andsituations capture all risk-relevant factors. Each is determined through methodologiesassociated with the three main areas of wildland fire research (fire occurrence, firebehavior, and fire effects). The resulting parameters are combined in a risk matrixpermitting calculation of risk characteristics for scenarios, objects, and the situation as awhole.

Need for a RobustTerminologyA robust wildland fire risk terminol-ogy can support a rigorous riskanalysis. Risk analysis, in turn, canintegrate the fields of wildland fireresearch, stimulating interdiscipli-nary work. In operational use, riskanalysis can help fire managersbetter understand how the variousaspects of fire occurrence, firebehavior, and fire effects fit togetherto form the totality of wildland fire.

For more information, pleasecontact Andreas Bachmann, Geo-graphic Information SystemsDivision, Department of Geography,University of Zurich, Winter-thurerstr. 190, CH-8057 Zurich,Switzerland, 41-1-635-52-52 (tel.),

41-1-635-68-48 (fax), [email protected] (e-mail); or BrittaAllgöwer, [email protected](e-mail).

AcknowledgmentsThe work reported in this articlewas funded by the Swiss NationalScience Foundation (project no.21–50842.97) and by the Govern-ment of Switzerland, Federal Officefor Education and Science (EC–Project INFLAME Nr. ENV4–CT98–0700, BBW Nr. 97.0182–2).

Literature CitedAlexandrian, D. 1996. A new method of fire

danger mapping in the forest urbaninterface. In: Proceedings of the Work-shop on Wildfire Management; 3–4 June1996; Athens, Greece. Athens, Greece:Algosystems S.A.

33Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Figure 5—Example of expected damage to objects and by scenario in Malcantone-Ticino,Switzerland, using a quantitative wildland fire risk analysis.

Risk analysis can integratethe fields of wildland fire research,stimulating interdisciplinary work.

Allen, F.R. 1992. The management of risk tosociety from potential accidents. London,UK: Elsevier Applied Science.

Bachmann, A.; Allgöwer, B. 1998. Aframework for wildfire risk analysis. In:Proceedings of the IIIrd InternationalConference on Forest Fire Research, 14thConference on Fire and Forest Meteorol-ogy; 16–20 November 1998; Coimbra,Portugal. Vol. 2. Coimbra, Portugal: ADAI(Associação para o Desenvolvimento daAerodinâmica Industrial): 2177–2190.

Bärtsch, A. 1998. GIS-analysis for theconcept of a fire management plan inSwiss National Park. Masters thesis.University of Zurich. Zurich, Switzerland.

Cabán, A.G. 1998. The importance ofnonmarket values in land and firemanagement planning. In: Proceedings ofthe IIIrd International Conference onForest Fire Research, 14th Conference onFire and Forest Meteorology; 16–20November 1998; Coimbra, Portugal. Vol.2. Coimbra, Portugal: ADAI (Associaçãopara o Desenvolvimento da AerodinâmicaIndustrial): 2191–2208.

CIFFC (Canadian Interagency Forest FireCentre). 1999. Glossary of fire manage-ment terms. Winnipeg: CIFFC.

Cohen, J.D.; Chase, R.A.; LeVan, S.L.; Trna,H.C. 1991. A model for assessingpotential structure ignitions in thewildland/urban interface. In: Proceedings

of the 11th Conference on Fire andForest Meteorology; 16–19 April 1991;Missoula, MT. Bethesda, MD: Society ofAmerican Foresters: 50–57.

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization).1986. Wildfire management terminology.Terminologie de la lutte contre lesincendies de fôret. Terminología delcontrol de incendios en tierras incultas.Rome, Italy: United Nations, FAO, ForestResources Development Branch.

Gheorghe, A.; Nicolet-Monnier, M. 1995.Integrated regional risk assessment:Continuous and non-point sourceemissions: Air, water, soil. Vol. 1.Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Hall, J.R. 1992. Fire risk analysis. In:Proceedings, Fire Hazard and Fire RiskAssessment; 3 December 1990; SanAntonio, TX. Philadelphia, PA: ASTM(American Society for Testing andMaterials): 21-10–21-18.

Jones, D.A. 1992. Nomenclature of hazardand risk assessment in the processindustries. Rugby, Warwickshire, UK:Institution of Chemical Engineers.

Keetch, J.J.; Byram, G.M. 1968. A droughtindex for forest fire control. Res. Pap. SE–38. Asheville, NC: USDA Forest Service,Southern Research Station.

Kolmogorov, A.N. 1933. Grundbegriffe derWahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Berlin,Germany: Springer.

Kumamoto, H.; Henley, E.J. 1996. Probabi-listic risk assessment and managementfor engineers and scientists. Piscataway,NJ: IEEE (Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers) Press.

Landau, S.I., ed. 1999. The new interna-tional Webster’s student dictionary of theEnglish language. New York, NY: TridentPress International.

Marxer P.; Conedera, M.; Schaub, D. 1998.Postfire runoff and soil erosion in sweetchestnut forests in south Switzerland. In:Proceedings of the IIIrd InternationalConference on Forest Fire Research, 14thConference on Fire and Forest Meteorol-ogy; 16–20 November 1998; Coimbra,Portugal. Vol. 2. Coimbra, Portugal: ADAI(Associação para o Desenvolvimento daAerodinâmica Industrial): 1317–1331.

Merz, H.A.; Schneider, T.; Bohnenblust, H.1995. Bewertung von technischenRisiken. Beiträge zur Strukturierung undzum Stand der Kenntnisse. Modelle zurBewertung von Todesfallrisiken.Polyprojekt Risiko und Sicherheit, Dok.Nr. 3. Zurich, Switzerland: vdfHochschulverlag AG.

NWCG (National Wildfire CoordinatingGroup). 1996. Glossary of wildland fireterminology. PMS 205/NFES 1832. Boise,ID: National Interagency Fire Center.

Pyne, S.J.; Andrews, P.L.; Laven, R.D. 1996.Introduction to wildland fire. New York,NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Ryan, K.C. 1998. Analysis of the relativevalue of morphological variables inpredicting fire-caused tree mortality. In:Proceedings of the IIIrd InternationalConference on Forest Fire Research, 14thConference on Fire and Forest Meteorol-ogy; 16–20 November 1998; Coimbra,Portugal. Vol. 2. Coimbra, Portugal: ADAI(Associação para o Desenvolvimento daAerodinâmica Industrial): 1511–1526.

Schöning, R.; Bachmann, A.; Allgöwer, B.1997. GIS-based framework for wildfirerisk assessment. Final report forMINERVE 2. Zurich, Switzerland:Department of Geography, University ofZurich.

Viegas D.X.; Ribeiro P.R.; Cruz M.G. 1998.Characterisation of the combustibility offorest fuels. In: Proceedings of the IIIrdInternational Conference on Forest FireResearch, 14th Conference on Fire andForest Meteorology; 16–20 November1998; Coimbra, Portugal. Vol. 1. Coimbra,Portugal: ADAI (Associação para oDesenvolvimento da AerodinâmicaIndustrial): 467–482. ■

34 Fire Management Today

endrick Mountain is a 10,400-foot (3,200-m), steep-sidedcinder cone that rises dramati-

Allen Farnsworth is a prescribed firespecialist for the USDA Forest Service,Coconino National Forest, Peaks andMormon Lake Ranger Districts, Flagstaff, AZ.

FIGHTING THE PUMPKIN FIRE—INDIRECTATTACK AND AERIAL IGNITION

Allen Farnsworth

Kcally more than 2,000 feet (610 m)above the surrounding CoconinoPlateau in northern Arizona (fig. 1).By 2000, after nearly 100 years offire exclusion, excessive fuel loadinghad primed the mountain for adevastating fire. Scientists fromNorthern Arizona University inFlagstaff, AZ, estimated that standdensity was 10 to 15 times greaterthan before European settlement.

Proposals were introduced tomanage fire and natural ignitions toreplicate the natural nonlethal fireregime. However, because ofwilderness values, threatened andendangered species, opposition tointroducing managed fire into awilderness, and a lack of funding, afire management plan was neverdeveloped for the Kendrick Moun-tain Wilderness.

Pumpkin Fire SizeupOn May 24, 2000, a lightning strikeignited the Pumpkin Fire (namedfor the nearby settlement of Pump-kin Center) 1 mile (1.6 km) south-west of the Kendrick MountainWilderness on the Kaibab NationalForest, about 20 miles (32 km)northwest of Flagstaff. By May 25,with a 10- to 20-mile-per-hour (4–8m/s) southwest wind blowing, thePumpkin Fire had spread morethan 5 miles (8 km) from where ithad begun through ponderosa pine

Fire managers used indirect attackand aerial ignition to reduce the risk

to firefighters and the damage to resourcesin a wilderness area.

and mixed-conifer forest into thewestern portion of the KendrickMountain Wilderness. Fire manag-ers soon realized that the fire wouldreach most of the 6,700-acre (2,700-ha) wilderness area.

The area was under extreme firedanger. On May 25, the FlagstaffNational Fire Danger Rating Stationrecorded dead fuel moisture for 1-hour fuels at 2 percent, 10-hourfuels at 5 percent, 100-hour fuels at5 percent, and 1,000-hour fuels at 9percent. If the wilderness had to

Figure 1—Southeast face of Kendrick Mountain on June 3, 2000, showing cloudlike smokeplumes from the Pumpkin Fire. The mountain rises 2,000 feet (610 m) above the surround-ing Coconino Plateau on the Kaibab National Forest in northern Arizona. Photo: AllenFarnsworth, USDA Forest Service, Coconino National Forest, Peaks and Mormon LakeRanger Districts, Flagstaff, AZ, 2000.

burn, the incident managementteam wanted it to be a low-intensityfire to reduce the risk to firefightersand the damage to resources. Firemanagers began to develop a planto use aerial ignition within thewilderness and to prepare anindirect fireline with mechanizedequipment outside the wilderness.

The Wildland Fire Situation Analy-sis determined that because ofextreme fire behavior, concern forfirefighter safety, available fire-fighting resources, heavy fuels,

35Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

private land adjacent to the wilder-ness. To achieve these objectives,firefighters needed favorable aerial-ignition conditions and timber-harvesting equipment and person-nel to prepare an indirect firelinefor burnout operations.

Fireline PreparationA Flagstaff-based logging company,under a fire suppression contractwith the USDA Forest Service,dispatched a feller/buncher, abulldozer, two skidders, and twofallers to the Pumpkin Fire on May26. A Forest Service timber saleadministrator was the companyliaison.

The first assignment for the equip-ment operators was to prepare thefuels next to a road on the north-east side of the fire for a burnoutoperation and to protect an 80-acre(32-ha) parcel of private land, withstructures adjacent to the wilder-ness boundary. With the densestands of ponderosa pine in thearea, the feller/buncher was the besttool available to thin dense thicketsalong the road and private landboundary.

The two skidders piled the treesthat were cut by the feller/buncherand removed downed logs and oldpitchy stumps. The fireline andmechanized fuel manipulationalong the private property boundaryeffectively kept the fire off theprivate land and minimized scorch-ing and mortality to the stands ofponderosa pine and mixed coniferssurrounding the private property(fig. 2). When the summer mon-soon started in late June, erosionfrom runoff in this treated area wasmitigated—an indirect benefit fromthe fuel manipulation.

Next, the equipment operatorsremoved and reduced fuels along a

Removing snags quickly and safelyhelps keep fire intensities low,

with less likelihood of crowning and spotting.

Figure 2—Night burnout (top) along a forest road following mechanical treatment toprepare indirect firelines on the Pumpkin Fire. Scorching and mortality to the residualstand (bottom) were minimal. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service, CoconinoNational Forest, Peaks and Mormon Lake Ranger Districts, Flagstaff, AZ, 2000.

difficult terrain, and weatherconditions, an indirect attack posedthe least risk to firefighters and hadthe highest probability of success.One objective that emerged from

the analysis was to reduce the effectof fire in wilderness and nonwilder-ness areas by using low-intensityfire to secure indirect firelines.Another objective was to protect

36 Fire Management Today

Hotshot crews that worked with thefeller/buncher were enthusiastic aboutthe performance, safety, and results.

road system on the east, south, andsouthwest sides of the wildernessboundary and the fire. The proce-dures they used had the followingadvantages:

• Feller/bunchers cut a low, incon-spicuous stump;

• Trees skidded under dry-seasonconditions pulverized and re-duced needle cast, grass, andother ground fuels;

• Skidders—mobile, fast, and lessdamaging than bulldozers—areuseful during burnout operationsfor suppressing spot fires;

• Piled trees could be sold ordispersed around the burned areafor erosion control or wildlifehabitat;

• Hand crews could be used to pilefuels for the skidders to moveoutside the fireline;

• Selectively thinning the denseponderosa pine along the firelinelet the heat from the firingoperation escape through open-ings in the canopy, reducingscorching and mortality; and

• Feller/bunchers cut hundreds ofsnags along the fireline faster andsafer than crews could usingchain saws.

Aerial IgnitionBy June 3, the Pumpkin Fire hadburned 12,000 acres (4,900 ha) andwas well established on the west,north, and east sides of KendrickMountain. Fire managers decidednot to allow the fire to spread on itsown to the south face of KendrickMountain, but rather to conduct aburnout operation on the southface to manage the fire intensitythere. To ensure firefighter safetyand reduce resource damage, theincident management team chosean aerial ignition plan using de-layed ignition devices (see sidebar).With aerial ignition, managersestimated that tree mortality would

be 20 to 35 percent in the south-facing stands, compared to about 80percent if the fire were allowed tospread on its own.

The weather forecast called forbreezy daytime southwest winds,with a chance for strong southwestwinds in the extended forecast. Awritten aerial ignition plan wasdeveloped daily that includedpreferred direction of travel, air-speed, number and speed of chutesfor the plastic sphere dispenser,number of plastic spheres, and amap. The team flew a reconnais-sance flight each day at 5 p.m. toprepare the final details for theplan, which was implementedapproximately one-half hour beforesunset. Several practice runs wereflown during the 5 p.m. reconnais-sance, with additional practice runsjust before the final sunset run.

A lookout tower was on the summitof Kendrick Mountain, with ahistoric cabin directly below and tothe east of it. Vegetation on thisportion of the mountain consistedof mixed-conifer stands of spruce,limber pine, and Douglas-fir,together with small aspen stands.Ground fuels were spotty andbroken up by talus slopes.

The team knew that successfulfiring at the top of the mountaindepended on using a preciseamount of fire. Too much fire wouldproduce a high-intensity crown firethat would destroy the stands andthreaten the lookout and historiccabin. The right amount of firewould carry through the stands butleave the canopy untouched. Forthe first several nights, aerial crewsignited only a single strip below thetower. When the fire was approxi-mately a quarter mile (0.4 km)below the tower, four strips spaced660 feet (200 m) apart were ignited.This action successfully generatedenough fire to reduce ground fuels,with only isolated canopy torching.

Next, the team dropped one line ofaerial ignition devices from thelowest point of the fire contouringacross to the next lowest point onthe fire in as straight a line aspossible. This allowed the fire toback downslope overnight and tocontinue downslope into the windthe next day (fig. 3). The usualbacking rate of spread over a 24-hour period is 520 to 1,320 feet(160–400 m).

The aerial ignition was completedon the evening of the June 7. Thefire edge was straightened out and

DELAYED AERIALIGNITION DEVICES

One method of ignition is byaircraft equipped with dispens-ers for dropping plastic spheresknown as delayed aerial igni-tion devices. The dispenser hasthree chutes that the spheresare dropped into at either aslow or a fast release speed. Onthe ground, the spheres emitpotassium permanganateinjected with ethyleneglycol tocreate a delayed chemicalthermal reaction. The resultingflame consumes the chemicalsand containers, ignitingsurrounding fuels.

37Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Figure 3—South face of Kendrick Mountain after three (top), four (middle), and five(bottom) evenings of aerial ignition. Delayed aerial ignition devices were dropped from thelowest point of the fire contouring across to the next lowest point, allowing the fire to backdownslope. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service, Coconino National Forest,Peaks and Mormon Lake Ranger Districts, Flagstaff, AZ, 2000.

brought to the bottom of the slope.From this point, hand crews quicklycompleted the ignition to theindirect line before high windscreated dangerous conditions onthe afternoon of the June 8 (fig. 4).

ResultsThe aerial ignition and mechanizedline preparation for the indirectattack succeeded. The safety recordwas exceptional—none of the morethan 1,000 firefighters reported anyserious injuries. Private propertywas protected and buffered fromheavy erosion damage by the fuelreduction and low-intensity fires.Archeologists determined thatminimal damage had occurred tothe more than 100 prehistoric andhistoric sites in the fire suppressionarea. The team achieved incidentobjectives under severe fire weatherconditions because of firefighterprofessionalism. Through carefulplanning and coordination, fire-fighters executed many complextactics safely and on time.

The entire Kendrick MountainWilderness burned—only a fewsmall areas were untouched by fire.The final fire perimeter encom-passed 15,800 acres (6,400 ha), with1,000 acres (400 ha) unburnedwithin the perimeter. Fire intensi-ties throughout the areas ignited byhand and air remained in the low-to-moderate range, with onlypockets of high-intensity fire.Preliminary observations indicatedthat actual tree mortality was lessthan 20 percent on the south face ofKendrick Mountain.

The FutureThe Pumpkin Fire offers consider-able opportunities for fire effectsresearch and monitoring (fig. 5).Opportunities for study, just toname a few, include aspen regen-eration, long-term conifer fire

38 Fire Management Today

mortality, and postfire use of thewilderness by Mexican spotted owl.An effective monitoring programwill help guide future managementdecisions for this and other wilder-ness areas. The rich opportunitiesfor studying the Pumpkin Firedemonstrate the need for prefirebaseline studies in wilderness areasto better document fire effects.

Renewed fire exclusion in theKendrick Mountain Wilderness willonly revive the vicious cycle ofunnatural fuel buildups and un-characteristic fire effects. Unlessextenuating circumstances exist,future suppression of natural firesin this wilderness should not occur.Additionally, the area burnedoutside the wilderness should bemaintained with periodic burns to

Figure 4—Aerial and ground ignition completed. The operation was conducted safely andeffectively, keeping tree mortality to less than 20 percent. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDAForest Service, Coconino National Forest, Peaks and Mormon Lake Ranger Districts,Flagstaff, AZ, 2000.

Figure 5—Arizona fescue and bracken ferns regenerating on Kendrick Mountain 48 daysafter the Pumpkin Fire started. Following the fire, fire-dependent plants flourished in thisfire-dependent ecosystem, offering abundant opportunities for study. Photo: AllenFarnsworth, USDA Forest Service, Coconino National Forest, Peaks and Mormon LakeRanger Districts, Flagstaff, AZ, 2000.

CRITICAL HABITATCONSERVED

Burned over by the 2000Pumpkin Fire, KendrickMountain in northern Arizonahas four Protected ActivityCenters for the Mexicanspotted owl, a threatenedspecies. In the BiologicalAssessment Emergency Con-sultation for the fire, theincident biologist wrote,“Objectives included protectionof threatened species habitat tothe greatest extent possiblewithout compromising safetyof the firefighters and public.This objective was met, par-ticularly with the aerial igni-tion and backing fires con-ducted to prevent stand re-placement and reduce thespread of the fire to the north,east and southerly directions.”

buffer wilderness fires. Natureintervened in May 2000. Now,humans must develop a fire man-agement plan to perpetuate thenatural fire regime in this wilder-ness.

For more on the Pumpkin Fire,contact Allen Farnsworth, USDAForest Service, Coconino NationalForest, Peaks Ranger District, 5075N. Highway 89, Flagstaff, AZ 86004,520-527-8227 (voice), [email protected] (e-mail). ■

39Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

he national awards for wildlandfire use and prescribed fireapplications, established in

SIX NATIONAL FIRE USE AWARDSPRESENTED FOR 1998 AND 1999David L. Bunnell

Dave Bunnell is the national fire useprogram manager, USDA Forest Service,National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID.

T1995 by the USDA Forest ServiceChief’s Office under leadership fromthe Director of Fire and AviationManagement, are designed torecognize units, groups, andindividuals in the Forest Servicewho have advanced the science, art,and/or acceptance of fire useprograms for ecosystem health.*Individual awardees may receive upto $1,000 and units or groups up to$2,500. Award winners also receivean oak plaque that is laser engravedwith a uniquely designed prescribedfire scene overlaid with a silver driptorch emblem.

Peer groups select the awardwinners based on nominationsmade through the regional Fire andAviation Management directors.The 1998 and 1999 awards werepresented to:

• Unit Awards—– 1998: Cherokee National

Forest, Fire Management Team,Cleveland, TN;

– 1999: Francis Marion NationalForest, Hurricane Hugo FuelTreatment Team, Columbia, SC;

– Program Support Award(1998)—George Matejko,Salmon–Challis NationalForest, Salmon, ID;

* For the full basis for the national fire use awards, seeDavid L. Bunnell, “National Prescribed Fire AwardsRecognize Excellence,” Fire Management Notes 56(4):12–13.

– Group Research Award(1999)—Steve Arno, RockyMountain Research Station,Missoula, MT; Steve Sackett,Pacific Southwest ResearchStation, Riverside, CA; and DaleWade, Southern ResearchStation, Athens, GA;

• Individual AccomplishmentAwards—– 1998: Paul Tiné, Superior

National Forest, Grand Rapids,MN; and

– 1999: David McCandliss, PineRidge Ranger District, SierraNational Forest, Clovis, CA.

The National Fire Use Awardsare bestowed annually in recognition

of extraordinary contributions to the advancementof fire use for ecosystem health.

Unit Award 1998The 1998 National Fire Use Awardfor unit excellence went to the firemanagement team on the CherokeeNational Forest, Cleveland, TN.Team members are District andZone Fire Management OfficersMarty Bentley, Rex Kelley, RonnieLintz, Fred Locke, Roby Phillippi,Ed Stiles, Guy Street, and BillWoody.

The team has developed andimplemented an aggressive, sophis-ticated prescribed burning programto improve ecosystem management.

The Fire Management Team on the Cherokee National Forest, Cleveland, TN, winner of the1998 National Fire Use Award for unit excellence. The team has developed and imple-mented an aggressive, sophisticated prescribed burning program to improve ecosystemmanagement. From left are Ronnie Lintz, Rex Kelley, Guy Street, Ed Stiles, Roby Phillippi,Bill Woody, and Fred Locke. Not pictured is Marty Bentley. Photo: John Stivers, USDAForest Service, Southern Region, Atlanta, GA, 2000.

40 Fire Management Today

Using both aerial and groundignition and mobilizing supportfrom volunteers, contractors,detailers, college students, andother forests and agencies, the teamburned more than 24,000 acres(9,700 ha) on complex landscapescontaining a wide variety of slopes,aspects, and elevations, with a rangeof timber types and age classes. Thistype of collaborative effort wasprecedent setting in the Appala-chian Mountains.

Prescribed burning has become thevegetation management tool ofchoice to restore, maintain, andenhance strategies for fire-depen-dent and fire-adapted ecologicalcommunities on the CherokeeNational Forest. Shortleaf, pitch,and table mountain pines, oak–hickory stands, and mixes of thesetypes occur on more than half theforest—300,000 acres (120,000 ha).Many stands in these ecologicalcommunities are threatened by:

• Hazardous fuel buildups;• Potential stand replacement of

stable, fire-adapted species by lessecologically sustainable types;

• Native and exotic forest pests; and• Encroachment by exotic, invasive

vegetation.

The fire management officers onthe forest are prime examples ofinnovative leadership by individualscharged with accomplishing com-plex management tasks. Working toensure success through well-planned operations and partner-ships, the prescribed burningprogram on the Cherokee NationalForest achieves forest healththrough sound land management.

Unit Award 1999The 1999 National Fire Use Awardfor unit excellence went to theHurricane Hugo Fuel Treatment

Team, Francis Marion NationalForest, Columbia, SC. Team mem-bers are Rebecca Ashley, JoeBenton, Marie Butler, Olga Cabal-lero, Steve Dix, Willie Irving,Robbie Risley, Shawn Shuler,George Stroman, Bill Twomey,William Weldon, Herman White,and Ricky Wrenn.

The team continued a comprehen-sive, vital prescribed burningprogram surrounded by the devas-tation caused in 1989 by HurricaneHugo. The ambitious program isbased on the team’s strong beliefthat prescribed fire is the mosteffective and efficient tool availableto reduce enormous fuel loads andrestore fire-adapted and fire-dependent ecosystems—especiallythe longleaf pine ecosystem.

Hurricane Hugo caused extremetimber breakage over about 250,000acres (100,000 ha) on the FrancisMarion National Forest. The hurri-cane left a swath of more than 1billion board feet of felled timber,approximately one-third of whichwas salvaged. The large amount of

downed fuel immediately made firesdifficult to control and extinguish.Since 1994, the buildup of decayingfuels has made them easy to ig-nite—even during periods of lowfire danger. When ignited, thepunky fuel releases copious amountof smoke for long periods. A com-plex smoke management programexists in the area’s wildland–urbaninterface.

Fire’s functional role in restoringhabitat and maintaining diversitywithin landscapes is well under-stood. Periodic fire sustains theintegrity of the longleaf pine andred-cockaded woodpecker habitat.On the Francis Marion NationalForest, controlling rapid midstorydevelopment facilitates the recoveryplan for the red-cockaded wood-pecker and meets an objective ofthe forest plan by restoring longleafpine.

On a landscape affected by one ofthe most severe natural disasters inrecent history, employees on theFrancis Marion National Forestaccomplish 30,000 to 35,000 acres

The Hurricane Hugo Fuel Treatment Team on the Francis Marion National Forest,Columbia, SC, winner of the 1999 National Fire Use Award for unit excellence. The teamhas continued a vital prescribed burning program surrounded by the devastation causedby Hurricane Hugo. From left are Herman White, Shawn Schuler, George Stroman, MarieButler, Bill Twomey, Joe Benton, Steve Dix, Olga Caballero, and Robbie Risley. Notpictured are Rebecca Ashley, Willie Irving, William Weldon, and Ricky Wrenn. Photo:Stephanie Neal Johnson, USDA Forest Service, Southern Region, Atlanta, GA, 2000.

41Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

(12,000–14,000 ha) of prescribedburns annually in the wildland–urban interface. The success of theprogram is due to the cohesion anddedication of the Hurricane HugoFuel Treatment Team.

Program SupportAward 1998George Matejko, forest supervisoron the Salmon–Challis NationalForest, Salmon, ID, and winner ofthe 1998 National Fire Use Awardfor program support, has providedoutstanding leadership and supportfor the development of the forest’saggressive and sustainable fire useprogram. Over the past few years,Matejko has emphasized the impor-tance of using fire as a resourcemanagement tool. Consequently,the forest’s burning programincreased from 4,300 acres (1,700ha) in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to 9,700acres (3,900 ha) in FY 1998, fol-lowed by a dramatic expansion to29,000 acres (11,700 ha) in FY1999.

Through progressive leadership,Matejko has restored fire as anintegral part of the ecosystem inIdaho’s Frank Church–River of NoReturn Wilderness. Recognizingthat lightning-caused fires have anatural vegetative disturbance rolein wilderness areas, the ForestService has long managed somelightning-caused fires to achieveresource benefits, if the location,risks to property, public safety,weather factors, and other condi-tions are within prescribed limits.In 1998, Matejko promoted themanagement of a complex oflightning fires for wildland fire use(WFU), known as the Main SalmonComplex. The complex consisted of16 WFU fires, which burned 21,600acres (8,700 ha). In 1999, Matejkohelped manage 13 additional WFUfires, which burned 12,700 (5,100

ha) acres, all on the Salmon–ChallisNational Forest. Although the useof wildland fire is difficult to plan,with outcomes that are highlyweather dependent, the success ofthe burning program on theSalmon–Challis National Forestcontinues to grow under Matejko’sdemonstrated leadership.

Group Research Award1999The 1999 National Fire Use Awardfor group research went to ForestService scientists Steve Arno, RockyMountain Research Station,Missoula, MT; Steve Sackett, PacificSouthwest Research Station,Riverside, CA; and Dale Wade,Southern Research Station, Athens,GA. Over the span of their com-

bined careers, the three scientistshave devoted about 100 years toexamining various research ques-tions related to fire and usingprescribed fire in the Southeasternand Western United States. To-gether, they have produced morethan 250 publications and 200presentations on fire and prescribedfire. Additionally, Arno, Sackett, andWade have devoted countless hoursto training individuals and groupsabout prescribed fire and fuels.

Arno, Sackett, and Wade beganresearching prescribed burning 10to 15 years before the ForestService officially accepted theprocess in the late 1970s as avegetation management tool. Today,through their efforts, the United

Where conditions warrant, fire use isbecoming the vegetation management toolof choice for restoring ecosystem health,

thanks to farsighted leadership in recent decades.

Winners of the 1999 National Fire Use Award for group research are, from left, Dale Wade,Southern Research Station, Athens, GA; Steve Sackett, Pacific Southwest ResearchStation, Riverside, CA; and Steve Arno, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT.The three Forest Service scientists have devoted a combined 100 years to research relatedto wildland and prescribed fire in the Southeastern and Western United States. Together,they have produced more than 250 publications and 200 presentations. Photo: JaneRohling, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID, 2000.

42 Fire Management Today

States uses and studies prescribedfire over extended periods atunique, long-term research sites.Research topics examined by thesescientists cover all aspects ofprescribed fire, including its inter-actions with ecosystem manage-ment, role in biological communi-ties, and ability to mimic naturalfire regimes.

Arno pioneered the developmentand transfer of methodologies todetermine the role of fire in theevolution and maintenance oflandscape-level processes and theuse of fire in the restoration andmaintenance of fire-dependentecosystems. Managers and scientistsroutinely use his methods todetermine the historical range ofvariation in ecosystem disturbanceand to document departure fromhistoric patterns. This informationprovides the basis for prescribingthe frequency and severity of firetreatment necessary for restorationof ecosystem structure and func-tion. Arno is the recognized author-ity in the Intermountain West onthe vegetative dynamic associatedwith fire-dependent ecosystems. Hiswork in developing fire history andlandscape disturbance mosaicmethods is the standard used byland managers and other scientists.

Sackett determined the appropriateburning interval to reduce hazard-ous-fuel accumulations in thepalmetto–gallberry fuel complex ofthe lower southeastern CoastalPlain. The natural fire regime forsouthwestern ponderosa pine gaveSackett a starting point for re-searching the use of prescribed fireto reduce fuel hazards in this foresttype. In recent years, he has focusedon the effects of fire reintroductioninto western ecosystems. To provide

a comprehensive picture of thepotential effects of prescribed fire,Sackett has examined the impact ofprescribed fire on several differentecosystem components, includingsoil, plant cover and composition,nutrient cycling, smoke, andcultural resources.

Wade has conducted research in theSouthern United States—princi-pally in the southern pine ecosys-tems. Because prescribed burninghas been widely used in the South-ern United States, Wade’s researchhas focused on understanding thevarious influences of prescribed fireto develop prescriptions for accom-plishing a variety of ecosystemmanagement objectives. Besides

Paul Tiné, winner of the 1998 National Fire Use Award for individual accomplishment,flanked by his wife, Sherry Phillips, and by (left) Fire and Aviation Management DirectorJosé Cruz (retired) and (right) then-Acting Director Harry Croft. Tiné, a fuels specialist forthe Superior National Forest, Duluth, MN, has demonstrated national leadership indeveloping and implementing a fire use plan for the Boundary Waters Canoe AreaWilderness in Minnesota. Photo: Dennis Neitzke, USDA Forest Service, Superior NationalForest, Duluth, MN, 2000.

basic ecological research, he hasexamined the comparative costs andefficiency of prescribed fire, herbi-cides, and mechanical treatments.Through the efforts of Sackett andWade, we are beginning to under-stand the long-term effects ofrepeated prescribed fire use insouthern and southwestern pinesystems.

Arno, Sackett, and Wade havedevoted their Forest Service careersto providing support and leadershipthrough science and education toadvance the use of prescribed fire inecosystem management. Recog-nized as experts in prescribedburning, these scientists havecontributed to the wider and wiser

43Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

use of prescribed fire in the UnitedStates.

IndividualAccomplishmentAward 1998The 1998 National Fire Use Awardfor individual accomplishment wentto Paul Tiné, fuels specialist for theSuperior National Forest, Duluth,MN. Tiné has demonstrated na-tional leadership in developing andimplementing a wildland fire useplan for the Boundary Waters CanoeArea Wilderness (BWCAW) inMinnesota—a national treasure ofimmense significance. Since 1999,Tiné has managed 45 fires forwildland fire use, treating a total of10,000 acres (4,000 ha). Addition-ally, he is pursuing an amendmentto the wilderness fire use plan toallow for management-ignited firein designated wilderness areas onthe National Forest System.

The BWCAW sustained a massivestorm on July 4, 1999, causingblowdown of more than 30 percentof the forested area. The total areaaffected by the storm was morethan three times the area affectedby the Mount St. Helens eruption in1980. Tiné coordinated and wasresponsible for a fire analysisorganization, including a compre-hensive fuel and fire preparednessassessment, in the blowdown andadjoining wildland–urban interfaceareas. He assembled a team ofnational experts in fuels and firebehavior, including preeminentresearch scientists, to providecritical baseline information anddocumentation for the SuperiorNational Forest. Under his leader-ship, immediate action was taken tosafeguard lives and property duringthe storm recovery work. The

Dave McCandliss (left) accepting the 1999 National Fire Use Award for individual accom-plishment from Fire Management Officer Gary Thompson. McCandliss, a fuels specialistfor the Kings River District, Sierra National Forest, Sanger, CA, helped implement alandscape-level approach to slash treatment on the forest, including prescribed fire. Photo:Dave Kohut, USDA Forest Service, Sierra National Forest, Clovis, CA, 2000.

team’s assessment will help toamend the existing fire use andpreparedness plans and to restoreecosystem form and function.

Tiné demonstrated a unique abilityto deal with diverse interest groupsand individuals to foster collabora-tion and improve understanding offire’s natural role in the Lake Statesecosystems. He has developed andpresented various multimedia talksand shows, professional discussions,community meetings, and otherpublic information and educationprograms to help the public under-stand that fire is a critical andintegral part of many northernhabitats. Tiné has been a tirelessadvocate for restoring fire’s naturaland historical role in the BWCAWecosystem and is recognized as aforemost wildland fire use programadvocate for the entire Northeast.

IndividualAccomplishmentAward 1999The 1999 National Fire Use Awardfor individual accomplishment wentto Dave McCandliss, fuels specialistfor the Kings River District, SierraNational Forest, Sanger, CA.McCandliss led in developing aprescribed fire program for theforest, which had conducted nounderburning during the previousdecade and had a treatment targetfor natural fuels of only 40 acres (16ha) per year.

In the early 1990s, episodic droughtand insect mortality requiredextensive salvage logging in low-elevation ponderosa pine andmixed-conifer stands on the SierraNational Forest. Slash accumula-tions made piling ineffective or

44 Fire Management Today

uneconomical, and biomass use wasnot an option. McCandliss realizedthat a landscape-level approach toslash treatment was necessary inthis area of highly flammable fuelsadjacent to the wildland–urbaninterface.

Working with other district special-ists, McCandliss developed andimplemented a plan to underburn6,000 acres (2,400 ha). McCandlisshas also provided essential fire-related information about the64,000-acre (25,900-ha) Kings Riverresearch study area. He has experi-mented with techniques and timing

to restore fire cycles, reduce land-scape flammability, meet increas-ingly restrictive air quality stan-dards, and increase prescribed fireuse to ensure ecosystemsustainability.

As McCandliss developed his perso-nal skills and knowledge aboutnatural fire regimes and restoringfire, he collaborated with districtfire personnel, other district spe-cialists, and Pacific Southwestresearchers and scientists, sharinginformation and ideas. McCandlissis an excellent example of leader-ship in fire management programs.

Future Fire UseProgram AwardsNominations for the National FireUse Awards are due each year onJanuary 31. For nomination formsand information on how to nomi-nate units, groups, or individualsfor excellence in prescribed firemanagement, contact your regionaldirector or Dave Bunnell, NationalInteragency Fire Center, 3833South Development Avenue, Boise,ID 83705-5354; 208-387-5218(voice); 208-387-5398 (fax);[email protected] (e-mail). ■

Editorial PolicyFire Management Today (FMT) is an interna-tional quarterly magazine for the wildland firecommunity. FMT welcomes unsolicitedmanuscripts from readers on any subject relatedto fire management. Because space is aconsideration, long manuscripts might beabridged by the editor, subject to approval by theauthor; FMT does print short pieces of interestto readers.

Submission GuidelinesSubmit manuscripts to either the generalmanager or the managing editor at:

USDA Forest ServiceAttn: April J. Baily, F&AM StaffP.O. Box 96090Washington, DC 20090-6090tel. 202-205-0891, fax 202-205-1272Internet e-mail: [email protected]

USDA Forest ServiceAttn: Hutch Brown, 2CEN YatesP.O. Box 96090Washington, DC 20090-6090tel. 202-205-1028, fax 202-205-0885e-mail: [email protected]

If you have questions about a submission, pleasecontact the managing editor, Hutch Brown.

Paper Copy. Type or word-process themanuscript on white paper (double-spaced) onone side. Include the complete name(s), title(s),affiliation(s), and address(es) of the author(s), aswell as telephone and fax numbers and e-mailinformation. If the same or a similar manuscriptis being submitted elsewhere, include that

of the manuscript, include clear, thoroughfigure and photo captions labeled in the sameway as the corresponding material (figure 1, 2,3; photograph A, B, C; etc.). Captions shouldmake photos and illustrations understandablewithout reading the text. For photos, indicatethe name and affiliation of the photographerand the year the photo was taken.

Electronic Files. Please label all disks carefullywith name(s) of file(s) and system(s) used. If themanuscript is word-processed, please submit a3-1/2 inch, IBM-compatible disk together withthe paper copy (see above) as an electronic filein one of these formats: WordPerfect 5.1 forDOS; WordPerfect 7.0 or earlier for Windows 95;Microsoft Word 6.0 or earlier for Windows 95;Rich Text format; or ASCII. Digital photos maybe submitted but must be at least 300 dpi andaccompanied by a high-resolution (preferablylaser) printout for editorial review and qualitycontrol during the printing process. Do notembed illustrations (such as maps, charts, andgraphs) in the electronic file for the manuscript.Instead, submit each illustration at 1,200 dpi ina separate file using a standard interchangeformat such as EPS, TIFF, or JPEG (EPS formatis preferable, 256K colors), accompanied by ahigh-resolution (preferably laser) printout. Forcharts and graphs, include the data needed toreconstruct them.

Release Authorization. Non-Federal Govern-ment authors must sign a release to allow theirwork to be in the public domain and on theWorld Wide Web. In addition, all photos andillustrations require a written release by thephotographer or illustrator. The author, photo,and illustration release forms are available fromGeneral Manager April Baily.

GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORSinformation also. Authors who are affiliatedshould submit a camera-ready logo for theiragency, institution, or organization.

Style. Authors are responsible for usingwildland fire terminology that conforms to thelatest standards set by the National WildfireCoordinating Group under the NationalInteragency Incident Management System. FMTuses the spelling, capitalization, hyphenation,and other styles recommended in the UnitedStates Government Printing Office StyleManual, as required by the U.S. Department ofAgriculture. Authors should use the U.S. systemof weight and measure, with equivalent valuesin the metric system. Try to keep titles conciseand descriptive; subheadings and bulletedmaterial are useful and help readability. As ageneral rule of clear writing, use the active voice(e.g., write, “Fire managers know…” and not, “Itis known…”). Provide spellouts for allabbreviations. Consult recent issues (on theWorld Wide Web at <http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/planning/firenote.htm>) for placement of theauthor’s name, title, agency affiliation, andlocation, as well as for style of paragraphheadings and references.

Tables. Tables should be logical and under-standable without reading the text. Includetables at the end of the manuscript.

Photos and Illustrations. Figures, illustra-tions, overhead transparencies (originals arepreferable), and clear photographs (color slidesor glossy color prints are preferable) are oftenessential to the understanding of articles.Clearly label all photos and illustrations (figure1, 2, 3, etc.; photograph A, B, C, etc.). At the end

45Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

ext to Smokey Bear, the mostfamiliar name in America’swildland fire organization is

THE 1910 FIRES: A NEW BOOKBY STEPHEN J. PYNE

Hutch Brown

Hutch Brown is the managing editor of FireManagement Today, USDA Forest Service,Washington Office, Washington, DC.

Nprobably Ed Pulaski. Those whoknow the pulaski firefighting toolalso know the man who invented itand the story that brought himfame. Pulaski’s tale is the centralstory of the Big Blowup of 1910, anevent often invoked for firelineinspiration or institutional self-validation. Pulaski’s story makes usall proud.

But maybe it shouldn’t. Maybe itisn’t even his story, at least not onethat Pulaski himself, a modest man,ever celebrated. Stephen J. Pyne’snew book Year of the Fires: TheStory of the Great Fires of 1910(Viking, 2001) makes that clear.Like all great historical writing,Pyne’s book goes against the grainof history, exposing uncomfortabletruths behind our founding myths.That’s what makes it so valuable.

A Year of Great FiresPyne’s book is about much morethan the Big Blowup. 1910 was awhole year of great fires, reachingin a vast arc from California toWashington to Minnesota. No oneknows how many acres burned, butPyne hypothesizes that 40 to 50million (16–20 million ha) is not anunreasonable estimate. More than amillion of those acres (400,000 ha)burned on August 20–21, the twodays of the Big Blowup in thenorthern Rocky Mountains; the restburned at other times and (mostly)

Pyne’s book goes against the grainof history, exposing uncomfortable truths

behind our founding myths.

in other places. Pyne writes aboutall the fires, moving with the fireseason month by month throughthe year.

As usual with Pyne’s books, thestory unfolds in a broad context offire ecology and social, political,and cultural history. The bookcontains multiple gems, such as aclear and concise explanation of fireweather. The centerpiece, of course,remains the Big Blowup; but it isonly one piece in the larger puzzleof American fire history, a central

subject for Pyne since Fire inAmerica: A Cultural History ofWildland and Rural Fire, hisseminal work in 1982.

The little-known 1910 BaudetteFire in northern Minnesota, forexample, also burned more than amillion acres, taking 42 lives.Comparing it to the Big Blowup,Pyne notes that the Baudette Fire—the last fire to burn more than amillion acres in the Great Lakesregion—signaled the end of thegreat “settlement fires.” Settlement

“Effects of hurricane and fire in a heavy stand of white pine on the Little North Fork of theSt. Joe River,” Coeur d’Alene National Forest, ID. Eyewitnesses reported a “hurricane”before the 1910 Big Blowup, with winds strong enough to topple mature trees. Pyneconcludes that strong winds associated with a passing front blew up smoldering fires—including backfires from previous firefighting efforts—into multiple firestorms on August20–21. Photo: Courtesy of National Agricultural Library, Special Collections, ForestService Photograph Collection, Beltsville, MD (1910; 43815).

46 Fire Management Today

fires were associated with landclearing, farming, railroads, andother frontier and rural activitiesthat vastly increased fuels andignition opportunities. As agrarianconditions gave way to industrial-ization, opportunities for large firesfaded and the great settlement firesended.

New Firefighting Model“If the Baudette Burn was the lastmillion-acre burn from a century ofgreat settlement fires,” Pyneobserves, “the Big Blowup was thefirst in a century of fire fought inwildlands.” The Big Blowup blewout of the backcountry in thesparsely settled Interior West; areason it killed at least 78 fire-fighters in the United States (theCanadian Rockies, Pyne points out,had no fatalities) is that the fledg-ling Forest Service, already steepedin the doctrine of fire control,fought to suppress every fire. TheBig Blowup tested a new model offirefighting: fire control not toprotect threatened towns throughsettler militias, but on publicwildlands through backcountry firecrews. By validating their sacrificeafter the fact, the Big Blowup

shaped our modern understandingof wildland fires and our culture ofwildland firefighting.

In telling the story, Pyne weaves anintricate tale from sources re-searched over many years—ForestService records, personal letters andaccounts, and U.S. Army reports byofficers on fire duty. Characters popin and out of the narrative as Pyneshifts to another topic, event, area,or crew; a list of principal charac-ters at the beginning of the bookhelps the reader keep track. Acontinuous thread is the story ofWill Morris, pieced together frompersonal letters that the youngForest Service employee wrote fromIdaho’s Coeur d’Alene NationalForest—hardest hit by the BigBlowup—to his family in Chicago,IL.

Each story—Morris’s, Joe Halm’s,Ed Pulaski’s, the Lost Crew’s, andall the rest—stands on its own, yetall are interwoven in snippets thatare constantly interrupted. Discur-sive interludes further break up thenarrative, telescoping out from afirefight, for example, to its broaderimplications in an age of Progres-sive politics and Pragmatic philoso-

phy. The weaving is deliberate andskillful. No single narrative takescenter stage, as Pulaski’s does formost of us today. And that is Pyne’spoint: The heroic narrative we knowso well, the one that, over and over,has revalidated our fire controlmission, is not the true story of the1910 fires.

Fire Control MythologyPyne’s message is that the heroicnarrative that emerged from the BigBlowup is an artifact, a culturalconstruct created in the fires’smoldering aftermath to servepolitical and institutional purposes.The narrative helped make firecontrol central to the ForestService’s mission. The followingyear, a hitherto floundering WeeksAct sailed through Congress,setting the stage for the ForestService to become the nationalcoordinator for fire protection. Theepic tale subsequently molded ourview of wildland fire as an enemy tobe fought in military fashion byheroes who gave their all andsometimes paid the ultimate price.Above all, it virtually decided thedebate against light burning infavor of fire exclusion. It ensuredthat our institutional culture of firewould become, as Pyne puts it, “aculture of fire suppression.”

What finally happened to EdPulaski? Temporarily blinded andsuffering from postfire pulmonaryproblems, he recovered and re-turned to work on his rangerdistrict. Shunning celebrity, hequietly tended the graves of thosewho died. We can still be proud ofPulaski—but less for his vauntedheroism than for his quiet compe-tence, his self-effacing personalintegrity, and his dedication to theland. We can be proud to support anon-the-ground tradition thatnurtures such character. ■

Aftermath of the 1910 Big Blowup in Wallace, ID, where some 200 buildings burned. Thefight to save the town is only one of many tales interwoven in Pyne’s new book Year of theFires. Photo: Courtesy of National Agricultural Library, Special Collections, Forest ServicePhotograph Collection, Beltsville, MD (1910; 43823).

47Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

AFTERMATH

Editor’s note: The followingexcerpt from the conclusion ofStephen J. Pyne’s book Year of theFires illustrates Pyne’s mastery ofdiscursive prose.

By the end of the twentiethcentury, the triumph of fireexclusion had proved as fleeting asits critics had claimed it would be.

Many of the public lands sufferedfire famine; forests were diseasedand dying and prone to catastrophicfires. Then came that annushorribilis, 1994, in which thirty-four firefighters died, two millionacres burned, and emergency firecosts reached a ballistic $965million. Everyone admitted thesystem was broken. The policy that

had boiled out of the GreatFires had, like the conflagra-tions themselves, at last endedits colossal run. The federalagencies sought to salvage whatthey could, and they intended todo so by reintroducing somespecies of controlled (or pre-scribed) burning.

WEBSITES ON FIRE*

Northwest Wildland Fire CompactThe Northwest Wildland Fire Compact is an opera-tional agreement to identify and exchange wildlandfire resources among the States of Alaska, Idaho,Montana, Oregon, and Washington and the Canadianprovincial and territorial agencies in Alberta, BritishColumbia, and the Yukon. The eight participants havedeveloped operational guidelines and resource-sharing templates. The Compact’s mission is “tofacilitate the prevention, pre-suppression and controlof wildland fire in the Pacific Northwest by:

* Occasionally, Fire Management Today briefly describes Websites brought to ourattention by the wildland fire community. Readers should not construe thedescription of these sites as in any way exhaustive or as an official endorsement by theUSDA Forest Service. To have a Website described, contact the managing editor,Hutch Brown, at USDA Forest Service, 2CEN Yates, P.O. Box 96090, Washington,DC 20090-6090, 202-205-1028 (tel.), 202-205-0885 (fax), hutchbrown/[email protected](e-mail).

• Expediting the delivery of fire control resources;• Exploring opportunities to share fire management

data and systems; and• Cooperating in prevention programs and activi-

ties.”

Website links connect to the forestry or fire manage-ment departments of each Compact member and tothe Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre and itsU.S. counterpart, the National Interagency FireCenter.

Found at <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/Protect/NWCompact> ■

The story unfoldsin a broad context of fire ecology

and social, political, and cultural history.

48 Fire Management Today

FIRST ANNUAL PHOTO CONTEST (CORRECTION)n 2000, Fire Management Today held its first annual photo contest. Photos in the contest were reprinted in theFall 2000 issue (Fire Management Today 60(4), pages 38–41). Due to a production error, the printed images didnot do justice to the original photos. The photos are reprinted here to show their high quality.I

Do you have a photo that tells a story about wildland fire management? If so, turn to page 51 for instructions onhow to enter our annual photo contest.

First Place, Ground Resources. Firefighterburning out a section of fireline on the 1988Fayette Lake Fire, Jim Bridger Wilderness,Bridger–Teton National Forest, WY. Photo:Richard Claypole, USDA Forest Service,Klamath National Forest, Happy CampRanger District, Happy Camp, CA, 1988.

Honorable Mention, Wildland Fire. Fayette Lake Fire burning in lodgepole pine atabout 9,000 feet (2,700 m) near the Continental Divide on the Jim Bridger Wilderness,Bridger–Teton National Forest, WY. The fire coincided with the 1988 Yellowstone Fires.Photo: Richard Claypole, USDA Forest Service, Klamath National Forest, Happy CampRanger District, Happy Camp, CA, 1988.

Second Place, Miscellaneous. Bracken fern,one of many carpeting the forest floor 2 yearsafter a prescribed fire on the Coconino NationalForest, AZ. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDAForest Service, Coconino National Forest,Peaks Ranger District, Flagstaff, AZ, 1998.

First Place, Prescribed Fire. Single strip of prescribed fire under ponderosapines on the Fort Valley Experimental Forest, Coconino National Forest, AZ.Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service, Coconino National Forest, PeaksRanger District, Flagstaff, AZ, 1996.

49Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Third Place, Miscella-neous. Historic firelookout tree on LindbergHill, North Rim, GrandCanyon National Park,AZ. Photo: AllenFarnsworth, USDA ForestService, CoconinoNational Forest, PeaksRanger District, Flagstaff,AZ, 1999.

Honorable Mention, Prescribed Fire. Strip firing under ponderosapines on the Fort Valley Experimental Forest, Coconino NationalForest, AZ. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service,Coconino National Forest, Peaks Ranger District, Flagstaff, AZ,1996.

Honorable Mention, Prescribed Fire. The Flagstaff Hotshots usingprescribed fire to restore a travel corridor for pronghorns. Photo:Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service, Coconino National Forest,Peaks Ranger District, Flagstaff, AZ, 1999.

First Place, Miscellaneous. Lupines carpeting the floor of an openold-growth ponderosa pine forest maintained by frequent lightningfires on the Powell Plateau, North Rim, Grand Canyon NationalPark, AZ. Photo: Allen Farnsworth, USDA Forest Service, CoconinoNational Forest, Peaks Ranger District, Flagstaff, AZ, 1998.

First Place, Aerial Resources. A P3–Aairtanker delivering retardant on the1999 Yellow Pine Complex, ModocNational Forest, CA. Redding Hotshots(foreground) are preparing to help burnout a large section of fireline after theretardant drop. Photo: James Gould,USDA Forest Service, Klamath NationalForest, Happy Camp Ranger District,Happy Camp, CA, 1999.

50 Fire Management Today

ildland fire managers havelong understood the needfor speed in detecting,

BEFORE HELICOPTERS: BLIMPS FOR WILDLAND FIREFIGHTING?Hutch Brown

Hutch Brown is the managing editor ofFire Management Today, USDA ForestService, Washington Office, Washington,DC.

Wreaching, and suppressing firesbefore they grow large. Beginningin 1919, the USDA Forest Serviceeagerly embraced a relatively newfire management tool for its speedand versatility: aircraft.

Airtankers, smokejumpers, andhelicopters were still far in thefuture. In the early 1920s, the onlyfeasible use for aircraft seemed tobe detection. But that wouldchange. Creative minds werealready scheming to use aircraft totransport firefighters and equip-ment and for resupply on remotewildland fires.

During the 1920 fire season, ablimp was tested on the AngelesNational Forest in California. “As aresult of this trial,” reportedHutchinson, “officers of the UnitedStates Forest Service are of theopinion that the blimp offers apractical solution to many of theforest fire problems in our country.”

Hutchinson was wrong; blimpsnever saw operational use. Still, theexperimentation with blimps didprefigure many helicopter uses thatcame much later, including supply,transportation, and even helirap-peling.*

Blimp tested for fire patrol on the Angeles National Forest, CA. The carriage suspendedfrom the balloon (visible at top) could carry firefighters, supplies, and equipment. Photo:Courtesy of National Agricultural Library, Special Collections, Forest Service Photo-graph Collection, Beltsville, MD (W.I. Hutchinson, 1921; 156936).

AcknowledgmentThe author wishes to thank JerryWilliams, a historical analyst forthe USDA Forest Service, Wash-ington Office, Washington, DC,for providing the information forthis article.

ReferenceHutchinson, W. 1921. “Pony Blimps for

fighting forest fires.” AmericanForestry Magazine. October:618–619. ■

One early idea was to use blimps.The blimp seemed to offer many ofthe advantages associated todaywith helicopters. According toWallace Hutchinson (1921), anearly advocate of wildland fireaviation, the blimp could:

• fly “from 25 to 50 feet of theearth as well as at severalthousand feet”;

• “land on a very small plot offavorable ground”;

• “be held nearly stationary closeto the earth”;

• “discharge fire fighters by meansof rope ladders”; and

• “be used for transportingsupplies and fire-fightingequipment.”

* See Michael Dudley and Gregory S. Greenhoe, “FiftyYears of Helicopter Firefighting,” Fire ManagementNotes 58(4): 6–7.

51Volume 61 • No. 4 • Fall 2001

Fire Management Today invites you tosubmit your best fire-related photos to bejudged in our annual competition. Judgingbegins after the first Friday in March ofeach year.

AwardsAll contestants will receive a CD–ROM withall photos not eliminated from competition.Winning photos will appear in a future issueof Fire Management Today. In addition,winners in each category will receive:

• 1st place—Camera equipment worth$300 and a 16- by 20-inch framed copy ofyour photo.

• 2nd place—An 11- by 14-inch framedcopy of your photo.

• 3rd place—An 8- by 10-inch framed copyof your photo.

Categories• Wildland fire• Prescribed fire• Wildland–urban interface fire• Aerial resources

ANNUAL PHOTO CONTEST• Ground resources• Miscellaneous (fire effects; fire weather;

fire-dependent communities or species;etc.)

Rules• The contest is open to everyone. You may

submit an unlimited number of entriesfrom any place or time; but for eachphoto, you must indicate only onecompetition category.

• Each photo must be an original colorslide. We are not responsible for photoslost or damaged, and photos submittedwill not be returned (so make a duplicatebefore submission). Digital photos willnot be accepted because of difficultyreproducing them in print.

• You must own the rights to the photo,and the photo must not have beenpublished prior to submission.

• For every photo you submit, you mustgive a detailed caption (including, forexample, name, location, and date of thefire; names of any people and/or their jobdescriptions; and descriptions of anyvegetation and/or wildlife).

• You must complete and sign a statementgranting rights to use your photo(s) tothe USDA Forest Service (see samplestatement below). Include your fullname, agency or institutional affiliation(if any), address, and telephone number.

• Photos are eliminated from competitionif they lack detailed captions; have datestamps; show unsafe firefightingpractices (unless that is their expresspurpose); or are of low technical quality(for example, have soft focus or showcamera movement). (Duplicates—including most overlays and othercomposites—have soft focus and will beeliminated.)

• Photos are judged by a photographyprofessional whose decision is final.

Postmark DeadlineFirst Friday in March

Send submissions to:USDA Forest ServiceFire Management Today Photo ContestAttn: Hutch Brown, 2CEN YatesP.O. Box 96090Washington, DC 20090-6090

Sample Photo Release Statement(You may copy and use this statement. It must be signed.)

Enclosed is/are _________ (number) slide(s) for publication by the USDA Forest Service. For each slide submitted, the contestcategory is indicated and a detailed caption is enclosed. I have the authority to give permission to the Forest Service to publish theenclosed photograph(s) and am aware that, if used, it or they will be in the public domain and appear on the World Wide Web.

Signature Date

4/95

5614

subscription(s) to Fire Management Today for $ 13.00 each per year ($ 16.25 foreign).