Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies ... · sioner Stephen House (London Metropolitan Police Service), Tom Imrie (former manager of the Toronto Police Service’s

Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic:Case Studies and Recommendations

from the Field

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:

Andrea M. Luna and Corina Solé BritoElizabeth A. Sanberg

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:

Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic:Case Studies and Recommendations

from the Field

Andrea M. Luna and Corina Solé BritoElizabeth A. Sanberg

October 2007

This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressedherein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., orindividual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, butauthors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other informationon the websites.

Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 20036Copyright 2007 by Police Executive Research Forum

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 978-1-934485-03-3

Edited by Craig Fischer

Cover and interior design by Dave Williams. Cover photographs, starting at top left,courtesy of Loren Rodgers/istockphoto, Greg Knobloch/Centers for Disease Controland Prevention (showing Dr. Taronna Maines), Doug Webb/istockphoto, and FederalEmergency Management Agency.

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iBy Chuck WexlerExecutive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

C H A PT ER ONE

Introduction, Background,and Summary of Findings . . . . . . 1

C H A PT ER T WO

The Fairfax County PoliceDepartment Case Study . . . . . . . 17

APPENDIX A

Fairfax County Pandemic Influenza CriticalInfrastructure Agency Planning Checklist . . . . . . . . . 34

APPENDIX B

Sample Critical Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

APPENDIX C

HomePacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

C H A PT ER THREE

The Toronto Police ServiceCase Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

APPENDIX A

Estimated Direct Health Impact of Pandemic Influenza on the City of Toronto Based on Historical Mortality and Morbidity Rates. . . . . . . . . . 60

APPENDIX B

Employee/Visitor Screening Form Record . . . . . . . . . 61

APPENDIX C

Prisoner Screening Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

CHAPTER FOUR

The Overland Park PoliceDepartment Case Study . . . . . . . 65

APPENDIX A

Overland Park Police Department Continuity of Operations Draft Spreadsheet . . . . . . . 72

CHAPTER FIVE

The London MetropolitanPolice Service Case Study . . . . . . 77

APPENDIX A

Metropolitan Police Service Critical Activities Template. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

CHAPTER SIX

Recommendationsfrom the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

CHAPTER SEVEN

List of Resources for Pandemic Flu Planning . . . . . . . 103

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107About the Police Executive Research Forum . . . . . . 109About Motorola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Contents

Transmission electron micrograph of recreated 1918 influenza virions courtesy of cynthia goldsmith/centers for disease control

Foreword — i

olice officials regularly plan for a variety ofman-made and naturally-occurring hazards, espe-cially since the September 11th attacks. But most lawenforcement agencies have not yet thought aboutthe implications of a type of disaster that couldcause tens of thousands of deaths and could devas-tate police operations—an influenza pandemic.

Many people may not realize that flu pan-demics are not a merely theoretical threat. Asrecently as 1968–69, the “Hong Kong flu” caused34,000 deaths in the United States. The worst flupandemic in recent history was the “Spanish flu” of1918–19, which killed as many as 50 million peopleworldwide, and 675,000 in the United States.

Why would a flu pandemic be a police prob-lem, as opposed to a public health problem? Thereare several reasons: Police may be called upon toenforce quarantines, to provide security in hospi-tals swamped with patients, and to ensure that vac-cines—when they became available in limitedquantities—could be delivered to those with thegreatest need for them.

But perhaps the biggest reason why a flu pan-demic would be a police problem lies in the answer tothis question: Whenever anything bad happens,whom do people call? The local public health agency?How many people even know the name of their public health agency, much less its phone number?

When bad things happen, people call thepolice. Public health agencies would take the lead-ing role in dealing with a flu pandemic, but policewould be involved from start to finish, if onlybecause the public always looks to the police toanswer their questions and solve their problems.

And even as a flu pandemic would cause jam-ming of 911 telephone lines by frantic callers, police

departments would be responding with a dimin-ished workforce—because many of their ownemployees would be coming down with the poten-tially fatal flu. Other police employees would haveto stay home to care for sick family members, or tolook after their children because the schools wouldbe closed.

PERF has produced this report to help stateand local police and sheriffs’ departments begin theprocess of analyzing how a flu pandemic wouldaffect their operations, and how they can beginplanning for such an event. Planning for a pan-demic is particularly complicated in that it requirescoordination with a wide variety of other publicand private agencies.

But advance planning is critically important,because it would almost certainly save countlesslives. When a pandemic hits—and experts agreethat it will happen, we just don’t know when—theoverall goal of the entire nation will be to minimizeits impact and delay its spread for as long as possi-ble. That is because the medical establishment willbe working to produce a vaccine and other drugs,but it will take some time, perhaps 20 weeks ormore. The more we can slow the spread of a pan-demic, the fewer people will die in the early phases,while scientists are still scrambling to develop thevaccine.

Thus, we can’t afford to “wait and see,” andstart thinking about a pandemic after it happens.Lives will depend on our getting our plans organ-ized now.

The origins of this report lie in a March 30,2006 symposium in Washington, D.C. hosted byPERF, with support from Motorola, entitled “TheLaw Enforcement Response to Pandemics.”Attendees

P

Foreword

ii — Foreword

included federal government representatives, locallaw enforcement officials, and public health experts.Speakers at the event included Assistant Commis-sioner Stephen House (London Metropolitan PoliceService), Tom Imrie (former manager of theToronto Police Service’s Occupational Health andSafety Unit), Jane Speakman (public health attorneyfor the city of Toronto), and Dr. Bill Smock (policesurgeon to the Louisville, Ky. Metropolitan PoliceDepartment and a nationally-recognized expert).Participants were encouraged to ask the speakersquestions and engage each other in dialogue aftereach presentation. Their open and honest discus-sion highlighted the need for a document thatwould help departments of all sizes to plan and pre-pare for a flu pandemic (or other public healthemergency).

PERF followed up on the symposium by con-ducting in-depth case studies of four police depart-ments that already were involved in preparing for apandemic: the Toronto (Ontario) Police Service,the London Metropolitan Police Service, the Fairfax

County (VA) Police Department, and the OverlandPark (KS) Police Department.

This document captures the informationgathered during these four case studies and sum-marizes the various approaches taken by thedepartments and the lessons learned.

Motorola, Inc. and PERF are pleased to pres-ent the case studies, promising practices and rec-ommendations that came to light as a result of the2006 symposium and subsequent case study work.It is our hope that this publication will assist locallaw enforcement in identifying resources and forg-ing stronger relationships within the community—and with other first responder agencies—to createtheir own pandemic response plans.

A final word: I would like to thank Sir IanBlair, commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Ser-vice in London, who suggested that his AssistantCommissioner Steve House work with PERF on thisimportant project. The PERF/Met relationship con-tinues to be a strong driving force behind ourresearch, and I am grateful for Ian Blair’s leadership.

Executive DirectorPolice Executive Research ForumWashington, D.C.

Acknowledgments — iii

e would like to thank the many individ-uals who contributed to this publication. Its value isdue largely to our contributors’ commitment toimproving the law enforcement pandemic planningprocess.

First, we must thank those who served as ouron-site contacts. They received our many e-mailsand phone calls, assisted us in conducting site visits,and answered countless questions. They engaged inthoughtful discussions about how local law enforce-ment and other agencies must work together to planfor and respond to public health critical incidents.Just as impressive was their willingness to discusssensitive issues and concerns on the current status oftheir collaborations and preparation. Their open-ness demonstrates a sincere commitment to devel-oping effective solutions and strengtheningpartnerships within the community.

They were:

n Fairfax County:

– Chief David M. Rohrer, Fairfax County PoliceDepartment

– Major Larry Moser, Fairfax County PoliceDepartment

– Craig DeAtley, Director, Institute for PublicHealth Emergency Readiness, WashingtonHospital Center, Washington, D.C. and Assis-tant Medical Director, Fairfax County PoliceDepartment

– Master Police Officer Kenneth Brennan, Fair-fax County Police Department

– Carol Lamborn, Strategic Initiative Manager,Fairfax County Department of Public Works

– Amanda McGill, Fairfax Office of the CountyExecutive

– Lieutenant Brian Johnston, Fairfax CountySheriff ’s Office

n London

– Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner, London Metro-politan Police Service

– Deputy Assistant Commissioner RichardBryan, Metropolitan Police Service

– Commander Simon Foy, Central Communica-tions Command, Metropolitan Police Service

– Chief Superintendent Simon Lewis, Head ofEmergency Preparedness, Metropolitan PoliceService

– Chief Inspector Graham Stokes, MetropolitanPolice Service

– David Hill, Technical and Logistical Adviser,Metropolitan Police Service

– Diana Venn, Head of Branch for Capabilities,London Resilience Team, Government Officefor London

– Sarah Wulff-Cochrane, London ResilienceTeam, Government Office for London

– Caroline Newman, Personal Assistant to OCUCommander, Metropolitan Police Service

n Toronto

– William Blair, Chief of Police

– Inspector Bill Neadles, Toronto Police Service

n Overland Park—Chief John Douglass, OverlandPark Police Department

W

Acknowledgments

iv — Acknowledgments

We also want to thank those who reviewedthe document and provided feedback:

n Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte-MecklenbergPolice Department, N.C.

n Clifford Karchmer, Member, BJA Pandemic Con-sortium, Silver Spring, Md.

n Josephine Peters, R.N., M.A., Arlington, Va.

Their expertise in law enforcement, publichealth, influenza pandemics, and general planningstrategies was extremely helpful in developing the“Summary of Findings” and “Recommendationsfrom the Field” chapters.

We would also like to thank Assistant Com-missioner Steve House of the Metropolitan PoliceService of London for approaching PERF with hisconcerns regarding pandemic planning. His atten-tion to the issue led PERF to investigate the matter,which resulted in a conference to lay out the issuesand the research efforts of this project. We alsothank Helen Cryer, Staff Officer to AC House, forassisting with numerous aspects of this project.

Special thanks are due to our partners atMotorola, Inc., for their support of the Critical Issuesin Policing series. Motorola has supported PERF for many years in our effort to stimulate progress in policing. We are especially grateful to GregBrown, President and Chief Operating Officer;

Mark Moon, Corporate Vice President and GeneralManager, Government and Commercial Markets;and Rick Neal, Vice President, Government Strategyand Business Development. This document wouldnot have been possible without their help. We arevery grateful for their support and leadership.

We are also grateful to BJA for granting uspermission to reprint a sidebar from the documentThe Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emer-gencies: Special Considerations for an All-HazardsApproach.

This report could not have been producedwithout the assistance of several talented and dedi-cated PERF staffers. Executive Director ChuckWexler guided the project from start to finish withinsight, thoughtfulness, and determination to pro-vide a meaningful product for the field. Eric Albert-sen created a comprehensive resource list. We arealso grateful to Craig Fischer for his patience inediting this document and to Jerry Murphy for histhoughtful review. A PERF Fellow, Chief Superin-tendent David Bilson of the London MetropolitanPolice Service, was also instrumental in the comple-tion of this project.

Finally, we dedicate this document to those ofyou in law enforcement who work to make ourcommunities safe. We hope that these case studiesprovide you with resources and information toassist you in your pandemic planning efforts.

The Authors

Chapter 1. Introduction, Background, and Summary of Findings — 1

oday law enforcement officials4 are chal-lenged with balancing the daily responsibilities ofmaintaining public order and safety with the needfor emergency preparedness—often with fewerresources than they have had in the past. As lawenforcement executives spend more time thinkingabout increases in violent crime, the threat of ter-rorism, and other issues, the threat of an influenzapandemic may not be high on the list of planningpriorities. However, a pandemic flu has the potentialto cause more death, illness, and social and economicdisruption than most other threats faced by lawenforcement.

The threat of an influenza (flu) pandemic isnot new, but has recently been recognized as a realpossibility for which law enforcement agenciesmust prepare. The task of planning for a pandemicinfluenza can be daunting, especially when oneconsiders the potential impact of a flu pandemic ona police department’s personnel as well as theresources that will be needed to prepare for andimplement an effective response. While manydepartments have created emergency plans torespond to a loss of physical structures, communi-cations, and information technologies, mostdepartments have yet to consider the loss of human

T

Introduction, Background,and Summary of Findings

“States should plan for mild, medium and worst-case flu pandemic”1

“Bird flu remains a global threat”2

“As outbreak worsens, expediency replaces basic services”3

1

1. http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/02/01/health/16_40_481_31_07.txt2. http://www.forbes.com/leadership/careers/2007/02/06/avian-bird-influenza-biz-cx_0207oxford.html 3. http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/n/content/oh/story/news/local/2007/02/04/sns020507champaign-flu.html 4. For the purposes of this document, the term “law enforcement” and “police” are used interchangeably torefer generally to sworn personnel servicing state, city, county and tribal jurisdictions (e.g., police officers,sheriffs’ deputies, and state troopers). Specific references to other types of law enforcement officials, suchas federal agents, park rangers, animal control officers, and others will be noted.

2 — Chapter 1. Introduction, Background, and Summary of Findings

resources and the effect that such a loss would haveon the department and community. Planning forsuch losses and how to maintain critical functionsshould not only be part of every department’s pan-demic flu-specific plan, but also part of its all-hazards approach to emergency planning.5

Planning for a pandemic flu is imperative fora number of reasons, including the following:

n Hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens (and tensof millions worldwide) died during three previ-ous influenza pandemics in the last century.

n Policing agencies inevitably play an enormousrole responding to any large-scale emergency.

n Planning in advance could save valuable time if apandemic flu occurs, helping police act quickly tomitigate the damage of a fast-moving catastrophe.

n Quick and coordinated responses were demon-strated to greatly mitigate the impact of previousflu pandemics.

For these reasons, the Police ExecutiveResearch Forum (PERF) and Motorola, Inc. havefocused on pandemic flu planning as the latest inthe Critical Issues in Policing series.

B AC KG R O U N D O NT H E P E R F S T U DY

To engage law enforcement agencies that wereinterested in the issue of pandemic flu planning,PERF held a “Pandemic Influenza Symposium” inMarch 2006 in Washington, D.C. The goal of thesymposium was to introduce law enforcement offi-cials to the importance of planning for such anevent and to meet and share ideas, lessons learned,and resources. Speakers and other participants atthe event included officials from the U.S. Depart-ments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security(DHS), the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC), and other local, state, and federal police and public health experts from the United States and around the world. Duringthis meeting, initial background information onthe flu pandemic threat, Toronto’s 2003 experiencewith severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),and the current flu pandemic planning efforts ofsome law enforcement agencies were discussed.

As a result of this meeting and subsequentstudy, PERF researchers identified four police agen-cies on which to conduct in-depth case studies.These departments were chosen for two main rea-sons. First, all of these departments were in varyingstages of developing plans, which provided theopportunity to observe many phases of the plan-ning process firsthand. Some departments had alsoincorporated lessons learned from recent, relevantincidents. Second, PERF selected departments thatserved different types and sizes of jurisdictions(both within the United States and abroad) toensure that officials of any law enforcement agency,regardless of size or resources, could compare theiragency’s planning experiences to those presented inthe document and draw relevant parallels.

For these reasons, case studies were con-ducted on:

n Fairfax County (VA) Police Department: A countydepartment that serves a large population withina metropolitan area (Washington, D.C.), and hasincorporated lessons learned from several multi-agency investigations (including the investiga-tion of the anthrax bio-attacks in 2001) into itspandemic flu and other public health hazardplanning.

n Toronto (Ontario) Police Service: A departmentthat serves a large city, that experienced the SARSpublic health crisis in 2003, and that created apandemic flu-specific plan to reflect lessonslearned from the SARS experience.

5. This document deals specifically with planning for a flu pandemic. However, much of the document isapplicable to other types of public health and other emergency preparedness planning.


n Overland Park (KS) Police Department: A depart-ment that serves a medium-size jurisdiction,with a plan that focuses on protecting publicsafety even if its own staff has been reduced bythe flu pandemic.

n London (UK) Metropolitan Police Service: A largedepartment that dealt with terrorist attacks and apublic health emergency. London’s plan is aresult of a large-scale, multi-agency effort andfocuses on addressing staffing and other humanresources challenges for extended periods oftime.

B AC KG R O U N D O NPA N D E M I C F LU

An influenza (flu) pandemic is defined as a globaloutbreak that occurs when a new flu virus surfacesfor which humans have little or no immunity, andfor which there is no vaccine.6 Officials estimate apandemic flu may circle the globe in several waves,each of which could last for six to eight weeks. Suchan incident could affect millions of people world-wide, have a significant impact on social and economic structures, disrupt basic services, andgreatly strain law enforcement resources.7 Manyresearchers believe it is only a matter of time untilthe next flu pandemic occurs, yet no one can pre-dict the timing or severity of the next pandemic flu.

Influenza pandemics have occurred threetimes in the past century: in 1918–19 (the “Spanishflu”), 1957–58 (the “Asian flu”), and 1968–69 (the“Hong Kong flu”).8 The Hong Kong flu causedapproximately 34,000 deaths in the United States,and the Asian flu resulted in 70,000 U.S. deaths. Byfar, the worst flu pandemic in recent history was the

Spanish flu, which killed an estimated 50 millionpeople worldwide, including 675,000 people in theUnited States.9 (Other sources have placed theworldwide Spanish flu death toll at 20 million; esti-mates are imprecise because of the sheer enormity ofthe disasters, the lightning-fast speed with which flupandemics overwhelmed cities, and the lack of com-prehensive record-keeping nearly a century ago.)

In a series of presentations, U.S. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services Mike Leavitt hasdescribed the impact of the Spanish flu on variousstates. For example, in Georgia, he stated that thepandemic flu “probably arrived during the firstweek of October 1918, and then spread like a wild-fire throughout the state….In just three weeks,from October 19th to November 9th, there weremore than 20,000 cases and more than 500deaths.”10

Accounts from the 1918–19 pandemic fluindicate that the public looked to law enforcementofficials to maintain the peace and to enforce pub-lic health orders when the social structures began tobreak down. For example, Chicago police officerswere ordered to arrest anyone coughing or sneezingin public.11 However, police departments facedinternal challenges; in Philadelphia, nearly 500 offi-cers failed to report for duty.12 In Arizona, a citi-zens’ committee resorted to deputizing a specialpolice force of volunteers to enforce public healthordinances, such as requiring all persons to wearmasks in public. Those who violated this order, orwho were caught coughing or spitting without cov-ering their mouths, were arrested.13

Navy nurse Josie Brown, who served at GreatLakes Naval Hospital in Illinois during the 1918–19Spanish flu pandemic, recalled: “The morgues werepacked almost to the ceiling with bodies stacked

6. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/7. Ibid.8. http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/focuson/flu/illustrations/timeline/timeline.htm 9. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/historicaloverview.html10. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic.html#georgia11. http://www.paho.org/English/DD/PIN/Number18_article5.htm 12. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic3.html 13. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic.html#1


one on top of another. The morticians worked dayand night. You could never turn around withoutseeing a big red truck loaded with caskets for thetrain station so bodies could be sent home.”14

While there are only a handful of accounts ofthe police role during flu pandemics, hundreds ofpersonal accounts of the mass death and devasta-tion make it clear that a 21st-Century pandemic flucould push law enforcement agencies to their limitsand beyond.

T H E C U R R E N T“ B I R D F LU ” T H R E AT

In 1996, a new strain of influenza virus, known asH5N1 (avian or bird flu), was isolated and identi-fied in China.15 This virus is particularly worrisometo health officials because it is unusually virulent,can be spread by migratory birds, and can be transmitted in certain circumstances from birds to humans. The World Health Organization(WHO) has been tracking outbreaks of bird flusince 1996, and the bird-to-human transmission of

the virus has led to several outbreaks and deaths.WHO listed a total of 291 laboratory-confirmedhuman cases with 172 fatalities (a 59-percent fatal-ity rate) caused by the bird flu between 2003 andApril 2007.16

Although there have been relatively few iso-lated cases of human-to-human transmission of thebird flu to date (and no cases of bird flu in humansin North America), the high mortality rate and thepossibility of the virus mutating and becomingmore infectious have caused concern among publichealth officials. Experts fear that if this virus con-tinues to undergo further change in a manner thatwould allow it to be transmitted easily betweenhumans, it very well could cause a 21st-Centurybird flu pandemic.

WHO categorizes the threat of a pandemic fluinto six phases. As shown in Figure 1, at the timethis PERF document went to press, WHO rated theworldwide risk of a pandemic flu at level 3.

The symptoms of the H5N1 flu virus rangefrom normal influenza symptoms (including fever,coughing, sore throat, and muscle aches) to

14. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/greatpandemic.html#il 15. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/Timeline_15.02.pdf 16. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2007_01_22/en/index.html 17. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html

Figure 1. World Health Organization: Phases of a Pandemic17

Inter-pandemic phaseNew virus in animals, no human cases

Low risk of human cases 1

Higher risk of human cases 2

Pandemic alertNew virus causes human cases

No or very limited human-to-human transmission

3

Evidence of increased human-to-human transmission

4

Evidence of significant human-to-human transmission

5

Pandemic Evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission

6

pneumonia and other life-threatening complica-tions.18 There is little or no immune protectionagainst H5N1 and similar viruses in the humanpopulation, and currently there is no commerciallyavailable vaccine to protect humans against H5N1.Researchers are developing and testing possibleH5N1 vaccines, but large amounts of a vaccine can-not be stockpiled until researchers know the exactnature of a virus that is causing an epidemic orpandemic.19 Even after the specific form of a virushas been identified, it can take up to six months tomake a vaccine available, and only limited quanti-ties will be available at first.20 Research is being con-ducted on methods of quickly making largerquantities of vaccines; but currently, if a flu pan-demic were to occur, the need for a vaccine wouldbe likely to outstrip supply.21

F E D E R A L P L A N N I N GF O R A F LU PA N D E M I C

Because of this growing concern, countries aroundthe world have taken a renewed interest in planningfor a response to a flu pandemic. In November2005, the White House released National Strategyfor Pandemic Influenza, and in May 2006, it releasedthe Implementation Plan for the National Strategyfor Pandemic Influenza.22 In February 2007, the U.S.Department of Health and Human Services andCenters for Disease Control released an InterimPre-pandemic Planning Guidance document thatdiscusses measures other than vaccination and drugtreatment that might be useful for communities toimplement during an influenza pandemic (e.g.,voluntary quarantines and child and adult “socialdistancing”—banning public gatherings and takingother steps to reduce contacts between people, in

order to reduce the spread of disease). This docu-ment also presents a “Pandemic Severity Index” andsuggests that local decision-makers consider vari-ous interventions during a pandemic flu based onthe index rating of the situation.23

Through these documents, federal officialsoutlined their role in planning for and respondingto a pandemic flu. They also tasked state and localgovernment officials—including law enforce-ment—with developing their own plans that willprepare them to respond effectively in the event ofa pandemic flu. Chapter Eight of the White HouseImplementation Plan focuses solely on the role oflaw enforcement and provides some guidance onhow agencies should prepare and plan for a pan-demic flu. It states,

“If a pandemic influenza outbreak occurs in the

United States, it is essential that governmental

entities at all levels continue to provide essential

public safety services and maintain public

order. It is critical that all stakeholders in state

and local law enforcement and public safety

agencies, whose primary responsibility this is,

be fully prepared to support public health

efforts and to address the additional challenges

they may face during such an outbreak”

(p. 153).24

S U M M A RY O F F I N D I N G S :PA N D E M I C F LU P L A N N I N GE F F O RT S I N F O U R L AWE N F O R C E M E N T AG E N C I E S

In September 2006, the Bureau of Justice Assistance(BJA) and the Police Executive Research Forumreleased The Role of Law Enforcement in PublicHealth Emergencies: An All-Hazards Approach. The


18. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/index.html#h5n1 19. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/index.html#h5n1 20. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/02/28/us_panel_urges_ok_on_bird_flu_vaccine/ 21. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/whatis.html 22. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu/ 23. Available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/mitigation.html 24. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf


following excerpt from this publication describesthe role of police, and the challenges faced bypolice, in responding to a pandemic:

Public health emergencies pose special chal-

lenges for law enforcement, whether the threat

is manmade (e.g., the anthrax terrorist attacks)

or naturally occurring (e.g., flu pandemics).

Policing strategies will vary depending on the

cause and level of the threat, as will the poten-

tial risk to the responding officers. In a public

health emergency, law enforcement will need to

quickly coordinate its response with public

health and medical officials, many of whom

they may not have worked with previously.

Depending on the threat, law enforce-

ment’s role may include enforcing public health

orders (e.g., quarantines or travel restrictions),

securing the perimeter of contaminated areas,

securing health care facilities, controlling

crowds, investigating scenes of suspected bio-

logical terrorism, and protecting national

stockpiles of vaccines or other medicines.

In a large-scale incident, such as a pan-

demic, law enforcement resources will quickly

become overwhelmed, and law enforcement

officials will have to balance their resources and

efforts between these new responsibilities and

everyday service demands. All of this may have

to be accomplished with a greatly diminished

workforce, as officers and their families may

become infected and ill and some personnel

may determine that the risk of continuing to

report to work is just too great to themselves or

their families. A department’s ability to respond

effectively to any emergency—public health or

otherwise—greatly depends on its prepared-

ness, and this is directly linked to the law

enforcement agency’s planning and its partner-

ships (p.1–2).25

The need for advance planning is criticalbecause a pandemic flu can sweep through a pop-ulation in a matter of days and weeks. By contrast,it can take months to develop plans for a pan-demic flu. A pandemic flu raises very difficult ques-tions that require significant research toanswer—such as, “Do current laws give police theauthority to enforce quarantine orders? And, even ifadequate legal authority exists, how do we instructofficers to enforce such orders when they may befearful of exposure to the flu? Is enforcing quaran-tine orders an effective use of law enforcementresources when possibly facing the potential of sig-nificant reductions in staffing? Do we have ade-quate protective equipment to prevent infection?What department functions are critical during thistype of emergency and how will we ensure thatthese functions continue?”

While a pandemic flu can move quickly, therehave been great advances in public health research,surveillance of disease patterns and trends, andother technological capabilities since the time ofprior flu pandemics. These scientific advances pro-vide advance warning of this type of emergency.Because of this advance notice, community mem-bers will expect better response from the agenciesthat serve them. It is important, then, for policeleaders to begin preparations now to ensure thatplans are in place to guide their response to a situa-tion that could cause great harm in the community.Law enforcement executives have responsibility forparticipating in multi-agency local emergency pre-paredness efforts, as well as for ensuring their owndepartment’s internal preparedness.

The Police Executive Research Forum studiedthe pandemic flu planning efforts of four lawenforcement agencies: 1) Fairfax (VA) PoliceDepartment; 2) Toronto (Ontario) Police Service;3) Overland Park (KS) Police Department and 4) London (UK) Metropolitan Police Service.

25. Richards, E. P., Rathbun, K.C., Solé Brito, C., Luna, A. (2006, September). The Role of Law Enforcementin Public Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-Hazards Approach. Washington, D.C.: Bureau ofJustice Assistance.


PERF looked specifically at issues such as localmulti-agency coordination, continuity of criticaldepartment operations, the special role of lawenforcement during a pandemic flu, officer educa-tion and safety, and communications planning.

PERF posed the following questions to eachpolice department:

n How is the local government approaching pan-demic flu planning? How is law enforcementinvolved in this effort?

n What is the role of the police department in thelocal government’s pandemic flu emergencyresponse?

n How is the department coordinating its pan-demic flu planning efforts with other local enti-ties, such as the local public health agency andarea hospitals?

n How is law enforcement approaching planningwithin the department?

n What is critical to the department-specific plan-ning process? Who is involved?

n What issues must be addressed to ensure conti-nuity of critical operations and an effective lawenforcement response? How is the departmentaddressing these issues?

n How is the department planning to train its offi-cers on their role in the department’s plan?

n What are the challenges to this type of planningand how are these challenges being addressed?

While the four law enforcement agencies werein different phases of the planning process, therewere a number of similar critical issues raised anddecisions made in the sites. Because law enforce-ment planning for a flu pandemic is still in itsinfancy, the case studies are anecdotal and reflectonly the experience of these agencies’ efforts.Because this is an emerging issue and departmentsare still in the process of formulating plans, there islimited information available, including data on“best practices.” The guidelines we propose areoffered with some measure of caution. But the

experiences of these four agencies to date will giveother law enforcement leaders insight into some ofthe issues that need to be addressed in a pandemicflu plan.

External and Internal Planning

The first area of planning efforts described below—“external efforts”—consists of the planning strate-gies requiring coordination with other local entitiesoutside the law enforcement agency, such as publichealth and other community agencies. The secondarea—“internal efforts”—is specific to the internalworkings of the law enforcement agency. The find-ings of the case study sites’ external and internalplanning efforts are summarized below.

“External” Efforts Involving Local Multi-Agency Planning

Effective planning for a flu pandemic requires lawenforcement agencies to consult with public healthagencies, hospitals, schools, and many other publicand private entities. Law enforcement participation inlocal multi-agency planning efforts is important to:

n clarify roles and responsibilities,

n identify critical services and available resources,and

n discuss possible scenarios and responses, anddevelop alternative operating plans based on thepossibility of reduced staffing levels and otherchanges that impact law enforcement operations.

While public health agencies at the federallevel and many at the state and local levels alreadyhave formulated plans for a flu pandemic, thedescription of law enforcement’s role in those plansis often very general. Some plans include a few spe-cific functions, such as controlling traffic to ensurethat vaccines and/or antiviral drugs can be trans-ported to distribution sites. These same plans mayalso include “catch-all” language, such as a provi-sion that local law enforcement will “assist and sup-port other state and local agencies where possible,”as one state expressed it in its statewide Pandemic


Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan.26 Whilethis language allows for flexibility in the responsestage, it is not difficult to imagine how those fewwords could in fact translate to expectations ofhuge responsibilities and an overextension of policeresources that may already be strained.

The PERF case studies found that the externalplanning process and the resulting plans serve toclarify law enforcement’s roles and responsibilities,as well as to develop a coordinated planningapproach for the local jurisdiction. A summary ofthe case study sites’ external planning efforts is pro-vided below.

n Participating in multiagency emergency planningefforts. In all four sites, the local emergency man-agement authority coordinates the local pan-demic flu planning. These authorities alsocoordinate the planning for the local all-hazardsapproach to emergency preparedness. Manypolice departments are following the all-hazardsapproach to plan for all types of emergencies.

n Supporting public health agencies. In each sitestudied, the planning approach recognized pan-demic influenza foremost as a public healthissue, with public health officials playing themost central role in monitoring the situation,and providing updates and subject matterexpertise. Law enforcement, other first respon-ders, and those who provide critical supportservices (e.g., transportation, sanitation, electric)have very important secondary and/or support-ing roles and are engaged in the planningprocess. In all jurisdictions, public health alsotakes the lead on risk communications and pub-lic education efforts, with the support of otherlocal agencies.

n Using a coordinated incident managementapproach. All jurisdictions and law enforcementdepartments studied approached planning for apandemic flu in the same manner theyapproached planning for other hazards: using a

coordinated incident management approach.Using this approach, and speaking the same“incident management” language, makes it easierfor agencies that may not have worked togethermuch in the past to conduct operations during acritical incident.

n Local multi-agency planning. All four of thedepartments have participated in a series of plan-ning meetings with other first-responding agen-cies (e.g., public health, fire, EMS) and with othercritical infrastructure providers (e.g., power,water, and telecommunications). In FairfaxCounty and London, these meetings served todevelop and coordinate planning guidance forother local government agencies. They also pro-vided a forum for developing and disseminatingpublic health-specific messages and planningguidance.

n Role of law enforcement. In every site, plans callfor police to maintain public order and:

– Provide security for vaccine/treatment trans-port and vaccine distribution sites,

– Be prepared to assist in executing public healthorders,

– Provide initial site security as needed at med-ical facilities and similar venues, and

– Assist with handling mass fatalities.

In some sites, law enforcement will assistwith other efforts, including public educationand risk communication.

n Representing the department at the jurisdiction’semergency operations center(s). Police at all siteshave plans to send a representative to the juris-diction’s emergency operations center(s). Thisrepresentative is expected to have a strong under-standing of the plan and to serve as a liaisonbetween the department and city emergencyoperation centers. Based on lessons learned fromthe SARS outbreak (e.g., the police departmentneeded information about the disease and what

26. See http://www.idph.state.il.us/pandemic_flu


it meant for the department, especially in theearly stages of the outbreak), the Toronto PoliceService plan assigns one senior officer to serve asa liaison officer to the command centers, includ-ing the public health emergency operations cen-ter. The liaison officer provides daily updates ofhealth-related issues between public health andthe police department.

n Communicating with the news media. In all foursites, the plans designate the public healthdepartment as the agency responsible for com-municating with the news media. Each lawenforcement agency serves in a supporting roleto public health in this effort. For example, inToronto, the public health department plans toprovide medical advice and train “pandemicperiod key spokespersons” in risk communica-tions. In London, because the MetropolitanPolice Service has a very large media departmentand is proficient at coordinating media commu-nications during large-scale events, the MPSpress bureau will help get information to themedia and provide support to the public healthagencies in coordinating and carrying out themedia strategy.

n Testing and updating the plan. Each departmenthas acknowledged the evolving nature of theplanning process and the need to regularly exer-cise their plans. These exercises provide theopportunity to incorporate the lessons learnedfrom their experiences into the plans. Most of thesites have engaged in some form of multi-agencyexercises of parts of the plan, such as distributionof Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). TheFairfax County Police Department participatedin a PPE stockpile distribution exercise with thehealth department, schools, and emergencymanagement department. London (includingthe Metropolitan Police Service) participated in anational test of its plan at the local, regional, andnational levels. One important finding fromLondon’s exercise was that agencies were not as

well prepared to respond to a situation thatbuilds up over time (like a pandemic flu), com-pared to the well-practiced responses to immedi-ate threats (like a terrorist bombing).

“Internal” (Police Department-Specific)Planning

Effective planning for a flu pandemic requires lawenforcement agencies to consider how theirresponse fits into existing emergency operationsplans as well as how the police response wouldaffect officers and the community. Many internalfactors were taken into consideration by the casestudy sites during their pandemic flu planningprocess. Following the format of the PERF/BJAdocument The Role of Law Enforcement in PublicHealth Emergencies, these factors are categorized as:Preparing the Department; Protecting the Officers;and Protecting the Community. A brief overview ofthe factors and examples of how certain depart-ments incorporated them into their plans follows.

PREPARING THE DEPARTMENT

Activating the Plan

Once the jurisdiction activates the publichealth function of its emergency operations plan(and its pandemic flu-specific plan, if applicable),the police department will activate its internal plansas well. In Toronto, the Police Service’s pandemicflu plan calls for activation when the World HealthOrganization (WHO) declares that the phase ofalert has reached level 5 (evidence of significanthuman-to-human transmission) or when Torontopolice have been notified, by either city or provin-cial health representatives, that a flu pandemic ispending in the area. The Fairfax County Office ofEmergency Management also modeled its planningstages after the WHO phases of a flu pandemic. Thepolice department shifts into emergency operationswhen alerted that WHO or the Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention (CDC) have moved intoPandemic Flu Phase 5.27

27. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html


Continuity of Operations

n Identifying core department functions that must bemaintained during an emergency. Identifying corefunctions within each unit of a police depart-ment and determining how those activities maybe impacted during a pandemic flu were the firstand most important activities that each siteundertook. The Overland Park Police top com-manders met to determine the critical functionsthe department would maintain in a pandemicsituation. Fairfax County and London policeofficials also engaged in an extensive process ofidentifying their core functions. Fairfax policeprioritized their functions in three categories:those that must continue during an incident,those that could be suspended but would need tobe resumed as quickly as possible following anincident, and those that could be suspended untilconditions returned to normal. London identi-fied a list of core functions and had each bureauidentify the point at which personnel losseswould mean it would no longer be able to effec-tively carry out these functions.

The sites’ plans are flexible enough to allowfor changes in the list of essential functions. Forexample, depending on how severely a pandemicflu affected a particular jurisdiction, curtailedpolice activities might begin with crime preven-tion programs, parking enforcement, andenforcement of certain misdemeanor laws. Ifschools were closed, all Drug Abuse ResistanceEducation (DARE) officers and school resourceofficers could be reassigned. Some law enforce-ment agencies have worked to define stages of acrisis that would gradually expand the list of cur-tailed activities. This process, and the list of crit-ical functions that emerged from it, were notedby all sites as beneficial for pandemic flu plan-ning and for general planning for other emergen-cies during which agency workforces may bedecreased.

n Planning for sharp reductions in the police workforce. All four of the departments studied under-stood that a pandemic flu could lead to sharpreductions in their workforces and have planned

accordingly. They all adjusted plans based on theloss of increasing proportions of their workforce.The plans prepare for the possibility of losinganywhere from 10 to 80 percent of the depart-ment’s workforce. In jurisdictions affected bypast flu pandemics, between 25 and 35 percent ofthe population was infected.

To account for additional absences and thepossibility that police officers may be more likelyto become sick than other people because of thenature of their work, law enforcement agenciesprojected higher rates of infection. The FairfaxCounty Police Department estimated that 40percent of its staff could be absent from workduring a pandemic flu. The Overland Park PoliceDepartment based its continuity-of-operationsplans on 10-percent increment changes in bothdemands for service and reductions in staff.

Furthermore, police officials consider itlikely that personnel losses would not be spreaduniformly throughout a department; losseswithin certain units or bureaus, especially thosein which there are a small number of employeesworking in close quarters, could be higher. Thiscould disproportionately damage the ability ofthe police to respond in cases where the smallunits perform highly specialized, critical tasks.Several of the departments have prepared forreductions in the workforce that are not uniformfrom one bureau or unit to the next. For exam-ple, London Metropolitan Police Service devel-oped a register of the special skills of alloperational staffers, administrative personnel,and volunteers (some of whom are retired offi-cers). The skills register includes language skills,typing, and truck/heavy vehicle driving experi-ence. In the event of a pandemic flu, departmentleaders would be able to search the database andidentify personnel who could be reassigned tohelp carry out core functions.

n Addressing employee fatigue. Some of the depart-ments are also considering the issue of fatigueamong officers who remain healthy and who tryto compensate for the loss of other personnel byworking long hours over an extended period oftime. A pandemic flu can last weeks or months,


and the plan must consider the sustainability ofextreme work schedules among a sharplyreduced staff, working in an unusually stressfulenvironment. While some employees might bewilling to work very long hours, that may exacer-bate the problem. The London MetropolitanPolice Service learned that employee fatigue wasan important issue in dealing with the suicidebombing incidents of July 7, 2005, and that les-son is reflected in the planning for a pandemic.The SARS outbreak taught the Toronto PoliceService a similar lesson. The Overland ParkPolice Department will resist activating 12-hourshifts for as long as possible in order to ensurethat employees get adequate rest.

PROTECTING THE OFFICERS

n Law enforcement facilities. The goal during a pan-demic flu is to keep the law enforcement work-place as disease-free as possible by increasing thecleaning of police facilities and reducing the pos-sibility of having sick or exposed persons con-taminating the work area and thus exposingother personnel to the disease. To address thisissue, employees and visitors to police facilities inToronto will not be allowed access to policebuildings until they have answered a health ques-tionnaire and have complied with a hand wash-ing/disinfectant protocol. In Fairfax, the policedepartment’s facility management officials havedecided to modify the tasks for cleaning andmaintenance personnel based on the threat. Forinstance, perhaps instead of vacuuming the floor,cleaning personnel would increase the frequencyof washing doorknobs and other shared surfaces.

n Supplementing occupational health and safety pro-grams. All four sites have some form of occupa-tional health and safety programs that haveprovided support and education in the pandemicflu planning process. Toronto’s occupationalhealth and safety program gives all officers andselected civilian staffers (based on assignment)training in communicable-disease risk manage-ment, including issues specific to pandemic flu.In Fairfax County, the Police Department has

participated in an occupational health programfor some time. However, following National Inci-dent Management System (NIMS) training, thedepartment recognized the value of having a fieldliaison specializing in responding to various haz-ards including respiratory and biological threats.Following the fire and rescue department’s lead,Fairfax County police designated a safety coordi-nator to meet this need and to assist in planningefforts. To ensure that all personnel have somebasic information on the threat, Fairfax Countypolice requires that all personnel view a publiceducation video (available on the VirginiaDepartment of Health website) on pandemic fluplanning and communicable disease preventionmethods. Many police executives understand thewisdom in the words of Overland Park PoliceChief John M. Douglass: “Preventative dollars aremore effective than response dollars.”

n Providing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) andTraining. All four sites provide some form of PPEto their staffs; however, the amount and kinds ofPPE stockpiled vary by department. Through theToronto Police Service’s Occupational Healthand Safety Program, PPE has been provided toevery patrol officer and to some civilians deemedat risk as a result of their duties, such as courtsecurity officers and employees who clean theinside of police vehicles. Toronto Police Servicemembers have been instructed to wear PPE incircumstances where the health state of an indi-vidual is not known. Overland Park maintains a90-day supply of PPE for all officers. FairfaxCounty Police Department is purchasing andstockpiling PPE in cycles to prevent all of the PPEfrom expiring/deteriorating at the same time.

London Metropolitan Police Service’s(MPS) approach is quite different, as they arestockpiling only a minimum amount of PPE fora pandemic flu to prevent panic and to avoidmisuse of the equipment. The police service’s“business resilience” group has set up prioritycontracts with vendors for short-notice orders ofspecific types of PPE. To ensure vendors will beable to fulfill these orders, MPS requires that allcritical service providers and suppliers have


continuity of operations plans and demonstratean ability to meet contractual demands duringan emergency.

n Addressing vaccination and prophylaxis require-ments. Each site has different pre-hire vaccina-tion requirements, but none of them mandatesflu vaccination on an annual basis (although it isoffered and encouraged in each site). None of thedepartments studied has established a policy thatwould mandate vaccination in the event of apandemic flu (should a vaccine become avail-able). Some of the departments are stockpilingprophylaxes, such as general anti-viral treat-ments that may be of some use in slowing theadvance of a pandemic flu. Toronto Police Ser-vice officers are in the third priority group forreceiving vaccine and antiviral treatment (front-line and essential health-care providers and keyhealth decision-makers are in the first twogroups). This is similar to the vaccination prior-ities set in other jurisdictions. Currently, LondonMetropolitan Police Service personnel and otherfirst responders have an allocation of anti-viralmedication reserved in the local stockpile.

n Considering sick leave policies. Encouraging thosewho are sick or who may have been exposed to adisease to stay home rather than to report to workis an important component of protecting thehealth and safety of others in the workplace. TheFairfax County Police Department is educatingemployees about the risks of a flu pandemic, andabout the risk of spreading the disease if theyreport to work during a flu pandemic when theyare sick or have come into contact with aninfected person while not wearing personal pro-tective equipment. “With proper education, offi-cers will recognize that they are doing more harmthan good by coming into work sick,” one officialsaid. To encourage compliance, Toronto PoliceService members who are directed to be quaran-tined as the result of a work-related contact willbe compensated as if they were on duty duringtheir regularly scheduled shifts. In contrast,London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) offi-cials have discussed the issue and have identified

possible challenges in getting employees toremain home if they think they are infected, buthave decided not to make any formal changes totheir usual sick leave policies until it is likely apandemic flu is imminent. “Flexibility is good inyour policies, but you don’t want to set them upwhereas they encourage extensive absences,” saidone of the MPS emergency preparedness officials.

n Protecting officers’ families. All sites noted theimportance of helping officers and their lovedones plan for the effects of a pandemic flu. Inparticular, Fairfax County is advising families toprepare “HomePacks” which would contain asmall amount of PPE and cleaning supplies thatmight be helpful during a flu pandemic.

n Using technology. Some of the sites have identi-fied ways in which technology will assist themduring a flu pandemic. This varies site to site, butincludes allowing employees to “telework,” usingtele- and video-conferencing within the lawenforcement agency and between local agencies,which can reduce the need for employees togather in a room and possibly spread the fluamong themselves. Another technique involvesexpanding the opportunity for citizens to reportcrimes on the Internet, rather than through in-person meetings with police.

Some administrative functions of a lawenforcement agency may be suitable for tele-working. To a limited extent, teleworking mayserve to maintain the productivity of officerswho are not sick but cannot report to workbecause they believe they may be infected. All ofthe Overland Park Police Department’s informa-tion technology employees are currently able towork off-site, and this process has been testedsuccessfully. To ensure the integrity of criticaldatabases as more personnel may begin to tele-work, Fairfax County police have also devisedinnovative ways to decrease the demands placedon their IT systems. They have developed thecapability to efficiently “turn off” non-criticaldatabases that would otherwise strain the system.

A key advantage of video-conferencing andsimilar technologies is that they allow police


officials to communicate among themselves andwith other agencies while minimizing the unnec-essary gathering of officials. Fairfax County iscurrently completing the installation of videoconferencing units in different agencies acrossthe county, including the police department.This was also one of the recommendations fromthe Toronto public health department in theaftermath of the SARS incident.

PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY

n Enforcing public health orders. During a flu pan-demic, officers may be called on to assist withenforcing quarantines and other public healthorders. While the importance of gaining volun-tary compliance with these orders cannot beoverstated, every site acknowledges the need forpolice to be prepared to assist public healthauthorities in enforcing critical orders, such asthe closure of public facilities. This is especiallythe case in the early stages of a flu pandemic,when enforcement of these orders may greatlyslow the spread of the flu and reduce the harm tothe community.

Because serving public health orders is nota function law enforcement is called on to do veryoften, law enforcement officials are reviewing therequirements to fulfill this responsibility. Onequestion is whether any personnel should receivespecialized training, and if so, who should receivethe training. In Fairfax County, Police Depart-ment personnel may become involved by assistingFairfax County Sheriff ’s Office deputies in deliv-ering mandatory quarantine orders and enforc-ing the orders if they are violated. (Fairfax Countyhas a sheriff ’s department that shares jurisdictionand some overlapping responsibility with thepolice department.) One idea under considera-tion to assist in this effort is the use of electronicsurveillance bracelets. It is thought that this meas-ure would deter violations, assist in monitoringthose under public health orders, and reduce theneed for law enforcement intervention.

While most Fairfax County police officershave not previously enforced these types oforders, comprehensively training the entire force

was considered too cumbersome at this point.Instead, the FCPD identified a core team of thedepartment’s volunteer officers in the Civil Dis-turbance Unit to be specially trained on theseissues. This group would be involved in an initialflu pandemic response as other officers werebrought up to speed on their role and the rele-vant legal authorities. In Toronto, the Commu-nity Oriented Response Unit and the PublicSafety Unit have been trained to work with pub-lic health to identify and apprehend those whorefuse to comply with quarantine orders.

n Protecting hospitals and other critical institutions.Agencies in every site have plans to protect hos-pitals and other critical institutions at the onsetof a flu pandemic, and on an as-needed basis.Because police resources will be strained, how-ever, some police agencies hope that private secu-rity could take over this function to some extentas the security threats diminish. Fairfax Countypolice will provide security at vaccination sites,medical distribution sites, and quarantine sites asthey are requested and able to do so. In Fairfax,although the Police Department may handle anyinitial need for security at hospitals, the FairfaxCounty Sheriff ’s Office will take over the securityefforts as soon as possible. During later phases ofa pandemic flu, courts likely will be closed, allow-ing Sheriff ’s Office personnel assigned to courtsecurity to redeploy to assist with field prioritiessuch as hospital security.

Although the agencies varied in size andjurisdiction served, the departments’ approachesto planning and the issues identified as critical tomaintaining public order and providing an effec-tive response were remarkably similar.

R OA D M A P F O R U N D E R S TA N D I N GT H E I N D I V I D UA L C A S E S T U D I E S

In the following four chapters, the case studies anddetails of each agency’s planning efforts are pre-sented. The goal of the individual case studies is toassist law enforcement officials in their planningprocess by detailing the approaches taken by fourvery different law enforcement agencies. Sidebars


that present specific topics and the perspectives ofthose involved in the planning process are alsoincluded.

Each case study consists of six main sections:

1. Overview of the Department. This section providesa brief introduction to the agency: the number of people employed, the number of bureaus or commands the force is broken into, and somebasic demographic information about the jurisdiction.

2. Description of the Area. A detailed, community-specific view is provided to help readers comparetheir own jurisdiction to those in the case stud-ies. By reading about the community’s demo-graphics and infrastructure, the reader can betterunderstand both the scope of the law enforce-ment role and potential methods or routes ofdisease transmission within that community.The demographic information presented in thissection includes information on the followingtypes of infrastructure, for the following reasons:

n Hospitals. Many in the medical communityhave agreements with local law enforcementagencies or simply expect police to providesome sort of security in the event of a pan-demic flu. In addition to their traditionaltreatment roles, hospitals may serve as publicdistribution sites for vaccines or medicationduring a pandemic flu, presenting a potentialneed for security.

n Schools. Schools are considered “sociallydense” environments (i.e., the average spacebetween students is relatively small), and chil-dren without pre-existing immunity to circu-lating influenza viruses are more susceptiblethan adults to infection.28 Strategies such astemporarily closing schools and/or child carefacilities will have an impact on local lawenforcement. If closed to students, someschool facilities might serve as distribution

sites for vaccines or medication, presenting apotential need for security.

n Transportation. Information on public transit isprovided to illustrate the sheer volume of localtravel (i.e., daily commuting) as well as state,national, and international travel. Local lawenforcement may be affected, for example, ifairline flights need to be quarantined because ofa symptomatic passenger, or if roads need to beclosed to facilitate the transport of medication.

n Major employers. Information on the majoremployers in each site is provided to show theeconomic impact that certain social-distanc-ing strategies could have on a jurisdiction. Insome cases, the law enforcement agenciesthemselves are also major employers in thecommunity.

3. City/County-Wide Approach to Emergency Opera-tions details the area-specific risks and “typical”hazards the community and the law enforcementagency could be faced with any day—and possi-bly simultaneously to the challenges posed by apandemic flu. An overview of the jurisdiction’semergency operations plan (including its currentinterpretation of incident command) and a briefdiscussion of the police agency’s roles in the planare also provided.

4. City/County-Wide Approach to Pandemic Flu-Specific Planning further explains local emer-gency operations, but focuses on pandemic flu-specific planning. This section describes whatroles the law enforcement agency will play withineach community’s plan.

5. The Police Department’s Approach to PandemicFlu-Specific Planning presents an overview of eachdepartment’s pandemic flu-specific plans,including law enforcement-specific policies onpersonal protective equipment (PPE), communi-cations regarding risks to the public and the

28. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/commitigation.html#III


police force, and other issues specific to lawenforcement. The continuity of operations planfor each department is also addressed if available.Because the four jurisdictions are at differentstages of their planning processes, the content ofthis section varies by case study.

6. Conclusion. The final section of each case studysummarizes key plan components and gives asnapshot of where each department was in theplanning process when the document went topress.

W H AT T H I S D O C U M E N T I S N O T

Law enforcement officials have not faced a flu pan-demic in many years. Thus, this document is notintended to present “best practices” for pandemicflu planning, because there is not enough experi-ence or research on which to base judgments aboutwhich practices are best. Nor is the documentintended to be a critique of the four sites’ pandemicflu planning processes. Rather, it presents a “snap-shot” of where each department is in its process andthe components they have included in their plansthus far.

DATA C O L L E C T I O N M E T H O D

The case studies describe each agency’s experienceswith pandemic flu planning, from a law enforcementperspective. Although representatives from otheragencies (e.g., public health and fire departments)typically provided input into the police agencies’planning, it was beyond the scope of this documentto describe the plans of the other agencies, except tothe extent that law enforcement agencies areinvolved in these efforts.

Once case study sites were chosen and pri-mary contact persons were established, an inter-view protocol was created and was administered toeach site. Variables included in the protocol werebased on the suggested pandemic flu plan consider-ations presented in the Police Executive ResearchForum/Bureau of Justice Assistance document TheRole of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emergen-cies: Special Considerations for an All-HazardsApproach.29 Case studies were written as closely tothe protocol as possible, but because of the signifi-cant differences in both the agencies and the com-munities they serve, not all factors had beenimplemented in all plans.

29. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/role_law_enforce.pdf

Chapter 2. The Fairfax County Police Department Case Study — 17

1. OV E RV I E W O F T H EP O L I C E D E PA RT M E N T

The Fairfax County Police Department (FCPD)serves the largest jurisdiction in Virginia and in theWashington, D.C., metropolitan area. The depart-ment has 1,424 sworn officers and more than 500civilian employees. There are eight patrol stations,and the department serves more than 400 squaremiles.1 FCPD is no stranger to emergency response;it has coordinated and/or participated in successfulcounty-wide operations and multijurisdictionalresponse operations during the aftermath of 9/11;the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington, D.C.,Virginia, New York City, and Florida; the 2002

“Beltway Sniper” case in Washington, D.C., Vir-ginia, and Maryland; and a 2006 shooting at aFCPD precinct in which two officers and the sus-pect were killed.

The Fairfax County PoliceDepartment Case Study

“We are striving for outcomes similar to Toronto during SARS. If wecan’t control the first handful of cases, it is unlikely and unrealistic to

think that large-scale quarantine orders will be a realistic option. FCPDhas invested substantial time and resources into building community

partnerships and supporting county cross-discipline initiatives, and webelieve that our ability to work closely with the community at all levels

is one of our strongest assets and highest priorities.”M A J O R J O S I A H L A R RY M O S E R, 2006

2

1. FCPD 2004 Annual Report http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/police/pdf/AnnualReport2004.pdf2. Fairfax County Website http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/demogrph/gendemo.htm

2. D E S C R I P T I O N O FT H E J U R I S D I C T I O N

Fairfax CountyArea Description

Fairfax County is located in northern Virginia,just west of Washington, D.C. It has a populationof approximately 1,040,000.2 Fairfax County ishome to seven main hospitals and more than

Virginia

FairfaxCounty

3. T H E C O U N T Y- W I D E A P P R OAC HT O E M E R G E N C Y O P E R AT I O N S

Fairfax County uses an all-hazards approach toemergency management, based on the NationalIncident Management System (NIMS). The countyalso participates in National Capital Region emer-gency response and planning and other regional

planning and mutual aid efforts. In Fairfax County,the Office of Emergency Management is responsi-ble for coordinating preparedness, response, andrecovery efforts for significant emergency eventsthat may occur in Fairfax. This office is also respon-sible for managing the county’s emergency opera-tions center, conducting training and exerciseprograms, managing the county’s citizen volunteerprogram, and activating emergency alert systems.8

4. T H E C O U N T Y- W I D E A P P R OAC HT O PA N D E M I C - S P E C I F I CP L A N N I N G

In the fall of 2005, closely coinciding with therelease of the federal government’s report on pan-demic preparedness, National Strategy for PandemicInfluenza: Implementation Plan, Fairfax Countybegan to focus intensively on the efforts needed toprepare for and respond to a pandemic influenza.County Executive Tony Griffin requested thatDeputy County Executives Robert Stalzer and Ver-dia Haywood co-chair the county’s Pandemic FluPlanning Initiative. To ensure county-wide coordi-nation among key stakeholders, a Leadership Teamand two key coordinating committees—PublicHealth, and Critical Infrastructure and ResourceManagement—were established. Almost 40 localagencies participated in the planning efforts led bythese committees. The Critical Infrastructure andResource Management Committee took the lead onthe county’s first-responder planning for a pan-demic. This core team included representativesfrom the Fairfax County Fire Department, theDepartment of Public Works, the Office of Emer-gency Management, and the Fairfax County PoliceDepartment.

18 — Chapter 2. The Fairfax County Police Department Case Study

200 elementary, middle, and high schools.3 Fivecolleges and universities are located within thecounty. Fort Belvoir, an 8,600-acre military instal-lation in southern Fairfax, is the county's largestemployer.4 The top five largest private employersin the county are the Inova Health System, BoozAllen Hamilton, Northrop Grumman, ScienceApplications International Corporation, andSprint Nextel.5 Fairfax County is also home to theCentral Intelligence Agency and the NationalReconnaissance Office and to thousands of fed-eral government employees and officials.6

Because of its close proximity to Washing-ton, D.C., the transportation network is expan-sive. Three lines of the Washington MetropolitanArea Transit System (or “Metro”) serve FairfaxCounty, as does the Virginia Railway Express.There are a number of major highways and roadsrunning through Fairfax County, including I-495(the “Capital Beltway”), I-95, I-66, I-395, theGeorge Washington Memorial Parkway, theDulles Toll Road, and U.S. Routes 1, 29, and 50.The American Legion Bridge connects Mont-gomery County, Maryland to Fairfax County.Dulles International Airport, the largest airportserving the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area,is located in Fairfax County, and Ronald ReaganNational Airport is just east of the county.7

3. Fairfax County Public Schools http://www.fcps.edu/4. Fairfax County Economic Development Authority 2006 http://www.fairfaxcountyeda.org/brac.htm5. Fairfax County Economic Development Authority 2006 http://www.fairfaxcountyeda.org/publications/top50.pdf 6. Interview with Commander Larry Moser, 2006 and http://ludb.clui.org/ex/i/VA3142/ 7. http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/living/transportation/8. http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/oem/

“Having two Deputy County Executives involved from the beginning of theplanning process played a big part in our successes. The deputies were directlyinvolved in giving clear direction and ensuring there was cross-countycommunication. Visible and active executive leadership was key.”A M A N DA M C G I L L , O F F I C E O F T H E C O U N T Y E X E C U T I V E, E X E C U T I V E T E A M A N DC R I T I C A L I N F R A S T RU C T U R E A N D R E S O U RC E M A NAG E M E N T C O O R D I NAT I O N


9. The Emergency Management Coordinating Committee will serve as the Leadership Team for this effort10. Steering Committee: Dr. Gloria Addo-Ayensu, Dr. Raja’a Satouri, Barbara Antley, Holly Clifton, KimberlyCordero, Zandra Duprey, Marilyn McHugh, Michelle Milgrim, John Niemiec11. Steering Committee: John Burke, Carol Lamborn, Amanda McGill, Becky McKinney, Larry Moser

n Vaccine and anti-viral distributionn Community disease preventionn Surge Capacityn Laboratory and Surveillancen First Responders and mass casualtyn Legal Considerationsn Communications and Notificationn Essential Needs

n Policy Supportn Operational Supportn Public Safetyn County Infrastructuren Private Sector Planning

Updated 8/7/2006

Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Planning Initiative Structure

Fairfax CountyPandemic Flu

Plan CoordinatorsJohn Burke

(Deputy Fire Chief)Amanda McGill

(Program Manager)Laura Suzuki, R.N. MPH

(Public Health Nurse)

Executive Team(provides oversight, sets direction and ensures appropriate internal and external communication)

Co-Chairs: Deputy County Executives Verdia Haywood, Rob Stalzer

Leadership Team (EMCC)9

(ensures coordination and integration of coordinating committees)Chairperson: Rob Stalzer

Public Health Coordination(responsible for planning, response and recovery for

public health efforts)Co-Chairs: Dr. Gloria Addo-Ayensu (Director of Health

Department) and Dr. Raja’a Satouri

Critical Infrastructure and Resource ManagementCoordination

(responsible for planning, response and recovery forinfrastructure and resource management efforts and

private sector planning)Co-Chairs: Doug Bass (Coordinator of Office of

Emergency Mgmt.)Merni Fitzgerald (Director, Office of Public Affairs)

Public Health Work Groups10 Critical Infrastructure and Resource ManagementWork Groups11

Planning Approach

As part of the county’s post-9/11 planning efforts, alldepartments were tasked with developing emergencyoperations and continuity of operations plans, andmany aspects of these plans have been drafted andexercised. When developing the pandemic planningapproach, county officials quickly recognized thevalue of integrating this type of planning into theexisting emergency operations and continuity ofoperations plans, to create an all-hazards approach.The pandemic plans of every county department—and the county itself—are now a component of itsexisting emergency operations plans.12

The existing emergency plans developed byFairfax County departments addressed many chal-lenges that could be encountered during an emer-gency. However, some of the pandemic-specificimpacts had not been as closely considered. Realiz-ing that a pandemic may greatly reduce workforceavailability, the Critical Infrastructure and ResourceManagement Work Group worked extensively toidentify and raise awareness of critical infrastruc-ture issues, such as staffing, service provision, andsupplies that might be reduced during a pandemic.Work group members met with agency heads andkey staff from the county’s Departments of Infor-mation Technology, Purchasing and Supply,Human Resources, and Risk Management to ensurethere was a clear understanding of potential chal-lenges associated with a reduced workforce on thecritical infrastructure.

Mulitagency Work Sessions

The work group team also facilitated two half-daysessions attended by representatives of every FairfaxCounty agency, public schools, utility companiesand other entities. Examples of issues discussedinclude: the possible redefinition of essential serv-ices and job functions during an emergency flu

pandemic, the development of policies and proce-dures for increased telecommuting, revision ofemergency staffing plans given the possibility of 30-to 50-percent absenteeism, and the impact of theloss or substantial reduction of services andresources the county relies upon. During these ses-sions, key staff members were paired together, anddiscussions were professionally facilitated to iden-tify key considerations unique to a pandemic. Thisformat promoted needed dialogue regarding strate-gies to address business/operational continuity.

Release of the Plan

Fairfax County’s Pandemic Flu Preparedness Planwas released in September 2006. The goals of theplan are to minimize the disruption of critical gov-ernment functions, protect the workforce during anoutbreak, and maintain business continuity in theevent that a pandemic occurs. The plan providesgeneral guidance to planning agencies and outlines,step by step, the activities that follow the phases ofa pandemic.

To assist departments in supplementing theirexisting emergency plans, the county developed awebsite and numerous planning and informationalresources, such as a pandemic flu planning check-list. Developing the checklist involved sitting downwith managers in each of the many critical countydepartments (e.g. Department of HumanResources, Department of Information Technol-ogy). Participants noted that the process was asimportant as the resulting tool, because these meet-ings required the county’s leaders to think criticallyabout the impact of a reduced workforce, currentpolicies, core activities, and other considerationsfor pandemic planning. These meetings also pro-vided the agencies and departments with an oppor-tunity to provide input into the county’s efforts(See Appendix A, County Checklist).13


12. Moser 200613. The Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan and additional county resources and planningdocuments are available at http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/emergency/pandemicflu/

“The most useful thing was coming upwith the checklist and sharing it withheads of the departments. It gotpeople thinking along those terms.You never think, ‘What would happenif I only had 50 percent of my staffshow up?’ While you don’t know whowill be affected, thinking through itand doing some planning will at leasthave you in the mindset in case apandemic occurs.”C A R O L L A M B O R N , S T R AT E G I C I N I T I AT I V EM A NAG E R, FA I R FA X C O U N T Y D E PA RT M E N TO F P U B L I C WO R K S

5. T H E P O L I C E D E PA RT M E N T ’ SPA N D E M I C P L A N N I N G

In early 2006, as Fairfax County was rampingup its multi-agency continuity of operations plansand pandemic planning efforts, Police Chief DavidRohrer stressed the importance of focusing on thistopic. In January, with the chief ’s support, CraigDeAtley, the Police Department’s assistant medicaldirector, and William Hauda, the operational med-ical director, met with the chief and command offi-cers to discuss preparedness efforts and presentmedical information on pandemic influenza, thethreat to-date, and basic considerations for thedepartment.

What Chief Rohrer took away from thatmeeting was a realization that he needed to inte-grate the Police Department’s plan with the countyplan. Chief Rohrer directed Major Josiah LarryMoser, commander of the Technical ServicesBureau, to serve as liaison with the county and toprepare the police department internally for thepandemic threat.

When Chief Rohrer approached MajorMoser, he made it clear he was not merely seeking apaper plan; he wanted to ensure that all employeeswere in fact protected and best prepared to respondto a threat of this nature. He selected Major Moserbecause of his previous work during the anthraxthreats and his well-established relationships withrelated service providers.


Excerpt from Fairfax CountyPandemic Flu Preparedness Plan

Public Safety Agencies (Fire and Rescue Depart-ment, Police Department, Office of the Sheriff,14

Department of Public Safety Communications)play an integral role in county operations duringa pandemic. Due to stresses placed upon thehealth care system and other critical functions,calls for emergency medical assistance are antic-ipated to be higher than normal and civil distur-bances and breakdowns in public order mayoccur. Likewise, the local 9-1-1 emergency callcenter may be overburdened with calls for assis-tance, including requests to transport influenzavictims, and local law enforcement agencies maybe called upon to enforce movement restrictionsor quarantines, thereby diverting resources fromtraditional law enforcement duties.

Through the establishment of jointresponse protocols and linkages among the key

14. In Fairfax County, the Police Department handles patrol, investigative, and other functions, and the Sheriff’s Office manages the detention center, provides courthouse security, and serves civil law process.

components of public health, emergency man-agement, fire and rescue, and law enforcementand through county guidance, joint training, andthe use of exercises, all public safety agencieshave a better understanding of their respectiveroles and applicable governing legal authoritiesso they can coordinate their efforts in the eventof a pandemic outbreak.

–Fairfax County Pandemic FluPreparedness Plan, p. 35

Planning Approach

The county’s planning approach was to expand exist-ing emergency operation plans, resources and part-nerships, and this theme carried over heavily into thepolice department’s approach to planning. The Fair-fax County Police Department’s goal was to developa flexible plan that builds on existing emergencyoperations planning and relies on existing policiesand procedures internalized within the department.FCPD’s existing emergency operations plan is basedon the Incident Command System (ICS). The depart-ment built upon that by examining pandemic-specific situations, including functioning with feweremployees and enforcing public health orders.

Key Plan Components

A primary tenet of the department’s approach is tokeep the plan within the framework of the existingemergency operations plan (EOP).

Within the existing operations framework,pandemic preparedness efforts are focusing on:(1) Continuity of Critical Operations (e.g, staffingand maintaining information databases); (2) Train-ing Officers for a Public Health Emergency (e.g.,enforcing public health orders); and (3) Protectingand Educating Officers and Their Families.

The following sections describe the depart-ment’s approach to these preparedness efforts inmore detail.

(1) Continuity of Critical Operations

STAFFING

A major challenge that departments are likelyto confront during a pandemic is maintaining crit-ical department functions with reduced staffing.Unlike other emergencies, public health emergen-cies—and particularly an influenza pandemic—could take out a sizeable portion of the workforce.Based on national estimates, a pandemic couldimpact 20 percent (low attack rate) to 30 percent

(high attack rate) of the population. Fairfax Countyestimates that up to 40 percent of its workforcecould be absent due to illness, the need to care forill family members, or self-imposed quarantining.For planning purposes, these estimates are used toanticipate reductions in staffing for periods of time,as the pandemic may hit communities in waveslasting six to eight weeks at a time.15

PLANNING FOR UNEVEN STAFF REDUCTIONS

Unlike other critical incidents, a pandemicdoes offer some lead time for preparing for areduced staff, but predicting the actual impact onstaffing in various divisions is impossible. Forexample, it is difficult to predict whether employeesfrom various divisions would become ill at similarrates, or whether a pandemic might decimate cer-tain divisions while leaving others relativelyunscathed. Thus, departments need to be preparedto scale back operations in all critical services areasand cross-train personnel for multiple functions.

“While calculations that estimate theloss of workforce are important inplanning, in reality you don’t knowexactly where these staffing losses will occur. Half the personnel in one bureau may be unavailable, butanother bureau may only have a fewpersonnel out. The ability to adapt toever-changing dynamics is crucial inour roles as community leaders.Planning is important, but the planshould merely help guide us. Leadersneed to keep a finger on the pulse oftheir agency and adapt resources andplans accordingly. Remaining calmand communicating with honestconfidence will allow the workforcewe are privileged to lead to perform,problem-solve, and do their best whilealso instilling calm in a communityseeking leadership.”M A J O R L A R RY M O S E R , C O M M A N D E R O FT H E T E C H N I C A L S E RV I C E S B U R E AU


15. Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan, 2006.

A GREATER NEED FOR

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYEES

FCPD’s operations and patrol bureaus have aprocess for reallocating resources, allowing them toincrease operations with supplemental officers whohave trained and maintained proficiency in variousfunctions. Fairfax County patrol officers are gener-alists, and the department cross-trains officers tofill in some of the specialty units. For example,FCPD has a 200-person, non-standing Civil Distur-bance Unit (CDU). Officers join the CDU voluntar-ily and receive training in various areas of expertiseso they can be placed on call to assist in response todaily needs or during special events.

Increasing or scaling back operations is a com-mon practice for the operations and patrol divisionand is ingrained in the department’s daily operatingculture. However, the Administrative ServicesBureau (ASB) and Information Technology Bureau(ITB) had not traditionally needed to ramp up ordown and had not seen themselves as essential per-sonnel. That changed as officials realized, for exam-ple, that during a pandemic, the ITB would play akey role in maintaining computer systems thatwould allow police employees to work from home orallow the department to take crime reports online. Inplanning for a pandemic, Fairfax County policefocused much of their attention on ensuring plan-ning efforts within the Administrative Services andInformation Technology Bureaus. Using the sameapproach used by the County’s Critical Infrastruc-ture and Resource Management Committee, FCPDorganized an internal police department committeewith representatives from the Personnel Division,the Criminal Investigations Bureau, and the Chief ’sOffice of Research and Support, along with theschool liaison commander, the Patrol Bureau com-mander, the wildlife biologist,16 the occupationalhealth liaison, and the department safety officer.

Using a team approach garnered departmental “buy-in” and support within the many bureaus. Teammembers were then given various assignments, withminimal requirements for meetings.

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL OPERATIONS

The FCPD plan establishes a system to repri-oritize calls for service and other critical functionsas needed during a pandemic. This will help ensurethat priority calls can be maintained with a reducedworkforce, despite a probable increase in calls forservice and other situational demands on depart-ment resources. The specific priorities will be deter-mined through daily communication based onactual staffing availability and other demands. In apandemic, emergency response calls will continuebe a critical function. To maintain the ability torespond to all of them, the department will changeits response to other calls for service, such as sus-pending non-injury motor vehicle accident investi-gations and certain types of alarm calls.Communications personnel may direct these callsto online reporting or give other instructions overthe phone. For instance, in a car accident withoutinjuries, the motorists would be instructed toexchange insurance information and then file areport online. FCPD has been experimenting withonline crime reporting, so that if needed, morecrimes could be reported on FCPD’s website. TheInformation Technology Bureau has taken the nec-essary steps in the planning process to quickly putthis in place when it is needed.17

Fairfax County police have classified their serv-ices into three categories in their continuity of opera-tions planning. These categories are: “missioncritical—no interruption,”“immediate post incident—services restored within 12 hours of incident,” and“normal services—restored at conclusion of inci-dent up to 30 days out.” Thirty-three functions are


16. The Fairfax County Police Department has one full-time wildlife biologist, who works with the AnimalServices Division. The wildlife biologist’s responsibilities include: responding to community complaintsabout wildlife, training officers in wildlife-related issues, and implementing programs that deal withproblematic wildlife species within the community. 17. Moser 2006

listed as mission critical; 21 are listed as immediatepost incident, and 50 services are classified as nor-mal services.18 Examples of each include:

Mission Critical:

n Security at critical sites,

n SWAT,

n Homicide investigations, and

n Payroll19

Immediate Post-Incident:

n Sex crimes unit,

n Gang investigations, and

n Victims services

Normal Services:

n Crime prevention coordinator,

n Enforcement of animal control laws, and

n Parking enforcement.

The preparation of the essential function/services list was intended to provoke thought aboutthe services provided by the various bureaus anddivisions of the police department. Bureau/divisionpersonnel are accustomed to justifying their ownneeds for resources in the regular budget process,but are not usually engaged in defending anotherdivision’s needs or factoring what the impact wouldbe on their own bureau if they were denied servicesprovided by other sections of the department. Theuse of a written list brought issues from all bureausequally into discussion and helped ensure equitablerepresentation and discussion.

Three steps were used to create this list. First,bureau representatives were asked to submit a list of their critical functions and services offered.

Individual submissions were then merged into asingle list and redistributed among command stafffor comment. Finally, a facilitated discussion washeld during a command-staff meeting. Comman-ders were divided into diverse groups and asked toprioritize the items on the list. This group discus-sion provided safe commentary about what wastruly most important during critical periods. It alsoprovided a platform where commanders could havesome spirited discussions about what is reallyimportant when services need to be altered.

The resulting list of functions and rankings isflexible, and depending on the threat, the criticalityor role of the specific function may drasticallychange. Officials said that the most important partof this process was creating the list and thinkingthrough the importance of each function, so thatduring an emergency no functions and bureaus willbe overlooked, even if a shift in priorities doesoccur. During a critical incident, the list will serveto remind decision-makers of the various servicesthat exist and will help them to select the best rampup/ramp down options.

MAINTAINING KEY INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGIES AND DATABASES

Fairfax County’s databases and remote accessservers are generally shared among all county agen-cies. Fairfax County agencies also have teleworkpolicies, which allow some employees access tocounty databases from remote locations (includinghome). During a pandemic, the county hasinstructed all agencies to use the policy’s “maxi-mum flexibility” to reduce risk of transmission offlu virus within the workplace.20, 21

As the demand for emergency services andteleworking increases during a pandemic, it isanticipated that these shared systems may be


18. For a more detailed list, see Appendix B. 19. (It may seem surprising to find payroll on a list of highest priorities, but a failure to maintain payroll forany reason could cause some employees to fail to report to work, worsening the reduced-workforce problem.) 20. Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan, 2006. 21. Within FCPD, selected positions are authorized for teleworking, and these positions are typically adminis-trative. However, during a public health emergency, most positions that are not linked to responding in anoperational capacity will have some latitude for teleworking with supervisor approval.

heavily strained. As part of the planning process,Fairfax County police also designated certain data-bases as “critical” and “non-critical” to their conti-nuity of operations and developed a plan forensuring access to these systems.

To ensure that the critical systems would beavailable to the necessary personnel during anemergency, FCPD worked with the county’sDepartment of Information Technology (DIT) andthe police IT Bureau to observe the systemdemands during peak days and times to estimate itscapacity. If the demand should exceed capacity,then DIT will be able to regulate who has access. Aswith other prevention measures, DIT will first seekto gain voluntary compliance to reduce systemdemand by telling users about any problems withexcess demand and explaining the objectives ofrestricting access. Although the details are not final-ized yet, extensive discussion has occurred to assignblocks of time for various tasks. For example, timeand attendance clerks would have priority accessduring pay period submissions. Although volun-tary compliance is the preferred method, DIT willhave the ability to regulate access privileges.

If necessary, the IT Bureau has the ability toregulate who has access to the “critical” databasesand which databases are able to run. The informa-tion technology systems are structured so that non-critical databases may be shut down in anemergency. Examples of critical systems include theradio and computer-aided dispatch and the recordsmanagement systems. These systems are able tohandle a full capacity even if everyone is usingthem. Non-critical systems include the employeedatabase, court scheduling, the geographic infor-mation system, and non-criminal tickets. The ITBureau is clustering databases that are related toessential services and functions. By bundling cer-tain databases together, IT will be able to essentially“turn off” non-critical databases without impact-ing the critical ones.

Also, the police IT Bureau is identifying andprioritizing authorized telework and Citrix-accesspersonnel who will be able to access critical data-bases remotely if needed. Communications, com-puter-aided dispatch, and the records managementsystem will have priority if the remote access sys-tems become taxed during a peak period. Moreover,it is now policy to keep hard copies of critical digi-tal documents (such as time sheet templates andemployee contact information) in case they becomeinaccessible online.22

MAINTAINING INTERAGENCY AND

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

Maintaining interagency communicationswill be critical for coordination and effectiveresponse during a pandemic. Fairfax County Police,the Sheriff ’s Office, and the Emergency Manage-ment and Fire Departments use a shared emer-gency communication system for all emergencyresponders.

The service is managed by the Department ofPublic Safety Emergency Operations Center anduses a shared computer-aided dispatch and publicsafety radio system to communicate emergency andnon-emergency public safety information. Thecounty also has a teleconference ability that is runout of this center. The center’s audio conferencecapability can accommodate 1,900 simultaneoususers on one call. This system has been used forinteragency communications in the aftermath ofHurricane Isabel in 2003, during the Beltway Sniperincidents in 2002, after the terrorist attacks of Sep-tember 11, 2001, and during the 2001 anthraxattacks. For interagency communications, emer-gency services providers in and around FairfaxCounty dialed in to the communications center atpreset times for incident briefings, updates, discus-sion, and direction on next steps.


22. FCPD Internal Memo regarding Pandemic Planning, 2006, pgs. 10–11.

AUDIO-CONFERENCING LATEST PANDEMIC INFORMATION AT ROLL CALL BRIEFINGS

FCPD currently uses the communication cen-ter’s audio conferencing capabilities for internalcommunications. Some members of the policepatrol bureau use it weekly at preset times. Duringcritical events in the past, the police department hasused the communication center’s audio conferencecapability as frequently as several times every dayfor briefings during roll calls. In the eventof a pandemic, it is anticipated that briefings wouldbe timed in conjunction with shift changes toensure that employees are best informed and lead-ers have accurate, up-to-date information on thestatus of staff availability and demands for service.During initial planning, FCPD worked with thecounty to develop a fixed schedule of available usetimes for the department. In a pandemic, FCPDwill use the system in conjunction with the hoursassociated with their various staffing plans. Forexample, during their standard 11.5-hour shift,briefings will occur at 0545 hours, 1345 hours, and1915 hours.23

To further enhance communications, FairfaxCounty police have taken the lead and partneredwith the Fire Department to install video confer-encing equipment at each of their key facilities. Thisequipment has substantial expansion capacity,but was primarily intended to communicate withall eight district stations, headquarters, the criminaljustice academy, operations support, the Depart-ment of Public Safety, and other county emergencymanagement and key fire and rescue sites.It is expected that videoconferencing will furtherfacilitate interagency communications during critical incidents as more agencies obtain this capability.

MANY TECHNOLOGIES FOR

COMMUNICATING WITH EMPLOYEES

FCPD’s internal communication plans includemultiple means of communicating with personnel.The method of conveying these messages maychange according to whether it is a routine commu-nication about preparedness, or an emergency com-munication about a potential or existing criticalincident or emergency situation. For routine com-munications (and those which are not time-sensi-tive), general command staff memorandums,standard operating procedure memorandums,employee networks, roll-call boards and other stan-dard communications methods will be utilized.FCPD’s communication plan includes sharing infor-mation with personnel through mobile communica-tions terminal (MCT) announcements (messages onthe terminals in police vehicles), emails, an employeestaffing and information hotline, the EmergencyAction Notification (EAN)24 Message Alert System,and the Operations Intranet site.

(2) Training Officers for aPublic Heath Emergency

During a pandemic, officers may be called on toassist with activities that vary from routine, such asenforcing quarantine and other public healthorders. FCPD is anticipating assisting public healthauthorities in issuing such orders in the early phaseof a pandemic—when such orders will likely beissued and are more likely to be enforceable. Sincemost FCPD officers have not previously served thesetypes of orders or had to respond pandemic-like situations, FCPD recognized the need to providespecialized officer training on pandemic response.The department has provided education on pan-demic preparedness and response to its officers andother personnel; however, comprehensively training


23. FCPD Internal Memo regarding Pandemic Planning, 2006, p. 10 and Moser, 2006.24. Emergency Alert Notification (EAN) is a free notification service that citizens can enroll in through theEmergency Management Department, which offers various methods of communicating emergency andother important information via email, pager, cell phone, and other digital communication devices.

the entire force would be unwieldy at this point andwould require ongoing in-service training updates.A manageable solution that FCPD has implementedwas to identify a core team of volunteer officers tobe specially trained and involved in an initial pan-demic response and to phase in other employees’training.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT TRAINING

FCPD’s approach to staffing has been to trainall officers as generalists and then to cross-trainpatrol officers to staff specialty units. FCPD has a200-person, non-standing Civil Disturbance Unit(CDU) that is composed of personnel from variousparts of the department. While this unit is non-standing, it trains regularly and is deployed period-ically to ensure readiness. Officers in the CDU arecomfortable with receiving various assignments toaddress daily service needs and in preparation forspecial events. Further, FCPD also has 108 auxiliaryofficers and 100 certified pre-screened volunteers inservice who may supplement the department.

As planned, an initial team of 30 officers fromthe 200 CDU volunteers has received comprehen-sive education on the elements of a pandemic (e.g.,risk factors and protective measures) and trainingon law enforcement response, including relevantlegal authorities, PPE requirements, how to servepublic health orders, assisting with appeals of pub-lic health orders, and enforcing voluntary andinvoluntary movement restrictions. This selectgroup will be composed of “positions,” not specificindividuals, so if one person leaves the department,another person will be trained to fill that slot in acontinuous process.

FCPD is currently working with other firstresponders in the county to develop a training pro-tocol for the initial response group and preparingtabletop exercises to assist in training. Topicsinclude:

n Pandemic Influenza 101

n Detailed Orientation to Departmental Plan

n PPE and Fit Testing

n Briefing by Health Department

n Legal Issues Associated with Service of Quaran-tine and Isolation Orders

n Table Top Quick Review.

ENFORCING PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS

Training for the core group of officers willspecifically outline how officers are to carry out thelaw enforcement roles as delineated in the county’splanning process. In Fairfax County, these rolesinclude assisting with the following:

Assisting the Health Department with itslead responsibilities regarding:

n Voluntary quarantine and social distancing

n Mandatory quarantine and service of courtorders associated with quarantine and isolation

n Public health order appeals

n Protection and distribution of medicalresources.

Voluntary Quarantine and Social Distancing

For a voluntary quarantine, the state healthcommissioner and the county Health Departmentwill specify voluntary compliance. No law enforce-ment action will be needed, except to assist inspreading the message by educating members of thecommunity with whom officers come in contact


“By bringing this small percentage of our workforce to a higher level of knowledge and readiness, thedepartment will have an immediateresponse capacity of willing,appropriately trained and equippedstaff. The existence of this smallergroup of trained personnel willreduce communication challenges,while offering a buffer as additionalstaffs are ramped up. Having a coregroup of volunteer officers who are well trained will likely also help reduce anxiety within thedepartment and the community.”M A J O R L A R RY M O S E R , C O M M A N D E R O FT H E T E C H N I C A L S E RV I C E S B U R E AU

during routine policing activities about the impor-tance of complying with a voluntary quarantine.

Mandatory Quarantine and Service of Court Orders

Police and sheriffs’ departments are expectedto play a role in enforcing any mandatory quaran-tine. The Virginia state health commissioner issuesall mandatory quarantine orders. Previously, Fair-fax County police officers had limited authority toserve civil orders; this responsibility fell mostlyunder the authority of the sheriff 's office. However,because of the widespread impact a pandemiccould have, the Virginia General Assembly revisedthe State Code, effective July 1, 2007. The code nowauthorizes police officers to serve isolation andquarantine orders (Virginia State Code Section §15.2-1704).

The sheriff ’s office will take primary respon-sibility for serving quarantine and isolation orders.If the person being served the order complies, noother law enforcement action will be needed. But ifthe subject of the order does not comply, then thestate health commissioner will issue an emergencydetention order allowing law enforcement officersto take the person into custody. Defying the manda-tory quarantine order is punishable as a Class 1misdemeanor, resulting in confinement in jail fornot more than 12 months and/or a fine of not morethan $2,500. Fairfax County police will help thehealth department ensure that initial cases are con-tained, as they realize that the first cases may havethe greatest impact on limiting the spread of a pan-demic, giving medical authorities valuable time tobegin working on a vaccine and other counter-measures.

When serving these civil orders and inresponding if the orders are violated or appealed,FCPD officers will be expected to continue to usediscretion in the amount of force needed to carryout these responsibilities. Current use-of-forcepolicies are flexible enough to allow officers to useprudent judgment and to examine their experience

and factors in the field to make the best determina-tion of how to handle a situation. In most cases,Fairfax police officials say they expect that theorders will offer options of mandatory quarantineat locations other than jail confinement; an arrestwill be made as the very last resort.

One innovative idea that has been proposedfor enforcing the mandatory quarantines is usingelectronic surveillance bracelets. This measurecould deter violations, assist in monitoring thoseunder public health orders, and reduce the need forlaw enforcement intervention. The sheriff ’s office iscurrently using electronic bracelets for persons sen-tenced to home detention.

Public Health Order Appeals

Law enforcement will also be involved when-ever a person complies with a mandatory quaran-tine order but chooses to appeal the order. Becauseof the need to resolve such appeals immediately,health order appeals, unlike other types of civil liti-gation, will not be scheduled for court hearingsdays, weeks, or months later. Rather, the police willbe responsible for taking the person to a CircuitCourt hearing. The appeal at Circuit Court couldbe conducted at the courthouse, through a video-conferencing system, or by bringing a judge or amobile video conferencing unit to the client. Thejail has a system for conducting arraignments andother hearings by a magistrate via video. If theclient does need to be placed in confinement, oneoption is that the Sheriff ’s Office has a certainamount of “negative-pressure” space for peoplewith tuberculosis and other airborne illnesses.FCPD will ensure that only those trained in andusing personal protection equipment will be incontact with persons known to be infected.25

Protection and Distribution of Medical Resources

Police also may be required to enforce move-ment restrictions as requested by the county. FCPDwill provide security at vaccination sites, medical


25. FCPD Internal Memo regarding Pandemic Planning, 2006, pgs. 8–9.

distribution sites, and quarantine sites as requestedand as the department is able to respond.26 In Fair-fax, although the Police Department may handleany initial response for security at hospitals, it hasbeen agreed that the Sheriff ’s Office will providesupplemental security at hospitals.27 During laterphases of a pandemic, it is assumed that courts willbe closed and other court work may be modified,allowing those providing court security to redeployto assist with field priorities such as hospital secu-rity. For many years the Sheriff ’s Office has partici-pated with police Civil Disturbance Unit training,so it is well prepared for this role.

ACTIVATING THE

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

Because Fairfax County has modeled its plan-ning stages after the phases set by the World HealthOrganization (WHO), a pandemic emergency oper-ations would be initiated when the county is inPhase 5 of a pandemic based on the WHO or theCenters for Disease Control and Prevention stages.At this stage the county’s Emergency OperationCenter will have been activated.

(3) Protecting and Educating Officers and Their Families

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY PROGRAM

FCPD’s occupational safety program has beeninvolved in planning for a pandemic flu. This program is led by the Fairfax County Fire and Res-cue Department. Following National IncidentManagement System (NIMS) training, the policedepartment recognized the value of having a fieldliaison specializing in responding to various haz-ards, including respiratory and biological threats.

Following the fire and rescue department’s lead,FCPD designated a safety coordinator to meet thisneed. Master Police Officer Kenneth Brennan hasbeen serving as the FCPD safety coordinator forabout a year with a staff of five supplemental safetyofficers, who volunteer for these responsibilities inaddition to their regular duties. All officers partici-pating in this role attend the National Fire Protec-tion Association (NFPA) officer’s school, wherethey receive in-depth training on working with haz-ardous materials, including live agents and weaponsof mass destruction (WMD).

The safety coordinator also helps to ensurethat the department is taking adequate precautionsto prevent job-related injuries. For example, thesafety coordinator has been involved in planning forextended operations and deployment in hot or coldtemperatures. The safety coordinator and safetyofficers have worked to ensure that officers will havethe supplies needed to prevent hypoglycemia ordehydration.28 In a pandemic situation the plannedprecautions include education on infection controlmeasures, such as maintaining a six-foot distancefrom people who have cold or flu symptoms.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

To date, the police safety coordinator’s largestrole in pandemic planning has been to provideguidance on personal protective equipment (PPE)and to assist in identifying, ordering, and maintain-ing the equipment. One of the critical decisionsFCPD had to make was to determine how muchPPE was needed. This issue was discussed at length,as FCPD had to think about how much may beneeded and the cost of the equipment and storage.The department has stockpiled N95 masks,29 handcleaner (containing 60 to 90 percent alcohol),


26. FCPD Internal Memo regarding Pandemic Planning, 2006, p.7.27. As mentioned earlier, Fairfax County has both a Police Department and a Sheriff’s Office; the two agencieshave overlapping authority, with the Sheriff’s Office providing security to courthouses, managing the detentioncenter, and serving civil law process.28. Interview with Kenneth Brennan, 2007.29. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defines N95 masks as disposable devices that cover the mouthand nose during medical procedures. N95 masks help protect the caregiver and patient against microorganisms,body fluids, and small particles in the air. They fit closely to form a tight seal over the mouth and nose andrequire fit-testing to provide the intended effectiveness. http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ppe/masksrespirators.html

protective gloves, eye protection, and surgicalmasks. FCPD has stockpiled a base amount and willcontinue to order additional items strategicallythrough grant and budget opportunities.30

In December 2006, FCPD began fit-testing N95masks and PPE distribution during officers’ annualphysicals. Currently, fit-testing is only being con-ducted for selected groups of non-sworn and swornfield personnel. Civil Disturbance Unit members arebeing prioritized for receiving PPE and fit-testing.Previously, all CDU patrol officers and specialty unitswere issued Level C PPE31 and were fit-tested accord-ing to the equipment requirements. Now, mostemployees receive annual fit-testing for their issuedMillennium Chemical-Biological Mask.32 FCPD willcontinue to fit-test its employees during firearmrecertification and other prescheduled functions.33

While many officers have been fit-tested, littleequipment will be issued until it is actually needed.The equipment degrades and becomes damaged ifstored in the trunks of patrol cars where tempera-tures are not regulated. Instead, equipment isstrategically placed in the field and at storage sites.In 2006, Fairfax County police participated instockpile distribution rehearsals with the health,schools, and emergency management departments.

SICK LEAVE AND HYGIENE POLICIES

The Fairfax County Department of HumanResources establishes leave policy and has deter-mined that the regular department leave policiesare appropriate for a pandemic flu. This policy

provides for maximum flexibility in using family,annual, compensatory, sick, transferred, andadvance sick leave to meet emergency needs.Worker’s compensation-related leave can also beused.34 In general, personnel are expected to use allof their leave hours; then, if necessary, they candraw from the employees’ bank of donated leavehours.

“The department’s philosophy is clearthat everything in its power will bedone to support our employees andtheir families, so that they can care forthemselves and ultimately return thissame level of support for theircommunity through their service tothe department.”M A J O R L A R RY M O S E R , C O M M A N D E R O FT H E T E C H N I C A L S E RV I C E S B U R E AU, 2006

FCPD strongly recommends that employeesnot report to work if they believe they are sick orthey believe they have been in contact while notwearing PPE with someone who has the flu virus.The department is educating officers on the impor-tance of this policy. It is hard to predict the impactof a pandemic, but the department is stockpilingenough surgical masks to ensure that masks will beavailable to meet their needs and ensure employeesafety. Additional stockpiles of N95 masks have alsobeen acquired, and the masks are routinelyinspected for damage or degradation.


30. Brennan, 2007.31. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) classifies PPE into four categories: A, B, C,and D. The highest level, A, is used when “the greatest level of skin, respiratory, and eye protection isrequired.” Level D equipment is used for “nuisance contamination only.” Level C PPE is for airborne sub-stances that require air-purifying respirators. Other PPE used in level C may include: coveralls, gloves (bothinner and outer), and boots. More information can be found at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9767 32. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved this full-face gas mask forprotection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. More information can befound at http://media.msanet.com/NA/USA/DomesticPreparedness/GasMasksAPR/MillenniumCBA/0517-06MilleniumCBRN.pdf33. The process of fit-testing all officers for N95 masks is estimated to take up to three years because some ofthe younger officers receive physicals only every three years. If an emergency arises before all are fit–tested,the department will issue the masks to personnel regardless of testing. The department is able to approximatemask sizes when ordering stockpiles, because 85 percent of the population wears a medium-size mask.34. Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan, 2006, pg. 59.

“With proper education, officers willrecognize that they are doing moreharm than good by coming into work sick.”M A S T E R P O L I C E O F F I C E RK E N N E T H B R E N NA N , 2007

FCPD has established guidelines for person-nel hygiene during a pandemic, based on the sug-gestions made during the county’s planningprocess. These recommendations emphasize goodgeneral hygiene habits such as washing hands andcovering the mouth with a tissue or sleeve whencoughing. When dealing with persons who havebeen exposed to or have contracted a virus, person-nel should wear gloves, N95 masks, long-sleeveclothing, and protective eyewear. Personnel shouldalso have the exposed person wear a surgical maskand maintain a distance of at least six feet whenpossible. Other practices recommended by thedepartment include social distancing (e.g., avoidingclose personal contact and avoiding attendingunnecessary public places and gatherings) andcleaning frequently used surfaces (e.g., door han-dles, computer keyboards, and elevator buttons).Currently this is strictly a personal responsibility,but if pandemic Phase 5 or 6 were reached, thecounty’s facility management department wouldlikely take a greater role in ensuring the cleanlinessof department facilities and work stations. Impor-tantly, facility management officials plan to modifythe scope of work for cleaning and maintenancebased on the threat. For instance, rather thanspending time vacuuming floors, cleaning person-nel would frequently wash doorknobs and othershared surfaces.

GUIDELINES FOR

DEATH INVESTIGATIONS

Fairfax County has an existing fatality management plan that addresses mass casualtiesduring a pandemic. The county also participates in

a workgroup of regional funeral directors, cemeterydirectors, hospital officials, county emergency plan-ners, and first responders to assist in refining thefatality management plan for the county. Thecounty anticipates that most flu-related deaths willbe easily distinguished from other deaths, becausethe victims will have sought some type of medicaltreatment. All homicides, accidents, suicides, andviolent, sudden, and unexpected or suspiciousdeaths are required to be reported as usual to thelocal medical examiner.35

The Police Department continually commu-nicates with the Chief Medical Examiner’s Officeand the Health Department to assess risk to itsemployees, and will make policy changes accord-ingly. During Pandemic Phase 5 and 6, the depart-ment anticipates requiring personnel to use at leasta minimal level of the following PPE: disposablehooded Tyvex coverall (lightweight paper-like dis-posable material); single-layer non-sterile ambidex-trous gloves which cover the cuffs of the coverall;N95 filter mask; eye protection; and Tyvex shoe cov-ers. While this PPE is currently available, it is notmandated. At the time of this writing, FCPD is com-municating with the medical examiner’s office andwill follow the prescribed recommendations fromthe medical examiner’s office, which will be deter-mined by assessment of the threat faced. Mass fatal-ity procedures continue to be discussed regionally.

EDUCATING OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

In the Fairfax County Police Department’spandemic planning, much consideration wasdevoted to providing guidance to personnel onfamily health issues. The department encouragesfamilies to have an emergency plan and to discussgood hygiene and social distancing practices. Thedepartment demonstrated the value of a programcalled the Family Assistance Services Team (FAST)during the aftermath of the May 8, 2006 shooting oftwo of their officers. FAST is defined as a team ofhuman resources professionals who establish


35. Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan

contact with employees and their families and pro-vide them with all available resources so that emer-gency operations employees (including police, fire,EMS, etc.) may perform their jobs.

Fairfax County police have been refining andexpanding FAST based on this experience, and havegiven a high value to the FAST concept; the depart-ment is committed to making a high priority ofcommunicating with and supporting officers andtheir families. FCPD also suggests that families pre-pare “HomePacks” which would include suppliesneeded in case of an emergency, such as surgicalmasks, disposable gloves, and disinfectant (SeeAppendix C for a complete list). The departmenthas stressed emergency self-preparation during theinitial policy dissemination. However, agency lead-ers realize that people often fail to prepare. Accord-ingly, the department anticipates prioritizing thismessage during annual in-service wellness assess-ments and by repeating the message during unre-lated videoconferences. The department alsoanticipates using the Civil Disturbance Unit mem-bers as ambassadors of the message.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The Fairfax County Pandemic Influenza Planincludes a detailed public education and risk com-munications plan. The Department of Health is thelead organization for official public communica-tions, and has put extensive effort into public edu-cation on pandemic preparedness. The healthdepartment has also worked with the communityand has participated in business summits and busi-ness continuity/disaster planning.

The county’s medical spokespersons will bethe health director and the deputy medical directorof the Fairfax County Health Department. Non-medical spokespersons may include the director ofthe Office of Public Affairs for Fairfax County, theFairfax County Executive, and the director of com-munications for Fairfax County Public Schools.

The police department’s community, crimeprevention, and business liaisons have taken the

lead on educating the public about health depart-ment education and planning sessions. Police rep-resentatives have also joined in county meetings.The police department views its role as a conduitfor referrals to county services, helping to relay theinformation the county puts forth. For example,the police disseminate information on communitysummits and events. For any police-related issuesthat may need to be communicated during a pan-demic—such as how security will be handled atvaccination sites, reductions in routine services, orwhen to call the police—the police Public Informa-tion Office (PIO) will be the spokesperson for thedepartment. The department also plans to use thecounty’s Emergency Alert Network (EAN) to issueany public information or directives from thedepartment.

“One of our duties as police officers isresponding to community membersseeking guidance or resources byhelping refer them to appropriatecounty agencies and resources. Often,when people don’t know what to do,they call the police, and the officersin the field are their first contact inreaching any county service.Accordingly, we try to make sureofficers can make the appropriatereferral. This is a daunting task for acounty that offers so many services.To assist, officers have access to phonedirectories available on the mobilecommunications terminals, and theyare exposed to roll call trainingsessions and other service awarenessefforts. Each police station also hastwo crime prevention officers and a standing Neighborhood Patrol Unit that have expanded knowledge and contact with various serviceproviders.”M A J O R L A R RY M O S E R , 2006


6. C O N C LU S I O N

Fairfax County has taken many important steps inpreparing for a pandemic or other similar publicheath emergency. The Police Department’s plan-ning efforts have emphasized:

n Developing multi-agency partnerships andplans,

n Identifying mission-critical functions,

n Incorporating pandemic-specific planning elements into its existing plans,

n Maximizing capacity through the use oftechnology,

n Focusing on cross-training administrative personnel, and

n Educating personnel on the threat.

Future Directions:

At the time this document was released, the FairfaxCounty Police Department was continuing its plan-ning efforts. FCPD is currently working on the following activities:

n Training all of its Civil Disturbance Unit officerson the pandemic preparedness plan and theirroles and responsibilities,

n Ongoing PPE fit-testing,

n Working on technology issues and implement-ing video conferencing, and

n Working with courts and the Sheriff ’s Office tofurther define response protocols.


The following document is intended to assist agen-cies in generating discussion and addressing conti-nuity-of-operations concerns associated withPandemic Influenza planning. It is assumed thatagencies will facilitate discussions and conductplanning exercises that will focus upon scenarios inwhich the entire globe would be faced with a pan-demic event that places extreme demands uponcountries’ standard operational norms. This check-list is merely a planning tool and is intended to helpagencies address topics of preparedness.

While we may or may not face a pandemicnear-term, experts seem to agree that when we doface a pandemic such as one that could stem fromH5N1, as much as 25–40% of our workforce might

be absent caring for loved ones, or from illnessthemselves. We have all dealt with localized inci-dents that paralyze our daily functions for a fewdays during a snowstorm. But it is wise to planbeyond those instances, and to be prepared toaddress challenges that have a sustained globalimpact outside of our control. You know your busi-ness, but when planning, consider how reduction ofyour service affects others, and how the reductionof services that you rely upon would impact yourability to do business. When considering criticalservices it is asked that you think in terms well out-side of your traditional planning and consider thatsystems will be taxed and technology will be over-whelmed, if or when we face such a challenge.


A P P E N D I X A

Fairfax CountyPandemic Influenza Critical Infrastructure

Agency Planning Checklist36

Responsibility & Status

Core IssuesSTARTED COMPLETED

Cri

tical

Fun

ctio

ns &

Pos

ition

s

p p

p p

When addressing critical services, keep in mind that we are planning foran escalating loss of personnel with longer durations than our standardemergencies. Value might be derived from looking at this as being similarto budget planning when identifying/prioritizing lines of business andidentifying vulnerabilities.

Inventory and prioritize the following:

n Critical Services [Without these services, critical components of thecounty would not function. Example, Dept. of Vehicle Services (DVS)must provide fuel to ensure ambulance service.] What impact willoccur without the service?

n Non-Critical Services [Services that are important, but are not deemedcritical to sustain county services. For example, police crime preventionservices.] What impact will occur without the service?

36. Fairfax County Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan, 2006, pgs. 66–71.



Core IssuesSTARTED COMPLETEDA

ppro

pria

te A

utho

ritie

s

p p

p p

p p

p p

n Assign key staff with the authority to develop, maintain and act uponinfluenza pandemic preparedness and response plan.

n Determine who will serve as your agency Pan-Flu Liaison (should be a critical thinker, facilitator and should have an overall knowledgeof agency).

n Appropriate authorities will determine the potential impact of a pan-demic on your Department/Division’s usual activities and services.Plan for situations likely to result in an increase, decrease or alterationof services you deliver.

n Determine the potential impact of a pandemic on outside resources orservices that your Department/Division depends on to deliver services.

Com

mun

icat

ion

Stra

tegy

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

You should begin involving and educating your employees at all levelsabout influenza pandemic preparedness. The county has and will con-tinue to provide additional resources to assist with educating youremployees.

Determine how you will communicate with your employees and critical staff on a scheduled basis during a pandemic.

n Who needs to be notified or included in communications?

n How will communications occur?

n What will be the frequency of communication (pre-scheduled to minimize capacity demands)?

n How will you carry out pulse checks regarding: staffing, servicedemands, morale, etc.?

Determine the number of critical staff that would need access to telecon-ference or video conference equipment. This will assist Dept. of Informa-tion Technology (DIT) in their efforts to address systems capacity.

Some agencies already have scheduled communications or briefings. Toassist DIT with systems load management, identify existing or desiredcommunications options and schedule. For example, police and fire rollcalls with field personnel occur at pre-scheduled re-occurring times. Thisinformation may assist if prioritization of technology usage is required.(For example, off-hour teleconferences, rotational schedule such asHealth Department every a.m. at 0900 hours, DVS every Wednesday at0600 hours, etc.).



Core IssuesSTARTED COMPLETEDSe

rvic

e a

nd O

pera

tions

Met

hods

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

p p

Consider that during a pandemic, systems will likely be taxed and prioriti-zation must occur to sustain services.

Service Methodology

n Determine how you will assess service demands. Examples: Projectednumber of on-line users at peak times, projected number of facility visitors during a pandemic.

n Consider how selected services may be offered through non-traditionalmeans. Example: Police expanding the types or incidents permitted tobe reported by phone vs. in-person.

n Determine how you will take services off-line or reinstate them. Exam-ple: During an ice storm, police might modify their accident reportingpolicy to ensure that the highest-priority events are addressed. A desig-nated commander then reinstates normal reporting procedures basedon call volume and staffing.

Identify telework options

n List who are critical users (remember this is trying to ensure criticalservices are sustained).

n Determine how you will manage usage to avoid system overload.

n Determine how many employees currently have on-line or remoteaccess capacity.

n Determine how many employees truly need on-line or remote accesscapacity.

n What would occur if DIT only offers selected services to prioritizedgroups at scheduled times?

List what services can be supported by volunteers, retirees, privateservice providers.

n How would this occur?

n What training is required?

Identify what policies/laws would need to be modified to accommodaterequired change in service methodology. In some instances purchasing isrequired to hold public forums associated with bids. Would a businesschange require code amendments?

Review the most critical functions that may benefit by implementingsome type of quarantine at work in the most critical periods. Example:Are there some functions that are so critical that it may be wise to housethe employee and/or their family either at or near the workplace?



Core IssuesSTARTED COMPLETEDLi

nes

of S

ucce

ssio

n

p p

p pp p

p p

p p

p p

n Establish a written line of succession for key leaders, managers andessential employees.

n Determine how authority will be delegated or transitioned.

n Identify and train essential staff (including full-time, part-time, retirees,and unpaid or other volunteer staff).

n Outline what the organizational structure will be during an emergency.The outline should identify key contacts with multiple backups, rolesand responsibilities, and who is to report to whom (NIMS model).

n Determine what skill sets or knowledge is needed to sustain criticalservices.

n Evaluate and list positions with skill sets that can be shared or cross-trained and what positions could be reallocated to like functions else-where in the agency or county.

Cri

tical

File

s/R

ecor

ds o

r D

atab

ases

p p

p p

p p

Keep in mind that a pandemic is global and that system access must beprioritized to minimize systems overload:

n Determine the critical systems that need to be running to support critical services/functions.

n List and prioritize what systems could be taken off-line to maximizecapacity.

n Determine how employees could access vital files, records, databasesneeded to support critical services/functions: Removable Drives, Citrix, Phone, Hard Copy Records, On-Line, etc.

Age

ncy

Polic

y C

onsi

dera

tions

p p

p p

Dept. of Human Resources (DHR) is working on leave and compensation-related matters to assist in guiding policy in these areas (To Be Determined).

Assess agency policies for compatibility with circumstances unique to apandemic.

Many agencies have agency-specific policies that interpret county policyfor specific work areas. In the event of a pandemic, flexibility to react tochanging conditions is critical for continuation of critical functions. As aresult, agencies must assess agency-specific policies to ensure that theyare conducive to protocol introduced during a pandemic as well as com-patible to any changes to county policy to respond to a pandemic.

n Evaluate and resolve policy conflict to ensure that recommendedresponses are capable of being implemented. (For example, Board ofSupervisors meetings via video conference from remote sites wouldrequire code change. What impact does postponement of performanceevaluations have?)



Core IssuesSTARTED COMPLETED

Pers

onal

Pro

tect

ion

and

Bas

ic S

uppl

ies

for

your

Em

ploy

ees

p p Determine what number of employees will be performing under critical-service conditions that would have unavoidable face-to-face contactrequiring Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in order to sustain criticalservices.

n Face mask

n Eye protection

n Hand cleaner

n Surface cleaner

The county is researching training options regarding Personal Protectionand related equipment usage.

You should evaluate what are the most critical supplies that might not beavailable from suppliers during a pandemic.

Fam

ily s

uppo

rt

p p

p p

While the county has services to offer to your employees for mentalhealth, etc., it is wise to evaluate additional options for caring for oneanother to ensure morale and other family support during the mostcritical times.

Evaluate the depth of services currently utilized.

Consider what your Division or Department can do to assist families toensure that sick family members do not come to work, and healthy mem-bers are able to feel confident their family is cared for so they are willingto come to work.

Logi

stic

s

p p Based on your outcome of the previous questions, your agency’s logis-tics needs can be better addressed. While it may not be feasible or neces-sary to stockpile supplies for all hazards, it is prudent to strategicallyobtain supplies needed do sustain critical services. This is an under-standably difficult task. However, if you are able to quantify these needs,it may assist the county in possible submissions as large-scale orders(stock goals regarding: meals, protective equipment, and office surface-cleaning supplies).

Some agencies may need to address lodging options as well.

Test

ing

p p

p p

Determine how your agency will test your Pandemic Flu plan.For example, can a tabletop exercise test the plan sufficiently?

Determine the frequency of testing.


A P P E N D I X B

Sample Critical Functions

Bureau Service/FunctionCriticality UnderExtreme Conditions

Public Information Officer Public Information Officer 1 Mission Critical

Patrol Bureau Patrol Response to Life Safety Emergencies 1 Mission Critical

Patrol Response to Serious Crimes, In Progress/ Just Occurred

1 Mission Critical

Respond to Animal Complaints — Threat to Human Life Safety

1 Mission Critical

Security at Critical Sites 1 Mission Critical

Security for Fire and Rescue Operations 1 Mission Critical

Animal Shelter — receiving and custodialoperations

1 Mission Critical

Traffic Control 1 Mission Critical

Citizen Reporting Section 1 Mission Critical

Staff Duty Officers 1 Mission Critical

Police Communications Assistant 1 Mission Critical

Crossing guards 1 Mission Critical

School Resource Officers 1 Mission Critical

School Liaison Commander 1 Mission Critical

Operations Support Bureau/Traffic

AUXILIARY POLICE 1 Mission Critical

MOTORS 1 Mission Critical

CRU Critical/Fatal Accident Investigation 1 Mission Critical

Operations Support Bureau/Special Operations Division

Civil Disturbance Unit 1 Mission Critical

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 1 Mission Critical

SWAT 1 Mission Critical

Safety Officers 1 Mission Critical

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS 1 Mission Critical

Fairfax County Police Department Pandemic InfluenzaContinuity of Operations (COOP) Planning

1 Mission Critical = No interruption in these services2 Immediate Post Incident = The service will be restored within 12 hours of incident.3 Normal Services = The service will be restored at conclusion of incident. Up to 30 days out.


Bureau Service/FunctionCriticality Under Extreme Conditions

Operations Support Bureau/Helicopter

PD MISSIONS/MEDEVACS 1 Mission Critical

Information Technology Bureau Network Administrator 1 Mission Critical

Internal Affairs Bureau Investigation of Critical/Major Event 1 Mission Critical

Support of Civil Litigation 1 Mission Critical

Criminal Investigations Bureau – Major Crimes Division

Child Services 1 Mission Critical

Homicide Investigations 1 Mission Critical

Criminal Investigations Bureau –Investigative Support Division

Crime Scene 1 Mission Critical

Administrative Support Bureau Casualty Assistance Plan – Support Serv &Fast Team

1 Mission Critical

Medical Liaison Officer 1 Mission Critical

Payroll 1 Mission Critical

Purchasing 1 Mission Critical

Technical Services Bureau/Field Support Division

Fleet Services 2 Immediate Post Incident

Property Room 2 Immediate Post Incident

Patrol Bureau Patrol response to Minor Crime, In Progress/Just Occurred

2 Immediate Post Incident

Patrol Response to Serious Crime, Report Only

2 Immediate Post Incident

Resolve Rabies Vector Threats 2 Immediate Post Incident

Gang Investigations 2 Immediate Post Incident

Fleet/ Equipment Mgt – Station level 2 Immediate Post Incident

Operations Support Bureau/Traffic Virginia Dept. of Transportation LIAISON 2 Immediate Post Incident

Alcohol Test Unit 2 Immediate Post Incident


CANINE 2 Immediate Post Incident

SEARCH RESCUE 2 Immediate Post Incident

Underwater Search and Recovery Unit 2 Immediate Post Incident

Information Technology Bureau Radio Coordinator 2 Immediate Post Incident

Internal Affairs Bureau Compliance Monitoring 2 Immediate Post Incident


Robbery Unit 2 Immediate Post Incident

Sex Crimes Unit 2 Immediate Post Incident

Juvenile Fugitive 2 Immediate Post Incident

Criminal Investigations Bureau –Investigative Support Division

Victim Services 2 Immediate Post Incident

Criminal Investigations Bureau – CID

Criminal Intel Unit 2 Immediate Post Incident

Special Investigations 2 Immediate Post Incident

National Capital Region Intelligence Center 2 Immediate Post Incident



Technical Services Bureau/Field Support Division

Uniform 3 Normal Services

Patrol Bureau Patrol response to Minor Crime, Report Only

3 Normal Services

Traffic Enforcement 3 Normal Services

Non-Critical/Non-Fatal AccidentInvestigation

3 Normal Services

Crime Prevention Coordination 3 Normal Services

Patrol Response to service calls 3 Normal Services

Resolve Injured Animal Complaints 3 Normal Services

Respond to Animal Complaints – Threat to Animal Life Safety – No Threat to Human.

3 Normal Services

Enforce animal control laws 3 Normal Services

Respond to Animal Complaints – No threat to human life safety

3 Normal Services

Criminal Investigation (CIS – propertycrimes, street robberies, telephonethreats, prescription fraud and stalking)

3 Normal Services

Court Liaison Section 3 Normal Services

Crime Analysis 3 Normal Services

Crime Prevention Officers 3 Normal Services

Neighborhood Patrol Units 3 Normal Services

School Resource Officer Coordination 3 Normal Services

Field Training Coordinator 3 Normal Services

Gang Outreach Coordination 3 Normal Services

Regional Gang Database Mgt 3 Normal Services

School Education Officers 3 Normal Services

Operations Support Bureau/Traffic

Motor Carrier Safety 3 Normal Services

TRAFFIC SERVICES 3 Normal Services

IMPOUND OFFICER 3 Normal Services

CRIME ANALYST 3 Normal Services

DWI COORDINATOR 3 Normal Services

PARKING ENFORCEMENT 3 Normal Services


MARINE PATROL 3 Normal Services

Operations Support Bureau ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 3 Normal Services

Internal Affairs Bureau Response to Freedom of Information ActRequest

3 Normal Services

Response to Legal Process (i.e. Lawsuit, Subpoena)

3 Normal Services



Internal Affairs Bureau Appeal Process 3 Normal Services

Investigation of Routine Complaint/Event 3 Normal Services

Response to Citizen/Agency/Etc. Inquiries 3 Normal Services

Database Entry and Maintenance 3 Normal Services

Policy Development 3 Normal Services

Scheduled Inspections 3 Normal Services

Criminal Investigations Bureau –Organized Crime Division

Money Laundering 3 Normal Services

Narcotics 3 Normal Services

Street Crimes 3 Normal Services


Auto Theft 3 Normal Services

Financial Crimes 3 Normal Services

Fugitive 3 Normal Services

Administrative Support Bureau False Alarm Reduction Unit 3 Normal Services

Polygraph 3 Normal Services

Recruiting 3 Normal Services

Applicant 3 Normal Services

Criminal Justice Academy Basic Training 3 Normal Services

Firearms Training Unit 3 Normal Services

Emergency Vehicle Operations 3 Normal Services

In Service Training 3 Normal Services

The Fairfax County Police Department has pro-vided guidance to assist personnel in preparingthemselves and their families for a pandemicinfluenza. The following excerpt entitled “Family

Support” is from a pandemic influenza planningmemo sent to all FCPD command staff. This infor-mation was compiled by FCPD.

A P P E N D I X C

HomePacks


The care and well-being of our employees is thenumber one priority and is paramount to ensur-ing our ability to professionally serve the public.Care of employees and their families will be prior-itized. Employees are strongly encouraged tohave a family emergency plan.

Should we face a pandemic influenza of con-cern, employees shall not report to work if theybelieve they have contracted the virus or havebeen in contact with someone who has the viruswithout proper protective equipment. This isessential for the agency to maintain healthy staffand ensure employees are willing and able tocome to work when we need them. To assistemployees and their families, the AdministrativeSupport Bureau has substantial resources includ-ing FAST teams, Peer Support, EAP, and aDepartment Psychologist.

Employees and their family members willhave to shop, buy gas and have other limitedpublic interaction during the course of a pan-demic. They may also need to care for sick familymembers and may be exposed to the pandemicillness. Simple, basic precautions are the bestway to prevent infection. Remind your family to:

n Practice “Social Distancing.” Reduce expo-sures to individuals who may be infected.

n Be careful what you touch, and wash handsoften with soap and water or alcohol-basedhand cleaner.

n Cover your cough. If a family member has acough, have them wear a mask.

n In a pandemic situation, wear a simple proce-dure mask if you are within 6 feet of anyone.

n Clean surfaces that may have been contaminated.

n Exchange your emergency contact and medicalinformation with your neighbors and family.

n Arrange for someone to check on your family.

One suggestion for taking care of yourselfand your family is to prepare an “Employee Sup-port Pack” or “HomePack.” The HomePackitems are intended to support the guidelinesabove and offer protection away from home. Aspart of family disaster preparedness, employeesmay wish to purchase additional supplies forInfectious Disease HomePacks. The numbersprovided below will support an employee for upto 30 days. Increase amounts for the number offamily members. Suggested items include:

n 1 box of 30–50 Procedure or Surgical masks—NOT fitted HEPA masks37

Family Support:


n 1 box of Nitrile or Latex Gloves – 50 pair38

n Small containers of alcohol-based hand cleaneror Antimicrobial hand wipe packets39

n Surface disinfectant wipes—such as Clorox orother non-chlorine wipes40

If you are caring for a sick family member youmay need:

n Disposable gowns

n Eye protection41

Some sources of the supplies are listedbelow: Prepare NOW

In the event of a pandemic, availability ofmany supplies will be severely limited. The listbelow is not intended as an endorsement or rec-ommendation. It is provided only as a resourceand indication of availability.

37. Not reusable. Remove carefully and discard after exposure.Medical experts agree that simple Procedure/Surgical masks arethe most appropriate mask for general use. Flu virus is spread bydroplets, and simple masks offer protection. Rated (N95 orgreater) masks must be individually fitted to offer rated protectionand are only recommended for health care workers doing medicalprocedures within 3 feet of patients. We have inventoried thesemask for employees who by the nature of their assignment willhave forced public interaction. In general, cone-shaped particlemasks do not provide a very good fit for larger and smaller faces.Use flat masks similar to Procedure or Surgical masks. If they fityou properly they are probably OK. Fit-tested HEPA masks areuncomfortable for long-term use and much more expensive. Oneexception is the ALPHA STYLE™ N95 Particulate Respirator whichseems to fit most people and is relatively inexpensive at less thanabout $ 0.75 each. Available from www.life-assist.com.

38. Not reusable. Remove carefully and discard after exposure.Nitrile gloves are recommended because of latex allergies in someindividuals and because latex may break down in the presence ofsome cleaning products. If neither is available, consider vinyl.39. Available in a variety of stores. Small, 1-2 oz. containers ofalcohol-based waterless hand cleaners are readily available, inex-pensive, convenient and can be refilled. Label should indicate 60%or greater alcohol content. Examples are Purell and Avagard D.Rated Hand Disinfectant packets are generally not available fromconsumer sources.40. Available in a variety of stores NOT FOR HAND CLEANING.At home, normal disinfectant cleaners are adequate. Surface Disin-fectant Wipes come in a large tub of more than 100. Keep in origi-nal sealed container for storage. For portability, place a convenientnumber in a ziplock bag.41. Wraparound safety glasses or shields that provide splash protection.

Costco Drug Stores Internet Orders Home Centers

Procedure/Surgical Masks37

2 boxes 50 ea $11.30Costco Business CentersOnly

N95 = ~$2.00 eaSurgical 20 for$12.99

www.life-assist.comwww.excelgloves.comwww.boundtree.comGoogle search

Dust and unfittedN95 $.40 – $5.00 ea

Disposable Gloves38 Latex 3x100 $9.99 50 / $8.00Vinyl 100 / $8.00

Vinyl 100/~$12.00

Nitrile $4.49 box 100Costco Business Centers

0.5 – 2 oz. WaterlessHand Cleaner39

< $2.00 ea

Hand Wash Packets39

Surface DisinfectantWipes40

Clorox 3 x 75 $9.49Kirkland 3 x 185 $9.00

35 / $5.00

Disposable Gowns See Above

Eye Protection41 $3.00 – $10.00 ea

(Information obtained from Seattle Fire Department)

Chapter 3. The Toronto Police Service Case Study — 45

1. OV E RV I E W O F T H EP O L I C E S E RV I C E

More than 5,200 uniformed officers and 2,200 civil-ians work for the Toronto Police Service (TPS).1

The department has six primary commands:

n Human Resources

n Administrative

n Executive

n Divisional Policing

n Specialized Operation

n Detective Services

The jurisdiction is divided into 17 divisionsand spans 243.6 square miles. The department servesa population of approximately 2.5 million residents.2

The Toronto Police ServiceCase Study

3

1. Toronto Police Service Public Information Unit (2006). Toronto Police Service. Annual Report 2005.http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/2005annualreport.pdf 2. Toronto Police Service (2006). Annual Statistical Report. http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/2005statsreport.pdf 3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toronto,_Ontario 4. Statistics Canada, the nation’s central statistical agency, defines “visible minority" as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour."


The city of Torontois the capital ofthe province ofOntario, thelargest city in Canada,and the fifth most popu-lated city in North Amer-ica, after New York City,Los Angeles, Chicago,and Houston.3 Morethan 40 percent of the city’sresidents consider themselves asbeing part of a “visible minority”4 (primarilyChinese, South Asian, black, and Filipino).

Toronto

Toronto is home to 31 public and private hos-pitals, many of which contain smaller facilities.5

There are also five “Community Care Access Cen-tres” that provide long-term care for adults, and anumber of “Community Health Centres” (nonprofitorganizations that provide primary health care andrelated programs for individual residents, familiesand communities).

There are nearly 700 public and private ele-mentary and secondary schools and 150 highschools in the city.6, 7, 8, 9 Toronto is also home tothree public universities, four community colleges,an art college, and many private institutions.10 In thefall of 2005, 155,905 students were enrolled in theuniversities and the art college, and all of these insti-tutions provide on-campus housing. The two mainprivate colleges in Toronto are Master’s College andSeminary (376 students)11 and Tyndale UniversityCollege & Seminary (479 students).12

According to the Greater Toronto AirportsAuthority, Toronto Pearson is the busiest airport inCanada, with more than 78,000 passengers travelingthrough the airport each day in 2004 (approximately21,000 international passengers, 23,000 transborder[within Canada] passengers, and 34,600 domestic[within Ontario] passengers). Nearly 29 million pas-sengers flew into Toronto Pearson International Air-port in 2004.13 Toronto also has a regional airport,the Toronto City Centre Airport, with approxi-mately 120,000 annual take-offs and landings.14

Toronto’s extensive public transit systemincludes a subway system, streetcars, buses, andtrains. Its mass transit system is the second largest inNorth America, surpassed only by New York City’s.15

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) serves thecity of Toronto, while GO Transit is an interregionalpublic transit system for the entire Greater TorontoArea.16 In 2005 the TTC served 431.2 million cus-tomers.17 GO Transit carries approximately 48 mil-lion customers a year on its train and busnetworks.18 The center of Toronto’s transportationsystem is Union Station, which serves over 41 mil-lion GO train and bus passengers, 20 million TTCsubway passengers, and 2.34 million passengers onthe VIA Rail Canada nationwide rail carrier eachyear.19 A unique aspect of Toronto’s transportationnetwork is its underground pedestrian system(PATH). It connects Union Station, 5 subway sta-tions, and numerous stores, restaurants, office tow-ers, and hotels under Toronto’s city center.20 Fourmajor highways serve the city,21 and there are morethan 10,000 streets and over 20,000 intersections inthe city of Toronto.22

The top five private-sector employers inToronto are all in the financial industry. Other majorprivate employers are Bell Canada, Apotex, Bom-bardier Inc., IBM Canada Ltd., and Shoppers DrugMart Inc. These companies collectively employapproximately 71,100 people.23 The top four majorpublic-sector employers are general governmententities at the municipal, provincial, and federal lev-els; other major public-sector employers are theToronto Catholic District School Board, the Univer-sity Health Network, Canada Post, Sunnybrook andWomen's College Hospital, the University ofToronto, and the Hospital for Sick Children. Theseorganizations collectively employ approximately136,900 people.24

46 — Chapter 3. The Toronto Police Service Case Study

5. For a complete list, see http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/ public/contact/hosp/ toronto_7_dt.html#toronto. 6. Information found on Toronto District School Board web page:http://www.tdsb.on.ca/ 7. Information found on Toronto Catholic District School Board web page: http://www.tcdsb.org/8. http://www.csdcso.on.ca/9. http://www.csdccs.edu.on.ca/10. http://education.yahoo.com/college/essentials/school_search/search?txt_or_state%5B%5D=CAN11. http://education.yahoo.com/college/facts/6184.html12. http://education.yahoo.com/college/facts/7981.html13. Information found on Greater Toronto Airports Authority web page: www.gtaa.com

14. http://www.torontoport.com/airport_facts.asp 15. http://www.toronto.ca/toronto_facts/infrastructure.htm 16. http://www.toronto.ca/toronto_facts/infrastructure.htm17. http://www.toronto.ca/ttc/pdf/ttc_annual_report_2005.pdf 18. www.gotransit.com19. http://www.toronto.ca/union_station/numbers.htm20. http://www.toronto.ca/toronto_facts/infrastructure.htm 21. http://www.toronto.ca/invest-in-toronto/tor_overview.htm 22. http://www.toronto.ca/toronto_facts/infrastructure.htm 23. http://www.2ontario.com/communities/majoremployers.asp?mun_name=3520005&topic=124. http://www.2ontario.com/communities/majoremployers.asp?mun_name=3520005&topic=2


3. T H E C I T Y W I D E A P P R OAC H T OE M E R G E N C Y O P E R AT I O N S

According to the Basic Plan section of the city’s2005 emergency plan, “The City of Toronto is vul-nerable to numerous hazards. These can be human-caused, such as airport crashes; technological, suchas those involving hazardous materials; infrastruc-ture disruptions that could involve utility andpower failures; and natural hazards such as severeweather.”25 The Office of Emergency Management(OEM) lists the following specific hazards:26

n Natural Events. Severe weather, floods, blizzards,tornadoes, food or human health emergencies.

n Human-Caused Events. Incidents intended to doharm to public safety and security; civil disorder;bomb threats; Improvised Explosive Devices and Improvised Dispersal Devices. Chemical,biological, radiological and/or nuclear agentsmay be used on their own or in combinationwith the explosive or dispersal devices.

n Technological and Infrastructure Disruptions. Inci-dents involving hazardous materials, utility andpower failures, transportation accidents, aircraftcrashes, water supply failures, building or struc-tural collapse, critical resource shortages, orcomputer-related incidents.

n Nuclear. Although construction and operation ofnuclear power plants are closely monitored andregulated, an accident, though unlikely, is possi-ble. The potential danger from an accident at anuclear power plant is exposure to radiation.

The Office of Emergency Management is theagency in charge of developing plans and programsto prevent disasters and reduce their effects on residents. The OEM also coordinates city agency

emergency response and recovery plans. TheOEM’s work is based on five phases of emergencymanagement: risk identification, mitigation, pre-paredness, response, and recovery.

An Administrative Overview of the City’s Plan

The Toronto Emergency Management ProgramCommittee (TEMPC) is a panel made up of themayor, the city manager, the chief of police, themedical officer of health, the chief general managerof the Toronto Transit Commission, the fire chief,and other key personnel from city agencies, includ-ing parks, electric services, and the port authority.The TEMPC has a subcommittee known as theControl Group, which is responsible for activatingand coordinating the emergency plan (p. 10).

While the typical role of the emergency planis described as proactive, “In the event of an emer-gency,” the plan states, “the…committee convenesas it becomes reactive” (p. 7). The plan includes 15 Operational Support Functions (OSFs), similarto the United States’ National Response Plan’sEmergency Support Functions.27 In addition tospecific scenarios (e.g., debris management, evacu-ation, caring for large numbers of victims), the plan includes functions regarding how members ofthe TEMPC are to be notified of an emergency situation, the emergency operations center, and the incident management system. The plan alsoincludes specific guidelines for seven types of criti-cal incidents, including the city’s response to aninfectious disease outbreak (e.g., a pandemic),which in turn includes the supporting roles andresponsibilities of various city departments (p. 17).More information about the infectious disease OSF is presented in a subsequent section of thiscase study.

25. http://www.toronto.ca/wes/techservices/oem/pdf/emergency_plan.pdf 26. Taken directly from http://www.toronto.ca/wes/techservices/oem/risks.htm 27. The Office of Emergency Management chose not to share OSFs with the PERF project staff forsecurity reasons.

4. T H E C I T Y W I D E A P P R OAC H T OPA N D E M I C - S P E C I F I C P L A N N I N G

In December 2002, Toronto Public Health (TPH)began planning for an influenza pandemic, sayingthat its mission was “to reduce the morbidity andmortality associated with detection of a novel andvirulent strain of influenza and to minimize societaldisruption during pandemic influenza in the city ofToronto.”28 Planning was temporarily halted in 2003to allow the department to respond to the SevereAcute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, inwhich a form of severe pneumonia killed approxi-mately 40 people in the Toronto area and resulted inthousands of residents being quarantined. Thereport “SARS and Public Health in Ontario” notedthat when SARS appeared in Ontario, the provincehad no influenza pandemic plan in place and waslargely unprepared to deal with a significant out-break of infectious disease. Based largely on lessonslearned from the SARS outbreak, the first version ofthe city’s pandemic plan was published in Novem-ber 2005; it was updated in March 2006.

Toronto Public Health sought contributionsfrom key stakeholders in fields such as health, vol-unteer services, and social services when preparingthe plan (see page 3 of the city pandemic plan,found at the Website below). The agency created fiveworkgroups that each consisted of communitystakeholders and Toronto Public Health representa-tives to help fine-tune roles and responsibilities inthe following areas:

1. Laboratory and Surveillance

2. Communications

3. Emergency Measures

4. Health Services

5. Vaccine/Antiviral Medications

The Emergency Measures Workgroupincluded representatives from TPH, the Toronto

Police Service, OEM, Emergency Medical Services,and Fire Services. Other members represented theCanadian Red Cross, several hospitals, the chiefcoroner’s office, funeral homes, and long-termhealth care providers. The workgroup focused onhow to maintain public safety and order during apandemic. This included security for vaccine trans-portation and distribution, volunteer management,and the development of a mass fatality plan.

An Administrative Overviewof the City’s Pandemic PlanThe mayor of Toronto (or his/her designate) is thechair of Toronto’s Emergency Management Pro-gram Committee (TEMPC) and is responsible fordeclaring that a pandemic emergency exists. Oncean emergency has been declared, the mayor is tomake arrangements for notification of the city’ssolicitor general, the minister of community safetyand correctional services, and members of citycouncil (see page 31 of the plan). The chief of policeis a member of the TEMPC.

The OEM is responsible for maintaining thecity’s pandemic plan, which includes coordinatingagencies in creating and updating documents thatmake up the plan. Senior staffers from the TorontoPolice Service and other city agencies work togetherto develop these documents. The physical mainte-nance of the Toronto Emergency Operations Cen-tre (TEOC) also is a duty of the Office ofEmergency Management.

The city’s pandemic plan is divided intoeleven chapters, described in Table 1.

Incident Management

Under the Pandemic Influenza Plan, a pandemic orother emergency in the city would be managedthrough the Incident Management System (IMS),which is a system “used by government agenciesacross Canada, including Toronto Public Healthand all other agencies of the City of Toronto, to


28. Toronto Public Health (2006). Toronto Pandemic Influenza Guide. Available at:http://www.toronto.ca/health/pandemicflu/pdf/toronto_pandemic_influenza_plan.pdf


Chapter Description

Chapter 1: PlanningApproach

n Presents overall goals of plann Describes planning process in detailn Presents ethical framework for local decision-making

Chapter 2: PandemicInfluenza

n Provides an overview of influenza, pandemics, and the bird flun Describes pandemic phasesn Describes scope and impact of illness (specific to Toronto)

Chapter 3: Roles andResponsibilities

n Presents roles of World Health Organization, national, provincial, and citypublic health agencies

Chapter 4: Surveillance n Describes methods used to monitor a threat

Chapter 5:Communications

n Summarizes communications plans Toronto Public Health would employ toprovide information to its staff, hospitals, and government agencies (includingToronto Police Service)

Chapter 6: EmergencyPlanning

n Describes relevant Operational Support Functions (OSFs) and lead agency roles– Toronto Police Service and the Office of the Chief Coroner are the lead

agencies for the Mass Fatality OSF

Chapter 7: HealthServices

n Describes issues that will affect the health care systemn Focuses on health care capacity and surge issues

Chapter 8: PublicHealth Measures

n Provides an overview of movement restrictions, community education, andcase management

Chapter 9: Vaccine andAntiviral Medications

n Describes Toronto Public Health role in coordinating and distributing vaccineand antiviral medications

Chapter 10: InfectionControl

n Provides general information on influenza (e.g., symptoms, communicability)n Describes infection control practices for the general public and in health care

and community settings

Chapter 11: Self-Care n Provides advice to residents on prevention, recognizing the symptoms ofinfluenza, and basic care

Table 1. City of Toronto Pandemic Plan Chapters


manage an emergency” by coordinating the work-load and resources of various government agencies(p. 36). Five functions make up the IMS structure:

n Command (establishes the decision-makingprocess and communications flow),

n Operations (manages response operations suchas providing security for vaccine transport),

n Planning (continually monitors the situation andcreates an Incident Action Plan). In the case of apandemic, this plan lists the public health objec-tives for the emergency and nonemergencyresponse activities.

n Logistics (provides personnel, services, materials,and facilities to carry out the emergencyresponse), and

n Finance/administration (tracks all expenses,claims, and contracts initiated during the criticalincident).

The Police Role in the City’s Pandemic Plan

A comprehensive search of the city’s plan foundseveral mentions of Toronto Police Service roles.These are discussed in the order in which theyappeared in the plan.

Under Chapter 5, “Communications,” theplan states, “Toronto Public Health Communica-tions Unit will coordinate media requests, verifyappointed spokespersons, establish and build cred-ibility for spokespersons and TPH, and provide risk communications management and mediatraining for key staff as needed” (p. 52). If a pan-demic occurs, TPH plans to provide expert medicaladvice and leadership through key “corporatespokespersons” (including Toronto Police Servicerepresentatives). Currently, the chief of policeworks regularly with the department’s Public Information Unit to create public messages and

ensure that police spokespersons are trained todeliver them.

In Chapter 6, “Emergency Planning,” theToronto Police Service and the Office of the ChiefCoroner are named as the lead agencies for MassFatality Operational Support Functions (OSF) (p.67).29 The plan explains that TPS was involved indeveloping this OSF. During a pandemic period,TPS is expected to “establish representation at the[Toronto Emergency Operations Centre and]implement the …[OSF] as outlined.” The TPS rolein this function is described in more detail later inthis case study.

Chapter 9, “Vaccine and Antiviral Medica-tions,” states that the role of the police is to “providesecurity for the transportation of vaccine.” TheToronto Police Service has agreed to this and to pro-vide security to Toronto Public Health with regardto mass vaccinations (p. 129). The chapter also lists“provide perimeter control in high traffic areas suchas hospital parking lots” as a TPS role. These com-ponents are also part of the Police Service’s pan-demic-specific draft plan (discussed later in this casestudy). According to Toronto Public Health, moreplanning needs to be done in the area of having thepolice enforce public health orders (p. 67).

TPH is using a variety of surveillance effortsin order to receive an early warning of the flu strainin the city. These efforts include monitoring trendsin febrile respiratory illness, identifying and work-ing with “sentinel physicians” in the city, and exam-ining 911 calls and emergency room complaintdata. TPH also plans to ask some larger employersto provide weekly absenteeism data. Currently, theToronto Police Service is acting as a pilot workplacefor sharing this data (p. 46).

During the SARS outbreak of 2003, the largemajority of residents were “very cooperative aboutquarantining themselves voluntarily” (p. 4). TheToronto police were asked to help serve quarantineorders on only one community member.

29. Operational Support Functions (OSFs) listed in the city’s emergency plan are comparable to EmergencySupport Functions (ESFs) found in the U.S. National Response Plan.


Lessons Learned from the SARS Experiencebox 3.1

Julian Fantino, former commissioner of theToronto Police Service, recent past commissionerof Toronto’s Office of Emergency Management,and current chief of the Ontario Provincial Police,authored the article “2003 SARS Outbreak: TheResponse of the Toronto Police Service.”30 In it,he explains what led to the first medical emer-gency ever declared in the province of Ontario (onMarch 26, 2003), the police response to theemergency, and the lessons that TPS learnedfrom the SARS outbreak and incorporated into itspandemic-specific plan.

On the same day the medical emergency wasdeclared, the province created a SARS executivegroup, to which the Toronto Police Service detaileda deputy chief of police and a staff superintendent(the rank below deputy chief). In accordance withthe TPS Emergency Preparedness Plan, thedepartment activated its Police Command Centre(PCC), and for several weeks after the declaration,the PCC operated 24 hours a day, seven days aweek. The PCC operated under the Incident Man-agement System, and was responsible for:

n Dealing with health threats to the TPS and itsstaff (the biggest of which was the threat ofcontamination of police employees, whichcould affect operational efficiency),

n Supporting TPS field units in the maintenanceof normal police operations,

n Acquiring and disseminating informationabout the crisis and developing appropriate

responses to it based on available resources,and

n Capturing and recording all information rele-vant to the TPS for the duration of the event,both to respond to the crisis and to use indebriefing exercises after its conclusion.31

Staff at the Police Command Centre includedan incident manager, an incident specialist andliaison officer (the manager of the OccupationalHealth and Safety Unit), a public information offi-cer, communication operators, and planning andlogistics staffers. Throughout the emergency, thePCC maintained continuous communication andregular briefings with TPS units and commandstaff, and spoke with other local law enforcementdepartments daily. They also recorded and dis-seminated pertinent, accurate information to theTPS staff.

The department’s Occupational Health andSafety Unit (OHS) maintained regular contactwith both local and provincial health authorities,and “took the lead role in researching and analyz-ing information, seeking appropriate advice, andcontacting police personnel regarding quarantineand safety practices.” Former Police Chief Fantinowrote, “OHS staff members were also instrumen-tal in obtaining needed safety equipment for fieldpersonnel, particularly the N95 masks needed toprevent the transfer of the SARS virus” (p. 3).

Providing “accurate, timely information,”according to Fantino, enabled TPS to continue to

>> continued on page 52

30. Fantino, J. (2005). “2003 SARS Outbreak: The Response of the Toronto Police Service.”Police Chief Magazine, 72(3):1–8.31. Taken directly from the article (p. 2).


provide law enforcement services, support theresponse to the crisis, and protect officers. “Oneof the main priorities of the TPS command offi-cers,” he writes, “was to ensure that all membersof the organization had the information neededto keep themselves safe, and to de-escalate thefear and concern they had on their own behalf andon behalf of their loved ones” (p. 3).

Information from the city’s Health Depart-ment Operations Centre (HDOC) was sentquickly to TPS command and field staff. Any timenew or conflicting data was presented, TPSworked with a medical consultant to help clarifythe issue. One key objective was to create confi-dence that would sustain police officers, whowere being subjected to incorrect informationthat was “at best misleading and at worst outra-geously speculative” (p. 3). To help prevent anatmosphere of chaos or panic and to establish asense that even in a crisis, things could be undercontrol, the message “Effective risk managementequals business as usual” was printed on each

information sheet distributed through the depart-ment’s Intranet. For the sake of consistency, TPSnow requires that only one person serve as theliaison between the HDOC and the PCC.

The article also lists several effects the out-break had on TPS staff. First, nearly 6 percent ofthe force was quarantined during the outbreak(307 members total). Because many of them hadbeen to hospitals where SARS was present, theywere quarantined immediately. A scale was sub-sequently created to evaluate exposure risks forthose who had come into contact with places orresidents affected by SARS. Quarantined TPSemployees could not leave their homes and hadto wear masks when in the presence of otherhome residents for a 10-day period. Quarantinedmembers did not have to use any sick time duringthat period—TPS decided to pay them as if theywere on duty. (This was decided in part because ithad been determined that they had likely beenexposed to SARS while on duty. This policy is alsopart of the TPS pandemic-specific plan.) n

>> box 3.1 continued


Toronto Police Service Occupational Health and Safety Program32

box 3.2

By Tom Imrie, Unit Commander, OccupationalHealth and Safety, Toronto Police Service

The Toronto Police Service Occupational Health andSafety Program ensures that all police officers andsome civilian staff receive training in communicable-disease risk management and appropriate personalprotective equipment (PPE). Through this program,PPE has been provided to every patrol officer andsome civilians deemed at risk as a result of theirduties, such as court security officers and staff whoclean the insides of police vehicles.

Police officers and court officers are issued PPE,including “officer safety kits” that are contained inpouches on an officer’s duty belt. These kits includeantimicrobial gloves, antiseptic towelettes, salinesolution and a one-way CPR air mask. Higher-levelkits are stored in the trunks of patrol vehicles andinclude enhanced PPE such as: N95 masks,33 protec-tive eye wear, waterless antiseptic hand wash, needledebris containers, Tyvex or similar material coveralls,heavy duty rubber gloves, and biohazard storagebags for contaminated clothing. The foregoing is con-sidered basic equipment and is available to all mem-bers who may be exposed to communicable diseases.

The capability to identify which officers to pro-vide with enhanced PPE was one benefit of the les-sons learned during the SARS epidemic and fromother events such as anthrax hoaxes.

Through risk assessment, the Toronto Police Ser-vice determined that there was a need for officers whocould respond to natural or manmade public health

emergencies. In preparation for such incidents, thedepartment trained and equipped specific forensicidentification officers in Level 4 Hazmat. The equip-ment provided to these officers consists of positivepressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA),and full coverage, total isolation biohazard contain-ment suits. These officers were then trained on recog-nition, assessment and control of biological hazards.In a biohazard emergency, whether the emergency isnatural or manmade, their function is to mitigate thebiological hazards that resulted in the emergency,through appropriate means (e.g., containment, isola-tion, decontamination), and then conduct an investi-gation into the cause of the event includingpackaging and collecting evidence of the offence.

The department has also similarly trained andequipped officers who perform investigations intoclandestine drug labs and “hydroponics grow” oper-ations. These officers can also be deployed to assist inthe event of natural and manmade incidents. Theyare provided with SCBA, Level 1 Hazmat suits, andevidence collection and packaging materials suitableto the risks present. This model has been adoptedthroughout Canada.

Having this type of program gave the TorontoPolice Service an advantage during the SARS out-break. All TPS officers were supplied with PPE andthe Occupational Health and Safety Unit commu-nicated regularly with them. “In spite of more than1,500 documented high-risk contacts,” Fantinowrote, “not one member of the TPS contractedSARS through an occupational exposure” (p. 4). n

32. Reprinted with permission. Richards, E., Rathbun, K., Solé Brito, C., & Luna, A. (2006). The Role of LawEnforcement in Public Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-Hazards Approach. Washington,DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance. NCJ 214333. 33. Masks certified by the CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health as filtering out atleast 95 percent of airborne particles (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/disp_part/ ).


Police officers were sent to hospitals in thebeginning of the outbreak to secure checkpoints andenforce safety protocols. Once the situation wasdeemed under control, hospitals employed their secu-rity staffs to carry out those assignments. The TPS alsohad to reprioritize calls due to a personnel shortage(caused by the quarantining of officers as well as theadditional responsibilities officers undertook).

Fantino wrote, “The biggest operationalimpact of the SARS outbreak on the Toronto Police

Service was on its own personnel. More than$560,000 was spent on quarantined members,overtime, and call-back expense. More than 15,700 person-hours were dedicated to SARS-relatedduties” (p. 5).

Fantino concluded the article by groupinglessons learned into nine categories (Table 2).Below is a chart developed by PERF that summa-rizes his analysis (Table 2).

Lesson Description

Training n More training needed regarding communicable diseasesn More training needed in the Incident Management System

Pandemic DiseasePlanning

n The SARS outbreak was the impetus behind the creation of the Toronto PoliceService’s pandemic plan.

Case Tracking n The TPS will implement a case-tracking program in the future that will help themfollow exposed, quarantined, and/or ill personnel.

Communication n Whenever possible, there should only be one spokesperson from TPSresponsible for dealing with the issue

n This spokesperson should only disseminate information when sure it is correct

Command Center n Certain renovations to the Police Command Centre were planned after theoutbreak:– Handheld communications devices were to be made available to all members.– Information technology issues were to be addressed.– Issues such as petty cash availability were to be addressed.

Staffing n The TPS staffing plan for critical incidents would be reworked to “make betteruse of staff and to improve the efficiency of the [Incident Management System].”

EmergencyPreparedness Plans

n TPS would work on continuity of operations planning.

Partnerships n Should include emergency response agencies, health care providers, the privatebusiness community, and other city departments

Resources andEquipment

n TPS currently stockpiles N95 masks and antibacterial gel (due to shortages ofboth during the SARS outbreak)

Table 2. Toronto Police Service Lessons Learned from SARS Outbreak


5. T H E P O L I C E S E RV I C E ’ SPA N D E M I C P L A N N I N G

Subsequent to the SARS outbreak, the TorontoPolice Service took the lessons learned from itsexperience and created a draft “Public HealthEmergencies/ Pandemic Response Plan.” The planwas written with the assistance of several agencies(e.g., Toronto Public Health, Toronto Fire Service,Toronto Emergency Medical Services). TPS alsosought guidance and information from provincialand federal agencies to ensure that plan compo-nents were within the framework of other govern-mental and law enforcement partners in theGreater Toronto Area. Both the OccupationalHealth and Safety Unit and the Emergency Plan-ning Operations Section of the Public Safety Unitare responsible for the maintenance of the plan.The most current draft of the plan (used for thiscase study) was updated on December 15, 2006and, at the time of this writing, had yet to beapproved by the chief and Services Board. The planis divided into five main sections: situation, mis-sion, execution, administration, and communica-tions (the last section only provides contactinformation for PCC staff and is not covered in thiscase study).

Situation

The first section of the TPS draft pandemic plan provides a general overview of influenza and theplanning being conducted by the World HealthOrganization, provincial authorities, and TorontoPublic Health. A list of definitions is provided for the reader, followed by a section that describes theinfluenza virus and pandemics in more detail. Theimpact a pandemic would have on the city is presented, accompanied by a table showing esti-mated morbidity and mortality range totals (basedon 15 and 35 percent infection rates; see AppendixA). The section concludes with an explanation ofWHO’s pandemic phase designation; at the time thisdocument was prepared, the world was categorizedin Phase 3 (pandemic alert), with no or very limitedhuman-to-human transmission of the bird flu.

Mission

This section of the draft plan lists the TPS missionstatement and mission objectives during a pan-demic or other public health emergency:

1. Provide priority-policing services

2. Act as a sentinel agency and share informationwith health officials

3. Provide command and control over policingoperations

4. Provide personal protective equipment, besthealth practices and up-to-date health informa-tion to TPS

5. Provide specially trained and equipped responseteams to calls that refer to a person’s suddendeath

6. Provide alternate staffing models to address per-sonnel shortages

7. Assist public health with the safe delivery ofvaccines/treatments.

Execution

The bulk of the draft plan is contained in this sec-tion, which details when the plan will be activatedand procedures that will be followed by police per-sonnel. The pandemic plan can be activated eitheronce WHO declares that the phase of alert hasreached level 5 (evidence of significant human-to-human transmission) or once TPS has been noti-fied that a pandemic is pending in the area. TPS willbe notified of these situations by either city orprovincial health representatives. Once the PoliceCommand Centre (PCC) is activated, a senior offi-cer will serve as a liaison officer between the HDOCand the PCC. Based on the vetted information pro-vided by this officer, the PCC will be the sole sourceof health information to TPS.

Typically, the chief of police reports to thecity’s emergency operations center, leaving a deputychief in charge of the PCC. The rest of the PCC willbe staffed based on the Incident Management Sys-tem organizational chart shown in Figure 1. The


Figure 1. Toronto Police Service/ Incident Management SystemPandemic Organizational Chart

Police Incident Manager

Incident Specialist(s)Legal

Medical

Public InformationWithin the Service

Outside the Service

LiaisonHealth DepartmentOperations Center

Health & Safety

Documentation ReportsCase Tracking

Analyst

Resources Tracking As needed

Situation Reports

Demobilization Plans

PhysicalCommunications

Major Event Log

Operational Services

Detective Support

Central Field Planning

Area Field Planning

Planning ManagerOperations Manager Logistics

primary operational response is split into two com-mands—Area Field and Central Field—which areled by their respective staff superintendents.

Each TPS Unit/Division must report twicedaily all sick notifications and current dailystrength. The PCC will deliver daily situation

reports and major event logs and will report allhealth information and recommendations to frontline and support units.

PERF staff developed Table 3 to present theother procedures and unit responsibilities that willbe put into place once the plan is activated.


Protecting TPS Staffand Facilities

n Toronto Police Service members are instructed to don personal protectiveequipment (PPE) when dealing with an individual whose health state is notknown. This equipment can include:– A disposable mask– Latex-free medical examination gloves – Infection control gowns or biohazard suits (if there is potential exposure to

blood or other bodily fluids)– Antibacterial gel

n Employees and visitors to police facilities (including the Police Command Centre)will not be allowed access until they have answered a health questionnaire(Appendix B) and have complied with the hand washing/disinfectant protocol.The TPS Fleet and Facilities Management Unit is responsible for installing wall-mounted hand sanitizers at the entrance of each police facility.

Staffing Issues n Each police Unit/Division must report twice daily all sick notifications and currentdaily strength.

n Each Uniform Division will supply a Quick Response Team to work with cityEmergency Management Services teams. These teams will be available 24 hoursa day and will be the only teams to be dispatched to “sudden death” calls.

n The Forensic Identification Unit will dedicate personnel for record keepingregarding arrival and relocation of the deceased. A garage in the city has beensecured as a temporary storage area for bodies, and TPS will provide security atthe gate.

n The Public Safety Unit will assist with civil unrest, security issues associated withvaccine/treatment distribution, hospital security, and apprehension orders.

n With regard to prisoner screening, police are instructed to question all newcustody intakes about symptoms of bird flu or recent travel to any of the affectedcountries/areas. A Prisoner Screening Form can be found in Appendix C.

n The Toronto Police Service (through the Police Command Centre) will deal withguarding stockpiles of medical supplies and crowd control at vaccine/treatmentdistribution sites on a case-by-case basis.

InternalCommunication

n A senior officer will be assigned by the PCC as a liaison officer to the HealthDepartment Operations Center (HDOC). Through this assignment, the liaisonofficer will communicate vetted health information from the HDOC to TPS. At the same time, the PCC will provide the liaison officer with daily updates of health-related TPS issues for him/her to share with the HDOC.

Table 3. Post-Plan Activation Procedures and Unit Responsibilities

Dealing with Quarantine,Mass Deaths, and Staffing Changes

A breakdown of quarantine strategies (for TPSmembers, community members, and prisoners) isalso found in this section of the TPS pandemicplan. As previously mentioned, TPS members whoare directed to be quarantined—where it is deter-mined to be as a result of occupational contact—will be compensated as if they were “on duty”during their regularly scheduled shifts. Either aMedical Officer of Health or the TPS Medical Advisory staff can order a police employee to bequarantined. Members who have been quarantinedmust immediately report this to the OccupationalHealth and Safety Unit, which will determine com-pensatory next steps with the Medical Officer ofHealth.

If a member of the public does not complywith a quarantine order, police may be called uponto enforce these orders. Toronto’s Health Protectionand Promotion Act is summarized in this section of the TPS plan, and it states, “The police force shall do all things reasonably able…to locate,apprehend and deliver the person in accordancewith the order” (p. 16). The plan states that prison-ers who are showing signs of illness (or thosearrested under a court order) must be taken tothe hospital for admittance. TPS is responsible forguarding these individuals until they can be lookedafter.

Next, the role of Quick Response Teams indealing with mass deaths is described. Teams will beavailable 24 hours per day and will respond to calls(with Toronto EMS) at private residences where aperson has died. They will work with EMS to deter-mine if the death was potentially the result of thebird flu, notify the coroner, and record the event forpolice records. (A pandemic-specific field deathreport that would be completed, along with a Sud-den Death Report, was being developed by TPS atthe time this document was prepared.) The plannotes, “These teams shall require a suitable numberof rehabilitation breaks due to the stress of wearingpersonal protective equipment for extended peri-ods of time” (p. 18).

The next section deals with redeployment andstaffing changes as a result of “severe staff short-ages.” Staff at the PCC may choose to implement a12-hour shift schedule to make up for these short-ages. Further, all leave may be cancelled and thoseworking in plainclothes or in support roles may be redeployed. All training would likely be cancelled,and responses to lower-priority calls for servicemight have to be suspended.

Administration

This section of the TPS pandemic plan lists thehours of operation and staffing plan of the PoliceCommand Centre. Currently, the plan calls for—at a minimum—an inspector, civilian planner anduniformed sergeant from the Emergency PlanningOperations Section of the Police Service. As theincident escalates, the following staffers could beadded to the Police Command Centre:

n One officer from Operational Services

n Two officers from Field Planning

n Two members from Occupational Health andSafety.

Daily situation reports that indicate the dailynumbers of sick members, available on-duty mem-bers, and a synopsis of challenges encountered dur-ing the shift must be submitted to the PCC. Thenumber of sick or absent members will be trackedin order to determine “Hot Spots” of illness withinTPS.


The city of Toronto was in the early stages of plan-ning for a pandemic when the SARS outbreak tookplace. Planning resumed at the end of the outbreak,and the city incorporated the lessons learned intoits pandemic plan. The police service followed suit,emphasizing the following in its draft plan:

n Training all personnel in daily PPE use and gen-eral disease prevention,


n Employing one person to serve as the liaisonbetween the police and health communities inthe event of a public health emergency,

n Working with city emergency management torespond to sudden death calls,

n Paying quarantined members who had beenexposed to a pathogen while on duty as if theywere on duty,

n Incorporating pandemic-specific planning ele-ments into its existing plans.

Future Directions:

At the time this document was released, theToronto Police Services was in the process of:

n Obtaining approval of the draft plan from sen-ior-level officials,

n Finalizing information on family readinessstrategies, and

n Finalizing and obtaining approval on a “Pan-demic Field Death Report” form.



34. Based on estimates of 15 percent and 35 percent infection rates and on Statistics Canada populationestimates of 2,611,661.

A P P E N D I X A

Estimated Direct Health Impact of PandemicInfluenza on the City of Toronto Based onHistorical Mortality and Morbidity Rates34

Clinically ill 392,000 – 914,000 individuals

Require outpatient care 175,000 – 431,000 individuals

Require hospitalization 2,900 – 12,000

Deaths 910 – 5,000

Source: Toronto Police Service Draft Public Health Emergencies/Pandemic Response Plan.


35. Source: Toronto Police Service Draft Public Health Emergencies/Pandemic Response Plan

A P P E N D I X B

Employee/VisitorScreening Form Record35

(This screening would be administered to visitors to police facilitiesand to police employees during a pandemic.)

VISITORSSTOP – DO NOT ENTER THIS FACILITY UNTIL YOU HAVE COMPLIED WITH THISSCREENING DIRECTIVE.HAVING COMPLIED WITH THIS DIRECTIVE THE VISITOR / EMPLOYEE SHALL SANITIZE THEIR HANDSBEFORE ENTERING THE FACILITY

To be completed by staff member or other authorized person.

SYMPTOMS: Are you experiencing any of the following symptoms?

Myalgia (muscle aches) p Yes p No

Malaise (severe fatigue or unwell) p Yes p No

Severe headache (worse than usual) p Yes p No

Cough p Yes p No

Shortness of breath p Yes p No

Difficulty breathing p Yes p No

If the employee or visitor answers yes to two or more of the abovethere will be no entrance allowed to the facility

CIRCUMSTANCES: Please answer the following questions.

Have you had contact with a person with or under investigationfor FLU in the last (incubation period) days?

p Yes p No

Have you been to (endemic region) in the last (incubation period) days?

p Yes p No

Have you been to (focus of outbreak) last (incubation period) days? If yes, please identify the date and the area?

Date/Area:

An answer to one of the above will cause no admittance to the facility


EMPLOYEESSection B to be completed by Supervisory Staff

1. If the staff member/authorized person does not have a temperature at or above 38 °C, no abnormal clinicalsigns and answered no to the first two circumstantial questions, he/she may report for work.

2. If the staff member person has had contact with a person with or under investigation for FLU in the last(incubation period) days, instruct him/her to call Telehealth Ontario at 1-866-797-0000 and also contact thePublic Health Department.

3. If the staff member/other person has attended (focus of outbreak) in the last (incubation period) days,he/she should submit to voluntary quarantine at home and contact his/her personal physician and the local Public Health Department.

4. If the staff member/other person has a temperature at or above 38 °C, abnormal clinical signs or answeredyes to either of the first two circumstantial questions, call Telehealth Ontario at 1-866-797-0000.

If a staff member is absent from work as a result of these restrictions, a medical certificate certifying fitness toreturn to work must be provided. The Service will cover the cost of the certificate.

Temperature (at or above 38 degrees °C) p Yes p No

Name Signature


36. Source: Toronto Police Service Draft Public Health Emergencies/Pandemic Response Plan.

A P P E N D I X C

Prisoner Screening Form36

As a result of a declaration of a Pandemic Influenza emergency, Officers-in-Chargeare to use the following screening tool when booking prisoners.

Prisoner:

Name:

Date/Time:

Do you have a fever? p Yes p No

Do you have a cough (worse than usual)? p Yes p No

Are you having difficulty breathing? p Yes p No

Do you have muscle aches or pain (worse than usual) p Yes p No

PART 1 (Symptoms subject to review)

Have you traveled to (an endemic region), and returned within the last (incubation period) days?

p Yes p No

Have you attended at (focus of the outbreak if applicable) within the last 10 days?

p Yes p No

Have you ever been told you should be quarantined? p Yes p No

If YES, when were you told? p Yes p No

PART 2

If the prisoner answers YES to two or more of these questions and the reason is not obvious(foot pursuit, pepper spray, resisted arrest, etc.), proceed to PART 2.

If the prisoner answers YES to two or more of the above questions, the Officer-in-Charge shall call TelehealthOntario at 1-866-797-0000 and obtain advice from that source and the Police Command Centre.

Chapter 4. The Overland Park, Kansas Police Department Case Study — 65


The Overland Park Police Department has 254sworn officers and 56 full-time and 59 part-time

civilian employees. The city is not divided into dis-tricts; instead, the department operates under a tar-geted deployment strategy. The department hasthree bureaus, six divisions, and several other units:

The Overland Park, KansasPolice Department Case Study

4

Bureau Divisions

TacticalOperations

n Patrol Division n Emergency Services Division– Traffic Section– Tactical Support Section– Animal Control

SpecialServices

n Detective Division– Investigation Section– Analysis and Intelligence Section– Crime Analysis Section

n Community Policing Division– Community Policing/School Resource

Officers/DARE Officers– Crime Lab/Property Room

Administration n Personnel and Training Division– Personnel Section– Training Section

n Logistics and Support Division– Technology Section (includes dispatch)– Fleet Operations (includes school

crossing guards)

n Policy Reviewn Budget and Finance Analyst

n Homeland Security and Office ofProfessional Standards (under the Chief of Police)

66 — Chapter 4. The Overland Park, Kansas Police Department Case Study

1. http://www.opkansas.org/_Vis/index.cfm 2. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20/2053775.html 3. http://www.opkansas.org/_Gov/History/index.cfm 4. http://www.opkansas.org/_Res/News/kid_friendly.cfm 5. http://www.opkansas.org/_Gov/History/index.cfm 6. http://www.opkansas.org/_Gov/History/index.cfm 7. http://www.opcvb.org/welcome/information.html 8. http://www.opedc.org/living/health_care.htm

9. http://jcac.jocogov.org/airport.html 10. http://www.thejo.com/main.aspx?page=about 11. Personal conversation with Brian Shields, City Traffic Engineer,2/6/07. 12. http://www.opcvb.org/welcome/areafacts.html 13. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/states/K.html 14. http://www.opcvb.org/welcome/areafacts.html


Overland Park islocated in JohnsonCounty and is thesecond largest cityin Kansas, afterWichita.1 OverlandPark has a population of approximately 167,000and is part of the greater Kansas City metropoli-tan area. The 2000 Census reports that over 90percent of the city’s population is white, 2.5 per-cent is black or African–American, and 3.8 per-cent is Asian-American.2 In 1996, Overland Parkreceived the highest rating in quality of life vari-ables by the County Economic Research Institute.3

Overland Park was named the “Number One Kid-Friendly City in the Nation” in 2001.4 Just twoyears later, Money magazine ranked OverlandPark one of the best places with populationsgreater than 100,000 to live.5 The same magazinenamed the city one of the top 10 best places to livein America in 2006.6

There are five hospitals in Overland Parkand one urgent-care facility.7 Two health carefacilities which provide non-trauma health care

services are located in Overland Park shoppingmalls.8 The Overland Park Police Department hasjurisdiction over public and private schools inthree school districts: 35 elementary schools, 11middle schools, and 9 high schools. Several insti-tutions of higher education are located in Over-land Park. All of these universities generally caterto adult students, and none of the campuseshouses students.

There are three regional airports locatedwithin or in close proximity to Johnson County:Johnson County Executive Airport (the secondbusiest in the state of Kansas),9 New Century AirCenter, and Kansas City Downtown Airport. “TheJO” (Johnson County Transit) is the city’s mainsource of mass transit, with more than 100 busesand other vehicles operating five days a week.10

There are 23 major thoroughfares that runthrough Overland Park.11

Overland Park is home to four majoremployers (Sprint Nextel, Embarq, and twoschool districts)12 and serves as the regional head-quarters for several Fortune 500 companies (e.g.,YRC Worldwide [trucking] and Ferrellgas Part-ners [energy]).13 Both the Shawnee Mission Med-ical Center and Overland Park Regional MedicalCenter are also listed as “major employers.”14

Kansas

OverlandPark


3. T H E C I T Y- W I D E A P P R OAC HT O E M E R G E N C Y O P E R AT I O N S

Potential Hazards

Authors of the Johnson County Local EmergencyOperations Plan grouped the hazards that affectthat area of the country into three categories: natu-ral hazards, technological hazards, and terrorismand weapons of mass destruction.15

Natural Hazards

Severe types of weather (especially high winds, tor-nadoes, and ice and snow storms) have been knownto affect the county. The Emergency Operations Planstates that the county has a “moderate earthquakerisk” and mentions that the area is “subject to natu-rally occurring infectious diseases, both those thataffect humans and animals.” (See page 6 of the plan.)

Technological Hazards

According to the Emergency Operations Plan, “Therapid growth and complexity of the county makethe risk it faces from man-made and technologicalhazards at least as high as and perhaps higher thanthat of natural hazards. Risk from HAZMAT trans-portation accidents is especially high due to thepresence of major national and international high-way corridors, the main rail lines of two major rail-roads, and the flight path of commercial air trafficall serving the major industrial districts of theKansas City metropolitan area.” (p. 6)

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Johnson County, and Overland Park in particular,are home to several large companies, making thethreat of terrorism a concern. The plan states, “Var-ious programs are in place to enhance the county’sability to prevent, prepare for, respond to, andrecover from terrorist events.” (p. 7)

The Overland Park Police Department servesroles in the emergency operations plans of both thecity and Johnson County. The most recent city planwas published in January 2003; the city is updatingits plan to ensure it is NIMS-compliant and basedon components similar to the National ResponsePlan. The updated plan will contain a public healthannex that will refer to continuity-of-operationsplans for each city department. The police depart-ment’s supplemental support role to public healthin securing mass prophylaxis sites will also bedetailed. A major from the Overland Park PoliceDepartment is overseeing this process.

Administrative Overview of the City’s Plan

The mayor of Overland Park is responsible fordeclaring a state of emergency. The city manager,with help from the emergency management coordi-nator, will be in charge of coordinating and direct-ing the response efforts. The city manager will alsoserve as the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)coordinator. The city attorney will handle any legalissues associated with the critical incident. (p. 2)

Incident Management

According to the city plan, in the event of a criticalincident, the lead representative from the PoliceDepartment will designate a director of field oper-ations, who will establish a field command post ifnecessary. (p. 2) The city’s current incident com-mand structure follows:

n The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible forthe overall operation of the disaster response.The plan states that the main functions of the ICare “to develop, monitor, and evaluate the overallstrategy employed toward the goal of preservinglife and property and restoring the community toits original high standards of livability.”

15. Johnson County, Kansas (2005). Local Emergency Operations Plan. Available athttp://www.jocoem.org/documents/LEOP/LEOP_(2005).pdf


n The lead agency commander will be appointedby the city manager, and will be a supervisorfrom the lead response agency.

n The director of field operations will oversee theassessment of the incident’s magnitude, amongother responsibilities.

n The emergency management coordinator main-tains the plan and runs the Emergency Opera-tions Center and related emergency planning.

In order to maintain the plan, the city man-ager has appointed a 13-person committee thatconsists of representatives from the following citydepartments: public works, planning and develop-ment, parks and recreation, the police and firedepartments, and the city manager’s office.

The Police Role in the City’s Plan

A comprehensive search of the city’s plan foundseveral mentions of police roles during a criticalincident. Specifically, should the police departmentbe designated the lead response agency (and thus bemade responsible for establishing a commandpost), the first officer on the scene would beexpected to remain with his or her vehicle andreport to communications. Once a field sergeantarrives, he or she will be responsible for: keeping alog of the units responding to the scene and theirassignments; requesting that the radio be cleared;selecting a site for the field command post; andrequesting the activation of the emergency opera-tions plan.

In the “Duties and Responsibilities” annex tothe plan, the police role includes traffic control andmonitoring the scene for secondary incidents. Asthe incident progresses, the Police Department’sresponsibilities could include establishing a passsystem, property center, and/or temporary morgue,and helping with rescue operations and notifyingrelatives of injured or deceased persons. Annex IV

to the plan, “Overland Park Police Department,”describes the department’s resources that will beaccessed in response to a critical incident (e.g., per-sonnel, equipment, and communications). Thedepartment is listed as having a primary responsi-bility in the event of a major storm, but is listed as having a support role in most of the rest ofthe plan.

4. T H E C I T Y W I D E A P P R OAC H T OPA N D E M I C - S P E C I F I C P L A N N I N G

The Overland Park Community Services Division(the city’s equivalent of a public health depart-ment) focuses mainly on sanitation and inspectionand permitting issues, and makes no informationabout seasonal or pandemic influenza available toweb site visitors. The Johnson County PublicHealth Department (www.jocoflu.org/planning.html) has posted general seasonal flu informationon its web page (e.g., where to get vaccinated), aswell as some general information on planning for apandemic flu. The department also publishes amonthly e-newsletter, EPI Update, to provide epi-demiology information to the public. The countyexpects to release its Public Health EmergencyResponse Plan, including pandemic influenza andisolation and quarantine procedures, in the nearfuture.

5. T H E P O L I C E D E PA RT M E N T ’ SPA N D E M I C P L A N N I N G

In January 2006, Overland Park Police Chief JohnDouglass initiated the creation of the department’spandemic-specific plan. According to Chief Dou-glass, the goal of the plan is to “maintain orderwhile maintaining services.”16 In the early planningstages, Chief Douglass held a senior leadershipmeeting with division and bureau commandersand worked on a strategy for addressing the majorcomponents of a pandemic as they relate to the

16. All direct quotes from Chief Douglass are from an interview with him on February 2, 2007.


department. The department employed a collegeintern over the summer who tracked pandemic-specific news articles daily.

OPPD members have met with JohnsonCounty Health Department representatives a num-ber of times to discuss the elements of a pandemic.Further, Chief Douglass and other OPPD staffershave attended and made presentations at severalconferences on the topic. Chief Douglass explainedthat much of the department’s plan is based on suc-cess stories presented at these conferences regardingthe 1918 Spanish flu pandemic and the 2003 SARSoutbreak in Toronto. All of the work on the planwas carried out solely by members of the policedepartment and was overseen by Chief Douglass.The most current draft of the plan was finalized inAugust 2006.

Continuity of Critical Operations

In Chief Douglass’s words, “This is not a plan fordealing directly with a pandemic. Our job is to fig-ure out how to deal with the necessity of policeservices during a pandemic with a reduction inforce.” The primary focus of OPPD’s plan is conti-nuity of critical operations.

Staffing

The crux of the plan is a spreadsheet, prepared withMicrosoft Excel, that will serve as a guide for thedepartment to continue to provide service to thecommunity with a reduced staff (see Appendix A).The plan is broken down into nine levels of a pan-demic scenario. For each level, the staffing leveldecreases 10 percent, even as the demand for serv-ices increases by 10 percentage points, resulting in ashortfall in available employee-hours. As the pan-demic levels increase, certain OPPD functions aregiven a lower priority or eliminated. The depart-ment projected the number of full-time hoursneeded to accomplish critical functions at eachlevel, and projected available patrol full-time hoursare also included. Other projections in the plan

include 1-percent and 5-percent fatality rates, basedon the city’s population of 170,000. Chief Douglassreported that he found these rates in the literatureand chose to incorporate them into the plan.

Identifying Critical Operations

In the early stages of the planning process, Over-land Park police command staff met several timesto identify critical department functions. In StageOne of the plan, for example (this assumes a 10-percent shortage in officer hours plus a 10-percentincrease in demand for police services), all DrugAbuse Resistance Education and school resourceofficers would be placed on patrol. This decisionwas made based in part on the assumption thatschools would be closed. Even if schools remainedopen, in this stage of the plan, school resource andDARE officers would likely be reassigned to meetthe increase in demand for police services. At StageTwo, with a 40-percent total shortfall, the depart-ment’s Traffic Accident Prevention Program wouldbe suspended, and civilian staffers would likelyhandle non-injury accidents. The departmentwould set up a phone bank staffed by civilians tohandle calls for crimes such as vandalism and lostproperty. Tavern and business checks would be dis-continued, as would the investigation of noise com-plaints. A decrease in revenue would accompanysome of these discontinuations (e.g., the fees col-lected via traffic enforcement), and this has beennoted in the spreadsheet.

“When it came to evaluating how wewould provide our services, weprioritized those functions basedupon the most mission-critical andtook into consideration the naturalchanges that would take place. Forexample, the DARE and SROs wouldbe the first to be reassigned, based onthe assumptions that schools wouldclose early on.”C H I E F J O H N D O U G L A S S


Maintaining Information Technologyand Communication

The city of Overland Park, including the PoliceDepartment, is in the process of identifying jobtasks that can be accomplished remotely. All of thepolice department’s information technologyemployees are currently able to work off-site. ThePolice Department hosts its own computer-aideddispatch and records management systems. Otherlocal agencies share the system (e.g., the fire depart-ment), and the police department is in the processof determining whether planning for some sort ofprioritization scheme would be necessary in theevent of a pandemic.

Movement Restrictions and Site Security

While the decision to regulate social distancing, iso-lation, or quarantine rests solely with the JohnsonCounty Health Department, the Police Departmentexpects to have a significant role in the decision toenforce these restrictive measures. In Chief Dou-glass’s opinion, from a law enforcement perspec-tive, social distancing as an early interventionwould have the most positive result in terms of lim-iting the spread of the virus. Challenges with socialdistancing remain, however. While shopping mallsand similar sites in Overland Park could be closedto the public, Douglass cited the challenge associ-ated with dealing with private house parties. Thecity, he said, is “really banking on communicatingthe benefits of social distancing and voluntaryquarantine to the public before a pandemic occurs.”

Douglass stressed that the Police Departmentis trying to be part of any city- or county-wide dis-cussion regarding quarantines and to prevent agen-cies from creating plans that will be impossible tocarry out. The department’s main priority will bemaintaining essential service levels, leaving very fewlaw enforcement resources available to enforcemandated quarantine or to protect treatment sitesand/or hospital/clinic perimeters.

The use of quarantine “is limited in its effec-tiveness as it contributes geometrically to the degra-dation of available human resources,” ChiefDouglass warned. In other words, “when you start

quarantining first responders based on their con-tact with the first to become sick, you quicklydeplete your ability to respond.”

Furthermore, isolation of infected persons“will have some major repercussions,” Chief Dou-glass said, because “free movement is one of the pil-lars of our society.”

Protecting and Educating Officersand Their Families

There is a citywide occupational health program forall employees, including those of the Police Depart-ment. The Police Department is currently workingto ensure officers’ family members have access toany vaccines that become available and other treat-ments in the event of a pandemic.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

The OPPD has stockpiled a 90-day supply of PPE inthe form of N95 masks, gloves, and protectiveclothing. Antibacterial gel is currently available toofficers in the stock room, and many officers carryit with them. Most officers carry protective gloveson their belts and have been doing so for sometime. Chief Douglass plans to secure training on theproper fit and use of PPE from infection controlexperts employed by local hospitals. Other prophy-laxes such as vaccine or anti-viral medication havenot been stockpiled, as they would be obtainedthrough the health department and its plan.

Sick Leave and Vaccination Policies

While the OPPD does not yet have a pandemic-specific sick leave policy in place, which couldensure a continued income for officers who areplaced under quarantine due to their exposure to asick individual, Douglass said he plans to furtherexplore the topic. The department currently has noplan to quarantine officers solely because of theircontact as first responders, but plans to handlethese situations on a case-by-case basis.

With regard to mandating vaccination (shoulda vaccine become available), Douglass stated, “The


controversial nature of a mandatory vaccination pol-icy dictates that this policy decision be made by thegoverning body [the Overland Park City Council]when and if a vaccine becomes available.”


The Overland Park Police Department’s pandemicplanning efforts emphasize continuity of opera-tions and the effects of suspending non-criticaloperations on the department and the community.At the time this document was being finalized, thedepartment was working on training officers inproper fitting of PPE and looking into creating aspecial leave policy for employees who have to bequarantined as a result of on-the-job exposure.

Current plans have emphasized:

n Developing multi-agency partnerships and plans,

n Identifying mission-critical functions,

n Incorporating pandemic-specific planning ele-ments into the Police Department’s existingplans,

n Maximizing capacity through the use oftechnology,

n Cross-training administrative personnel, and

n Educating personnel on the threat.

Future Directions:

At the time this document was released, the Over-land Park Police Department was continuing itsplanning efforts. OPPD is currently working on thefollowing activities:

n The feasibility of having certain employeeswork remotely,

n Training all of its civil defense unit officers onthe pandemic preparedness plan and their rolesand responsibilities,

n Ongoing PPE fit-testing, and

n Working on technology issues and implement-ing video conferencing.


Editor’s note: The following spreadsheet shows theOverland Park Police Department’s projections ofhow an influenza pandemic could reduce its work-force while increasing demands for service.

The spreadsheet suggests that as a pandemicworsened, the OPPD would reassign officers topatrol and take other steps to keep up withdemands for service. But eventually, as the shortageof officers and the increased demand for servicesreached extreme levels, the department couldbecome overwhelmed, the projections indicate.

For example, at Stage One of a pandemic,OPPD projects that 10 percent of its patrol officerswould become sick or otherwise unavailable towork. The number of patrol hours normally avail-able, 4,328, would drop 10 percent, to 3,895.2.Meanwhile, as the pandemic began to spread, thedemand for service would increase 10 percent,resulting in the need for patrol hours to increase 10percent, from 4,328 to 4,760.8. The overall resultwould be a shortfall of 865.6 work-hours.

However, by moving DARE and schoolresource officers to patrol and discontinuing patrolresponse to non-injury traffic accidents and non-verified burglar alarms, OPPD would gain 936

hours. The single step of assigning school resourceofficers to patrol would result in a gain of 540 ofthose hours. Thus, the department would be able tokeep up with demands for service.

In Stage 2, with a 20-percent loss of patrolofficers and a 20-percent increase in calls for serv-ice, OPPD would take additional steps, such asusing civilians to handle calls regarding vandalismand other low-level crimes. There would be adiminishing return on some of the efforts to miti-gate damage, however. For example, the gain fromreassigning school resource officers would dropfrom 540 hours to 480 hours, because some of theschool resource officers presumably would becomeinfected with the flu virus or might have stay hometo take care of ill loved ones (or children homefrom school), so they would be unable to work.

By Stage 3, with a 30-percent loss of patrolofficers and a 30-percent increase in calls for serv-ice, the tide would turn against the OPPD. And byStage 5, with a 50-percent loss of patrol officers anda 50-percent increase in demand for service, thedepartment would have only one-third of thepatrol officer hours required to maintain even areduced level of services.

A P P E N D I X A

Overland Park Police Department Continuity of Operations Draft Spreadsheet


17. Source: Chief John Douglass, Overland Park Police Department.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN

DARE Officers Moved to Patrol

Effect: The temporary commitment of all DARE officers to the patrol function would suspend all DARE operations within the schools.

180

School Resource Officers Moved to Patrol

Effect: The temporary commitment of all SRO officers to the patrol function would suspend all SRO activities at the five high schools.

540

Discontinue Working All Non-Injury Accidents

Effect: Suspension of non-injury accident reports for the duration of the emergency wouldresult in accidents not worked by the patrol division. In order to remain consistent withreporting requirements in the law, civilian replacements to take reports would be neces-sary. We would train and deploy six civilian positions to take basic phone reports of non-injury accidents.

93

Discontinue Answering Intrusion Alarms—Verified Response

Effect: The suspension of the Alarm Program in its current form would result in respondingto only verified burglaries. Active armed robbery and bank alarms would continue to behandled as they are today. Although 99% of all alarms are false, we could still expect thepublic to respond negatively to the suspension of this program.

123

Total Hours Gained by Actions Taken 936

Net Capacity 70.4

Reduction ofOfficers +Increase inDemand forService

PopulationAffected

Fatality RatePatrol Full-Time HoursNeeded

AvailablePatrol Full-Time Hours

Full-TimeHours Surplus or(Shortfall)

1% of thoseaffected

5% of thoseaffected

Normal Situation 4,328 4,328 0

Stage OnePandemic

Total PercentChange 20%

17,000 170 850 4,760.8 3,895.2 (865.6)

Overland Park Police Department Continuity of Operations Draft Spreadsheet17


ACTION TO BE TAKEN

DARE Officers Moved to Patrol 160

SRO Officers Moved to Patrol 480

Traffic Officers Committed to Patrol

Effect: This will suspend our current Traffic Accident Prevention Program. Traffic accidentsare expected to increase minimally in the short term. Traffic enforcement will be down aswill a small amount of traffic enforcement revenue.

576

Discontinue Working All Non-Injury Accidents 93

Discontinue Answering Intrusion Alarms—Verified Response 123

Deferred/Assisted Reporting of Thefts

Effect: Store security would have to submit police reports on detained shoplifters withoutdirect assistance from the police. The paperwork would then be forwarded to the policedepartment. This system would result in numerous non-identification suspects and thepotential of some cases being lost in court.

53

Refer to Phone Bank


PopulationAffected




1% of thoseaffected

5% of thoseaffected

Stage Two Total PercentChange 40%

34,000 340 1,700 5,193.6 3,462.4 (1,731.2)

Effect: Development of a Phone Bank of civilians wouldallow for the transference of minor reporting functionsfrom Patrol to the Phone Bank. Civilian staff wouldhandle calls such as vandalism, lost property, andother information reports. This Phone Bank wouldoperate 16 hours a day, five days a week, and wouldrequire five civilian positions to staff. Reportingcapability on behalf of the public would be delayed and positive satisfaction would decline.

n Station Reports 50

n Vandalism 4

n Lost Property 6

n Destruction of Property 7

n Information Reports 31

n Harassment Reports 3

n Juvenile Info 9

n Juvenile Runaways 3

n Suspicious Person/Vehicle 9

Discontinue Service of Municipal and Misdemeanor Warrants

Effect: Discontinuing service of Municipal and Misdemeanor Warrants would result in abacklog of these documents. Some cases could be lost due to statute of limitation issuesbut overall the effects would be minor.

57


ACTION TO BE TAKEN

Discontinue Tavern Checks

Effect: The discontinuance of Tavern Checks would have only minor effects on our operation.

5

Discontinue Business Checks

Effect: The discontinuance of Business Checks would have only minor effects on our operation.

40

Discontinue Response to 9-1-1 Hang Ups

Effect: The discontinuance of 9-1-1 Hang Ups would have only minor effects on our operation.

39

Discontinue Response to Noise Complaints

Effect: The discontinuance of Response to Noise Complaints would have only minor effectson our operation.

13

Total Hours Gained by Actions Taken 1,761

Net Capacity 29.8


PopulationAffected




1% of thoseaffected

5% of thoseaffected

Stage Two continued

ACTION TO BE TAKEN

DARE Officers Committed to Patrol 140

SRO Officers Committed 420

Traffic Officers Committed 504

Community Policing Officers Committed 420

Personnel Officers Committed 392

Detectives Committed 168

Discontinue Working All Non-Injury Accidents 93

Discontinue Answering Intrusion Alarms—Verified Response 123

Deferred/Assisted Reporting of Thefts 53

Stage Three Total PercentChange 60%

51,000 510 2,550 5,626.4 3,029.6 (2,596.8)


ACTION TO BE TAKEN

Refer to Phone Bank

n Station Reports 50

n Vandalism 4

n Lost Property 6

n Destruction of Property 7

n Information Reports 31

n Harassment Reports 3

n Juvenile Info 9

n Juvenile Runaways 3

n Suspicious Person/Vehicle 9

Stop Service of Municipal and Misdemeanor Warrants 57

Discontinue Tavern Checks 5

Discontinue Business Checks 40

Discontinue 9-1-1 Hang Ups 39

Discontinue Noise Complaints 13

Total Hours Gained by Actions Taken 2,589

Net Capacity (7.80)


PopulationAffected




1% of thoseaffected

5% of thoseaffected

Stage Three continued

Stage Four Total PercentChange 80%

68,000 680 3,400 6,059.2 2,596.8 (3,462.4)

Stage Seven Total PercentChange 140%

119,000 1,190 5,950 7,357.6 1,298.4 (6,059.2)

Stage Eight Total PercentChange 160%

136,000 1,360 6,800 7,790.4 8,65.6 (6,924.8)

Stage Five Total PercentChange 100 %

85,000 850 4,250 6,492 2,164 (4,328)

Stage Nine Total PercentChange 180%

153,000 1,530 7,650 8,223.2 432.8 (7,790.4)

Stage Six Total PercentChange 120%

102,000 1,020 5,100 6,924.8 1,731.2 (5,193.6)

Chapter 5. The London Metropolitan Police Service Case Study — 77


The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is London’slargest employer, with more than 47,000 personnel(approximately 31,000 of whom are officers).1 Lon-don is comprised of 32 boroughs, all of which areunder the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan PoliceService. There are between 300 and 1,400 officers ineach borough.

MPS is divided into 10 operational bureausbased on function. Emergency planning (includingpandemic planning) is housed in the Central Oper-ations Bureau. Each of the operational bureaus pro-vides policing services across London and is led byan assistant commissioner who reports to the Com-missioner, Sir Ian Blair.

The other bureaus provide various manage-ment, administration and support functions (e.g.,recruitment, training and information technology).

Some functions, such as vehicle maintenance andaspects of information technology and telecommu-nications, have been contracted out to the privatesector.2

The London MetropolitanPolice Service Case Study

5

1. London Metropolitan Police Department, http://www.met.police.uk/about2. http://www.met.police.uk/about/organisation.htm#pan 3. London Metropolitan Police Department, http://www.nhs.uk/England/Hospitals/AllHospitals.aspx4. http://www.ealing.gov.uk/services/education/schools

2. D E S C R I P T I O N O F T H E A R E A

London—the capital of the United Kingdomand the largest city in the EuropeanUnion—has a population of7.2 million people in an area of620 square miles. There aremore than 30 general hos-pitals in London andhundreds of specialtymedical clinics of allsizes.3 Within theLondon Metropoli-tan area there are hundreds ofpublic and private schools.4

London

78 — Chapter 5. The London Metropolitan Police Service Case Study

3. C I T Y W I D E A P P R OAC H T OE M E R G E N C Y O P E R AT I O N S

a. Administrative Overview of the City’s Planning Approach

London has many area-specific risks. For example,major structures such as the Palace of Westminsterand Buckingham Palace require continuous protec-tion. The public transportation system is also at risk(as evidenced by the 2005 terrorist attacks). Onenaturally occurring threat is that of the Thames

flooding. London also hosts approximately 1,500major events each year and has been selected as thesite for the 2012 Olympic Games.

London Resilience Partnership

Prior to September 11, 2001, London had a limitedsystem for multi-agency emergency planning.Emergency planning was coordinated by a panel of senior officials representing only emergencyresponders (police, fire, ambulance). Multi-agencypartnerships with other entities were not formal-ized, and local planning efforts were not linked withthose of the national government or critical privatecompanies (such as those providing transportationand utility services).

In response to the attacks of September 11, theLondon Resilience Partnership (LRP) was estab-lished in May 2002 to coordinate all emergencyplanning efforts for London. The LRP is a multi-agency team that consists of emergency responderagencies and government and private entities frommany other sectors, including transportation, utili-ties, health services, central and local government,the military, and the business community.

Officials from these organizations meet rou-tinely to evaluate risks and coordinate critical inci-dent planning efforts. In addition, the LRP also hasa staff that works full-time on emergency planningissues and risk assessment. Senior agency represen-tatives in the London Resilience Partnership meetquarterly to review and approve plans.10

“Modular” Planning Approach

London’s pandemic plan is one of a series of plansdeveloped to address “all hazards” that the city mayface. The overall planning structure set by the LondonResilience Partnership is modular, with differentmodules addressing specific activities or risks. The

5. http://www.london.gov.uk/london-life/business-and-jobs/financial-centre.jsp6. http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/abt_tfl.asp7. Ibid.8. http://www.tfl.gov.uk/ 9. http://www.heathrowairport.com/assets/B2CPortal/Static%20Files/TopAirports04.pdf 10. For more information on London’s emergency planning, see www.londonprepared.gov.

In just the 21 square miles that cover Ealing Borough, for example, there are 96 public andprivate schools. Major employers include theMetropolitan Police Service, the transportationsystem (both public and privately run entities),and British Telecom. London is headquarters tomore than 100 of Europe’s 500 largest companiesand a quarter of the world’s largest financial companies.5

The London public transportation systemis one of the largest in the world with approxi-mately 30 million journeys made per day inGreater London—including journeys by bus,subway, rail, light rail, car, bike and foot.6 Anextensive part of London’s public transportationis the London Underground system or the“Tube,” which carries passengers making morethan 3 million trips per day at 275 stations.7 Thebus system carries over 6 million passengers onmore than 700 routes each day.8 London is servedby five major international airports; three arelocated within MPS jurisdiction. Heathrow Air-port has the highest number of international passengers in the world, with more than 60 mil-lion international travelers in 2004.9


planning system has been compared to a set of ency-clopedias, with each “volume” representing a plan. Inan emergency, agencies would select the volumes thatbest address the overall situation. For example, duringa pandemic, large numbers of fatalities could requireofficials to activate the mortuary plan in addition tothe pandemic plan.

b. Incident Command

The London Resilience Partnership has required allof the city’s agencies that participate in citywideemergency planning to adopt a “gold, silver andbronze” system for incident command. Agency offi-cials serving in the gold, silver and bronze capacitiesduring an emergency are chosen not according torank, but rather according to their role in theagency and their level of knowledge about the typeof incident that is at issue.

Command Structure:

n Gold (strategic): The gold group is composed ofthe overall command personnel, who establishthe response strategy (there is usually only onegold representative from each agency).

n Silver (tactical): The silver group is composed ofpersonnel who will respond to the incident andare responsible for formulating the tactics thatwill implement the strategy.

n Bronze (operational): The bronze group controlsthe resources and implements and directs thetactics that are determined by the silver group.

Note: Each agency involved in the city’s emer-gency response will establish its own gold, silver

and bronze command structure internally. Thedetailed responses of the silver and bronze groupsare determined by agency officials serving at thegold level. This case study highlights the roles andefforts at the gold level of incident command.

Gold Coordinating Group

All of London’s emergency plans are developed bythe “Gold Coordinating Group,” and this groupultimately reports to the Prime Minister.11 Mem-bers of this group are gold level representativesfrom each of the various city agencies that areinvolved in the emergency response. Additionalagencies and subject matter experts may participatein the Gold Coordinating Group based on the typeof critical incident (Figure 1 depicts the basic GoldCoordinating Group structure).

The role of the Gold Coordinating Group isto develop the overall emergency response plan andto provide clarity and overall direction for respon-ders during the incident. During a major event orcrisis, the Gold Coordinating Group meets regu-larly, ensuring that the gold representatives from allagencies are coordinating with each other. As amatter of practice, the gold representative fromeach agency should not change during the emer-gency. This ensures that the strategy for each agencyremains the same.12

“Two hundred different officials in aroom would produce 300 differentstrategies. By having the same oneperson in the gold position, you keep the strategy consistent.”C H I E F S U P E R I N T E N D E N T S I M O N L E W I S ,M P S E M E RG E N C Y P L A N N I N G

11. In an extreme emergency, the Prime Minister would lead this group with the top police and military officials. 12. Note on Fatigue: Because a pandemic may come in waves and last for an extended period of time, person-nel fatigue is a critical issue that must be considered, especially when the department may be facing an already-reduced workforce. One principle of London and MPS’s emergency planning structure is that only onerepresentative will usually hold the gold position through the course of the emergency or event. Fatigue isaddressed by limiting the scope of hands-on involvement of these representatives in overseeing response deliv-ery, which is done by bronze representatives. However, the idea of only one gold representative raises importantquestions for London and MPS as to how this should be handled during a pandemic emergency and what willhappen if a Gold Coordinating Group representative becomes sick.


“We are trying to build on the idea of multi-agency cooperation. Inpreparing for an emergency—andduring an emergency—it is not onlyabout what your agency has to do,but also what you can expect yourpartners to do.”S A R A H W U L F F- C O C H R A N E , LO N D O NR E S I L I E N C E T E A M

Figure 1 shows the range of entities participat-ing in the Gold Coordinating Group13 which reportsto the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)—thePrime Minister’s most senior officials.

c. Law Enforcement Role In the City’s Emergency Operation Plan

The Metropolitan Police Service plays a critical rolein London’s citywide emergency plan. A police offi-cial serves as chairperson of the city’s Gold Coordi-nating Group for most emergencies and isresponsible for leading the group, ensuring repre-sentatives agree on clear objectives and actions, andoverseeing the response to the emergency.

The department is also responsible for assign-ing a separate gold representative to participate in theGold Coordinating Group meetings and to set strat-egy and ensure delivery of the police response. MPSmay also play a key role in media communications.

13. Note: the Local Authority may represent schools as well as other important local sectors on the GoldCoordinating Group for a pandemic.

Figure 1. Representation of the Gold Co-ordinating Group

MILITARY

MEDIAGOVERNMENT

LIAISON OFFICER

AMBULANCE

HEALTHPUBLIC HEALTH

ADVISORTRANSPORTUTILITIES

LOCAL AUTHORITY

CABINET OFFICE BRIEFING ROOM

GOLD CO-ORDINATING GROUP (GCG)

CHAIR GCG(Police)POLICE

Metropolitan Police ServiceCity of London Police

British Transport PoliceMinistry of Defence Police

Media Group

HQ LondonDistrict

(Joint RegionalLiaison Officer)

GovernmentLiaison Team London Fire

BrigadeLondon

AmbulanceService

FIRE

London Local Authority Gold/Local Authority

Chief ExecutiveTransco

National GridThames WaterBritish Telecom

London UndergroundTransport for London

Network RailPort of London AuthorityBritish Airports Authority

National Air Traffic Service

Health Advice

London StrategicHealth Authority

Note: The Health elements of the GCG i.e.“London Ambulance Service,” “Health,” and“Public Health Advisor” may be co-located within the SCC when mutually beneficial.

THE GOLD CO-ORDINATING GROUP LOCATED WITHIN THE STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATION CENTRE (SCC)

Source: London Resilience Partnership (2006). London Command and Control Protocol—Version 1 (p. 9).Available: www.londonprepared.gov


The London Resilience Partnership’sCommunications Plans

INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS:

FASTEST FINGER FIRST

The London Resilience Partnership hasdevised a system of sharing information called“Fastest Finger First.” At the onset of any event, allGold Coordinating Group partners will beinformed of a crisis as soon as it occurs, because thefirst person to know about an event is charged withimmediately informing everyone else in the group.As everyone in the Gold Group has access to cellphones and other communications devices, thissystem hopefully will ensure that Gold Group part-ners will first learn of an incident from their LRPpeers rather than through news media inquiries.Every member has the responsibility to call; anymember can make the first call.

FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS

Citywide, agencies are divided into two cate-gories for receiving emergency communications.Category One responders include police, fire,ambulance, environment, health, and local author-ities.14 Category Two responders include serviceproviders such as utility and transport contractorswho are not required to have emergency plans, butare obliged to assist if asked. Almost-daily alertsfrom various government departments are sent toall Category One and Category Two responders.15

NEWS MEDIA APPROACH

To ensure a coordinated approach, the mediastrategy for a critical event will be decided by theGold Coordinating Group, which includes a newsmedia liaison, usually from the Police Service.16

Compared to other agencies, the Metropolitan

Police Service has a very large media bureau, whichis proficient at coordinating media communica-tions during large-scale events. Although one of thepublic health agencies may take the lead, the MPSpress bureau is likely to be closely involved in get-ting information to the media and providing sup-port to the public health agencies in coordinatingand carrying out the media strategy.17 After theGold Coordinating Group meets, the media liaisonwill coordinate with other agencies’ press represen-tatives and will disseminate the details approved bythe group.

4. C I T Y W I D E A P P R OAC H T OPA N D E M I C - S P E C I F I C P L A N N I N G

The London Resilience Partnership’s (LRP)approach to pandemic-specific planning is verysimilar to the approach it has taken to preparing forother emergencies. The LRP has convened a GoldCoordinating Group to consider pandemic-specificissues, such as the need for stockpiling personalprotective equipment and any available antiviralmedications, and the need for a strategy to dissem-inate the stockpiled items effectively during anemergency. The LRP has also considered how otheremergency plans, such as the plan for large num-bers of fatalities, may dovetail with the plans devel-oped for a pandemic. The specific response to apandemic, depending on the scale of the pandemicand other factors, would be decided on by the GoldCoordinating Group during the emergency andwould be carried out by the silver and bronzegroups in each of the corresponding agencies.

The Department of Health will be the pri-mary source of public health-related messages, andas the lead government department, will workclosely with the central government’s media center

14. http://www.warrington.gov.uk/council/emergency/Civil_Contingencies_Act_2004.asp15. As delineated in the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004. 16. Because of the scope and nature of a pandemic, this function may change to another appropriate leadagency, such as health. The central government may also take over this responsibility to ensure a consistentnational message.17. Chief Inspector Graham Stokes, 2007.


to deliver a nationally-coordinated communicationstrategy. Plans for a print and broadcast campaignand a public information film have been developed.A national leaflet mailing will be activated if thepandemic threat reaches the World Health Organi-zation’s Phase 5.

5. P O L I C E D E PA RT M E N TA P P R OAC H T O PA N D E M I C -S P E C I F I C P L A N N I N G

Within MPS, emergency planning is coordinated inthe Central Operations Command bureau, specifi-cally within the Emergency Preparedness Unit. Inaddition, each police borough is responsible fordeveloping detailed local plans. These plans areintended to serve as a foundation that local incidentcommanders can build upon during an actualemergency.

Police Command Structure for aPandemic Emergency

Like other London emergency response agencies,the Metropolitan Police Service has its own gold,silver and bronze incident command structure thatwould be activated during any critical incident,including a pandemic. The chairman of MPS’sGold Group is also the representative to the City ofLondon’s Gold Coordinating Group. Currently, theMPS Gold Group for pandemic planning includesapproximately 30 representatives, such as publichealth officials and medical officials from withinthe Police Service. MPS’s silver and bronze groupshave been activated to participate in planning andexercises of plan components.

The following sections of this case study pro-vide an overview of the specific planning stepsrequired for MPS to successfully maintain its inci-dent command structure and response, as well asother critical operations during a pandemic.

Continuity of Operations Planning—Human Resource Resilience

“MPS . . . has a legislative obligation tomaintain critical services throughoutany pandemic. Indeed, the greater theseverity of the pandemic, the greaterthe challenges that will be placedupon MPS to maintain the peace.”18

Within MPS, the Central Operations Bureauwas tasked with coordinating resilience plans for allof the bureaus and units in the entire department.Early plans focused on the department’s physicalinfrastructure, such as the lost use of a police build-ing through fire or power failure; there were noplans in place for handling the loss of humanresources.

In 2005, as international attention was drawnto the possibility of an influenza pandemic, MPSbegan to consider the impact of such an event on itshuman resources and the organization’s ability tomaintain critical functions. Initially, the CentralOperation Bureau requested every unit to identifyits critical activities. Personnel responded by nam-ing thousands of activities that they considered crit-ical. Bureau officials realized that to get to the coreof the issue, they needed a detailed understanding ofthe impact of a pandemic on operations, so theydevised a new approach for identifying the organi-zation’s most crucial functions.

In the spring of 2006, MPS set up a series ofworking groups of senior officials to identify andclassify the core functions of the MPS and to devisea plan for dealing with high absenteeism. Theapproach was originally designed to deal with apandemic, but later evolved into a “human resourceresilience” plan that could be applicable during anycritical incident which would require the MPS towork at maximum capacity for an extended periodof time.

18. MPS Staff Abstraction Appendix A, Contingency Planning for a Pandemic Influenza, “Preplanning”


“Throughout the process, it was impor-tant to demonstrate that the planningwas about supporting the key activitiesof the MPS. We had to help them refo-cus on what is important and to under-stand that policing London will change.You may be dealing with riots causedby panic, there may be no gas, no food,no access to cash. The priorities forpolice will likely change, and [under-standing] that is the benefit of focusingin on what we are all really about.”DAV I D H I L L , T E C H N I C A L A N D LO G I S T I C A LA DV I S O R, C E N T R A L O P E R AT I O N S B U R E AU

The process of identifying the MPS’s criticalfunctions took approximately six weeks. Senior MPSofficials identified the following 12 core functions:19

1. Receipt of 999 calls (similar to 911 calls in theUnited States)

2. Command and control (MPS Gold Group meetingsand headquarters command center operations)

3. Response to emergency calls

4. Major incident response

5. Crime investigation

6. Maintenance of public order (street patrol;public security and safety; officer deploymentsto demonstrations and mass gatherings; crowdcontrol; etc.)

7. Custody management (arrest and detention ofprisoners)

8. Security and protection (related to royal, govern-mental, and diplomatic officials and buildings)

9. Health, safety and welfare of the MPS staff

10. Criminal case progression and management(management of prosecution papers and sum-monses prior to transfer to prosecutors)

11. Community policing

12. Communications and news media

Once the initial list was compiled, the groupdeveloped a “critical activities template” thatincluded these core functions and identified howmany staff members are currently needed to carryout each activity, as well as skills that are needed(See Appendix A). Using the template, officials ineach bureau calculated the impact on the criticalactivities if there were 25-percent, 40-percent, 60-percent, and 80-percent reductions in staff. Thetemplate also captured information on the mini-mum level of staff resources needed to deliver serv-ices at an acceptable level, and identified at whatpoint during a pandemic the acceptable standard ofdelivery would no longer be viable. This processhelped department officials to prioritize their core functions should such reductions in staffingoccur.

“The level of staff absenteeism fromwork during a pandemic will dependsignificantly on the nature of the pan-demic virus when it emerges…. Giventhe inevitable uncertainties, a range of percentile absenteeism should beplanned for. [MPS bureaus] shouldensure that their … continuity planshave the flexibility to accommodatethese ranges. It must be stressed that aclinical attack rate of, say 25 percent,should not be interpreted as equatingto one-in-four absentee level acrossthe workforce. Small teams workingclosely together will be particularlyvulnerable to higher levels of absen-teeism, for if one member of the teamcontracts the virus, there is every like-lihood that many of the team will besimilarly infected.”20

19. MPS 2007. Impact of Staff Abstraction on Critical Activities Worksheet. 20. MPS 2007. Staff Abstraction Appendix A: Contingency Planning for a Pandemic Influenza: Introductionand Guidance Notes on the Completion of Templates for Assessing the Impact on Service Delivery whenSubject to Significant Staff Abstraction.


As the police operational plans were com-pleted, the MPS Emergency Preparedness Unitreviewed the plans for operational viability, and anychanges needed were discussed with the unit com-manders. Discussion and revision of the bureau’soperational plans gradually raised the awareness ofthe MPS staff regarding the overall impact of aninfluenza pandemic and how it would affect thepolice service. It took approximately six months forplans to be completed.

Contract Services

As part of this planning exercise, unit commanderswere also tasked with identifying the contract serv-ices relied on for the provision of critical businessfunctions. Like many police departments, MPScontracts out for services such as cleaning and vehi-cle and building maintenance.

MPS recognizes that its local vendors wouldalso be impacted by a flu pandemic, and is not tak-ing vendor-supplied services and products forgranted. MPS is requiring critical vendors to pro-vide the department with details of their own con-tinuity plans for mitigating the damage of apandemic. When needed, MPS has entered into pri-ority contracts with other service providers foradditional and “backup” supplies, services andequipment that may be needed. These contractsgive MPS first priority over other customers andoften allow for orders on very short notice.

It should also be noted that a private com-pany maintains the MPS’s information technologystructure and servers. MPS engages in a priorityservice contract for these services and requires itscontractors who assist in providing critical func-tions to have a robust continuity plan thataddresses human resource resiliency, and willensure that contractors can continue to provide theservices during a large-scale incident.

Activating the Human ResourceResilience Plan

During an emergency, each unit will redeployemployees as necessary to ensure that the most

important MPS functions are taken care of, and toadjust for changes in staff availability. In general, itwill be expected that each MPS bureau will manageits core functions and move personnel as needed. Ifassistance is required, then the bureau may reachout to the MPS continuity group for help in identi-fying staff in other bureaus that may assist in carry-ing out critical functions. This type of cross-bureaustaffing request would need to be decided upon bythe Central Operations Bureau Assistant Commis-sioner and would be discussed in the department’sGold Group meeting.

Special Skills

Through the process of identifying critical MPSfunctions, officials realized that to develop a trulyeffective resilience plan, they needed to consider thekey skills needed to carry out the core functions,rather than just moving employees to fill gaps in theworkforce. While it is unlikely that a pandemicwould cause a 60-percent or 80-percent decrease instaffing across the MPS, such severe losses could belikely within one or two units. This is especiallypossible in the case of personnel working in small,specialized units who work closely together (e.g.,engineers and explosives officers) and who maybecome ill at the same time.

When preparing the Critical Activities Tem-plates (described earlier in this chapter under “Con-tinuity of Operations Planning—Human ResourceResilience”), the MPS continuity group requestedthat all of the bureaus identify the key skills neededto carry out its core functions. From this “criticalskills list,” the group worked with the HumanResources Bureau to develop a register of skills of alloperational, staff and administrative personnel andvolunteers. This database of skills would be availableto identify personnel who may be able to carry outcore functions during an emergency.

Administrative and Support StaffMobilization

One change that came out of the aftermath of theJuly 7, 2005 public transit bombings (see “Terrorism


and Bombings” sidebar, later in this chapter) was toidentify additional MPS personnel, both uniformedand non-uniformed, to assist in various capacitiesduring an emergency. As a result, during futureemergencies, employees working on non-criticalfunctions may be moved to assist with critical func-tions. MPS has also created a list of employees whohave volunteered to assist either by working pastregular duty hours or by conducting tasks outside oftheir usual scope of work. For example, administra-tive personnel were needed during the July 7th silver(tactical) group meetings, which ran through thenight after the bombings. Prior to July 7th, thedepartment had a police mobilization plan to bringin officers from other boroughs when assistance wasneeded. Now they have a volunteer list and plans formobilization of administrative employees as well.Not only does this provide the administrative sup-port needed, it also has given administrative staffersan important way to help during an emergency orlarge-scale event and has improved the sense ofunity within the department.

The Metropolitan Police Special Constabulary (MPSC)

MPS also has a constabulary of volunteers who maybe called to assist. These volunteer police officers—known as “Police Specials”—are members of the pub-lic who volunteer for at least 200 hours a year. PoliceSpecials receive professional police training and havethe same powers as regular officers. They also weara uniform similar to that of regular officers.21, 22

Since July 7th, MPS has also recruited mem-bers of its existing support staff to participate in thePolice Specials program.23 The benefits of havingadministrative and support staffers serve as Specialsis that they will already be on site and ready to mobilize when needed. Employees serving as

Specials keep their uniforms and equipment on-site. To encourage participation in the program,police staffers are given two paid days off a month toparticipate in the program in their home borough.

“The staff-volunteer and ‘police specials’program closes the gap between policeofficers and staff. Now the staff feelslike a greater part of the family, and itbrings them into the loop.”C H I E F S U P E R I N T E N D E N T S I M O N L E W I S

Internal Communications

Like many departments, MPS works hard to ensurethat the bureaus are working collaboratively and aresharing information. MPS has done a lot of work toshare information across the department’s bureausand geographic units.

Because MPS is such a large organization, itrelies heavily on the use of its Intranet for mass com-munications. MPS employees are instructed to checkthe Intranet’s home page at the beginning of eachshift. Through the Intranet, messages on current orupcoming events and brief educational informationand tips are posted. Health and safety information isalso posted here (see “Occupational Health and Offi-cer Safety,” below). Although this is a simple and effi-cient way of reaching every employee, MPSrecognizes it is only effective if employees follow pol-icy and read the information posted.

If specific information needs to reach a cer-tain group of personnel (e.g., unit commanders),email is used. Each borough also has an emergencyplanner who is routinely contacted and briefed bythe Central Operations Bureau. The borough’semergency planners have been involved in develop-ing the detailed local response plans and will workwith their supervisors to coordinate the borough-level resources and response.

21. http://www.metpolicecareers.co.uk/default.asp?action=article&ID=32 22. As many retired officers return as Police Specials, the business resilience group is also working withhuman resources to record the special skills of volunteers as well. 23. To prevent double counting of staff, the continuity group has worked with the various bureaus toidentify critical positions and to note whether these positions are held by staffers who also volunteer forthe Specials program. Depending on the type of emergency, those who are not in critical positions maybe called up to serve in their Police Specials role.


Briefing packets are prepared during an inci-dent or event to provide specific operational infor-mation needed by those involved. Briefing packetsinclude critical information on the incident/event,identify who is serving in critical roles of the com-mand structure, and provide information on riskassessment and intelligence.

External Communications

Public Information and Education

Currently, the UK Health Protection Agency isresponsible for providing public health informa-tion and assurance to the public. MPS is not cur-rently involved with these efforts. However, becausecitizens look to the police for information, there isa role for the police in sharing information andproviding guidance on whom to contact for addi-tional information or assistance during an emer-gency. During previous incidents (e.g. thepolonium-210 poisoning of Alexander Litvinenkoin 2006), the London Resilience Partnership has setup a helpline for public information. During a pan-demic flu, similar steps would be taken to reducethe pressure on the police agency for answeringhealth-related questions and fielding calls.

Occupational Health and Officer Safety

Within MPS, there are two branches dedicated toofficer welfare: Occupational Health, and Healthand Safety. The Occupational Health branch has afull-time staff of doctors and nurses who provideservices to officers, monitor post-event trauma, andprovide advice upon request. The Health and Safetybranch is the department responsible for assessingand planning for risks, and protecting the healthand safety of officers. The Health and Safety branchroutinely posts information on relevant health

topics on the MPS Intranet homepage. During apandemic, a senior representative from this branchwill sit on the department’s gold group to provideupdates based on health surveillance informationand infection control measures.

Current health and safety efforts require allofficers to attend a safety course every six months.This course includes a combination of self-defensetraining and health and safety topics tailored to theofficers’ role. For example, drug squad trainingemphasizes procedures for safe searches.

Personal Protective Equipment

The Police Service’s Health and Safety branch hasalso been involved in the purchase of departmentpersonal protective equipment (PPE). A trainedteam of risk assessors is currently monitoring thepossibility of a pandemic, and is advising thedepartment to take simple precautions and to focuson managing anxiety among employees.

“We are taking precautions and issuinginstructions, but we try to keep itsimple. We haven’t gone overboard,and the planning advice from ourhealth officials is that we don’t needto [go overboard].”C H I E F S U P E R I N T E N D E N T S I M O N L E W I S ,EM E RG E N C Y PR E PA R E D N E S S

To date, there have been no formal recom-mendations from UK government officials on thetypes of personal protective equipment that need tobe provided. The public health guidance that hasbeen provided states that masks are not very effec-tive unless used by persons who are sick (asopposed to the use of masks by healthy people whohope that the masks will prevent their infectionwith the flu virus).24 Currently MPS has some PPEstockpiled in a central area. To avoid having the

24. In general, paper masks worn loosely over the nose and mouth are good protection against bloodsplatters and prevent one from putting contaminated fingers into one’s nose or mouth. As noted above,putting a mask on the person who has contracted a respiratory infection is a much more effective methodof controlling the spread of respiratory diseases. (From Richards, E. Rathbun, K., Solé Brito, C., and Luna,A. (2006). The Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-HazardsApproach. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance.


supplies used inappropriately and to avoid causingfear or alarm, stockpiled PPE will not be dissemi-nated unless the police role requires its use.25 MPShas set up priority contracts with several vendorsthat will enable them to order and receive incident-specific PPE when necessary.

Prophylaxis

The Greater London Authority has purchased dosesof Tamiflu, which could be of benefit in reducinginfected persons’ symptoms during a flu pandemic.Some of the Tamiflu is intended specifically for distribution to the police, fire, and transportauthorities. In the event of a flu pandemic, theTamiflu will be released to four locations withinLondon. MPS medical personnel will assist in disseminating the Tamiflu doses, and MPS opera-tional personnel will assist in site security for alldissemination sites. The process for disseminatingTamiflu will be as follows:

n A central call center staffed by nurses will be setup to receive and screen requests for Tamiflu andto authenticate that the individual requesting themedication is eligible to receive it.

n An authorization code and pick-up location willbe given to the individual.

n The individual or family member will report tothe pick-up location with the authorization codeand receive the Tamiflu.

Vaccinations

The UK’s National Health Service recommends cer-tain vaccinations for all citizens, but vaccinationsare not mandatory. MPS offers annual flu shots toessential personnel within the department.Depending on the employee’s role, the departmentmay also provide hepatitis vaccine or require othervaccinations before deploying an officer. Certainroles (e.g., body recovery) require specific vaccina-tions, but these vaccinations are not mandatory;

if an officer does not receive a required vaccination,he or she will be reassigned to another role. It is leftto officers in high-risk roles to receive the vaccina-tions and prove they are current before they will bedeployed. Tetanus shots are recommended as aminimum for all officers.

Sick Leave Policies

Compared to most U.S. police departments, theMPS has very generous sick leave policies. Person-nel are allowed eight consecutive sick days withoutdocumentation from a physician, and are eligiblefor paid sick leave at 100 percent of their salary forup to six months. After six months, paid sick leavemay drop to 50 percent of salary unless an officer’ssickness or injury was a direct result of using theirpowers as a constable. To ensure that sick leave pol-icy is not abused, use of leave is monitored througha comprehensive absence management system, andexcessive sick leave absences are tied to personnelperformance evaluations and the ability to be pro-moted or transferred, unless mitigated. The depart-ment’s Gold Group has agreed to possibly reviewthis policy to prevent employees from being penal-ized because of flu absences in the event of a pan-demic. The current rationale is that by notchanging the policy now, MPS is remaining flexiblebut is not risking abuse. Compassionate leave canbe taken for providing child care, caring for a sickfamily member, or for bereavement.

“Flexibility is good in your policies,but you don’t want to set them upwhereas they encourage extensiveabsences.”C H I E F I N S P E C T O R G R A H A M S TO K E S ,E M E RG E N C Y P R E PA R E D N E S S

Police Roles and Responsibilities

During any event or emergency, the police will beresponsible for carrying out the critical functions

25. PPE training is provided every six months by the Health and Safety Branch.


of the MPS. During a pandemic, the MPS may beresponsible, all or in part, for the following duties:

n Managing fear

n Enforcing public health orders

n Site security and cordons

n Coordinating mortuary services for mass fatalities

Managing Fear

During a pandemic, the London Resilience Partner-ship will give the police ongoing information brief-ings, and MPS officials will assist in managing fearby fielding calls for information and assistance, andby providing information to persons encounteredduring the course of their duties. MPS officials mayalso participate in a multi-agency call center thatwill be established, and police may play a role in theoverall media strategy by discussing public order-related measures that the department has implemented.

Enforcing Public Health Orders

The UK has strong protections on civil liberties andfreedom of movement, and currently MPS policeofficers do not have the power to isolate or quaran-tine individuals for public health reasons. Underthe Terrorism Act of 2000, officers have the right tocordon off an area and keep people from moving inor out of the area, but only if there is reasonablecause to suspect terrorism. Police do not have theright to cordon off an area and keep people frommoving in and out for public health reasons. How-ever, the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 does havea provision that enables the police to petition thePrime Minister for emergency powers.26 Should thePrime Minister approve emergency powers such asquarantine, MPS officials would work to enforcethese orders to the extent reasonable and possiblewith existing staff.

Site Security and Cordons

Site security and cordons may be required at siteswhere Tamiflu, vaccines, or PPE is distributed. MPSroutinely provides cordons for approximately 1,500sports and military events, marches, and royalevents annually. MPS is responsible for the dailyprotection of royalty and diplomats and theirbuildings, government ministers, and the Palace ofWestminster. While officers are very proficient atthese tasks, the challenge is to ensure that theapproach currently used is sufficient for a pan-demic emergency, and to anticipate what may bedifferent. Further, for an organization as large asMPS, an additional challenge is to ensure that theofficers who are securing a site have the necessaryinformation about why the site is being secured andwho, if anyone, should be allowed access in or outof the cordoned-off area. For example, because amulti-agency response to a flu pandemic mayrequire personnel from many public and privateagencies and contractors to move in and out of anarea, proper credentialing is needed. Proper creden-tialing and communication with site security offi-cers about who should and should not be allowedaccess to the scene was an issue faced by MPS dur-ing the July 7th Tube bombings and is currentlybeing addressed.

Note on Use of Force: The ultimate sanctionfor a public health violation is a fine. However, thepossibility of an influenza pandemic that may causemass fatalities raises the question of whether offi-cers should use force (and how much) to maintainthe integrity of a cordon. The MPS guideline onusing any type of force in the line of duty is that theuse of force must be reasonable given the situation.Officers are trained to use their discretion in choos-ing the type of action to take. Proper education toensure officers fully understand the situation willassist in their use of discretion on the job.

26. http://www.ukresilience.info/ccact/finalregs.pdf


Terrorism and Bombingsbox 5.1

While the pandemic-specific plans have not beentested during an actual emergency, the GoldCoordinating Group and several of the LondonResilience Plans were put to the test in two recentcritical incidents: the public transit terroristbombings of July 7, 2005 and the poisoning ofAlexander Litvinenko in November 2006.

July 7, 2005 Suicide Bombings

At approximately 8:50 a.m. on July 7, 2005 (nowcommonly referred to as 7/7), four suicidebombers attacked the public transport system inCentral London. Three bombs went off withinminutes of each other on trains undergroundbetween stations. The fourth suicide bomber detonated his bomb on a busnear Tavistock Square aboutan hour later. A total of 52commuters were killed, andhundreds were injured.

What Worked Well in the Police Response

This tragic event provided the first real-life test of theLondon Resilience Partner-ship’s Strategic EmergencyPlans. The city’s Gold Coordi-nating Group (gold-level rep-resentatives from everyresponding agency) con-vened, and the meetings wereconsidered effective, becausethe group members were

familiar with the process and their respectiveroles had been agreed upon in advance. TheLRP’s mass fatality plan, which had been finalizedonly a few days before 7/7, also worked well.Using this plan, responders set up a temporarymortuary facility in a preselected site within thecity. On 7/7, the mortuary was ready to operate.Importantly, it had four completely separate sec-tions with different staffs, entrances, water sys-tems, and other facilities, which helped to preventcross-contamination of evidence from the fourdifferent bombing sites.

One aspect of planning that has since beendeveloped is setting up “Humanitarian AssistanceCentres” where family members, friends, and

>> continued on page 92

July 2005 London bombings courtesy of empics limited of pavilion house,16 castle boulevard, nottingham, ng7 ifl


27. http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/lhacplan.pdf

survivors can go to inquire about loved ones whomay have been involved in a critical incident.27

The centers were not preplanned prior to 7/7, butwith a structure of multi-agency collaboration al-ready in place, the city was able to set up and staffa full-service assistance center within several daysof the bombings.

Challenges

Several challenges arose from the 7/7 attacks.First, there was the problem of determiningwhere the bombings occurred. Three of the explosions were underground, and the soundtraveled in both directions, so it seemed thatthere were more explosions than actually tookplace. Another challenge involved balancing victim recovery and identification with the investi-gators’ need to maintain the crime scenes.Another challenge which is common duringmajor events was that the city’s telecommunica-tions system became overloaded. Currently, LRPis focusing on educating the public not to use thephone for an extended period of time and onlywhen needed.

The cordon system that was in place also pre-sented several problems on 7/7. Because manyutility and transportation contractors and otherofficials may not have had proper identification, itwas difficult to determine who should or shouldnot be allowed through the cordon. This issue isnow being addressed by the LRP.

Staff utilization was one of the most impor-tant issues that emerged from 7/7 and will espe-cially be an issue in pandemic response, with theneed for a sustained response over an extendedperiod of time. On 7/7 MPS had approximately

35,000 officers and 15,000 civil staffers. Someofficers and civil staff members worked longhours, especially those in the crime scene andinvestigation teams. The personnel in theseoffices were physically exhausted and mentallytired. Sustainability of this work schedule forthese employees was an issue.

Many other officers and civil staff memberswould have liked to work more, but there was no sys-tem in place to arrange it. Since 7/7, MPS hastaken one step to help address this issue byenlisting support staffers to volunteer for addi-tional duties (See “Administrative and SupportStaff Mobilization,” above in this chapter).

Polonium-210 Poisoning

The poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with polo-nium-210 in late 2006 is another recent criticalevent that has tested the emergency plans of theCity of London and its Metropolitan Police Service.On November 1, 2006, Litvinenko became ill. Hewas treated at two hospitals but died on Novem-ber 23. It was discovered that he was poisoned bythe radioactive substance, polonium-210.

MPS took the lead in investigating Litvinenko’sdeath. As a radioactive substance, polonium-210leaves a radioactive “fingerprint” wherever it hasbeen present, so investigators were able to track itto more than 30 locations. Because of the numberof sites, the case’s high profile, and the unknownhealth risks involved, London convened a GoldCoordinating Group of gold-level representativesfrom the relevant responder agency representa-tives. These representatives also activated internalcommand structures within their own agencies asneeded to respond.

>> box 5.1 continued


The MPS and London’s Gold CoordinatingGroup worked on the Litvinenko case with a number of agencies that are not usually involvedin planning, including the Health ProtectionAgency (HPA)28 and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). This provided MPS with an opportunity to expand its multi-agency partnerships.

At first it was unclear how much and whatform of polonium would be required to injure orkill someone. This made it necessary to maintainclear internal communications about risks. MPS’sHealth and Safety Branch was closely involved inidentifying experts on the subject, interpretingrisk information and establishing guidance for theinvestigating officers on PPE and safety anddecontamination issues. During the incident,briefing packets were sent to the boroughs

containing information about risk assessmentand roles and responsibilities.

MPS was not directly involved in public healthreassurance. When members of the public calledor asked for information, they were given a hot-line number set up by the Health ProtectionAgency. This took a lot of pressure off of thepolice in answering questions and fielding calls.During a pandemic, a similar hotline directed tohealth officials will be set up.

The polonium poisoning incident was one ofthe first times MPS worked so closely with healthagencies. This experience provided the MPS witha glimpse of the types of cooperation that will beneeded if a flu pandemic occurs. Thus, it is easyto see that a flu pandemic would bring challengessimilar to, but far greater than, those presented inthe polonium incident. n

28. Note: The London Strategic Health Authority is the usual representative at Gold Coordinating Groupmeetings. However, specialists on radioactive materials were needed in this instance.


Coordinating Mortuary Servicesfor Mass Fatalities

During a flu pandemic, unless a crime is suspected,MPS’s responsibilities in the mass fatalities plan willbe limited to: assisting local authorities in coordi-nating mortuary services,29 including assisting insetting up and securing temporary mortuary facili-ties; managing the reception and the documenta-tion of the deceased at the mortuaries; security ofmortuaries; and serving as liaison with the coro-ner’s office and mortuary managers.30

One challenge for London mortuaries will bemanaging large numbers of bodies with a reducedworkforce. Public health officials and mortuaryservices and funeral directors have been closelyinvolved at the borough level in planning for thistype of event. Currently London has four mobilemass fatality centers that can be set up to assist iffatalities overload the mortuary service capabilities.

6. S U M M A RY A N DF U T U R E D I R E C T I O N S

Multi-agency planning efforts and the recent expe-rience with several critical incidents have put manykey relationships and systems in place for respond-ing to a pandemic. To date, London’s efforts havefocused on:

n Developing Gold Command Structures andestablishing a Gold Coordinating Group (amulti-agency group of officials who will be incharge of the city’s pandemic response)

n Engaging Gold Coordinating Group representa-tives and other senior officials in the planningprocess, including discussions about issues anddecisions the group will face during a pandemic

n Coordinating pandemic planning efforts withother emergency plans to address various situa-tions the city may confront during a pandemic(e.g., the mortuary plan)

n Developing a coordinated communications andmedia strategy for London and devising strategiesfor quick communications among key officials.

The Metropolitan Police Service’s efforts havefocused on:

n Identifying mission-critical functions

n Establishing a Business Resilience PlanningGroup

n Developing a plan for determining which func-tions may be suspended based on a reduction inworkforce availability

n Creating a database of employees’ specific skillsto assist in continuation of critical functions

n Engaging other local authorities in planning atthe borough level.

Future Directions:

At the time this document was released, Londonwas continuing its citywide planning efforts. Lon-don is currently working on the following activities:

n Conducting nationwide exercises to test variousaspects and levels of the response plans,

n Following up on exercise outcomes and incorpo-rating findings into planning, and

n Conducting further work on managing largenumbers of deaths in a flu pandemic.

Currently, the Metropolitan Police Service is:

n Exploring staffing options to prevent officerfatigue during long-term responses,

n Working with its boroughs to further developlocal response plans, and

n Proceeding with approval of the critical func-tions staffing plan by the Police Commissioner.

29. The temporary mortuaries have the capacity to handle 500 bodies per day.30. LRP 2005, April. Strategic Emergency Plan, Version 2.1.


Editor’s note: The following spreadsheet shows the template that the Metropolitan Police Service(MPS) uses to project how a staff reduction from an influenza pandemic could impact its 12 corefunctions. The example shows how one districtmight estimate the effects of a pandemic on its operations.

The left column of the template lists the 12“critical activities” or “core business functions” ofMPS. Varying levels of staff reduction—25, 40, 60,and 80 percent—are listed across the top of thedocument.

Each “business unit” in MPS has filled out thistemplate based on that unit’s current number of staffand the unit’s role in supporting the department’s

critical functions. The template also captures infor-mation on the minimum level of staff resourcesneeded to deliver services at an acceptable level, andidentifies at what point during a pandemic theacceptable standard of delivery would no longer beviable.

In the sample provided, for example, the unithas 240 officers that support the department’s corefunction of responding to 999 calls (the third func-tion listed). As the workforce is reduced by 25 per-cent, the unit would still be able to respond to 999calls but staff would be required to work rest daysand longer shifts. However, once the unit’s work-force is reduced by 80 percent, the unit would nolonger be able to respond to 999 calls.

A P P E N D I X A

Metropolitan Police ServiceCritical Activities Template


MPS CRITICALACTIVITY (COREBUSINESS)

ACTIVITY OFOCU/BUSINESS UNITTO SUPPORT/DELIVERMPS ACTIVITY

CURRENT ESTABLISHMENTDEPLOYED ON THE ACTIVITY

25% ABSTRACTION (FROM TOTAL WORKFORCE)


POLICEOFFICER

UNIFORMPOLICESTAFF

POLICESTAFF

IMPACT ONDELIVERY OFACTIVITY

Is an accept-able standardof delivery stillviable?



RECEIPT OF ‘999’ CALLS

N/A service provided byInformation Room

COMMAND ANDCONTROL

CAD Room 8 12 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes as for 25% and takeofficers fromresponse teams

yes

RESPONSE TO‘999’ CALLS

IBO and ResponseTeams

240 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes Staff required to workrest days and/or longershifts make use ofPCSOs to deal withlow grade calls

yes

MAJOR INCIDENTRESPONSE

resources only allocated asand when required fromresponse teams

CRIMEINVESTIGATION

CID, Crime Desk,Telephone reportingBureau

60 25 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts alsoprioritise cases

yes

MAINTENANCE OFPUBLIC ORDER

resources only allocatedas and when requiredfrom response teams

CUSTODYMANAGEMENT

Custody Team 11 9 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes Brigade resources withneighbouring BOCU tohave one ‘clean’ andone ‘dirty’ custodycentre (in case ofPandemic)

yes

RDPG PROTECTION not applicable

HEALTH, SAFETYAND WELFARE OFMPS STAFF

no dedicated resources,part of line managementresponsibility

CRIMINAL CASEPROGRESSION

CJU, Property Store 4 32 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes

COMMUNITYPOLICING

Neighbourhood Policing Teams


yes Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes

COMMUNICATIONSAND MEDIAHANDLING

Local Press Liaison (all other resources provided by DPA)

1 Continue with role ona part-time basis

yes as for 25% yes

OTHER UNIT ACTIVITIES (in order of criticality)

“MUST DO” Duties planning, CriticalIncident Gold Groups,Respond to PQs, ProcessPay and Overtime claims.,Daily Briefings


yes as for 25% yes

“SHOULD DO” Crime Pattern Analysis,Payment of Invoices,Maintain Front Counters

2 10 18 Staff required to workrest days and/orlonger shifts

yes as for 25% and onlyopen Front Counters7am–7pm

yes

DISCRETIONARY Schools Liaison, CrimePrevention Advice, Localrecruiting, open days,

3 1 3 Continue with activities at a reduced capacity

yes Cease activities anddivert resources tocritical activities

no

TOTALESTABLISHMENT

400 80 120 If the OCU/BusinessUnit continues to per-form the critical and‘must do’ activitiesindicated above, it will have:

If the OCU/BusinessUnit continues to per-form the critical and‘must do’ activitiesindicated above, it will have:

A surplus of staff Just enough staff

Impact of Staff Abstraction on Critical Activities

Source: London Metropolitan Police Department, 2007

OCU/BUSINESS UNIT: Sample

6 6




MINIMUM LEVEL OF STAFFRESOURCES NECESSARY TODELIVER ACCEPTABLE LEVEL

OF SERVICE PROVISION

Specific skills necessary to undertake the activity





POLICEOFFICER

UNIFORMPOLICESTAFF

POLICESTAFF

as for 40% yes as for 60% yes 4 8 CAD trained staff only to beused

prioritise calls yes only respond to mostserious calls

no 84 Minimum requirement for2 advanced drivers and4 basic drivers each tourof duty

as for 40% yes as for 60% no 20 7 Requirement for AccreditedInvestigators to perform particular roles

as for 40% yes Close BOCU Custody centre and concentrateresources in AreaBridewells

yes 4 4 Custody Officer must be aminimum rank of Sergeant

Prioritise cases (butcaseload will declinedue to fewer arrests andgreater use of cautions)

yes as for 60% no 1 6

Remaining resourcesdiverted to responsepolicing

no as for 60% no 20 40

as for 40% yes as for 60% yes 1

as for 40% yes as for 60% no 7

Cease activities anddivert resources to critical activities

no as for 60% no 1 4 10

as for 40% no as for 60% no 1 1

If the OCU/Business Unitcontinues to perform thecritical and ‘must do’activities indicated above,it will have:

If the OCU/Business Unitcontinues to perform thecritical and ‘must do’activities indicated above,it will have:

Just enough staff Insufficient staff6 6

Chapter 6. Recommendations from the Field — 97

he “Summary of Findings” section in Chap-ter 1 of this document provides a synopsis of thefactors that police must consider when writingplans for a flu pandemic, and describes the similar-ities and differences in PERF’s four sites’approaches to these issues. This chapter presentsrecommendations from the police planning offi-cials who helped develop the flu pandemic plans ineach site. These “lessons from the field” may be ofparticular value to law enforcement and other gov-ernment officials starting the process of writingpandemic flu plans for their communities.

Start by gaining a thorough understandingof the threat. Before drafting protocols, it is imper-ative that those who are responsible for the plan-ning have a thorough understanding of the threat,including the impact a flu pandemic may have onthe community and on the department’s ability tofunction. Understanding the threat and the issuesthat will arise will help police officials to accuratelyassess the planning components and resourcesneeded, as well as to anticipate how a flu pandemic

may change the policing environment and depart-ment priorities.

Reach out to subject matter experts for help in the process. As with other emergency planning efforts, flu pandemic planning should be a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency effort. Policeplanning officials should reach out to other subject matter experts who are involved in thejurisdiction’s emergency planning, and engagethem in the police department’s education andplanning efforts. In all four sites, the police depart-ments participated in jurisdiction-wide planningefforts that involved public health and medical officials, who in turn were able to help the policedepartments educate themselves and develop theirown plans. In Toronto, for example, local andnational experts in the medical, legal and other relevant fields reviewed the police department’splan. And Toronto and Overland Park police offi-cials worked closely with the city’s public healthofficials to ensure that the citywide plan would bepractical and realistic.

Recommendationsfrom the Field

6

T

Build on existing relationships. To identifylocal subject matter experts, police officials couldreach out to public health or medical officials withwhom the department interacts on a routine basis.Several of the police departments in the PERF siteshad in-house medical professionals who weredeeply involved in the process of writing plans.Representatives from all four sites worked withpublic health officials at some point in the planningprocess. The Fairfax County Police Departmentinvolved public health officials with whom itworked during the 2001 anthrax attacks. Police offi-cials said that the anthrax investigation was the firsttime they had officially reached out to healthdepartment officials, and those relationships werehelpful as they sought out information aboutinfluenza pandemics and began coordinating plan-ning efforts. Similarly, the Toronto Police Serviceworked with public health officials and otherexperts with whom they had formed relationshipsduring the 2003 SARS outbreak in that city. Lessonslearned from the SARS experience were incorpo-rated into the flu pandemic plans.

Look for outside resources and promisingapproaches in other departments. Many resourcesare being developed to assist local officials in plan-ning for a public health emergency. For example,the Fairfax County Police Department’s planningcoordinator and Overland Park’s police chiefattended national and local conferences and sym-posiums, and used these events as an opportunityto make contact with national and local experts andothers involved in pandemic flu planning. Theinformation and resources provided during theseconferences and the contacts made helped bothofficials make informed planning decisions fortheir departments.

To date, very few local policing agencies havecompleted comprehensive plans for a flu pandemic,but as more police departments begin to move for-ward in the planning process, they may developresources and planning guidance that will proveuseful to other departments’ planning processes.Internet search engines also can be useful in finding

the most up-to-date information and in identifyinglaw enforcement agencies that have developed plans.

Identify relevant public health laws andauthorities. Police department personnel need tobecome familiar with the relevant public healthlaws governing any response to a flu pandemic,such as the laws that specify who has the authorityto declare a public health emergency, and any lawsthat give policing agencies special powers duringthis time. A good understanding of the role of lawenforcement in enforcing public health orders willhelp policing agencies know what will be expectedof them in enforcing quarantines and other sensi-tive matters. Departments may look to local publichealth officials for assistance in identifying relevantlaws and regulations and in determining how thisinformation will be incorporated into their internalflu pandemic response plans and training efforts, aswell as in multi-agency efforts.

Include other local criminal justice entitiesin the planning efforts. Recognize that the othercomponents of the justice system, such as courts,correctional agencies, and other law enforcementdepartments, will likely be impaired during a pan-demic flu. Work with other local criminal justiceentities to determine how each agency’s plans mayoverlap and affect those of other criminal justicesectors.

Set realistic expectations of the law enforce-ment role in a pandemic flu scenario. In writingpolice plans, be very clear about the ability of thedepartment to assist other agencies during a pan-demic flu. In any large-scale emergency, policeresources (and the resources of other first respon-ders) can quickly be overwhelmed. In the case of aflu pandemic, police departments are likely to facethe additional burden of operating with a reducedworkforce, as some of their own officers maybecome sick or require isolation after beingexposed to infected persons. A key part of the juris-diction-wide planning for a flu pandemic is toidentify the priority roles that only law enforcement

98 — Chapter 6. Recommendations from the Field


agencies can take, and to find alternatives to policeassistance where possible.

Be strategic in determining how staffinglosses may impact the functioning of the depart-ment. Work with each unit in the department toidentify its core functions, and think about how theactivities required to perform those core functionswould be affected during a flu pandemic. Also con-sider what outside services and resources thedepartment depends on for carrying out theseactivities, and ensure that those services andresources will be available. Identify police activitiesthat can be suspended if necessary, and decide atwhat point each activity would be curtailed as apandemic worsened.

Look for alternative ways to accomplish thefunctions that are critical and must be main-tained—for example, through use of technologyand teleworking (see below). Develop strategies forinforming the public about the suspension of non-critical law enforcement duties.

Identify the key skills needed to maintaincritical functions, and cross-train personnel toprovide backup. For critical functions, look forways to cross-train additional employees to be ableto perform these functions if necessary. Identify thespecial skills required to carry out the criticaldepartment functions—especially tasks carried outby small, highly specialized units—and then iden-tify other personnel or volunteers in the depart-ment who possess these skills or could be trained inthem. The London Metropolitan Police Serviceupdated a pre-existing database that contains thenames of employees with particular skills, rangingfrom training in disarming bombs to fluency inlanguages, motor vehicle repair skills, and the abil-ity to drive heavy trucks. These staffers could becalled on during an emergency to use their skills toperform functions they might not usually perform.

Plan for sustaining law enforcement opera-tions with minimum staffing over the long term.It may become difficult for departments to sustainoperations—even those that are given the highest

priority—for very long. Within a matter of weeks, adepartment could find itself operating with half itsnormal workforce. Officials need to consider howto supplement the department’s workforce, forexample by using volunteers. Also be aware of theneed to prevent burnout and fatigue among theemployees who do not become sick, some of whommay try to work many additional hours to helpmaintain the department’s critical functions. TheOverland Park chief said that he would resist mov-ing to 12-hour shifts for as long as possible to pre-vent employee fatigue.

Use existing plans, and incorporate only the new components that are needed during a pandemic flu. Planning for a pandemic flu can bevery similar to planning for other types of criticalincidents. While there are pandemic flu-specificcomponents that must be planned for (such as pre-venting disease transmission in the workplace), plansshould be flexible and applicable to other types ofpublic health emergencies. In London, for example,the overall emergency planning structure is “modu-lar.” Individual modules cover such topics as evacua-tion of the city, or how mortuaries should plan tohandle mass fatalities. Depending on the nature ofan emergency, different modules can be taken off theshelf and implemented. In developing pandemic fluplans, London police officials realized that their fluplan could also serve as a “human resource resilienceplan” that would be applicable to any event in whichthe police workforce is diminished.

Build on processes that are already internal-ized within the department. “Ramping up” opera-tions in response to large events—and subsequentlyscaling back—is a common practice for policedepartments. As more departments adopt Comp-Stat or other systems that involve strategically rede-ploying resources, such changes are becomingingrained in the daily operating culture of policing.Planning for a pandemic can build on these basicprinciples. However, it is important to note thatthere are some departmental functions that tradi-tionally have not needed to ramp up or down to anygreat extent, such as administrative functions and

building maintenance. Those units may need addi-tional training to become familiar with the con-cepts of scaling back operations.

Begin department education efforts as soonas possible. An educated workforce will betterunderstand the flu pandemic threat. That will helpreduce fear and ensure that if a flu pandemic begins,employees will adhere to good hygiene recommen-dations that could significantly dampen the spreadof the illness. Many educational resources alreadydeveloped by federal and state health agencies may be easily incorporated into your department’seducational efforts. Educate employees about hownew plans and policies fit within the existing emer-gency operations framework. Plans also need toensure that timely and accurate information will be provided to department personnel during a flu pan-demic. The degree to which employees understandpandemic flu will affect the impact of a flu pan-demic on the agency’s workforce, and how well it isable to communicate information about the threatand manage fear during interactions with the pub-lic. (See “Develop a public communication strategyin advance,” below.)

Communicate regularly throughout theplanning process (both internally and externally).Ongoing communications are imperative to main-taining momentum in the planning process and toensuring a coordinated response. Police departmentofficials should endeavor to obtain feedback fromagency personnel and meet regularly with othersinvolved in the local process, to review the plan andupdate each other on new planning efforts. Forexample, London uses regularly scheduled meetingsto facilitate continued discussion of its flu pandemicplan at the highest levels of authority.

Regularly update the plan. As new scientificinformation about pandemic flu becomes availableor as situations or resources change, departmentsshould update their plans and make the new versions available to all department personnel. Lon-don’s Metropolitan Police Service posts department

information and news updates on its Intranet,which personnel are instructed to check daily at the beginning of their shifts. MPS officials are con-sidering using this mechanism to communicateplan updates to their personnel. In Toronto, thePandemic Planning Committee meets every sixmonths (or as necessary) to discuss the flu pandemic plan, and the Police Service’s PublicSafety Unit is responsible for updating the planannually.

Exercise the plan. Incorporate lessonslearned and address components that need addi-tional work. Provisions of a pandemic flu planshould be exercised to familiarize personnel withtheir roles and responsibilities and to identify areasthat need additional work. Multi-agency testing ofthe plan will help identify any misconceptionsabout roles and responsibilities. Departmentsshould also incorporate lessons that they learn fromexercises or actual uses of the plan. For example,Toronto incorporated the lessons learned from its experience with SARS into its current publichealth emergency/pandemic flu plan. London’sPolice Service participated in several local andnational exercises of the city’s plan and identified afew areas for further development, such as localhandling of mass fatalities. London’s recent experi-ence with the Polonium-210 poisoning of Alexan-der Litvinenko underscored the importance ofobtaining accurate and reliable information aboutthe nature of a public health threat and the risk tofirst responders.

Use technology as a force multiplier. Be cre-ative in identifying ways in which technology mayassist during an emergency. Jurisdictions that havea capacity for “teleworking”—allowing employeesto access computer databases from remote loca-tions, including home—should consider how theycould use that capacity during a pandemic flu with-out compromising critical databases. Other strate-gic uses of technology, such as enabling residents toreport nonviolent crimes via the Internet or settingup special hotlines or telephone reporting units,



can lessen the demand on police personnel duringa flu pandemic or other critical incident.

Develop a public communication strategy inadvance. Work with public health officials todevelop messages and strategies for communicatingrisks to the community. Communications shouldinclude accurate and timely information andshould follow responsible risk communicationguidelines that will reduce unnecessary fear andpanic. Messages should be very clear in explainingthe threat, providing guidance on what the publicshould do in the event of an emergency, andemphasizing the importance of voluntary compli-ance with public health orders (such as self-quaran-tine and “social distancing” measures that aredesigned to prevent the congregation of people inmovie theaters, churches, nightclubs, or other con-fined spaces where contagion is likely).

Law enforcement personnel should be wellversed in how to describe the pandemic flu threatand the importance of voluntary compliance, sothey can improve public understanding in all oftheir contacts with members of the community.Fairfax County already has prepared pre-writtenmedia messages to inform the public about partic-ular types of incidents and events, and the policedepartment is helping to deliver public communi-cations through its community liaison officerswhen requested. Some departments recommendadditional training for key spokespersons on theissue.

Carefully consider the amount and type ofpersonal protective equipment (PPE) and emer-gency supplies needed, and consider staggeredpurchases so that equipment with a limited shelf-life will not expire all at once. Departments’ healthplanning officials need to work with other govern-ment and law enforcement agencies to determinewhat types of PPE are being stockpiled locally and

what the department should consider stockpilingon its own. Planning officials should carefullydetermine what is reasonable to stockpile, in lightof the anticipated need for various products andthe fact that some products have a limited shelf-life.This should be done with the assistance of theoccupational health department and/or within thecounty/state’s guidelines. When stockpiling PPE,Fairfax County recommends making staggeredpurchases to avoid a “lump sum” investment in PPEthat will all expire at the same time (thus requiringanother lump-sum investment to maintain thestockpile). Also, carefully consider which types ofPPE should remain in a central location and whichshould be immediately disseminated to personnel.Immediate dissemination of large quantities of PPEmay result in undue concern and misuse (or unnec-essary use) of the equipment, and will deplete thesupply. And some types of PPE can deteriorate ifleft in the trunk of a police vehicle, for example.1

Departments may consider setting up priorityagreements with vendors to supply additionalresources on an as-needed basis.

Review leave policies that may encourageemployees to report to work when sick or possiblyexposed. Law enforcement officials should reviewcurrent sick-leave and family-leave policies toensure that employees who are infected or who mayhave been exposed to the disease will not report towork. Officials in the studied sites noted thatinfected employees who report to work can domore harm than good if they infect other employ-ees. The Toronto Police Service has taken this a stepfurther, to the point of quarantining employeeswho have had an on-the-job exposure to a pan-demic flu virus. Based on the city’s experience withSARS, the policy provides that such employees willbe compensated as if they were “on duty” duringtheir regularly scheduled shifts. Toronto officialsbelieve this will encourage officers to report possible

1. See, for example, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/191518.htm, Guide for the Selection of PersonalProtection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, NIJ Guide 102-00. November 2002.

exposures and to comply with quarantine orders.However, London Metropolitan Police Service offi-cials noted that such policies need to be writtencarefully in order to avoid encouraging excessiveabsences.

Consider making recommendations thatemployees can share with family members (i.e.,create a family plan). Protecting the families ofpolice department personnel is critical to the conti-nuity of police operations. Including “family plans” ina pandemic flu plan can help ensure that the greatestnumber of employees possible will report for duty.With this in mind, Fairfax County and the county’spolice department have issued recommendations tohelp employees create family emergency plans. Theyhave also provided a list of recommended items forfamilies to stockpile for a pandemic flu, such aswater, canned food, antiseptic, and gloves.

C O N C LU S I O N

The experiences of these departments underscorethe need to approach the planning process system-atically and logically, beginning with a thoroughunderstanding of the issue. Lessons from the fieldindicate that department officials should focus ondeveloping a flexible plan that builds on currentpublic health recommendations specific to a pan-demic flu. Engaging and educating the department,as well as incorporating existing multi-agency plan-ning and emergency response efforts into the plan,will assist in the department’s preparation process.As one official noted, “The planning process is justas important as the outcome—you have to gothrough the educational process of understandingthe risk and thinking through the issues to trulyunderstand the impact. Then, you (as a depart-ment) are able to break it down to its most simpleelements.”


Chapter 7. List of Resources for Pandemic Flu Planning — 103

P O L I C E - S P E C I F I C L I N K S

The Bureau of Justice Assistance has compiled a listof flu pandemic resources that are specific to lawenforcement and public safety. Some of theresources include recommendations for flu pan-demic planning and discussion of law enforcementroles and how to properly carry out a quarantine.These and other resources can be found at theBureau of Justice Assistance’s links below:www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/pandemic_main.htmlandwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/resources.html

R E L AT E D L I N K S

This link is to the U.S. government’s pandemic flusite, a massive resource that is managed by theDepartment of Health and Human Services. It hastips on flu pandemic planning for various organiza-tions at the federal, state, and local levels regardingflu pandemic planning in the workplace, schools,health care agencies, and communities.www.pandemicflu.gov/

This link is to the World Health Organiza-tion’s section on Avian Influenza. It containsreports, news and various other resources. It alsolists contacts and cooperating partners who areworking on this issue.www.who.int/topics/avian_influenza/en

This is a link to the National Sheriffs’ Associ-ation’s flu pandemic resource center, which pro-vides a list of various government flu pandemicsites that are pertinent for law enforcement:www.usaonwatch.org/PandemicFlu/Resources4

LawEnforcement_PublicSafety.php

This is a link to the White House’s flu pan-demic planning section. It has various reports on flupandemics and pandemic flu planning, including asix-month status report on the implementation ofthe national strategy for pandemic influenza.www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu

This is a link to the American Red Cross pan-demic flu section, which provides some information

List of Resources for Pandemic Flu Planning

7

about pandemic flu, how to prepare for and respondto a pandemic flu, and how to care for someone whois infected with a pandemic flu.www.redcross.org/news/ds/panflu/index.html

The following is a list of websites for the policedepartments that participated in the PERF study:

Fairfax County, VA:Police: www.fairfaxcounty.gov/police/Health Department: www.fairfaxcounty.gov/hd/Office of Emergency Management: www.fairfaxcounty.gov/oem/Pandemic Flu Plan: www.fairfaxcounty.gov/emergency/pandemicflu/countyplan.pdf

Toronto:www.torontopolice.on.ca/Health Department: www.toronto.ca/health/index.htmOffice of Emergency Management:www.toronto.ca/wes/techservices/oem/index.htmPandemic Flu Plan: www.toronto.ca/health/pandemicflu/pdf/toronto_pandemic_influenza_plan.pdf

Overland Park, KS:www.opkansas.org/_Res/Police_and_Fire/Police_Department/index.cfmHealth Department: www.health.jocogov.org/Office of Emergency Management:www.jocoem.org/default.htmPandemic Flu Plans: www.jocoflu.org/docs/take%205%20flyer%2005-25-06.pdf

London:www.met.police.uk/Health Department: www.dh.gov.uk/en/index.htmOffice of Emergency Management: www.londonprepared.gov.uk/Pandemic Flu Plans:www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/flu_pandemic_response_plan_v2.pdf

A D D I T I O NA L R E S O U R C E S

Continuity of Operations Planning(COOP)Avian Influenza (Tabletop Exercise Number 1)Harvard School of Public Healthwww.hsph.harvard.edu/hcphp/products/exercises/HSPH-CPHP%20Avian%20&%20Pandemic%20Influenza%20Tabletop.pdf

Federal GuidelinesModel Operational Guidelines for Disease Exposure Control The Center for Strategic and International Studies,Homeland Security Programwww.immunizecaadults.org/healthcare/documents/draft_homeland_security_guidelines.pdf

Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan Department of Homeland Securitywww.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Quick_Reference_Guide_5-22-06.pdf

PolicyLarge-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United States Barbera, Macintyre and Gostinwww.jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/286/21/2711.pdf

Quarantines: The Law Enforcement RoleThe Police Chiefhttp://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=807&issue_id=22006

Risk CommunicationAnthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical andPublic Health Response Gursky, Inglesby and O’Toolewww.liebertonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/153871303766275763?cookieSet=1

104 — Chapter 7. List of Resources for Pandemic Flu Planning

Crisis Emergency Risk Communicationby Leaders for Leaders Centers for Disease Control and Preventionwww.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/leaders.pdf

Communicating in a Crisis: Risk CommunicationGuidelines for Public Officials Department of Health and Human Serviceswww.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/RiskComm.pdf

Disease, Disaster, and Democracy:The Public’s Stake in Health Emergency Planning Schoch-Spana, Monica, et al.www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.313

Obvious or Suspected, Here or Elsewhere,Now or Then: Paradigms of Emergency Events Sandman, Peterhttp://www.psandman.com/articles/obvious.pdf

Pandemic Flu Public Affairs Table Top Exercise Departments of Health and Human Services,Homeland Security, and Agriculturehttp://www.ag-security.com/Library/Business%20Continuity/Pandemic%20Flu%20Table%20Top%20-%202005.pdf

Preparing for a Pandemic Influenza:A Primer for Governors and Senior State Officials National Governors Associationwww.nga.org/Files/pdf/0607PANDEMICPRIMER.PDF

The Pandemic Influenza Plan:Implications for Local Law Enforcement Colwell, Lee. The Police Chiefwww.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=784&issue_id=12006

Chapter 7. List of Resources for Pandemic Flu Planning — 105

About the Authors — 107

Andrea Morrozoff Luna, M.A., PERF Chief ofStaff, is the pandemic project director and the coau-thor of the Fairfax County and London case stud-ies. Ms. Luna’s work at PERF includes directingfederally-funded training and technical assistanceprojects. Currently, she is part of a team that isworking on a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)project to develop guidelines and other resourceson police planning for a public health emergency,based on promising practices in the field. This proj-ect focuses on three areas of planning: occupationalmedicine, communication of information aboutrisks to the public, and continuity of operationsplans. Ms. Luna was also one of four authors of therecent BJA/PERF publication, The Role of LawEnforcement in Public Health Emergencies: SpecialConsiderations for an All-Hazards Approach. Ms.Luna is also working on projects related to otherpolicing topics, including immigration enforce-ment, violent crime reduction, witness intimida-tion, and police organizational effectiveness.

Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Luna served in anumber criminal justice-related research and pro-gram administration positions. She directed thegrants and planning section of a state law enforce-ment agency and served as a state coordinator anddirector of a federal block grant program for police.She has also managed and participated in severalfederally funded research programs on crime andjustice issues. She earned her master’s degree fromthe University of Memphis and a bachelor’s degreefrom Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Corina Solé Brito, M.A., a senior associate withPERF’s Homeland Security Unit, wrote the Overland

Park and Toronto case studies. She is currentlyworking on the BJA project regarding pandemicplanning guidelines for police, and is focusing onoccupational health and risk communicationissues. Ms. Solé Brito was a coauthor of theBJA/PERF All-Hazards report cited above. Sherecently oversaw a review of the City of Chicago’sEmergency Operations Plan, in which she helpedrepresentatives of more than 40 city agenciesupdate their individual plans. She also helped bringthe Chicago plan into compliance with NIMS standards.

Ms. Solé Brito also recently worked with sev-eral large city agencies across the country todevelop a communications tool that would allowthem to share information about preparing for andresponding to critical incidents. She was the leadauthor of PERF’s “Partnering to Prepare for andRespond to Critical Incidents.” She is also workingto finalize PERF’s curriculum Improving theResponse to Elder Abuse: A Curriculum for LawEnforcement Agencies.

Ms. Solé Brito served as PERF’s CommunityPolicing Consortium Management Team represen-tative for several years and helped create, deliver andoversee problem-solving training and technicalassistance across the country. As a senior programmanager with the Pacific Institute for Research andEvaluation, she managed data collection and pres-entation of a document entitled “Costs and Conse-quences of Substance Use”; oversaw a statewideproject on impaired driving; and trained lawenforcement representatives in electronic sobrietycheckpoint data collection. She has been publishedin various media, including monographs, textbooks,training curricula, and conference proceedings.

About the Authors

108 — About the Authors

She has also edited several publications for PERF,including three of the four Problem-OrientedPolicing Conference Proceedings books, thenewsletter Subject to Debate, and various problem-solving policing curricula. Ms. Solé Brito has anM.A. in Criminology from the University of Mary-land at College Park.

Elizabeth Sanberg, a PERF research assistant withthe Homeland Security Unit, co-authored the Fair-fax County and London case studies. Currently,she is working on several research and technicalassistance projects. Ms. Sanberg is the lead assistanton PERF’s immigration initiative, part of 2007Motorola Critical Issues in Policing Series,which explores the debate regarding local lawenforcement of federal immigration laws. She isalso the lead author of a guide to occupationalhealth and safety for law enforcement officers,which is part of a project funded by the Bureau ofJustice Assistance to develop guides on pandemicplanning and preparedness for law enforcement.

Ms. Sanberg contributes to the “Meth 360” pro-gram, a methamphetamine demand reductionstrategy created by the Partnership for a Drug-FreeAmerica, sponsored by the Justice Department’sOffice of Community Oriented Policing Services.She also is working on a project examining the rela-tionship between law enforcement and state andlocal intelligence fusion centers, sponsored by theDepartment of Homeland Security.

Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Sanberg worked atthe Justice Research and Statistics Association,where she conducted research on topics includingthe Weed and Seed program, information sharingtechnology, sexual assault, and crime victim assis-tance. She has worked for the Center for HomicideResearch, where she researched gay, lesbian, bisex-ual and transgender homicide. Ms. Sanberg is cur-rently pursuing her Master’s Degree in Justice, Lawand Society at the American University. Shereceived her bachelor’s degree in Sociology—Law,Crime, and Deviance and Political Science from theUniversity of Minnesota.

About the Police Executive Research Forum — 109

he Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)is a professional organization of progressive chiefexecutives of city, county and state law enforcementagencies who collectively serve more than 50 per-cent of the U.S. population. In addition, PERF hasestablished formal relationships with internationalpolice executives and law enforcement organiza-tions from around the globe. Membership includespolice chiefs, superintendents, sheriffs, state policedirectors, university police chiefs, public safetydirectors, and other law enforcement professionals.Established in 1976 as a nonprofit organization,PERF is unique in its commitment to the applica-tion of research in policing and the importance ofhigher education for police executives. Besides acommitment to police innovation and profession-alism, PERF members must hold a four-year collegedegree.

PERF continues to conduct some of the mostinnovative police and criminal justice research andprovides a wide variety of management and techni-cal assistance programs to police agencies through-out the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work oncommunity and problem-oriented policing, racialprofiling, use of force, less-lethal weapons, andcrime reduction strategies has earned it a promi-nent position in the police community. PERF is oneof the founding agencies of the Community Polic-ing Consortium and the Commission on Accredita-tion for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).PERF continues to work toward increased profes-sionalism and excellence in the field through itspublications and training programs. PERF spon-sors and conducts the Senior Management Institutefor Police (SMIP). This program provides compre-hensive professional management and executive

development training to police chiefs and lawenforcement executives. Convened annually inBoston, SMIP instructors include professors fromleading universities, with the core faculty from Har-vard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

PERF’s success is built on the active involve-ment of its members. The organization also hastypes of membership that allow the organization tobenefit from the diverse views of criminal justiceresearchers, law enforcement professionals of allranks, and others committed to advancing policingservices to all communities. As a nonprofit organi-zation, PERF is committed to the application ofresearch in policing and to promoting innovationthat will enhance the quality of life in our commu-nities. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery ofpolice services and the effectiveness of crime con-trol through the exercise of strong national leader-ship, the public debate of criminal justice issues, thedevelopment of a body of research about policing,and the provision of vital management services toall police agencies.

PERF has developed and published some ofthe leading literature in the law enforcement field.Recently, PERF released two publications on con-temporary law enforcement issues. The books—entitled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use ofForce and Police Management of Mass Demonstra-tions: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches—serve as practical guides to help police leaders makemore informed decisions. In addition, PERF hasreleased a series of white papers on terrorism in thelocal law enforcement context, Protecting YourCommunity from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, which examined such issues aslocal-federal partnerships, working with diverse

About the Police ExecutiveResearch Forum

T

110 — About the Police Executive Research Forum

communities, bioterrorism, and intelligence shar-ing. Other recent publications include Managing aMultijurisdictional Case: Identifying Lessons Learnedfrom the Sniper Investigation (2004) and Commu-nity Policing: The Past, Present and Future (2004).Other PERF titles include the only authoritativework on racial profiling, Racial Profiling: A Princi-pled Response (2001); Recognizing Value in Policing(2002); The Police Response to Mental Illness (2002);Citizen Review Resource Manual (1995); ManagingInnovation in Policing (1995); Crime AnalysisThrough Computer Mapping (1995); And Justice

For All: Understanding and Controlling Police Use of Deadly Force (1995); Why Police OrganizationsChange: A Study of Community-Oriented Policing(1996); and Police Antidrug Tactics: New Approachesand Applications (1996). PERF publications areused for training and promotion exams and toinform police professionals about innovativeapproaches to community problems. The hallmarkof the program is translating the latest research and thinking about a topic into police practices that can be tailored to the unique needs of a jurisdiction.

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

About Motorola — 111

About Motorola

otorola is a Fortune 100 global com-munications leader that provides seamless mobilityproducts and solutions across broadband, embed-ded systems and wireless networks. Seamlessmobility means you can reach the people, thingsand information you need in your home, auto,workplace and all spaces in between. Seamlessmobility harnesses the power of technology conver-gence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective andflexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S.$35.3 billion in 2005.

Today, Motorola is comprised of three busi-nesses: Connected Home Solutions; MobileDevices; and Networks & Enterprise.

Connected Home Solutions provides a scala-ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery ofbroadband services that keeps consumersinformed, entertained and connected. Its technol-ogy enables network operators and retailers to cre-ate and execute on new business opportunities by

providing innovative products and services to thehome.

Mobile Devices offers market-changing iconsof personal technology—transforming the deviceformerly known as the cell phone into a universalremote control for life. A leader in multi-mode,multi-band communications products and tech-nologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sellsand services wireless subscriber and server equip-ment for cellular systems, portable energy storageproducts and systems, servers and software solutionsand related software and accessory products.

Networks & Enterprise is a leading providerof end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice anddata communications, and information solutions.Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-criticalsecure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broad-band systems to meet the needs of public safety,government, private, service provider and enter-prise customers worldwide.

M

For more information go to www.motorola.com.

Police Executive Research Forum1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930Washington, DC 20036202-466-7820202-466-7826 faxwww.PoliceForum.org

We are grateful to Motorola for its support of the Critical Issues in Policing Series

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project

Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force

Police Management of Mass Demonstrations

A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America

Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat:Guidelines for Consideration

Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

Documents

Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies ... · sioner Stephen House (London Metropolitan Police Service), Tom Imrie (former manager of the Toronto Police Service’s