Poli - Outline 4

8/12/2019 Poli - Outline 4

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REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS III

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III(ArcadioIvan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located inBarangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, a nd was bounded in the Northeast by L ot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C.Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandonedroad, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended hisapplication for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of theproperty. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Paraaque (the City)opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; thatthe property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the propertywas not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not ber egistered in favor of the applicants for thereason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

The RTC granted the application for land registration. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), appealed. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code torespondents benefit. Article 457of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion whichthey gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronouncedthat on the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of theParaaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins thesame property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from

his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, and stated that itcould not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which theygradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, ArcadioIvan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the ParaaqueRiver which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property isowned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother The Republic submits, however, that theapplication by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact thatrespondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque River.Issue: Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD1529)

Held: NO. (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of thewater-belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river isnot accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparianowner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.)

CIR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA

Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the

time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her

death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the

Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal

properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum

of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties

in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer

of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to

section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of

Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the

sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria

Cerdeira..ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes.

HELD: Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that

foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose

transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a

similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our

government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law

has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.

CABANAS VS PILAPIL

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also

indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his

brother Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and Francisco then took charge

of Florentinos benefits for the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint

seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor of her and for her to be the childs trustee and the

childs benefits. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and

obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy? HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any

member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a

litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be

the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the

mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in

consonance with this countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent

(mother) is observed.

LAUREL VS MISA

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the

enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of

treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the

correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty

over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT

BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION
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HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their

legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty

of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate

government.

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory

occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights,

duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during milita ry occupation.

DISSENT:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full

harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ]

as part of law of the nation.

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power

whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government, if it is legitimate for

the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabit ants such obedience as may be necessary for t he

security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration of the country.

PERALTA VS. DIRECTOR

Pet iti one r, a mem ber of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was prosecuted for thecrime of robbery as defined by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. TheCourt of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7 promulgated by thePresident of theRepublic found him guilty and sentenced to serve time. The petition for habeas corpus isbased on the ground that theCourts existence was void ab initio because it was created as a political

instrumentality under the command of the Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate hisconstitutional rights; that the penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen is of theopinion that the petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court istinged withpolitical complexion, that the procedure does not afford a fair trial and violatesconstitutional right of accused person sunder a legitimate Constitution. The courts of the opinion that: As to the validity of the creation of the Court of S pecial and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, The only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance.It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader inthe occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirelyfrom the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through

Special tribunals, whose authority and procedure are defined in the military codeof the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of theoccupied district." (Taylor, InternationalPublic Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines,being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to

create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as towhether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of

applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexionor not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to thevalidity of the creation of the court in question.The validity of the sentencerendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon theherein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. It appears clear that it was within the power andcompetence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic ofthe Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses byimprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances

promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death asmaximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity,incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, theprotection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. Thelast question is the legal effect of there occupation of the Philippines and restoration of the CommonwealthGovernment; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy,the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra,that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceasedto be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrineto the present case, the sentence, which convicted the petitioner of a crime of apoliticalcomplexion, must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso fact upon the reoccupation or liberation of thePhilippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

SEAFDC VS. NLRC

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a department of aninternational organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreemententered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate. Lacanilao in hi scapacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to thefinancial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD'sfailure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in favor ofLazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case? NO

Held: Petition Granted

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an internationalagency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDECincluding its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whoseterritory its office is located.

MINUCHER VS CAKhosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manilacame to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agentsin his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied byprivate respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-upcharges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

ISSUE:


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WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

RULING:The SC DENIED the petition.

Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of theinterests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, arevested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertainingwhether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of

diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends anddevelopments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departmentsin the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of anerroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over hisperson, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of aforeign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of aforeign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in hisofficial capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without itsconsent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is notaccorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem,non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. Theimplication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act tosatisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the

suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can beestablished that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is anindispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur,if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bustoperation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be saidto have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

DEPT. OF AGRA VS. NLRC

Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security servicesto be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployedby Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for

underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holidaypay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for thepayment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal thedecision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforceand execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff leviedon execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflectsnothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten

rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. Asovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against

the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. TheState may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may bemade through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itselfcommences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, thegovernment is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself ofits sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be

made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in itsproprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed tohave actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where thecontract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity whenit entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressor implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first bebrought to the Commission on Audit.

SANDERS VS VERIDIANO

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanentpart-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to thepertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the changeof employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City acomplaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputationsagainst the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been suedfor damages.

RULING:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were

performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services departmentof NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, workassignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the officialcharacter of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of theUnited States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless thegovernment sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of AuthorityFacts: The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background: Wiki), together

with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of theorders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republicof the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines

May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and officialcapacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mendiola_massacrehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mendiola_massacre


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Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called

"genuine agrarian reform" The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and

demands such as: giving lands for free to farmers zero retention of lands by landlords stop amortizations of land payments Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987 On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then Pr esident

Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting Tension mounted the next day The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the

employees from going inside their offices On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group

decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng MaralitangLungsod (KPML)

Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPAelements, and that an insurrection was impending

Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm

From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium brokeloose" After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo) 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1987 as

follows The march did not have any permit The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by law) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law It is not clear who started the firing The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water

cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because: there was no order to use them they were incorrectly prepositioned they were out of range of the marchers The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals

shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police

District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par.4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985

Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for

inciting sedition Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make effective

use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola: Gen. Ramon E. Montao

Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres

Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz Col. Cezar Nazareno Maj. Filemon Gasmin Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated

by the government It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the

government No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines,

together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its

consent Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver Motion for Reconsideration was also denied Issues: Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against the

State with its consent) Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to

indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State hasconsented to be sued

Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the StateHolding: No.

This is not a suit against the State with its consent. No.Ratio: Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically

attaches to the State The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action for

litigation; it does not bind the State immediately President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver

by the State Some instances when a suit against the State is proper: When the Republic is sued by name; When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability

will belong not to the officer but to the government Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during the incident,

their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the crowd instead No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

US VS RUIZ

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. Thebase was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and theUnited States.

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio deGuzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests basedon the letters received from the US.


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In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did notqualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance ratingon a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collinsand Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is toorder the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event thatspecific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to p ay damages. The companyalso asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from enteringinto contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction ofthis court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter ofthe complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant UnitedStates of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit forthe causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition tothe issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but tono avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-Mfor lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able toinvoke state immunity

Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and

Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State

without its consent or w aiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independenceand equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantlydeveloping and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary todistinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial andproprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil(sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out ofcommercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stateddifferently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus bedeemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It doesnot apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projectsare an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and thePhilippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nordedicated to commercial or business purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but thelegal nature of the act

MAKATI VS CA

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral

Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which

the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of

P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the

petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for

reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to

do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law,

citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to

the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue : Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of

P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public

fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is

merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and

execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market

fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and

functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has

passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy

under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has

been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising

from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised

within the bounds of fair play and justice.

FONTANILLA VS MALIAMAN

FACTS

On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a

government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for

the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia

Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was

ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for

hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and

attorneys fees of 20% of the total award.

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily

proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is


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therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they

have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990.

NIA believes this bases this on:

PD 552 amended some provisions

of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)

The case of Angat River Irrigation

System v. Angat RiverWorkers Union

Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a

governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended

to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting

opinionheld that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions.

The Angat dissenting opinion:

Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did

stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since hisservices were necessary and

desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had

acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause.

The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been

promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.

ISSUE

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the

government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its

driver, who was not its special agent

HELD: YES

Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary

or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter

connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.

The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true

that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public

welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was

created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation

systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the

community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only

incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government,

thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:

Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporateis hereby created which shall be known as the National

Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its

principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper

conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis).

Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:

(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under

its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation,

maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the

extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction


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and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation

development under section 2 hereof;

Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then

on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land,

and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is

levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .

The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.

It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or

conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain

subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law , insofar as

they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION : The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency wi th a

juridica l personal ity separa te and d istinct f rom t he governmen t. It is not a mere agency of the govern ment but a

corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the

negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

ACCORDINGL Y, the Motion for Reconsiderat ion dated Janu ary 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The

decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.

DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for

damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing.

The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for to rt committed byits employeesonly when it acts through a special agent .

COTABATO VS. GRP

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government andthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country wherethere has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. Itmust uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but itmust do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by thatsame Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through theChairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreementon the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in KualaLumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion ofpetitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued aTemporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreementsbetween the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, theGRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, theysigned the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed asG.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction andTemporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek tocompel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including itsattachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA- AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declaredunconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of theMemorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered thatconsultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUESNos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,

Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of ful l disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriateremedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial orpolitical subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation ofRepublic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & ChapterVII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]


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If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, andthe Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland isa justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources,and Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions orto resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicialreview to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendentalimportance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisitelocus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of theGRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception tothe "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptionalcharacter of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide thebench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreementon Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can berenegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared tothe original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no seriouschallenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Courtfound that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate noticeto the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS

funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, andthe identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subjectof the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carryout the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of thelegal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. Itillustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but thevery concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, areunconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on itsway to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Documents

Poli - Outline 4