Poetic Justice of the Stranger

8/10/2019 Poetic Justice of the Stranger

1/16

Cardozo School of Law

Palais de Justice and Poetic Justice in Albert Camus' "The Stranger"Author(s): Ernest SimonSource: Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 1991), pp. 111-125Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/743503 .Accessed: 11/12/2013 16:03

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press and Cardozo School of Law are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 24. 157.45.226 on Wed, 11 Dec 20 13 16:03:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucalhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/743503?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/743503?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal


2/16

Ilov

P a l a i s de usticea n d P o e t i c Justice

in A l b e r t CamusT h e Stranger

Ernest Simon

Richard Weisberg1 and Richard A. Posner2 address from thepoint of view of the jurist the ever-simmering question of Meursault'sguilt or innocence in Albert Camus' The Stranger. Weisberg argues thecase for Meursault's nnocence. He finds "no moral aberration" n the

protagonist of Part I (116), where Camus "builds a portrait of a manwith his own system of ... positive values," who "partakes f the freeflow of human existence with honesty, if not perfect Cartesianrationality." 120) He absolves Meursault f guilt for the murder of theArab and speculates that "in an American court, Meursault's ack ofreal premeditation would have formed the basis of a viable defense"(121), and "he would have been convicted of manslaughter." 122)Posner focuses on Meursault's guilt and takes Camus to task for"inviting he reader to take Meursault's art despite his crime and lackof remorse,

by depictinghim as victim rather than killer and

bydepersonalizing the real victim." (89) Posner enthusiasticallyendorses Rend Girard's argument3 hat Camus, in his portrayal of thetrial, indulged his "contempt or judges," and for this purpose neededthe paradoxical igure of an "innocent murderer." Posner concludes:"This analysis shows how little The Stranger has really to do with lawand how much it has to do with a form of neoromanticism in whichcriminals are made heroes." (90)

As lawyers, Weisberg and Posner share a central interest inthe link between law in reality and law in fiction. This concernprompts them to take the trial literally. Yet, Camus, commenting onThe Stranger n his Carnets of 1942, warned that "Le rdalisme est unmot vide de sens .... Je ne m'en suis pas soucid. S'il fallait donnerune forme a mon ambition, je parlerais au contraire de symbole."4(Realism is a word devoid of meaning .... I took no account of it. If Iwere to give a form to my intentions, I would, rather, speak ofsymbol.) The terms by which both legal commentators assessMeursault's uilt or innocence are: their judgment of the assumptions

-111

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/16

of the law and its representatives, he fairness of the legal procedures,and the values embodied in the investigating magistrate and the

prosecutor. Weisberg equates the law with "regimentation" 122),stating that, in the eyes of society, "the protagonist's capital offense... is his being-against-the-law, ot his act against the Arab." 122)Posner, on the other hand, sees the trial as "a sinister farce in whichthe defendant is condemned not for having murdered he Arab but forrejecting bourgeois values." (87)

My thesis is that we can assess Meursault's guilt and/orinnocence only if we understand his trial not as a mimesis of legalprocess, but as a metaphor for another kind of trial in which his

particular kind of guilt -- a guilt that, realistically, cannot be formallysubmitted to a court of law -- is examined and evaluated.

Jean-Marie Apostolides has pointed out that the Frenchclassical theater, particularly Moliere's comedies, "offered a space forsimulation where new behaviors were subjected to imaginary esting,by trial and error."5 These comedies castigate behavior that, likeavarice or philandering, s beyond the purview of the law: "Althoughthis behavior may flout the moral code, it is not clearly illegal."6 InThe Stranger, Camus uses a court to examine and judge not the actualcrime, but the kind of behavior that has traditionally been judged byliterature, because it escapes the law's jurisdiction.

Camus may have been aware of this affinity between his storyand Moliere's comedies. As the first court session is about to open,Meursault emarks about the row of jurors acing him:

Je n'ai eu qu'une impression: j'dtais devant unebanquette de tramway et tous ces voyageursanonymes 6piaient le nouvel arrivant pour en

apercevoir les ridicules. Je sais bien que c'dtait uneidde niaise puisque ici ce n'dtait pas le ridiculequ'ils cherchaient, mais le crime. Cependant ladiffdrence n'est pas grande ... (1185)

(I had only one impression: I was facing abench in a streetcar and all these anonymoustravelers were scrutinizing he new passenger to findhis ridiculous traits. I know very well that this was asilly idea, for here it was not ridiculousness theywere looking for but criminality. Still, the differenceis not that great ....)

This passage also suggests that Meursault s about to undergocastigation by ridicule as well as by judicial process -- a humiliationthat befalls him (1198) and some of the witnesses (Pdrez, 1190;CUleste, 1191; Masson and Salamano, 1192) in the course of the

-112,



4/16


5/16

Your salary s modest. And, all in all, she was happierhere.)

This is at worst a lie, at best a pious exaggeration, since weknow that Madame Meursault was still a vigorous woman who, on herevening walks with Pdrez, could tackle the four-kilometer ound tripfrom the home to the village. Salamano, too, supports Meursault'sexcuses after informing him that the neighborhood had judged himseverely for putting his mother in the home: "Et 'asile, du moins, onse fait des camarades" (and at least at the home one can makefriends), echoing the director's earlier remarks.

As witnesses at the trial, however, both the director andSalamano, despite their good will, give damaging testimony. Onefunction of the trial, then, is to break down this complicity in theillusion of innocence that Meursault had effortlessly obtained fromothers and in turn extended to them, as when he agreed withRaymond's elf-exonerating assessment of his brutality o his mistress,"C'est elle qui m'a manqud" (she's the one who did me wrong),echoing his 'Ce n'dtait pas de ma faute" (It was not my fault) earlier nPart .

We are all each other's "copains" buddies) and accomplicesin the claim of innocence,8 as Camus insists elsewhere as well:Clamence, in The Fall, develops this idea of complicity and pairs itwith guilt, for only the guilty need accomplices. "Je n'ai plus d'amis, jen'ai que des complices" (I no longer have friends, I have onlyaccomplices), says Clamence, describing one of the consequences ofhis self-recognition.9 Later, he remarks:

Chacun exige d'etre innocent,' tout prix, meme si,

pour cela, il faut accuser le genre humain et le ciel.... Si vous dites a un criminel que sa faute ne tientpas a sa nature ni

' son caract're, mais a demalheureuses irconstances, l vous en sera violemmentreconnaissant. 1517)

(We all claim to be innocent, at any price,even if, to this end, we have to accuse both heavenand humankind .... If you tell a criminal that hisfault lies in neither his nature nor his character, butin unfortunate circumstances, he'll be

vehementlygrateful o you.)Meursault's riendly witnesses try to introduce the excuse Clamencelater calls "unfortunate ircumstances." The good Cdleste says "Pourmoi, c'est un malheur. Un malheur, out le monde sait ce que c'est; ;avous laisse sans ddfense;" (1191) (For me, it's a misfortune. A

1 1 4



6/16

misfortune, everybody knows what that is; it leaves you defenseless).Raymond claims that Meursault's presence at the beach was "un

hasard" a matter of chance).Weisberg, in espousing the point of view of the defense,echoes Meursault's riendly witnesses: "the natural environment onthe day of the murder -- coupled with the slight drunkenness rom theluncheon wine ... -- did in effect rob him of his free will." (121) Heinsists, indeed, that Meursault's rime stems from neither his naturenor his character, stressing his "positive values," his honesty, hiscompassion (Salamano), his loyalty (Raymond), and even hisenjoyment of everyday labor (120), thus echoing the defense

attorney's presentation of his client as a model son, a loyal employee,a man who is well-liked and sensitive to others' misfortunes. ButCamus dismisses this portrait as unconvincing, ineffectual, and nomore faithful to reality than the prosecutor's diatribes. Posner, on theother hand, in his unequivocal condemnation of Meursault, spousesthe state's position to the point of writing a weighted summary of PartI (86-87) that parallels the prosecutor's account -- which we know tobe false -- and distorts Meursault's ife in precisely the same way. Andwhen Judge Posner opines that "a case can be made that he is apsychopath, utterly self-absorbed and incapable of any feeling for hisfellow-human beings

...." (89), he puts himself in the untenable

position of the shopkeeper of The Plague, whose reaction to a newsitem concerning a young office worker who has killed an Arab on abeach proposes a solution of sweeping simplicity: "Si l'on mettaittoute cette racaille en prison ... les honnetes gens pourraientrespirer" (1262). (If they put all that rabble in jail, ... decent folkscould breathe more freely.) In Camus, the ambiguity of guilt andinnocence is not so easily resolved; by ignoring the author's ironicsignposts, Weisberg takes the part of an accomplice, Posner of anexecutioner.

The legal process, epitomized in the prosecutor's speeches,labels Meursault as "criminel de nature et de caractere" and hencedestroys the tacit complicity in innocence that has otherwise markedMeursault's ife.10This labeling may be an arbitrary, nfair, and deadlyform of regimentation, as Weisberg claims; but it forces Meursault olook at himself in the unfamiliar and hitherto unbearable light of

culpability.That is

why,when he

finallydoes stare at his reflection in

his tin plate, he has a schizoid dxperience:Il m'a sembld que mon image restait sdrieuse alorsque j'essayais de lui sourire. Je l'ai agitde devantmoi. J'ai souri et elle a gardd e meme air sdvere ettriste. (1183)

(It seemed to me that my reflection remained

5



7/16

serious even as I was trying to smile at it. I jiggled itbefore my eyes. I smiled and it kept the same stern

and sad expression.)A moment later, however, Meursault becomes acutely conscious of hissituation, of the meaning of being in prison, that is, of his new identityas a "coupable" (a guilty one), and the reflection is again faithful tohis self. For the first time, he recognizes his voice as his own:

Le jour finissait et c'dtait 'heure dont je ne veux pasparler, I'heure sans nom, oi' les bruits du soirmontaient de tous les dtages de la prison dans un

cortege de silence. Je me suis approchd de lalucarne et, dans la derniere lumiere, j'ai contempldune fois de plus mon image. Elle dtait toujourssdrieuse, et quoi d'dtonnant puisque, a ce moment,je l'dtais aussi? Mais en meme temps, et pour lapremiere fois depuis des mois, j'ai entendudistinctement le son de ma voix. Je l'ai reconnuepour celle qui rdsonnait ddjia depuis de longs joursa mes oreilles et j'ai compris que pendant tout cetemps j'avais parld seul. (1183)

(The day was ending and it was the hour Idon't want to speak of, the nameless hour, when thesounds of evening rose from all levels of the prisonin a train of silence. I went to the window and, in thelast light, I contemplated once more my reflection. Itwas still serious, and no wonder, since, at thatmoment, so was I. But at the same time, and for thefirst time in months, I distinctly heard the sound ofmy voice. I recognized it as the voice that had beensounding in my ears for many long days and Iunderstood that during all that time I had beenspeaking to myself.)

Meursault's ncreased understanding emerges only graduallyduring the legal process. At its beginning, the examining magistrate,brandishing a crucifix, exclaims: "Les criminels qui sont venus devantmoi ont toujours pleurd devant cette image de la douleur." (Thecriminals who have come before me have always wept before thisimage of suffering.)11 Meursault eacts with:

J'allais rdpondre que c'dtait justement parce qu'ils'agissait de criminels. Mais j'ai pensd que moi aussij'dtais comme eux. C'dtait une idde &quoi je nepouvais me faire. (1175-76, emphasis added)

1 1 6



8/16

(I was about to answer that that was precisely because theywere criminals. But then I thought that I too was like them. It was an

idea I couldn't get used to.)He begins to accept the notion of his culpability only well into thetrial, when he senses the audience's revulsion: "J'ai senti alorsquelque chose qui soulevait la salle et, pour la premiere fois, j'aicompris que j'dtais coupable (emphasis added). (Then I sensed

something that aroused the courtroom and, for the first time, Iunderstood that I was guilty.) Thus the trial serves both to apply toMeursault from without the label of culpability, and to induce him to

acceptand internalize it as

partof his altered identity. Yet Meursault

does not discard his former identity. He remains attached to the

supposedly carefree, natural creature whose speech was silence,whose season was eternal summer, and whose playground was thebeach; otherwise, his speech of self-justification to the priest at theend of the novel would be empty and meaningless. But he now beginsto understand that his former identity was incomplete, inadequate.

Caligula, looking into his mirror an the end of Camus' play(the second version of which is contemporary with the novel)

exclaims: "ma libertd n'est pas la bonne" (my freedom is not the rightone); Meursault, looking into his tin plate, might say to himself: "Myinnocence was not the right one; my happiness was not the goodone." His kind of innocence, based as it was on the treacherousequilibrium of neutrality, and his kind of happiness, foundedprimarily on sensual enjoyment, were terribly fragile. He recognizesthis in a flash, without yet a clear, detailed understanding, when hesays after firing the fifth shot, "J'ai compris que j'avais d6truitl'dquilibre du jour, le silence exceptionnel d'une plage ou j'avais dtd

heureux. (I understood that I had destroyed the balance of the day,the exceptional silence of a beach where I had been happy.) Throughhis trial, understood as a testing of his identity, Meursault, this manwith half a name, is brought to understand that his former life ofuninvolvement on the beach was indeed exceptional, and that intrying to experience only the pleasant side of life (l'endroit) whileavoiding the negative side (l'envers), he was living only half a lifewith half an identity.12

To my knowledge, no critic has accorded much prominenceto the theme of identity in Part II; and that is curious, when weconsider that in The Misunderstanding (the play Camus wrote in 1941-43) Jan is killed because he concealed his identity.13 Yet, Camus marksthe two crucial events of Meursault's new life (his initial incarcerationand the start of the trial) with the question of his identity. Part IIbegins:

-117-



9/16

Tout de suite aprns mon arrestation, j'ai dtd interrogdplusieurs fois. Mais il s'agissait d'interrogatoires

d'identitd qui n'ont pas durd longtemps. (1171)(Right after my arrest, I was interrogated

several times. But it was about my identity, and thesession didn't last long.)

And at the start of the first court session:

On m'a encore fait d6cliner mon identitd, et malgrdmon agacement, j'ai pensd qu'au fond c'dtait asseznaturel, parce qu'il serait trop grave de juger un

homme pour un autre. (1187)(They asked me once again to state my

identity, and despite my irritation, I thought that itwas natural enough because it would be a seriousthing indeed to judge one man for another.)

The irony of that remark lies in the fact that this court is indeed goingto judge one man for another: it is going to judge and condemn theman who fired the four shots that did not kill for the man who fired

the first shot that did kill. Both the investigating magistrate and theprosecutor emphasize those four shots. The magistrate asks repeatedly:"Pourquoi avez vous tird sur un corps a terre? Pourquoi? II faut quevous me le disiez. Pourquoi?

(Why did you fire on a fallen body? Why? You must tell me. Why?)

And the prosecutor concludes his analysis of the accused'spremeditation with this triumphant flourish, as reported by Meursault:

Et "pour etresOr

que la besognedtait

bien faite,"j'avais tird encore quatre balles, posament, ' coupsur, d'une fagon rdfldchie en quelque sorte. (1196)

(And "to make sure that the job was well-done," I had fired another four rounds, calmly, atpoint-blank range, in a well considered way so to

speak.)

This emphasis on the four shots is a major element in the

miscarriage of justice that most commentators have felt and that both

Weisberg and Posner, in their opposite ways, place at the center oftheir discussions. But it is a miscarriage of legal justice only; for it is

perfect poetic justice. The Meursault who fired the four shots couldnot have fired the first; yet the Meursault who fired the four shotscould not have come into being without the other, and only thesecond Meursault could understand, assume responsibility, and

-118-



10/16

meaningfully undergo judgment or the guilt of the first.The first Meursault is still there, however, the one who can

say, "Et meme, dans un sens, cela m'intdressait de voir un proces. Jen'en avais jamais eu l'occasion dans ma vie." (And, in a sense, it wouldeven be interesting to see a trial. I had never in my life had theopportunity.) This is the uninvolved observer who watches thepassing human scene with acuity and mild amusement. But there isnow in Meursault another observer who observes the first -- apsychological reflexivity that becomes characteristic over the course ofPart II. Camus immediately objectifies this new psychological situationthrough the enigmatic figure of the young reporter, about whom

Meursault reflects:Dans son visage un peu asymdtrique je ne voyais queses deux yeux tris clairs, qui m'examinaientattentivement sans rien exprimer qui fOt d6finissable.Et j'ai eu l'impression bizarre d'etere regardd parmoi meme. (1186, emphasis added)

(In his slightly asymmetrical ace I saw onlyhis two very bright eyes, which scrutinized me

intentlywithout

anydefinable

expression.And I

hadthe odd impression of being watched by myself.)The reporter as observer and recorder,

epitomizes the role Meursault ypically assumed inPart I, as when he spent Sunday afternoons on hisbalcony, overlooking the human scene below. Thereporter hus embodies the complex of attitudes thatmost fully defines the nature of Meursault's uilt: hisplacing himself above the human drama -- his

character as dtranger in the sense of outsider, hisattitude of neutrality ntended to relieve him of theburden of making difficult choices, his strategy ofnon-responsibility, as when he says about Marie'sproposal of marriage, "c'dtait elle qui le demandaitet moi je me contentais de dire oui." (She's the onewho was asking; as for me, I merely said yes.) Theman who failed to establish his full identity feelsrobbed of his individuality when his own attorney

uses the first person, "disant 'Je' chaque fois qu'ilparlait de moi," (saying "I" each time he spokeabout me.) When questioned about this oddpractice, the policeman replies, "Tous les avocatsfont ca." (All lawyers do that.)

Indeed Meursault, playing the role of advocate for Raymond when

1 1 9



11/16

writing the letter to his mistress, must have written "Je" many times.So Camus applies poetic justice with ruthless specificity. Both parts

begin with incarceration; Meursault had put his mother in an old agehome, and at the beginning of Part II he is put in prison. He hadalways avoided others' questions:

Je ne voulais pas ddjeuner chez Cdleste commed'habitude parce que, certainement, ils m'auraientposd des questions et je n'aime pas cela. (1139)

(I didn't want to have lunch at Cdleste's asusual because they would certainly have asked me

questions,and I don't like that.)

Now as part of the legal procedures he is subjected to relentlessquestioning.

Camus mposes poetic justice on Meursault rimarily hroughthe medium of the prosecutor's argument, which finds consequenceand value in actions that Meursault had deliberately left arbitrary ndinsignificant. The law's strategy thus finds an interpretive void, arequirement of some explanation for Meursault's ife, and the law isquite ready to provide its own authoritative iew. The refusal to viewthe mother's body,'4 he cafd-au-lait, he cigarettes, he Fernandel ilm,the affair with Marie, he letter for Raymond, and the false depositionon his behalf -- all these acts, which Meursault had dismissedimplicitly or explicitly with "cela ne veut rien dire" (that doesn't meananything) the prosecutor now organizes into a structure ofconnections, meanings, and values. We and Meursault know these tobe outrageously false, but Meursault, n the absence of any suchstructure of his own making, is forced to accept them as "plausible."The prosecutor manages to assign to his victim the fundamentalidentity of criminal.

Camus' message is clear: in the perspective of a reality bereftof meaning (the absurd), you cannot choose, and you cannot judge.You are innocent because no one can judge you; but your personaland human identities are forged out of choices and judgments, and ifyou do not assume the responsibility of making them, someone elsewill make them for you, and you will be found guilty. Out of suchdilemmas is built the tragedy of the human condition.

This ethicalparadox

isclearly

illustratedby

Meursault'sresponse to his lawyer's question concerning his love for his mother:

"Sans doute, j'aimais bien maman, mais cela nevoulait rien dire. Tous les etres sains avaient plus oumoins souhaitd la mort de ceux qu'ils aimaient."(1172)15

1 2 0



12/16

(Certainly, I did love mama, but that didn'tmean anything. All healthy beings had more or less

desired the death of those they loved.)The statement illustrates the wrong side and the right side of thingsand points to the deeper meaning of "that doesn't mean anything." nthe original Meursault's philosophy, opposites cancel each other,leaving nothing; but it is precisely because all aspects of life containtheir opposites that anguished judgment is necessary, so that the goodcan be chosen and separated from the bad. Meursault could havechosen to live his love for his mother and let the hatred lie dormant.Camus, through the trial, makes him bear the responsibility for thechoice he did not make.

Nearinghis

execution,Meursault

cceptsthis

responsibility; in his last outburst, he asks for a hatred fullycompatible with his guilt.

The legal condemnation to death cannot be his solepunishment, for in the face of death we are all equally "privileged." Asboth Weisberg and Posner point out, however, Camus does offer arecognizable account of a trial in a French court as well as a caricatureof it. He goes into considerable detail in depicting its conventions andprocedures; he dwells on the behavior of the participants, he cordialatmosphere in the courtroom, where habituds greet each other as in aclub, the formality and mechanical regularity of the procedure, theinflation of language perpetrated by both the prosecutor and thedefense attorney, he sarcasms of the presiding judge, the browbeatingof the witnesses and the misleading truthfulness of their testimonies,culminating n Marie's earful protest: "On la forgait a dire le contrairede ce qu'elle pensait." (1192) (They forced her to say the opposite ofwhat she was thinking.)

Camus imposes such painstaking detail in order to subjectlaw itself to poetic justice. That is why Camus, departing from theclassical model of Molibre, brings the world of the law into his novel,its formal and practical manifestations, its social and politicalassumptions, ts representatives and procedures -- law as a whole mustalso be subjected to the light of philosophic scrutiny, under which itspretenses, deficiencies, and arrogant complacencies will be revealed.In a world where any potential judgment -- particularly moraljudgment -- is tinged with ambiguity, no person, no institution, can beentirely innocent. Camus puts the law, too, on trial, by virtue of thesame principle that turns Clamence, the anti-hero of The Fall into a"judge-penitent."

If the law is deemed incapable of resolving the ambiguitiesof the human situation and inadequate to the task of judgment, thisdoes not mean that Meursault must be innocent -- as Weisberg nsists;nor does it mean that Camus romanticizes the criminal -- as Posnerwould have it. Meursault, ike Tarrou n The Plague, has abdicated the

1 2 1



13/16

burdensome responsibilities of choice and made himself vulnerableto both external judgment -- the court's verdict -- and the judgment of

that other self whose unsmiling visage he sees reflected in his tinplate.16 Yet the law must also be imaged in a critical mirror. AndMeursault's situation and personality are well suited to the job ofdestroying its pretense. A spectator at his own trial, distanced by hisestrangement rom the society the court represents, he can look uponthe tragi-comedy of the courtroom ike a modern Candide or Ingdnu,sometimes with wide-eyed astonishment and amusement, sometimeswith a caustic, conscious irony that is more the author's han his own.Meursault's ccount of the prosecutor's summation s particularly ichin

examplesof this

strategy:Moi j'dcoutais et j'entendais qu'on me jugeaitintelligent. Mais e ne comprenais pas bien commentles qualitds d'un homme ordinaire pouvaientdevenir des charges dcrasantes contre un coupable.(1196)

(I was listening and I was hearing that I wasbeing judged intelligent. But I didn't quite under-stand how an ordinary man's qualities could become

crushing charges against a culprit.)Et j'ai essayd d'dcouter encore parce que le

procureur 'est mis a parler de mon ame.11 disait qu'il s'dtait penchd sur elle et qu'il

n'avait rien trouvd, messieurs les jurds. II disait qu'ala vdrit6 je n'en avait point, d'ame, et que riend'humain, et pas un des principes moraux quigardent le coeur des hommes ne m'dtait accessible.(1197)

(And I tried to listen some more because theprosecutor started o talk about my soul.

He was saying that he had looked at it closelyand that he had found nothing, gentlemen of thejury. He was saying that in truth I didn't have one -- asoul, and that nothing human, and not one of themoral principles that stand guard over the hearts ofmen was accessible to me.)

(Note that in this lastpassage,

thesurprising

switch from indirect todirect discourse within the same sentence underscores and casts intodoubt Meursault's upposed naivetd.) These are only two examples ofa whole series of ironic-ingenuous remarks culminating in a finalcomment that captures he essential traits of Meursault's ituation andpersonality:

-122 -



14/16

Je n'ai pas regardd du cotd de Marie. e n'en ai pas eule temps parce que le prdsident m'a dit dans uneforme bizarre que j'aurais a tete tranchde sur uneplace publique au nom du peuple frangais. 1201)

(I didn't glance in Marie's direction. I didn'thave time for that because the presiding judge toldme in an odd phrasing that my head would be cutoff in a public square in the name of the Frenchpeople.)

The mention of Marie recalls his innocent sensuality; the notice he

takes of the judge's "odd phrasing" expresses his ingenuousness andhis estrangement as well as his ironic perspective on the court; thespelling out of the penalty evokes his new identity as culprit andanticipates his new consciousness of mortality.

Many ommentators, ncluding Posner (88), have underscoredthe "unrealistic" harshness of this sentence -- especially in a colonialsetting,17 when self-defense provided a very plausible argument. ThatMeursault's attorney hardly alludes to self-defense is anotherimplausibility, one so glaring that Camus must have intended it.Camus' portrayal of the trial cannot be taken as a realistic account oflegal process in a French colonial court any more than his hero'sapocalyptic experience during his ten-minute walk on the beach aftera French luncheon in a setting of banal domesticity can be taken as arealistic portrayal of the hostility of nature. We see here not a frontalassault on the law, but a critique of judgment tself, which reaches itsclimax in the prosecutor's summation. Weisberg has quite rightlypointed out that in Continental jurisprudence "as depicted byEuropean novelists" the investigating magistrate "duplicates themethods and the creative deeds of the novelist ... Thus, in both theinquisitor and the novelist, acuity of perception serves to uncover andto record reality n its fullness." (47) But it remains for the prosecutor(and the defense attorney) to organize that reality into a structure ofmeanings. What invalidates the prosecutor's interpretation ofMeursault's reality is not its wrongness, for it does fulfill a primerequirement of both legal and literary discourse: it is "plausible."What invalidates it is its ease, its rhetorical glibness, its blindness to

ambiguities,and its exclusion of

any feelingfor the accused. These are

literary more than judicial failures.In Molibre's plays, aberrations threatening to society but

immune to the law are exposed and satirized; in Camus' novelaberrations damaging to humanity but normally immune to the laware prosecuted in a court of law so that the law itself can be exposedand satirized. For the law, in its mechanical application of judgmentand its simplistic distinction between guilt and innocence, does

-123



15/16

violence to human solidarity by separating human beings into twomutually exclusive categories (Weisberg's "regimentation"). The

novel itself thus becomes the privileged space where both Meursault'slife and the persons and institutions that would judge that life can besubjected to scrutiny and ultimately, perhaps, to the reader'sjudgment.18

1. The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1984). All subsequent references o this work will be indicated bypage numbers et in parentheses n the text.

2. Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1988). All subsequent references to this work will be given by parenthetical pagereference n the text.

3. Rent Girard, Camus' tranger Retried," 9 PMLA, 19 (1964).4. Albert Camus, Thdatre, Rdcits, Nouvelles, (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 1933. Allsubsequent references o Camus' works are to this volume and will be given in the text.All translations re by the author.

5. "Moliere and the Sociology of Exchange," 4 Critical nquiry 477 (1988).6. Id., at 491.

7. See Brian T. Fitch, The Narcissistic Text Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 1982), ch. 4, fora detailed discussion of the text's "reflexivity" nd the reader's role in fulfilling itsintentions. Fitch argues that Part I functions as a trap that ensnares the reader intoadopting the point of view of the prosecutor. This is what Posner has done. Fitch urthersuggests that Part II may function as a trap that ensnares the reader nto rejecting hepoint of view of the prosecutor and sympathizing xclusively with the accused. That swhat Weisberg has done.

8. It is high time to point out that the word innocence, in both French and English, hasat least two meanings: ingenuousness and freedom from guilt. The two meanings arerelated; but the distinction s important. Meursault oses his illusion of the second kind

of innocence on the beach; but, as we shall see, be brings some of the first kind withhim into the courtroom.

9. I was alerted o this parallel between Clamence and Meursault y Marilyn K.Yalom n"Albert Camus and the Myth of the Trial," 25 Modern Language Quarterly 34 (1964).Yalom also points to the nature of Meursault's uilt when she remarks: "The medievalsin of neutrality - a lack of commitment o good or to evil -- is rendered nto modernterms as a crime of complicity, whose uncertain moral status is mirrored n the grayDutch landscape." d. at 488.

10. Again, The Fall develops this theme more explicitly. Clamence imagines a moraluniverse where people would be labeled by sign-boards n their houses, which wouldadvertise their moral condition -- as would their calling cards: "... nous serion forcesde revenir sur nous-memes .... Oui, I'enfer doit etre ainsi: des rues a enseignes et pasmoyen de s'expliquer. On est class6 une fois pour toutes" (1499). (... we'd be forcedto reflect upon ourselves.... Yes, hell must be like that: streets with sign-boards andno way to explain yourself. You are stamped once and for all.") Meursault and hisfriendly witnesses find no way to explain themselves at his trial.

11. That an examining magistrate would, in the course of carrying ut his official duties,

-124



16/16

indulge in such a personal and passionate outburst is highly improbable, o say theleast. So much for realism But, see the alternative xplanation of Weisberg upra note 1,ch. 3.

12. I allude to the essential meaning of the title of Camus' irst collection of essays,L'Envers et l'endroit (The Wrong Side and the Right Side), written in 1935-36 andpublished in Algiers n 1937, just before he started work on The Stranger.13. Note that the experience of the image in the tin plate takes place just after Meursaultrelates the story of the Czechoslovakian, which summarizes the plot of TheMisunderstanding.

14. But seeWeisberg, supra, note 1, pp. 121-22, or a convincing case that Meursault asat first eager to view his mother's body and later declined for very understandablereasons.

15. Critics "friendly" o Meursault re fond of quoting this statement about his motheras evidence of his honesty. Indeed, it is startlingly onest; and clearly, Camus ets it incontrast to conventional hypocrisy, here represented by the lawyer. But honesty doesnot guarantee nnocence; and hypocrisy does invoke real values.

16. In The Plague, his double vulnerability s expressed n Tarrou's uccumbing o bothforms of the disease: the bubonic (external, social) and the pulmonary (internal,private).17. Posner, supra note 2, p. 88: "A colonial French court would not have been so eagerto convict and sentence to death a Frenchman ccused of murdering 'native.' "

18. Camus hus emphasizes the part of French criminal procedure hat admits characterevidence. Weisberg's argument that Meursault would not have been convicted ofmurder n an American ourt (supra, note 1, pp. 121-122) and Posner's tatement o thecontrary (supra, note 2, pp. 88-89) with his demonstration that Camus faithfullyportrayed actual French procedure, are irrelevant n the literary perspective of poeticjustice.

-125

Documents

Poetic Justice of the Stranger