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I. Civil Service Law, Subtitle A,Title I, Book V of E.O. 292 Important topics for CSC Scope of the Civil Service Appointments in the Civil Service Classification of positions (under the Civil Service Law/Constitution) Career and non-career Competitive and non-competitive Appointment process Functions and powers of the Civil Service Commission Personnel action The Civil Service, CONST. Art. IX (B); Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360 – abanilla G.R. No. L-39451 February 20, 1989 ISIDRO M. JAVIER vs. PURIFICACION C. REYES Facts: This case involves the two appointments approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan. Isidro M. Javier was duly appointed as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan by the then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba on November 7, 1967 as approved by the Municipal Council. The following day, Javier took his oath of office and thereafter assumed and discharged the duties of his office.

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I.  Civil Service Law, Subtitle A,Title I, Book V of E.O. 292

Important topics for CSC

       Scope of the Civil Service       Appointments in the Civil Service       Classification of positions (under the Civil Service Law/Constitution)

               Career and non-career               Competitive and non-competitive

       Appointment process

               Functions and powers of the Civil Service Commission

       Personnel action

       The Civil Service, CONST. Art. IX (B);

               Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360 – abanilla

G.R. No. L-39451 February 20, 1989

ISIDRO M. JAVIER vs. PURIFICACION C. REYES

Facts:

This case involves the two appointments approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan.

Isidro M. Javier was duly appointed as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan by the then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba on November 7, 1967 as approved by the Municipal Council. The following day, Javier took his oath of office and thereafter assumed and discharged the duties of his office.

On January 3, 1968, the newly elected Mayor Purificacion Reyes recalled the appointment of Javier from the Civil Service Commission and designated Police Lt. Romualdo Clemente, a non-eligible as Officer-In-Charge of the Police Dept.

On May 2, 1968, the Civil Service Commission attested and approved the appointment of petitioner as such Chief of Police, in its 3rd Indorsement stating that the appointment of Mr. Bayani Bernardo as Chief of Police of Malolos has not been confirmed by the Municipal Council, and as the consent of the Municipal Council is a mandatory requirement under Section 1 of Rep. Act 1551, the said appointment is considered null and void. In view thereof, the attached

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appointment of Mr. Isidro M. Javier has been approved as permanent under Section 24 (b) of R.A. 2260.

Reyes refused to comply with the order of the CSC. Hence, Javier was deprived of his salary

Issue: which of the two appointments is valid?

SC: Javier was ordered reinstated.

Ratio:

On appointments: acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Based on the facts, Bernardo never assumed office or took his oath. Apparently, he has not accepted the appointment which makes the same ineffective, over which Javier’s appointment prevails.

- The fact that Bernardo’s appointment was confirmed by the CSC does not complete it since confirmation or attestation by the Commission, although an essential part of the appointing process, serves merely to assure the eligibility of the appointee.

Petitioner’s acts amounted to acceptance and gave rise to a vested right to the office in his favor by going to the CSC to ask for reinstatement and for bringing the suit of mandamus

               Favis v. Rupisan, 17 SCRA 190 – almoneda

G.R. No. L-22823             May 19, 1966

FAVIS, vs. RUPISAN, et al,

FACTS: The PVTA, granted petitioner Godofredo N. Favis, an extended an appointment to the position of Assistant General Manager, signed by the board-chairman, and accordingly took the oath of office and thereafter discharged the functions thereof.

After two years the same board of directors, on the allegation that the petitioner has committed acts constituting a breach of the trust and confidence of the Board, declared the position vacant and appointed thereto, Canuto Fariñas, Jr. The latter was sworn into office on the same day.

Claiming that his removal was made in violation of Section 32 of the Revised Civil Service Law (Rep. Act 2260), and the appointment of respondent Fariñas to the same position constituted usurpation and unlawful possession, Favis immediately filed an action for quo warranto,

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The respondents contended that the position occupied by the petitioner is, highly confidential and therefore, removable at the pleasure of the appointing power and that even if the position may be considered as belonging to the competitive or classified service petitioner cannot be said to have been duly appointed thereto, because his appointment has never been approved by nor submitted to, the Commissioner of Civil Service, hence, the petitioner is at most a de facto officer, and can be removed from office even without cause.

ISSUE: Whether Rafis as Assistant General Manager is entitled to the right to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Civil Service law and rules.

RULING : No.

x x x x Considering that the position involved in this controversy is not one of those enumerated in the law as falling in the non-competitive and exempt classes, it follows as a logical conclusion that the same belongs to the classified or competitive service.

In this connection, the Civil Service Rules, implementing Section 16 (h) of Republic Act 2260 which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive jurisdiction over the "approval under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments including promotions to positions in the competitive service", provide:

RULE VI. APPOINTMENTx x x           x x x           x x x

SEC. 2 (a) All appointments including promotions to positions in the competitive or classified service must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and Rules and the WAPCO plans. Said appointments, prepared in the prescribed form and duly signed by the appointing officer, shall be submitted to the Commissioner for approval and such approval shall be a sufficient authority for the payment of salary to the appointee, unless otherwise provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no question, therefore, that for an appointee to a classified position to be entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal, his appointment must receive the proper approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service.

In the present case, respondents' allegation that petitioner's appointment was not approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service has not been controverted. Of course, we may take judicial notice of the fact that as a matter of practice, the positions of officials in government corporations are being treated by the offices concerned not only as non-competitive, but their appointments are considered effective and complete upon the appointee's assumption of office. And the central personnel agency is merely furnished with copies of the appointment or of the oath of office — for record purposes only. This must be the reason why petitioner remained in occupancy of the position,

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drawing the corresponding salary therefor, for almost two years without anybody questioning his right to such possession.

But this situation does not create or bestow upon the petitioner any right to the position or to the guarantees provided by law. The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. In the circumstances, for the duration of his occupancy of the position in question, the petitioner may be considered merely as a de facto officer, and may consequently be removed from office even without cause.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.

               Mitra v. Subido, 21 SCRA 127 - casibua

       Appointment

               Triste vs. Leyte State College – maguliman

Triste v. Leyte State College 

FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari on the vice-presidency of the Leyte State College (LSC). It seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Trustees of said College ousting and replacing petitioner with private respondent as Vice-President (VP), as well as the resolution of the Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17 dismissing petitioner's appeal.

LSC became a state college by virtue of P.D. No. 44, Section 4 of the decree provides that "the governance and administration of each College and the exercise of its corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Trustees and in the President of the College insofar as authorized by said Board". In addition to its general powers of administration, Section 6 provides that the Board shall have the power and duty:

"(c) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of each College, a Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Development with a position next in rank to the President of the College who shall assist in the administration and supervision of the College and who shall automatically assume the presidency of the College in an acting capacity, with full powers and duties, in the absence of the President or when the office of the president is vacant."

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June 10, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1437  was promulgated to define the composition and powers of the governing boards of chartered state universities and colleges and the term of office its Presidents.

One of the governing board's specific powers as laid out in Section 3 of P.D. 1437 is the following:

"f. To confirm appointments of vice-presidents, deans, directors, registrars, heads of departments, professors, and other officials and employees of the university or college made by the president, to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as the governing boards may promulgate, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws; to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing."

Feb. 3, 1984, the Lsc Board passed a resolution confirming the appoinment of petitioner Triste as Vice-President of LSC and for more than 2 years, Triste discharged her duties as VP of LSC.

Feb. 1986, there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of the LSC. The then President of LSC retired and one Purificacion Flores became the OIC.

July 18, 1986, petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position was not vacant, the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that of the recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. Also, she stated that she was qualified as College President.

August 21, 1986, petitioner received a letter from President Flores assigning her the job of director of the college's research program. A week later, a resolution was passed by the board replacing her with Dr. Gonzaga as the VP of LSC.

Triste filed a motion for recon, alleging that the appointment of Dr. Gonzaga, in effect eased her out of her position, contended that her constitutional right to security of tenure had been violated. Her requests for certified copies of the reso designating Dr. Gonzaga as VP remained unacted and her motion for recon was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner was merely “designated” and not “appointed” to the College Vice-Presidency

RULING:

The petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of petitioner with backwages to the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is hereby ordered.

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In Borromeo v. Mariano, this Court, through Justice Malcolm, noted that "(a)ll authorities unite in saying that the term 'appoint' is well-known and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an individual." We defined "appointment" in Aparri v. Court of Appeals as the "act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. " On the other hand, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the word "designate," when used by the appointing power in making an appointment to office, is equivalent to the word "appoint."

Common usage, however, oftentimes puts a distinction between the terms "appointment" and designation". Perhaps, the reason for this is that the word "appointment" connotes permanency while "designation" implies temporariness. Thus, to "designate" a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or, in some cases, a public officer may be "designated" to a position in an acting capacity as when an Undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.

               Sevilla vs. CA, 209 SCRA 637 - penalosa

               Chua v. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA 65 – Ramirez

               De los Santos v. Mallari, 87 Phil. 289 – rovero

G.R. No. L-3881             August 31, 1950

EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner, vs.GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor, PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer and RAFAEL USON, in his capacity as City Auditor, respondents.

Nature of the case: This is an original action in the SC. Quo warranto.

Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.

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- On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.

- Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position.

- Hence this, petition. The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

In respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified service."

-That section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner’s removal is legal

2. Whether or not the provision of 2545 of the revised Administrative code is still in force

Ruling: No, the petitioner’s removal is not legal.

Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, he (Governor-General now President) may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers," is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." The two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms permits what the other in similar terms prohibits.

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that this particular provision has been repealed and has ceased to be operative from the time the constitution went into effect.

- Article XII of the Constitution which contains the provisions on Civil Service contemplates the entire Civil Service regardless of whether the employees embraced therein belong to the classified or unclassified service with the exception of those positions “which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature,”

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This theory is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936 to implement Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil Service almost in the identical words of that article of the organic law. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution.

Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

The phrase "for cause" in connection with the removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.

Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public."

With regards to the second issue:

The provision is inoperative.

We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional. What we declare is that the particular provision thereof which gave the Chief Executive power to remove officers at pleasure has been repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument went into effect. Unconstitutionally, as we understand it, denotes life and vigor, and unconstitutional legislation presupposes posteriority in point of time to the Constitution.

It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct the effect of which the Constitution specifically forbids (State ex-rel. Mack vs. Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St., 273; 39 NE. [2d], 840.) A law that has been repealed is as good as if it had never been enacted, and can not, in the nature of things, contravene or pretend to contravene constitutional inhibition.

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So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before this petitioner was appointed.

               Ortiz v. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812 – tan

               Teologo v. Civil Service Commission, 191 SCRA 238 – abanilla

G.R. No. 92103 November 8, 1990

VIOLETA T. TEOLOGOvs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DR. PRUDENCIO J. ORTIZ, DR. JOSE M. TUPAZ, JR., and MRS. RUBY G. GELVEZON

Facts:

Petitioner VioletaTeologo questions the appointment of private respondent Ruby Gelvezon, a retiree as Chief Nurse I of Pedro Trono Memorial Hospital claiming that she has preferential right being that she is in an acting capacity for more than one year and that she is the next-in-rank and is not disqualified. Gelvezon (Teologo’s allegation) is not eligible.

Gelvezon was reinstated under CSC memorandum-Circular No. 5, S-1983, which allows the reinstatement of a retiree only under certain conditions. This reinstatement was protested by VioletaTeologo, one of the two aspirants for the same position. It was however, denied y the CSC by Dr. Prudencio Ortiz, Regional Health Director, who justified the appointment of Gelvezon on grounds of the exigency of the service and her superior qualifications. The CSC declared that Gelvezon is neither a retiree nor over-age (57 or over), hence, it alleged that there is no need of prior authority.

Issue: whether or not the Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Gelvezon.

SC: yes.

Ratio:

Under the Civil Service Law, it is the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Health, who can make appointments of key personnel in the Department of

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Health. It is presumed that Dr. Ortiz was responsible of the reinstatement and likewise asked for the authority to reinstate as if he had the power to do such act. It is his superior who actually has the power to ask the authority of reinstatement.

The assessment of the appointee’s qualifications like the determination of whether the appointment is demanded by the exigencies of the service should be made by the appointing authorities themselves, as it is them who understand the needs and operations of their office and not the CSC.

A retiree cannot just resume where he left off without special qualifications as required by regulation. Discretion given to the appointing authority is subject to stricter review where the person appointed is being returned to the Government after voluntarily retiring and collecting all the benefits appurtenant to such retirement.

The rule expressly allows reinstatement only if the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees in the agency concerned. As a retiree, Gelvezon could not be simply reinstated like any new appointee but had to satisfy the stringent requirements laid down by CSC Memo Circular No.5, S-1983. Finally, promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty and not least important, loyalty to the service.

       II.  Chapter 4:  De Leon

Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, et. al. 77 Phil. 635 – almoneda

G.R. No. L-831            November 21, 1946

LO CHAM, vs. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, City Fiscal of City of Manila

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 876            November 21, 1946

ALEJANDRO CANAPE, et al , vs. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First of Manila, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, City Fiscal of Manila

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 878            November 21, 1946

PEOPLE , vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and CONRADO PIRING Y MENDOZA

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FACTS: Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing. He was temporarily detailed to the Office of City Fiscal of Manila, to assist in the discharge of duties of City Fiscal with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal.

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed information in the aforesaid case after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground that Doctor Lantin has no authority to sign and file information.

ISSUE: Whether a temporarily detailed officer in the Office of the City Fiscal may exercise functions and authority of the assistant City Fiscal including signing and filing of information.

RULING:

Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides:

SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.

x x x x x

Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. (43 American Jurisprudence, 68, 70.) The authority to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and its predecessors.

x x x x x x

It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to sign informations. Granting that he does not retain such power, a question which we do not

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decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we have arrived. The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations, which is inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause "with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to which we have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney General to sign informations, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the Attorney General's power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing informations. The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was a surplusage.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876 are denied and dismissed, and the petition in case No. L-878 is sustained. Without costs.

Lao vs. To Chip, 158 SCRA 243 - casibua

Lamb vs. Phipps, 23 Phil. 156 [1912] - magulimanAprueba, et. al. vs. Ganzon, 18 SCRA 8 [1966] - penalosaBF Homes vs. National Water Resources Council, 154 SCRA 88 - ramirezSharp International Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299 – rovero

G.R. No. 93661 September 4, 1991

SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING, petitioner, vs.

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HON. COURT OF APPEALS (14th Division), LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEOGRACIAS VISTAN, respondents.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the decision o the CA.

Facts: On April 27, 1988, United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) entered into a Contract to Sell the property to Sharp International Marketing, the agreement to be converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment by the latter of the full purchase price of P3,183,333.33.

Even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner, through its President Alex Lina, offered to sell it to the Government for P56,000,000.00, (later increased to P65,000,000.00).

Although the land was still registered in the name of UCPB, the offer was processed by various government agencies during the months of June to November, 1988, resulting in the recommendation by the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution in the Department of Agrarian Reform for the acquisition of the property at a price of P35,532.70 per hectare, or roughly P67,000,000.00.

On December 1, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between UCPB and Sharp by virtue of which the former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated consideration of P3,183,333.33. The property was registered in the name of the petitioner ( SHARP) on December 6, 1988.

On December 27, 1988, DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines created a Compensation Clearing Committee (CCC) to expedite processing of the papers relating to the acquisition of the land and the preparation of the necessary deed of transfer for signature by the DAR Secretary and the LBP President.

The following day, the CCC held its first meeting and decided to recommend the acquisition of the property for P62,725,077.29. The next day, December 29, 1988, DAR Secretary Philip Ella Juico issued an order directing the acquisition of the estate for the recommended amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to Sharp.

On January 9, 1989, Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. On that same day, the LBP received a copy of the order issued by Secretary Juico on December 29, 1988.

On January 17, 1989, LBP Executive Vice President Jesus Diaz signed the CCC evaluation worksheet but with indicated reservations.

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For his part, LBP President Deogracias Vistan, taking into account these reservations and the discovery that Sharp had acquired the property from UCPB for only P3.1 million, requested Secretary Juico to reconsider his order.

Secretary Juico then sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as to whether the LBP could refuse to pay the seller the compensation fixed by the DAR Secretary.

Meantime, on February 3, 1989, Vistan informed Juico that LBP would not pay the stipulated purchase price.

The reply of the Justice Department on March 12, 1989, was that the decision of the DAR Secretary fixing the compensation was not final if seasonably questioned in court by any interested party (including the LBP);

Reacting to Sharp's repeated demands for payment, Juico informed Lina, that DAR and LBP had dispatched a team to inspect the land for reassessment.

Sharp then filed a petition for mandamus to the court to compel the DAR and LBP to comply with the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus would lie

Ruling: No, it is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion.

We agree with the respondent court that the act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion. The compensation to be approved was not trifling but amounted to as much as P62 million of public funds, to be paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier for only P3 million

Respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a specific application

Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no contract between Sharp and the Government. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was incomplete and therefore had no binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot claim any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition for mandamus.

National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel, 3 this Court held:

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... the action for mandamus had no leg to stand on because the writ was sought to enforce alleged contractual obligations under a disputed contract — disputed not only on the ground that it had failed of perfection but on the further ground that it was illegal and against public interest andGovernment is bound by the official decisions of Secretary Juico and cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular. public policy ...

Government is bound by the official decisions of Secretary Juico and cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

III.  Chapter Five

Cases for compensation

Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384 - tanSadueste vs. Municipality of Surigao, 72 Phil. 485 – abanilla

G.R. No. L-47380     June 27, 1941

ZACARIAS DE SADUESTE vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO

Facts:

The material facts of the present case are contained in the stipulation of the parties.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Pursuant to the provisions of section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Acts Nos. 3257 and 3978, plaintiff, Zacarias D. Sadueste, as district engineer for the Province of Surigao, was, on March 10, 1936, designated by the Director of Public Works as sanitary and waterworks engineer for the same province, the designation to take effect on January 1, 1936, with an additional compensation of not more than P60 a month payable from the income of the waterworks system under his supervision. On April 20, 1936, the provincial board of Surigao, by resolution, approved the designation. From January 1, 1936 to March 30, 1939, plaintiff rendered services to the defendant municipality in his capacity as sanitary and waterworks engineer. The municipal council of the defendant municipality having failed to provide the necessary appropriation for his services in the aggregate sum of P2,338.06, plaintiff

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instituted an action for its recovery with claim for damages in the amount of P300.

Lower court dismissed the complaint holding that sec 1916 have been repealed by sec.17 of Act No. 4187, otherwise known as the General Appropriation Act for 1936.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner is entitled to receive the additional compensation.

SC: Affirmed lower court’s decision

Ratio:

The last paragraph of section 1916 of the Administrative Code, as amended. provides:

Upon designation of the Director of Public Works, a district engineer may be allowed additional compensation with the approval of the provincial board not to exceed sixty pesos per month to be paid from the income of the waterworks system supervised by him for services rendered in his capacity as sanitary and waterworks engineer.

Section 17 of Act No. 4187 reads:

Abolition of additional compensation. - Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full time officer or employee of the government shall thereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created by law, except (a) officers serving as chairmen or members of boards of entities and enterprises organized, operated, owned or controlled by the Government, who may be paid per diems for each meeting actually attended or when on official travel; (b) auditors and accountants; (c) provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees; (d) employees serving as observers of the Wheather Bureau; and (e) those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the provisions of this Act. This section is hereby made permanent legislation.

The last provision was repeated verbatim in Act No. 4231, which was the Appropriation Act for the year 1936.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

It is contended, however, that section 17 of Act No. 4187 is unconstitutional, it being offensive to Article 3 of the Jones Law, which provides "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall be expressed in the title of the bill." (This is substantially re-enacted in the Philippine Constitution as Art. VI, sec. 12, par. 1, and later as Art. VI, sec. 21, of the amended Constitution.) It is not necessary to pass upon the constitutional

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question raised for the reason that under Article XI, section 3, of the Philippine Constitution, "no officer or employee of the Government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. There being no law by which the appellant is specifically authorized to receive additional compensation for his services as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim therefore must fail.

The authority granted in the last paragraph of section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code is a general authority given to all district engineers. The authority required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority given to a particular employee or officer of the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of extra or additional compensation. The purpose of the Constitution is to prohibit generally payment of additional or double compensation except in individual instances where the payment of such additional compensation appears to be not only just but necessary.

Peralta vs. Auditor General Mathay, 38 SCRA 256 – almoneda

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26608. March 31, 1971]

PEDRO G. PERALTA, vs. AUDITOR GENERAL ISMAEL MATHAY,

SYLLABUS

1. It is expressly provided in the Constitution: "No officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law." This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious r circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position. It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. If it were to be thus though, there must be a law to that effect. So the Constitution decrees.

2. As is expressly declared in the Constitution, the Civil Service is to embrace "all branches and subdivisions of the Government * * *." Conformably to the above, the

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Philippine Civil Service, by law, includes ''all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations . . . ." Petitioner has not disputed, nor can he dispute that as a trustee, he was an officer of the government, the GSIS having been established in order "to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the Philippines and to replace the [then] pension systems established in [previous acts].'' As such officer, petitioner cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

3. Under the GSIS Act. petitioner is entitled as trustee "to a per diem of P25.00 for each day of actual attendance in session." As in the case of government controlled corporations, the term ''per diems" was used in the sense the compensation or remuneration attached to the office of Trustee. Such is not the meaning usually attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries Workers Union, (L-24632, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 668). A "per diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance "for each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his home base." Its usual signification is thus that a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of one's duties. If employ in a statute, as in this case, in the concept of remuneration, however, there must be, to justify an additional compensation, a specific law that so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional command is lacking.

4. A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of a cost of living allowance. If it could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather than additional emoluments or perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor General cannot find support in the Constitution. What was said in an American State decision has relevance. It was therein categorically stated "that it is universally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office." To the same effect is this excerpt appearing later in the opinion: "A careful and, we believe, exhaustive examination of the decisions fails to disclose a single case in which it has ever been held that a legislative act, providing for an allowance, for expenses incurred in the discharge of official duties, to a public officer, whose salary or compensation was fixed at a stated sum, was in violation of provisions such as are found in many stte Constitutions, forbidding an increase of salary during official terms, or forbidding the granting of 'fees,' 'perquisites,' or 'emoluments' to such officer. Legislative acts which directly in terms, or as construed, attempted to increase such salaries, have been held invalid. But no decision has been found or, as we believe, can be found, which holds a legislative act to be unconstitutional which merely relieves an officer, who received a fixed salary or compensation, from expending such salary for expenses incident to the performance of his official duties." It is worth noting that there are specific provisions in

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the applicable statutes allowing trustees or directors, traveling expenses which may be collected by the board of directors of the Philippines Virginia Tobacco Administration; traveling and subsistence expenses by the members and board of directors of the Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley Authority; and traveling and other necessary expenses by the members of the Philippine Medical Care Commission. Such provisions are prompted by what may appear to be an excess of caution, for the accepted doctrine is that an allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his task cannot be looked upon as an additional compensation. Such a principle does not come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show that the cost of living allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to an additional compensation.

5. It is quite obvious that by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation. The very characterization of what was received by petitioner as bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to spur him possibly to more diligent efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice except to deduct from petitioner's gratuity such items.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS: The GSIS, granted the Petitioner, in a resolution duly passed, an optional retirement gratuity of P40,336.07. Of that amount, he was not able to collect the sum of P7,032.26, covering P3,982.26 as cost of living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive bonus, and P1,775.00 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed in audit. the view of respondent Auditor General being that they should be deducted from his gratuity, on the ground that they "partake of the nature of additional compensation," a trustee's remuneration being fixed by law in the form of a per diem of P25.00 for every board meeting of the GSIS attended. Respondent denied the succeeding motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cost of living allowance as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses paid to petitioner Pedro G. Peralta, a Trustee of the GSIS, partake of the nature of additional compensation

RULING: Yes.

Under the GSIS Act, he is entitled as trustee "to a per diem of P25.00 for each day of actual attendance in session." As in the case of government-controlled corporations, the term "per diems" was used in the sense of the compensation or remuneration attached to the office of Trustee Such is not the meaning usually attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries Workers Union. A "per diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance "for

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each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his home base." Its usual signification is thus that of a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of one's duties. If employed in a statute, as in this case, in the concept of remuneration, however, there must be, to justify an additional compensation, a specific law that so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional command is lacking.

A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of a cost of living allowance. If it could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather than additional emoluments or perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor General cannot find support in the Constitution. What was said in an American State decision' has relevance. It was therein categorically stated "that it is universally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office." x x x x It is worth noting that there are specific provisions in the applicable statutes allowing trustees or directors, traveling expenses which may be collected by the board of directors of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration; traveling and subsistence expenses by the members and board of directors of the Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley Authority; and traveling and other necessary expenses by the members of the Philippine Medical Car Commission. Such provisions are prompted by what may appear to be an excess of caution, for the accepted doctrine is that an allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his task cannot be looked upon as an additional compensation. Such a principle does not come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show that the cost of living allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to an additional compensation.

So it is in the case of the bonuses received by him. It is quite obvious that by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation. The very characterization of what was received by petitioner as bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to spur him possibly to more diligent efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice except to deduct from petitioner's gratuity such items.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Auditor General of June 28, 1966, as reiterated in its order denying the motion for reconsideration of September 1, 1966, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

       Personnel Action

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Panis vs. Civil Service Commission, 229 SCRA 589 [1994] – casibua

       Other rights

Request of CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes, 216 SCRA 728 – maguliman

REQUEST OF CTA PRESIDING JUDGE ALEX Z. REYES

FACTS:

Nov. 24, 1991, Judge Reyes compulsorily retired with 37y, 9mos,7d in govt service. There was a 7 yr gap in his govt service from 1946-1954.

Dec. 19,1991,he asked for a reconsideration and recomputation of his accumulated sick leave credits. The SC Administrative Office, in processing his terminal leave application, did not include his accumulated leave credits.

1. The inclusion of 57.625 days vacation leave and 57.625 days sick leave which he earned for services with the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1941 to 1946, and

2. The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from his total accredited vacation and sick leaves of 322 days for the period beginning February 17, 1954 to July 19, 1980, during which he was with the Department of Finance.

n processing the terminal leave application of Judge Reyes, the Supreme Court Administrative Office did not include Judge Reyes' accumulated leave credits earned for services with the AFP, by virtue of the application of a 1st Indorsement dated May 2, 1957 of the then Bureau of Civil Service, which provides:

When transfer of leave credit not allowed— The transfer of leave credit is allowed only when there is no gap in the service of the officer or employee concerned.

In his request for reconsideration, Judge Reyes cites Memorandum Circular No. 54 of the Office of the President dated March 24, 1988, as restated in Civil Service Commission Circular No. 10 which provides:

                Any officer/employee of the government who retires/voluntarily resigns/is separated from the  service through no fault of his/her own, andwho is not otherwise covered by special law, shall be entitled to the commutation of all his/her leave credits exclusive of Saturdays/Sundays/holidayswithout limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned; provided that the leave privilages under EO No. 1077 as

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herein outlined may be availed of only by concerned officers/employees in the service as of the effectively thereof on January 9, 1986.

It is evident that said Memorandum Circular No. 54 supersedes the 1957 indorsement of the Bureau of Civil Service. Under said Circular, government officers and employees are now entitled to the commutation of all leaves credits exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned, provided the claimant was in the service as of January 9, 1986.

ISSUE:

The issue which then arises is whether or not the phrase "without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned" is applicable to the judiciary. Such phrase may be so applicable on the condition provided in the circucular itself, that the judiciary is "not otherwise covered by special law."

 

RULING:

the COURT RESOLVED to:

(1) GRANT the request of Judge Alex Z. Reyes for:

a) The inclusion of 57.625 days vacation leave and 57.625 days sick leave earned for services with the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1941 to 1946 in his accumulated leave credits.

b) The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays from the total of his accredited vacation and sick leaves of 322 days for the period beginning February 17, 1954 to July 19, 1980 during which period Judge Reyes was with the Department of Finance; and

(2) DECLARE that Memorandum Circular No. 54 of the Office of the President dated March 24, 1988 shall apply in the computation of the creditable vacation and leave credit of members the judiciary who retired or shall retire on or after March 24, 1988, the date of said Memorandum Circular.

The law governing leave credits of municipal judges began with RA No. 843 dated May 5, 1953 which provided for vacation and sick leave, thereby adding a new section to the Judiciary Act of 1948. RA No. 843 was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 3086 dated June 17, 1961, Section 3 of which provides as follows:

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SEC. 3. Section ninety-eight-A of the same Act, as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 98-A. Vacation and sick leaves of judges of municipal courts and justices of the peace. Judges of municipal courts and justices of the peace shall be entitled annually to fifteen days vacation and fifteen days sick leaves with pay and in the computation thereof Sundays and holidays shall be excluded and such leave privileges shall be cumulated but not to exceed three hundred days.

Said law, therefore, provides that judges of first instance not specially assigned to vacation duty shall be on vacation leave while those on vacation duty shall be entitled to vacation leave at any subsequent time for the same number of days that they spend on vacation duty. The only limitation is that the judge's entitlement to vacation leave shall not exceed two months per year, one month of which is cumulative.

The special laws provide the boundaries by which the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by "justices and other governement officials covered by special law" are to be limited. Again, there is no special law governing the specific issue addressed by Memorandum Circular No. 54 and Section 26 of the Omnibus Rules. And absent any implementing rules and regulations yet promulgated, the general provision must be applied there being no reason to discriminate against the judiciary and deprive judges of the benefits of commutation without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits where earned. In other words, there is no special law governing the commutation of leave credits of judges and, therefore, they are entitled to benefits under Memorandum Circular No. 54.

Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 - penalosaRabor vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614 – Ramirez

People vs. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689 [2000] – rovero

G.R. No. 132875-76           February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Motion to be allowed to discharge duties as Congressman.

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.

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The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.

He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

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RULING: No, he is not exempt.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

All top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After

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conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Antonio F. Trillanes IV vs. Honorable Oscar B. Pimentel Sr. et.al., G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 - tan