PLC Brief in the Falls Church Case

8/13/2019 PLC Brief in the Falls Church Case

1/23

No. 13-449

WILSON-EPES PRINTINGCO.,INC. (202)789-0096 WASHINGTON,D.C.20002

IN THE

Supreme ourt of the United States

THE FALLS CHURCH,

Petitioner,v.

THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THEUNITED STATES OFAMERICA AND THE PROTESTANT

EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OFVIRGINIA,ET AL.,Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorarito the Supreme Court of Virginia

BRIEF OF THE PRESBYTERIAN LAYCOMMITTEE ASAMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

FORRESTA.NORMANCounsel of Record

DICKIE,MCCAMEY &CHILCOTE,P.C.

127 Public SquareSuite 2820, Key TowerCleveland, Ohio 44114(216) [email protected]

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 8, 2013


2/23


3/23

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................ iv

INTERESTS OF THEAMICUS CURIAE......... 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .. 4

CONCLUSION .................................................... 17


4/23

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCASES Page(s)

Abbington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374U.S. 203 (1963) .......................................... 16

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104(1968) ......................................................... 8

Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) ..............passim

Keyser v. Stansifer(1834), 6 Ohio 363 ......... 8

Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,127 (1982) .................................................. 8

Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church,396 U.S. 367 (1970) ............................... 9, 10, 17

Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393U.S. 440 (1969) .......................................... 16

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 734 (1976) ..... 6, 10

The Falls Church v. The ProtestantEpiscopal Church in the United States,et al., Record No. 120919 (April 18,2013) .........................................................passim

Waston v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872) ............ 13, 14

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. amend I ................................. 8, 16, 17


5/23

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinuedOTHER AUTHORITIES Page(s)

Book of Order, The Constitution of thePresbyterian Church (USA), Part II(2011/2013) ........................................ 3, 7, 15, 16

A Guide to Church Property Law, Theo-logical, Constitutional and PracticalConsiderations (2nd ed., ReformationPress, 2010) ............................................... 2


6/23

IN

THE

Supreme ourt of the United States

No. 13-449

THE FALLS CHURCH,Petitioner,

v.

THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THEUNITED STATES OFAMERICA AND THE PROTESTANT

EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OFVIRGINIA,ET AL.,Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorarito the Supreme Court of Virginia

BRIEF OF THE PRESBYTERIAN LAYCOMMITTEE ASAMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTERESTS OF THEAMICUS CURIAE1

The Presbyterian Lay Committee respectfullysubmits the accompanying brief as amicus curiae insupport of petition for writ of certiorari.

1The parties have consented to the filing of this brief (letterson file in the Clerks office). Pursuant to S.Ct. R.37.6, this affirmsthat no counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part,

and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution to fund the

preparation or submission of this amicus brief, which is fundedsolely by the Presbyterian Lay Committee. In accordance withS.Ct. R. 37.2, counsel of record received notice of intent of this

amicusto file its brief more than 10 days prior to the filing.


7/23

2

Established in 1965, the Presbyterian Lay Commit-tee (PLC) is a non-profit corporation whose missionincludes informing Presbyterians about issues facingtheir denominations2, and equipping local congrega-tions and their members in their interaction withregional and national entities of the PresbyterianChurch (United States of America) (PCUSA).

The PLC has served as an advocate on behalf ofcongregations concerned with the misapplication ofecclesial governance and the improper usurping ofauthority and improper seizure of property and has

served as an amicus in multiple state supreme courtson the property issues at the heart of the currentpetition. As an entity that helps equip lay leaders andclergy in maintaining the integrity and balance of thePCUSAs expression of Presbyterianism, the LayCommittee has a strong interest in this matter. As anadvocate of local churches which seek to retain theirproperty as a legal right, the PLC has a strong interestin this matter.

The PLC regularly reports on judicial decisions

concerning church property issues and publishesa legal guide regarding church property matters:A Guide to Church Property Law, Theological,Constitutional and Practical Considerations (2nd ed.,Reformation Press, 2010).

In the wake of this Courts decision inJones v. Wolf,443 U.S. 595 (1979), the General Assembly of the

2 There are numerous Presbyterian denominations in theUnited States, including the Presbyterian Church (USA),

(PCUSA), Presbyterian Church in America, (PCA), Evangeli-

cal Presbyterian Church (EPC), Orthodox Presbyterian Church(OPC), Evangelical Covenant order of Presbyterians, (ECO),the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, (CPC), and others, along

with independent Presbyterian Churches.


8/23

3

PCUSA amended its Book of Order, purporting toassert a trust in its favor over local congregationalproperty, even though legal title to local Presbyterianchurch property is virtually always held by the localchurch, and in the name of the local church, alone. Inalmost all instances, the local churches never assentedto the purported trust. Few, if any, formal propertytransfers followed the General Assemblys unilateraldeclaration. The PLC holds that this unilateralassertion of a trust is inconsistent with the intent ofmember congregations, and is inconsistent with the

historical structure of Presbyterian governance.The PCUSA is the only main Presbyterian denomi-

nation in the United States which asserts a trustinterest in affiliated churches properties and thatassertion of trust interest is fervently disputed bymembers and affiliated churches throughout thedenomination. The PCA, EPC, OPC, and ECO, forexample, do not make such a claim on property upondisaffiliation. The PCUSAs trust clause, upon whichthey base their claim, came into being afterJones vWolf, as a direct response toJones v Wolf.

Courts, such as the Virginia Supreme Court in thecase sub judice, have misinterpreted this Courtsruling in Jones in a manner which raises issues ofentanglement, establishment of religion, and denial ofdue process of law, all to the detriment of the titledproperty owner.

Because courts are constitutionally prohibited fromdelving into issues of ecclesiastical self governance,and are not well situated to assess comparativedifferences between religious organizations and their

structures, the PLC is concerned that unfamiliaritywith ecclesiastical structure and polity has led tomisapplication of neutral principles of law and


9/23

4

deference has been given to one litigants assertionover the others.

To clear up the confusion which has ensued basedon misapplication ofJones v. Wolf, thisAmicusurgesreview.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Confusion continues over whether Jones v. Wolfmodified substantive trust law, creating a new way ofclaiming a trust interest available only to hierarchicalreligious denominations, or if the hypothetical exam-ple given in dicta was meant only as an illustrationand still contemplated compliance with state trust lawrequirements. State Supreme Courts are seeing itdifferently3, with some applyingJonesas a means toallow non-owners of property to acquire a beneficialinterest in the land which permits them to divest thetitled owner of that land when there is a theologicalparting of the ways, contrary to otherwise establishedstate trust laws and contrary to the intent of theproperty owner. If the intent of the dicta inJoneswasnot to modify substantive trust law, then constitu-tional error has crept into church property law

jurisprudence, and clarification is needed to stop theimproper divestiture of property from local churches.

This is not a split of two constitutionally permissiblelegal methodologies for resolving church propertydisputes, but is a split on applying one Supreme Courtprecedent in mutually exclusive ways.

The Falls Church case is emblematic of theapproach resulting from an erroneous interpretation

3 The division between state law interpretations of Jones iswell documented by the petitioner and need not be restated here.


10/23

5

ofJones. The result admittedly contradicts both theintent of the property owner and the state statutes ontrust creation. This petition presents an opportunityto establish the scope of permissible constitutionalinquiry under neutral principles of law with clarityand certainty, and answer the question as to whetherthis courts decision in Jones created a new form oftrust creation available only to hierarchical denomina-tions, which permit unilateral imposition of trusts onproperty not owned by the denomination claiming it atthe time the trust is allegedly asserted, or whether the

intent of neutral principles is to make the same lawsapply to religious denominations as to any secularlegal entity.

Denominations are not static. Ever since the Pro-testant Reformation began in 1517 Western ChristianChurches have aligned themselves in groupings, ordenominations, in accordance with the dictates of theirconsciences. Disagreements over theology, liturgy, orprinciples of church governance lead to realignmentswith great regularity, birthing hundreds of denomina-tions in the U.S. alone. Because denominational re-

alignment will continue in this country as long asthere are churches, clarification of the property lawsaffecting those realignments is crucial.

The effect of the erroneous approach employed byseveral states divests legally seized property owners oftheir lands against their will, and without compen-sation. Multi-tiered or so-called hierarchical denom-inational entities have been given a free pass todeclare themselves beneficial owners of local churchproperties, taking the titled landowners property

when churches withdraw from the denomination.Courts have been all too willing to permit thisalienation of property even when the landowner


11/23

6

challenges the validity of the claim of the trust, andeven when the purported basis of the claim of trustfails to meet state law standards for trust creation. Byemploying a deferential posture to one partys claim,solely by virtue of its status as an ecclesiasticalgoverning body, the court places a secular governmen-tal imprimatur on a challenged religious declaration.Clarification of this courts holding inJonesis neededto avoid entrenching an unconstitutional misinter-pretation into church property jurisprudence.

As cautioned inSerbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 734 (1976), to makeavailable the coercive powers of civil courts to rubberstamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religiousassociations, when such deference is not accordedsimilar acts of secular voluntary associations, would. . . create far more serious problems under theestablishment clause. (Id. at 426 U.S. at 734,Renquist, J. dissenting). The Virginia Supreme Courthas fallen into this trap, placing its rubber stampand imprimatur upon an ecclesiastical edict by theEpiscopal Church when such a similar edict would

never stand under state law. In the very firstparagraph of its opinion, the Virginia Supreme Courtacknowledges that it is asked to consider whether thetrial court properly applied neutral principles of law indeciding the ownership of certain disputed churchproperty, [and] whether that application was constitu-tional . . . . (Pet. App. 1a). The court then proceededto set aside all ordinary indicia of ownership, disre-gard statutory requirements for trust establishment,and look no further than the Dennis Canon to findsufficient evidence of the necessary fiduciary relation-

ship (Pet. App. 20a) to imply a trust which the courtassumes would divest the church of its propertyinterest upon departure from the denomination.


12/23

7

What the Virginia court has done is to create a classof implied trusts established by ecclesiastical edictalone, disregarding the intent of the property owner toretain title and control. The intent inferred by thecourt is strictly by virtue of the courts interpretationof what it means to be a member of a church hierarchy.Given that any church hierarchy is a function ofinternal polity, and is necessarily established by thechurchs Book of Order, Book of Canons, or disciplinethe court delves right into the heart of ecclesiology andaccepts, or defers to, the interpretation of one of the

parties the denomination by virtue of its claim tobe the superior tribunal. This is so even where thescope of its authority is disputed by the opposingparty. Analogizing church connectionalism to acontractual relationship, as was done by the FallsChurch court, (Pet. App. 21a), misclassifies anecclesiastical spiritual relationship in a manner notintended by the parties, and entangles the court withreligious matters. In Presbyterianism, for example,membership has spiritual leadings, but not contrac-tual obligations. To impose a contractual or quasi-

contractual set of duties upon members fundamentallyalters the nature of the relationship. Thus the courtis establishing the terms, conditions, and conse-quences of participation in a denomination, whichclearly violates constitutional boundaries. Once thedoor is opened to courts placing contractual obliga-tions on church membership, either for individualmembers or congregations of members, entanglementand establishment issues enter in without logicallimitation.

The right to own property in the United States has

never been tied to the holding of a particular beliefstructure. As aptly observed by the Ohio SupremeCourt in an 1834 church property dispute case, [i]t


13/23

8

does not follow that they lose their property by ceasingto entertain certain opinions. Keyser v Stansifer(1834) 6 Ohio 363, 365. Unless title itself is predicatedon the maintenance of a particular belief, the changingof religious beliefs should have no bearing on propertyownership whatsoever. The misapplication of Joneshas supplanted property owners rights to hold titledland as they see fit, subordinating the land ownersrights to a denominational declaration of self-control,or worse, to a courts estimation of the partiesintentions regarding their church membership.

The Framers did not set up a system of governmentin which important, discretionary governmentalpowers would be delegated to or shared with religiousinstitutions. Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U.S.116, 127 (1982). The means by which propertyownership is recorded, transferred, encumbered, or bywhich trusts are created, are matters historicallygoverned by the states. Permitting religious institu-tions to set up alternative means of propertyalienation effectively establishes that religious entitywith state powers. This court has stated that the

First Amendment mandates governmental neutralitybetween religion and religion, and between religion,and non-religion. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104 (1968). Permitting state courts to recognize achurch only form of trust formation does not reflectthe neutrality required by our Constitution.

Extrapolating Justice Blackmans comment thatthe Constitution of the general church can be made torecite an express trust in favor of the denominationalchurch to mean that the U.S. Supreme Court was

establishing a new means of trust creation thattrumps state law trust creation statutes, misconstruesthe basic syllabus ofJones v. Wolf. The paragraph in


14/23

9

which the alternative comment/hypothetical is foundfirst qualifies and limits the pronouncement by statingthat the civil courts will be bound to give effect to theresult indicated by the partiesprovided it is embodiedin some legally cognizable form. Id. (Emphasisadded). At a bare minimum, this suggests that thelegally cognizable form would be compliant with statestatutes, and not contrary to these state statutes.

Likewise, the paragraph in which the alternativeis stated is clearly a hypothetical designed to illustrateone potential application of neutral principals. Justice

Blackman observed that at any time before thedispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they sodesire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical churchwill retain the church property. Id. Certainly JusticeBlackman was not suggesting that the hierarchicalchurch should always retain the church property orthat it would unilaterally declare the parties rights.If the parties desired, they could take steps to ensurethat the local congregation retained the churchproperty as well. Jones v. Wolf was not making apronouncement which foreordained a particular

outcome, always in favor of the denomination, inchurch property disputes. Rather, the point of neutralprincipals, and Justice Blackmans dicta, was that theparties, plural, could decide the outcome they desired,in agreement with one another, by modifying thedocuments to reflect their mutual intent.

InMd. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396U.S. 367 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court consideredan appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals ofMaryland upholding the dismissal of two actions

brought by the National Level Eldership, seeking toprevent two of its local churches from withdrawingthat general religious association. The Eldership also


15/23

10

claimed the right to select the clergy and to control theproperty of the two local churches, but the MarylandCourts, relying upon provisions of state statutory lawgoverning the holding of property by religious corpora-tions, and upon language in the deeds conveying theproperty in question to the local church corporations,and upon the terms of the charters of the corporations,and upon the provisions and the Constitution of theGeneral Eldership pertinent to ownership and controlof church property, concluded that the Eldership hadno right to invoke the states authority to compel their

local churches to remain within the fold or to succeedto control of their property. Md. & Va. Churches v.Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 suprasummarizedin Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,426 U.S. 696, 732.

If neutral principles can be interpreted as theVirginia Supreme Court did in Falls Church, adenominational assembly or ecclesiastical court cancircumvent civil property laws by unilateral self-declaration, avoiding civil court review of its decision.Declaring that the trust was created by an ecclesiasti-

cal act, where it is known that civil courts will notreview such ecclesial acts, or will defer to themregardless of the property owners intent, entirelydefeats the concept of neutral principles, and leavesthe property owner without a remedy for the generalchurchs appropriation of property.

Viewing neutral principles as the Falls Churchcourt has done gives the full force and effect of the lawto an ecclesiastical bodys declaration of trust, andestablishes that ecclesiastical entitys pronounce-

ments as the law over those who no longer adhere tothat ecclesiastical entity. This gives judicial cover toan anti-conversion exit penalty. Thus, if a local


16/23


17/23

12

of a trust which entitled them to property withoutevidence of consent by property owners, and the courtsare deferring to that pronouncement, purportedly asan aspect of neutral principals, because the dicta in

Jones postulated that denominational constitutionscould be amended to do so, provided they were done soin a legally cognizable manner. The jurisdictions like Virginia which give credence to denomination-ally declared trust interests do so by ignoring thelegally cognizable prong of Justice Blackmanpostulate and disregard the prong which required it

reflect the intent of the parties. This turns neutralprincipals upside down.

While at first blush it may seem to be supportive ofreligious liberties to give extra credence to a religionsinstitutions claim of property rights, preferring ahierarchical entitys claim over a lessor groupsclaim, nothing of the sort actually occurs. Religion isneither enhanced nor inhibited all that happens isthat one organizational structure is given evidentiarypreference over another by virtue of its claimed statusas a higher religious body. Thus, where an underly-

ing question is whether the denomination had thelegal right to lay claim to a beneficial ownershipinterest in the property in the first place, deference tothe denominations claim gives legal preference to ahierarchys claim over a smaller groups denial of thatclaim merely because the higher level says so. Thecivil dispute is thus determined not by courts based onprinciples of law, but by a religious hierarchyspronouncement. While resolution of questions of faithand practice are properly left to church judicatories fordetermination, civil rights are not. The circularity of

deference does not protect religious liberties ratherit circumvents the rights of the property owner forproper judicial redress.


18/23

13

Denominations do not have the right to impose civilpenalties. Forfeiture of property is a civil penalty. Anecclesiastical body has the right to define the terms ofits membership, to set internal rules of operation, andto discipline those members who do not adhere to theinternal rules, but submitting to any such discipline ispurely voluntary on the part of the member. And, if amember ceases to consent, the only remedy left to theecclesiastical body is to exclude that individual frommembership. So it must be with church membership,as well. If a congregation of members withdraws

consent to denominational discipline the denomina-tion may sanction or censure the congregation withrestrictions on participation in membership events,but cannot impose direct civil penalties. By anyinterpretation, forfeiture of property is a civil penalty.

An ecclesiastical declaration that property of anaffiliated congregation, parish, or local church, ownedby that church by virtue of title, somehow reverts tothe denomination, not by title, but by ecclesiasticaledict, is an attempted enforcement of a civil penalty.This is not permitted by the U.S. constitution. A clear

example of ecclesiastical overreaching was given inWatson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). Illustrating thatecclesiastical entities cannot decide matters of prop-erty the U.S. Supreme Court observed

If the General Assembly of the PresbyterianChurch should undertake to try one of itsmembers for murder, and punish him withdeath or imprisonment, its sentence would beof no validity in a civil court or anywhere else.Or if it should at the instance of one of itsmembers entertained jurisdiction as between

him and another member as to theirindividual right to property, real or personal,


19/23

14

the right in no sense depending on ecclesiasti-cal questions, its decision would be utterlydisregarded by any civil court where it mightbe set up. And it might be said in certaingeneral sense very justly, that it was becausethe General Assembly had no jurisdiction ofthe case.

80 U.S. 679, 733. Thus, for over 140 years, the U.S.Supreme Court has recognized that an ecclesiasticaltribunal cannot adjudicate property rights and give itcivil law effect. It logically follows that if an

ecclesiastical tribunal cannot make such a declaration,neither should an ecclesiastical council. The form ofecclesiastical body does not impact its ability to makedeclarations of civil law, it is simply beyond its

jurisdiction. Yet the misunderstanding and mis-application of edicta in Jones has morphed into aprincipal of law which unconstitutionally givesecclesiastical edict the force of civil law.

As an amicus to this petition, the Presbyterian LayCommittee is particularly interested in advising the

court as to the adverse effect the unresolved split inlaw has upon Presbyterian churches. First off, theoversimplified two-fold classification of churchstructures as either hierarchical or congregationaldoes not reflect the true variations of polity, many ofwhich are not based upon a simple hierarchical orcongregational structure. Presbyterianism is oneof those variations. Presbyterianism is neitherhierarchical nor congregational. Secondly, becausethe PCUSA modified its constitution based upon thedicta inJoneswhich suggested that a general church

could amend its constitution to assert an express trustinterest, and it seeks retroactive application of thatassertion over the property of all affiliated churches,


20/23

15

regardless of the individual church / property ownersintent, every affiliated church in the PCUSA stands tobe affected by the clarification of the law. Third,because Presbyteries, which are regional assemblies ofPresbyterian churches, often cross state lines, andgiven the split in the law along state lines, affiliatedchurches are receiving disparate property rightsdeterminations under similar fact patterns because ofthe lack of clarity as to how Jonesshould be applied.Fourthly, the courts misinterpretation of Jones hasgiven civil law authority over a denominational

constitution that never intended to have suchauthority.

The largest of the Presbyterian denominations inthe United States, the PCUSA, expressly notes in itsconstitution that ecclesiastical discipline must bepurely moral or spiritual in its object, and not attendedwith any civil effects. PCUSA Book of Order at F-3.0108. The PCUSAs constitution expressly statesthat all church power, whether exercised by the bodyin general or by the way of representation by delegatedauthority, is only ministerial and declarative, again,

emphasizing that it does not have punitive civil effect.(PCUSA Book of Order F-3.0107.) It further limits itsreach by noting that councils of this church have onlyecclesiastical jurisdiction for the purpose of servingJesus Christ and declaring and obeying his will inrelation to truth and service, order and discipline.(PCUSA Book of Order G-3.0102.) And discipline, asnoted above, is not attended with any civil effects.The Book of Order of the PCUSA does not intend forthe ecclesiastical pronouncements to be given civil laweffect. At the outset of its constitution the PCUSA

states that we [the PCUSA] do not even wish to seeany religious constitution aided by the civil power,further than may be necessary for protection and


21/23

16

security, and at the same time, be equal and commonto all others. (F-3.0101(B)). The immediately preced-ing version of the constitution expressly noted thatgoverning bodies of the church are distinct from thegovernment of the state and have no civil jurisdictionor power to impose civil penalties. (PCUSA Book ofOrder G-9.0102,pre-nFog).

Notwithstanding the PCUSAs own limitations oncivil law application of its constitution, cases likeFallsChurchsuperimpose civil law authority upon ecclesi-astical edicts not intended to have that effect.

The Falls Church decision violates the FirstAmendment by employing the courts for the enforce-ment of religious edicts. In Presbyterian Church v.

Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), this court cautionedthat First Amendment values are plainly jeopardizedwhen church property litigation is made to turn on theresolution by civil courts of controversies over reli-gious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertaketo resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate theproperty dispute, the hazards are ever present of

inhibiting the free development of religious doctrineand of implicating secular interests in the mattersof purely ecclesiastical concern. Because of thesehazards, the First Amendment enjoins the employ-ment or organs of government for essentially religiouspurposes. Presbyterian Church v. Hull, 393 U.S. at449; citing toAbbington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374U.S. 203 (1963). Consequently, the court cautionedthat states, religious organizations, and individualsmust structure relationship involving church propertyso as not to require the civil courts to resolve

ecclesiastical questions. Presbyterian Church v. Hull,393 U.S. 440, 449. Yet Falls Church was decided


22/23


23/23

18

corporations should be evaluated in the same manneras property held by any other legal entity. An asser-tion of a trust by a self-described trust beneficiarycannot properly be enforced under trust law principalsapplicable to every other person in civil society. Thatpreferentially idiosyncratic rule should not be enforcedmerely because the self-described beneficiary occu-pies, for some purposes, a higher tier in a religiouscommunity. Correct enunciation of these principals bythis court will help preserve the basic legal expecta-tions of Presbyterian, Episcopal, and other congrega-

tions throughout the United States. Accordingly, thePLC respectfully submits its views on the constitu-tional analysis properly applicable to church propertydisputes and the ramifications of the competinganalyses and methodologies which have spread fromthe competing applications of this courts decision in

Jones v. Wolf, and as most recently manifested in thecase sub judice.

Amicus urges review to clarify the intent of thiscourt inJones.

Respectfully submitted,

FORRESTA.NORMANCounsel of Record

DICKIE,MCCAMEY &CHILCOTE,P.C.

127 Public SquareSuite 2820, Key TowerCleveland, Ohio 44114(216) [email protected]

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 8, 2013

Documents

PLC Brief in the Falls Church Case