Plan for Today: Neoliberal Institutionalism & Concluding Liberalism 1. Complete group activity reporting. 2. Survey neoliberal solutions to the Prisoner’s

Plan for Today:Plan for Today:Neoliberal InstitutionalismNeoliberal Institutionalism& Concluding Liberalism& Concluding Liberalism

1.1. Complete group activity reporting.Complete group activity reporting.

2.2. Survey neoliberal solutions to the Survey neoliberal solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Prisoner’s Dilemma.

3.3. Compare neorealist and neoliberal views Compare neorealist and neoliberal views on likelihood of cooperation.on likelihood of cooperation.

4.4. Evaluate liberalism as theory.Evaluate liberalism as theory.

Small Group DiscussionSmall Group Discussion

Think as a group of 2-3 Think as a group of 2-3 ideas of ideas of modifications to the PD game that might modifications to the PD game that might lead to greater cooperation. (5 minutes)lead to greater cooperation. (5 minutes)

But still keep:But still keep: Actors as selfish utility-maximizers.Actors as selfish utility-maximizers. Players simultaneously deciding, so each can’t Players simultaneously deciding, so each can’t

know what other will choose.know what other will choose. Payoff values for each possible outcome.Payoff values for each possible outcome.

Leader report group proposals to class.Leader report group proposals to class.

Prisoner’s DilemmaPrisoner’s DilemmaNumerical PayoffsNumerical Payoffs

(refer to Lipson for more details)(refer to Lipson for more details)

P

layer 1P

layer 1

Player 2Player 2CooperateCooperate DefectDefect

CooperateCooperate 3, 33, 3 1, 41, 4DefectDefect 4, 14, 1 2, 22, 2

Neoliberal InstitutionalismNeoliberal Institutionalism

Institutional Modifications to Institutional Modifications to Increase CooperationIncrease Cooperation (Lipson, (Lipson, Axelrod):Axelrod):

1.1. Repeated interactionsRepeated interactions..1.1. Critical mass of “nice” players who start Critical mass of “nice” players who start

by cooperating and use “tit-for-tat” by cooperating and use “tit-for-tat” strategy strategy cooperation. cooperation.

2.2. Reputation becomes important.Reputation becomes important.



2.2. Monitoring.Monitoring.1.1. Agency that monitors who cooperates and Agency that monitors who cooperates and

who defects over time.who defects over time.



3.3. Number of Players.Number of Players.1.1. Fewer players Fewer players easier monitoring and easier monitoring and

punishment.punishment.

NeoliberalismNeoliberalism


4.4. Interdependent Issues.Interdependent Issues.1.1. Cooperation can evolve if players meet Cooperation can evolve if players meet

repeatedly in varying kinds of issues. repeatedly in varying kinds of issues.

Comparing Realists and Comparing Realists and Neoliberals on CooperationNeoliberals on Cooperation

1.1. Focus on different issues.Focus on different issues. Neoliberals tend to focus on economic Neoliberals tend to focus on economic

issues.issues. Realists tend to focus on security Realists tend to focus on security

issues.issues.

PD in a Security WorldPD in a Security World Likely payoffs entirely different.Likely payoffs entirely different.

““Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more

immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation).immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation).

P

layer 1

Pla

yer 1

Player 2Player 2

CooperateCooperate DefectDefect

CooperatCooperatee

3, 33, 3 1, 41, 4

DefectDefect 4, 14, 1 2, 22, 2

PD in a Security WorldPD in a Security World Likely payoffs entirely different.Likely payoffs entirely different.

““Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more Sucker’s payoff” = steeper loss and more

immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation).immediate (i.e. battle loss or nuclear annihilation).

P

layer 1

Pla

yer 1

Player 2Player 2

CooperateCooperate DefectDefect

CooperatCooperatee

3, 33, 3 -10-10, 4, 4

DefectDefect4, 4, -10-10 -1, -1-1, -1


2.2. Relative Gains vs. Absolute GainsRelative Gains vs. Absolute Gains.. NeoliberalsNeoliberals: states concerned with how : states concerned with how

much they can gain in much they can gain in absoluteabsolute terms. terms. NeorealistsNeorealists: states concerned with how : states concerned with how

much they gain much they gain relativerelative to other states. to other states.


3.3. Fungibility of power.Fungibility of power. NeorealistsNeorealists must believe economic power must believe economic power

easily easily fungiblefungible (convertible) into military (convertible) into military power.power.

NeoliberalsNeoliberals must believe economic power must believe economic power not so fungible.not so fungible.

Summary: Neoliberal Summary: Neoliberal InstitutionalismInstitutionalism

1.1. Accepts realists’ assumptions about states-as-Accepts realists’ assumptions about states-as-actors and their interests.actors and their interests.

2.2. Focuses on opportunities to build regimes or Focuses on opportunities to build regimes or institutions to overcome instances of market institutions to overcome instances of market failure.failure.

3.3. PD as illustration of market failure – introduces PD as illustration of market failure – introduces simple mechanisms for changing game to simple mechanisms for changing game to encourage more cooperation.encourage more cooperation.

4.4. Disagreements between neorealists and Disagreements between neorealists and neoliberals on cooperation: areas of focus, neoliberals on cooperation: areas of focus, absolute vs. relative gains, fungibility of power.absolute vs. relative gains, fungibility of power.

Evaluating Liberalism as a TheoryEvaluating Liberalism as a Theory

1.1. Explanatory power:Explanatory power:1.1. Tells us a lot about how, when, why Tells us a lot about how, when, why

cooperation emerges.cooperation emerges.1.1. Better in economic issues than security.Better in economic issues than security.

2.2. Loses explanatory efficiency (“Loses explanatory efficiency (“parsimonyparsimony”) ”) by including far more actors. (except by including far more actors. (except neoliberal)neoliberal)


2.2. Predictive power:Predictive power:1.1. Better than realism at predicting institutional Better than realism at predicting institutional

change.change.

2.2. Liberal interdependence: virtually no Liberal interdependence: virtually no predictive power.predictive power.1.1. Too many actors with an infinite number of Too many actors with an infinite number of

interests.interests.


3.3. Intellectual consistency and coherence:Intellectual consistency and coherence:1.1. Neoliberals: Again, can we assume self-help Neoliberals: Again, can we assume self-help

from anarchy?from anarchy?

2.2. Other liberalism: Can’t be evaluated easily in Other liberalism: Can’t be evaluated easily in terms of logical consistency as logic often terms of logical consistency as logic often not strictly specified.not strictly specified.


4.4. Scope: Good.Scope: Good.1.1. Liberal interdependence: can say a lot more Liberal interdependence: can say a lot more

about more kinds of actors than realism.about more kinds of actors than realism.1.1. E.g. How can realists explain international E.g. How can realists explain international

campaign to ban land mines?campaign to ban land mines?


5.5. Self-reflection and engagement with Self-reflection and engagement with other theories: OK.other theories: OK.

1.1. Neoliberal institutionalism itself came as Neoliberal institutionalism itself came as response to identified weaknesses in response to identified weaknesses in liberalism.liberalism.

2.2. Liberals have adopted some new Liberals have adopted some new constructivist lines of argument.constructivist lines of argument.

Documents

Plan for Today: Neoliberal Institutionalism & Concluding Liberalism 1. Complete group activity reporting. 2. Survey neoliberal solutions to the Prisoner’s