Pitfalls in the language-thought distinction: a view on studies of linguistic relativity

Holden Härtl Universität Kassel

holden.haertl@uni-kassel.de

Introduction

3

Linguistic relativity hypothesis:

“We dissect nature anlong lines laid down by our native language […] the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic system in our minds.”

see Whorf (1956: 213); cf. Pederson et al. (1998), Boroditsky et al. (2003)

Introduction

The LRH is compatible with (at least) two different models of cognition.

“The particular language we speak and its grammar shape our thought”

LINGUISTIC COGNITION

NON-LINGUISTIC COGNITION THOUGHT

GRAMMAR

COGNITION = LANGUAGE

Contents

5

Can we test linguistic relativity at all?

How circular are the empirical arguments? What are potential solutions?

1 Empirical language-thought research and problems

2 Circularity problem

3 Philosophical notions of circularity

Grammatical gender

Event conceptualization

Do we have to take the philosophical doubts seriously?

Thinking for speaking

Language apriori

Unaviodability of language

Object perception and gender

6

Do we attribute specific biological qualities to inanimate objects?

Apparently yes: Boroditsky et al. (2003) show that grammatical gender influences perception and memorization of objects.

Germans remembered a male name (Patrick) for APPLE better than a female one (Patricia).

Spanish subjects showed opposite results (MANZANA, Patricia).

→ Patricia

→ Patrick

derMASC Apfel – dieFEM Birne

Object perception and gender

7

Picture similarity test: Spanish subjects > German subjects

cf. Phillipps & Boroditsky (2003)

→ la tostadora

→ der Toaster =

Object perception and gender

8

Picture similarity test: German subjects > Spanish subjects

→ la cuchara

→ der Löffel =

cf. Phillipps & Boroditsky (2003)

Pitfall 1

Circularity of the argument

Circularity problem

10

Objection and alternative explanation:

• “Don’t the participants simply name the objects internally? From this the detected similarity between der Löffel und der Prinz follows logically!!”

• „So, people do not perceive the two alike, they are just labeled in similar ways!“

„der Prinz“ „der Löffel“

Solution 1

11

Try to strain the language system thus obstructing internal naming:

cf. Phillipps & Boroditsky (2003)

Results were identical and the authors conclude that the picture similarity effect is indeed based on non-linguistic associations.

Block the language system

Solution 2

12

Other studies have shown that only word stimuli elicit gender effects:

Explanation: Gender information does not influence non-linguistic representations but the level of (linguistically oriented) “Thinking for speaking”.

cf. Vigliocco et al. (2005); Slobin (1996)

(Non-linguistic) pictures do not trigger Whorfian effects:

asino (‘Esel’) = cammello (‘Kamel’)

≠

Invent a new cognitive level

Thinking for speaking

13

Abbildung: Modell der Sprachproduktion (vereinfacht)

Konzeptualisierung Außersprachliches Wissen

(Episodisches und Weltwissen)

Formulierung Mentales Lexikon

Artikulierung

Thinking for speaking

Grammatische Repräsentation

Phonetische Repräsentation

s. Levelt (1989); Slobin (1996)

Thinking for speaking

14

Eye-tracking studies show similar TfS-effects for event conceptualization.

see Papafragou et al. (2008)

Greek

English

PATH-VP + MANNER-PP

MANNER-VP+ PATH-PP

At 0 ms after SO:

Thinking for speaking

15

Eye-tracking studies show similar TfS-effects for event conceptualization.

Greek

English

PATH-VP + MANNER-PP

MANNER-VP+ PATH-VP

At 1500 ms after SO:

Crucially, the effect was found only for verbalization; no Whorf-effect for (non-linguistic) memorization of the events. Conclusion: Language affect TfS only and nothing “beyond”.

Pitfall 2:

Can we look beyond language?

A philosophical issue: Language apriori

17

Language apriori (à la Wittgenstein, Herder, Davidson, Heidegger, etc.): “All knowledge is based on language.”

Herder’s circularity criticism:

C: Language is a product of thought, which is independent from language.

Herder: But you can only have thought if you have language.

THOUGHT

LANGUAGE

Cognitive-psychological evidence (cf. de Villiers & de Villiers 2000):

Mastering (false) beliefs depends on linguistic abilities and propositional embedding; test group: deaf children with delayed language development

A philosophical issue: Language apriori

18

Bierwisch’s examples of “beyond language” (i.e. non-propositional) knowledge:

Bierwisch’s (2008) answer:

“Propositional knowledge is based on language.”

“Language separates propositional thought from everything beyond.”

“Everything thinkable is expressible.” (à la Searle 1969)

Face recognition Music comprehension

A philosophical issue: Unavoidability

19

Problem: Unavoidability (‘Unhintergehbarkeit’) of language

But even if we accept knowledge beyond language, can we access it at all?

So, in a strict sense, any empirical / experimental approach towards non-linguistic cognition fails from the outset because the approach itself is always in some sense linguistic.

Solution: ???

Wittgenstein (1922): “Denn um dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, müssten wir beide Seiten dieser Grenze denken können (wir müssten also denken können, was sich nicht denken lässt.”

If language relates to propositional knowledge only, this implies that there is no linguistic means available to consult non-linguistic knowledge.

Summary

Research on linguistic relativity of thought presumes a separation of linguistic from non-linguistic cognition (otherwise it would be trivial).

Empirical research is challenged by the circularity problem: Are the empirical effects really non-linguistic in nature?

A (pretty trivial) solution is to implement a “linguistically oriented” level of non-linguistic cognition (thus accepting circularity): Thinking for speaking.

20

Thank you.

The circularity problem has its underpinnings in the philosophical notions of the language apriori and the unavoidability of language, of which at least the latter seems somehow serious to me.

Literatur Bierwisch, Manfred. (2008): Bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Sprache die Grenzen meiner Welt? In: H. Kämper & L. M. Eichinger (eds.), Sprache – Kognition –

Kultur. IDS-Jahrbuch 2007, 323-355. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Bertram, Georg. (2011): Sprachphilosophie. Hamburg: Junius.

Boroditsky, L.; Schmidt, L. A.; Phillips, W. (2003): Sex, Syntax, and Semantics. In: Dedre Gentner und Susan Goldin (Hg.): Language in Mind. Advances in the

Study of Language and Cognition. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, S. 61-80.

Carroll, J. B. (Hg.) (1956): Language, Thought and Reality. Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.

De Villiers, J. G., & de Villiers, P. A. (2000): Linguistic determinism and the understanding of false beliefs. In P. Mitchell and K. Riggs. (Eds.), Children’s reasoning

and the mind (pp. 189–226). Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press.

Gardt, Andreas (2001): Beeinflusst die Sprache unser Denken? Ein Überblick über Positionen der Sprachtheorie. In: Andrea Lehr et al. (Hg.): Sprache im Alltag.

Beiträge zur neuen Perspektiven der Linguistik. Herbert Ernst Wiegand zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 19-39.

Gentner, Dedre; Goldin, Susan (Hg.) (2003): Language in Mind. Advances in the Study of Language and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Online

verfügbar unter http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/79602688.

Goddard, Angela; Patterson, Lindsey Meân (2009): Language and gender (2nd. Edition). London, New York: Routledge. Online verfügbar unter

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/233485232.

Gumperz, John Joseph; Levinson, Stephen C. (Hg.) (1996): Rethinking linguistic relativity. Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/33047146.

Härtl, Holden (2009): Linguistische Relativität und die 'Sprache-und-Denken'-Debatte. Implikationen, Probleme und mögliche Lösungen aus Sicht der

kognitionswissenschaftlichen Linguistik. In: Zeitschrift für Angewandte Linguistik 51, S. 45-81.

Levelt, Willem J. M. (1989): Speaking. From Intention to Articulation. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Online verfügbar unter

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/18136175.

Papafragou, Anna; Hulbert, Justin; Trueswell, John (2008): Does Language Guide Event Perception? Evidence from Eye Movements. In: Cognition 108, S. 155–

184. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.007.

Pederson, Eric; Danziger, Eve; Wilkins, David; Levinson, Stephen; Kita, Sotaro; Senft, Gunter (1998): Semantic Typology and Spatial Conceptualization. In:

Language 74 (3), S. 557-589.

Phillips, W.; Boroditsky, L. (2003): Can Quirks of Grammar Affect the Way You Think? Grammatical Gender and Object Concepts. In: Richard Alterman und

David Kirsh (Hg.): Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Boston, MA: Cognitive Science Society, S. 928-933.

Slobin, Dan. I. (1996): From "Thought and Language" to "Thinking for Speaking". In: John Joseph Gumperz und Stephen C. Levinson (Hg.): Rethinking linguistic

relativity. Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press, S. 70-96.

Vigliocco, Gabriella; Vinson, David P.; Paganelli, Federica; Dworzynski, Katharina (2005): Grammatical Gender Effects on Cognition. Implications for Language

Learning and Language Use. In: Journal of Experimental Psychology 134, S. 501‐520.

Whorf, B. L. (1956): Science and Linguistics. In: J. B. Carroll (Hg.): Language, Thought and Reality. Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge (MA):

MIT Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus logica-philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, in: Schriften, Band 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958): Philosophical investigations. Blackwell: Basil.