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Minnie Pit 1918 update Researched by John Lumsdon

The sinking of the Minnie Pit commenced three hundred yards from the North Staffordshire Railway Company Station at Halmerend in April 1883, to a depth of about 1,200 feet. Although the first sod was actually cut in 1871 in sinking the shaft there was trouble with quicksand and water. This persisted for a depth of 38 feet. The final diameter was 16 feet 3 inches and the shaft was less than originally intended, owing to the lining that had to be fitted to combat the sand and water.  The headgear over the shaft was of strong pitch pine timber and its main legs were 50 feet long.An explosion occurred in February 1898 without loss of life, although numbers of pit ponies were killed. Then on a Sunday in 1915 when only twenty-seven men were at work, tragedy struck with an explosion killing nine men with others severely injured. A third of the work-force died that day. Had it been a weekday it would have been a been a major disaster

 

 

Minnie PitSafety measures in today’s mines are more stringently applied than may have been the case

in days gone by, when the coal barons of the day were more interested in production and profit than in safe working conditions of their workforce.  Even so, in today’s relatively good

conditions, working many hundreds of yards under ground can hardly be described as an ideal environment in which to earn a living.

What then of the working conditions in the Minnie pit in the days prior to the third explosion in 1918?

Ventilation

A modern colliery will probably have coalfaces up to 200 or 300 yards in length with an intake airway at one end and a return airway at the other end, so that an uninterrupted flow of air is carried through the entire workings.  In such conditions it would be more difficult for noxious gases to accumulate. In contrast the Minnie pit had many steeply inclined and honeycombed workings.

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The air entering these districts became warm as it progressed through the working places the temperature increased as heat was picked up from the coal, the bodies of men, pit ponies, lamps and shot firing.  By the time the air reached the outer limits of the district, the temperature would have risen substantially. This warm air, being lighter, would concentrate, along with any methane gas present in the higher parts and roof cavities of the workings.Because of a weakened airflow in these areas, highly dangerous pockets of inflammable gas would tend to accumulate. A modern colliery would also have a system of piping off this methane gas for commercial use, but in the old days they were happy enough to be able to disperse the dangerous accumulations by directing airflow over the higher parts of the workings. This task was made so much more difficult by the fact that many of the working areas were off shoots from the main dips. The air circulation became more and more sluggish as it found its way into these isolated pockets.  

In some cases metal pipes were bolted together in an attempt to introduce a better airflow into the more inaccessible places, but it must be realised that noxious gases could not be removed from the areas where men were working, in a totally satisfactory manner. Another method of combating these dangerous conditions was the use of brattice cloth; this is a thick Hessian type of material. If a test for gas proved positive, the brattice cloth would be erected in such a manner that it would re-direct the gas/air mixture into places where dilution would occur, thus making a potentially dangerous mixture, relatively harmless.

Gobs

A gob is the void left after the coal has been extracted, and because of the old pillars of coal and props previously supporting that area a certain amount of caving in of the roof has taken place. These old areas invariably had a certain amount of coal left in them, and gave rise to spontaneous combustion, resulting in what’s called a gob stink, a sulphurous gas.  A gob fire could follow, and the only way to combat this situation would be to completely seal off the area, as these gob fires were impossible to extinguish by conventional methods.  Of course, a gob fire is one of the means of igniting the methane gas and causing an explosion. Explosions are traditionally regarded as the most serious of hazards faced by the miners in the course of their daily work. Traditionally firedamp is blamed for colliery explosions, but in fact, with rare exceptions, violent explosions have been caused by the combustion of coal dust. So it is worthwhile to look at some of the historical facts on coal dust explosions.

Coal Dust

At the beginning of the 19th century, the danger of coal dust was slowly being realised. There were references to the explosibility of coal dust in several reports, including that of the celebrated North of England mining engineer, John Buddle, on the Wallsend Colliery Explosion in 1803 and that of the Rev. John Hodgson, describing the Felling Colliery Explosion in 1812.

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More emphatic and detailed is the description by Lyall and Faraday (great scientists of their day, on the Hasswell Colliery Explosion in 1844, they stated: - “In considering the extent of the fire from the explosion, it is not to be supposed that firedamp is the only fuel.

The coal dust, swept by the rush of flame and wind from the roof, floor and sides of the workings, would instantly take fire and burn if there was enough oxygen in the air present to support its combustion.

In his report on the Ince Colliery Explosion in 1854 HMI of Mines Dickinson stated: - “That as the workings were very dry, it would be aggravated by the coal dust raised by the blast”.

Another interesting reference was made by two colliery managers at the inquest following the Winnstay Explosion in 1873 when they said in their evidence that the coal dust would be ignited by “firing the shot”.

There were many other examples of the potential danger of coal dust not only in Britain but also in France and other European countries. In 1906, one of the most extensive explosions happened at Courrieres, Northern France, where 1,099 men lost their lives. This was a formidable coal dust explosion.  Investigators from this country believed that nearly all the big explosions were due chiefly, and in some cases entirely, to coal dust, and that, “the only certain method of preventing such loss of life would seem to be, to render the mines incapable of being the scene of widespread dust explosions, by watering or otherwise preventing the accumulation of dry coal dust in the roads and workings”.

About the same time, experiments were carried out in the North of England and the Midlands. The results of the Midlands experiments were reported in a paper, read before the Chesterfield and Derbyshire Institute of Mining in 1878 and concluded: - “Explosions of coal dust and air were obtained in the absence of firedamp”.

After the Seaham Pit Explosion in September 1880, in which 164 died, the problem assumed great public importance, and the British Government sanctioned official experiments.

At this enquiry too it appears that the first mention of stone dust was made. Atkinson, a mines inspector, stated that:  “the intake travelling road was not damaged by the explosion, but the parallel haulage road was completely wrecked”.

The difference he attributed to the presence of stone dust in the travelling road. So that reduced the potential hazard. Thus this for-shadowed one of the future methods of combating the inflamabillity of coal- dusts in mines.  It was not until the Coal Mines Act of 1887 that amongst the precautions required, was that of watering the dust in the vicinity of shots for a radius of 20 yards.

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 Royal Commission

Following further disasters, the Home Secretary invited suggestions for the prevention of colliery explosions. As a result, one of H.M. Inspectors of Mines, Mr. Henry Hall, was commissioned to carry out experiments. In 1891 a commission report, recommended that the mine dust be watered and that certain rules be adopted affecting the use of explosives in mines.

It was in 1901 that the first official mention of the possible general application of incombustible dust is made, and that was at an inquiry of the Talke-o-th-Hill explosion H.M.I. of Mines, Mr Atkinson stated: It is far easier to prevent an explosion occurring, than to stop it after it has travelled some distance.

The Minnie Pit Disaster  

 In the Minnie pit at Halmerend, on January 12th 1918 the conditions prevailing at the time were, begging disaster. A spark was all that was needed, and this was provided, resulting in the deaths of 155 men and boys.

On that fateful Saturday, Mr. Smith, the colliery manager, was in his office at the surface of No 3 pit. He was informed that haulage lads were at No1 pit bottom and wanted to come out of the pit. There had been a sudden gust of wind against the air current, and pieces of small coal and dirt had been projected out bye (towards the shaft) and they thought something was wrong. At the same time his attention was drawn to the soot and smoke issuing from the fan chimney at the up cast shaft. He went round to the fan house, where he found the fan running all right, but the fan attendant informed him that a few minutes previously, it had slowed down. He then went into the hauling engine house, where the engineman said; that the haulage rope was fast (stuck) and the engine could not be moved. Mr. Smith then got in communication with Frank Halfpenny at the top of the Banbury dip, who told him that the men and boys were lying around in the dark owing to their lamps having been extinguished. Mr. Smith told Halfpenny not to allow anybody to go through the separation doors into the return airway, as it would be contaminated with poisonous gases, and he instructed the winding engineman not to allow anyone down the No. 3 up cast shaft. He also rang up the Central Rescue Station at Stoke-on-Trent and asked for apparatus and teams to be sent to the Minnie pit immediately.

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The agent manager and under manager went to the Minnie pit immediately, and after a brief consultation, it was decided, that the agent and under manager should descend the pit, whilst the manager should remain on the surface to take in hand the general organisation of the rescue operations.

On descending the pit, they found a party of men from the West district and preceded them up the haulage road in the direction of the area affected by the explosion. A lad was found dead about 20 yards out bye of the Rearers junction.

Three more bodies were close by, seven men and boys were found alive, though suffering from the affects of afterdamp. The party divided at the top of the Banbury dip, one going to the Rearers district and the other down the Banbury dip. No one was found alive below the top of the Banbury dip haulage road, but the men and boys in the Rearers district were alive and safe.

In the meantime Mr. Smith, the manager, who had called for the rescue brigades, made arrangements for the reception and treatment of any injured men. The rescue apparatus from Stoke Central Rescue Station soon arrived, also rescue brigades fully equipped and with instructions to travel as far as they could in the direction of the workings. By noon, all the injured men had been brought out of the pit and the rescuers continued with their work. The Minnie pit brigade reported a large fall of ground at the entrance to the Bullhurst crut had obstructed them going any further, but ventilating air was travelling through to the Bullhurst. They then made their way to the top of Lockett’s dip, where their progress again obstructed by another large roof fall. They came back and went into the return airway, where smoke was seen coming out of the Bullhurst seam. After receiving this report, a conference was held between Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, Mr.Henshaw, the managing director of Talke-o-th-Hill colliery, and other mining engineers and management.

A gob fire was feared in the Bullhurst seam and it was decided to seal the seam off temporarily. To do this, the Silverdale rescue brigade, wearing self contained breathing apparatus (to enable the wearers to breath and work independently of the surrounding atmosphere), descended the Minnie pit at 4.30 pm with Mr. Bull, Sub-Inspector of Mines, Mr. Davies, and the manager. They found that the separating doors between Lockett’s intake and return roadways were blown out, but 50 yards further inbye another set of doors were intact. They took air samples at various places and this team returned to the surface at 7.30 pm. and was replaced by the Burley colliery brigade. A bird, taken to the place where air samples had been obtained, died at once. As the team advanced they found the dead bodies of a man, boy and horse. Rescue brigades continued to attempt to enter the Bambury workings in advance of the air until 4 pm. On Sunday, when it was decided to carry forward the air with them, and at 8 pm. Holland’s place was reached. Here three more bodies were found.

Hugh Doorbar’s Death

On Monday morning the captain of Birchenwood rescue brigade, Hugh Door bar, lost his life when engaged in the work of exploration in the Seven feet seam.

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The team consisted of 6 men, and, after Hugh Doorbar had consulted with the captain of the team coming off duty, they proceeded in bye. On reaching the top of what is known as Lockett’s dip, the men noticed an unpleasant smell. Tests were made for the presence of gas without result. However, the flame safety lamp burned dimly and it was decided to couple up their self-contained breathing apparatus. The team proceeded slowly and ultimately reached a point where the safety lamp went out, indicating an irrespirable atmosphere. As they were going forward slowly a sharp report was heard and Hugh Doorbar said, “oh my apparatus”. His comrades tried to assist him, but he struggled violently.  

Efforts were made to get him back to fresh air, but owing to his struggles, during which he repeatedly knocked off the nose clips of the other men and actually knocked one man down, they were unsuccessful. The forcible removal of their nose clips resulted in other men being affected by the atmosphere, and they were finally obliged to leave Doorbar.  When they left him, they were satisfied that he was dead. Birchenwood colliery No. 2 team recovered the body the same day.

The apparatus worn by Doorbar was sent to Dr. Briggs, director of the government research on mines rescue apparatus, at Herio-watt College, Edinburgh, for examination, where it was found that Hugh Doorbar lost his life due to a combination of faults on two valves of his breathing apparatus, whilst exploring in an irrespirable atmosphere. It also recommended the use of a new type of nose clip that could not be displaced easily.

On the 16th January, the chairman of the North Staffs Colliery Owners Association, realising that the exploration of the workings devastated by the explosion was going to be a long and anxious matter and would in all probability have to be done by means of rescue brigades wearing self contained breathing apparatus, called a meeting of the Association Rescue Committee. This committee was made up of all interested bodies. They were to consider the difficulties and procedure with regard to the opening of the Bullhurst seam and the provision of rescue teams. On the 19th January, the organisation of rescue teams and the work done in the in the Seven feet seam were discussed at a meeting of the consultative committee, and, on the 22nd January, analyses of air, taken from the Bullhurst back crut, showed that it was charged with an atmosphere that would not support combustion.

The exploration of the Seven Feet workings was completed on the 7th February, and all the bodies were recovered from that seam. There remained 98 bodies in the Bullhurst seam, 3 of which were shortly afterwards recovered from the entrance to the Bullhurst crut. Investigative work and various steps were taken. Analyses of air samples indicated leakage of air from the seven feet workings into the Bullhurst crut or and it was agreed to build a stopping to prevent this. A fall of roof at the entrance to the main Bullhurst crut had been effective in preventing circulation of air and it was agreed to commence opening the district. On the 23 rd of February, gob stink was found over the fall and steps for preventing circulation of air was proposed and it was agreed, to put in temporary stoppings and the smell to be closely watched. On the 25th of February, other work was carried on with technical matters. On the 1st of March, a meeting of representatives was held to discuss the situation and it was agreed that there was still gob stink present.

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It was a decided to put in further stoppings to prevent leakage of air from the Seven feet workings and to strengthen the existing stoppings. At this meeting, the chairman of the colliery company raised the question of risking further loss of life. Operations were then suspended for 7 days.

An inspection was made on the 8th of March. It was found that the workings were charged with firedamp. They adjourned for a week, and in the meantime the stoppings were to be carefully watched and air samples taken. A further inspection on March 15th found that leakage had occurred at a stopping and the position was not as satisfactory as the week before. An additional stopping was built and measures taken to prevent air leaking into the Bullhurst area. On the 27th of March, it was found that the gobstink had disappeared.

The committee met the same night to discuss the position and the procedure to be adopted in re-opening the workings. Three schemes were submitted, setting a plan to be followed and it was agreed to go along with the scheme submitted by Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines.

The owners of the colliery were reluctant to proceeding with the exploration of the Bullhurst seam. They were of the opinion that it was too dangerous to do so, and that serious risk of a further explosion and loss of life would be run if it were attempted.

The Miners Federation and the North Staffs Miners Association were of the opinion that it could be done safely. The Inspector of Mines agreed with this view and urged that the bodies remaining in the mine should be recovered and the cause of the explosion ascertained if possible.

Considerable pressure had to be exercised by the Home Office and representatives of the Miners Federation on the owners to get the work done.

It was only undertaken after a meeting with them at the Home Office on the 27th June 1918, at which the Rt. Hon. W. Brace, M.P. then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, said: “The department is strongly of the opinion, that the workings should be explored, the bodies recovered and the cause of the explosion thoroughly investigated”. The owners eventually agreed to carry out the work.

The work of exploration was done in stages, in close co-operation with the representatives of the workmen and Inspector of Mines, on the lines of the report of the consultative committee, by means of rescue brigades wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. The work started on July 18th 1918 and four brigades were engaged for more than twelve months. Thirty-four stoppings were built in an atmosphere devoid of oxygen and the seam was opened up step by step, until the last body was brought out, on August 19th 1919. -- 19 months after the explosion.

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Combined Rescue teams at Minnie pit

The test to which the apparatus and the brigades were put, is probably the greatest ever applied to rescue brigades wearing self-contained breathing apparatus and, its successful completion reflects the greatest credit on the manager, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Biddington of the Miners Federation,

both of whom wore the apparatus and accompanied the brigades during the whole time, in fact on everyone who had to do with the operations.

Verdict of Jury

In pursuance of section 83 of the Coal Mines Act 1911, a formal investigation of the causes and circumstances of the disaster was held, and, after hearing the evidence of forty witnesses, the jury returned the following verdict:

We consider that the deceased persons met their death from a medical point of view as follows.

o 144 from carbon monoxide poisoning

o 11 from violence plus carbon monoxide poisoning

The cause of death was an explosion of gas and coal dust in the Bullhurst and Banbury seams of the Minnie pit.

That there is not sufficient evidence to show what caused the initial flame.

We consider that the pit has been carried on in accordance with the Coal Mines Act 1911, and general regulations as far as they have been issued, but, we are of the opinion that, if the dust had been systematically removed, the explosion would not have been so extensive.

We do not consider that any particular person is to blame for the explosion.

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As a result of the inquiry, we consider that further regulations should be issued at once for the treatment of coal dust, and that there is great scope for inquiry by government experts on this point, particularly making coal dust itself inert.

The jury consider that any shot-lighter should report in writing anything he considers unsafe in the mine.

Outstanding Cases of Bravery

There are two cases of outstanding bravery to be recorded. One of them is that of James Thomas Machen, leader of the Rescue Brigade on the occasion when Hugh Doorbar collapsed.

The other one was; that of Frank Halfpenny, who, when the explosion occurred, was 500 yards from the No.1 (or Minnie) pit bottom at the top of the new haulage.

He stated that there was noise caused by reversing of the air current, followed by dust and smoke. He lay down on the floor and after the air current resumed its natural course he got up again and attempted to telephone to the top of the Banbury dip, but got no answer.

Then, without the slightest hesitation and although there was smoke all round him, he went to the top of the Banbury dip, a distance of 800 yards, and telephoned to the surface to inform the manager, Mr. Smith, of the state of affairs below ground. He received instructions not to go into and not allow anyone else to go into the return airway. His going in bye a distance of 800 yards in the circumstances, which existed, was a brave act. Most men, instead of doing so, would have made at once for the shaft, but Halfpenny proceeded in bye to see if he could render any aid, regardless of the risk he him self ran in doing so. On the way he found a body of a lad lying in the gutter, and lifted him out and put him on the side of the road, while he also found another lad lying unconscious who ultimately recovered.

 Ventilation and Measurements of Air Current

The Coal Mines Act 1911 and attending regulations require the measurement each month, of the quantity of air in the main ventilation current to each seam, in every split in the current, where an intake road into a district forked off from the main intake road and at a point 100 yards back from the first working place at the face. These measurements were required to be recorded in a book maintained in the mine for that purpose.

These sensible requirements were designed to ensure that adequate ventilation was provided throughout the workings and that it was duly recorded. The last measurements, prior to the explosion, of the air in various parts of the mine were recorded in December 20th 1917.

But, at the inquiry, it was established that the management contravened sections 24 (1) and 29 (2) of the Act. The manager’s explanation was, that these measurements were made by Jones; an overman, who was one of the victims of the explosion and were entered in his notebook, but not in the prescribed book. As the notebook had not been recovered, the manager was unable to state the volume of air, which travelled the faces of the various

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districts and whether or not there was any undue leakage between the entrance to the ventilating districts and faces.

A further breach of section 62 (3) was recorded, by the failure to remove, as far as practicable, coal dust from the floor, roof and sides. Mr. J.B. Atkinson, for 40 years H.M.I. of Mines, now consulting mining engineer representing the Miners Federation of Great Britain, stated at the inquiry:

“The roads traversed by the explosion contained an excess of coal dust”. And it was his opinion that, “this was the propagating agent”. Mr. Atkinson alleged that the Home Office had not taken proper measures to obviate the dangers arising from coal dust.  He thought that they had been lacking in not drawing up proper regulations, and he also complained of their interference with Inspector’s reports. He resigned because of this.

There was further evidence when Mr. Cave of the North Staffs Miners Federation, called two witnesses. The first, Mr. George Harrison, of High St. Halmerend said he worked on the main level of the Bullhurst district for some weeks before the explosion, and these districts were very dusty. Formally, a man named Mainwaring was employed to clear up the dust, but he had left two or three months before, and, due to the men trampling though the dust, he said: “We could hardly see one another when we were going out”. The second witness, Sam Bate, of high St. Halmerend, stated: “The main north level was six inches thick with dust. At weekends, lads cleared some of the dust away”.

Having considered the dust aspect, let us look at the gas aspect, as these combined, only need a source of ignition to cause an explosion and both of the previous explosions, 1898 and 1915, were attributed to gob fires.

Gas and Shot Firing

In the working of the Banbury, Seven feet and Bullhurst seams, firedamp was given off freely. The manager, realising this, instructed his officials to withdraw the men when 2% or more gas was found in the working place and that a report was to be entered in the book kept for that purpose. A breach of the 1911 Act section 14 (3) was recorded at the inquiry.

A fireman had been assigned a district of such a size, that he was prevented from carrying out in a thorough manner all his statutory duties. H. Downing, in evidence stated that, when the manager assigned the district to him, he objected to taking it, on the grounds that it was too large. Then a shot-firer was appointed to assist him in making the statutory inspections.

Evidence was given that shortly after midnight on January 11th the colliers in Ratcliffe’s place had come out owing to the presence of gas and sent for Rowley, who was described as assistant fireman and shotlighter. Rowley examined the place and found 1.5% of gas.

He told the men to go back, but made no report because he considered that one was not required unless an official had withdrawn the workmen.

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After the inquiry it was recommended that a report be made if a workman had withdrawn himself. In the Banbury seam, the fireman fired shots, as well as the shot firer, and, from the shot-firing book, there was evidence that those fired by the fireman, amounted at times to 40 per shift.

The fireman, after being pressed by the Inspector, admitted more than two hours of the shift were taken up with the firing of shots. He estimated that each shot took him 3 minutes. But in cross-examination, he admitted it would take nearly 10 minutes. The practice followed in the Banbury seam was illegal.

All inspections in a fireman’s district, under sections 64-65 of the Act, must be made by the fireman in charge of that district, and if the fireman is allowed to fire any shots, the district assigned to him must be of such a size that shot firing does not interfere with his statutory duties. (Section 14)

Gas Explosion and Coal Dust

As was mentioned earlier, the Minnie pit was a gassy pit, and Joe Johnson said, on the night before the explosion, he was working at the top of No 4 district and during the night there was about 1.5% of gas in the place, which increased when tops came down in the adjacent Carter’s place. Men working in Cartlidge’s place and Radcliffe’s, both at the top of No. 4 district, spoke of the presence of gas there on the night before the explosion. Mr Granville Pool, H.M.I. of Mines, was of the opinion that the point of origin of the explosion was in the gob at the top of No. 4 district, sparking from the Bulldog stone.  

As propagation or spread of explosion was concerned, he thought the first ignition was of gas and that this developed into a coal dust explosion, pure and simple. Mr. Frank Lingard, who had worked as a miner in the Minnie pit for 26 years, describing the sparks he had seen in the mine, when Bulldog stone was breaking and falling from the roof, states:

“As near as I can tell you, it was like a tram car going along, striking one of the cups, it is like that, only a longer streak, like an electric flash”.

Here were all the ingredients of a disastrous explosion of gas: a source of ignition, and coal dust; (To spread the explosion).

Were there any lessons to be learned?

Well, the Coal Mines Act 1911 was the culmination of years of work by the Royal Commission of 1906, and embodied the knowledge and experience, often bitter, of the miners, the mines Inspectorate and owners, over many years. It was a serious attempt to get standards for safety and conditions in an industry with a long history of danger, sudden death and disaster.  Consequently, the provisions of the Act were quite positive in their protection of the workers from these inherent dangers. But, they recognised also that these aims would not be achieved on a voluntary basis. For this reason the Act spelt out the penalties attending failure to comply with its many requirements. Unfortunately these penalties were not a very

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effective deterrent. For an example let’s look at the Senghenydd  Pit Disaster in Glamorgan, when on the 14th October 1913 no less than 439 lives were lost in a violent explosion.

The coal dust had not been dealt with properly, a matter on about which the Chief Inspector of Mines took a most serious view at the inquiry, and on behalf of the Home Office, the Inspector prosecuted the owners and manager for breaches of the Coal Mines Act. On the coal dust charges, the manager was fined £5 or 14 days in goal. Altogether there were convictions on five charges, and the total fines were £24. The local newspaper headed its report, “Miners lives at One and a Penny Farthing each,” (Five and a Half Pence)

It does not seem, that the penalties inflicted for breaches of mining law, bore no relation to the gravity of the offences committed, nor were they on such a scale as to be an effective deterrent. How many more lives were lost under similar circumstances? 155 at the Minnie pit can be taken as one example.

Of all the stories told about the Minnie pit, before and at the time of the explosion, few can be so well authenticated and as sadly prophetic as told by Mr. Fred Burgess of Bignall End, when he was 90 years of age. (And I have a tape recording of this) He said he had ignored his father’s pleas to continue working with him; otherwise he would almost certainly have been a teenage fatality in the explosion. At the age of 13 he started at Jammage pit on the screens, where he sorted the stone from the coal. Then at 16 he joined his father at the Minnie, loading for him in the Bullhurst seam.

He tells of the numerous times that he and the men with whom he made his way to their place of work, someone would remark, “our clogs will be battering against the roof one of these days”, indicating an explosion. So extensive was the accumulation of gas that their lamps, when raised to little more than shoulder height, would all but, be extinguished. Such was their concern that Burgess, Dick Pool, Arthur Roades and Arthur Morgan, made up their minds to give two weeks notice of their intention to leave employment at the Minnie. They worked their notice, which ended exactly one week before the explosion. Burgess’s father was killed.

Reminiscing

I’ll just continue with some other research I done when people were reminiscing 56 years after the explosion. Remote from the battlefields of the First World War, the citizens of Halmerend were looking forward to their annual party in the Primitive Methodist schoolroom. Every larder in and around the village was to yield ingrediance for a real “Beano” in that decorated schoolroom, and Saturday promised to be a day to remember. It was, but for an entirely different reason.

The day came in cold with a promise of more snow. The men of the Minnie pit night shift were safe and sound in their beds. The village itself was astir quite early, for it was Saturday and the weekends shopping had to be done, homes tidied and finishing touches added to the preparations for the old people’s party.

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Over a 1,000 feet below ground 247 men were toiling, happy enough, for it was pay-day, a short shift, football in the afternoon, other forms of entertainment in the evening and last but not least the prospect of a long and restful weekend.  Alas they were only minutes away from death and misery.

Black Canopy

Colliery manager Joseph Smith, the man responsible for the safety and smooth running of his pit, the intermediary between the miner and the owner sat in his office, in the shadow of the Podmore headgears. Like the rest of the pit personnel he too was looking forward to a long and restful weekend, “away from it all.” It was about 9.45 am and Smith was sipping his morning cup of tea. Suddenly incoherent shouts from surface workers caused him to look through his office window. For a few seconds his gaze was transfixed. “God almighty” he gasped as the awful implications struck him like a thunderbolt. Smoke, soot and dust peppered with sparks were issuing from the Podmore shaft and the fan chimney and coiling upwards into the sky to form a black acrid canopy over the colliery. An explosion had occurred.

 

Sketch by Tom Byrne

Smith immediately contacted the fan attendant, who informed him that the ventilation process had been reversed for some minutes. It was working normally now, but the powerful haulage engine had stalled completely. Simultaneously frantic phone calls from the Minnie pit bottom declared that the haulage lads wanted to ascend the shaft. They had been alarmed by a tremor that had shaken their working places, followed by a cloud of dust, soot and small

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coal. Whatever his inner thoughts, the emotions of Joe Smith can only be imagined, 247 precious lives were at stake. Thoughts of these men, their families, wives and children, must have distressed him.

Some had several members of their families underground. He immediately ordered his under manager, C.H. Weaver, to descend the shaft to investigate, while he himself remained on the surface to marshal his rescue teams, medical units, to isolate the colliery and to notify the owners. Weaver found the pit bottom more horrifying than he had anticipated. There was utter confusion. No one seemed to know what had happened. No one gave orders. Everything was coated with thick oily black dust. It clogged nostrils affected breathing and made the eyes smart. An experienced mining official, Weaver knew the signs; a methane gas explosion had taken place.

He was about to precede further inbye, when out of the smoke and gloom emerged a grimy Frank Halfpenny, who was carrying a badly injured boy. Both Weaver and Halfpenny agreed that a big explosion had occurred beyond the Banbury dip and fully trained men wearing breathing apparatus could only accomplish that rescue work. Even the recovery of bodies would be dangerous.

A Mortuary

Meanwhile the manager realising he had a full-scale rescue operation on his hands contacted Stoke Central Rescue Station, which served several collieries and had a permanent staff on call 24 hours a day. In less than no time mining officials, engineers, medical units, ambulances, highly trained rescue brigades and police were on their way to Halmerend. Barriers had been erected around the colliery to facilitate access and exit and to control the crowds who gathered. Every available

space and accommodation in the village was requisitioned. The Primitive Methodist Church room, which was to have been the setting for the old folk’s party, became, instead, a mortuary.

News of the explosion spread like wildfire, people ran out on to the streets; mothers clutching babes to their breast with one hand and tugging toddlers with the other, hobbled to the Minnie pit.

Bleary-eyed nightshift workers, roused from their sleep, dressed hurriedly and hastened to the pit. The sinister black canopy of acrid smoke hovering like a spectre of death over Podmore, told them all they wanted to know.

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It was heart rendering to witness the grief of all concerned. Many of them had several of their families in the pit. The managing director of the colliery Mr. W. Hill of Apedale Hall, mines inspectors; Messrs Bull, Saint, Clive, Felton and Walker, local colliery managers, all eager to help with their expertise, were soon on the spot. Highly trained rescue teams, eager to descend the shaft, reported for duty. The first to descend the shaft was the Minnie pit rescue team, with instructions to venture inbye as far as prudent to repair broken ventilation doors, so that air might circulate according to plan, without which rescue work would be impossible and men would suffocate.

Charles Jeb had arrived home from his night shift at the Minnie pit. His brothers George age 22 and Percy, who had just left school, had gone down in the day shift. Everything was peaceful and Mr Jeb was thinking about getting a well-deserved rest, but it was not to be. For at 9.45 am an explosion ripped through the Bullhurst seam.

News spread round the village quickly and as soon as he heard, Charles Jab, despite the fact he had been working thought the night, rushed to the pit head to offer his assistance.

Mr Jeb who was 82 (when interviewed 1974) and can clearly recall the turmoil and bewilderment of those minutes after his arrival at the pit. There were 247 men and boys on the 6 am shift that morning and Mr Jeb remembers the scenes of jubilation among the relatives when their loved ones were found to be alive. But there was fear and terror in the eyes of others as husbands, boy friends, and sons were feared lost Mr Jeb was in the first rescue team to descend.

Messages were continually relayed to the surface to let the gathering crowds know the greave situation. Rescue work was extremely difficult because of the dust and gas. There was a need to explore and restore the ventilation. Although some of the bodies had been burnt and were not easily recognised, some were well preserved and Mr Jeb was able to identify his two brothers when he found them sitting up against the roadway wall, in the act of eating their sandwiches.

One man we found had a pocket watch, which had stopped at 9.45. It was a long arduous job before the last victim was brought out, David Leighton age 20 at 9.30 on August 19th 1919.Mr Jeb said the disaster and recovery of the bodies did not deter him from carrying on with his career as a miner. When he finished the job at the Minnie he was transferred to Florence colliery.

After an hour the team returned to the surface with a dozen survivors, all suffering from shock, injury and the effects of choke damp.

The captain’s report was most concerting, large sections of the roadways had caved in, the whole atmosphere underground reeked with gas and as far as he could ascertain, the explosion “had ripped the guts out of the Banbury and Bullhurst seams”. He was afraid there would be very few survivors.

Crawled Out

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But some miners, depending on their location in the pit, were more fortunate. Even while the Captain was giving his doleful report, 47 men and boys and their deputy Charles Greatbatch, were crawling almost vertically, slowly and painfully up though the dark and steep grades of the Rearers to the old pit shaft at Miles Green. Some of grades in the Rearers had a gradient of one in two. The shock wave of the explosion hit the Bullhurst South Rearers with a spanking slap and the sound like the flapping of heavy canvas in a gale. Dust soot and debris were scattered over a wide area. Cries of pain, coughing and spluttering followed by a babble of hoarse voices, indicated panic.

 “Stay where you are!” yelled Greatbatch. Don’t go back into the workings for your clothes and for God’s sake don’t panic.

The vehemence of his voice steadied the group and gave him time to warn them of their disturbing predicament.

The explosion had cut them off from the pit bottom and the rest on the mine. They were now he warned caught like rats in a trap, but to behave like undisciplined men and run blindly out of the area would sign their death warrant. Unfortunately one boy panicked and ran off in the direction of the Minnie pit bottom only to die in the poisonous atmosphere. He then went on to explain his plan, the one and only hope of survival.

Fortunately, the Rearers had its own air current and were therefore independent of the Minnie air supply. By shortcutting the air, this would create a temporary air pocket, which would keep at bay the noxious gas. To short circuit the current he would have to open, partially, the separation doors between the intake and return air. But he cautioned them they would have only two hours respite.  Sporadic roof falls close by and suspicion of chokedamp, hastened the groups decision. “It’s an even break” commented a survivor of the 1915 explosion, who spoke from experience. We might make it and then again we might not. But if we remain here we shall certainly die.

Into The Sunlight

The men asked questions and made suggestions and even some good-natured banter began to seep into the serious talk, which built the trust Greatbatch wanted before allowing them to venture up towards the old pit The men new he was an expert in mining affairs and a flare for leadership, which impressed them and guided them to safety up to the old Busted Onion shaft. By 1.30pm the group stood shivering, tattered and torn, blinking in the brassy sunlight. With a loud cheer they greeted their leaded.

For some of the survivors their joy was tempered with grief. Their kith and kin were still in the pit. An Edward Johnson was told that his two young sons, Fred age 17 and Oliver 14 were missing. Harold Dean whose eldest brother was killed in France learned that his other 2 brothers were trapped below ground.

The Captain of Staley Brook football team which was to have played an important match that afternoon, was informed, that 7 members of his team were dead. Among the 12 survivors brought up by the Minnie pit rescue team were two brothers, Wilson and Jesse

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Taylor, both of whom had escaped death by inches, while their workmates had died violently only a few yards away from them. Night fell on the village of Halmerend, a miserable night. People still stood around in groups discussing the day’s disaster. They were exhausted, worried and overwrought and the night was bitterly cold. Six homes adjacent to each other had lost 13 members of their families.

Rescuer’s Death

Hugh Doorbar, Captain of No.1 Birchenwood colliery rescue team led his men into Lockett’s Dip in attempt to penetrate Bateman’s Dip. “What a mess!” was his comment, as he surveyed the extensive roof fall in Lockett’ Dip.  His apparatus had a faulty valve. Some of his men had their nose-clips knocked off, which endangered their lives. Doorbar ceased to struggle. The gas had done its dirty work the Captain laid dead.

The team’s exhausted condition precluded the idea of carrying so heavy a man back to base. Doorbar’s body was retrieved at 4.30 am on Monday morning by Thomas Machin, Captain of No.2 Birchenwood colliery rescue team, thus the Minnie pit claimed a victim from a neighbouring colliery. The funeral of Hugh Doorbar took place on January 19th. The village of Rookery had been in mourning since the accident. A large crowd followed the cortege to the Wesleyan cemetery at Kidsgrove.

The Bullhurst was divided into 4 districts, to facilitate the quick sealing off in case of gob fires. The explosion occurred in No.4 district Bullhurst seam, more than a mile away from the pit bottom and underneath Audley village.

The blast with vicious savagery, cut a swath of devastation right through No’s 3, 2, 1 and into the Banbury Dip, then up into the Rearers and the Banbury districts, North and South. Its passage caused a massive cracking of roof supports, which brought the roof crashing down in clouds of dust. Miners further away had time to scramble along the coal face; those who were not killed outright had a few minutes crawl to whatever shelter they could find, only to be overcome by carbon monoxide gas.

Worst of all was the fate of the men and boys employed along the haulage routes whose occupations place them directly in the path of the blast which tossed them aside like straw dolls over the scorched earth and smack up against the rocky sides of the roadway.

The wreckage of man, beasts and equipment was piteous and appalling. Battered air-pipes were blown away and twisted girders festooned the landings and roadways. Solid brick stoppings were reduced to rubble while loaded and empty tubs were rammed into the roof. Pit ponies still harnessed to their tubs lay grotesquely on top of their boy drivers. Articles and clothing and other personal affects, parts of the human body, littered the roadways. “Such a site I never want to see again,” wrote one of the Inspectors of Mines.

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A pathetic find saddened the rescue squad as they arrived in Slant’s dip. Father and son, George and Jabez Burgess lay side by side as if asleep. The son had his arm around his father’s neck, while the father’s head reclined on his son’s shoulder. Placing them on stretchers and covering their faces with clean sacks, the squad carried them to transfer points, where they could be taken to the surface.

Another rescue team were working on a damaged air crossing and one was sent to get some brattice cloth, he indicated to his Captain to “come here and have a look”. There seated upright, unscathed but dead, was Sam Richardson of High Street Halmerend. His spectacles were still perched on the end of his nose and an open bible rested on his knees.

He had died from suffocation. Richardson was a well-known local preacher and one assumes he was in the act of preparing his Sunday sermon during his snapping break. Sam was a good man, commented the Captain. “He died as he had lived, with his bible in his hand.”

Splitting into allocations, rescue teams from Burly, Fenton, and Silverdale and Norton collieries headed inbye towards the four districts. Mr. Davies manager of Silverdale colliery gave orders to his colliery team to seal off the area.

The Norton colliery rescue team with its Captain Sam Allman had the unenviable task of bringing out up 4 brothers to the surface.

Their father, a blind man, was waiting pathetically near the pit top and still calling out the names of his sons. “Take me to them Mr. Allman and place my hand on each of their foreheads so that I may kiss each one.” Mr. Allman’s son still has the medal, which his father received for rescue work in the Minnie pit.

(Extract from George Rowley’s personal diary who worked 204 shifts on rescue and recovery and recovery work)

16th Feb and following week with the working party at the fall in the the old Bull Hurst Crut, G Bailey’s body found at the top of Bullhurst Dip, arm and leg off also bricks embedded in his body.

One of the survivors was 83-year old Mr. Elijah Myer from Audley. One of five sons, he was working in the Minnie pit with his father and his brother Joseph who was just 17.  Joseph was killed but he and his father were among the 47 men and boys, led by deputy Charles Greatbatch of Wood Lane, on an almost vertical crawl to safety, with minutes to spare before they were overcome through the dark and steep grades of the “Rearers” to sunlight at the old shaft at Miles Green, known as the “Busted Onion.” Mr. Myer said, there was a gust of wind just like a gale and it sounded as though someone was rattling tambourines. It was pretty frightening at the time. My father and myself were working at the other end of the pit, were

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among who escaped through the “Busted Onion”. I was on loading with the main haulage at the Banbury Dip, 9 hours a day for 1/7. (About 8p these days) He also worked at Brymbo, Jamage and Rookery mines in the 48 years he was a collier.

Mrs. Gladys Myer age 68, his niece, remembers as a youngster the funerals and the general sadness of the village. She said her father was a banksman, looking after the cage and granddad, George Dean was a check weighman, and she also had 2 uncles in the pit.

Rewarded

Three years after the tragedy, in a ceremony in the National Schools at Halmerend, the heroism displayed by many others, particularly in the rescue teams were recognised with certificates a monetary grants were presented under the Carnegie Trust.

Awarded £25 each were; Dr William Megaw, Walter Farrington, Henry Summer, William Hancock, John Holding, Frederick Perkin, James Farrington, Thomas Machin Edward Warren, Harry Stanier, William Stanyer, John Moores, Frank Halfpenny, Charles Greatbatch and Thomas Brockley. Those awarded £10 were; Thomas Genders, William Kesteven, Charles Dean, Frederick Jones, Arthur Jones, William Jones, George Clarke, William Machin, Henry Machin, John Bailey, Arthur Roberts, Ernest Hankey, William Guest,  C.H. Weaver, and Joseph Smith. Trust medallions, also awarded, bore the words; “He serves God best who most nobly serves humanity.” Mr. James Machin was a member of Birchenwood rescue team, of which Hugh Doorbar; the only rescue worker to lose his life in the disaster was the Captain. His son, Thomas Machin still has in his possession the scroll of parchment presented to his father. A 74 year old, John Swingewood holds the North Staffs Colliery Owners’ Association medal awarded to rescue team workers for their part after the Minnie pit explosion.

Mrs. Wardle, who is 72, was previously Miss Byatt and an uncle; Mr. Arnold Byatt was killed in the Minnie at the age of 18. A pair of new clogs he was wearing identified him. Another uncle of Mrs Wardle, Mr. S.V. Byatt who will be 81 in April of 1980, he was the sole survivor of 8 brothers and 7 sisters of whom 6 brothers were miners. He worked at Leycett colliery and got his brother a job there, but he didn’t like it and left after one day. He was taken on at the Minnie, without realising that he wouldn’t complete a full week there.

Home Office and Minnie Pit Management 1920Researched by John Lumsdon

Sir John Baird (Under Secretary Home Office) July 1920 writes that the suggestions made in the report of the Chief Inspector of Mines in the Minnie Pit explosion in 1918 are being considered. The Home Secretary considered the question of prosecuting the management. In view, however, of the decision of the Courts in the Senghenydd case, it appeared doubtful whether proceedings could be taking successfully for breach of Section (62) (3) of the Coal

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Mines Act, and, after consideration of all the circumstances, it was decided that a persecution was not necessary. Since the explosion the management had taken proper precautions by stone dusting the roads, and the Inspector reported that the requirements of the Act were being fully observed.

The question of the prevention of danger from coal dust, had, Sir John adds, had now been placed on an entirely different footing by the new regulations dealing with the treatment of coal dust, which had now been finally settled. There was every ground for hoping that these regulations, which were based on the recommendations of the Explosion in Mines Committee, would prove an effective safeguard against terrible disasters as occurred at Senghenydd and the Minnie Pit.

Greater Safety in Mines

During the Coroner’s inquiry into the Minnie pit disaster in1918, Mr. W. walker, then acting Chief Inspector of Mines, announced the making of new Regulations, designed to minimise the danger of coal dust explosions. These Regulations are now operative and the paper which was read by Mr. A.L. Lovatt at Monday’s meeting 24th January 1921 of the North Staffordshire Mining Institute detailed the stone dusting methods which have been adopted at the Birchinwood collieries, to give effect to the Regulations.At Birchinwood, as at other collieries, stone dusting has been in use prior to the issue of these statutory requirements, but, of course, methods have now been modified to conform to the new regulations.The discussion, which followed the paper, was the most animated and useful that has taken place at the Institute for years, and it brought out new points and queries, which cannot fail to be of advantage. For example Mr. T.W.D. Gregory, Lecturer on mining chemistry at the central school of science and technology, raised the important question of the employment of limestone, which, by the form of the present regulations, may possibly be barred from use. The theory in regard to the use of limestone for the stone dusting of mines obviously needs further investigation by research. The claim is that in the case of an explosion carbon dioxide gas would be evolved from the limestone, by the heat from the explosive flame, acting as a dilution of the oxygen of the air and a check to the progress of the flame. This possible effect is, however, disputed by some experts, as it was on Monday by Mr. Henshaw. As the regulations stand, Mr. Gregory pointed out; the carbon dioxide contained in the limestone must be calculated on analysis as combustible matter, where as he contends, a special test should be provided for by which carbon dioxide should be calculated as forming part of the incombustibles. This, however, was but one question raised. Mr. Henshaw pointed out that a good deal of doubt had been thrown on the effectiveness of 50% of incombustible matter being sufficient to prevent the propagation of an explosion when it had once started and accumulated velocity and pressure.

As a further safeguard, he has therefore, adopted a system of stone dust barrages or barriers, designed to come into operation in the event of an explosion, with the object of containing the explosive wave to a limited section of the pit.

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Quite apart from minimising the coal dust danger, the present compulsory practice of stone dusting mines is likely to have a beneficial effect, which, had not been taken into calculation. As is now known, that commonest of occupational deceases miners’ nystagmus, is chiefly due to the inadequacy of the illumination of mines. The use of stone dust, by reason of its greater surface brightness as compared with coal and coal dust, has already improved the lighting of the pits considerably.Dr T. Lister Llewellyn, the authority on nystagmus, dealt with this phase of the question very informatively, and his desire is that, other things being equal, mining engineers should choose a dust with high surface brightness. It will be a very great achievement if this stone dusting of mines, not only prevents coal dust explosions, but also reduces the incidence of a very painful occupational disease.

And in conclusion,

Times have changed and the march of progress has made its presence felt in Halmerend. It is well groomed and more modern. The grandchildren of those who lost their lives in the Minnie pit have more and better opportunities.

Nevertheless every January 12th is sure to remind someone of that fateful Saturday in 1918 when 155 men and boys and one rescuer died. A sad story but true and is part of our mining heritage. That should never be forgotten.

Fathers and sons who died in North Staffordshire's worst ever pit disaster were remembered with the unveiling of a

new memorial in the 86th anniversary year.

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To the memory of all those who lost their lives in the fight to extract coal from this mine".

MINNIE PIT. HALMEREND. 1890-1931

To the memory of the teachers and scholars who lost their lives in the Minnie pit disaster Jan 12th 1918

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