PIRPAU JETTY

REPORT

ON

COMPREHENSIVE CUMULATIVE

CHEMICAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT PLAN

FOR

PIRPAU JETTY (FIRST, SECOND AND PROPOSED NEW BERTHS)

At PirPau Jetty, Mumbai Gulf, West Coast of India OF

M/s MUMBAI PORT TRUST Prepared By

PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LIMITED

(A Govt. of India Undertaking) PDIL Bhawan, A-14, Sector – 1, Noida

Gautam Buddh Nagar, UP List ‘A’ - Accredited EIA Consultant Organization by QCI-NABET

PDIL JOB NO: EN-00255 SEPTEMBER, 2021

Cumulative Chemical Hazard Management Plan for Pirpau Berths of Mumbai Port Trust

EN-00255-QRA-MBPT PirPau Jetty 1

DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 2 OF 4

FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Description Page No. 1.0 Introduction 01

1.1 Brief about MbPT 01

1.2 Location of Berths 01

1.3 Details of Consultant 03

2.0 Facility Description 04

2.1 Introduction 04

2.2 Proposed Berth 04

2.3 Details of the First, Second and Proposed Berth 05

3.0 Hazard Identification 11

3.1 Definitions 11

3.2 Chemical Hazard Management Plan 12

3.3 Hazard identification 13

3.4 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance 13

3.5 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products &

Chemicals 16

3.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index 17

4.0 Risk Assessment 19

4.1 Hazard Assessment and Evaluation 19

4.2 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCA) Approach 19

4.3 Consequence Analysis 21

4.4 Consequence Analysis for Selected Failure Cases 30

4.5 Risk Assessment 55

4.6 Acceptability of Risk 65

4.7 Risk Results 65

5.0 Controlling the Risk 67

5.1 Hierarchy of Control 67

5.2 Elimination and Substitution 68

5.3 Engineering Control at First, Second & Proposed Berths 68

5.4 Administrative Controls 70

5.5 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 71





6.0 Monitor & Review 74

7.0 Emergency Preparedness & Response 75

7.1 Emergency Mitigation Measures 75

7.2 Emergency Preparedness Measures 80

7.3 Response Plan 84

7.4 Hazard specific Response Plan 84

7.5 Evacuation Routes 91

7.6 Medical & First Aid 92

7.7 Mutual Aid Response Group Chembur - Mahul & Wadala - Sewree

Area 92

7.8 Important Telephone Numbers 94

8.0 Conclusion & Recommendation 97

8.1 Conclusion 97

8.2 Specific Recommendations 97

8.3 General Recommendations 98

LIST OF TABLES

Fig No. Description Page No.

3.1 Properties of LPG, POL & Chemicals used in the Study 12

3.2 Toxicity Level of LPG & Chemicals 15

3.3 Degree of hazard potential of F & EI 18

3.4 Fire Explosion Index (F & EI) 18

3.5 Fire Explosion Index for LPG, POL & Chemicals handling 18

4.1 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity 26

4.2 Pasquill stability classes 27

4.3 List of Failure Cases with input data 28

4.4 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due To Jet Fire 30

4.5 Toxic dispersion of products at IDLH concentration 54

4.6 Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010 55

5.1 Engineering Controls at Berths 69

5.2 Personal Protective Equipments used at Berths 72





LIST OF FIGURES

Fig No. Description Page No.

1.1 Location of Berths at PirPau Jetty 02

2.1 Location of First, Second and Proposed Berth at PirPau Jetty 04

4.1 Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safety Program 24

5.1 Hierarchy of Control 68

7.1 Safety Policy of Mumbai Port Trust 79

ATTACHMENTS

Annexure No. Description Page No.

1. Location Plan of FCB, SCB, TCB A1 –A2

2. ISO Risk Contour A3

3. F-N Curve A4

4. FCB, SCB & TCB firefighting layout A5 – A8

PDIL, Noida Page 1 of 99


Introduction

CHAPTER – 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Brief about Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT)

Mumbai Port has long been the principal gateway to India and has played a pivotal role in

the development of the national economy, trade & commerce and prosperity of Mumbai city

in particular.

Traditionally designed to handle general cargo, over the years, the port has adapted to

changing shipping trends and cargo packaging from break bulk to unitization / palletization

and containerization. Besides, it has also developed specialized berths for handling POL and

chemicals.

For decades, Mumbai Port was India’s premier port. Even today, with the development of

other ports, it caters to 8.61 percent of the country’s sea-borne trade handled by Major Ports

of the country in terms of volume. It caters to 16.07 percent of POL Traffic handled by

Major Ports.

Marine Oil Terminals

For handling Crude oil and Petroleum products, there are four jetties at Jawahar Dweep. One

of the jetties at Jawahar Dweep, which was commissioned in 1984 can handle tankers with

the maximum loaded draft of 12.7 metres corresponding to 125,000 Displacement tons.

Two of the jetties can accommodate tankers upto 70,000 Displacement Tons and 228.6 m

length and the third one can take tankers of 213.4 m length and upto 48,000 Displacement

Tons. Chemical and POL products are handled at two jetties at Pir Pau.

Old Pir Pau jetty can accommodate tankers of 170.7 m length while the new one

commissioned in December 1996 can handle tankers with a length of 197 m and a draft of

10.5 m. All the jetties are connected to Oil Refineries by a network of pipelines.

1.2 Location of Berths

The Mumbai Harbor is a natural deep-water harbor, situated, on the west coast of India

(Latitude 18° 54’, N, Longitude 72° 49’E) and inside the protected waters of the Mumbai

Gulf area.



Introduction

The geo-coordinates of the Berths are:

S. No. Name of the Berth Latitude Longitude

1. First Chemical Berth 18°58'48.34"N 72°55'11.44"E

2. Second Chemical Berth 18°58'33.96"N 72°54'55.39"E

3. Proposed Third Chemical Berth 18°58'56"N 72°55'18"E

The location of the berths shown in below image:

Fig 1.1: Location of Berths at PirPau Jetty



Introduction

Road and Rail Connectivity to MbPT Jetty

Mumbai Port is well connected to the hinterland through major arterial road network of

suburbs of Mumbai city. The main road networks connecting the hinterland to Mumbai Port

are as follows. The NH-8 from North & Gujarat, NH-3 from Central part and Nashik, NH-4,

Mumbai – Pune Expressway and NH-17 from Southern Part of country bring the traffic to

Mumbai port.

1.3 DETAILS OF CONSULTANT

Projects & Development India Limited (PDIL – A Govt. of India Undertaking), a

premier Engineering Consultancy and NABET accredited EIA consultancy organization

(Certificate No. NABET/EIA/1821/SA 0124), have been retained as Consultant by Mumbai

Port Trust (MbPT) for conducting and preparation of Cumulative Chemical Hazard

Management Plan for Berths at Pirpau Jetty. PDIL is a Mini Ratna, Category-I, under

Department of Fertilizers. PDIL is an ISO 9001:2015 & ISO 45001:2018 Certified

and ISO/IEC 17020:2012 accredited premier Consultancy and Engineering Organization. It

has over six decades of experience in providing Design, Engineering and related project

execution services from concept to commissioning of various Projects.



Facility Description

CHAPTER – 2

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

2.1 Introduction

The first deep draft liquid chemicals/specialized grades of POL berth was Commissioned in

December, 1996 on the northern side of the Gulf near the explosive vessels anchorage area,

about 2.85 km offshore at Pir Pau. The Second Liquid Chemical Berth is constructed 650

meter on the south of existing First Chemical Berth off Pir Pau and in the same alignment as

that of the First Chemical Berth.

2.2 Proposed Berth

Mumbai Port has proposed the construction of Third Chemical Berth at the North of existing

First Chemical Berth at a distance of 300m at PirPau Jetty. With the construction of the

Mumbai Trans-harbor Link, the Old PirPau is now being restricted to handle only small

barges of lesser than 2000 tonnes. The capacities of first and second chemical berth are 2

MMTPA and 2 MMTPA, respectively. Even though the berth occupancy is high, due to

lesser parcel size, the traffic handled is less than the capacity of berths. Considering the berth

occupancy of more than 70% and also as requested by the users, it would be necessary to

construct the third chemical berth.

Fig 2.1: Location of First, Second and Proposed Berth at PirPau Jetty




2.3 Details of First, Second and Proposed Berth

S.No. Description Value First Berth

1. Location Latitude Longitude

New Pirpau Jetty (FCB) 18°58'48.34"N 72°55'11.44"E.

2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA - 197 m

Draft – 10.6 m 5. Ship parcel size received 600 MT to 25000 MT 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 100,000 MT 8. No. of Unloading Arms for

a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

02 01 01

9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

dia. (in) - 10”& 12” dia. (in) - 10” dia. (in) –12”

10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr 1800 kL/hr

11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar 15 Bar

12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

-40 Deg C Ambient 90 degree C

13. Area of Berth 14. Water Source MCGM

Consumption 30 m3/ month

Power Source Tata Power Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg.)

15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system

Storage tanks Capacity

As per OISD guidelines. The sea water is used for firefighting purpose. No storage facility

b. Fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)

3 pumps of 1440 m3/ hour.

c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) 2 pumps of 144 m3/hr




Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)

d. Tower monitor Flowrate / Discharge pressure (bar)

7570 LPM at 7 Bar

e. Ground monitors Flowrate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

NA

f. Hydrant System Flowrate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

1100LPM at 7 Bar

g. Foam System Tank capacity Discharge pressure (bar)

15000 Litres 15 bar

h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations NA i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4Nos of each 6000LPM at 7Bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) Wired remote control system k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system Manual Call point, Siren and VHF

communication l. Fire shore connection NA m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment NA o. First aid (list and locations) p. Public Address System NA q. Fire Tenders Available at combined building fire

control room. 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and

idle time) Aegis: 05 No’s

17. List of PPEs’ Aegis: Hard Helmet: 05 Safety Shoes:05 Life Jackets: 06 Splash Goggles: 05 Chemical Suit: 02

18. Distance from the other berths From OPJ – 2.5km & from SCB – 0.8km

19. Layout Plan of Berth 20. Fire extinguishers and GMS locations Layout Aegis Fire extinguishers:

CO2 – 02 No’s ABC - 02 No’s GMS:01 No

21. Fire hydrant layout Annexure - 4 22. Mutual Aid agreement (if any) Available (MARG)




S.No. Description Value Second Berth


Second Chemical Berth 18°58'33.96"N 72°54'55.39"E

2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA - 230 m

Draft - 11.4 m 55,000 DWT

5. Ship parcel size received 600 MT to 35000 MT 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 150,000 MT 8. No. of Unloading Arms for

a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

2 1 1

9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

dia. (in) – 10”&12” dia. (in) –10” dia. (in) – 12”

10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr 1800 kL/hr

11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar 15 Bar

12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals c. POL

-40 Deg C Ambient 90 Deg C


Consumption 30,000 T Power Source Tata Power

Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg) 15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system


As at First Chemical Berth



c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)





d. Tower monitor Flow rate / Discharge pressure (bar)

4Tower monitors of each 6000LPM at 11Bar

e. Ground monitors Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

2 ground Monitors of each 3000LPM at 7Bar

f. Hydrant System Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

27sets of double headed hydrant valve & 6Nos. of single headed hydrant valve.


30,300 Litres

h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations 4Nos. at Jetty berth i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4 Jumbo curtains each 6000LPM at

12bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) At SCB Control Room k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system Gas detector, Flame sensor, MCPs,

siren & PA system l. Fire shore connection Available m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment NA o. First aid (list and locations) p. Public Address System Available q. Fire Tenders Common fire tender located at

combined building fire control room 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and

idle time) Aegis: 05 No’s

17. List of PPEs’ Aegis: Hard Helmet: 05 Safety Shoes:05 Life Jackets: 06 Splash Goggles: 05 Chemical Suit: 02

18. Distance from the other berths From FB-0.8km & from OPJ – 3.3km

19. Layout Plan of Berth Pl. provide the document 20. Fire extinguishers and GMS locations Layout Aegis Fire extinguishers:

CO2 – 02 No’s ABC - 02 No’s GMS: 01 No

21. Fire hydrant layout Annexure - 4 22. Mutual Aid agreement (if any) Available (MARG)




S.No. Description Value Proposed New Berth


18° 58’ 56” N 72° 55’ 18” E

2. Products Handled LPG, POL and Chemicals 3. Products imported from Various countries 4. Max. Size of Ship tankers LOA 230m

Draft-13m DWT-55,000T

5. Ship parcel size received 600 t to 35,000 T 6. Frequency of unloading (no. of ship parcel per month) 20 Ships 7. Monthly import capacity 1,50,000T 8. No. of Unloading Arms for

a. LPG b. Chemicals

2 4

9. Loading arm dia. (in) and length (m) a. LPG b. Chemicals

12” 8”

10. Arm unloading rate/pumping capacity (MT/hr.) a. LPG b. Chemicals

400 MT/hr 450 kL/hr

11. Pressure (bar) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals

7.5 Bar 7.5 Bar

12. Temp. (oC) of unloading through arm a. LPG b. Chemicals

-40 Deg C Ambient


Consumption 30,000T Power Source Tata Power

Consumption 8000 kWh (Avg.) 15. Firefighting Facilities a. Fire water system





c. Jockey fire water pumps (no’s) Capacity Discharge pressure (bar)


d. Tower monitor Flow rate / Discharge pressure (bar)

4 Tower monitors of each 7570 LPM @ 11 bar

e. Ground monitors Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

2 No’s each of 3000 LPM @ 11 bar




f. Hydrant System Flow rate/ Discharge pressure (bar)

1100 LPM @ 7 bar


As per OISD-156. Tank Capacity 30 m3

h. Gas monitoring System (GMS) number and locations As per OISD-156 i. Jumbo water curtain nozzle 4 Nos. each of 6000 LPM @ 7 bar j. Remote control system (for firefighting system) As per OISD-156 k. Fire detection, Alarm and communication system As per OISD-156 l. Fire shore connection 2 No’s International shore

connections at unloading platform. m. Fire extinguishers number and locations As per OISD 156 n. Mobile and water borne firefighting equipment As per OISD 156 o. First aid (list and locations) As per OISD 156 p. Public Address System As per OISD 156 q. Fire Tenders Available at combined building fire

control room 16. No. of Employees/Personnel (at the time of unloading and

idle time) NA

17. List of PPEs’ As per OISD 156 18. Distance from the other berths 350 m from First Chemical berth



Hazard Identification

CHAPTER – 3

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 3.1 Definitions

The common terms used in Hazard identification & Risk Assessment are elaborated below:

Hazard: Anything (e.g. condition, situation, practice, behavior) that has the potential to

cause harm, including injury, disease, death, environmental, property and equipment

damage. A hazard can be a thing or a situation.

Hazard Identification: This is the process of examining each work area and work task for

the purpose of identifying all the hazards which are “inherent in the job”. Work areas include

but are not limited to machine workshops, laboratories, office areas, agricultural and

horticultural environments, stores and transport, maintenance and grounds, reprographics,

and lecture theatres and teaching spaces. Tasks can include (but may not be limited to) using

screen based equipment, audio and visual equipment, industrial equipment, hazardous

substances and/or teaching/dealing with people, driving a vehicle, dealing with emergency

situations, construction. This process is about finding what could cause harm in work task or

area.

Hazard analysis is the evaluation of tasks and processes for potential loss-causing events.

Losses can be injury (legislative requirements), equipment (insurance implications), or loss

of process time.

“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its

chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human

beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment.

“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which

may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which

may result in pollution of the general environment.

Risk: The likelihood, or possibility, that harm (injury, illness, death, damage etc) may occur

from exposure to a hazard.

Risk Assessment: Is defined as the process of assessing the risks associated with each of the

hazards identified so the nature of the risk can be understood. This includes the nature of the

harm that may result from the hazard, the severity of that harm and the likelihood of this

occurring.




Risk Control: Taking actions to eliminate health and safety risks so far as is reasonably

practicable. Where risks cannot be eliminated, then implementation of control measures is

required, to minimize risks so far as is reasonably practicable. A hierarchy of controls has

been developed and is described below to assist in selection of the most appropriate risk

control measure/s.

Monitoring and Review: This involves ongoing monitoring of the hazards identified,

“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This

highlights the typical nature of emergency. It will be after experience that enough is not

enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible

to avoid them always.

“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management.

Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged

in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after

an emergency.

Responsibilities

Effective risk management requires the commitment to MbPT from managers and Officer as

well as the input and involvement of workers.

It is the responsibility of all managers and supervisors to ensure that this HSE policy is fully

implemented in their area(s) of control and to consult with workers as part of undertaking the

hazard identification, risk assessment and control process. It is the responsibility of workers

to cooperate and comply with HSE policy. This includes providing effective and constructive

information and feedback to aid the risk management process.

Officers have a responsibility to ensure that the areas under their control are complying with

legislative requirements. This includes the Officer understanding the hazards and risks

associated with their operations and ensuring that appropriate resources and processes are in

place to eliminate or minimize these risks.

3.2 Chemical Hazard Management Plan

Hazard management is essentially a problem-solving process aimed at different problems,

gathering information about them and solving them.

The main steps involved in the management plan are:

1. Hazard Identification

2. Risk Assessment

3. Controlling the Risk




4. Monitoring and Review &

5. Emergency Preparedness

3.3 Hazard identification

The first and most important step in any risk management program is to identify the hazards.

Hazard analysis is the most important step in risk analysis because, unless hazards are

identified, consequence and likelihood reduction cannot be implemented.

• Identified potentially hazards that can cause loss of human life/injury, loss of properties

and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment.

• Identified potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent

hazards like fire & explosion and toxic release.

• Identification of representative failure cases;

• Identification of possible initiating events;

• Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the impact

zones from the accidental scenarios;

• Consequence analysis for all the possible events

Hence, all the components of Jetty operations need to be thoroughly examined, to assess

their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which

can be termed as an accident.

3.4 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance

Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable/explosive

substances, unstable substances and toxic substances.

Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized. Under

certain circumstances, the vapors arising from flammable substances when mixed with air

may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in sufficient quantity

such clouds may explode in open air also.

Unstable substances are liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence to give

rise to blast waves.

Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when released

into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on flammability,

reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes.

3.4.1 Properties of LPG & Chemicals

The hazard failure scenarios of following chemicals were studied in this report.




Table 3.1: Properties of LPG, POL & Chemicals used in the Study

Sr. No.

Product/ Chemical Name

Chemical Formula

Molecular Weight in g/mol

Specific gravity at 25°C

Density in kg/m3

B.P

in ºC

Flash point in ºC

AIT

in ºC

Tc

in ºC

Flammable limits.

Vol.% in air

NFPA Classification and

Hazard Rating

LEL UEL N(H) N(F) N(R)

LPG

1. LPG [C3H8(60%) +C4H10 (40%)]

44.09 0.51-0.58 510 >-40

-104.4

(CC)

470-550 -96.7 1.9 9.5 1 4 0

POL

2. MS BS IV Mixture of HC (C5-C12) 150-250 0.69-

0.77 690-770

30-180 -45 257 280 1.3 7.6 1 3 0

3. HSD BS IV Mixture of HC (C13 - C18)

150-250 0.86-0.90

860-890

215-376 >35 225 447 0.6 6.0 1 2 0

4. BASE OIL Heavy Paraffinic - - 950-

980 >280 >208 >320 - 1.0 10.0 1 1 0

CHEMICALS

5. METHANOL CH3OH 32.04 0.791 792 64.7 11 464 240 6 36 1 3 0

6. TOLUENE C6H5CH3 92.14 0.86-0.87 867 110.6 4 480 319 1.1 7.1 2 3 0

7. ACETONE C3H6O 58.08 0.786 784 56 -17 465 508 2.0 12.8 1 3 0

8. BUTYL ACETATE C6H12O2 116.16 0.882 882 126 27 370 306 1.7 7.6 2 3 0

9. STYRENE MONOMER C8H8 104.15 0.909 909 145 31 490 373 1.1 6.1 2 3 2

10. ORTHO XYLENE C6H4(CH3)2 106.17 0.880 880 144 17 463 358 0.9 6.7 2 3 0

11.

ETHYL ALCOHOL DEN.

C2H5OH 46.04 0.790 790 78 16.6 363 243 3.3 19.0 2 3 0

12. ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL

CH3-CH(OH)CH3 60.1 0.786 786 82.5 12 425 235.6 2.0 12.0 1 3 0

13. ISO NONYL ALCOHOL C9H20O 144.3 0.833 -

0.839 837 98 94 280 - 0.9 6.0 0 1 0

14. PROPYL HEPTANOL C10H22O 158.3 0.83 830 218.4 100 265 559.9 0.8 5.7 1 1 0

15. DIMETHYL C3H7NO 73.09 0.949 944 156.1 58 473 345 2.2 15.2 2 2 0




FORMAMIDE

* Ref. MSDS of Materials & NFPA Rating

Table – 3.2: Toxicity Level of LPG & Chemicals

Sr. No.


State Hazard Involved

Class of chemicals

TLV in

ppm

LD50mg/kg

LC50mg/m3

Odor Threshold

in ppm

IDLH value

in ppm

1. LPG Gas Flammable A 1000

LC50(oral rat)- not listed

Inhalation LC50 Rat 658 mg/L 4 h

5000-20000 2000

2. MS BS IV Liquid Flammable A 300 - - -

3. HSD BS IV Liquid Flammable B 800 L.D50 (Oral-Rat): > 5g/kg

L.C 50: (rat 4hrs) 5g/m3 - -

4. BASE OIL Liquid Flammable C -

Oral LD50 > 15000 mg/kg Rat, Dermal LD50 > 5000 mg/kg Rabbit

- -

5. METHANOL Liquid Flammable A 200

LD50 oral rat 5628 mg/kg; LC50 inhalation rat 64000 ppm/4H; LD50 skin rabbit15800 mg/kg;

- 6000

6. TOLUENE Liquid Flammable A 20

Rat, Oral, LD50: 636 mg/kg

Rat, Inhalation, LC50: >26 700 ppm (1 h); 12.5 mg/L (4 h); 49 g/m3(4 h) Rabbit, Dermal LD50: 8390 mg/kg;

0.16-100 500

7. ACETONE Liquid Flammable A 750

LD50 oral rat-5800 mg/kg, LD50 dermal rabbit-20000 mg/kg, LC50 inhalation rat (mg/l)- 76 mg/l

160 2500

8. BUTYL ACETATE Liquid Flammable B 150 LD50 oral rat-12789

mg/kg, LD50 dermal 0.63-7.4 1700




Sr. No.


State Hazard Involved

Class of chemicals

TLV in

ppm

LD50mg/kg

LC50mg/m3

Odor Threshold

in ppm

IDLH value

in ppm

rabbit-14000 mg/kg,

9. STYRENE MONOMER Liquid

Flammable &

Reactive B 20

LD50, Oral rat 5,000 mg/kg, Inhalation LC50, 4 h, Vapor, rat 11.8 mg/l

0.0016 700

10. ORTHO XYLENE Liquid Flammable A 100

Lethal Dose - Inhalation (LCL): 6125 ppm 12 hours [Rat]; 6125 ppm 12 hours [Human] Lethal Dose - Oral: 5000 mg/kg [Rat]

1 7350

11. ETHYL ALCOHOL DEN.

Liquid Flammable A 1000

Oral LD50 = 7060 mg/kg (Rat) Inhalation=20000 ppm/10H (Rat)

80 3000

12. ISO PROPYL ALCOHOL Liquid Flammable A 200

Oral, rat: LD50 = 5000 mg/kg Skin, rabbit: LD50 = 12800 mg/kg, Inhalation, rat: LC50 = 6000 ppm/8H.

40-200 2000

13. ISO NONYL ALCOHOL Liquid Flammable B - Oral, rat: LD50 =

>2.0g/kg - -

14. PROPYL HEPTANOL Liquid Flammable C - - - -

15. DIMETHYL FORMAMIDE Liquid Flammable B 10

LD50 Oral - rat - 2,800 mg/kg, LC50 Inhalation - rat - 4 h - 9 - 15 mg/l, LD50 Dermal - rabbit - 1,500kg/kg

0.47-100 500

* Ref. MSDS of Materials

3.5 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products & Chemicals

The hazard of unloading arm/equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products and chemicals

is the potential loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of gas/liquid

causing fire. A rare pipeline fracture releases large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product

gets collected on the platform/trestle area/neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a

fire hazard if it gets source of ignition due to lack of proper precautions.




Catastrophic failure of the arm/pipeline is a very rare phenomenon, which may occur due to

floods/earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. Corrosion in the pipework may

cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid. In case of oil spill collected on ground

an oil pool shall be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called as Pool Fire. It creates long

smoky flames, the wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and

damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off rapidly

beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the Jetty area and near the

source of generation. In case of release of considerable quantity explosion may occur.

In case of formation of small holes on the arm/pipeline pressurized, the liquid may escape in

the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due to heat radiation

from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the ignited jet can impinge

on other arms/pipelines causing domino effect.

3.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index

The Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) calculation is a tool to help determine the areas of

greatest loss potential in a particular process. It also enables one to predict the physical

damage that would occur in the event of an incident.

The Material Factor (MF) is the basic starting value in the computation of the F&EI and

other risk analysis values. The MF is a measure of the intrinsic rate of potential energy

release from fire or explosion produced by combustion or chemical reaction. The MF is

obtained from the flammability and instability rankings according to NFPA 704.

After the appropriate Material Factor has been determined, the next step is to calculate the

Process Unit Hazards Factor (F3), which is the term that is multiplied by the Material Factor

to obtain the F&EI.

The numerical value of the Process Unit Hazards Factor is determined by first determining

the General Process Hazards Factor and Special Process Hazards Factor listed on the F&EI

form. Each item which contributes to the Process Hazards Factors contributes to the

development or escalation of an incident that could cause a fire or an explosion.

The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the

criteria given below:




Table 3.3: Degree of hazard potential of F & EI

S. No. Range Degree

1. 0 - 60 Light

2. 61 - 96 Moderate

3. 97 - 127 Intermediate

4. 128 - 158 Heavy

5. > 159 Severe

By comparing the indices F&EI, the unit is classified into one of the following three

categories for the purpose (Table-3.4).

Table 3.4: Fire Explosion Index (F & EI)

Category Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI)

I F&EI < 65

II 65 < or = F&EI < 95

III F&EI > or = 95

Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the three

hazard categories.

Fire and Explosion are the likely hazards, which may occur due to the improper handling of

LPG and other chemicals. Hence, Fire and Explosion index has been calculated for

unloading operations of PirPau Jetty of FCB, SCB and proposed new Berth. Detailed

estimates of FE&TI are given in Table- 3.5.

Table 3.5: Fire Explosion Index for LPG, POL & Chemicals handling

S. No. Material Flow Rate F & El Degree Category Radius of Exposure (ft)

1. LPG 400 MT/hr 97 Intermediate III 81 2. POL (MS) 450 kL/hr 74 Moderate II 62 3. Acetone (Chem.) 450 kL/hr 46 Light I 39 4. Methanol (Chem.) 450 kL/hr 74 Moderate II 62



Risk Assessment

CHAPTER – 4

RISK ASSESSMENT

4.1 Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). PHA is

a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements. The main purpose

of this analysis is for an early recognition of hazards, thus saving time and cost, which could

result from major plant redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. It is generally

applied during concept or early development phase of a process plant and can be very useful

in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in

the preliminary phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or

no insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA

focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the plant

design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on procedures.

The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be released in an

uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to:

● Pipeline / equipments;

● Interface among system components;

● Operative environment;

● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.);

● Facility; and

● Safety equipment

The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent design

phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence Analysis.

4.2 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCA) Approach

4.2.1 Introduction

A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with a

maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.

MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an

accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of probability that is

still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In practice, the

selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-Analysis is done on the basis of



Risk Assessment

engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis studies, especially accident

analysis.

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA

analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and calculate

the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic releases, vapor

cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the

complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to

establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact

on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective

damage caused can be assessed.

As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and storage units

and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level of risk for the surroundings in

terms of damage distances. For this selection, the following factors have been taken into

account:

• Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;

• Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and

• Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of

incompatible materials.

In addition to be above factors, the location of Jetty operations with respect to adjacent

berths is taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of an accident. This

phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The units and activities, which have been

selected on the basis of the above factors, are summarized; accident scenarios are established

in hazard identification studies, while effect and damage calculations are carried out in

MCAA Studies.

4.2.2 Common Causes of Accidents

Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents are

identified as:

• Poor housekeeping

• Poor maintenance

• Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities

• Unsafe or defective equipment facilities

• Lack of proper procedures

• Improvising unsafe procedures



Risk Assessment

• Failure to follow prescribed procedures

• Jobs not understood

• Lack of awareness of hazards involved

• Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities

• Lack of guides and safety devices

• Lack of protective equipment and clothing

4.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

4.3.1 Intro

The products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and accidental release. However, due

safeguard has been taken in design, installation and operation of the system to prevent any

unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment/pipework. In the event of release

of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chance of explosion is

less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios,

analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.

Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure

scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the

distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for consequence

analysis are manifolds like -

• Computation of risk.

• Aid better layout.

• Evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties & human lives.

• Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.

• Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.

• Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan.

The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all known and

unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and to get information

about how to deal with possible credible events. It also gives the authorities, workers, district

authorities and the public living in the area an understanding of the hazard potential and

remedial measures to be taken.

4.3.2 Consequence Analysis Modeling

Modelling refers to the calculation or estimation of numerical values (or graphical

representations of these) that describe the credible physical outcomes of loss of containment



Risk Assessment

scenarios involving flammable, explosive and toxic materials with respect to their potential

impact on people, assets, or safety functions.

Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The

model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios:

• Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work.

• Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in the

atmosphere.

• Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet

fire, pool fire and flash fire.

• Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of

release

• Modeling of Toxic dispersion in downwind.

The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss of

containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material released

leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both.

4.3.3 Modeling Software

A site-specific consequence analysis of the accidental release scenarios was conducted using

the commercially available Process Hazards Analysis Software Tool (PHAST) consequence

modeling software, v8.4 of M/S DNV, is responsible for the development of a number of

established, world leading, hazard and risk modeling software tools. These tools include the

consequence modeling package PHAST, the risk analysis tools SAFETI.

4.3.4 Discharge Rate

The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the

equipment, size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two-phase). The release

rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction depends mainly on

the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-down the equipment.

4.3.5 Dispersion Modeling

The PHAST Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) was used to assess the impacts of the

releases, the downwind dispersion distance, the concentration profile and the width of

flammable/toxic releases.

Dispersion models use an average time to calculate the maximum concentration and the

plume width. The values used in this QRA are detailed below and consistent with the

PHAST default parameters. A short averaging time is usually used for flammable gas



Risk Assessment

dispersion effects since the peak concentration is more important, and a longer averaging

time is usually used for toxic dispersion effects since the long-term concentration is more

important.

• All flammable dispersion models used an averaging time of 18.75 seconds (PHAST

default)

Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the wind, by

turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the release. In case

of flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their Lower Flammable Limit

(LFL) are important in determining whether the release will ignite. In this study, the results

of dispersion modelling for flammable materials are presented as LFL quantity.

4.3.6 The Consequence Event Tree

Each accidental release scenario in the QRA involves the potential for ignition or no ignition.

If ignited, a range of fire and/or explosion consequences could occur. For each release

modelled in the QRA, a range of potential outcomes is assessed, each with its own

probability of occurrence, and include:

• Jet Fire

• Pool Fire

The ultimate consequence resulting from an accidental release is determined by the

following factors:

• The duration of the release (continuous or instantaneous);

• The phase after release (vapor/liquid/two-phase);

• The time of ignition (immediate or delayed); and,

• The level of obstruction in the area of the vapor cloud.

The generalized event tree shown in Figure 4.1, illustrates the potential outcomes of an

accidental release of a flammable material.



Risk Assessment

Figure 4.1: Generalized Event Tree for Consequences in the Safety Program

4.3.7 Pool Fires, Jet Fires, Toxic Release

Pool Fire: The fire hazards examined in this study include pool fires and jet fires, where

impacts to people are the result of thermal radiation generated by the fire. Thermal radiation

emanates from the visible portions of the flame. The actual radiation received by a person

depends on the distance from the flame surface, location (indoors vs. outdoors), building

construction as well as other atmospheric conditions, with sheltering reducing the magnitude

of the thermal radiation hazard.

Upon ignition, a spilled flammable liquid will burn in the form of a large turbulent diffusion

flame. The size of the flame will depend on the spill surface and the thermo-chemical

properties of the hazardous material. If the spill is confined, the confined area will determine

the pool size which will then dictate the size of the fire. If the spill is unconfined, the pool

dimensions will depend on the amount of liquid released (liquid volume), burning rate of the

liquid and the terrain surface characteristics.

A Jet fire can result when the material released is a gas or high-pressure liquid that ignites

immediately. The size of the jet flame depends primarily on the release rate of the gas or



Risk Assessment

high pressure liquid. The thermo-chemical properties of the substance are also taken into

consideration in determining the size of the jet flame.

Toxic Hazards

The extent of the toxic hazard ranges will be product released from the failure scenarios of

Dimethyl Formamide &Toluene. Toxic impacts will depend on the combination of the

exposure duration and the toxic concentration.

The aim of the toxic risk study is to determine whether the operators in the jetty, people

occupied control room building and the public are likely to be affected by toxic substances.

Toxic gas cloud e.g. Dimethyl Formamide, Toluene & Styrene was undertaken to the

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit to determine the

extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of a toxic substance.

4.3.8 Release Quantity

Release Quantity or release rate refers to the quantity of (or the rate at which) a hazardous

chemical is released in the event of an accident. For gaseous and high-vapor-pressure liquid

releases, the vapor release rate will be the same as the discharge rate. However, for non-

flashing liquids, the vapor release rate is governed by the evaporation rate of the liquid and

will always be less than the liquid release rate. Release rate in our study is mentioned for

every failure scenario as kg/s.

4.3.9 Duration of Release

The dispersion model used in this study is encoded in PHAST and takes into account the

actual duration of release. The discharge duration in this study is taken as 3 minutes for

continuous release scenarios as it is considered that it would take jetty personnel about 3

minutes to detect and isolate the leak.

4.3.10 Damage Criteria

The damage effects are different for different types of failure scenarios. The physical effects

of ignition of hydrocarbon vapors, e.g. blast wave, thermal radiation due to release of

hydrocarbons from the containment are discussed below:

i. Hydrocarbon vapors released accidentally will normally spread out in the direction of the

wind. If it comes into contact with an ignition source before being dispersed below the

Lower Flammability Limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame may travel

back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer from

severe burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance to LFL value is

usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by flash fires. Any other



Risk Assessment

combustible material within the flash fire is likely to catch fire and may cause secondary

fires. In the area close to the source of leakage of hydrocarbon there is a possibility of

Oxygen depletion since the vapors are heavier than air. A minimum of 19.5% Oxygen in

air is considered essential for human lives.

ii. Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet flame may cause various degrees of burn on human

bodies. Also its effects on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other

objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects with respect to thermal radiation

intensity are elaborated in Table-4.1.

In case of transient fires total thermal dose level (total incident energy) is used to estimate threshold damage level.

Thermal Radiation

Damage due to various levels of incident thermal radiation level has been given in Table 4.1.

Table-4.1: Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity

Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity,

kW/m2 Type of damage

Casualty Probability

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process

equipment 1.00

32 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally protected and pressurized storage tank

1.00

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing etc.

0.50

8 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally unprotected and pressurized storage tanks

--

4.5 1st degree burn 0.00 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure 0.00 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00

The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2and 4.5 kW/m2 radiation levels are

selected based on their effect on population; buildings and equipment were modeled using

PHAST/SAFETI.

4.3.11 Dispersion and Stability Class

In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapor plays an

important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion are mainly Wind

Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness.

Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F



Risk Assessment

Table 4.2: Pasquill stability classes

S. No. Stability Class Description 1. A Extremely unstable 2. B Moderately unstable 3. C Slightly unstable 4. D Neutral 5. E Slightly Stable 6. F Highly stable

Selected Wind velocity (2, 3, 5 m/s) and Stability class (B, D, F) for the study are 2B, 3D, 5D, 2F.

4.3.12 Modes of Failure

There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The leakages

may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small diameter pipeline,

leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds,

pipe bursting due to overpressure and any other sources of leakage.

4.3.13 Selected Failure Cases

A list of failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment,

experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general

mechanisms for loss of containment. The cases have been identified for the consequence

analysis is based on the following:

• Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence:

Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for

pumps, welding joints failure, corrosion failure, sample connection failure, instrument

tapping failure etc.

• Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence.

Example of such failure cases includes full bore rupture of arm/lines etc.

This approach ensures at least one representative case of all possible types of accidental

failure events, is considered for the consequence analysis. Moreover, the list below includes

at least one accidental case comprising of release of different sorts of highly hazardous

materials handled in the Pirpau Jetty. Although the list does not give complete failure

incidents considering all equipment’s, units, but the consequence of a similar incident

considered in the list below could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular

accident.



Risk Assessment

The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table –4.3.

Table–4.3: List of Failure Cases with input data

S. No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Credible/ Non-Credible

Input Data

Existing First Chemical/POL Birth

1.

LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 –

a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm & 50mm

b. 10” Arm rupture

Jet fire - Thermal radiation

Partially Credible

Material = LPG Flow rate =400MT/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C

2.





Partially Credible


3.

POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No. 3 –



Jet fire/Pool fire - Thermal radiation

Partially Credible

Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450KL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient

4.

LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,

25mm & 50mm b. 10” Arm rupture


Partially Credible


5.




Partially Credible


6.

POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –




Partially Credible

Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = Ambient

Existing Second Chemical/POL Birth

7.





Partially Credible


8.





Partially Credible


9. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No. 3 –

a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,


Partially Credible

Material = Chemicals Flow rate =450kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2



Risk Assessment

S. No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Credible/ Non-Credible

Input Data


T = Ambient

10.



Jet fire- Thermal radiation

Partially Credible


11.



Jet fire- Thermal radiation

Partially Credible


12.

POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –




Partially Credible


Proposed New Chemical/POL Birth

13.

LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,

25mm & 50mm b. Arm rupture


Partially Credible


14.

POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,

25mm & 50mm b. Arm rupture


Partially Credible

Material = POL Flow rate =400 kL/hr P = 7.65 kg/cm2 T = - 40°C

15.

Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm –


b. Arm rupture


Partially Credible


16.

LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – a. Leak of hole dia. 5mm,



Partially Credible


17.

POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –




Partially Credible


18.

Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –




Partially Credible




Risk Assessment

4.4 Consequence Analysis for Selected Failure Cases

Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been completed to evaluate and

identify possible consequences as well as to include suitable measures to prevent and

mitigate such failure events.

4.4.1 Jet Fire Results

The pipework between the marine unloading arm line or trestle pipeline to loading area may

fail and cause leak through the small openings of hole dia. 5mm, 25mm& 50mm. The

material may come out in the form of jet. In case of any ignition source, there is likelihood of

formation of jet fire. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation in case of leakage in

pipework have been considered and presented below.

In the event of the spill, if liquid does not catch fire, simultaneous evaporation and spreading

on the ground without any physical obstruction of the spill shall occur. The evaporating

cloud may disperse safely to LFL value, if it does not come in contact with any ignition

source between its flammability limits. The hazard distance to LFL value of has been

calculated for wind speed of 2B, 3D&5D (Day condition) and 2F (Night condition).

Table – 4.4: Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due To Jet Fire/Pool Fire

S. No. Failure case Scenario Weather

Category

Flame Length

(m)

Distance (m) downwind to Intensity level LFL

4.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2 m


1.

LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture

5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s

2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s

2/F 42 79 60 48 109 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75

50mm RR: 36.5 kg/s

2/F 75 147 112 88 102 2/B 75 146 111 88 167 3/D 67 140 105 82 164 5/D 58 133 98 75 150

Rupture

2/F 59 105 80 63 55 2/B 63 112 86 68 64 3/D 58 109 83 66 60 5/D 53 108 82 66 58

2. LPG Marine 12” Unloading

5mm RR: 0.37 kg/s

2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a



Risk Assessment

Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture

5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s

2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75

50mm RR: 36.6 kg/s

2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153

Rupture

2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65

3. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture

3.a MS BS IV–

5mm RR: 0.39kg/s

2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.7 kg/s

2/F 39 79 60 47 115 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78

50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s

2/F 70 148 111 87 88 2/B 70 147 110 87 164 3/D 63 141 104 81 165 5/D 54 135 98 75 155

Rupture

2/F 31 56 43 34 30 2/B 34 61 47 37 40 3/D 31 59 45 36 38 5/D 29 58 44 35 33

3.b Methanol

5mm RR: 0.46kg/s

2/F 17 20 18 n/a n/a 2/B 17 20 18 n/a n/a 3/D 15 18 16 n/a n/a 5/D 13 17 14 n/a n/a

25mm RR: 11.6 kg/s

2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25

50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s

2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36

Rupture

2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12



Risk Assessment

3.c Toluene

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s

2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32 5/D 33 74 54 42 34

50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s

2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58

Rupture

2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13

3.d Acetone

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s

2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61

50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s

2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101

Rupture

2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28

3.e O-xylene

5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s

2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 7.87 kg/s

2/F 23 44 34 26 23 2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20

50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s

2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29

Rupture 2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5



Risk Assessment

5/D 9 16 13 10 3

3.f Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s

2/F 14 20 16 n/a n/a 2/B 14 20 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 19 14 n/a n/a 5/D 11 17 13 12 n/a

25mm RR: 11.03 kg/s

2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27

50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s

2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38

Rupture

2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11

3.g Iso Propyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s

2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s

2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34

50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s

2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50

Rupture

2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12

4.

LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.51kg/s

2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 55 43 80

50mm RR: 42.1 kg/s

2/F 79 155 118 93 319 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 147 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167

Rupture 2/F 122 241 181 140 260 2/B 125 243 183 142 265



Risk Assessment

3/D 112 234 174 135 233 5/D 100 227 168 130 178

5.


5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.54kg/s

2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81

50mm RR: 42.2 kg/s

2/F 79 155 118 93 335 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167

Rupture

2/F 137 272 204 158 244 2/B 139 274 206 160 281 3/D 125 263 196 152 229 5/D 112 255 189 146 189

6. POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

6.a MS BS IV

5mm RR: 0.47kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 14 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 8 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.8 kg/s

2/F 42 86 65 51 137 2/B 42 85 64 51 117 3/D 37 82 61 47 108 5/D 33 78 57 44 88

50mm RR: 47.1 kg/s

2/F 75 160 120 94 152 2/B 75 158 119 94 183 3/D 67 153 113 88 179 5/D 58 146 106 81 152

Rupture

2/F 11 18 14 12 31 2/B 11 19 14 12 9 3/D 10 19 14 11 9 5/D 10 20 15 11 9

6.b Methanol

5mm RR: 0.56kg/s


25mm RR: 13.9 kg/s

2/F 50 62 52 n/a 22 2/B 59 74 61 n/a 25 3/D 55 71 57 n/a 25 5/D 50 70 54 n/a 26

50mm RR: 55.9 kg/s

2/F 61 77 63 n/a 35 2/B 75 95 77 n/a 36 3/D 69 92 72 n/a 36 5/D 63 88 68 n/a 38



Risk Assessment

Rupture

2/F 8 9 n/a n/a 10 2/B 8 9 n/a n/a 8 3/D 7 8 n/a n/a 8 5/D 7 8 8 n/a 8

6.c Toluene

5mm RR: 0.54kg/s

2/F 11 20 16 12 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 11 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a

25mm RR: 13.5 kg/s

2/F 31 60 45 36 26 2/B 35 67 51 40 22 3/D 32 66 50 39 23 5/D 29 66 49 37 24

50mm RR: 54.0 kg/s

2/F 41 80 60 48 38 2/B 47 93 70 55 32 3/D 44 92 69 54 33 5/D 39 91 67 51 35

Rupture

2/F 4 7 5 n/a 11 2/B 4 7 5 n/a 8 3/D 4 7 5 n/a 8 5/D 4 7 5 4 8

6.d Acetone

5mm RR: 0.55kg/s

2/F 14 21 16 15 n/a 2/B 14 21 16 15 n/a 3/D 12 20 15 13 n/a 5/D 11 19 14 12 n/a

25mm RR: 13.9 kg/s

2/F 53 89 69 55 56 2/B 53 88 68 55 57 3/D 47 84 64 50 62 5/D 41 79 59 46 59

50mm RR: 55.5 kg/s

2/F 80 137 106 85 58 2/B 92 158 123 98 71 3/D 84 155 118 93 78 5/D 73 146 110 85 89

Rupture

2/F 13 19 14 n/a 11 2/B 14 20 15 n/a 8 3/D 13 19 14 14 8 5/D 12 20 15 13 8

6.e Orthoxylene

5mm RR: 0.54 kg/s

2/F 7 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 8 14 11 9 n/a 3/D 7 14 11 8 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a

25mm RR: 13.6 kg/s

2/F 18 35 26 21 23 2/B 21 40 31 24 21 3/D 20 40 30 23 21 5/D 18 41 30 23 21

50mm RR: 54.4

2/F 23 43 33 26 35 2/B 27 53 40 31 30 3/D 25 53 39 31 30



Risk Assessment

kg/s 5/D 23 53 39 30 31

Rupture

2/F 2 2 n/a n/a 11 2/B 2 2 n/a n/a 8 3/D 2 2 n/a n/a 8 5/D 2 2 n/a n/a 8

6.f Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.53kg/s

2/F 15 21 17 n/a n/a 2/B 15 21 17 n/a n/a 3/D 14 20 15 15 n/a 5/D 12 19 14 13 n/a

25mm RR: 13.2 kg/s

2/F 39 57 45 41 25 2/B 47 69 54 49 25 3/D 44 68 53 46 26 5/D 40 68 52 42 27

50mm RR: 52.9 kg/s

2/F 46 69 54 48 37 2/B 58 86 67 60 35 3/D 54 84 65 56 36 5/D 49 82 63 51 37

Rupture

2/F 5 5 5 n/a 11 2/B 5 6 5 n/a 8 3/D 4 5 4 n/a 8 5/D 4 6 4 n/a 8


5mm RR: 0.52kg/s

2/F 14 21 16 15 n/a 2/B 14 21 16 15 n/a 3/D 12 20 15 13 n/a 5/D 11 19 14 12 n/a

25mm RR: 13.11 kg/s

2/F 36 58 45 37 28 2/B 43 71 55 45 27 3/D 40 71 54 42 28 5/D 37 71 53 41 30

50mm RR: 52.5 kg/s

2/F 42 69 54 44 40 2/B 53 89 69 55 36 3/D 49 88 67 53 37 5/D 45 86 65 50 39

Rupture



7.


5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s

2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s

2/F 42 79 60 48 109 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75

50mm 2/F 75 147 112 88 102



Risk Assessment

RR: 36.5 kg/s

2/B 75 146 111 88 167 3/D 67 140 105 82 164 5/D 58 133 98 75 150

Rupture

2/F 59 105 80 63 55 2/B 63 112 86 68 64 3/D 58 109 83 66 60 5/D 53 108 82 66 58

8.


5mm RR: 0.37 kg/s

2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s

2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75

50mm RR: 36.6 kg/s

2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153

Rupture

2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65

9. POL and Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 –

9.a MS BS IV–

5mm RR: 0.39kg/s

2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.7 kg/s

2/F 39 79 60 47 115 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78

50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s

2/F 70 148 111 87 88 2/B 70 147 110 87 164 3/D 63 141 104 81 165 5/D 54 135 98 75 155

Rupture

2/F 31 56 43 34 30 2/B 34 61 47 37 40 3/D 31 59 45 36 38 5/D 29 58 44 35 33

9.b Methanol

5mm RR: 0.46kg/s


25mm RR: 11.6

2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23



Risk Assessment

kg/s 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25

50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s

2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36

Rupture

2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12

9.c Toluene

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s

2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32 5/D 33 74 54 42 34

50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s

2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58

Rupture

2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13

9.d Acetone

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s

2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61

50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s

2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101

Rupture

2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28

9.e Orthoxylene

5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s

2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm 2/F 23 44 34 26 23



Risk Assessment

RR: 7.87 kg/s

2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20

50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s

2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29

Rupture

2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5 5/D 9 16 13 10 3

9.f Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s


25mm RR: 11.03 kg/s

2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27

50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s

2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38

Rupture

2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11


5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s

2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s

2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34

50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s

2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50

Rupture

2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12

10.

LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of

5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a



Risk Assessment

hole dia. & rupture 25mm

RR: 10.51kg/s

2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 55 43 80

50mm RR: 42.1 kg/s

2/F 79 155 118 93 319 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 147 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167

Rupture

2/F 122 241 181 140 260 2/B 125 243 183 142 265 3/D 112 234 174 135 233 5/D 100 227 168 130 178

11.


5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.54kg/s

2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81

50mm RR: 42.2 kg/s

2/F 79 155 118 93 335 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 70 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167

Rupture

2/F 137 272 204 158 244 2/B 139 274 206 160 281 3/D 125 263 196 152 229 5/D 112 255 189 146 189

12. POL and Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

12.a MS BS IV

5mm RR: 0.47kg/s

2/F 10 20 15 12 11 2/B 10 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 9 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 8 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.8 kg/s

2/F 41 84 63 50 146 2/B 41 83 63 50 112 3/D 37 80 59 46 104 5/D 32 76 55 43 84

50mm RR: 44.8 kg/s

2/F 73 156 117 92 243 2/B 73 154 116 92 243 3/D 65 149 110 86 220 5/D 57 142 103 79 175

Rupture

2/F 67 135 101 78 114 2/B 69 136 102 79 114 3/D 62 131 98 76 108 5/D 57 130 96 75 91

12.b Methanol 5mm RR:

2/F 18 21 19 n/a n/a 2/B 18 21 19 n/a n/a



Risk Assessment

0.53kg/s 3/D 16 19 17 n/a n/a 5/D 14 18 15 n/a n/a

25mm RR: 13.4 kg/s

2/F 67 85 69 n/a 25 2/B 69 87 71 n/a 27 3/D 61 81 64 n/a 28 5/D 53 75 58 n/a 29

50mm RR: 53.5kg/s

2/F 98 127 101 n/a 39 2/B 111 144 115 n/a 40 3/D 101 138 108 n/a 41 5/D 90 130 101 93 43

Rupture

2/F 67 80 70 n/a 28 2/B 69 81 71 n/a 24 3/D 62 78 65 n/a 25 5/D 57 77 60 n/a 26

12.c Toluene

5mm RR: 0.52kg/s

2/F 12 21 16 13 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a

25mm RR: 12.9 kg/s

2/F 43 85 64 50 46 2/B 45 88 67 53 54 3/D 40 85 63 49 61 5/D 35 80 59 45 56

50mm RR: 51.7 kg/s

2/F 62 125 94 74 59 2/B 70 141 106 84 71 3/D 64 139 103 80 78 5/D 57 135 99 76 85

Rupture

2/F 31 55 41 32 35 2/B 32 56 43 33 35 3/D 29 55 41 32 34 5/D 27 56 42 33 32

12.d Acetone

5mm RR: 0.52kg/s

2/F 12 21 16 13 n/a 2/B 12 21 16 13 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a

25mm RR: 12.9 kg/s

2/F 43 85 64 50 46 2/B 45 88 67 53 55 3/D 40 85 63 49 61 5/D 35 80 59 45 56

50mm RR: 51.8 kg/s

2/F 62 125 95 74 59 2/B 70 141 106 84 71 3/D 64 139 103 80 78 5/D 57 136 99 76 85

Rupture

2/F 31 55 42 32 35 2/B 32 56 43 33 35 3/D 29 55 41 32 34 5/D 27 56 42 33 32

12.e Orthoxylene 5mm 2/F 10 19 15 12 n/a



Risk Assessment

RR: 0.52kg/s

2/B 11 21 16 12 n/a 3/D 10 20 15 12 n/a 5/D 9 19 14 11 n/a

25mm RR: 13.1 kg/s

2/F 27 52 40 31 27 2/B 30 59 45 35 24 3/D 28 59 44 34 25 5/D 26 59 43 33 26

50mm RR: 52.4 kg/s

2/F 39 78 59 46 40 2/B 44 88 66 52 35 3/D 40 86 64 50 36 5/D 36 84 61 47 37

Rupture

2/F 17 30 23 19 12 2/B 18 31 24 19 9 3/D 16 30 23 18 9 5/D 15 31 23 18 9

12.f Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.51kg/s

2/F 15 21 16 n/a n/a 2/B 15 21 16 n/a n/a 3/D 13 20 15 15 n/a 5/D 12 18 14 13 n/a

25mm RR: 12.7 kg/s

2/F 54 81 63 56 30 2/B 58 87 68 60 30 3/D 52 82 63 54 32 5/D 45 76 58 47 34

50mm RR: 50.8kg/s

2/F 79 120 94 81 44 2/B 90 138 108 93 42 3/D 82 133 103 85 45 5/D 73 128 97 76 47

Rupture

2/F 45 63 48 n/a 28 2/B 46 64 49 n/a 25 3/D 42 61 47 44 25 5/D 39 62 48 41 26


5mm RR: 0.49kg/s

2/F 13 21 16 14 n/a 2/B 13 21 16 14 n/a 3/D 12 19 15 13 n/a 5/D 10 18 14 11 n/a

25mm RR: 12.49 kg/s

2/F 49 83 64 51 36 2/B 52 86 67 54 43 3/D 46 82 63 49 48 5/D 40 77 58 45 49

50mm RR: 49.99 kg/s

2/F 71 122 94 75 50 2/B 82 142 110 88 56 3/D 75 138 105 83 61 5/D 67 134 100 78 70

Rupture

2/F 39 60 46 41 34 2/B 40 61 47 42 34 3/D 36 59 45 38 32 5/D 34 59 45 36 31



Risk Assessment


13.


5mm RR: 0.36 kg/s

2/F 11 19 14 12 10 2/B 11 19 14 12 n/a 3/D 10 18 13 11 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.14 kg/s

2/F 42 79 60 48 119 2/B 42 79 60 47 101 3/D 38 75 57 44 94 5/D 33 71 53 41 75

50mm RR: 36.5 kg/s

2/F 75 147 112 88 122 2/B 75 146 111 88 187 3/D 67 140 105 82 178 5/D 58 133 98 75 153

Rupture

2/F 66 120 91 72 65 2/B 71 127 97 77 74 3/D 65 124 95 75 69 5/D 61 126 95 76 65

14. POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. & arm rupture

14.a MS BS-IV

5mm RR: 0.39 kg/s

2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.71kg/s

2/F 39 79 60 47 96 2/B 39 79 60 47 106 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 53 40 78

50mm RR: 38.9 kg/s

2/F 70 148 111 87 77 2/B 70 147 110 87 140 3/D 63 141 104 81 144 5/D 54 135 98 75 145

Rupture

2/F 27 48 37 29 26 2/B 29 51 39 31 34 3/D 26 49 38 30 32 5/D 24 47 36 29 26

14.b HSD BS-IV

5mm RR: 0.42kg/s

2/F 9 20 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.5 kg/s

2/F 23 51 38 30 28 2/B 27 60 44 35 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 60 43 33 29

50mm RR: 41.8 kg/s

2/F 34 75 56 44 40 2/B 39 87 65 50 37 3/D 35 86 63 48 38



Risk Assessment

5/D 32 83 60 45 40

Rupture

2/F 7 12 9 8 4 2/B 7 13 10 8 3 3/D 7 12 10 8 3 5/D 6 12 9 7 3

14.c Base Oil

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 9 17 12 10 n/a 2/B 9 18 14 11 n/a 3/D 8 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 7 16 12 9 n/a

25mm RR: 11.3 kg/s

2/F 22 45 34 27 23 2/B 25 52 39 31 22 3/D 23 52 38 30 23 5/D 21 52 38 29 24

50mm RR: 45.2 kg/s

2/F 32 67 50 39 35 2/B 36 76 57 45 31 3/D 33 75 55 43 32 5/D 29 74 53 41 33

Rupture

2/F 7 11 9 7 4 2/B 8 13 10 8 3 3/D 7 12 10 8 3 5/D 6 12 9 7 3

15. Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.3 –

15.a Methanol

5mm RR: 0.46kg/s


25mm RR: 11.6 kg/s

2/F 60 76 63 n/a 22 2/B 66 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 77 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 55 n/a 25

50mm RR: 46.4 kg/s

2/F 89 114 92 n/a 34 2/B 99 127 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 95 n/a 35 5/D 80 115 88 83 36

Rupture

2/F 31 35 33 n/a 12 2/B 36 40 37 n/a 15 3/D 33 39 35 n/a 15 5/D 31 39 32 n/a 12

15.b Toluene

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s

2/F 36 70 53 42 29 2/B 39 76 58 45 30 3/D 36 75 56 43 32



Risk Assessment

5/D 33 74 54 42 34

50mm RR: 44.9 kg/s

2/F 54 107 81 63 42 2/B 59 117 88 69 49 3/D 54 115 85 66 53 5/D 48 112 82 63 58

Rupture

2/F 15 25 19 16 13 2/B 18 30 23 19 17 3/D 17 29 23 18 16 5/D 16 29 23 18 13

15.c Acetone

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 11.37 kg/s

2/F 49 82 63 51 55 2/B 49 81 63 51 64 3/D 44 77 59 46 67 5/D 38 72 54 42 61

50mm RR: 45.5 kg/s

2/F 88 151 117 93 60 2/B 88 150 116 93 92 3/D 79 143 109 86 99 5/D 68 135 101 78 101

Rupture

2/F 41 61 48 43 26 2/B 45 67 52 47 36 3/D 41 65 51 43 35 5/D 38 63 50 40 28

15.d Orthoxylene

5mm RR: 0.31 kg/s

2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 7.87 kg/s

2/F 23 44 34 26 23 2/B 26 49 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 28 20 5/D 21 48 35 27 20

50mm RR: 13.6 kg/s

2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 38 74 56 44 28 3/D 34 72 54 42 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29

Rupture

2/F 9 14 11 10 5 2/B 10 17 13 11 5 3/D 10 16 13 11 5 5/D 9 16 13 10 3

15.e Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.44 kg/s


25mm RR: 11.03

2/F 49 72 56 51 26 2/B 55 81 63 57 25



Risk Assessment

kg/s 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 27

50mm RR: 44.13 kg/s

2/F 71 107 84 73 38 2/B 80 120 94 82 36 3/D 73 116 90 75 37 5/D 65 112 85 67 38

Rupture

2/F 21 28 23 n/a 11 2/B 25 32 26 n/a 14 3/D 23 32 25 n/a 14 5/D 22 32 25 23 11

15.f Iso Propyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.43 kg/s

2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 20 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 19 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 10.85 kg/s

2/F 44 73 57 46 30 2/B 49 82 64 51 29 3/D 44 78 59 47 32 5/D 38 73 55 43 34

50mm RR: 43.39 kg/s

2/F 64 108 84 67 41 2/B 72 123 95 76 43 3/D 66 120 92 72 46 5/D 59 116 87 68 50

Rupture

2/F 18 26 20 n/a 13 2/B 22 31 24 23 16 3/D 20 30 24 21 15 5/D 19 30 24 20 12

15.g Butyl Acetate

5mm RR: 0.55 kg/s


25mm RR: 13.8 kg/s

2/F 33 44 35 n/a 18 2/B 37 49 39 n/a 19 3/D 34 47 36 n/a 19 5/D 31 46 35 33 19

50mm RR: 55.23 kg/s

2/F 48 65 51 n/a 29 2/B 53 72 56 n/a 27 3/D 49 69 53 51 28 5/D 43 66 50 45 28

Rupture

2/F 12 14 n/a n/a 4 2/B 15 17 16 n/a 3 3/D 14 17 15 n/a 3 5/D 14 18 15 n/a 3

15.h Styrene Monomer

5mm RR: 0.47 kg/s

2/F 8 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 9 15 12 9 n/a 3/D 8 15 11 9 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a

25mm 2/F 22 42 32 25 21



Risk Assessment

RR: 10.67 kg/s

2/B 24 46 35 27 18 3/D 22 45 34 26 19 5/D 20 45 33 25 19

50mm RR: 46.68 kg/s

2/F 33 64 49 38 32 2/B 36 70 53 42 27 3/D 33 68 51 40 27 5/D 29 67 49 37 28

Rupture

2/F 8 13 10 9 4 2/B 10 16 12 11 3 3/D 9 16 12 10 3 5/D 9 16 12 10 3

15.i Iso Nonyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a

25mm RR: 11.31 kg/s

2/F 3 5 3 n/a 21 2/B 4 6 5 3 20 3/D 3 6 5 3 20 5/D 3 6 5 3 21

50mm RR: 45.22 kg/s

2/F 4 8 6 4 32 2/B 5 9 7 6 29 3/D 5 9 7 5 30 5/D 4 9 7 5 30

Rupture

2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a 4 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a 3 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a 3 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a 3

15.j Propyl Heptanol

5mm RR: 0.45kg/s


25mm RR: 11.25kg/s

2/F 6 12 9 7 22 2/B 8 14 11 9 20 3/D 7 14 11 8 21 5/D 7 14 10 8 21

50mm RR: 45.01 kg/s

2/F 9 17 13 10 33 2/B 11 21 16 12 29 3/D 10 20 15 12 30 5/D 9 20 15 11 31

Rupture


15.k Dimethyl Formamide

5mm RR: 0.86kg/s

2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a



Risk Assessment

25mm RR: 21.45 kg/s


50mm RR: 85.79 kg/s


Rupture


15.

LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

5mm RR: 0.42 kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.54 kg/s

2/F 44 83 64 50 137 2/B 44 83 63 50 107 3/D 39 79 60 46 100 5/D 34 75 56 43 81

50mm RR: 42.18 kg/s

2/F 79 155 118 93 315 2/B 79 154 117 93 232 3/D 71 148 110 86 209 5/D 61 140 103 79 167

Rupture

2/F 119 233 175 136 196 2/B 121 235 177 137 206 3/D 109 226 169 130 181 5/D 98 221 164 127 153

16. POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

16.a MS BS IV

5mm RR: 0.39kg/s

2/F 10 19 14 11 12 2/B 10 19 14 11 n/a 3/D 9 18 13 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 12 10 n/a

25mm RR: 9.66 kg/s

2/F 39 79 60 47 139 2/B 39 79 59 47 105 3/D 35 76 56 44 98 5/D 30 72 52 40 78

50mm RR: 38.62 kg/s

2/F 70 148 111 87 180 2/B 70 146 110 87 211 3/D 62 141 104 81 194 5/D 54 134 97 75 158

Rupture

2/F 45 86 64 50 69 2/B 47 90 68 53 72 3/D 43 87 66 51 70 5/D 41 89 67 52 60

16.b HSD BS-IV 5mm RR:

2/F 9 19 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a



Risk Assessment

0.42kg/s 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.37 kg/s

2/F 23 50 38 29 28 2/B 27 59 44 34 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 60 43 32 29

50mm RR: 41.5 kg/s

2/F 33 75 55 43 41 2/B 39 87 64 50 36 3/D 35 85 62 48 38 5/D 31 83 60 45 39

Rupture

2/F 10 20 15 12 9 2/B 11 21 16 12 6 3/D 10 21 15 12 6 5/D 10 21 16 12 6

16.c Base Oil

5mm RR: 0.42kg/s

2/F 9 19 15 11 n/a 2/B 9 19 15 11 n/a 3/D 8 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 7 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 10.35 kg/s

2/F 23 50 37 29 28 2/B 27 59 44 34 26 3/D 25 59 43 33 27 5/D 23 59 43 32 29

50mm RR: 41.4 kg/s

2/F 33 75 55 43 41 2/B 38 86 64 50 36 3/D 35 85 62 48 38 5/D 31 83 59 45 39

Rupture

2/F 10 20 15 12 9 2/B 11 21 16 12 6 3/D 10 20 15 12 6 5/D 10 21 16 12 6

17. Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 – Leak of hole dia. & rupture

17.a Methanol

5mm RR: 0.46kg/s


25mm RR: 11.53 kg/s

2/F 60 75 62 n/a 22 2/B 65 82 68 n/a 23 3/D 59 76 61 n/a 24 5/D 51 71 54 n/a 25

50mm RR: 46.2 kg/s

2/F 89 113 91 n/a 35 2/B 99 126 102 n/a 34 3/D 90 121 94 n/a 35 5/D 80 114 88 83 36

Rupture

2/F 46 53 48 n/a 20 2/B 48 55 50 n/a 20 3/D 44 54 46 n/a 20 5/D 42 55 44 n/a 20



Risk Assessment

17.b Toluene

5mm RR: 0.45kg/s

2/F 11 20 15 12 n/a 2/B 11 20 15 12 n/a 3/D 10 19 14 11 n/a 5/D 9 18 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 11.15 kg/s

2/F 36 69 53 41 31 2/B 39 75 57 45 33 3/D 36 74 55 43 36 5/D 32 73 54 41 38

50mm RR: 44.6 kg/s

2/F 53 106 80 62 45 2/B 58 116 87 68 51 3/D 53 114 84 66 55 5/D 48 111 81 62 61

Rupture

2/F 21 37 28 23 24 2/B 23 39 30 24 24 3/D 21 38 29 23 23 5/D 20 39 30 23 21

17.c Acetone

5mm RR: 0.45kg/s

2/F 13 19 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 11.30 kg/s

2/F 49 81 63 51 65 2/B 49 81 63 51 66 3/D 44 77 59 46 69 5/D 38 72 54 42 61

50mm RR: 45.3 kg/s

2/F 88 151 117 93 83 2/B 88 150 116 93 97 3/D 78 143 109 85 105 5/D 68 134 101 78 104

Rupture

2/F 59 92 71 61 59 2/B 61 95 73 63 62 3/D 55 92 71 57 59 5/D 51 92 71 56 49

17.d Orthoxylene

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 8 15 11 9 n/a 2/B 9 17 13 10 n/a 3/D 9 17 12 10 n/a 5/D 8 17 13 10 n/a

25mm RR: 13.6 kg/s

2/F 23 44 33 26 22 2/B 25 48 37 29 19 3/D 23 48 36 27 20 5/D 21 47 35 27 20

50mm RR: 45.2 kg/s

2/F 34 67 51 40 34 2/B 37 73 55 43 28 3/D 34 71 53 41 29 5/D 30 70 51 39 29

Rupture

2/F 12 21 16 13 8 2/B 13 22 17 14 6 3/D 12 21 16 13 6



Risk Assessment

5/D 11 22 17 13 6

17.e Ethyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.44kg/s


25mm RR: 10.9 kg/s

2/F 48 71 56 50 26 2/B 54 81 63 57 25 3/D 50 78 60 52 26 5/D 43 72 55 45 28

50mm RR: 43.8 kg/s

2/F 70 106 83 73 39 2/B 79 119 93 81 35 3/D 72 116 89 75 37 5/D 64 111 84 67 39

Rupture

2/F 31 42 33 n/a 20 2/B 33 44 35 n/a 21 3/D 30 43 33 32 20 5/D 29 44 35 30 19

17.f Iso Propyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.43kg/s

2/F 13 20 15 14 n/a 2/B 13 19 15 14 n/a 3/D 11 18 14 13 n/a 5/D 10 17 13 11 n/a

25mm RR: 10.78 kg/s

2/F 44 73 56 46 30 2/B 49 82 63 51 31 3/D 44 78 59 46 35 5/D 38 73 55 42 37

50mm RR: 43.1 kg/s

2/F 63 108 83 66 43 2/B 72 123 95 76 45 3/D 66 120 91 71 49 5/D 59 116 87 67 54

Rupture

2/F 27 40 30 28 23 2/B 28 42 32 30 25 3/D 26 41 32 28 24 5/D 25 43 33 26 23

15.g Butyl Acetate

5mm RR: 0.55 kg/s


25mm RR: 13.8 kg/s

2/F 33 44 35 n/a 18 2/B 37 48 38 n/a 18 3/D 34 47 36 n/a 19 5/D 31 45 35 32 19

50mm RR: 54.93 kg/s

2/F 48 65 51 n/a 29 2/B 53 71 56 n/a 27 3/D 48 68 53 51 28 5/D 43 65 50 45 28

Rupture 2/F 18 21 20 n/a 7 2/B 19 22 21 n/a 6



Risk Assessment

3/D 18 22 19 n/a 6 5/D 17 23 18 n/a 6

15.h Styrene Monomer

5mm RR: 0.46 kg/s

2/F 8 13 10 8 n/a 2/B 8 15 11 9 n/a 3/D 8 15 11 9 n/a 5/D 7 15 11 9 n/a

25mm RR: 11.59 kg/s

2/F 22 42 31 25 21 2/B 24 46 35 27 18 3/D 22 45 33 26 19 5/D 20 44 33 25 19

50mm RR: 46.38kg/s

2/F 33 64 48 38 32 2/B 36 70 53 41 26 3/D 33 68 51 39 27 5/D 29 66 48 37 27

Rupture

2/F 12 20 15 13 8 2/B 13 21 16 14 6 3/D 12 20 16 13 6 5/D 11 21 16 13 6

15.i Iso Nonyl Alcohol

5mm RR: 0.45 kg/s

2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 2 n/a n/a n/a

25mm RR: 11.23 kg/s

2/F 3 5 3 n/a 21 2/B 4 6 5 3 20 3/D 3 6 5 3 20 5/D 3 6 4 3 21

50mm RR: 44.95 kg/s

2/F 4 8 6 4 32 2/B 5 9 7 6 29 3/D 5 9 7 5 29 5/D 4 9 7 5 30

Rupture


15.j Propyl Heptanol

5mm RR: 0.45kg/s


25mm RR: 11.18kg/s

2/F 6 11 9 7 22 2/B 8 14 11 9 20 3/D 7 14 10 8 21 5/D 7 14 10 8 21

50mm RR: 44.75 kg/s

2/F 9 17 13 10 33 2/B 11 20 16 12 29 3/D 10 20 15 12 30 5/D 9 20 15 11 30

Rupture 2/F 3 4 3 n/a 8



Risk Assessment

4.4.2 Toxic Dispersion Results

In case of 5 mm, 25mm dia. & 50mm dia. holes in pipework, the toxic gas will come out and

spread in the downwind direction causing health effects to personnel working nearby area.

a. Toluene

The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of Toluene is 500ppm.

Health effects of acute exposure

Acute exposure to toluene vapor can irritate the mucous membranes of the respiratory

tract. With massive exposure, accumulation of fluid in the lungs and respiratory arrest

may ensue. Pulmonary aspiration of toxic vomitus or ingested liquid toluene may

cause chemical pneumonitis.

Health effects of chronic exposure

Chronic toluene exposures at less than 200 ppm have been associated with headache,

fatigue, and nausea. Workers repeatedly exposed at 200 to 500 ppm have reported loss

of coordination, memory loss, and loss of appetite. Some workers have developed

reversible disorders of the optic nerves after chronic exposure in the workplace.

OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) - General Industry

• Limit Values: 200 ppm TWA, 300 ppm Ceiling, 500 ppm Peak (10 minutes)

2/B 3 5 3 n/a 5 3/D 3 5 3 n/a 6 5/D 3 5 3 n/a 6

15.k Dimethyl Formamide

5mm RR: 0.86kg/s

2/F 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2/B 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 5/D 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a

25mm RR: 21.37kg/s


50mm RR: 85.49 kg/s


Rupture




Risk Assessment

• Health Factors and Target Organs: Central nervous system depression, causing

fatigue, headache, confusion, paraesthesia, dizziness, and muscular in coordination.

Irritation of the eyes, mucous membranes, and upper respiratory tract.

b. Dimethyl Formamide (DMF)

The Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) of Dimethyl Formamide is 500

ppm.

Exposure Routes

Inhalation, skin absorption, ingestion, skin and/or eye contact

Symptoms

irritation eyes, skin, respiratory system; nausea, vomiting, colic; liver damage,

enlarged liver; high blood pressure; face flush; dermatitis; In Animals: kidney, heart

damage

The toxic dispersion of Toluene & DMF for their IDLH values are presented below: Table 4.5: Toxic dispersion of products at IDLH concentration

S. No. Failure case Scenario Weather

Category Downwind distance

(m) at IDLH

1. Toluene (IDLH: 500ppm)

5mm

2/B 83 3/D 69 5/D 60 2/F 69

25mm

2/B 276 3/D 264 5/D 204 2/F 212

50mm

2/B 314 3/D 318 5/D 312 2/F 196

2. DMF (IDLH: 500ppm)

5mm

2/B 8 3/D 8 5/D 9 2/F 10

25mm

2/B 18 3/D 18 5/D 18 2/F 26

50mm

2/B 24 3/D 25 5/D 25 2/F 36



Risk Assessment

The toxic dispersion of Toluene and DMF reached 83m, 276m, 314m and 8m, 26m, 36m

incase of 5mm, 25mm, 50mm hole dia. respectively downwind of the leak source. To

identify the leak of chemicals place toxic sensors in dominant direction of unloading

operations to prevent dispersion of hazardous chemicals.

4.5 RISK ASSESSMENT

4.5.1 Failure Probability

The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as

well as likelihood of harm or damage being caused to life, property and environment. This

harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/accidental release of any hazardous material

from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to

failure of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system

because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the

probability of fire/explosion and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like:

• Quantity and physical properties of material released.

• Source of ignition.

• Wind velocity, direction and atmospheric stability.

• Presence of population, properties etc. nearby.

4.5.2 Frequency Estimation

An important component of risk analysis is the estimation of the likelihood or frequency of

each failure case or release scenario. None of the events considered in this analysis are

common and major catastrophic events are very rare. Leak frequencies were developed using

a parts count, and event tree analysis was used to evaluate likelihood of success or failure of

release mitigation safeguards onsite, specifically the potential for detection and isolation of

leaks.Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010 and UKHSE 2017 are given below in Table

No. 4.6.

Table No. 4.6: Leak Failure frequencies as per OGP, 2010

S. No. Failure Scenarios Material Hole Dia., d in mm

Line Size, D in mm

Failure Frequency (per

m Year)


1 LPG Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06

2

LPG Marine 12” Unloading Arm No.2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06

3 Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – a. For MS BS IV

Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06

b.

For Methanol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 250 3.78E-06

c

For Toluene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06

d

For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06

e

For Orthoxylene Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 250 3.78E-06

f

For Ethyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

g

For Iso Propyl Alcohol Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 250 3.78E-06

4

LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 –

Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06

5

LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 –

Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06

6 Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 –

a. For MS BS IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06

b.


c


d

For Acetone Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 250 5.56E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year) Rupture Toluene 250 250 3.78E-06

e


f


g



7


8


9 Chemicals Marine 10” Unloading Arm No.3 – a. For MS BS IV

Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06

b.




Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

c


d


e


f


g


10

LPG 10” Trestle Pipeline No.1 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 250 7.28E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture LPG 250 250 3.78E-06

11

LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06 Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06

12 Chemicals 10” Trestle Pipeline No. 3 – a. For MS BS IV

Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 250 1.71E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 250 7.28E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year) Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 250 5.56E-06 Rupture MS 250 250 3.78E-06

b.


c


d


e


f


g



13


14 POL Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.2 –



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

a.

MS BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture MS 250 200 3.84E-06

b.

HSD BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm HSD 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm HSD 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm HSD 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture HSD 250 200 3.84E-06

c.

Base Oil Leak of hole dia. 5mm B. O 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm B. O 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm B. O 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture B. O 250 200 3.84E-06

15 Chemicals Marine 8” Unloading Arm No.3 –

a.

For Methanol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 200 3.84E-06

b.

For Toluene

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Toluene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Toluene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Toluene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Toluene 250 200 3.84E-06

c.

For Acetone


d.

For Orthoxylene

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 200 3.84E-06

e. For Ethyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year) Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

f.

For Iso Propyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

g.

For Butyl Acetate

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Butyl Acetate 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Butyl Acetate 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Butyl Acetate 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Butyl Acetate 250 200 3.84E-06

h.

For Styrene Monomer

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Styrene Monomer 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Styrene Monomer 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Styrene Monomer 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Styrene Monomer 250 200 3.84E-06

i.

For Iso Nonyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Nonyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

j.

For Propyl Heptanol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Propyl Heptanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Propyl Heptanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Propyl Heptanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Propyl Heptanol 250 200 3.84E-06

k.

For Dimethyl Formamide

Leak of hole dia. 5mm DMF 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm DMF 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm DMF 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture DMF 250 200 3.84E-06

16

LPG 12” Trestle Pipeline No.1/2 – Leak of hole dia. 5mm LPG 5 300 1.64E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm LPG 25 300 7.08E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm LPG 50 300 5.44E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

Rupture LPG 250 300 3.74E-06 17 POLs 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –

a.

MS BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm MS 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm MS 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm MS 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture MS 250 200 3.84E-06

b.

HSD BS-IV Leak of hole dia. 5mm HSD 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm HSD 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm HSD 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture HSD 250 200 3.84E-06

c.

Base Oil Leak of hole dia. 5mm B. O 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm B. O 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm B. O 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture B. O 250 200 3.84E-06

18 Chemicals 8” Trestle Pipeline No. 3/4/5/8 –

a.

For Methanol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Methanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Methanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Methanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Methanol 250 200 3.84E-06

b.

For Toluene


c.

For Acetone


d.

For Orthoxylene

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Orthoxylene 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Orthoxylene 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Orthoxylene 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Orthoxylene 250 200 3.84E-06



Risk Assessment


Line Size, D in mm


m Year)

e.

For Ethyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Ethyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Ethyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Ethyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Ethyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

f.

For Iso Propyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Propyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Propyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

g.

For Butyl Acetate

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Butyl Acetate 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Butyl Acetate 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Butyl Acetate 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Butyl Acetate 250 200 3.84E-06

h.

For Styrene Monomer

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Styrene Monomer 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Styrene Monomer 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Styrene Monomer 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Styrene Monomer 250 200 3.84E-06

i.

For Iso Nonyl Alcohol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Iso Nonyl Alcohol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Iso Nonyl Alcohol 250 200 3.84E-06

j.

For Propyl Heptanol

Leak of hole dia. 5mm Propyl Heptanol 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm Propyl Heptanol 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm Propyl Heptanol 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture Propyl Heptanol 250 200 3.84E-06

k.

For Dimethyl Formamide

Leak of hole dia. 5mm DMF 5 200 1.82E-05 Leak of hole dia. 25mm DMF 25 200 7.63E-06 Leak of hole dia. 50mm DMF 50 200 5.77E-06 Rupture DMF 250 200 3.84E-06



Risk Assessment

4.6 Acceptability of Risk

Risk evaluation is done in order to assess the impact of the people being exposed both inside

and outside the factory premises. The values is generally presented in terms of chances of

death per million per year. Acceptability criteria for individual fatality risk are usually

judged by comparing the values obtained in the risk analysis study to the statistical risk value

of other normal human activities.

Risk of death 1 per million population per year or 1x10-6 inside the premises are generally

accepted without concern and this risk is often seen to be lower than voluntary and

involuntary risk of death from human activities and other cases an individual is exposed to.

The acceptability levels of risk for people employed within the organization are generally

higher. This is because of the fact that those employed are well aware of the risk involved

and have accepted voluntarily some amount of risk while accepting the job.

For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the operation of Pirpau Jetty, the following has

been taken into consideration:

• The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned

for selected failure case as listed in Table No- 4.5 for 2B, 3D, 5D (Day condition) and 2F

(Night Condition).

• Probability of dominant wind directions has been taken from IMD data for Mumbai

location.

• No mitigation factors such as shelters, buildings etc. are considered which will result in

conservative risk estimation.

• During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered.

4.7 RISK RESULTS

4.7.1 Individual Risk

The location plan of Berths used for the Risk assessment is enclosed as Annexure – 1.

The individual risk contour (enclosed as Annexure - 2) for the LPG and POL & Chemicals

Pirpau Jetty, as shown in below fig., the risk contour illustrating the risk of 1 fatality in 1

million population per year i.e., 1 x 10-6 is confined around the all Berth of Pirpau Jetty.

The risk contour is generated based on the consequence analysis, frequency of occurrence,

population and possible ignition sources in the Pirpau Jetty.

4.7.2 Societal Risk Results

The F-N curve, illustrating the societal risk (enclosed as Annexure - 3) for the Pirpau Jetty, it

is evident from the curve that the frequency per year 1x10-6 is in ALARP to ACCEPTABLE



Risk Assessment

region. The risk for 1x10-6, the fatality rate is approx. 5 per million populations per year. The

fatality rate estimated is inclusive of partially-credible failure and non credible scenarios,

which has the low frequency of occurrence.

Hence, the societal risk can be reduced by identifying and mitigating the hazards of the

operations of Jetty (FCB, SCB and Proposed berth) with best possible methods, controls and

following suitable standards and guidelines in operating Jetty.



Controlling the Risk

CHAPTER – 5

CONTROLLING THE RISK

A control measure is an action taken to completely eliminate a chemical hazard from the

workplace — or at the very least — reduce the harm it could cause and bring it to an

acceptable level.

5.1 Hierarchy of Control

For handling of chemical hazards, consider the control measures from all six groupings in

the Hierarchy of Control. They should be considered in the following order of importance:

a. Elimination — Control measures that enables to stop using a hazardous chemical and

completely eliminate a work process.

b. Substitution — These are controls that replace a hazardous substance with another less

harmful chemical or procedure.

c. Isolation — These controls separate the chemicals from workers.

d. Engineering — Controlling hazards using mechanical devices, machinery, or changes to

workplace design.

e. Administration — These controls are the systems and safe working procedures

implemented by managers and followed by staff, workers and customers.

f. Personal Protective Equipment — PPE is the least effective of the control measures

because it only places a temporary barrier between workers and chemicals handled. PPE

shall never be introduced a sole control measure.

https://blog.storemasta.com.au/eliminating-vs-substituting-chemical-hazards-workplace

https://blog.storemasta.com.au/improving-chemical-safety-workplace-ppe




Fig 5.1: Hierarchy of Control

5.2 Elimination and Substitution

Elimination and substitution, while most effective at reducing hazards, also tend to be the

most difficult to implement in an existing operations. Eliminate all ignition sources in the

vicinity of the Jetty area.

5.3 Engineering Control at First, Second & Proposed Berths

Engineering controls are favored over administrative and personal protective equipment

(PPE) for controlling existing worker exposures in the workplace because they are designed

to remove the hazard at the source, before it comes in contact with the worker. Well-

designed engineering controls can be highly effective in protecting workers and will

typically be independent of worker interactions to provide this high level of protection. The

initial cost of engineering controls can be higher than the cost of administrative controls or

PPE, but over the longer term, operating costs are frequently lower, and in some instances,

can provide a cost savings in other areas of the process.




Table 5.1: Engineering Controls at Berths

S. No. Material/Chemical Engineering Control 1. LPG/Propane Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall

be regularly checked for leakages. Gas monitors provided with alarms set at specified concentrations. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

2. Methanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Gas monitors shall be provided for methanol vapor concentrations with alarms set at specified concentrations. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

3. Toluene Leak detection and repair systems shall be provided. Spilled material shall be absorbed or covered will dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers. Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure.

4. Acetone Emergency eye wash fountains should be available in the immediate vicinity of any potential exposure.

5. Butyl Acetate Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Handle in accordance with good industrial hygiene and safety practice. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

6. Styrene Monomer Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure. In case of spill: Absorb with an inert material and put the spilled material in an appropriate waste disposal

7. O/P-Xylene Provision for eyewash stations and safety showers shall be provided for emergency use where there is a possibility of exposure. In case of spill: Absorb with an inert material and put the spilled material in an appropriate waste disposal.

8. Ethanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

9. MS Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Prevent from spreading by making a barrier with sand,




S. No. Material/Chemical Engineering Control earth or other containment material. Use spark-proof tools and explosion-proof equipment. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

10. HSD Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Prevent from spreading by making a barrier with sand, earth or other containment material. Use spark-proof tools and explosion-proof equipment. Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

11. Iso Propanol Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb spill with inert material (e.g. vermiculite, sand or earth) Consider work permit system e.g. for maintenance activities.

12. Iso Nonyl Alcohol

Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb with dry sand, earth or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers for later disposal.

13. 2 Propyl Heptanol

Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Absorb with earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers for later disposal

14. Dimethyl Formamide

Absorb with DRY earth, sand or other non-combustible material. Prevent entry into sea waters.

15. Vinyl acetate Unloading arms and connected pipework/pipelines shall be regularly checked for leakages. Soak up with inert absorbent material. Remove all sources of ignition.

5.4 Administrative Controls

Administrative controls are frequently used with existing operations of First and Second

Berths at Pirpau Jetty. The same controls shall be extended to the proposed berth to control

the hazards.

Administrative controls, which may be used in conjunction with engineering controls and/or

PPE, would also be required if work was to continue while engineering controls are being




developed. Ultimately, though, administrative controls are not the optimal solution and

cannot be the selected method of abatement if a hazard, or employee exposure to that hazard,

can be eliminated.

The most effective type of administrative control is safety training. Effective training

programs educate employees about the dangers they face and provide viable strategies for

staying safe without impeding productivity or efficiency.

Administrative controls at Jetty include:

• Restricting access to a work area.

• Scheduling maintenance and other high exposure operations for times when few workers

are present (such as evenings, weekends).

• Using job-rotation schedules that limit the amount of time an individual worker is

exposed to a substance.

• Using a work-rest schedule that limits the length of time a worker is exposure to a hazard.

Work Practices

Work practices are also a form of administrative controls. Even if there are well designed

and well maintained engineering controls present, safe work practices are very important.

Safe work practices at Jetty include:

• Developing and implementing safe work procedures or standard operating procedures.

• Training and education of employees about the operating procedures as well as other

necessary firefighting, first-aid training.

• Establishing and maintaining good house-keeping programs

• Keeping equipment well maintained.

• Preparing and training for emergency response for incidents such as spills, fire or

employee injury.

5.5 Personal protective equipment (PPE)

PPE is the least effective protective measure on the hierarchy of controls, but it’s still

critically important. In situations where workers exposed to hazardous chemicals and other

dangers, their best bet is to wear carefully chosen, well-maintained PPE.

PPE includes items such as respirators, protective clothing such as gloves, face shields, eye

protection, and footwear that serve to provide a barrier between the wearer and the chemical

or material.




Table 5.2: Personal Protective Equipments used at Berths

S. No. Material/Chemical PPE’s 1. LPG Wear safety glasses with side shields

Wear leather safety gloves and safety shoes when handling/unloading operations at Jetty area.

2. Methanol Low risk of vapor/low risk of volume splash

High risk of vapor/low risk of volume splash

High risk of vapor/high risk of volume splash

Fire retardant clothing

Full chemical resistant suit

Full chemical resistant, impermeable suit

Gloves (Silver shield or disposable nitrile)

Chemical-resistant rubber gloves

Chemical-resistant rubber gloves

Safety glasses with side shields

Full face supplied air respirator

SCBA or compressed air breathing apparatus (CABA)

Full boot cover Chemical-resistant rubber boots

Chemical-resistant rubber boots

3. Toluene Use of respiratory devices. Wear Safety glasses, Chemical goggles are recommended if splashing is possible. Wear chemical resistant gloves and footwear.

4. Acetone Safety glasses. Gloves. Protective clothing. Face shield. High gas/vapor concentration: gas mask with filter type A

5. Butyl Acetate Use a respirator with an approved filter. Use self-contained breathing apparatus in high vapor concentrations. Safety glasses. Gloves. Protective clothing (butyl rubber)

6. Styrene Monomer Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapor respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self contained breathing apparatus should be used to avoid inhalation of the product.

7. O-Xylene Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapor respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self contained breathing apparatus shall be used to avoid inhalation of the product.

8. Ethanol Chemical safety goggles, gloves, safety shoes. 9. MS Wear chemical resistant gloves. Chemical splash

goggles. Safety shoes.




S. No. Material/Chemical PPE’s 10. HSD Wear chemical resistant gloves. Chemical splash

goggles. Safety shoes. 11. Iso Propanol Wear Chemical splash goggles, gloves, safety shoes. 12. Iso Nonyl Alcohol

Wear full or half face piece (with goggles) respiratory protective equipment when necessary, face piece with goggles. Wear resistant-chemical glove. An eye wash unit and safety shower station shall be provided at jetty area.

13. 2 Propyl Heptanol

Tight sealing safety goggles. Chemical resistant gloves. An eye wash unit and safety shower station shall be provided at jetty area.

14. Dimethyl Formamide

Wear Chemical splash goggles, gloves, safety shoes.

15. Vinyl acetate Chemical safety goggles, e protective gloves and clothing to prevent skin exposure.



Monitor & Review

CHAPTER – 6

MONITOR & REVIEW

It is important to monitor both the hazard and the control method to make sure that the

control is working effectively and that exposure to the hazard is reduced or eliminated.

Some tools include physical inspection, testing, exposure assessment, observations, injury

and illness tracking, accident/incident investigations reports, employee feedback/input,

occupational health assessment and other methods.

The following aspects are monitored at existing berths and the same shall be continued at the

proposed berth:

1. The coupling position of ship and loading arm.

2. Regular checking of pipework/pipelines for leakages.

3. Regular inspection of unloading arms

4. Functioning of Gas monitoring systems (GMS) and other chemical sensors/alarm systems.

5. Regular inspection pipelines along the trestle.

6. Sufficient number of firefighting equipments.

7. Fire hydrant lines

8. Pressure requirement in the hydrant line

9. Keeping walkways clear

10. Usage of PPE’s during unloading operations

11. Monitoring the health of personnel working at jetty area

12. Proper functioning of communication systems

The following are reviewed at existing berths and the same shall be continued at the proposed

berth:

1. Change in operational procedures during unloading.

2. Standard operating procedures in firefighting and other response measures

3. Work permits systems.

4. Maintenance of unloading arms and other facilities installed at Jetty.

5. New equipment installation or minor adjustments to the existing facilities.

6. Change in personnel of MbPT or other users (Aegis, BPCL etc.) at Berths.

7. Training requirements for personnel

8. The near miss incidents and accidents through root cause analysis.

9. The availability and stock/spares of firefighting equipments.



Emergency Preparedness & Response

CHAPTER – 7

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE Emergencies can create a variety of hazards for employees/workers in the impacted area.

Preparing before an emergency incident plays a vital role in ensuring that employers and

workers have the necessary equipment, know where to go, and know how to keep them safe

when an emergency occurs. The Emergency Preparedness and Response provides

information on how to prepare and train for emergencies and the hazards to be aware of

when an emergency occurs.

7.1 Emergency Mitigation Measures

Mitigation consists of various measures required for lessening or limiting the adverse

impacts of hazards and related disasters. "Mitigation" as measures aimed at reducing the risk,

impact, or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation. “Goal of mitigation is to

minimize risks from multiple hazards and the threats from individual hazards need not

always occur in isolation. At times, a hazardous event can trigger secondary events.

7.1.1 Resource mobilization

Resource mobilization includes manpower requirement, firefighting materials, appliances or

equipment, safety equipment, communication facilities, transport, list of emergency drugs

and appliances, etc.

Firefighting details are presented below:

S.

No.

Firefighting Facilities FCB SCB Proposed New

Berth

1. Fire water system

Storage tanks

Capacity

As per OISD

guidelines. The sea

water is used for

firefighting purpose.

No storage facility

As at First

Chemical Berth

As at First

Chemical Berth

2. Fire water pumps (nos)

Capacity

Discharge pressure

(bar)

3 pumps of 1440 m3/

hour.

As at First

Chemical Berth

As at First

Chemical Berth

3. Jockey fire water

pumps (nos)

2pumps of

144Cu.mtr./hr

As at First

Chemical Berth

As at First

Chemical Berth




Capacity

Discharge pressure

(bar)

4. Tower monitor

Flowrate / Discharge

pressure (bar)

7570 LPM at 7 Bar 4Tower monitors

of each 6000LPM

at 11Bar

4 Tower monitors

of each 7570

LPM @ 11 bar

5. Ground monitors

Flowrate/ Discharge

pressure (bar)

NA 2 ground

Monitors of each

3000LPM at 7Bar

2 Nos each of

3000 LPM @ 11

bar

6. Hydrant System

Flowrate/ Discharge

pressure (bar)

1100LPM at 7 Bar 27sets of double

headed hydrant

valve & 6Nos. of

single headed

hydrant valve.

1100 LPM @ 7

bar

7. Foam System

Tank capacity

Discharge pressure

(bar)

15000litres

15 bar

30,300 litres As per OISD-156.

Tank Capacity 30

m3.

8. Gas monitoring System

(GMS) number and

locations

NA 4Nos. at Jetty

berth

As per OISD-156

9. Jumbo water curtain

nozzle

4Nos of each

6000LPM at 7Bar

4 Jumbo curtains

each 6000LPM at

12bar

4 Nos. each of

6000 LPM @ 7

bar

10. Remote control system

(for firefighting system)

Wired remote control

system

At SCB Control

Room

As per OISD-156

11. Fire detection, Alarm

and communication

system

Manual Call point,

Siren and VHF

communication

Gas detector,

Flame sensor,

MCPs, siren &

PA system

As per OISD-156

12. Fire shore connection NA Available 2 Nos

International




shore connections

at unloading

platform.

13. Fire extinguishers

number and locations

As per OISD 156 As per OISD 156 As per OISD 156

14. Mobile and water borne

firefighting equipment

NA NA As per OISD 156

15. First aid (list and

locations)

As per OISD 156

16. Public Address System NA Available As per OISD 156

17. Fire Tenders Available at

combined building

fire control room.

Common fire

tender located at

combined

building fire

control room

Available at

combined

building fire

control room

18. No. of

Employees/Personnel

(at the time of

unloading and idle

time)

Aegis: 05 No’s Aegis: 05 No’s Proposed Berth

19. List of PPEs’ Aegis:

Hard Helmet: 05

Safety Shoes:05

Life Jackets: 06

Splash Goggles: 05

Chemical Suit: 02

Aegis:

Hard Helmet: 05

Safety Shoes:05

Life Jackets: 06

Splash Goggles:

05

Chemical Suit: 02

As per OISD 156

20. Distance from the other

berths

From OPJ – 2.5KM

& from SCB –

0.8KM

From FB-0.8KM

& from OPJ –

3.3KM

350 m from First

Chemical berth

21. Fire extinguishers and Aegis Fire Aegis Fire As at First




GMS locations Layout extinguishers:

CO2 – 02 No’s

ABC - 02 No’s

GMS:01 No

extinguishers:

CO2 – 02 No’s

ABC - 02 No’s

GMS: 01 No

Chemical Berth

Incident preventing measures and procedures

The incident prevention measures and procedures at installation include the following:-

(i) Safety policy;




Fig 7.1: Safety Policy of Mumbai Port Trust

(ii) Proper layout: Location Plan of TCB and Layouts of FCB, SCB are enclosed as

Annexure – 1 and Annexure - 4 along with report.

(iii) Work permit system: Permit to Work system is widely used in the Jetty area.

(iv) Fire detection & early warning alarm system: Gas detector, Flame sensor, MCPs,

siren & PA system, Manual Call point, Siren and VHF communication as per

OISD-156 are provided in the FCB and SCB and also shall be implemented in the

proposed berth.




7.2 Emergency Preparedness Measures

A comprehensive and well practiced plan is essential if a jetty/berth is to respond to

emergencies in an orderly and effective manner.

The procedures covered all types of emergency that can be envisaged in the context of

particular activities at the Jetty, for example gas leak, major oil/chemical spillage resulting in

an unconfined vapour cloud, fire, explosion and ill or injured persons.

Personnel involved must be familiar with the emergency procedures, shall be adequately

trained and shall clearly understand the action they would be required to take in responding

to an emergency. This shall include the sounding of alarms, the setting up of a control centre

and the organization of personnel to deal with the emergency.

7.2.1 Firefighting set at Pir Pau Fire station for FCB & SCB

Fixed fire fighting system is provided at Pir Pau Chemical Terminal, in accordance with

Standard OISD156 and Engineering Practices/ Requirement. It is with adequate access for

Firefighting, Rescue operations & escape routes provisions, for handling any emergency to

• Extinguish the fires on the jetty head

• Extinguish fires on the surface of the sea due to spillages

• Prevent the spread of fire to the vessels

• Provide a safe escape route for jetty and vessel personnel to the shore line.

The fixed fire fighting system provides sufficient wet cover as a means of protection to

escaping personnel, the jetty head, manifold connections, and the loading arms. Sufficient

quantity of Foam stocked, is maintained for quickly dousing the fires at the point of

combustion on jetty or on ships.

Port Fire Service Set Up -

For the complete Fire protection to one of most important Installation of Port, where highly

inflammable Toxic cargo is being handled, Port Fire Service stand as ‘Fire Shied’ for entire

Pir Pau Area from last 70 years, by providing round the clock fire safety coverage with

following experienced, knowledgeable & courageous fire fighters at all vital duty points-

Total fire staff at Pir Pau for two shift - Section leader- 3, Sub leader- 5, Motor Driver –

5, Pump Operator- 5, Firemen – 24

Posting of Fire Staff in shift –

1. Pir Pau Fire control room - Firemen -2 .

2. First turn out - Section leader -01, Motor Driver-1, Pump Operator -01 & Firemen -4

3. Ambulance - Motor Driver– 1 & Firemen -2




4. First Chemical Berth - Sub Section leader – 1, Firemen – 3/4

5. Second Chemical Berth - Sub Section leader – 1, Firemen – 3/4

7.2.2 Action Plan for Specific Cases

The best way to manage any emergency is to prevent it. Following guidelines for emergency

prevention shall be:

1. Sound engineering practice in the design, fabrication, installation and Maintenance of

facilities.

2. Careful selection and correct use of equipment.

3. Observance of safety and security regulations.

4. Proper and constant training and guidance to all personnel working in the pipeline

operation and in plant,

5. With particular reference to product knowledge and maintenance practices.

6. Good House-keeping.

7. Constant supervision and alertness.

a. Fire at small Leak in Pipeline

• Shut off the flow of LPG in the line by closing valves and by stopping pumping

• Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire

extinguishers

• Allow the gas in the line to complete burn

• Start water sprays those exposed to fire/ heat

b. Bursting of Gasket/Leakage through Joints

• Stop pumping.

• Close line valves.

• If Fire at a gasket leakage, it must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire

extinguishers

• Allow the gas to disperse into atmosphere to safe distance beyond LFL

• Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care, as per standards &

guidelines.

• Check the gasket/flange leakages regularly.




c. LPG/chemical spill contingency plan

Scenario Description

Jetty facilities of MbPT located at FCB, SCB and proposed new berth, the unloading

operations where LPG/chemicals will be transported to existing/proposed unloading arms. In

case of major leak in the arm/line during transfer operation LPG and other chemicals will

come out as jet and fall on the ground forming a pool. On pool, evaporation vapor cloud may

be formed which may ignite resulting vapor cloud explosion or flash fire. Pool of LPG may

be ignited if it gets contact with any ignition source. However, once pumping is stopped,

extent of leakage will reduce and flow will be less due to stoppage of pump & valve.

Action plan in case of leak resulting into pool fire at berths

i. In case of any leakage detected during transfer or hearing the information about leak and

pool fire, designated personnel of MbPT will rush to the spot along with required PPEs

and leak arresting accessories. They will inform fire and safety personnel also to rush to

the spot and stop LPG/chemicals transfer pump. Remote operated valve can be operated

to shut beforehand.

ii. MbPT personnel will arrange for identification and isolation of leak using required

techniques & PPEs.

iii. In case of small fire, the fire can be extinguished with the help of DCP Extinguishers.

iv. Area to be cordoned off for unauthorized entry.

v. LPG fires may be effectively put off by using DCP from Fire tender.

vi. In the event of any threat to the neighboring industries, alert them on the incident.

vii. Mutual Aid to be activated and district authorities shall be contacted for activating Off-

Site Emergency Plan, if required.

7.2.3 Action during Emergency

Immediate action is the most important factor in emergency control because the first few

seconds count, as LPG/chemical fires develop and spread very quickly unless prompt and

efficient action is taken. In the event of gas/Chemcial leak during operation of unloading the

products, the following action shall be taken as quickly as possible:

• Take immediate steps to stop LPG/Chemical leakage/ fire and raise alarm simultaneously.

• Initiate action as per Fire Organization Plan or Disaster Management Plan, based on

gravity of the emergency.

• Stop all operations and ensure closure of all ROVs and isolation valves.

• All out effort should be made to contain the spread of leakage/ fire.




• Saving of human life shall get priority in comparison to stocks/ assets.

• Jetty personnel without specific duties should assemble at the nominated place.

• All vehicles except those required for emergency use should be moved away from the

operating area, in an orderly manner at pre-nominated route.

• Electrical system except for control supplies, utilities, lighting and firefighting system

should be isolated.

• If the feed to the fire cannot be cut off, the fire must be controlled and not extinguished.

• Start water spray system at areas involved in or exposed to fire risks.

• In case of leakage of LPG without fire and inability to stop the flow, take all precautions

to avoid source of ignition.

• Block all roads in the adjacent area and enlist CISF/Police support for the purpose if

warranted.

7.2.4 Firefighting Operations

• Enlist support of local fire brigade and neighboring industries if possible.

• If escaping vapor cannot be stopped, jets of water should be directed at the point of

leakage to assist controlled release of vapor and in between water fog should be used for

dilution and rapid dispersion of vapor cloud.

• Firefighting personnel working in or close to un-ignited vapor clouds or close to fire must

wear protective clothing and equipment including safety harness and manned life line.

They must be protected continuously by water sprays. Water protection for firefighters

should never be shut off even though the flames appear to have been extinguished until

all personnel are safely out of the danger area.

• Exercise care to ensure that static charge is not generated in LPG vapour cloud. For this

purpose solid jets of water must be avoided, instead fog nozzles should be used.

• Firefighters should advance towards a fire downwind if possible.

• If the only valve that can be used to stop the leakage is surrounded by fire, it may be

possible to close it manually. The attempt should be directed by trained persons only. The

person attempting the closure should be continuously protected by means of water

spraying (through fog nozzles), fire entry suit, water jel blanket or any other approved

equipment. The person must be equipped with a safety harness and manned life line.




• Any rapid increase in pressure or noise level of product discharged through safety relief

valve of the vessel/ pipeline should be treated as a warning of over pressurization. In such

cases all personnel should be evacuated immediately.

• As in case of any emergency situation, it is of paramount importance to avoid

endangering human life in the event of fire involving or seriously exposing LPG

equipment or serious leakage of LPG without the fire.

7.3 RESPONSE PLAN

In Preparedness, MbPT has SOPs for all the emergencies, hazards and risks on the basis of

vulnerability in the port. The knowledge and capacities are developed by training as well as

governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and

individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely,

imminent or current hazard events or conditions as a part of the training. Based on the

preparedness, the response process begins as soon as it becomes apparent that a disastrous

event is imminent and lasts until the disaster is declared to be over. It is conducted during

periods of high stress in highly time-constrained situations with limited information and

resources. It is considered as the most visible phase amongst various phases of management

plan.

Response includes not only those activities that directly address the immediate needs, such

as search and rescue, first aid and temporary shelters, but also rapid mobilization of various

systems necessary to coordinate and support the efforts. For effective response, all the

stakeholders have been briefed about hazards, its consequences, and plans of action as per

SOPs are implemented during the mock drills.

7.4 Hazard specific Response Plan

7.4.1 Firefighting Operations:

a. On Duty Fire man in Fire Control Room -

• On receipt of message on duty fire man will write down all information and call back

on the telephone nos. given by the caller to confirm about the fire.

• After confirming he will press the ‘Fire Bell’.

• He will contact PSFO and Asstt. PSFO.

• After obtaining necessary orders he will deploy necessary crew and send them to

attend the incidence along with necessary equipments and fire tender.

• He will maintain the communication with the riding officer turnout with fire vehicle.




• He will inform the VTS / Harbour control.

• He will write all the information received from fire site in occurrence book

• He will provide all the help or reinforcement required at fire ground by informing the

officer present at fire station.

• He will activate the CRISIS management group if situation is beyond control &

evacuation has to be carried out, by informing P.A. of Chairman, Dy. Chairman, and

all HODs, after the message received from the Sr. Section leader from the fire ground.

b. Fire Crew

• Fire crew turn out to attend the call within 40 seconds and shall reach the spot and

inform the control room about the site situation

• Fire crew under guidance of Sr. Section leader and orders of PSFO will decide the

course of action for tackling fire and carry out the firefighting operation to extinguish

the fire.

• Fire crew will also carry out necessary rescue operation and shift the casualties to the

hospital in ambulance.

• Fire staff will communicate with seniors from the seat of the fire/ close to fire source

of fire to tackle it as quickly as possible.

• Fire crew will use the resource provided by seniors to tackle the fire and save the life

& property of Mumbai Port Trust.

c. Control Room Supervisors

Control room supervisors keep the reinforcement, ready (if required) and all emergency

nos. ready at desk

d. Sr. Section Leader

• After receiving the message of fire he immediately see that fire vehicle is turn out to

the emergency site within 40 seconds.

• He & crew will go to the fire call.

• After reaching the site he will analyses the situation, severity of fire and surrounding

risk.

• He will plan the strategy to tackle the emergency.

• He will organize the rescue operation, if required.

• He will decide the 'Extinguishing media' to be used to tackle the fire,

• He will implement the planning & strategy to tackle the fire/emergency,




• He will evacuate the non-essential people from the site.

• He will call for the resource like heavy equipment, cranes, BA Sets, emergency

equipments etc. if required to overcome the emergency,

• He will ask for the additional help if required from other agencies,

• He will maintain overall supervision of the situation for the safety of fire fighters and

the surrounding area.

• If situation goes beyond control, PS& FO and Asst. PS & FO will inform him to

activate the CRISIS Management Group

• He will inform the Control room fireman to inform PA of Chairman, Dy. Chairman &

all HODs about the disaster.

• After the fire is extinguished, he will do the rigging of the area to check if anything is

still smouldering or fire is completely extinguished.

If something still left or reignited he will again start the fire fighting and after completely

knocking down the fire, he will return back to fire station.

7.4.2 Tanker on Fire at Marine Oil Terminal

Master of Vessel

• Will immediately report the incident to the Dock Master JD/ PirPau, and Dock Master

Control Station on channel-12 or by phone, VTS and Terminal/Jetty Fire Service in-

charge.

• Sounds alarm

• Initiates vessel response plan.

• Cease cargo operation-advises loading master-closes manifold valves and disconnects oil

transfer arms (Chickson or the Hoses).

• Fire Fighting squads commence contain fire-status-extent damage-casualties

• Advises VTS and Port fire service status on VHF

• If necessary requests additional resources or-evacuation injured

• On arrival PFS and action group- coordinates with them to fight fire

• Keeps engines on standby to move the ship from berth.

• Provide Tugs to tow away the vessel to Isolation using Fire Wires or the ETA.

Fire service

• Port Fire Service will immediately turnout to he site within 40 sec.




• Tackle the fire, using foam or other extinguishing media to knock down the fire.

• Carryout rescue operation & save the life of people.

• Starts cooling ship side with water jet & tug fire fighting system.

• PFS will liaison with MARG-for help if required.

• On arrival of action group coordinates with Dy. Conservator and Master of the tanker for

fighting the fire.

• Arrange back up of Mumbai Sewree, Oil Terminal Companies.

Dy. Conservator -

• He will Proceed to the VTS/DMCR.

• He Will assess level of crisis.

• If at level 2 or 3 will inform Crisis Management Group through VTS

• Cooperation to Master water jets, Sprinklers fire fighting tugs, pilot, mooring, de-berthing

evacuate injured keep crisis mgmt group informed.

Dock Master JD & PP -

Dock Master is overall in-charge of Jawahar Dweep and will inform Deputy Conservator

about disaster.

• He will proceed to the berth /Jetty.

• He will alert other vessels on the adjacent berths.

• He will suspend Cargo operation on all adjacent berths by informing the Master of the

Oil companies.

• He will inform VTS / Harbour Control to provide the additional Port & Harbour Tugs,

Mooring Launches in tackling the disaster if necessary.

• He will instruct private Tug, available on Island, to assist in evacuation and any other

help.

• In consultation with DC– opt for the casting off the vessel/s to the emergency

anchorage.

• He will keep the D.C. posted the situation.

• For evacuation, if required, he will arrange Helicopter from Indian Navy.

• Instruct VTS/DMCR to keep record of event.

Crisis Mgmt Group

• Takes over charge from Action Group at control room if crisis is agreed at level 2 or 3.




• Coordinate at district, state, national level including Ministry of Shipping if crisis level 2

or 3

• Restore berth operational

• Complete maritime accident report

• Complete situation report

• Survey and cost damage to port installation

• Hold meeting of all concerned parties

• Seek compensation

• Initiate Fact finding inquiry and submit final report.

Action/On Site Group

Apply resources monitor work and provide necessary information and feed back to Crises

Management Group for further improvement and necessary support and action.

7.4.3 Vessel on Fire

Vessel action:

• Sounds alarm

• Initiates vessel response plan

• Cease cargo operation

• Fighting squads commenc contain fire-status-extent damage-causalities

• Advice VTS and port fire services status on VHF

• If necessary requests additional resources or evacuation

• Action group coordinates to fight fire

• Keep engines on standby to movie the ship from Berth

Fire Service:

• Start cooling ship side with water jet

• On arrival of action group coordinates with Dy.Conservator and Master of the vessel for

firefighting.

• If help required, PFS will liaison with MARG.




7.4.4 SPILLAGE OF OIL AT PIRPAU Jetty

Master/Captain of Vessel/ Loading Master /Any Watch Staff

Immediately informs the incident to the MOT Pir Pau, Loading/ Discharging In-charge of

the concerned Oil Company through wireless, and Superintendent/ Technical supervisor

through EPABX by raising a Fire Alarm. It can be also be operated by anybody anywhere at

Pir Pau. An information shall consists of

1. Name of the Vessel/Oil Pipe Line involved

2. Position of the Vessel/Oil Pipe Line

3. Details of oil and chemical spill

4. Severity of the situation

5. Details of help to be provided

6. In case of chemical spill – details of incompatibility, if any.

7. Any other information deemed necessary to mitigate the emergency.

Executive Engineer (w),

MOT Pir Pau

1. Takes immediate measures for the stoppage of the leakage. If the leakage is from a

running pipeline, he takes systematic steps for stopping of operation, closing of valves on

the after sufficient dropping of line pressure and plugging the leak.

2. He also takes action for the cleaning of the spillage in co-ordination with the Oil

Company involved in the operation along with the Port Fire Brigade.

3. In case of major leak he gives information to the Pollution Control Cell at BPX.

Dock Master (JD)

1. Informs Chairman/Deputy Chairman.

2. He has also to inform Coast Guards if the spill is large.

3. If necessary a help shall be sought from members of mutual aid Group as per

Memorandum of Understanding between Mumbai Port Trust, Jawaharlal Nehru Port

Trust, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and other participating oil companies on

the implementation of the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan (NOS-DCP)

within Mumbai Harbor.

4. He informs Security/Police to cordon of the area, and regulate traffic movement.




Director Pollution Control Cell

To take all necessary legal steps of sampling, analysis, sealing etc. for legal action against

the ship master/captain as laid down in the port rules for breach of Port regulations. After

cleanup operation the waste material is brought to shore for suitable disposal.

7.4.5 Toxic / Gas Leakage At Pir Pau

Terminal Mgr

• Shall immediately report the incidence to the Control Room VTMS Station

• Shall raises alarm and to the Pir Pau fire services

Pir Pau Fire Service/ Jetty Fire Service

1. Starts spraying with water jet to dilute the gas vapor concentration.

2. Will carry out rescue operation using necessary PPE.

3. On arrival of action group coordinates with Harbor Master and Master of the tanker for

detecting the source of leak

4. Liaison with MARG for additional Fire tenders.

Vessel Action

1. Sounds alarm

2. Initiates vessel response plan

3. Cease all cargo operation-advises loading master-closes manifold

4. Flighting squads commence spray-status extent damage casualties

5. Advises VTS VHF 16/12

6. Requests additional resources or-evacuation injured

7. Coordinates with PFS & Crisis Group

8. Liaison with MARG Companies for additional help.

9. Keeps engines on standby to move the ship from berth

Port VTS Station

Shall report the incident to the action group as well as crises management group.

Action Group

Harbor Master

1. Will assess level of crisis.

If at level 2 or 3 will inform Crisis Management Group thru Cooperation to Master water

spray, firefighting tugs pilot, mooring boats, unberth evacuate injured-keep crisis mgmt

group informed.




CISF

1. Cordon off Area.

2. Maintain Law & Order.

3. Ensure smooth flow of Road Traffic of Rescue Operations.

Crisis Management Group

1. Takes over charge from Action Group at control room if crisis is agreed at level 2 or 3

2. Coordinate at district, state, national level

3. Including MOST if crisis level 2 or 3

4. Prepare press conferences

5. Restore berth operational

6. Question witnesses

7. Complete maritime accident report

8. Complete situation report

9. Survey /cost damage to port inst.

10. Hold meeting of all concerned parties

11. Seek compensation

12. Distribute final report

7.5 Evacuation Routes

In Case Of Major Disaster at MOT, Pir Pau

i. Through Wadala Mahul Road to Welfare Centre, Wadala.

Equipment at the assembly point:

A room equipped with:

(i) First aid box, (ii) Telephone,

(iii) List of telephone number, & (iv) Stretchers

Temporary Shelters / Safe Zones

In the event of a probable disaster like release of toxic gas from nearby industry,

affected population MbPT colony residents would have to be transported to intermediate

temporary shelter. The temporary shelters identified for Port are Welfare Centre / school at

Wadala / extended docks shed. In case of failure of the above arrangement, Municipal /

District Authority will be contacted for evacuation and shelters.




Transportation:

The Executive Controller, Civil defense, should be the overall in-charge of transport as far as

relief and rescue operation is concerned. All the departments should send their idle

vehicle(s), which are not engaged in emergency duty of the department along with the driver

to the Civil Defense. Usage of those vehicle(s) will be maintained by the Civil Defence

Office.

7.6 Medical & First Aid

7.6.1 Medical & First Aid and Relief Centres

Port Trust Hospital at Wadala with 242 beds including ICU beds is working round the clock

and ready to act in case of any emergencies. At present 39 doctors are on the roster and most

of them are staying in the quarters within the Hospital compound. Most of the nurses are also

staying in the quarters located within the compound and thereby, their services can be

availed within a short period. In case of emergency, 38nos. of additional beds can be made

available. Two ambulances are kept on standby duty at Hospital and one at Hamallage

Building and another at Fire Brigade Station, Prince’s Dock. Dispensaries are located

throughout the MbPT estate at strategic locations and are operational during day time, which

can be utilized as First aid centre and relief centre. In emergency the staff at hospital has to

carry out their regular duties in war footing.

7.7 Mutual Aid Response Group Chembur - Mahul & Wadala - Sewree Area

Eight Industries in the Chembur Mahul Area and eighteen industries in the Wadala – Sewree

Area spreading over 10 Square km. have formed Two Mutual Aid Response Groups under

the guidance of the Directorate of Industrial Safety & Health (DISH). Mostly all the

members industries are handling, storing and transporting petroleum products through

pipelines and tank lorries. Major pipelines are owned by the port. The Chembur – Mahul

Mutual Aid Response Group is functioning under the chairmanship Senior most Officer of

one of the MARG company along with one conveyor of the group.

All the industries in the group have their “On-Site Emergency Plan” and are equipped with

adequate facilities and man-power for fire fighting and to cope-up with any kind of disaster

within their boundary limits. In case of major emergencies in any of the member industries

beyond the individual’s capacity to cope up the Mutual Aid Group has agreed to share

resources, information and expertise in that situation to save life and property.




MARG - CHEMBUR – MAHUL AREA

Sr. No.

Name of the Member Industry Telephone No.

1. M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Wadala

2507 6605

2. M/S. RCF, Fire Station 2552 2222 3. BARC, Fire Station 2550 5176 4. TATA Fire Station 6717 5555 5. M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

F/Stn. 2553 3701 / 4

6. CTTL Fire Station 6703 0114 / 5 7. Aegis Fire Station 2554 7366 8. IOBL, Control Room 2554 2725

MARG – SEWREE – WADALA AREA

S/ No.

Phone no. of other Industries in the area Telephone No.

1 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Wadala

2412 8598 2412 9801

2 M/S. Godrej Industries Ltd., (Food Division), Wadala (E)

2418 8152 / 55 / 58

3 I. B. P. Co. Ltd., Wadala 2414 6621 / 2412 3901 4 M/S. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Wadala 2418 1281 / 2411 4390 5 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,

Wadala

2414 3477

6 M/S. Castrol India Ltd., Wadala 5684 9200 / 2454 1496

7 M/S. Mahanagar Gas Limited 2404 5785 / 2403 1720

2401 2400 (emergency)

9324941244

8 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation

Ltd.,Benzene, Sewree

2414 6400 / 2412 3640

9 I. B. P. Co. Ltd., Sewree 2414 7129 / 2415 0078

10 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,

Sewree I

2412 3284

11 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,

(B/O), Sewree

2415 8902 / 2412 3640

12 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 2414 3700 / 2418 0227




Sewree II

13 M.S. Hisdustan Lever Ltd.,HajiBunder Road 2370 6700

14 M/S. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,

Mazgaon

2371 3807 / 71/ 75

15 M/S. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Sewree 2413 6259/ 2412 3806

16 M/S. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 2414 3587

17 M/S. Colgate Palmolive (I) Ltd. 2414 6457

18 M/S. Hindustan Lever Ltd. / Bon Limited 2370 6700

7.8 Important Telephone Numbers

MbPT Important Telephone Nos

Particular Office Extn.

Office Telephone

No.

Mobile No. Res. Extn.

Resident Telephone

No.

Harbor Master 4022 22612563 9820030205 4906 Sr. Dock Master 5040 22616636 9820193912

Dock Master, Control Stn. 5035 -- -- 4834

Fire & Safety Officer 6261 4946 -- 2376 7704

Dy. Chief Mechanical Engineer – I

6502 6918 -- 2377 2374

Dy. Chief Mechanical Engineer – III

6505 6903 -- 2378 1882

Dy. CE (Gen) 4033 6911 2588 4648

-- 5656 4034

Sr. Dy. Traffic Manager, Indira Dock

5480 2261 0244 -- 4903

Asst. Medical Officer 7711 -- -- 2416 6188

Asst. Security Officer 5653 -- -- 2261 3051

Dir. Pollution Control 5053 -- -- 2261 9565

Dock Master, JD &Pir Pau 5874 -- 9820282614 2454 2029




Important Telephone nos. of CISF unit

Office Cell No. E-mail Fax Control Room 66565090

66565791 22613849

- - -

Sr. Commandant 22643572 66564651

66564652 (PA)

8879628013 [email protected] 66564651

Asstt. Comdt. Port / Ops 66564659 9619865895 Asstt. Comdt. /Adm 66564658 9619865887

Asstt. Comdt. / PP & JD 66566163 (PP) 15832 (JD)

9619161523

Pir Pau (Marine Gate) 66566124 Pir Pau (New Jetty) 66566136 JD Landing Point 15808

Green Gate 66565192 Blue Gate 66565191

Yellow Gate (ID) 66565173 Orange Gate (PD) 66566352

Purple Gate 66566481

Phone nos. of Port Fire Stations

Sr. No.

Location Phone No.

1. Prince’s Dock / VICTORI DOCK

201 / 6261/ 6274, 2377 8704

2. Haji Bunder (Haji Bunder Haz. Cargo Complex)

7151 7152

3. Pir Pau (Marine Oil Terminal) 6656 6119 / 2554 8553 4. Jawahar Dweep

( Marine Oil Terminal) 2294 0633 - 640 Extn. 5844/5845

5. Port Fire & Safety Officer (Res.: 26, Wilson House, Colaba)

6260 (Off) 2377 6284

98200 28881 4946 (Res)

6. Asst. Port Safety & Fire Officer (Res.: 8Anderson House,Mazgaon-10)

6275 (Off) 9820663687 6948 (Res)

mailto:[email protected]




7. MbPT Fire Brigade Control Room, PD 201 8. Municipal Fire Service 2307 6111/101

Phone Nos. of First Aid Posts and Ambulance Service

Post Location / in charge Tel. No. First Aid Post No 1 Ballard Estate Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.) U.

M. Sagathia 4720, 4721, 4722

9969516854 First Aid Post No.2 Carnac Bunder Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.) C.

R. Sisodia 5678 / 2261 2933

9869616229 First Aid Post No.3 Dock Yard Dispensary Dr. (Mrs.)

ChitraWagh 6233 /2376 6597

9833525307 First Aid Post No. 4 Reynold Road Dispensary, Dr. S. N.

Dhanorkar 7389 / 2412 1296

9833408515 First Aid Post No.5 Antop Village Dispensary, Nadkarni Park 7688/89/98/78

2412 5778 Ambulance Service, Post No. 1 Port Department 5039 Ambulance Service Post NO. 2 Hamallage Building Asst. Manager Docks 5471, 5472 Ambulance Service Post No. 3 Fire Station, Yellow Gate, Prince’s Dock 6261/6260



Conclusion & Recommendations

CHAPTER – 8

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

8.1 Conclusion

Hazard management is the process which improves worker safety by providing measures to

reduce fatalities and injuries to workers in the operational area of jetty.

Hazards were identified and assessed the risk involved in the cumulative operation of First,

Second and proposed new Berth.

Individual Risk of Iso-risk contours have been plotted by SAFETI v8.4 of M/s DNV. It is

observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Annexure - 2) that the acceptable limit of individual

risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined around Pirpau Jetty premises. Societal

Risk (F/N Curve – Annexure - 3) developed for the Jetty remains in the ALARP to

ACCEPTABLE region.

The firefighting system is designed in accordance with OISD 156. Firefighting facilities

including Fire water pumps, ESD system, and Gas Monitoring system have been installed on

the FCB and SCB. The same shall be installed on proposed new (Third) Berth. Fire

extinguishers of different types are placed as per OISD-156. Personal Protective equipments

are being used and strictly followed. All the above systems shall be maintained in good

working order at all times.

Hence, it may be concluded that Pirpau Berth Jetty may be considered safe from

environmental risk point of view.

8.2 Specific Recommendations

• Simultaneous unloading operations of berths shall be restricted in the order of First

Chemical Berth (FCB) and Second Chemical Berth (SCB) or SCB and TCB (Proposed

third Berth) to avoid hazardous events and shall ensure smooth traffic of vessels.

• Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) systems shall be considered to shut down and limit the

inventory within 30 seconds of the occurrence of a leak in the unloading equipment or

pipeline.

• Spill containment: Leaks in LPG welded piping systems shall be contained in troughs.

Sufficient deck curbing, barriers shall be provided around the perimeter of the deck.

• Foam deluge systems shall be installed at the site to mitigate LPG spills by keeping the

vapors down.




8.3 General Recommendations:

• Prevailing, petroleum rules and all other applicable national & international standards/

codes and practices should be adopted during design/ procurement and installation of the

arms/pipelines.

• Only trained operators should be deployed for unloading operations at the Jetty.

• In order to reduce the frequency of failures and consequent risk, codes, rules and

standards shall be strictly followed.

• Smoking within the jetty premises should be strictly prohibited. Use of naked light or hot

work must be restricted to the areas designated for the purpose.

• Electro pneumatic ON OFF valve at jetty area must be checked regularly for timely

actuation of the safety system.

• Training of all the employees for firefighting and use of safety apparatus must be

conducted regularly. Mock drills for emergency should be conducted at regular intervals

(as per MSIHC rules) keeping liaison with local administration and firefighting facilities

available in the area.

• 100% radiography to be done for all welded joints.

• Inspection and testing of the pipelines should be done at regular intervals for ensuring

their health and condition monitoring.

• The use of PPEs should be strictly followed.

• Patrolling of the pipeline along the trestle shall be done on round the clock during

unloading operation.

• Design and construction of the pipe supports should be rigid to avoid failure of the pipe

supports due to earthquake or other natural calamities.

• Enforce an inspection program of all electrical equipment at regular intervals can prevent

some fires from occurring. This can be done by either the jetty management or other

companies themselves.

• The risks of damage of the jetty & affiliated facilities due to large waves, storm surges

design shall revise during New construction.

• Ensure trestle pathways free from obstructions for normal operation and maintenance as

well as for emergency handling.

• Gas detectors (for leak detection) provided at shall be checked regularly and calibrated

periodically.




• Ensure regular testing, inspection and maintenance of Fire Alarm systems.

• Fixed toxic gas detectors with alarm system (with Detection and service range) to be

provided near the pipe manifold in dominant downwind direction.

• The gaskets of flange joints shall be inspected regularly for breakage of gasket or

corrosion or any defects that leads to leakage.

• The sprinkler system and remote operated valves must be checked regularly for timely

actuation of the safety system as being done.

• Firefighting equipments/systems shall be checked regularly and ensure the stock/spare

available.

• Regularly check the pressure in the fire hydrant lines, preferably during mock drills.

• Inspection and testing of the major equipment’s pumps connecting lines, etc. shall be

done at regular intervals for ensuring their health and condition monitoring.

• Rapid isolation of significant leaks will not only eliminate the risks but will also help to

minimize the hazards and, particularly, the ignition probability (by limiting the total mass

of flammable vapor released). For isolation to be effective, first requires detection to

occur and hence best practice fire and gas detection systems, with associated shutdown

systems and procedures, shall be important mitigation measures.

• Electrical/hand operated fire siren shall be installed at suitable location in installation

• Manual call points at strategic location shall be provided on Jetty for emergency

response.

• Communication systems walkie-talkie and public address system shall be checked

periodically.

• Hazard control philosophy, trained manpower and SOP adherence shall be strictly

followed in the Pirpau Jetty.

DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERINGI I T MADRAS, CHENNAI-36

DR.S.NALLAYARASU

LOCATION PLAN

E

N

W

S

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PROPOSED THIRD CHEMICAL BERTH

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EXISTING FIRST CHEMICAL/ POL BERTH

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EXISTING SECOND CHEMICAL/ POL BERTH

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ULP

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END PLATFORM

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TCB

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UP

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W

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W

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DIESEL PUMP

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M

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M

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MCC ROOM

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EL(+) 9.50m

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G.W

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CROSS OVER WALKWAY

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TOILET 2100x1600

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COUNTER

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SECURITY ROOM

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ROOM FOR USER

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COMMON TOILET

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D

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DRAWING NO. IITM-MBPT-TCB-DWG-003

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LOCATION PLAN

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NOTES:

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1. ALL DIMENSIONS ARE IN MILLIMETRES UNLESS NOTED OTHERWISE.

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2. ALL LEVELS INDICATED ARE IN METRES WITH RESPECT TO CHART DATUM.

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TITLE:

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PROJECT:

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REV: A

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DATE: 19.02.2020

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CLIENT:

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CONSULTANT:

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CHECKED

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REV.

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DESCRIPTION

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DATE

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DRAWN

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REVISION

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CONSULTANT:

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THIRD CHEMICAL BERTH AT PIR PAU, MBPT

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A

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19.02.2020

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TSE

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VA

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MUMBAI PORT TRUST

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PORT HOUSE, 3RD FLOOR, SHOORJI VALLABHDAS MARG, BALLARD ESTATE, MUMBAI - 400 001

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ISSUED FOR APPROVAL

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SCALE 1:3500

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3. FOR GENERAL NOTES AND SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS FOR STEEL AND CONCRETE REFER DWG.NO.IITM-MBPT-TCB-002

venkataharinath

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Annexure - 1 Location Plan of FCB, SCB and TCB

venkataharinath

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Pg. A1

BUOY No 3

BUOY No 2

BUOY No 5

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SECOND

CHEMICAL

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OLD

PIR-PAU

FIRST

CHEMICAL

BERTH

(NEW PIR-PAU)

ELEPHANTA

ISLAND

BUTCHER

ISLAND

2100000N

280000E

CHIEF ENGINEER

DRG.NO.

SUPTG.

ENGINEER

DY. C.E.

EX. ENGINEER

Mb P T E S T A T E

VPA

DATEREV.

TITLE :

ASSTT.

EX. ENGINEER

DESCRIPTION

DRAWN TRACED DATE

NTS

INITIAL

SCALE

A3

MUMBAI PORT TRUST

LOCATION PLAN SHOWING

PROPOSED THIRD CHEMICAL

BERTH

F:\DRAWINGS\MBPT DRAWINGS\2021\76-2021 THIRD CHEMICAL BERTH.DWG

í

NORTH

15/09/2021

76 / 2021

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END PLATFORM

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PDIL, Noida Page A3


Iso Risk Contour

Annexure - 2: Iso Risk Contour for Pirpau Berths, Mumbai

PDIL, Noida Page A4


F-N Curve

Annexure - 3: F-N Curve for Pirpau Berths, Mumbai

PG

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SUBJECT:

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DATEREV.SIGN.

DESCRIPTION

DRAWN:

TITLE:

( )

DATE:

DRG.NO.

SCALE: N.T.S

CHIEF MECH. ENGINEERS OFFICE

MUMBAI PORT TRUST

DESIGNED BY:

APPROVED BY:

S.V.LONDHE 14-06-2012

* *

*

DY.CHIEF MECHANICAL ENGINEER

R

V PG

PUMP WITH I/C ENGINE

PUMP WITH I/C ENGINE

PUMP WITH ELECTRIC MOTOR

B/V

TOWARD SEA

R

V PG

R

V

16

"P

IP

E

REDUCER

10

"P

IP

E

TOWARD JOCKEY PUMP No.1

16

"P

IP

E

MOV

À'

TOWARD FOAM TANK

TOWARD JOCKEY PUMP No.2

H H

`B'

JETTY ROAD

NEW PIR PAU FIREPUMPING STATION

H

TM-1

TM-2

TOWARD JETTY

MOV

PG

10"PIPE

12"PIPE

12"PIPE

10

"P

IP

E

12

"P

IP

E

10"PIPE

12"PIPE

10

"P

IP

E

12

"P

IP

E

H

H

H

H

H

H

12"PIPE

PIR

PA

U M

AN

IFO

LD

BE

RT

HIN

G S

IDE

12"PIPE

36

32

3

8489

48

50

4080

VIEW-À'-À' VIEW-`B'-`B'

ML

A-1

ML

A-2

ML

A-3

ML

A-4

ML

A-5

4000

87

00

900

15000

1500

30

00

0

27

90

0

77

00

V

PG

5600

5600

400

11400

FIRE FIGHTING PIPING LAYOUT OF JETTY& BASEMENT AT NEW PIR PAU JETTY

FIRE FIGHTING PIPING LAYOUT OF PUMPINGSTATION AT NEW PIR PAU JETTY

GATE VALVE WITH FLANGE

PIPELINE CLOSED WITH FLANGE

PIPE TO PIPE CONNECTION

MARINE LOADING ARM

MOTOR OPERATED VALVE

REFERENCES

PG

PG

À'

`B'

BYPASS GATE VALVE

NON RETURN VALVE WITH FLANGE

PRESSURE GAUGE

HYDRANT

TOWARD BASEMENT/JETTY

TOWER MONITOR

G.L

9790

1100

8"PIPE

16"PIPE

10"PIPE

PUMPING STATION

PIPE JOINED WITH FLANGE

2380

95

0

12"PIPE

12"PIPE

16"PIPE

H H

16"PIPE

TOWARD

FOAM TANK

EXISTING FIRE FIGHTING PIPELINEFROM FIR PUMPING STATION TO NEWPIR PAU JETTY

JETTY FIRE PIPELINE SHOWN THUS.

BASEMENT FIRE PIPELINE SHOWN THUS.

H

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

10)

11)

12)

13)

No. DESCRIPTION SYMBOL

TOWARD JETTY

AutoCAD SHX Text

mauM

AutoCAD SHX Text

8

AutoCAD SHX Text

7

AutoCAD SHX Text

1

AutoCAD SHX Text

3

AutoCAD SHX Text

U

AutoCAD SHX Text

T

AutoCAD SHX Text

S

AutoCAD SHX Text

A

AutoCAD SHX Text

T-

AutoCAD SHX Text

pao

AutoCAD SHX Text

[-

AutoCAD SHX Text

ba

AutoCAD SHX Text

/

AutoCAD SHX Text

U

AutoCAD SHX Text

M

AutoCAD SHX Text

sT

AutoCAD SHX Text

M

AutoCAD SHX Text

T

AutoCAD SHX Text

B

AutoCAD SHX Text

P

AutoCAD SHX Text

R

AutoCAD SHX Text

T

AutoCAD SHX Text

O

AutoCAD SHX Text

T

AutoCAD SHX Text

R

AutoCAD SHX Text

I

AutoCAD SHX Text

ISO 9001-2000 PORT

AutoCAD SHX Text

MLA

AutoCAD SHX Text

V

AutoCAD SHX Text

MOV

AutoCAD SHX Text

R

AutoCAD SHX Text

PG

AutoCAD SHX Text

TM

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Annexure - 4 Firefighting system of FCB, SCB and TCB

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Pg A5

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Pg A6


DR.S.NALLAYARASU

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Pg A7


DR.S.NALLAYARASU

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Pg A8

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

venkataharinath

Typewritten Text

Documents

PIRPAU JETTY