J.B.L. REYES VS. BAGATSING 125 SCRA 553 Facts: Justice JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to compel the issuance of a permit for a rally to be held at the Luneta and a subsequent march to the U.S. Embassy on Roxas Boulevard. The petition was filed the day before the scheduled assembly as no action had apparently been taken on the application, although it turned out later that it had been rejected in a letter sent earlier by ordinary mail. The reasons for the denial was the mayors fear that the assemblage might be infiltrated by subversive elements to the prejudice of the public order, and thus the intended rally would violate a city ordinance implementing the provisions of the Diplomatic Convention requiring the receiving state to afford adequate protection to foreign embassies; hence his suggestion that the rally be held at an enclosed place like Rizal Coliseum for better security. Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance and modification of the permit is meritorious and is guaranteed under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. Held: The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent official to grant it. The choice of Luneta and U.S. Embassy for a public rally cannot legally objected to in the absence of clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy. The Philippines, being a signatory of Vienna Conventions which calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land as cited in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. 125 SCRA 553 (November 9, 1983) (Constitutional Law Freedom of Speech) FACTS: Petitioners request for a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally was denied by respondent mayor due to police intelligence reports affirming plans of criminal intent to disrupt the assembly. Respondent recommended that the permit may be issued if said rally is to be held at any other enclosed area where safety is ensured.

ISSUE: Whether or not denial of a permit to rally violates freedom of speech. HELD: Yes. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, is the danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil public safety, public morals, or any other legitimate public interest. Peaceful assemblies are guaranteed in freedom of speech. FACTS:

retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought to permit a rally permit from Luneta Park to front gate of the US Embassy in Manila. Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. He issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit rallying 500 meter radius around the Embassy. ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor violated the petitioners' constitutional right. RULING: Yes, the mayor's ordinance which prohibit the petitioners to rally violates their constitutional right to free speech and peaceable assembly. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.

Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the

country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tanada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18 Facts On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

RulingThe Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional.

While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

In RE: Garcia 2 SCRA 984

FACTS: Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of Bachillerato Superior in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the Insitututo de Cervantes for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as Licenciado en derecho. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar

RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

NICOLAS vs. ROMULO FACTS: Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required. Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the Constitution is also violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement

clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities." Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

G.R. NO. 159618: Feruary 1, 2011 BAYAN MUNA, Represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner v. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary , and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute.

Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute

First issue

The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence

Second issue

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most

favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

Petition is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011 BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs.ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents. VELASCO, JR., J.: Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions

Theserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by itsterms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Held: No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.

Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute

International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any

prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.

International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive

and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.