MF,IAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1976

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN : SOME EXPERIENCES AND SOME REFLECTIONS

CLYDE EVANS I would like to acquaint the readers with some work I have

recently been doing, as a philosopher, with elementary school students. (I have since done essentially the same kind of thing with all grades K-12, and with all ages. But my remarks here will be specifically about the elementary students-mostly third and fourth grades.) I will try to describe what I have done in suffi- cient detail to give you some idea of my procedure, the dynamics among the children, the “feel” of the sessions, and the excite- ment of the whole thing. I will then discuss at length those features of these sessions which I take to be of philosophical importance. I shall then, in closing, say a few words about the significance of this entire enterprise for philosophy in general.

Classroom Procedure I was invited to Hillside Elementary School, Hastings-on-

Hudson, N.Y., to work with the children on issues related to values, morals, responsibility, decision-making, and the like. So this immediately limited my scope to ethical, moral issues. The procedure I adopted was as follows: I would ask the class of 20-25 students to sit on the floor before a movie screen. I would then show them a short film strip. (“First Things”, produced by Guidance Associates, Pleasantville, N.Y.) Each strip tells a story of a child about their own age, and deals with an issue which children of this age can both understand and care about: issues like telling the truth, keeping promises, fairness, obeying rules, property rights. The story is deliberately conceived to leave the child, a t the end of the film, with a dilemma.

At the end of the film I would sit with the children on the floor and get a few initial “gut” reactions as to what they think the child in the film should do. In every case I have ever seen opinion would be divided-sometimes with a few undecideds. I would then make sure to elicit some comments from someone on each side of the issue, complete with their reasons for so choosing. This is to insure that everybody realizes that there is another point of view and that there are reasons for holding such a view-indeed some of their classmates and friends hold such a view. Then I would suggest that each group separate, talk

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it over, and try to come up with the best reasons they could for deciding as they did.

If there were some who were undecided, I would have them remain with me for a bit. Then I would get them to articulate their indecision, confusion, ambivalence, etc. This is to help them see as clearly as they can just what the issues are and what the alternatives are. After I feel that they all have a sufficiently clear understanding of the pros and cons of each suggested answer-that is, that they all feel the sharpness of the two horns of the dilemma-I recommend that they go over and join each of the other group’s deliberations and discussion, in order to see what kinds of reasons each can summon in support of its position. I also assure the students that suspending judgment is perfectly legitimate, if neither side is decisively convincing.

I would then visit each of the groups to more or less “monitor” the discussion. I was not an active participant, for I wanted them to talk to each other. My primary objective a t this point was to prevent them from devising imaginative ways by which they could slip off the dilemma. Here I wanted to keep the students from modifying the facts of the situation, offering compromises, or pulling things out of the air. Without becom- ing totally unrealistic, I wanted them to be forced to decide that particular case-even if the choice was viewed as between all undesirable alternatives. One of the reasons for this insistence is worth noting. This has to do with my belief that which par- ticular decision reached is not so important, nor even that the decision was made from among specified alternatives. Rather, what is of paramount importance is the process by which the decision is made.

Finally, we would all gather again, in a circle, with each group trying to persuade the other group-and any remaining fence- sitters-of the righteousness of its cause. A t this point I was mainly a referee. I tried to maintain some kind of “controlled warfare”. The important task I had a t this point was to try to get the students not to present “position papers” completely unrelated to the dialogue at that point, but rather to respond to what had just been said before. This would continue for a while. I would say a few words about why there was no second part to the film divulging the “answer”, and why in some cases they must determine the outcome. Then we would adjourn.

To give you some idea of the “feel” of these sessions, I would like to briefly indicate some of the responses. In one of the film- strips a girl is taken to the carnival by her father. It is her

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 55 seventh birthday and he has promised her she can choose any five rides she likes. But as they approach the gate he discovers he has forgotten his wallet. This is the last day of the carnival, and it is too far to go home and return before it closes. He counts the change in his pocket and then tells his daughter that he has enough to pay the entrance fee; they could go inside and look at the exhibits and parades, etc., but there would not be enough left over for the rides; or, she could lie about her age, say that she was six instead of seven, get in for half fare, and then they would have enough left for the rides. Then he dumps the problem in her lap, and tells her that she must decide for her- self what she should do. They walk to the entrance gate. The father says : “Two tickets, please.” The ticket seller says : “One adult and, let’s see, young lady, how old are you?” The film ends.

As expected, the children divided into those who would lie and those who would tell the truth. But the reasons for doing both varied tremendously. Some of the reasons given for lying: they’ve waited all year for this day; they only just that day turned seven; its the last day of the carnival and they won’t get another chance; it won’t hurt anybody; it’s only a few cents, not a lot of money; it wasn’t her fault that the father forgot his wallet; no one will know; the carnival is probably cheating you anyway, so it’s alright to cheat them back; the manager is prob- ably mean.

Some reasons given for telling the truth : it’s wrong to lie; they would feel so bad about lying that they could not enjoy the rides anyway; their conscience would bother them and they would not be able to sleep a t night; their father would never be able to trust them again; they might get caught; this could lead you to become a habitual liar; if everyone lied whenever they pleased, then no one could ever believe anyone else; it would not be fair to the carnival, which deserves to make a profit; if everyone cheated the carnival it might go bankrupt and then no one would have a carnival to attend; it would not be fair to all the seven-year-olds who paid the full fare.

Thus while there were only two courses of action chosen, there were a multitude of different reasons why one would be inclined to choose one course rather than the other. I believe this is an extremely significant feature of these sessions. For this helps the students to see that the objective is not merely to decide either to lie or to tell the truth; the objective is not merely to get the “right answer”. More is required. And what

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is required is precisely the grounding of that either I or decision upon particular reasons. Then they can begin to see that what is of paramount importance is the strength of the connection be- tween the reasons given and the conclusion (Lee, the decision). For they get the chance to see others of their classmates choose exactly the same course, reach exactly the same conclusion for (what they take to be) completely indefensible reasons. I cannot over-emphasize how important I think this feature is.

Unsurprisingly, not all the reasons given or comments made were as pertinent or to the point as most of those given above. Indeed, a fair amount of energy and ingenuity went into thinking of ways to “solve” the whole problem. They ranged from fairly ridiculous (tell the truth, pay full fare, and then you would prob ably find some money lying around on the ground once you got in) to absolutely brilliant (tell the truth, then find some old man inside the carnival, tell him the whole story; he would then give you the money for the rides, because old men will do anything for little kids).

But I can happily report that maneuvering to avoid the dilemma was minimal. I can also report that the children gener- ally took the entire enterprise rather seriously. There was the expected amount of playing around: “we have more on our side”; “all the girls are on the other side” (this actually happened once); “you can’t even climb a tree; “you’ve never even been on a boat”; “what do you know?”; and the like. But for the most part the students did deal and traffic in reasons. They tried to convince by giving reasons: both reasons why they were right and reasons why the others were wrong.

A quick story will help show why I have such confidence in the (general) seriousness of the children. During one discussion of the carnival dilemma we had a turncoat. At one point in the discussion a girl said that it would not be fair to all the other seven-year-olds who had to pay full fare, if she lied. A boy on the other side (with his left arm in a cast) had never thought of that; and when he did, it was enough to make him change his decision to lie. He decided, then and there, that telling the truth was the best course of action and the right thing to do. So he got up, on the spot, and moved over to join the truth-tellers. This kind of reversal did not happen often. But it happened more than once. These incidents (plus others) were enough to con- vince me that not only were the children considering reasons, but that they also were sincerely and seriously listening to the remarks of their classmates. I t was truly a dialogue.

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 57 Almost always the students would insist that I give my position

on the dilemma. When asked I would always postpone my answer until the end-after they had all expressed their own positions and justifications, and heard the same from their class- mates. Then I would honestly give my decision, admit if I felt uneasy about it, and explain why that position was most con- vincing to me. I would hasten to add that this is just my resolu- tion of the dilemma, and that each of them, having all the same evidence as I, might legitimately disagree with me-for reasons which they were in a position to give. When I come out for one of the two sides, it is natural that some of the members of that group feel vindicated in their judgement, and take my decision as a sign that they have “won”. On one occasion before the last word of my “confession” had died out, a girl from the “losing” side animatedly yelled a t her opponents: “But that doesn’t make it right.” Success !

What Does All This Have To Do With Philosophy? At this point you might well be thinking that this all sounds

like great fun, but wondering what it has to do with philosophy. For in these sessions the students learned nothing about Lucretius, Aquinas, or Wittgenstein. Thus, if there really was any “philosophy” in it at all, it cannot be philosophy thought of merely (or even primarily) as the thought of major philosophical figures. Secondly, we did not study or follow the development and evolution of philosophical thought on a particular issue. So again, if there was philosophy there, it was not philosophy thought of as a dialogue, an ongoing conversation continued through the ages. Thirdly, we did not discuss free will, mind/ body dualism, the nature of knowledge, logical necessity. So we could not have “done” philosophy in the sense of studying certain germinal problems which have recurred again and again in man’s attempt to rationally make sense of the universe. Finally, we did not engage in any discussions about what philo- sophy really is, or what philosophy can and cannot do-its limits. Thus we surely did not do philosophy thought of primarily as a concern with nzeta-issues rather than the issues themselves.

So what did we do that was philosophical? I would like to discuss three aspects of these sessions which I believe are of philosophical importance. I believe further that these three features justify our calling this activity philosophical-if only on

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a rudimentary level. I will call them philosophical commitments, philosophical skills, and (substantive) philosophical issues.

1. Philosophical Commitments. First, I think that such ses- sions introduce the students to what might be called philo- sophical commitments. These are the commitments which make philosophical discourse possible. Whenever people seri- ously seek to resolve a dilemma, or think their way through a problem, there are certain procedural principles to which they must be committed. I think this is always true. But it is especi- ally true when it takes the form of a social enterprise, i.e., when several people are involved. These are the commitments to doing things in a certain way, to establishing and observing certain criteria, to adopting certain attitudes toward the endeavor itself, These are, in short, the commitments that make a philosophical discussion go. They can be formulated as follows:

(1) There is the commitment to impartiality and objectivity. The idea here is simply that during his deliberations a student should not give undue weight to any particular person or in- terest, unless there are relevant reasons for doing so. This means he will give due (not necessarily equal) consideration to every proposal made, to every issue brought out, to every objection raised-with as much of an “objective” viewpoint as he can. (That is, he will also not give undue weight to his own position, merely because it is his own.) This commitment is necessary in order to insure that all sides of the issue are considered, and that no viewpoint or position is prematurely screened out by any sort of biased pre-selection.

This guarantee is required by the very nature of the enterprise itself: in philosophical inquiry we seek to arrive at the best understanding we can of a particular issue; and in order to do that we must attend to all considerations which are significant for this issue. We will usually decide that some points are less significant than others. But this can only be done after they have been given due consideration-as opposed to being ruled out even before being considered for their significance. And this is all the commitment requires anyway.

Just as the very nature of the philosophical enterprise requires this commitment so does the nature of my enterprise (with the children) require this commitment. For our objective was to understand the nature of the dilemma, see clearly the several issues involved, and arrive at the best possible resolution of that dilemma. (In practice this commitment to impartiality and objectivity means, e.g., that a student should not give any more

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 59 weight to a suggestion made by her best friend than she does to any other; nor any less to one made by her “worst enemy”; nor any “special” consideration to one made by the teacher.) Such an endeavor requires the same kind of comprehensive, thorough, consideration that is demanded in philosophy, and hence requires the same commitment (of the children) that is demanded of philosophers.

(2) There is the commitment to considering only relevant criteria. This is important because the participants might all be perfectly impartial and objective, but might be considering points completely irrelevant to the issue at hand. This commit- ment, in and of itself, will not, of course, determine which con- siderations are irrelevant. But it does indicate the awareness that such a distinction can be made, and the inclination to try to make it. (I will simply note here that the task of deciding which considerations are the relevant ones can be exceedingly difficult. Obviously the context of the situation will influence which considerations will be relevant in a given case; and this, of course, will vary. For instance, a girl wants to join an all-boys little league baseball team; and the decision is left up to the players. The fact that she is the best shortstop in the neighbor- hood seems to be a relevant consideration in deciding to accept her on the team. But there might be equally relevant considera- tions which would lead one to reject her, e.g., her having asthma. On the other hand, the fact that she is a girl seems to be completely irrelevant to deciding such an issue. But regarding a different issue, e.g., casting for the role of Ophelia, in Hamlet, her being a girl seems decidedly relevant.)

These are obviously (fairly) easy cases. My point is simply that if the participants in this social enterprise seek to come up with the best possible understanding of the problem and the best possible resolution of the dilemma, then they must be com- mitted to considering only those criteria which are most signifi- cant and relevant to the issue at hand. And failure to do so would seriously jeopardize any chances they might have for success. Thus given the rationale behind the enterprise to begin with, they must be committed to considering only relevant criteria. The necessity of this commitment in philosophical inquiry is evident, So again, the very nature of the activity re- quires of the children a commitment identical to that required of philosophers.

(3) They must be committed to consistency. That is, they must strive to make their thought and statements at one time

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compatible with those of another time. This is necessary if the discussion, as a whole, is to be at all comprehensible, and if it is to have any kind of cumulative progress toward its objective, This means that it is not “acceptable” or “appropriate” for one to make a statement that is patently contradictory to any of one’s previous statements. In practice this also means, for in- stance, that if a student raises an objection to one of his class- mates, he must be willing consistently to apply the same criterion to himself. To fail to do so would be “special pleading”, just an- other form of inconsistency. The necessity of this commitment (and the following ones) for philosophy is too obvious to require comment. So from now on I will merely indicate why they are required for our discussions.

(4) They must be “comprehensive” in their thinking. This means they must strive to apply these principles to every aspect of their endeavor. They cannot adopt this critical attitude in some areas of consideration, and ignore it in others. There thus can be no “sacred preserves” which lie beyond the reach, a priori, of this critical approach. They must be willing (at least in principle) to subject to critical scrutiny everything that might arise during the course of the inquiry. This is necessary in order for the students to protect themselves against uncriticalty mak- ing assumptions, or accepting statements, claims, etc., into their considerations which could be shown, upon examination, to be unwarrantable. And this can only work if everything is subject to such examination.

( 5 ) They must be committed to respecting each person in the discussion as a possible source of valuable information, relevant considerations, or persuasive arguments. This is so because if the student’s prime objective is to arrive a t the best possible solution, then it is at least secondary (and at most irrelevant) from what source that solution comes. This means that the student will consider each participant as an equal member of the group, a peer, and a partner in their search. Thus even if a student does not “like” one of his classmates, he is still com- mitted to at least leaving open the possibility that his “enemy” might say something important. Hence, he cannot automatically “tune” anyone out.

(6) Finally, they must be committed to the search for reasons, defensible reasons, as the basis upon which to make their deci- sions and determine their behavior. This must be so or else there would be no sense in jointly discussing reasons in the first place. This means that the student will strive to make decisions

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 61 not solely on the basis of personal desire, or caprice, or what his friends do, or impulse, or prevailing opinion, or what his teacher thinks. He will strive to decide because of the merits of the case that can be made for or against a particular position.

These commitments are absolutely necessary for any social enterprise in which a group of people try to think their way through something. These commitments are prerequisites for any philosophical discourse or inquiry, in the sense that anyone who seriously engages in the study of philosophy or in the activity of philosophisizing must presuppose such things. Philo- sophical inquiry and discourse could not proceed, would not be possible, without commitments to such principles on the part of the participants. This is true of philosophy a t every level- from the most sophisticated to the most elementary. And clearly, this is just as true of the discussions I had with the children on “what they would do”. It was just as necessary for these prin- ciples to be operative in those discussions as it is in professional philosophical journals. Thus it is equally necessary for the chil- dren to be committed to such principles.

We might be inclined to say at this point that this aspect regarding commitments is not properly speaking “philosophi- cal”. Rather it is what we might call “pre-philosophy”, in the sense that i t precedes any actual philosophizing. I do not think it is all that important to decide once and for all which name we wish this aspect to have, if we all understand just what is taking place. My point is simply this: first, these commitments are absolutely necessary for any philosophical discourse to take place; and second, students can come to form such commit- ments by simply being immersed in such an activity. I attempted to facilitate the formation of such commitments, not by “teach- ing” them or talking about them, but by creating a creation, an atmosphere in which the students could experience these com- mittments at work, and see their efficacy. I never said a single word about “philosophical commitments” or “philosophical pre- suppositions”. Not only would this have been for the most part futile. It is also unnecessary. I simply engaged them in a dis- cussion which requires for its very existence the presence of such philosophical commitments. Hence I feel that these dis- cussions are just as “philosophical” as any others which require these same philosophical commitments on the part of its par- ticipants.

2. Philosophical Skills. The second aspect of these sessions has to do with what can be called philosophical skills. The com- E

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mitments discussed above are more akin to a philosophical outlook or attitude. I have in mind now more the particular skills, tools which can be used by one who has such a philo- sophical attitude. These are the skills necessary for rational inquiry, critical analysis. I beIieve that such sessions with chil- dren have the capacity for helping them to acquire such skills. The basic reason why this is so is because again the very exist- ence of such a discussion involves the use of such skills- whether they are being used well or poorly, deliberately or un- knowingly, systematically or haphazardly. Reasoning processes are taking place at each point of the discussion. And all that is required is to make the students more consciously aware of the process in which they are already engaged.

Thus by directing more attention to the process itself we could help the children to see that there are some skills which would be valuable to have for such a discussion. (We could also help them to understand and develop such skills.) They could come to see that it would be very helpful if they were able to clarify and analyze a complex issue by separating and dis- tinguishing its various parts; if they were able to distinguish an exposition from an argument; to separate the conclusion of an argument from its supporting reasons; to distinguish inductive from deductive arguments; to determine when an argument is a good one; to recognize the common fallacies (and hopefully understand why they are fallacious); to understand the ways in which language can be used to distort, oversimplify, distract, etc. Such sessions involve the use of such skills, and thus provide an opening for their discussion and further pursuit. The amount of thoroughness or sophistication with which such skills are treated will obviously vary depending upon the children in- volved. But even at younger ages it is possible, I have found, to develop some understanding of and familiarity and facility with these skills.

I think this feature deserves to be called philosophical, be- cause quite simply it involves nothing more than the developing of philosophical tools and skills, totally analogous to the way in which budding philosophers develop and sharpen their philo- sophical tools. The sophistication of the tools themselves is obviously quite different in the two cases. But the basic idea-of mastering those skills required to pursue the task at hand-is exactly the same.

Let me now give three examples to show the operation of these commitments or the use of these skills. I will describe

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 63 how they appeared in our sessions. Then I will mention an instance from the history of philosophy in which the same feature is present.

First, let us consider a particular skill. By engaging in these sessions, a student can develop the capacity to trace out the implications of a given position or claim, i.e., to see what follows from it. Sometimes this will lead him to see that the implications of one of his positions is incompatible with the implications of another of his positions. And to the degree that these implica- tions are inconsistent with each other, to that degree he cannot maintain both positions a t the same time. In one dilemma, a girl wants to climb a tree to save a kitten’s life; but she also wants to keep her word to her father to stop climbing trees because of the danger. Here she is committed to keeping a promise and also committed to preserving life. But in this situa- tion these two positions lead to conflicting demands.

It is extremely enlightening for students to see that here the two positions are in hopeless conflict; and there is no way around it. Thus, since they cannot maintain (in the sense of act upon) both positions a t once, they must choose one and sacrifice the other. And this is precisely the remedy we would offer John Locke for some of the problems in his epistemology. For Locke wanted to maintain both: (1) that we have knowledge only of ideas and (2) that the primary qualities in objects resemble our ideas of them. But we cannot maintain both: for by 1 we can know only our ideas of primary qualities, thus we could never, in principle, know anything else to which they could be compared for resemblance. Hence we cannot have both 1 and 2. So what we have here is a concrete example of how one of the skills developed in these sessions is exactly the kind of skill useful for “real” philosophical inquiry and analysis.

Second, let us consider one of the philosophical commit- ments, viz., the commitment to consistency. This commitment has already been discussed so I will just give the example. Some of the students said it was alright to lie at the carnival because it was only a few cents involved, not a lot of money. The impli- cation is that it is the smallness of the amount of money in- volved which allows this action to be acceptable. Now some others said that if everyone lied, the carnival would lose money, would surely not make the same profit, and might possibly go bankrupt. Why? Because if everyone lied, then the total amount of money would then be large. Now some of the students re- sponded to this argument by saying that even so it is alright to

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lie because the carnival is probably cheating you anyway. But while this response deserves as much prima facie consideration as any other, it is not a possible response for the first speakers who said that lying was alright because it was only a little money involved. For now, it is not only a little money. And for those students to maintain the acceptability of lying even when this instance fails on their own criterion (of the amount of money involved) is to be patently inconsistent. For these students would be applying a criterion in one case and refusing to apply it- when it clearly does apply-in another. The comparable philo- sophical episode involves John Locke and Bishop Berkeley. Recall how Berkeley chastised Locke for assuming the causes of our ideas, viz., material objects. But then Berkeley does exactty the same thing himself when he assumes (postulates) the cause of our ideas, viz., spirits.

Finally, consider an example that combines both the use of particular skills and the operation of one of the commitments. In the carnival dilemma one of the boys felt that one should tell the truth. Why? because lying in this case could lead one to become a habitual liar, and the first thing you know, you’d be lying all the time. Other students countered by saying that this was just one little lie; it’s not like you lie all the time; and just because you lie this once it doesn’t mean you’ll start lying all the time. With just a bit more sophistication they could have pointed out, in addition, that the first boy was using a version of the slippery slope argument; and that without further support is fallacious on the face of it.

But the first boy did then provide further support. He said that lying is just like pollution. He claimed that to say it’s only one little lie, is like saying it’s only one little candy wrapper. But all the little candy wrappers add up. Then the first thing you know you have a big pollution problem. Likewise, the first thing you know you’ll have a big lying problem. Again, a student who had begun to develop these skills could have easily pointed out that this was an obvious argument from analogy (which, of course, is also fallacious without further support). In both cases, facility with particular skills would have greatly increased the sophistication of the exchanges. (Please note that i t is not merely the ability to use jargon that I am after here. For in the first case, the students did make the proper response even though they never used the words ‘slippery slope’. I wish only to say that we can help the students understand why their response was the proper one (i.e., why that argument is fallacious), and

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 65 we can help them learn to “spot” such arguments more readily.)

It will not be surprising when I tell you that none of the students in fact pointed out that this was an argument from analogy. But the responses they did make will indicate the particular philosophical commitment (in)operative here. They gave two replies, both of which were ad hominem attacks upon the speaker; one for each side of the analogy. They were quite simply: “You throw candy wrappers on the ground too” and “You lie too”. Clearly the virtue of the speaker is an inappropri- ate consideration in determining the merit of his argument. In fact, his arguments were lousy, but not because he too was a litter-bug and a liar. Thus any knowledge the students had of his character as a litter-bug andlor liar should still not prevent them from considering impartially whatever arguments he pro- posed. Hence the operation of the commitment to impartiality. The episode from the history of philosophy again involves Locke. In Book I of his Essay Locke spends a lot of time showing why the theory of innate ideas is indefensible. But in addition to giving particular arguments against that philosophical position, he also makes some disparaging remarks about the proponents of such a theory. And such ad hominem attacks are just as inappropriate for Locke as for children.

Thus for both the philosophical commitments and the philo- sophical skills we see that these sessions can lead to the development in the children of exactly the kinds of attitudes and skills required of “real philosophers”, and which have actually been manifested (as we have seen) by real-life philoso- phers in real-life philosophical episodes.

3 . Philosophical Issues. Finally, the third aspect of these sessions has to do with substantive philosophical issues. The point to be made here is simply this: in dealing with (seemingly) straightforward, everyday kinds of issues, the students find themselves almost immediately entangled in what have tra- ditionally been called philosophical problems. That is, lurking just below the surface of everyday issues lie substantive philo- sophical questions. And the great lesson to be learned from such sessions is that any serious, non-superficial consideration of many everyday issues involve-inherently involve-philo- sophy: the same kind of philosophy that we have always associated with names like Plato, Aristotle, Russell: the same questions discussed by them; the same skills used by them in trying to make sense of i t all.

In the example discussed above, the children started off by

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merely trying to decide whether to lie or not at the carnival. But how should they decide? Upon what basis, grounds, should they make up their minds? Some attempted to decide on the basis of what they thought would be the “fair” thing to do. But this requires some attention to what “fairness” is, or at least to some criteria for determining fairness in this case. And this is clearly just the problem of Justice with which philosophers have grappled since Socrates. So already the children are involved with an old philosophical chestnut.

Some tried to decide on the basis of a fundamental principle like “lying is wrong” (always, everywhere, and €or everyone). Some philosophers have also tried to ground their judgements on matters of fundamental principles. We think immediately of the categorical imperatives of Immanuel Kant. Some students made their decision on the basis of how they feZt about the rightness or wrongness of the act. Thus if they felt it was alright to lie in this case, then they would do just that. Again, some philosophers (e.g., Hume) have maintained that this is a perfectly acceptable position, for in the end, that’s all there is: our feezings of approval or disapproval for particular actions. And the “morality” of an act consists in nothing more. Other students apparently decided more simply on the basis of what they personally would or would not “get out of it”. Thus if a given course of action will benefit them, then it is right. (Cf. some versions of egoism, e.g., Plato in The Republic.) Finally some students decided on the basis of how their decision would affect the others involved, for better or worse. Again, many philoso- phers (e.g., Bentham, Mill) have also espoused just this kind of utilitarianism, as proposed by the children.

All of the above proposals were in fact made by the students themselves; that is, the students themselves raised these philo- sophical issues, and (at least) sketched out these philosophical positions by which to deal with them. Thus it is all too clear that this activity confronted the children with substantive philo- sophical issues-on a rudimentary level, to be sure, but neverthe- less genuine philosophical issues. This feature alone, I feel, would justify calling such activities philosophical in character.

Conclusion What we have seen is nothing more than an ordinary group

of people (in this case students) attempting to think their way through an issue that has significance for them. There are many

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 67 implications that follow from such an activity that are worthy of note (most of which are not discussed here). But there are three particular features especially noteworthy for philosophy- and all it stands for.

We have seen, for example, that participation in such an activity provides one with a perfect opportunity to develop those very skills required to make the activity successful. We have seen how this can help students master those skills of analysis, clarification, argumentation, and basic clear thinking without which they could never think their way through anything. We discovered furthermore, that these are precisely the skills re- quired of philosophers themselves.

But the far more important features of this social activity were those called “philosophical commitment” and “philosophi- cal issues”. We saw that the very nature of such an activity required certain philosophical commitments of its participants. And these are exactly the same commitments required of philosophers. But since few (if any) of these students will become philosophers, it is even more important to note that these commitments are also just the ones required of anyone engaged in any rational inquiry into any problem-whatever its nature. Hence we arrive at the extremely important realization that such activity helps the student to develop that outlook, attitude, which he must have if he is to ever “think his way through” anything whatever.

Finally-and this is the most important point for philosophy- we saw that the students began by talking about a practical, everyday kind of decision but ended by considering hard core philosophical issues-and this happened all in the natural course of the discussion. That is, merely by the serious, sustained pur- suit of some understanding of this practical issue, the students found themselves-not led by me-unavoidably confronting real, substantive philosophical problems. They will hopefully learn from this that “philosophy” is neither something that is “grafted on” by philosophers nor is it a luxury which can be ignored or omitted by all others. Rather, philosophy is essentially and inherently a part of the overall picture, and can be ignored only at the price of a superficial, shallow investigation. They will hopefully see that even in consideration of everyday, concrete, practical concerns, they are irresistably driven to consider the philosophical substratum which underlies it all; and thus see that there is this philosophical dimension to even the most practical of problems.

68 CLYDE EVANS

I believe that it is this necessary link-between the practical, everyday kinds of things we see and do, and philosophical “musings”-that is both the glory and the hope of philosophy. There will probably always be some who enjoy philosophical inquiry simply for its own sake and are drawn to it for that reason alone (“philosophy is its own reward”). But most, I think, will come to philosophy (if a t all) because they discover it is necessary to do so in order to answer some of the questions that arise in their everyday normal existence.

I am such a person. I did not begin by seeking philosophy; I was driven to philosophy. I wanted to understand certain things; I wanted to make sense out of what I saw; I wanted to think my way through certain issues. And I discovered time and time again that I needed philosophy and was driven to consider philosophy in order to achieve my goals. To be sure, the ques- tions that prompted my journey were not related to the price of admission to the carnival. But they were questions that arose from the diverse circumstances and observations of my par- ticular life (as perceived by me); questions like: What makes the world tick? i.e., why does the physical world work the way it does? Why do some people suffer in poverty while others do not? Why is our society structured the way it is? Why is there a law against this and not against that? Why do schools teach this particular subject, and why do they teach it in this way? Just what is it that schools are trying to accomplish in the first place? How can we tell if a given statement or-claim is just superstitious nonsense? etc. It was questions like these that led me inevitably into the realm of philosophy.

1 would like to see phiIosophy again thought of as “everyman’s business”, and not just the preserve of a privileged few. I would like to see it again known that even the ordinary person can engage in philosophy-even if only a t a very rudimentary level. At any rate, he cannot avoid doing so-whether he realizes he is doing so or not. If this could happen then philosophy could lose its image as the esoteric pastime of a few erudite minds. It could again be seen as something that has relevance for any- one, as something that has significance for ordinary people living ordinary lives. Then we could begin to direct our energies to finding ways to let philosophy enrich those lives-whether the lives of nine-year-olds trying to decide whether or not to “rip off’ the carnival, or the lives of ninety-year-olds trying to cope with the problems of aging, “uselessness”, leisure, and

PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN 69 loneliness. Philosophy cannot turn lead into gold, or water into wine. But it can help to bring more meaning into the lives of those who pursue and embrace it. I want to help make that happen.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT BOSTON