Philosophy of Science - University of Edinburgh fileHave a grasp of fundamental issues in the philosophy of philosophy of science, e.g. the problem of induction, falsificationism,

Epistemology, Ethics and Mind Online MSc./PGDipl/PGCert.

SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES


Philosophy of Science ONLINE MSC./PGDIPL./PGCERT.

Eduardo Paolozzi, Isaac Newton (after William Blake), Dean Gallery Edinburgh [image from Wikipedia commons]

COURSE ORGANISER

DR JAMES COLLIN



COURSE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES This course aims to introduce you to a number of perennially-interesting and enduringly relevant issues from the philosophy of science. No previous scientific, philosophical or logical expertise is required and any technical / unfamiliar terms will be defined as we go. Along the way, we’ll be considering key questions like the following:

• What is the problem of induction, chiefly associated with Hume? • Does the problem of induction present a challenge to scientific rationality? • What is Popper’s falsificationism all about? • Did Popper solve the problem of induction and thereby provide a successful theory of scientific

method? • What is scientific explanation? Which accounts of explanation are best? • What is distinctive about explanations in the biological sciences? • What is scientific measurement? Which accounts of measurement are best? • How should we conceive of probability? What is Bayes’ Theorem and what can it tell us about the

confirmation of theories? • What are scientific realism and scientific anti-realism? What arguments can be made for or against

realist and anti-realist views of science?

INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES By the end of this course, students should:

• Have a grasp of fundamental issues in the philosophy of philosophy of science, e.g. the problem of induction, falsificationism, theories of explanation, Bayesianism and probability, scientific realism and anti-realism.

• Be able to critically analyse and engage with literature by key philosophers in this field. • Understand how empirical and scientific work can support philosophical arguments, and be able to

use data derived therefrom in their essays and arguments. • Be able to present arguments clearly and concisely both within a classroom context and in a 2,500

word essay. • Gain transferable skills in research, analysis and argumentation



SYLLABUS

Area Week Topic Seminar Assessed Discussion Post

Introduction, Induction &

Falsification (AR)

1 A philosophical primer

2 Problem of induction

3 Popper and falsification Due 3rd February

Explanation (SL) 4 Confirmation

5 Bayesianism Due 17th February

Models & Measurement (AI)

7 Models

8 Measurement Due 10th March

Confirmation & Bayesianism (WS)

9 Deductive-nomological explanation

10 Biological explanations

Realism & Anti-realism (AR)

11 Realism

12 Anti-realism Due 7th April

Week 1: A philosophical primer – Alistair Richmond (AR) This seminar simply aims to furnish you with the all the philosophical technicalities that this course will require – introducing you to some key epistemological and logical terms.

Required Reading • Duncan Pritchard, What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?, Ch. 1-3. • E. L. Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, 23, 1963, 121-3. • Jonathan Vogel, ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’, The Journal of

Philosophy 87, 1990: 658-666.

Secondary Reading • Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Ch. 1-3. • Alvin I. Goldman, ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1967: 357-372.



Week 2: The problem of induction (AR) Some of the earliest–known systematic philosophies of science (e.g. that of Francis Bacon) depicted science as trying to establish conjectures through the use of induction. However, David Hume mounted a devastating attack on any non-circular justification of induction and this is often seen as a challenge to the rationality of the whole scientific enterprise. But what did Hume say about induction and what does his account reveal about the rationality of scientific practice?

Required Reading • James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 2. • David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,

(many editions but see e.g. that edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975), Sections IV, VI, VII and X.

• Stephen Buckle, 'Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 2001: 1-31.

Secondary Reading • Gilbert Harman, ‘Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation’, The Journal of

Philosophy, 65(18), 1968: 529–522. • Carl G. Hempel, ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, Mind, 54 (213), 1945: 1–26 and 54 (214),

1945: 97–121. • Patrick Maher, ‘The Hole in the Ground of Induction’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(3),

1996: 423–432. • John Vickers, ‘The Problem of Induction’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition),

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/induction-problem/

Week 3: Popper and falsification (AR) According to Karl Popper, science is not undermined by Hume’s problem, because science is not in the business of trying to prove conjectures true using induction at all. Instead science is in the business of proposing conjectures and trying to falsify them deductively. But is Popper’s falsificationist methodology a truly non-inductive alternative method for science?

Required Reading • James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 3. • Sir Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (5th edition, 1989), Ch. 1 and 3. • Sir Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (1992 edition), Ch. 1, 3 and 4. • Adolf Grünbaum, ‘Is the Method of Bold Conjectures and Attempted Refutations Justifiably the

Method of Science?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27, 1976: 105–136.

Secondary Reading • Adolf Grünbaum, ‘Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory pseudoscientific by Karl Popper's criterion of

demarcation?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 1979: 131–141. • K. K. Lee, ‘Popper’s Falsifiability and Darwin’s Natural Selection’, Philosophy, 44, 1969: 291-302. • Deborah G. Mayo, ‘Ducks, rabbits and normal science: Recasting the Kuhn's-eye view of Popper's

demarcation of science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 1996: 271–290.



Week 4: Paradoxes of Confirmation – Wolfgang Schwartz (WS) Scientific theories generally can’t be proved by experiment and observation. Nonetheless, some theories are well-confirmed by the evidence while others are not. What makes the difference? What does it take for a theory to be confirmed by evidence? In this session, we will look at some puzzles and paradoxes raised by the concept of confirmation and discuss how a probabilistic analysis seems to circumvent these problems.

Required Reading: • Michael Strevens (2012), Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory,

http://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf# chapters 1-8 Note: This is a long text, but it will be the main reading for both this session and the next one. You may also skip all the boxes as well as section 6.3.

Secondary Readings: • Carl Hempel (1945), “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I)”, Mind 54, pp.1-26 • John Earman and Wesley Salmon (1992), “The confirmation of scientific hypotheses”, ch.2 in their

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall

Week 5: Bayesian Confirmation Theory (WS) A probabilistic approach to confirmation looks promising, but it leads to another question: what is probability? The probabilities in question do not seem to be statistical probabilities or relative frequencies. According to (classical, “subjective”) Bayesian Confirmation Theory, the probabilities are subjective degrees of belief. We will have a closer look at this idea.

Required Reading: • Michael Strevens (2012), Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory,

http://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf# chapters 1-8

Secondary Readings: • Rudolf Carnap (1955), “Statistical and inductive probability”, reprinted in Antony Eagle (ed.),

Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 2010 • Patrick Maher (1996), “Subjective and Objective Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science 63, pp.149-174 • Branden Fitelson (2007): “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation”, Synthese 156,

pp.473-489

Week 6: Flexible Learning Week No lectures/readings.



Week 7: Models and Modeling – Alistair Isaac (AI) Many areas of science are driven by the practice of modeling, constructing idealized representations of the world for study. But how can we learn about one thing (the world) by looking at something else (a model)? This question has driven a recent surge of interest in modeling in philosophy of science.

Required Reading • Weisberg, M. (2007) “Who is a Modeler?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58 (2):207-

233. • Knuuttila, T. (2011) “Modeling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based

Representation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42: 262-271.

Secondary Reading • Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006) “The Strategy of Model-Based Science” Biology and Philosophy 21(5):725-

740. • Isaac, A. (2013) “Modeling without Representation” Synthese 190(16):3611-3623. • Levins, R. (1966) “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology” American Scientist 54(4):

421-431. • Morrison, M., & Morgan, M. (eds.) (1999) Models as Mediators. • Parker, W. (2011) “When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions”,

Philosophy of Science 78(4):579-600. • Potochnik, A. (2012) “Feminist Implications of Model-Based Science”, Studies in History and

Philosophy of Science 43: 383-389. • Weisberg, M. (2007) “Three Kinds of Idealization” Journal of Philosophy 104(12):639-659. • Weisberg, M. (2013) Similarity and Simulation. • Weisberg, Okasha, and Mäki (Eds) (2011) Biology and Philosophy 26(5) - special issue on Modeling

in Biology and Economics

Week 8: Measurement (and More Models) (AI) Scientific theories receive evidential support from the world through measurement, yet measurement has only very recently become a major topic in philosophy of science. Philosophical questions about measurement include: What do we assume about the world when we represent it with numbers? and When are concepts defined in terms of measurement outcomes meaningful? Recent interest in measurement has focused on the role of models in calibrating measurement devices, raising new epistemic challenges for the activity of modeling in science.

Required Reading • Tal, E. (2013) “Old and New Problems in Philosophy of Measurement”, Philosophy Compass 8(12):

1159-1173. • Morrison, M. (2009) “Models, Measurement and Computer Simulation: The Changing Face of

Experimentation”, Philosophical Studies 143: 33-57.

Secondary Reading • Chang, H. (2004) Inventing Temperature.



• Domotor, Z., & Batitsky, V. (2008) “The Analytic Versus Representational Theory of Measurement: A Philosophy of Science Perspective” Measurement Science Review 8 (6):129-146.

• van Fraassen, B. (2012) “Modeling and Measurement: The Criterion of Empirical Grounding”, Philosophy of Science 79 (5):773-784.

• Helmholtz, H. (1887) Counting and Measuring. • Mari, L. (2005) “The Problem of Foundations of Measurement”, Measurement 38 (4):259-266. • Tal, E. (2012) The Epistemology of Measurement: A Model-Based Account. Dissertation, University

of Toronto. • Tal, E. (forthcoming) “Making Time: A Study in the Epistemology of Measurement” British Journal

for the Philosophy of Science. • Teller, P. (2013) “The Concept of Measurement-Precision” Synthese 190 (2):189-202.

Week 9: Explanation (1) – Suilin Lavelle (SL) This seminar examines the role of explanation in Philosophy of Science. We will look briefly at the history of explanation, in particular the Deductive-Nomological model and Inductive-Statistical models, before thinking more carefully about the pragmatics of explanation. We will also consider the relation between Explanation and other areas of Philosophy of Science, especially Scientific Realism.

Required Reading • Lipton, P. (2001). ‘What Good is an Explanation?’, in G. Hon & S. Rackover (eds.), Explanation:

Theoretical Approaches, Kluwer, 2001, 43-59. Reprinted in J. Cornwell (ed.) Understanding Explanation, Oxford University Press, 2004, 1-22.

Secondary Reading • Hempel, C. “Two basic types of scientific explanation” in Curd and Cover , pp. 685-94. • Hempel, C. “The thesis of structural identity” in Curd and Cover pp. 695-705. • Hempel, C. “Inductive-statistical explanation” in Curd and Cover pp. 706-16. • Lipton, P. (1991/2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. (2nd Ed). (Chapter 8) Routledge. • Lipton, P. (2000). Inference to the best explanation. In W.H. Newton (Ed). A Companion to the

Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. 184 – 193. Available as an E-resource via the library website, and as a PDF on LEARN.

• Railton, P. “A deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation”, in Curd and Cover pp. 746-764.

• Lipton, P. (1990). “Contrastive Explanation”, in D. Knowles, (Ed.) Explanation and its Limits Cambridge University Press. Pp.247-66. Reprinted in D.H.Ruben (Ed.) Explanation. Oxford University Press, pp. 207 – 227.

• Psillos, S. (2002). Causation and Explanation. (Chapter 8.) Acumen.

Week 10: Explanation (2) (SL) This session examines a specific kind of explanation, namely, explanations in the biological sciences. In particular, we will look at the role of evolution in our explanations for features of organisms, and at the problems and advantages of attributing ‘traits’ to organisms that can be explained by appeal to natural selection.



Required Reading • Godfrey-Smith, P. (1998). Functions: consensus without unity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74,

196 – 208

Secondary Reading • Ariew, R. Cummins & M. Perlman (Eds) (2002) Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of

Psychology and Biology. [Maybe not so new now but many useful essays in this volume] OUP. • Buller, D. (1998). Etiological theories of function. Biology and Philosophy, 13 505 – 527. • Cummins, R. (1975). Functional Analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72 741 - 764 • Millikan, R. (1989). In defence of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56, 288 - 302 • Sober, E. (2000). Philosophy of Biology (2nd Ed.) Westview. Ch.3, sec.7 • Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139 - 168

Week 11: Realism and Anti-Realism (1) (AR) An enduring debate concerns the aims of science and their relation to truth. According to scientific realism, science aims to give us true descriptions of the unobservable as well as the observable world. Scientific anti-realism on the other hand stresses other goals for science besides truth, e.g. predictive success or empirical adequacy. This session looks at arguments for scientific realism, including the classic ‘No miracles’ argument.

Required Reading • James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 5. • Anjan Chakravartty, ‘Scientific Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/scientific-realism/

• Peter Lipton, ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93, 1993: 89–104. • Hilary Putnam, ‘Three Kinds of Scientific Realism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 1982: 195–200.

Secondary Reading • T. D. Lyons, ‘Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory’, Philosophy of Science, 70, 2003: 891–

901. • J. J. C. Smart, 'Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences', Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 1985,

272-80.

Week 12: Realism and Anti-Realism (2) (AR) This session considers arguments for anti-realism about science, focussing on Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism as an example of a non-positivist anti-realist theory.

Required Reading • Bas van Fraassen, “Constructive Empiricism Now”, Philosophical Studies, 106, 2001: 151–170. • Bas van Fraassen, ‘Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism’, The Scientific Image, (Oxford,

Clarendon Press, 1980): 6-21, 23-35 and 31-40; reprinted in Curd & Cover (edd.). • James Ladyman, “What's Really Wrong With Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the

Metaphysics of Modality”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, 2000: 837–856.



Secondary Reading • Jeff Foss, ‘On Accepting van Fraassen’s Image of Science’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51, 1984: 79-

92. • Grover Maxwell, ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’, as in Curd & Cover (edd.). • Alasdair Richmond, ‘Between Abduction and the Deep Blue Sea’, Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 1999,

86-91.

RESOURCES Please ensure you have completed the library induction tutorial. Should you have any problems accessing any of the materials for the course, please contact the course librarian Mrs. Anne Donnelly in the first instance or me (Dr. Collin).

Reference lists Please note: when putting together bibliographies for essays, it would be greatly appreciated if you didn’t simply copy-and-paste from the above lists of readings – the lists of readings here have been put together from a wide range of sources by several different authors and the occasional difference in formatting may well have resulted. So do strive to consistency in referencing even if is it not entirely achieved herein. (“Do as I say, not as I do” is the gist, and you can also feel that you are better than me …)

OFFICE HOURS My office hours will be Mondays 3 – 5 pm and Thursdays 1 – 3 pm Edinburgh time (i.e. G.M.T.). Office hours are a good (but I stress not the only) time for you to come and discuss ideas for your essays. Please don’t think you need have a ‘problem’ or a worry in order to come to my office hours; I am always more than willing to use this time to chat through any thoughts you may be having about topics covered in the course, or topics for your essays. If you are unable to meet with me during office hours, please send me an email and we can arrange an alternative time.

ASSESSMENT This course has two components of assessment:

• 2,500 word essay due Tuesday 23rd April 2017 by 12 noon G.M.T. This is 85% of your mark for this course.

• 4 x discussion posts (see below). This is 15% of your mark for this course.

You will also have the opportunity to submit a formative essay, prior to your assessed paper. For more details regarding the formative essay and general advice for writing please see the Programme Handbook.

Assessed discussion posts Discussion boards are there to help you. In our on-campus courses, student feedback has been very positive about these groups, with students saying that they found the discussions helpful.



Your participation in the discussion group will count for 15% of your grade for the course. You earn your participation grade by posting a comment on the week’s reading in the forum. The comment can be in the form of a question about the reading, asking for a clarification (with an explanation of why you are confused), or responding to a comment from another student. The graduate instructors and lecturers will check the boards daily and, where appropriate, respond to the comments. You are expected to post at least once in the week; there is no upper limit on the number of posts you can contribute in a week. Discussion boards of this kind will be used in weeks 3,5,8,12). You will therefore not be assessed every week. In the other weeks (e.g. weeks 1,2,4,7,9,10,11) discussion will take place synchronously, with the whole group and lecturer taking part in a 2 hour live seminar. Participation in the live seminar is not assessed. Details of the marking criteria for discussion board posts are available on the course Learn page. Posts must be online by 5 pm Edinburgh time of the deadline (see table above). Late posts will be counted as a failure to participate.

Penalties for failure to participate A student may miss one discussion session during the semester without penalty. However, if a student fails to post for 2 or more sessions, automatic penalties will start. A student will be deducted 5% from their participation grade for each week they miss. So missing 1 week incurs no penalty, missing 2 weeks incurs a penalty of 5%, missing 3 weeks incurs a penalty of 10%, and so on. If a student has a good reason why they have been unable to post to the forum (e.g. serious illness), they can contact their Personal Tutor to apply for Special Circumstances.

Where to post You should post the contribution you wish to be assessed in the weekly discussion forum marked ‘Debate’. If you want to post something which you don’t want to be assessed, e.g. a straightforward clarification request, then you should start a new forum outside of the ‘Debate’ forum.

Facilitating the discussion Be respectful towards the other members of the group. We all know that things we say in emails can sometimes come across as more critical than we intend them to be. You’re all nice people, so just double check your posts before you make them public to make sure nothing can be misinterpreted.

Start a new discussion thread for each week to keep your discussions organised. Don’t be afraid of saying that you don’t understand an aspect of the paper. The marking scheme is designed to reward thoughtful contributions, and not to punish misunderstandings! As you can see in the examples below, there are ways of expressing your confusion which demonstrate that you have thought about the paper and have tried to understand it.

Read the previous posts carefully! It doesn’t take long, and it will improve the discussion significantly.

The following examples are adapted from / an homage to examples from a course-guide written by my generous colleague, Dr. Suilin Lavelle – to whom many thanks:

Ex ample 1: A good discussion Topic: Eliminative materialism



Asha: I read the Churchland article ‘Eliminating the propositional attitudes’. His main point is that although we talk about people having beliefs and desires when we actually look at how the brain works we are not going to find anything like beliefs and desires actually causing our behaviour. He says that we should ‘eliminate’ talking about beliefs and desires, in favour of more accurate neurological explanations. So instead of saying ‘Bob went to the bar because he wanted a drink’ we should say that ‘Bob went to the bar because neurons X,Y,Z were firing’. I think that Churchland has a point about beliefs and desires not being realised exactly in the brain, but I don’t think I understand why he is so keen that we should not use this terminology anymore. Can anyone help on this?

Bob: Thanks for the helpful summary Asha! As far as I can tell, Churchland wants to eliminate talk about beliefs and desires because it is totally false. They do not map onto anything in the brain. As a scientific realist, Churchland thinks that our terms should map on to things in the world, and because beliefs and desires don’t map onto anything we should not use it any more. It is a redundant theory.

Is he right to think this? I don’t know. I think that he is probably right that beliefs and desires as we conceive of them aren’t going to exactly realised in neuorological structures. But maybe there are states which are pretty close to beliefs and desires as we use them, and let’s face it, belief- and desire-talk gets us a long way. So I think maybe we should keep them.

Cora: I was a bit confused about the argument Churchland uses from animals. He seems to be saying that just because animals can’t grasp beliefs and desires then they don’t exist. But I don’t see why the existence of beliefs and desires should rely on animals grasping them. Did anyone else find this confusing? Or have I totally misunderstood the argument?

Asha: I was confused by that too. It just doesn’t seem to be a very sensible argument. We’ve seen lots of evidence of animals predicting what others will do in a way that looks like they can attribute some kind of thought to each other. It does seem to be an odd argument to throw in there. I was more persuaded by his points about reducing qualia to brain processes…[etc]

What makes this a good discussion The participants have clearly read each other’s posts and are responding to specific points in them. Cora doesn’t understand an argument. She has given her interpretation of the argument (ok, it’s a bit short!) and why she doesn’t think it works. This opens up a new discussion. Bob responds to a question Asha poses, and does so in a respectful and friendly way. He shows that he has done a bit of the supplementary reading, and uses it to address some of Asha’s concerns.

Ex ample 2: A p o or discussion Arnold: I didn’t understand what Churchland says. Did anyone else find this reading weird?

Dave: I think the point is that we shouldn’t talk about beliefs and desires any more. That doesn’t make any sense though, because we’re not suddenly going to know lots about neuroscience.

Cat: Did anyone get the qualia argument? I didn’t.

Arnold: I just don’t think any of the paper makes any sense.

Kris: Churchland totally underestimates what animals can do. My dog used to know when it was time for me to come home from school because he sat at the door at 4pm to wait for me, even when I went to uni. That shows my dog is able to have beliefs. I don’t really see why he thinks animals can’t have beliefs.



What makes this a bad discussion When participants don’t understand the paper, they don’t specify what it is that they do not understand. None of the comments demonstrate that the participants have read each other’s posts. The comment about the dog is not obviously relevant, and the participant makes no attempt to show how it relates to the paper being discussed.

Documents

Philosophy of Science - University of Edinburgh fileHave a grasp of fundamental issues in the philosophy of philosophy of science, e.g. the problem of induction, falsificationism,