1 INTRODUCTION

Among the many novelties in the history of ideas that emerged in the seventeenth century, a widespread concern with language planning be­longs to the most conspicuous ones. The history of linguistic ideas had known extended episodes of intensive language study before that pe­riod, but it had never been usual for scholars to be engaged in the con­struction of artificial writing systems or the invention of fully-fledged universal and philosophical languages. In the seventeenth century, a large number of proposals and schemes appeared, which were all meant to provide a universal means of communication, and most of which were supposed to be suited to the tasks normally performed by means of natural languages. Indeed, it was often claimed that the artificial systems greatly improved on existing languages, not only for the purpose of communication, but also for accurate representation of knowledge. There werc even some who believed that an artificial lan­guage could be a miraculous instrument for thinking, which would ad­vance scientific knowledge with otherwise impossible and incredible speed.

The proposed schemes were diverse in several respects. Firstly, they ranged from tentative proposals and rudimentary sketches to completely developed artificial language schemes comprising a diction­ary and a grammar. Secondly, the aims of the various projects differed in that some were merely intended to overcome language barriers, while others were directed towards more ambitious scientific and phi­losophical goals. Thirdly, the methods used varied from numbering words in a dictionary to the construction of artificial words on the basis of sophisticated phonetic principles. A similar diversity charac­terized the social and scholarly status of the language planners. Some of them were unconnected with influential political or scientific cir­cles, and sometimes the inventors hoped to make their fortune out of their schemes. Others belonged to leading groups of scholars, and several of the men who are still famous for their contributions to science and philosophy, such as Newton and Leibniz, occupied them­selves with artificial language projects. Further, such activities were not confined to a particular country, as projects of this kind were pursued in France, Italy and Germany as well as in England. Neither were specific religious beliefs or clerical affiliations typical for the propo-

J. Maat, Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno,Wilkins, Leibniz

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

2 INTRODUCTION

nents of these schemes, as there were Catholic priests, Protestant reformers, as well as members of the Anglican clergy among them.

In the twentieth century, historians have studied these seven­teenth-century linguistic projects from various perspectives. When Couturat & Leau investigated the history of universal language schemes in 1903, this was done within the context of a heated debate on the choice between diverse universal languages, each of which had been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of language diversity. The seventeenth-century schemes thus came to be viewed as the first in a long list of fruitless attempts to create, or to restore, linguistic unity among the nations of the world. Couturat was also the historian who influentially drew attention to Leibniz's writings on the construction of a philosophical language, meant to be a logical and scientific tool.

Subsequent scholarship has rarely combined these two lines of in­vestigation. Most of the literature either focused on Leibniz, treating other plans, if at all, as a footnote to what he had to say on the sub­ject, or concentrated on one or other aspect of the schemes made by others, while disregarding Leibniz. Thus a number of logicians writing in the first half of the twentieth century tended to portray Leibniz's linguistic scheme as a unique achievement in the context of his time, while historians of science and linguistics occasionally published studies which were exclusively concerned with projects carried out in England. In a classic article, Cohen (1954) pointed out that thc project of a 'universal character' was by no means unique for Leibniz, and that in fact it was an intellectual commonplace in seventeenth-century West­ern Europe. Although this fact is now generally acknowledged, the more recent literature on the subject is still largely divided into Leib­niz-oriented studies on the one hand, and treatments of what is often called the universal language movement on the other hand.

In the latter type of literature, it has long been acknowledged that the construction of a universal means of communication was just one of many goals pursued by proponents of universal language schemes. A concomitant aim was precisely what made these schemes much more interesting than mere early versions of Esperanto-like projects. This was the endeavour to create a language that was not only more regular and easier to learn than existing ones, but also better suited to the unambiguous expression of thought and the accurate description of things. This latter aspect is clearest in two works that appeared in the 1660s in England, and it is on these projects, and the context in which they appeared, that most of the relevant literature is focused. These works are Dalgarno's Ars Signorum (1661), and Wil­kins's Essay concerning a Real Character, and a Philosophical Lan­guage (1668). In the last decades, a large number of studies have been devoted to the contents as well as the historical context of these

INTRODUCTION 3

works, among which are several book-length treatments (e.g. Salmon 1972, Knowlson 1975, Slaughter 1982, Strasser 1988, Hiillen 1989, Stillman 1995). Many, though not all, of these studies have argued, or rather simply assumed, that Wilkins's work constitutes the summit of the seventeenth-century universal language movement, while evaluat­ing Dalgarno's work as a minor contribution towards essentially the same goal.

In dealing with the work of Dalgarno, Wilkins and Leibniz re­spectively, this book differs from most of the existing literature with respect to the following points.

To begin with, it treats both the projects carried out in England and Leibniz's grand but uncompleted scheme from a single perspective, attempting to provide the material needed for a sound judgement of the similarities and the differences between the various projects in­volved. In discussing Leibniz, more than usual attention is paid to his acquaintance with the English schemes, and to the use he made of the work of both Dalgarno and Wilkins in working on the execution of his own plan. Though this account relies on published sources for the most part, some minor details are illustrated by unpublished material pre­served in the Leibniz Archiv in Hanover. The specific focus on con­nections with Wilkins and Dalgarno has led to the discovery that a few recently published Leibnizian manuscripts should be interpreted in the light of such connections. This discovery bears on wider methodologi­cal issues concerning research on Leibniz (cf. 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 below).

Further, this study treats Dalgarno's and Wilkins's artificial lan­guages as the result of two quite distinct, and indeed in some respects antagonistic, approaches. Although a comparison of their works is quite a sufficient basis to establish this too often neglected point, the argument profits greatly from an autobiographical manuscript by Dalgarno, which has only recently been published for the first time (Cram & Maat 2001: 351-390). The manuscript contains many illu­minating details concerning Dalgarno's debate with Wilkins on the proper foundation of a philosophical language (cf. 3.1 below).

A third respect in which the present treatment differs from pre­vious ones is that full recognition is given to the fact that the logical tradition, especially the theory of categories, was of central impor­tance in the development of each of the three schemes under discus-slOn.

A fourth difference with other literature concerns seventeenth­century views on the relationship between spoken and written lan­guage. The significance of these views, especially for the way in which the English schemes took shape, receives more emphasis than usual.

With the exception of the first, the points just mentioned were no preconceived starting points, but emerged as unexpected results of a

4 INTRODUCTION

specific methodological approach. This approach itself was not delib­erately chosen from the start of the investigations either, but pre­sented itself in the course of them as the most viable one. It consists in concentrating first and foremost on the internal features of the schemes and on what their authors tell us about them. In principle, the authors are taken at their word, unless some inconsistency or the existence of other evidence calls for reinterpretation. Only secondar­ily, when background information appears to be required, are other sources taken into account. Thus the discussion in the following pages is primarily based upon close reading of the relevant works, and only secondarily on external sources which relate to them. In other words, rather than examining the works under discussion from the perspective of the context from which they are supposed to have originated, the context, if discussed at all, is explored from the perspective of what these works appear to reveal about it.

Trivial as this starting point may perhaps seem, it appeared that a detailed analysis of what was actually achieved by Dalgarno, Wilkins and Leibniz might usefully supplement existing literature. Much has been written on the broader historical context within which they were operating, and much effort has been put in investigating why they un­dertook their projects. Our understanding of these issues has greatly advanced over the last decades. However, the focus on the whys and wherefores, and the wish to establish links with sociological and politi­cal circumstances has sometimes turned out rather unfortunate.

In the first place, historians have not un frequently portrayed these linguistic schemes as belonging to enterprises their authors ex­plicitly denounced as impossible. For example, Wilkins's close associa­tion with the Royal Society has led historians to assume much too easily that the language he created was meant to express and reflect the scientific views and social codes cherished within that circle. For this assumption ignores, among other things, Wilkins's explicit state­ment that contemporary scientific theory was unfit to be used as a basis for his artificial names (cf. 4.3.11 below).

In the second place, the significance of these schemes transcends the purely historical. One of the fascinating characteristics of the seventeenth-century agenda was the willingness of its proponents to move beyond sweeping proposals and to engage in practical work. In order to implement their schemes, they had to grapple with intellec­tual problems that have exercised scholars throughout the ages, and which are far from being solved today. At least in the case of Dalgarno and Wilkins, these efforts led to results that can be fruitfully examined and evaluated, regardless of the historical context in which they came into being. Although Leibniz did not produce definitive results, a simi­lar remark applies to his work as well. For he did a lot of practical

INTRODUCTION 5

work directed towards the realization of his goals. Unlike his pro­grammatic writings, this work has not received much attention so far.

The approach adopted here, concentrating on the workings of these schemes and on the details of the choices and decisions made by their authors, thus aims to contribute both to a more accurate histori­cal picture and to a more systematic investigation which poses general linguistic and philosophical questions. At the same time, the method followed has brought some obvious limitations with it. A great number of sources, influences, motives and historical connections known to be relevant for the subject treated in this book have been largely or com­pletely disregarded. These limitations are perhaps clearest in chapter 2, which provides a brief summary of some of the essential elements of the intellectual background. A much better treatment is to be found in most of the works mentioned (especially Salmon 1972). A further limitation is that the treatment of many of Leibniz's ideas had to be cursory, and only a minor part of the vast secondary literature on Leibniz could be taken into account. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with Dalgamo, Wilkins, and Leibniz respectively. Chapter 6 presents a few concluding remarks.