6

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Dalgarno and Wilkins

As the only two philosophical languages to be completed in the seven­teenth century are the outcome of an initially collaborative project, it is quite understandable that they bear a number of obvious resem­blances. As has been argued, an exclusive focus on similarities between the two schemes is however likely to obfuscate a clear picture of the debate on universal language carried on in the period. Now that both languages have been described in some detail, some differences and similarities may be summed up.

As far as objectives are concerned, it is clear that Dalgarno and Wilkins were both concerned to create a language which surpasses in­stituted ones, in being more rationally organized, and free from irregu­larities, redundancies, and ambiguities. However, they were also acutely aware that a perfect language is unattainable, and consequently they both set their goals much lower, convinced as they were that a lan­guage constructed according to 'rules of art', though necessarily imper­fect, is still much to be preferred to existing lang~ages. Further, they were both very much focused on word meaning in assessing defects and merits of languages as well as in constructing their own languages. Fur­thermore, in accomplishing their goal they both drew extensively on logic, that is, on the segment of the logical tradition that is primarily relevant to lexical meaning.

But in spite of these common characteristics, the general ap­proaches of Dalgarno and Wilkins diverge in opposite directions. Dal­garno's analytical approach is aimed, in principle, at making the struc­ture of speech correspond to what results from conceptual analysis 0 f thought, each simple element of thought being designated by a radical word, and all complex parts being designated by corresponding com­posite expressions. The foremost objective of Wilkins's encyclopedic approach is to establish a correspondence between language and things, such that the set of words is mapped one-to-one onto the set of kinds of things. The lexicon of radical words, which encode descriptive in­formation on their referents, thus provides an annotated inventory of the most important types of objects to be found in the world. Accord-

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ingly, in describing the features of a philosophical language Dalgarno emphasizes logicality and rationality, whereas Wilkins stresses accu­racy and comprehensiveness. Although both authors state that what is to be primarily designated are things of a 'simple' nature, they under­stand quite different things by this, Dalgarno meaning unanalyzable, primitive ideas, Wilkins thinking of distinct types of objects (cf. Slaughter 1982: 173). The disparity between the two approaches ap­pears quite clearly from the consequent evaluations of compound ex­pressions, which are favoured by Dalgarno as the summit of logicality, but avoided or else regulated as much as possible by Wilkins. Further, whereas the latter regarded the classificatory tables forming the basis of the lexicon of his language as an important achievement in their own right, Dalgarno never gave up his misgivings regarding the classifi­catory method, stating that it is impossible to establish a universally acceptable arrangement, and emphasizing that the method is unsuitable to provide the foundation for a practicable language.

Neither of the two authors pursued their principles consistently. Both Dalgarno and Wilkins compromised between their own ideal of a philosophical language on the one hand and the requirements of prac­ticability and learnability on the other hand. This caused them both to move toward a common centre, so that the actual differences between their languages are much smaller than they would have been if they each had stuck to their theoretical starting points. Yet the actual dif­ferences are still considerable.

Regarding the lexicon, one of the most conspicuous differences concerns the number of radical words, Dalgarno' s language containing about 1,000, Wilkins's consisting of more than 4,000. In general, the meanings Dalgarno selected to be expressed by means of radical words, overlap with those picked by Wilkins, though there may be some ex­ceptions to this. Since Dalgarno's radical words are ultimately defined by means of Latin, and those of Wilkins by means of English equiva­lents, it is strictly speaking impossible to determine whether or not the overlap is complete. For instance, Dalgarno has a radical word meaning 'optare - to wish'. In Wilkins's language, 'to wish' does not occur as a radical word, but it is listed as one of the words that are synonymous, whether roughly or not, to 'to desire'. According to Wilkins's diction­ary, 'to wish' is consequently to be rendered as 'desire + active'. How­ever, since 'optare' may well be translated as 'to desire', it can hardly count as an instance in which the radical words of both languages do not cover the same ground.

Obviously, there are thousands of radical words in Wilkins's lan­guage which have no corresponding radicals in Dalgarno' s language. It is here that the difference in approach becomes manifest. For instance, almost all the words for species of animals, plants and stones which in

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 393

the previous chapter have been used to illustrate Dalgarno's use of compounds, such as the words meaning marble, gold, gourd, heron, ele­phant, etc. (cf. 3.4.5), are expressed by radical words in Wilkins's lan­guage.

Besides the two categories of words mentioned, that is, firstly, radical words meaning roughly the same in both languages and sec­ondly, radical words in Wilkins's language which are expressed by compound words in Dalgarno's, there is a very large category consist­ing of words that are compound in both languages. Whereas Dalgarno puts only unspecified semantic constraints on composition of radical words with others, Wilkins relied on a special class of 'transcendental' particles for coining compound expressions. The result, as has been argued (cf. 4.4.3), is very much the same in both cases, Dalgarno for example expressing 'glove' as 'garment hand', Wilkins as 'hand + vest' .

As far as the grammar is concerned, both languages are very dif­ferent in that Dalgarno's borrows a minimal amount of categories from Latin, although his principles prescribe the absence of any cate­gory whatsoever, while Wilkins's language contains an elaborate appa­ratus of derivations as well as equivalents to all of the traditional word classes.

Wilkins and Dalgarno, and Leibniz

Since Leibniz never succeeded in producing a language, no detailed comparison of a similar type can be made between his scheme and those of the others. It is however clear, that if Leibniz had been able to create an artificial language, the differences between his language and those of Dalgarno and Wilkins would have been much more substantial than the differences between their languages.

In stressing the great differences between his own plans and those of his precursors, Leibniz emphasized the communicational pur­poses of the other schemes. Perhaps he downplayed concomitant mo­tives underpinning Wilkins's, and especially Dalgarno's language a lit­tle too much in doing so. Nevertheless, it is clear that on the whole he was right in claiming that his aims were completely different from anything that had been tried by either Dalgarno or Wilkins. Leibniz studied their work more carefully than many historians writing after him did. He was thus able to perceive that in spite of claims concerning logicality or descriptive accuracy, both Dalgarno and Wilkins were primarily concerned with communication. His own preoccupation was with language as an instrument for thinking.

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Although the logical tradition was important for all three schemes, it was only Leibniz who perceived that its potential could be profitably used. The categories, for both Dalgarno and Wilkins, formed an almost obsolete theory to which they reluctantly resorted for want of anything better. Leibniz was concerned from the very start to re­form the categories, and with their role in more complex expressions. Unlike Dalgarno and Wilkins, he endeavoured to define an all­embracing notion of logical consequence and to use it as a basis for his language.

Finally, whereas both Dalgarno and Wilkins were aware that compromises between conflicting goals were necessary to achieve a practicable language, Leibniz unconditionally believed that a perfect language was possible. His underestimation of the problems involved and his failure to appreciate the diversity of linguistic practice perhaps helps explain why he never saw practical results. From a long-term perspective however, in the history of ideas the implementation of realistic projects has often proved to be less fruitful than the pursuit of impossible dreams.