Philosophers and Prophets – Faith and Sacrifice By Nelson Whiting

Introduction

This paper asks, and attempts to answer, the question of the extent of compatibility

between Soren Kierkegaard and Joseph Smith regarding the subjects of faith and sacrifice.

Kierkegaard, a Scandinavian existentialist philosopher of religion, Smith an American prophet of

the Judeo-Christian God, both saw these concepts of faith and sacrifice as an absolutely

necessary and highly important part of the existence of a true disciple of God. Indeed, the most

important. In describing their views and compatibility, we will find the answer as to what role

these subjects play and why they warrant such importance for these two thinkers.

The subject is faith and sacrifice, and the question is how closely these two philosophers

fall in compatibility on the subject. It is a tall order to address both faith and sacrifice, especially

with these two men, but I will attempt it. My claim is that they are highly compatible on this

subject. Faith and sacrifice will be more than superficially defined and explained in this paper in

context of these two thinker’s works. Without more rigorous definitions than the average reader

is familiar with, the subject matter will be misunderstood. The careful reader will find that these

views are particularly unique within Christianity and philosophy of religion. Both of these men

claimed that these subjects are important to all people everywhere, but I will limit my audience

to any sincere seeker of truth within the realm of the religious.

These two thinkers held differing views on other subjects which will not be addressed in

this paper but very briefly, if at all. They would likely agree that a discussion on anything other

than faith and sacrifice subjects would be an inferior discussion; to address their differing views

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with more than with brevity is needless to the objective of this paper. There is, then, a bit of a

wall that these two thinkers, when viewed together, must scale, which herein will only be

addressed very briefly. It has to do with philosophical and religious worldviews that are the

subject of fiery debates in every known age of history.

Some claim a melding of philosophical and religious worldviews is impossible. But,

despite all the supposed incompatibility of philosophy and religion, Kierkegaard, at least, shows

they are not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing in order to understand truth and our

existence in this world. He demonstrates such with his philosophical approach to understanding

faith and sacrifice, though he does not claim to be a philosopher. Smith, on the other hand, uses

divine revelation as his primary source of knowledge of faith and sacrifice. Yet these two men’s

views are compatible with each other and illuminating at least on the subjects of how faith and

sacrifice produce a person that can please the God of Abraham, and in Smith’s view, achieve

salvation. Each thinker claimed they performed an Abrahamic-level sacrifice. Both found the

sacrifice to be ethically unacceptable, or against the accepted norm. Both felt these sacrifices

were produced by and resulted in faith, would be of near-incomprehensible difficulty, and

absolutely necessary. Kierkegaard will be addressed first.

Kierkegaard’s Non-Philosophy Conundrum

One of Kierkegaard’s most notable aphorisms is:

What I really need is to get clear about what I must do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to find a purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die (Kierkegaard, 1).

As a Christian, this statement is the focus of the subject matter of all his writings. Why?

Because his writings were an attempt to help men find an idea for which they were willing to live

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and die. For Kierkegaard that was God. He needed to find a truth, an idea, for which he and he

alone understood the necessary sacrifice, not only for which to die, but to live. Knowledge alone

was not sufficient, but only insofar as it preceded his action in accordance with what God wills.

His deep concern for the welfare of his soul and the souls of his associates was highly important.

Though a God fearing man he did not believe the highest aspects of the universe and eternity

could be understood. Unlike the vast majority of Christians of his day, Kierkegaard did not like,

and deeply disagreed with, the organized religion of his day. He believed in direct, immediate

sacrifice for God and that organized religion stifled faith. He believed faith could not be taught

or forced into someone, though he did attempt to teach it conceptually, as will expounded on

shortly.

He gave an analysis of Christianity in his writings that criticized previous and

contemporary German idealists, such as Hegel, who proposed to systematize a Christian way of

life into a philosophy of human beings. Several of these idealists would go so far as to say

philosophy is higher than religion. Of himself he said, “The present author is by no means a

philosopher” (Silentio, 7). He said this not because philosophy is a dishonorable pursuit, but

because it too often neglects faith. In that regard, he said, “I by no means conclude that faith is

something inferior but rather that it is the highest, also that it is dishonest of philosophy to give

something else in its place and to disparage faith. Philosophy cannot and must not give faith”

(Silentio, 33). He did not want to be compared with philosophical systems that proposed to

understand the complex paradox of faith and true devotion to the Supreme Being. Of those

philosophers he said, “Even if someone were able to transpose the whole content of faith into

conceptual form, it does not follow that he has comprehended faith, comprehended how he

entered into it or how it entered into him” (Silentio, 7). Why must philosophy not give faith?

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Faith, to Kierkegaard, was above our ability to understand within the accepted systems of

philosophy.

His sacrifice, then, followed directly from his belief that he felt he needed a purpose

given him from God, which purpose he could live and die for. He spoke of a sacrifice of

Abrahamic magnitude. So we need to define the type of sacrifice discussed by these two

thinkers. This paper will not use the broad and well known definition of sacrifice: giving up

something for something else in return. Indeed, such a broad definition could be construed to

apply to any Christian hero. Sacrifice for God is, after all, a Christian theme. This is not just

some sacrifice required by Christians or the religious type that fits nicely into their set of beliefs,

or is merely a difficult moral obligation to carry out. No, the type of sacrifice addressed by

Kierkegaard and Smith, is a crushing sacrifice that actually challenges personal beliefs, and in

fact, must necessarily be contrary to previously-held beliefs of the one carrying out the sacrifice.

It is a sacrifice that only the experiencer can fully appreciate and from which faith can be

gleaned. The Latin roots of the word are also important to note: sacra and facere together mean

to make something sacred.

What was Kierkegaard’s sacrifice? He broke up with the love of his life and fiancé,

Regine Olsen. Beyond the fact that he thought this was what he loved most, and therefore what

God required of him, he did not believe he had the faith sufficient to give her what she deserved.

He would give up his greatest love to obtain the faith he desired. I add this event simply as a

quick illustration as to what Kierkegaard felt was his Abrahamic-level sacrifice (Kierkegaard,

intro). How did this meet his criteria of an Abrahamic-level sacrifice?

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He treated this breakup as a symbol of his undying devotion to, and faith in, God. He felt

it was Abrahamic-level because it was unexplainable to others, contradictory to reason, was

supposed to be produced by and result in faith, and was of near incomprehensible difficulty for

him personally. He knew it would be seen as folly and stupidity by those around him.

Intuitively, however, this act does not seem as serious as killing your own child, as Abraham of

old. But for Kierkegaard, it met the sacrifice criteria because it met his “paradox of faith”

condition which will be explained later. Six years later, Olsen married Schlegel, a contemporary

philosopher of Kierkegaard’s. Kierkegaard later regretted this decision, believing God had not

actually requested it of him, and the relationship stood as an essential part of the progression of

his writings (Kierkegaard, xi-xix).

It was almost, as Kierkegaard says of Abraham’s sacrifice, a teleological suspension of

the ethical (Kierkegaard, ix-xxxix). The point of this section relating Kierkegaard’s own

sacrifice is to show contrast between his sacrifice and that which he deemed a worthy Abrahamic

sacrifice which required suspension of the ethical, which will be seen in Abraham’s own

example of sacrifice. But if such a suspension of the ethical is so important to Kierkegaard’s

philosophy of faith, what is such a teleological suspension, and how does it relate to faith?

Ethical Suspensions

The term “teleological” comes from the Greek telos, and signifies the study of purpose or

ends. It has to do with the concept of acting in a way that there is a specific purpose or ends to a

given act. It is important to understand telos because for Kierkegaard telos is duty to God. The

ethical standard of the day, that is, social morality, to Kierkegaard is subordinate to the will of

God. He placed a mediating relationship on living an ethical standard.

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The mediating relationship is precisely that there is a ethics serves the role as mediator

between the individual and God. A person learns the societally accepted moral standard, which

is what Kierkegaard calls the “universal,” and uses that ethical standard to find God initially. In

this case, the universal mediates the relationship between God and man. It brings one to God

when lived. For Kierkegaard, a person must find out the will of God through living that

societally accepted norm, or universal. Enacting the universal ethic will lead one to his or her

ultimate telos i.e. the real ethical standard which is God’s will. He talks about the teleological

suspension of the ethical in relation to faith in order to properly contextualize the story of

Abraham who performed such a suspension (Silentio, 70).

Kierkegaard uses this understanding as a foundation for his explanation of a teleological

suspension of the ethical in Abraham’s story. A teleological suspension of the ethical would be a

case wherein there is a higher purpose or ends to which the universal ethic is subordinated. The

universal ethic becomes second priority to a higher purpose which is God’s will. The paradox of

this issue lies in Kierkegaard’s understanding that most individuals will say, “The highest that

can be said of a man and his existence… is to be repentantly surrendering as the single individual

in the universal” (Silentio, 54). Why is this the paradox? Because the person who utters such a

statement sees no higher duty than to constantly surrender to the societally accepted ethical

norm.

Any reasonable person may side with such a belief, but Kierkegaard takes issue with this

belief because if the highest form of existence is surrendering personal desire for the universal

ethic, then “the ethical is of the same nature as a person’s eternal salvation, which is his purpose”

(Silentio, 54). What he is asking here is that if living the ethical norm is our purpose, then why

do stories like Abraham capture our full attention? Kierkegaard wants to believe it is as simple

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as living the universal ethic but Abraham’s story drowns this understanding into a hard-to-

explain contradiction.

Abraham’s Story

What makes Abraham’s story hard to explain? Kierkegaard says the greatest minds of all

of history must unceasingly study and live Abraham’s story to reveal its meaning:

Abraham I cannot understand; in a certain sense I can learn nothing from him except to be amazed. If someone deludes himself into thinking he may be moved to have faith by pondering the outcome of that story, he cheats himself and cheats God out of the first movement of faith—he wants to suck worldly wisdom out of the paradox. Someone might succeed, for our generation does not stop with faith, does not stop with the miracle of faith, turning water into wine—it goes further and turns wine into water (Silentio, 37).

Kierkegaard says people who purport to have faith think they can understand Abraham’s

story with minimal effort or the occasional fleeting sermon given by a Christian preacher. He

would say such a sermon would botch the true representation of the movement made to faith

(Silentio, 46). The first movement of faith is being a knight of resignation, which means

continually resigning the individual will over to God through sacrifice of personal desire.

Without assuming the reader is familiar with the story, I will simply say Abraham and Sarah

exemplify this perfectly in their situation where they have longed for 70 years to bear a child.

“By faith Abraham received the promise that in his seed all the generations of the earth would be

blessed” (Silentio, 17).

The time passed in which this promise became unreasonable because Sarah was so old.

Neither of them held the Lord in contempt for making them wait until their nineties to bear their

first child. He sorrowed but did not waiver. “As time passed, he did not gloomily count the

days; he did not look suspiciously at Sarah, wondering if she was not getting old” (Silentio, 17).

Then, finally they were blessed with a baby boy. Several years later, “… God tempted Abraham

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and said to him, take Isaac, your only son, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah and

offer him as a burnt offering on a mountain that I shall show you” (Silentio, 19). To

Kierkegaard, this request defied all reason. “…everything was lost… more appallingly than if it

had never happened! So the Lord was only mocking Abraham! He wonderfully made the

preposterous come true, now he wanted to see it annihilated” (Silentio, 19). Seventy years of

expectancy in a moment potentially shattered by the Lord’s request. But Abraham did not

waiver. He made the journey to the mount, gathered the wood for burning, and laid his son on

the altar. He raised his hand in faith, which faith produced an angel telling him not to follow

through with the act. He had passed his test.

Kierkegaard painstakingly performs an analysis of the faith required to perform the deed

Abraham was asked to carry out.

Kierkegaard’s Brain Teasing Formulation of Faith

“The dialectic of faith is the finest and most extraordinary of all; it has an elevation of

which I can certainly form a conception, but no more than that” (Silentio, 37). According to

Kierkegaard, true faith is a passion (Silentio, 42). It is a paradox from which no man or woman

escapes. He believes that if one wants to truly please God, he or she will experience a trial of

Abrahamic proportions at some point in life. For Kierkegaard, this is the telos or purpose of

every man and woman on earth. Why? Because Kierkegaard is an existentialist, a believer in

the individual’s unique position and responsibility to live life as a self-determining agent. A

person responsible for his or her choices… and for Kierkegaard, such responsibility includes

God’s will. He believed his whole life should be consumed with getting people to sacrifice

something for God and take Abraham’s story as an example. He wants to get himself and all

those around him to experience the paradox of faith wherein all must feel the deepest sorrow, of

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distance from the universal ethic, in order to know the most sublime ensuing joy, absolute

relation to God. In faith, the individual is paradoxically higher than the universal. But most

people cannot make this step, according to Kierkegaard. If they do, they are likely to be the

example of the man who hears the sermon on Abraham and goes home and kills his child. But

this would be misunderstanding the paradox.

In order to experience faith, one must be crushed by a confusing trial in which there is no

explanation, no one to whom the trial can be explained, a learning experience for the individual

alone. If the disciple succeeds, faith is achieved. This faith is what will make one happy and put

him or her in absolute relation to God. That absolute relation requires no mediating universal

ethic. Only this faith will bring one to know their God. This reverse psychology is the tool by

which God demonstrates his will. By the very move of giving up that which one loves, one

receives everything again in return. This is the paradox.

Faith is precisely the paradox that the… single individual who, after being subordinate as the single individual to the universal, now by means of the universal becomes the single individual who as the single individual is superior, that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute (Silentio, 56).

By this statement, Kierkegaard means to say that the single individual is initially bound

to the universal ethic as prescribed by the whole of society. After being bound to and living this

ethic he must at some point come to an absolute relation to God. This is done by becoming

superior to, or no longer bound only by, the universal ethic by receiving a duty from God, which

is one’s sacrifice. This must necessarily be a contradiction to the universal ethic in order to be a

test of faith to make the individual superior to the universal ethic and therefore in direct justified

relation to God. Kierkegaard believed that to know one’s limit was to know that necessary

sacrifice.

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But what happens when God asks, or dare we say, tempts, Abraham to dismiss all ethical

considerations and sacrifice his own son? Kierkegaard says, “In ethical terms, Abraham’s

relation to Isaac is quite simply this: the father shall love the son more than himself” (Silentio,

57). In order to understand the paradox of God asking Abraham to break ethical norms to

complete the deed, Kierkegaard addresses a “higher expression for the ethical that can ethically

explain his behavior” (Silentio, 57).

Kierkegaard says some are great because of their moral virtue, but “Abraham is great

because of a purely personal virtue” (Silentio, 59). What is so great or important about the

personal virtue of Abraham? Kierkegaard explains that the person who experiences a simple but

difficult moral trial is still within the ethical. Abraham is different in that “what tempts a person

is something that will hold him back from doing his duty, but here the temptation is in the ethical

itself” (Silentio, 60). He is saying that the requirement given of God will hold one back from

doing his ethical duty to society, and therefore the requirement of God is against the ethical

itself. Again, we find the paradox of faith.

Kierkegaard asks, “What is duty? Duty is simply the expression for God’s will”

(Silentio, 60) Because Abraham’s duty is truly an expression of God’s will then the request

made of him to sacrifice his son was still within the scope of deeds Abraham could enact that

would allow him to be saved. Yes, Abraham’s ethical duty was to love his son more than

himself. Yes, murder was clearly an unethical act. In the face of both these statements we find a

new view of God and what he requires when he has a “higher ethical” consideration in mind.

Abraham was allowed, in this instance, to dismiss or “suspend” the ethical in order to

meet God’s new purpose or telos for himself. Abraham was not required to sacrifice his son

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because God decided to provide him with a simple “spiritual trial” as he does on a regular basis

with all his subjects. Abraham needed to be educated about Abraham. As Kierkegaard says,

“education is the course one goes through in order to catch up with himself” (Silentio, 46).

This is exactly what Abraham did. He was willing to sacrifice in the form of murder

because God’s higher standard allowed for it as a test—and even required it. “The story of

Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of the ethical” (Silentio, 66). His ethical duty

to his own son was superseded by his duty to his God. Abraham was not simply a willing

almost-murderer; indeed, there was nothing simple about God’s request of him. He was willing

to carry out the request because his faith was instilled in a higher ethical expression of duty.

The “Fear and Trembling” title of his book from which these argument are found, refers

not to fear that Abraham held in him just before sacrificing Isaac. It is not the trembling hand he

held as he very nearly murdered his own beloved son. The fear and trembling, Kierkegaard says,

lay in the observer. The fear is in our hearts for what he was about to do. The trembling in our

hands as we turn the pages to read the paradox of faith. The philosophy Kierkegaard uses here is

his version of a non-philosophical approach to idealism and faith.

Kierkegaard takes a backseat to the philosophy of his time when he explains that his

writings do not fall within the category of philosophical systems, not even within ideological

philosophical systems. His is not a system in this way. Faith cannot be categorized in any

rational philosophical system. Faith is a movement of withdrawal or resignation, an acceptance

of total lack of control and culminating in a trust in God that yields peace in this finite life.

Idealistic philosophy may at times say we can control our environment for the better.

Kierkegaard’s non-philosophy says God is in control, and we only come to know what that

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means when we experience an infinite resignation of our will i.e. faith. It is reaching the point

where the individual has obsessed over wanting meaning for so long and so deeply that only

resigning the self to a lack of understanding and trust and faith will the problem resolve itself…

after the individual is tested.

Kierkegaard is the father of existentialism because he turns philosophy on to the self, but

then he goes further and turns philosophy into a demonstration of one’s complete fidelity to the

incomprehensible, namely God. His is not a system of science, a system of empirical

verifiability. His is a system of faith, feeling, passion, personal experience, and a relationship

with the supernatural.

The psychological implications of Kierkegaard’s non-philosophy are astounding. Here is

the very paradox and contradiction weaved into the story of Abraham and Isaac. Was Abraham

supposed to cheerfully murder his son, knowing God would fulfill promised blessings anyway?

Or should he have been full of sorrow? Why would he have been full of sorrow if he knew God

would make it up to him? If he was full of sorrow would that mean he did not have faith,

because for some reason he doubted, which would justify his sorrow? On the other hand, if he

murdered his son cheerfully did that mean he did not love his son? Could he reasonably be

sorrowful and perform the act, or cheerful and perform the act? These are not to be answered

here, but left to the reader to work out, though Kierkegaard would argue they can only be

answered by one who has passed the test.

For Kierkegaard, the answer to these questions will tell us if we have passed. It is an

incredible brain twister that took Kierkegaard the majority of his life to help people

conceptualize, yet never really grasp. Kierkegaard’s version of true sacrifice had to be

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incomprehensive to all so as to create a paradoxical version of faith. Faith, to Kierkegaard,

cannot be understood. Ethics can, faith cannot.

Though it cannot be understood, for him it was his life’s work, as he believed it should be

for all those who have devoted themselves to God. Faith is the first principle, a paradox, and it

supersedes reason. For Kierkegaard, the sacrifice of his love Regine was his proof to God that

he was willing to do whatever was needed to obtain such a faith. How, then, is this similar to the

views of faith and sacrifice of the American prophet, Joseph Smith?

Joseph Smith’s Non-Philosophy of Faith

Joseph was asked by God to live the law of plural marriage. Such was his sacrifice,

which, as was explained, means much more than simply to give something up for something else

in return. But to understand Joseph Smith’s views on faith and why he made this Abrahamic

sacrifice, we need a brief bit of context. His family attended Christian church meetings of

varying denominations on a regular basis. Smith, however, from a young age became confused

at the seemingly contradictory statements of the differing denominations and clergymen. Smith

was no robust religious philosopher, nor did he claim to be. Because he was admittedly very

ignorant as to the wisdom of men, he decided the only way he would know which denomination

to join was to ask God Himself.

When he was 14 years old, Smith claimed to receive a visit from Jesus Christ and God

the Father. They told him to join none of the churches for they were all wrong. In time, Smith

learned that he was to restore the true church of Jesus Christ, in preparation for Christ’s second

coming at the end of the world. Smith claimed to be a prophet, acting in God’s name and with

His authority. Kierkegaard declared that he possessed no god-like authority, but acknowledged

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that if a true apostle or prophet did exist, he would meet stringent criteria, one of which would be

the claim of divine authority.

Why am I comparing Kierkegaard and Smith? Half a world away, Smith claimed to have

God’s authority and meet the prophet-status criteria that Kierkegaard put forth, though they

never knew each other’s works. That meeting of prophet-status criteria is outside the scope of

this paper, but sufficeth to say Kierkegaard was looking expectantly for such a man as Smith

claimed to be. As it turns out, Smith came very close to teaching the same non-philosophy of

Kierkegaard regarding faith and sacrifice, though under the claim of divine revelation.

Importantly, Smith never claimed that his sayings were his own. He always said his

message was of God, given directly through divine revelation. (Author’s note: From here

forward any statement usually attributed to Smith should be understood as a revelation from God

who here will be used interchangeably with the name of Christ). In April 1830, Smith was

commanded of God and claimed to have restored the true church of Jesus Christ. He made

thousands of prophecies under the claim of divine revelation, and of life’s work, his close friend

said the following of Smith:

Joseph Smith, the Prophet and Seer of the Lord, has done more, save Jesus only, for the salvation of men in this world, than any other man that ever lived in it. In the short space of twenty years he has brought forth the Book of Mormon, which he translated by the gift and power of God, and has been the means of publishing it on two continents; has sent the fullness of the everlasting gospel, which it contained, to the four quarters of the earth; has brought forth the revelations and commandments which compose this book of Doctrine and Covenants, and many other wise documents and instruction for the benefit of the children of men; gathered many thousands of the Latter-day Saints, founded a great city, and left a fame and a name that cannot be slain… and like most of the Lord’s anointed in ancient times, has sealed his mission and his works with his own blood” (D&C 135:3).

Smith’s life was not filled with happy successes. He, like Kierkegaard, sought to please

God in every way, withholding nothing. To accomplish this, Smith, like Kierkegaard, sought to

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know what Abrahamic-level sacrifice would be acceptable to the Lord. Unlike Kierkegaard’s

voluntary sacrifice of his beloved Regine, Smith claimed not to have chosen the sacrifice he was

required to make, though he was ultimately willing to carry it out. One is not required take it for

the sake of argument that plural marriage was to Smith as killing Isaac was to Abraham, as

breaking up with Regine was to Kierkegaard. But only a deep reading and contemplation of

their works will reveal such. Both Kierkegaard and Smith believed their sacrifices were

Abrahamic-level sacrifices so we will take them at their words, assuming the reader is unwilling

to read their works. Should be required to take a moment to consider their intentions for making

a sacrifice? One can say without thought, for example, that polygamy makes Smith look like a

perverted adulterer with highly charged libido, or that Kierkegaard used his dislike for his

girlfriend to use her as the subject for a very intriguing philosophy on sacrifice. Though these

are not what the authors claimed, further explanation of their intentions falls outside the scope of

this discussion, and will, for the sake of argument, be put to rest for the remainder of the

discussion.

Let us look at his sacrifice in more detail, now that we have looked at Kierkegaard and

Abraham’s sacrifices. This allows us to compare whether Smith’s view really is compatible with

Kierkegaard’s on the subjects of faith and sacrifice. As this is not a biographical paper, we will

look at the individual views of the thinkers. In the 132nd section of The Doctrine and Covenants,

verse 32, in a claimed revelation from Jesus Christ, Smith was commanded: “Go ye, therefore,

and do the works of Abraham; enter ye into my law and ye shall be saved.” The law to which

this was referring was that of plural marriage, justification for which was subsequently explained

in great detail (which Kierkegaard was unfortunately never privileged to receive) by the Lord

using several Ancient prophets from the Bible, most notably Abraham. The law and principle:

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plural marriage, polygamy. To the eyes of his closest associates this was one of the vilest of

principles ever brought forth by Joseph Smith. It was non-Christian, lascivious, against Smith’s

previous propositions from The Book of Mormon, and a blatant disregard for public decency.

Smith had apparently known since 1831 (12 years before the above citation), that he was

being required to enter into the law of plural marriage (see intro to D&C 132). He claimed to

have received sixteen different angelic visitations commanding him to enter into this law of

plural marriage, which he found to be a repulsive and ungodly marital union. Why is this

important? It must be disclosed in order to illustrate the magnitude of what Smith was being

asked to carry out. He was not akin to the idea, nor did he feel it was explicable, and it therefore

meets another of Kierkegaard’s criteria.

Unlike Kierkegaard, but similarly to Abraham, Smith claimed to have a confirmation that

his sacrifice was acceptable to the Lord:

For I am the Lord thy God, and will be with thee even unto the end of the world, and through all eternity; for verily I seal upon you your exaltation, and prepare a throne for you in the kingdom of my Father, with Abraham your father. Behold I have seen your sacrifices and will forgive all your sins; I have seen your sacrifices in obedience to that which I have told you. Go, therefore, and I make a way for your escape, as I accepted the offering of Abraham of his son Isaac (D&C 132:49-50).

This sacrifice, however, was not originally in line with anything Joseph Smith considered

godly or scriptural. To him, it was a mind-bending contradiction to be required to take multiple

wives to him through marriage. This sacrifice reeked of Abrahamic-level suspension of the

accepted ethical norm of the day, and definitely an act unworthy of a prophet with so many loyal

followers. This is why it took Smith so long to succumb to the Lord’s request. He became, as

Kierkegaard would say, the Knight of Resignation sorrowfully resigning himself to God’s will,

only to find that he would soon become the Knight of Faith, who cheerfully submits to God’s

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will knowing that he is no longer a man of this world. Why are we to think that Kierkegaard’s

concepts actually apply here? Because Smith, though not using Kierkegaard’s terminology, fell

into the patter Kierkegaard spoke as the movement of faith. This is the very movement which

takes one from living ethically, to living for God sorrowfully, to living for God cheerfully.

Further, this is akin to Kierkegaard’s conception of the sacrificial attitude and resulting blessings

to receive a hundred fold for one’s Abrahamic sacrifice.

Joseph Smith’s Requirement of Sacrifice in all Things

Smith received revelations form God regarding a similar Keirkegaardian telos, but rather

than using the Greek, which he praised, he used the Latin term Summum Bonum, literally

meaning the highest or greatest good. Telos is the ends, while summum bonum is the means to

that end. For Kierkegaard, one’s purpose or telos is duty to god, achieved by obtaining faith.

For Smith, one’s telos is to help God make people eternally happy, achieved by obtaining a

fullness of priesthood, the summum bonum:

Now the great and grand secret of the whole matter, and the summum bonum of the whole subject lying before us, consists in obtaining the powers of the Holy Priesthood. For him to whom these keys are given there is no difficulty in obtaining a knowledge of facts in relation to the salvation of the children of men, both as well for the dead as for the living (D&C 128: 11).

To be clear, these scriptures refer to men as all of humanity, not solely to the male

gender. To Smith, this obtaining of the “powers of the Holy Priesthood” is all-important because

it allows one to act as an instrument in the Lord’s hands. The term, “priesthood,” here need not

be defined any further than power to know and act in accordance with God’s will. One obtains

the powers to know God will. One knows God’s will so he or she can help Him with His telos or

purpose, which Smith clarified in his translation of the book of Moses, quoting Scripture, “And

this is my work and my glory, to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man” (Moses

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1:39, PGP). Like Kierkegaard, Smith’s goal was to see himself and all humanity happy. For

Smith, however, it went further than happiness in this life; it was that all humanity’s immortality

and eternal life would be brought to pass. Of course, to obtain these powers of the priesthood an

Abrahamic sacrifice was required, and this by and for faith. So, for both Kierkegaard and Smith,

faith led to an achievement of one’s telos, and this by sacrifice.

While Smith suffered through his own sacrifice, he, like Kierkegaard, believed a sacrifice

of this magnitude was required of all men who desire to please God and have faith in Him. In

Lectures on Faith, Smith says:

“It is vain for persons to fancy to themselves that they are heirs with those, or can be heirs with them, who have offered their all in sacrifice, and by this means obtain faith in God and favor with him so as to obtain eternal life, unless they, in like manner, offer unto him the same sacrifice, and through that offering obtain the knowledge that they are accepted of him” (LOF 6:8).

The paradox here may be found in a statement immediately preceding the above: “…a

religion that does not require the sacrifice of all things never has power sufficient to produce the

faith necessary unto life and salvation” (Lectures, 6:7). If “obtaining faith” is an unfamiliar

locution to the reader, then reading further works by these men will increase understanding. It is

not a pattern or phrase used only by followers of Joseph Smith, but is the mission of all those to

whom this paper is addressed, sincere seekers of truth through religious endeavor. The concept

is not only: In order to receive all things from God, one must sacrifice all things for God. Rather,

just to obtain faith in God, one must sacrifice all things for God. And in this case, sacrifice

something that may be the one personally most difficult thing for each individual to sacrifice.

For Kierkegaard, this was his one true love, Regine. The sacrifice seems tailored to test the faith

of the individual, while providing faith as a result. It is designed to wrench at the very heart

strings of the sane and God-fearing individual. Again, and it bears repeating, the paradox

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requires acting in a manner higher than the universal ethic, because God himself is now giving

the orders in contradiction to the universal ethic. This, of course, is Kierkegaard’s terminology

applied to Smith. Smith carries out the paradox by overstepping his own society’s ethical norm

to fulfill the request of his God to take on plural wives. Yes, cultural relativism bears

consideration in analyzing the bounds of the society’s ethical norm. In this case, Smith’s

action’s fell outside of that universal ethic.

Though Kierkegaard believed he was making the correct sacrifice, then later admitted it

may have not been the sacrifice God was requiring, he was still of the mind that the required

sacrifice needed to be a sacrifice of all, just as Smith says. Kierkegaard believed he would be

treated as Abraham, and be blessed for his sacrifice. He believed also that he would be treated as

the biblical prophet Job, who would be blessed many fold in this temporal life for his sacrifice.

He admitted at the end of his life that because he did not see either of those fruits, he must have

sacrificed Regine in vain, which is why he saw himself as the knight of infinite resignation for

ever more until his death.

To advise Kierkegaard on the subject, Smith likely would have quoted the Lord’s words

from the same revelation that commanded Smith to make the Abrahamic sacrifice:

Behold mine house is a house of order, saith the Lord god, and not a house of confusion. Will I accept of an offering, saith the Lord, that is not made in my name? Or will I receive at your hands that which I have not appointed? I am the Lord thy God; and I give unto you this commandment – that no man shall come unto the Father but by me or by my word, which is my law, saith the Lord (D&C 132: 9-10, 12).

This statement set forth the parameters for Smith that no man was to make a sacrifice in

God’s name unless he had been commanded by the words of God himself, as Abraham of old

with his sacrifice of Isaac.

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In The Words of Joseph Smith, it is explained that “Abraham went ahead and proved his

integrity and faith. Consequently God bestowed upon him the highest blessing available to man,

the fullness of the priesthood.” (see Note 8 to 27 Aug 1843 discourse). Remember, this fullness

of the priesthood was what, according to Smith, enabled him to help God in His purpose to save

all men. And remember further that according to Smith, this priesthood, while possibly the

highest blessing available to man, is yet a means to one’s telos. It brings the knowledge of how

to save others and help all humanity have immortality and eternal life. Is this a sacrifice? No, at

least not in the same manner as the Abrahamic sacrifice. The sacrifice brings this power, which

requires further sacrifice, to save others and help God in His work. As an aside, this is akin to

Kierkegaard’s argument that once a knight of faith is produced by the necessary sacrifice,

repetition of sacrifice is required to maintain the happiness achieved by that knight of faith. It is

akin to Kierkegaard’s argument precisely because Smith believed his telos became a duty to

help God for the rest of his life. Such a telos required constant repetition of sacrifice for others.

The two views continue to show compatibility.

In the Doctrine and Covenants (D&C132:36) Smith recounts a revelation given by Jesus

Christ which said, “Abraham was commanded to offer his son Isaac; nevertheless, it was written:

Thou shalt not kill. Abraham, however, did not refuse, and it was accounted unto him for

righteousness.” Smith claimed that this was a revelation from the mouth of Christ Himself,

proving that Abraham’s breaking of the Lord’s already established written law was approved.

The apparently contradictory deed was approved and accounted unto him for righteousness.

Smith understood that the contradiction of faith required one to enter into the depths of sorrow,

rise a champion within the trial, and experience the resulting faith.

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Why is the sacrifice required in the first place? Smith said it is to produce faith sufficient

for salvation, and peace of mind in this life. Kierkegaard, as an existentialist, said it was to

produce a happy man or woman in this life, one who has overcome his surroundings. His was a

faith for the here and now, not for the afterlife. For Smith, this principle of faith is all-important

and must be had because it is “the first great governing principle which has power, dominion,

and authority over all things” (Lectures 2:55). It is a principle of power, for Smith, because it is

what stimulates action in all rational beings. He agrees with and expounds on the New

Testament statement, “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen”

(Hebrews 11:1). Because one cannot see the end from the beginning, he or she must first have

faith. The assurance that such a faith is not in vain comes through sacrificing oneself to God in

tireless devotion and service.

Smith’s explanation of God’s doctrine of faith and how it is only obtained through

sacrifice, jives well with Kierkegaard’s views on the same subject. The two views go hand in

glove to prove that philosophers of religion, and claimed prophets of the God, can indeed have

deeply compatible views.

Conclusion

An opponent to my argument, may well think, “No, the similarity between these men is

superficial. So many Christians believe it is important to sacrifice for God. There is no ‘special’

connection here.” That opponent has clearly misunderstood and refused to seriously meditate on

the type of sacrifice discussed and held in high esteem by both these thinkers. That opponent is

wrong by virtue of their refusal to think, and not simply read, what both these thinkers were

trying to convey. Kierkegaard believed that faith in God and the principle of sacrifice were

tantamount to one’s salvation. His version of true sacrifice, however, had to be

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incomprehensible to all so as to create a paradoxical version of faith. Joseph Smith also believed

that faith and sacrifice were all-important in each person’s salvation. His view followed a

similar course of that of Kierkegaard in the almost-incomprehensible magnitude of the sacrifice

required. Though it is not my attempt to show such, both thinkers had not only similar views,

but similar biographies, making them further compatible.

These men’s views were unique within Christendom in their day. Both fought against the

accepted organized religions of their time on these subjects and many others. Simply professing

a belief in God as was acceptable to virtually all other Christian sects was not sufficient for these

men. Sacrifice which challenged personal belief an giving of all for God was necessary. If one

thinks such a sacrifice is a common theme throughout Christianity, they are grossly mistaken,

and have misunderstood the story of Abraham. One can argue that both thinkers are clearly

influenced by the New Testament and therefore their religious arguments will be compatible.

But I would challenge any scholar to prove through the New Testament that such a paradoxical

sacrifice and path to faith is required in any form. It simply is not there.

One can further argue that both thinkers are influenced by the Old Testament, so it is

unsurprising that they would have compatible views. Abraham, after all, is an Old Testament

character, and both men surely studied his life, and therefore they would come to the same

conclusion. But this argument also fails, for both men claimed to receive their views on faith

and sacrifice from sources other than the Old Testament. Kierkegaard claimed it from serious

meditation and attempted sacrifice, and Smith claimed it from divine revelation and requested

sacrifice. Kierkegaard further fought against this idea of glossing over the Scriptures to obtain

understanding by saying how sermon-givers never told the story in a way that would produce a

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desire to follow God, but rather spawned a disgust and bad taste in the mouths of the preachers

listeners to hear of such a request from God.

There is no viable argument that can claim that the faith and sacrifice view of these men

is not unique within Christianity. Their claim comes from left field, from their own pursuit of

knowledge, not from any accepted understanding of the Bible within Christianity. In this case,

then, as was shown in this paper, Kierkegaard’s particular notion of faith and sacrifice is

especially resonant with Smith’s. Other definitions of faith and sacrifice may be given, other

arguments as to their intentions, meaning, and purpose provided, but at least within the scope of

Christianity and philosophy of religion, Kierkegaard and Smith’s view is unique. Their

particular views are not only unique in this realm, but their uniqueness is particularly similar.

Any student who claims to understand religion will accept that it is no small claim that a

monumental sacrifice of this kind is the only means of producing a happy man or woman, and in

some cases, salvation, if one believes in such. Indeed, this is such a wildly uncommon and truly

unique claim that it warrants much further study. Any true student of philosophy must accept

that the renowned philosopher of religion, Kierkegaard, conveys convincing arguments within

the realm of religious philosophy, and indeed a unique non-philosophical system of faith. If

Kierkegaard’s work warrants study, then his contemporary, Smith, also warrants study. One can

understand both on a deeper level if studied together.

Both the philosopher and the prophet died at young ages, Kierkegaard at 42 and Smith at

38, but they achieved influence which only escalated exponentially after their deaths. These

distant contemporaries would have been fast friends. Both lived to help others see a need for

faith in God, rather than man, and this through a monumental sacrifice of whatever it is that

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stands between man and God. How could a matter like religion, with stakes running as high and

lofty as peace in this life and possibly salvation itself, require anything less than a pure and

selfless faith in, and sacrifice for, the Creator of all things? Or so these two men would ask.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kierkegaard, Soren. Trans. Hong, Howard V. & Hong, Edna H. Kierkegaard: Journals and Papers (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1967)

Kierkegaard, Soren (Johannes de Silentio). Trans. Hong, Howard V. & Hong, Edna H. Fear and Trembling/Repetition, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983)

Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph, 2nd ed. rev., 1st digital ed. (1996)

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The Doctrine and covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The Pearl of great price. (Salt Lake City, UT: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 1989)

Lectures on Faith. Independence, MO: Herald House. 1953.

The Bible: Authorized King James version. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

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