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Human Development

Report 2009/10

Investing in Human Security

for a Future State

occupied Palestinian territory





FOrewOrd

The human security paradigm calls on policymakers and other stakeholdersto move away rom a traditional, State-centric conception o security toone that concentrates on the security o individuals, their protection andempowerment. It is particularly relevant to the occupied Palestinian territory(oPt) because much o the narrative surrounding the conict has ocused onState security to the detriment o other concerns.

A new approach is required as it becomes ever clearer that the dominantconict resolution and development paradigms applied to the oPt are inneed o extensive re-evaluation to assess their relevance and approriateness.The th Palestinian Human Development Report 2009/10, Investing in

Human Security or a Future State, captures and explains this predicament.It argues that all stakeholders must now prioritize the “liberation o humanbeings rom those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensivethreats to which their lives and reedom are vulnerable”. In so doing, itdraws attention to a multitude o threats which cut across dierent aspectso human development in the oPt, highlighting the need or an integrated,participatory approach to advancing development, human rights and theemergence o an independent, viable Palestinian State.

The Report has drawn on the scholarship o the Arab Human DevelopmentReport 2009 Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries. It is hopedthat together the documents will enhance the prole o the human securityparadigm and prove its relevance to improving the lives o women, men,girls and boys in the Middle East.

Since 1990 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has beenissuing annual human development reports to assess the state o globaldevelopment rom a people-centred perspective; one that places theexpansion o human capabilities, choices and opportunities at the heart o the development process. Human development reports are not statementso UNDP policy: the independence o the writing team is crucial, allowingor a solid analytical critique based on an impartial political and culturalanalysis. The Palestinian Human Development Report or 2009/10 is the

product o an independent research team, comprised o Palestinian andinternational readers and researchers who have scrutinized Palestiniansociety and the occupation critically. We hope that the Palestinian HumanDevelopment Report 2009/10 will be a useul tool or motivating discussionon human development issues in the oPt and beyond.

I wish to extend my thanks to all the contributors to the Palestinian HumanDevelopment Report 2009/10. My sincere hope is that the Report makes amodest contribution towards achieving justice and peace in the region.

J Toyb-Faz

Special Representative o the Administrator Jerusalem, January 2010





AcknOwledgemenTs

This Report could have not been prepared without the generouscontributions o the individuals and organizations listed below.

PrIncIPAl AUTHOrs

Suan Mushasha, Louise Dear

edITOrIAl TeAm

Vanessa Farr, Louise Dear, Suan Mushasha, Savitri Bisnath , Jens Toyberg-Frandzen, Roberto Valent, Geo Prewitt,

keY cOnTrIBUTOrs a AdVIsOrsIsabelle Daneels, Jamil Hilal, George Gicaman, Mahmood Ataya (Ministry o Planning), Mohmmed Al Masri (Palestinian Central Bureau o Statistics), JamilRabah (Near East Consulting), Sara Bailey, Mohsen Abu Ramadan, Lisa Monaghan

memBers OF THe BOArd

Dr. Samir Abdallah, Mr. Jens Toyberg-Frandzen, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dr. CairoAraat, Ms. Lily Habash, Dr. Sabri Saidam, Dr. Luay Shabaneh, Dr. GhassanKhatib, Dr. Fawwaz Abu Sitta, Dr. Anan Jayousi, Dr. Abdel Karim Ashour, Dr. AzmiShuaibi, Ms. Rawia Shawwa, Mr. Bassem Khoury, Mr. Mamoun Abu Shahlah

eXTernAl reVIewersMary Kaldor, Proessor o Global Governance, London School o Economics& Political Science

George Gicaman, Proessor o Philosophy, Bir Zeit University

Mient Jan Faber, Proessor o Human Security in War Situations, FreeUniversity Amsterdam

Sally Stares, Postdoctoral ellow, Methodology Institute, London School o Economic & Political Science

BAckgrOUnd PAPers

Anne Le More (Middle East and North Arica Program, Chatham House),Penny Johnson, Jamil Hilal, Nader Said, Daragh Murray & Louise Dear(Palestinian Centre or Human Rights), Mohsen Abu Ramadan, NaserAbdelkarim (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute -MAS), TuridSmith Polus, Mushtaq H. Khan (School o Oriental and Arican Studies),Nidal Rashid Sabri (MAS), Abdel Aziz Mousa Thabet, Tayseer Mohaysen,Mohammad Khaleeeh (MAS), Muhamad Hammed (MAS), Sa’eda Aooneh((MAS), Fat’he Srouje (MAS), Ibrahim Abu Hantash (MAS).

AdmInIsTrATIVe TeAm

Sama Khalil

Note: The analysis and policy recommendations o this Report do not necessarily reectthe views o the United Nations Development Programme. The Report is an independentpublication commissioned by UNDP





AcrOnYms

BBC............................................. British Broadcasting CorporationCMWU.................................... Coastal Municipalities Water UnitCPI ............................................... Consumer Price Index

DCAF ........................................ Geneva Centre or the Democratic Control o Armed ForcesDCI .............................................. Deence or Children InternationalDCO........................................... District Coordination OceEC-ECHO............................. European Commission Humanitarian Aid OceEU................................................. European UnionFAO ............................................. Food and Agricultural OrganizationGA................................................ General Assembly (UN)GDI.............................................. Gender Development IndexGDP ........................................... Gross Domestic Product

GEM........................................... Gender Empowerment MeasureHRC ............................................ Human Rights Council (UN)HDI.............................................. Human Development Index

HPI-1 ........................................ Human Poverty IndexICAHD..................................... Israeli Committee Against Housing DemolitionsICCPR ....................................... International Covenant on Civil and Political RightsICESCR ................................... International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural RightsICG............................................... International Crisis Group

ICJ ................................................ International Court o JusticeICRC........................................... International Committee or the Red CrossID................................................... Identication cardIDF............................................... Israeli Deence ForceILO............................................... International Labour OrganizationIMF.............................................. International Monetary FundIRIN............................................. Integrated Regional Inormation Networks

IWC............................................. International Women’s CommissionMCM......................................... Million Cubic MetersMDG ......................................... Millennium Development GoalsNUG........................................... National Unity GovernmentNGO .......................................... Non-governmental OrganizationNIS............................................... New Israeli ShekelOCHA ...................................... Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian AairsoPt............................................... occupied Palestinian territoryPA ................................................. Palestinian AuthorityPCBS ......................................... Palestinian Central Bureau o StatisticsPCHR........................................ Palestinian Centre or Human RightsPHDR ....................................... Palestinian Human Development Report

PLO............................................. Palestinian Liberation OrganizationPNA............................................ Palestinian National AuthorityUDHR ...................................... Universal Declaration o Human RightsUN ................................................ United NationsUNDP / PAPP ................United Nations Development Programme / Programme o Assistance

to the Palestinian People UNESCO............................... United Nations Educational Scientic and Cultural Organization UNFPA.................................... United Nations Populations FundUNICEF.................................. United Nations Children’s FundUNRWA................................. United Nations Relie and Works Agency or Palestine Reugees

o the Near EastU.S. .............................................. United States o America

USAID ..................................... United States Agency or International DevelopmentUSD............................................ United States DollarVTC............................................. Vocational Training CentreWHO......................................... World Health Organization





Tab o cott

lit o ap .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11

lit o box............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11

lit o u .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11

lit o pitu .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................12

Pa ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................13

Th rpot i Bi .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................14

cHAPTer One: Itoutio a cotxt ..............................................................................................................................................19

1.1 Itoutio ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................19

1.2 Hua uity, hua vopt a hua iht i oPt.........................................................................20

1.3 cotxt ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................23

1.4 ky vt hapi hua uity o 2005 to 2010 .................................................................................................27

1.5 couio .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................31

cHAPTer TwO: Th ut tatu a t o hua vopt.......................................33

2.1: Itoutio ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................33

2.2 Hua dvopt Iiato .....................................................................................................................................................................34

2.3 eooy a poyt .....................................................................................................................................................................................35

2.4 Io povty .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................39

2.5 Hath...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................42

2.6 euatio ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................44

2.7 wo’ pot a quaity ..............................................................................................................................45

2.8 eviot ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................49

2.9 couio ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................51

cHAPTer THree: Titoia atatio a poitia poaizatio..........................................53

3.1 Itoutio ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................53

3.2 Th ahittu o oupatio a titoia atatio ..............................................................................54

3.3 doitio a ipoio ........................................................................................................................................................................59

3.4 Iai ttt a th hii a hai aap o th oPt ............................................

613.5 Th wa a hua uity ..............................................................................................................................................................................63



3.6 chpoit a vioatio o o o ovt .....................................................................................................66

3.7 miitay iuio a u........................................................................................................................................................................68

3.8 Th ia axatio o eat Jua .............................................................................................................................................693.9 Poitia poaizatio ........................................................................................................................................................................................................75

3.10 Fo poitia poaizatio to oia atatio? ......................................................................................................78

3.11 couio .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................82

cHAPTer FOUr: Fo o at, o o a a o to iv

i iity: hua uity i th oPt .................................................................................................85

4.1 Itoutio ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................85

4.2 Fo to iv i iity .......................................................................................................................................................................................864.2.1 Health security ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................86

4.2.2 Environmental security ................................................................................................................................................................................89

4.3 Fo o at .........................................................................................................................................................................................................93

4.3.1 Economic security .................................................................................................................................................................................................93

4.3.2 Macro-strategy: addressing want; re-shaping the economic agenda .....................................................97

4.4 Fo o a ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................98

4.4.1 Personal security.....................................................................................................................................................................................................98

4.4.2 Community security .......................................................................................................................................................................................1014.4.3 Political security .................................................................................................................................................................................................105

4.4.4 Addressing ear: the importance o credible liberation strategies...........................................................107

4.5 couio: uthi iity.......................................................................................................................................................................108

cHAPTer FIVe: Toa cohio: Ivti i Hua suity i th oPt ....................111

5.1: Itoutio ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................111

5.2 Pottia o ita hai a oia ohio ............................................................................................................112

5.3 stthi ohio thouh ivi oity patiipatio ................................................................................1145.4 Oppotuiti a otait o stat-buii i th oPt ..................................................................................121

5.5 Inveting in a participatory state-building trategy: toward huan ecurity in the oPt ...........125

5.6 Patiipatoy stat-buii pioiti ...............................................................................................................................................126

5.7 couio ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................130

AnneX 1: ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................133

AnneX 2: ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................143

AnneX 3: ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................170



lit o ap

Isreal and the oPt1.

West Bank and the Gaza Strip2.Jerusalem Barrier: Ma’ale Adumim Land Requisitioned3.

Fragmentation o the West Bank 4.

Palestinian Neighbourhoods in Jerusalem5.

Access to resh water or Palestinians6.

lit o box

Palestinian workers exploited7.

The Agreement on Movement and Access8.Psychological eects o demolitions on children9.

Isolated and depressed: living under the Wall10.

Al Nu’man village: an example o ragmentation11.

Physical measures restricting Palestinian movement in the West Bank 12.

Denial o cultural rights in East Jerusalem13.

The seeds o polarization14.

Political polarization and human rights violations15.

Multiple crisis in Gaza’s health services16.

Micro-initiatives tackling health insecurity: PA Health Insurance Scheme17. Dried wells18.

Micro-initiatives tackling environmental insecurity: Palestinian Water Authority19.

Inormal economic activities20.

Micro-initiatives addressing economic insecurity: Solutions or Development Consulting21.Co: InTajuna

Micro-initiatives addressing personal insecurity: Palestinian Independent Commission or22.Human Rights

Micro-initiatives addressing community insecurity: Student Dialogues23.

Micro-initiatives addressing political insecurity: Coalition or transparency and corruption24.

(AMAN)Truth and Reconciliation Commissions25.

Families, clans and inormal security26.

Israel and violations o the Fourth Geneva Convention27.

11







THe rePOrT In BrIeF

The Palestinian Human Development Report 2009/10 Investing in Human Security or a Future State isthe th volume in the series o Palestinian Human Development Reports sponsored by the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP). The Report has been authored by an independent writingteam comprised o international and Palestinian academics and development practitioners. The Reportwas prepared in the tradition o independence. Human development reports are deliberately notocial UN or UNDP documents: they intend to stimulate and inorm a dynamic, new, public discourseacross the oPt and beyond. They do not reect the ocial views o either organization, and some o the views expressed by the authors are not shared by UNDP or the UN.

The authors note with considerable concern that since the publication o the rst PalestinianHuman Development Report in 1997, Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) have

witnessed more violence – rom the second intiada up to the Israeli entitled ‘Operation Cast Lead’– and endured an increasingly overpowering and intrusive occupation system that penetratestheir political, economic, social and cultural lives. Concomitantly, ollowing the Oslo Accords in1993, there has been an increased emphasis, rom the Palestinian political representatives andthe international community, on State-building in the oPt. However, it is evident that the State-building process and accompanying development policy has been largely abstracted rom theneeds o the Palestinian people. By utilizing the concept o human security, the PHDR 2009/10calls or reconsideration o the State-building process in the oPt, involving people-centreddevelopment policies, and improved preparedness rom systemic shocks, increased militancy andoutside intervention. Human security is a pre-requisite or human development, and its widespreadabsence in the oPt has greatly impeded Palestinian progress.

mthoooy

The methodology or the Report was designed to be participatory and to integrate public opinionand perceptions wherever possible. An Advisory Board co-chaired by the UNDP and the Ministry o Planning, involving a number o key Palestinian gures, was ormed to lead the preparation process o the Report. Ater a theme was selected, reections were gathered in a series o workshops in the WestBank and Gaza Strip, involving a range o commentators and research centres. Eighteen backgroundpapers were commissioned and prepared by teen local and three international individuals /organisations. In addition to this, an extensive survey was undertaken: Palestinian Perceptions towards

the Human Security Situation in the occupied Palestinian territory (2009), which has also been published

as an independent document.

An independent Palestinian consultancy rm (Near East Consulting) was commissioned to conductthe human security survey; the ndings and analysis drew on 4,700 randomly sampled telephoneinterviews with Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

To ensure that the perceptions and analysis were accurately captured and conceptualised, thePHDR team and Near East Consulting took a number o steps to ensure reliability, including anexamination o sampling and sample design, the interview process, eldwork procedure orinterviewers, the questionnaire, pre-testing, eldwork, data cleaning and manipulation, dataweighting and analysis.

14



Ater drat zero was produced the ndings and recommendations were released or urther consultationwith a range o stakeholders in ocus group discussions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A completedrst drat was then submitted or external review by a range o experts.[1]

The PHDR 2009/10 builds on the scholarship o the UNDP’s 1994 Global Human Development Reportand the Arab Human Development Report 2009, both o which developed the theme o humansecurity.

Th opt

Human insecurity is the result o pervasive, recurrent or intense threats, and can only be remedied bythe protection and empowerment o people. While the human security paradigm places a concernwith human lie and dignity at the ore, it is considered to be the rearguard o human development.[2] This Report explores the acets o human security (economy, ood, health, environment, political,personal, community) rom the perspective o establishing reedom rom want, reedom rom earand reedom to live in dignity.

The consideration o these themes marks a move away rom traditional concepts o security, wheresecurity was narrowly dened, in deensive terms, as security o territory rom external aggression. Thereraming o the concept o ‘security’, to one that places the security o individual on par with the State,is essential when reecting on Israel and the oPt, and is particularly signicant given the application o a security based discourse by the State o Israel to legitimise its actions in the oPt.

Th tatu a t o hua vopt

The Report presents an overview o traditional development indicators, in addition to reviews o employment, poverty including ood security, health including nutrition, women’s empowerment andgender equality, education, and environmental sustainability.

The authors nd a clear correlation between sectoral authority and the ability to positively aecthuman development in the oPt. They present a commanding argument that until Palestinians areaorded ull economic and environmental control, specically control over macro‐economic policy,trade, livelihoods, water resources and borders, sustained development will remain elusive.

Titoia atatio a poitia poaizatioSince 1967, the territorial breakup o the oPt has become gradually more pronounced. The State o Israel has systematically segregated Palestinians communities into a series o ragmented archipelagos(reerred to variously as isolated islands, enclaves, cantons, and Bantustans) under a system that hasbeen deemed “one o the most intensively territorialized control systems ever created”.[3] Israel controlsPalestinian air space, territorial waters, natural resources, movement and the macro‐economic

[1] Mary Kaldor, Proessor o Global Governance, London School o Economy; Mient Jan Faber, Proessor o Human Securityin War Situations, Free University, Amsterdam; Sally Stares, Postdoctoral ellow, Methodology Institute, London School o Economics; George Gicaman, Director o Muwatin, and Proessor o Philosophy in Bir Zeit University; Jamil Hillal, scholar and

major contributor to all previous PHDRs.[2] UNDP (2009) ‘Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in Arab Countries’.[3] David Delaney, ‘Territory: A Short Introduction’, Blackwell Publishing (2005).

15





It is argued that social, economic and political participation is crucial both or building a viable

Palestinian State and or galvanising a large scale civil rights movement. The participatory State-building priorities are highlighted as: gaining territorial integration / contiguity, economic integration,social cohesion, sovereignty and political reconciliation. To this end, a reormulation and reactivation o the long‐serving principle o sumud’ with proactive emphasis in the ace o the prolonged occupation,is proposed as one strategy or popular mobilisation which could contribute to these priorities.Another important recommendation emerging rom the Report is the need or an internal, indigenousreconciliation mechanism. A ‘National Sulha’ is proposed to repair some o the damages o politicalpolarization and the resultant political violence.

The Report strongly suggests that i Palestinians deem that a two‐State solution is part o the preerredresolution to the conict, then in order that a sovereign Palestinian State is viable, such a State must have popular legitimacy and not be driven by either top‐down or external actors. In its assistance to

the emerging Palestinian State, the international community, and particularly the UN, must maintainneutrality and adopt a Do No Harm[4] approach to the provision o aid, whilst simultaneously honouringtheir obligations under international law, and ensuring compliance amongst the conicting parties.

Fao o ovi oa

Determined and courageous actions are necessary now to achieve the human security o Palestiniansand ensure their sel‐determination and sovereignty. The ramework or moving orward ocuses onmaking the ndings operational.

A snapshot o the priorities highlighted include: ensuring aid be de-linked rom the political processso that institutional arrangements can be established to ensure that the rights o Palestinians areprotected and their needs are addressed; establishing a Commission or Eective Governance tomonitor implementation in the short to medium term, building accountability and lending credibilityto the State-building project.

The Report nds that the biggest obstacles to Palestinian unity remain the occupation, especiallythrough its imposition o limited movement and access between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank andEast Jerusalem, and the current internal political divisions. I these issues are addressed in line withinternational and Palestinian law, opportunities or reconciliation and national unity will be improved.Ensuring the accountability o political leaders, ending the siege o Gaza and encroachments into theWest Bank including East Jerusalem are immediate and essential actions, and will hopeully have a

catalytic eect on human security in the oPt at large.

[4] Mary B. Anderson (1999) ‘Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War’, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

17







Human Development Report 2009/10 occupied Palestinian territory

Investing in Human Security for a Future State20

commercial services.[5] The ragmenting impactso these externally imposed constraints are alsobeing compounded by a weak political and legal

authority and the eects o internal divisionbetween the two main political parties, Fatahand Hamas. Recent years have seen ashes o actional ghting and signs that Palestiniantrust and unity are becoming compromised.

The relationship between the two dominantpolitical parties and their associated actions hasdeteriorated dramatically, especially ater theinternational boycott o Hamas and its takeover o Gaza in 2007. There have been increasingly violentinter-Palestinian conrontations and the geographyo the division, which sees Fatah in control o the West Bank and Hamas in control o the GazaStrip, aggravates the political discord. Decades o persistent conict have exposed Palestinians toproound insecurity and violence, loss o opportunityand increasing political rustration. From a humansecurity perspective, which understands thatdevelopment can only proceed i supported bysecurity and human rights, one o the most tragicaspects o these losses is that the will and creativityneeded to sustain a coherent peaceul resistance

strategy is now seriously compromised. Within theoverall context o the Israeli/Palestinian conict, theprolonged occupation and the recent breakdownin intra-Palestinian political relations are creatinga situation in which human security in all itsdimensions is undermined and the opportunitiesor human development are obstructed or whollythwarted.

1.2 Hua uity, hua

vopt a hua ihti oPt

At its core, human security is concerned withreedom and dignity.[6] This Report understandshuman security as the best means to saeguard

[5] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development’,Report No 47657-GZ, Middle East and North Arica Region.See Chapter 3 or additional details.[6] UNDP (1994) ‘Human Development Report 1994New Dimensions o Human Security’, New York: OxordUniversity Press.

lives rom pervasive threats and promotelong-term individual and collective ullment.[7] Palestinian men, women and children ace

persistent and multiple orms o insecurityincluding large numbers o deaths resultingrom both the occupation and internal ghting,other human rights violations, injustice, weak governmental authorities, a lack o politicallegitimacy and the global economic crisis.Even during periods o relative calm, their lack o sel-determination remains constant. Whyis this state o aairs allowed to persist, andindeed escalate, and what can be done to stopit? The Report aims to answer these questions

through reerence to a human security modelwhich ocuses on people, their human rightsand desire or reedom.

Traditionally, security has been narrowly dened,in deensive terms, as “security o territory romexternal aggression.”[8] According to UNDP’sHuman Development Report 1994, the concepto security was originally related more to nation-States than to people. From this perspective,“orgotten were the legitimate concerns o ordinary people who sought security in their

daily lives”. The Report notes that or mostpeople, insecurity is intricately connected to thelived realities o daily lie captured in questionssuch as these: “Will they and their amilies haveenough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Willtheir streets and neighbourhoods be sae romcrime? Will they be tortured by a repressiveState? Will they become a victim o violencebecause o their gender? Will their religion orethnic origin target them or persecution?”[9]

The reraming o what ‘security’ can mean is

particularly important in Israel and the oPtbecause the Israeli ocus on State security overand above the requirements o human securityhas been a dominant theme since the inception

[7] Sen, Amartya (2000) ‘Why Human Security’, Text o Presentation at the International Symposium on HumanSecurity Tokyo, 28 Jul. 2000.[8] UNDP (1994) ‘Human Development Report 1994New Dimensions o Human Security’, New York: OxordUniversity Press.[9] UNDP (1994) ‘Human Development Report 1994New Dimensions o Human Security’, New York: OxordUniversity Press.







extensive and can address issues that are clearlynot basic.[16] The second dierence is that thehuman security paradigm tries to address threats

such as violence or economic downturn directly:it recognizes that wars are a real possibility and insome cases, such as the oPt, an entrenched reality.While the objective o human development hasbeen “growth with equity,” human security canaddress “downturn with security”.[17] To a largerextent than a human development policy, a humansecurity agenda oresees and develops responsesto multi-aceted threats.

UNDP’s Human Development Report (2000)reasserts that “human rights are possessed byall persons, by virtue o their common humanity,to live a lie o reedom and dignity,” and indeed,human rights and a rights-based approach helpensure sustained and sustainable human securityand human development. Universal, inalienableand indivisible, “Human rights express ourdeepest commitments to ensuring that all personsare secure in their enjoyment o the goods andreedoms that are necessary or dignied living.”[18]

Human security and human development,

inormed by human rights “share a commonvision and a common purpose: to secure thereedom, well-being and dignity o all peopleeverywhere.”[19] They aim to protect:

Freedom rom discrimination-by gender,•

race, ethnicity, national origin or religion

Freedom rom want-to enjoy a decent•

standard o living

Freedom to develop and realize one’s•

human potential

Freedom rom ear-o threats to personal•

security, rom torture, arbitrary arrestand other violent acts

[16] Alkire, Sabrina (2003) ‘A Conceptual Framework orHuman Security’, Centre or Research on Inequality, HumanSecurity and Ethnicity, CRISE.[17] Sen, Amartya (2000) ‘Why Human Security’, Text o Presentation at the International Symposium on HumanSecurity Tokyo, 28 Jul. 2000.[18] UNDP (2000) ‘Human Development Report 2000:

Human Rights and Human Development’ New York [19] UNDP (2000) ‘Human Development Report 2000:Human Rights and Human Development’ New York.

Freedom rom injustice and violations•

o the rule o law

Freedom o thought and speech, and•

to participate in decision-making andorm associations.[20]

Given that the oPt lacks State sovereignty,Palestinians must rely on the international law,specically human rights law and humanitarianlaw, as appropriate, to protect these rights.These include:

Customary international law, which are•

a set o rules developed rom interna-

tional and national jurisprudence, inaddition to State practice. The rules arelegally binding on all States

International humanitarian law,•

including Hague and Geneva law,most relevantly the Fourth GenevaConvention governing situations o belligerent occupation

International human rights law, par-•

ticularly those Conventions signed byIsrael (engaging extraterritorial obliga-

tions in the oPt): International Cove-nant on Civil and Political Rights; Inter-national Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights; Convention on theRights o the Child; Convention on theElimination o Discrimination AgainstWomen; International Convention onthe Elimination o All Forms o RacialDiscrimination; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment

The occupation o the oPt is now over orty yearsold. The Oslo Accords – elements o which arestill relevant today – envisaged a ve year tran-sition period to an independent state; but theyare now over teen years old. Developmentgains achieved during the relative calm o theOslo period (1993-1999) are being rapidly erod-ed and as a result, human insecurity is growingas Palestinians continue to suer prolonged oc-cupation, conict and other multi-aceted chal-

[20] UNDP (2000) ‘Human Development Report 2000:Human Rights and Human Development’ New York.







The West Bank is a landlocked area locatedon the west bank o the Jordan River with apopulation o approximately 2.3 million. On

its west, north and south is Israel and Jordanlies to its east. The West Bank has a total landarea o approximately 5,640 km² (2178 miles²)and borders o 404km (251 miles), althoughbecause the borders are so contentious this isdicult to calculate precisely. The West Bank is divided into eleven governorates: Hebron;Bethlehem; East Jerusalem; Ramallah and al-Bireh; Jericho; Salt; Qalqilya; Nablus; Tulkarm;Tubas; and Jenin.

Jerusalem is the disputed capital city o Israeland the oPt. Between 1948 and mid-1967, it wasdivided in two: West Jerusalem, which coveredan area o about 38 km², was under Israeli control.East Jerusalem, which contained an area o some6 km², was ruled by Jordan. In June 1967 Israelannexed approximately 70 km² to the municipalboundaries o West Jerusalem and imposedIsraeli law there.[25] This annexation included notonly the part o Jerusalem that had been underJordanian rule, but also an additional 64 km²,most o which had belonged to 28 villages in

the West Bank and part o which belonged tothe municipalities o Bethlehem and Beit Jala.Following this annexation, the area o WestJerusalem tripled, and Jerusalem became thelargest city in Israel. The Jerusalem Institute orIsrael Studies reports that the total area o theJerusalem Municipality is now 126,400 dunams.[26] Figures rom the Institute or 2008 recordthe total population o Jerusalem as 747,600(265,000 Palestinians and 487,100 Israelis).[27]

In 2008 there were 10.5 million Palestinians

worldwide, approximately 70% o whom arereugees constituting the world’s largest reugeepopulation.[28] One in three reugees around the

[25] B’tselem (2009) ‘East Jerusalem: Legal Status’.[26] A dunum is a unit o land measurement dating back tothe Ottoman Empire; it is equivalent to a thousand squaremetres, or 0.25 acres. Jerusalem Institute or Israel Studies(2008) ‘Statistical Yearbook’.[27] Jerusalem Institute or Israel Studies (2008) ‘StatisticalYearbook’. For more inormation on the status o Jerusalem,

see Chapter 3.[28] PCBS (2008) ‘Special Report on the 60th Anniversary o the Nakba’, 15 May. 2008.

world is Palestinian; around hal o all Palestinianreugees and displaced persons are Stateless. [29] In response to the mass displacement o

Palestinian reugees in 1948, the UN GeneralAssembly passed Resolution 194, which statesthat “…the [Palestinian] reugees wishing toreturn to their homes and live at peace withtheir neighbours should be permitted to do soat the earliest practicable date”.[30] For decades,the State o Israel has ignored this decision anddenied reugees their right to choose to returnto their homeland. Within the oPt, 44.6% o thepopulation or approximately 1.7 million peopleare reugees, o which 31% are in the West Bank

and 67.6% are in the Gaza Strip.[31]

This amountsto 1,059,548 registered reugees in the Gaza Stripand 754,263 in the West Bank. 191,408 reugeeslive in 19 United Nations Relie and Works Agencyor Palestine Reugees in the Near East (UNRWA)camps in the West Bank, and 492,299 reugeeslive in 8 camps in the Gaza Strip. The remainingreugees live in cities, villages and unofcialcamps across the oPt.[32] The population densityin the Gaza reugee camps, according to UNRWA,is the highest in the world.[33]

Prior to 1967, the West Bank was underJordanian control and the Gaza Strip was underEgyptian control. Since the Six-Day War in 1967the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including EastJerusalem, have been under occupation by theState o Israel resulting, among other things, in aviolation o the right o the Palestinian people toexercise sel-determination. During the reportingperiod, the machinery o occupation, includingcheckpoints, closures and curews, placed severerestrictions on Palestinian individuals, amilies,and communities, restraining their economic,social and cultural aairs. Settlement expansion,

[29] Rempel, Terry (2006) ‘Who are Palestinian Reugees?’,Forced Migration Review, Issue 26, Sep. 2006.[30] UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948) availableat http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9037396.html.[31] PCBS (2008) ‘Special Report on the 60th Anniversary o the Nakba’, 15 May 2008.[32] ‘Unocial camps’ pertains to urban neighbourhoods –not administered by UNRWA – with a heavy concentration

o reugees.[33] See UNRWA statistics available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/reugees/gaza.html.



25chapt OItoutio a cotxt

a separation barrierwhich will be reerredto in this Report as the

Wall, and demolitionso Palestinian-owned houses andstructures in Area Cand East Jerusalemand dispossessinghundreds o Palestinians in theWest Bank.[34] Suchrestrictions, theragmenting eects

o the Wall, thecontainment andblockade o Gaza,the many militaryincursions and theviolence stemmingrom a growinginternal conict, areeroding the socialabric o Palestiniansociety.

To varying degrees,the mechanisms o occupation shapethe lie trajectorieso the majority o the population,with all Palestiniansunder 40 havinglived their livesunder occupation.The occupation hasbecome a structuringelement o everyday lie in the oPt. Palestinianindividuals, amilies and communities havebeen orced to negotiate and adapt to it overthe past two decades and most acutely in thepast eight years. Generalized insecurity andanxiety colour the backdrop o Palestinian lie;violence, intimidation and humiliation metedout by the IDF, Israeli settlers and increasinglyby intra-Palestinian ghting, are oten dailyexperiences.

[34] Discussed in depth in Chapter 3.

Through Israel’s expansion and building o illegalsettlements, outposts and the Wall, as well as itsdesignation o specic areas as military and naturezones, the oPt is evolving into a collection o narrower, more conned and increasingly isolatedenclaves with high population densities that aresubject to various residency status and otherregimes o control. These ‘islands’ o populationsare separated rom each another by a range o obstacles to access and movement, including, inthe West Bank, a complex permits system, militarycheckpoints, roadblocks, a segregated highwaysystem which reuses Palestinians access to certainroads, and the Wall. Gaza has been closed o

Map 2: the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Source: PASSIA, 2006





rom the outside world more or less hermeticallysince Israeli disengagement in September 2005,with a tight blockade in place since Hamas took

over the Strip in June 2007. Through its physicaland administrative architecture, the OccupyingPower is able to assume control over the enclavesas well as the relationships between them. Livingconditions have consistently deteriorated as theterritory is too resource poor and overpopulatedto be able to unction in isolation rom the rest o the world.[35]

The physical and administrative restrictionsimposed by Israel on the movement o Palestinians is changing the physical landscapeand built environment. For example, whencertain residential and/or arming areaswithin the oPt (and Israel) are deemed to beor the sole use o the State o Israel and itscitizens, Palestinians are orced to rebuildtheir lives elsewhere. One eect o this typeo displacement is increased urbanizationwithin an increasingly shrinking area o land.In essence urban centres, such as Ramallah, arebecoming increasingly distinct and isolatedeconomic islands that are largely subsistence-

based; there is no ‘national’ economy per se.

Similarly, the Palestinian political eld hasexperienced qualitative changes since the 1980s.It started out being led by a liberation movement,the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),characterized by intellectual, political andorganizational pluralism although dominatedby one large political organization, Fatah. As aresult o the Oslo Accords, the Fatah movementbecame – de-acto – the Palestinian Authority(PA) in 1995, a governing system that lacks the

minimum elements o a sovereign independentState. Tensions between Hamas (the ‘opposition’– Hamas considers Israel an illegitimate State andIsrael views Hamas as a terrorist group that mustbe dismantled) and Fatah (the ‘authority’) beganto climb in 2005 ater the death o long-time PLOleader Yasser Araat and intensied urther ater

[35] The international blockade has the harmul eect o unintentionally promoting inormal and illegal economicactivities – like or example the extensive tunnel economy– as well as doing more direct harm to the Palestinianpopulation in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas achieved considerable success in the

elections or the Palestinian Legislative Councilon January 25, 2006, winning 74 o the 132

available seats, while Fatah’s 45 seats positionedit as the opposition party.

While pluralism has survived, the political eldhas been transormed by the competitionand conict that marks the current politicalimpasse between Fatah and Hamas. [36] Thelack o legitimate political authority and Statesovereignty is one o the principle drivers o human insecurity in the oPt.

The perceived corruption, ragmentation and

lack o accountability o the internal Palestiniansecurity services – ostensibly driven by politicalafliation – is also a major concern in theoPt. In the West Bank, the newly taught andbetter equipped Palestinian National SecurityForces, trained in Jordan with U.S. unding, areestablishing a wholesale crack-down on Hamasoperatives (and supporters).[37] Similarly, internalsecurity services in the Gaza Strip, currentlymonopolized by Hamas, are violently impingingon civil and political reedoms. The Geneva

Centre or the Democratic Control o the ArmedForces (DCAF) when reporting on the situation inJenin in 2009, ound that civil society no longertrusts those in authority and ears an increasein repression: “Arrests and investigations havebecome political,” said civilians they interviewed.“The Palestinian authorities, whether here or inGaza, have lost the trust o the people.”[38]

Indeed, security service reorm is one o thethorniest issues on the table at the national unitytalks between Fatah and Hamas. The maintenance

o basic law and order is also impeded by acompromised legislature and judiciary, as willbe discussed in Chapter 5. The ollowing sectionhighlights some o the key actions inuencingthe human security and human developmentstatus during the reporting period.

[36] Hilal, Jamil (2009) ‘Severe Polarization in, andFragmentation o, Palestinian Society’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.

[37] ICG (2008) ‘Palestine Divided’, Middle East Brieng No.25, 17 Dec. 2008.[38] DCAF (2009) ‘Civil Society Spotlight’ No. 3, Aug. 2009.




1.4 ky vt hapi hua

uity o 2005 to i-2009

Israeli’s unilateral disengagement rom the

Gaza Strip (September 2005) involved theremoval o Israeli settlements and around 8,500settlers, the demolition o buildings and arminginrastructure (at the request o the PA), and theevacuation o military personnel. The ormerIsraeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, declared thatits withdrawal marked “the end o Israeli controlover and responsibility or the Gaza Strip.” [39] However, while disengagement did result in therelinquishment o certain controls over Gaza, it

was ollowed by the introduction o a regime o containment and the tightening o control overair, sea and land borders. The rst military actions,including bombardments, began and continueto this day. Despite what it claims, the highestauthorities in international law have stated thatits disengagement has not absolved the State o Israel o its obligations as an Occupying Power. [40]

Ater disengagement, the Agreement on

Movement and Access and the Agreed Principlesor Raah Crossing (November 2005) signed

by Israel and the PA were set up to decide theconditions o entry to and exit rom Gaza. TheAgreement on Movement and Access has thestated aim “to promote peaceul economicdevelopment and improve the humanitariansituation on the ground”. It lays out severalelements, including opening the internationalEgypt-Gaza border at Raah and commercialcrossing points rom the Gaza Strip into Israel;acilitating movement o people and goodswithin the West Bank, including a plan to reduce

obstacles to movement; acilitating movemento people between the Gaza Strip and theWest Bank through bus and truck convoys; andconstructing a seaport in Gaza. This Agreementhas never been implemented and the ability o Palestinian residents o the Gaza Strip to accesseither the West Bank or the outside world remainsextremely limited, except in a ew special cases,

[39] Gisha (2007) ‘Disengaged Occupiers: the Legal Status

o Gaza’ Jan. 2009.[40] Gisha (2007) ‘Disengaged Occupiers: the Legal Status o Gaza’ Jan. 2009. See Chapter 3.

while the ow o commercial trade is negligible.Freedom o movement within the West Bank is also heavily restricted and continues to be

eroded:[41] in 2008 alone, the number o xedphysical walls increased rom 528 to 563.[42]

Adhering to the principles o democracy has alsonot brought Palestinian increased security. Votersin the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, includingEast Jerusalem, were eligible to participate inthe 2006 elections which were described by theQuartet as “ree, air and secure.”[43] Nonetheless,shortly ater the elections, the State o Israel andthe major donors imposed economic sanctionsagainst the PA, directed specically at Hamas.President Olmert stated “It is clear that in light o the Hamas majority in the Palestinian LegislativeCouncil (PLC) and the instructions to orm anew government that were given to the heado Hamas, the PA is – in practice – becoming aterrorist authority”.[44] The sanctions consistedo: (i) withholding tax revenues collected in theoPt by Israel; (ii) cutting o international aid tothe PA by the major donors; (iii) imposing Israelirestrictions on Palestinians’ reedom o movementand the movement o goods in and out o the

oPt; and (iv) imposing U.S. banking restrictionson the oPt. These sanctions were escalated inJune 2007 ollowing the Hamas take-over o Gaza when a more severe Israeli Blockade on theGaza Strip was initiated. They undermine humansecurity and are aggravating the splits and socio-economic decline o the territory.

The last ew years have also seen a scaling-up o Israeli military actions against the oPt.Operation Summer Rains began on June 28,2006 as the rst large-scale conventional war

[41] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘Report No. 85 Implementation o theAgreement on Movement and Access and Update on GazaCrossings’, 04-17 Feb. 2009. http://www.ma.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reerence+Documents/Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+rom+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm. Chapter 2 explores movement and accessin greater detail.[42] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Consolidated Appeals Process oPt’.[43] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: PullingBank rom the Brink’ Middle East Report No. 54, Jun.[44] BBC News (2006) ‘Israel to impose Hamas sanctions’, 19Feb. 2006 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4729000.stm





since Israel’s unilateral disengagement rom theGaza Strip in September 2005. According to theState o Israel, it was launched both to suppress

the ring o rockets into the Negev area o Israelby Palestinian resistance groups and securethe release o Sta Sergeant Gilad Shalit, amember o the Israeli army who was kidnappedby Hamas on June 25, 2006. Israel “used tanks,troops, gunboats and aircrat to attack the Gazaarea,”[45] causing the deaths o and injuries tomany Palestinians as well as the destruction o essential inrastructure, including three bridgesand the only electricity plant in the Strip.

When the Operation ended with an Israeliwithdrawal and a ceasere between Hamas andIsrael, no deal or the release o Shalit had beenreached. The destruction to civilian propertyand inrastructure caused by the war – whichIsraeli human rights organisation, B’tselem,described as punitive – adversely aected theelectricity supply, water and sewage systemsand medical acilities in the Strip.[46] The SwissForeign Ministry noted that a “number o actions by the Israeli deence orces in theiroensive against the Gaza Strip have violated

the principle o proportionality and are to beseen as orms o collective punishment, whichis orbidden....There is no doubt that [Israel]has not taken the precautions required o it in international law to protect the civilianpopulation and inrastructure.”[47]

Ater Operation Summer Rains in June, mutuallydestructive conict, military incursions androcket re involving Israel and residents o the Gaza Strip continued until another largemilitary incursion, Operation Autumn Clouds,

began on November 1st 2006. From July 1, 2006

[45] The Jerusalem Post (2006) ‘Switzerland: Israel violatingint>l law’, 3 Jul. 2006, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885911457&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull[46] B’tselem (2006) ‘Act o Vengeance: Israel’s Bombingo the Gaza Power Plant and its Eects’, Sep. AmnestyInternational (2006) ‘Israel/Occupied Territories: Hostage-taking and wanton destruction must cease’, 28 Jun. 2006.[47] The Jerusalem Post (2006) ‘Switzerland: Israel violatingint>l law’, 3 Jul. 2006, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885911457&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

to November 4, 2006, 391 Palestinians and veIsraelis were killed.[48]The IDF began to withdrawrom the Strip on November 7, 2006.

Following Israel’s withdrawal, the ghting turnedinwards with the breakdown in relations betweenthe Hamas-led government and Fatah oppositionleading to intense ghting rom December 2006to January 2007. Several ceasere attempts ailedas a result o continued battles until in February2007, Fatah and Hamas met in Mecca and agreedto a ceasere. Even so, minor incidents continuedthroughout March and April 2007, ending withanother series o violent clashes in May 2007 andthe Hamas take-over o Gaza on June 14, 2007.This move was described by President Abbasand Fatah as a premeditated coup d’état and byHamas as the‘Second Liberation’ o the Gaza Strip. [49] The ICRC estimated that at least 118 peoplewere killed and more than 550 were wounded.[50] This bloody and violent conrontation was ashock to the Palestinian people who had pridedthemselves until then on being able to peaceullysolve the internal conict.

The Israeli containment and blockade o Gaza

began in June 2007 and compounded the pre-existing policy o isolation, strangling Gaza’s oncethriving economy, reducing the supply o basicgoods such as ood, money, uel, cement, glass,medicines, and spare parts or water and electricalinrastructure, and creating a severe crisis o humandignity and ear or the population. The State o Israel changed the movement arrangements atthe ve Gaza border-crossing points under itscontrol (Erez, Karni, Kerem Shalom, Nahal Oz, andSua) and, except in some exceptional cases, doesnot permit the movement o people or goods

between Israel and Gaza.[51] Egypt also partiallysealed its border crossing with Gaza. [52]

[48] OCHA-oPt (2006) ‘Protection o Civilians: WeeklyBrieng Notes’; Bt’selem (2006) ‘Statistics: Fatalities’.[49] ICG (2007) ‘Ater Gaza’, Middle East Report No. 68, 2 Jul.2007.[50] ICRC (2007) ‘Gaza-West Bank – ICRC Bulletin’, No22/2007.[51] B’Tselem (2007) ‘The siege on the Gaza Strip’, 24 Jul.

2007.[52] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘The Humanitarian Monitor’, Apr.2009.







Israel.[60] During the incursion, rockets and mortarshells continued to be red out o Gaza intosouthern Israel. These attacks killed three Israeli

civilians and one soldier and injured more than 84people, our o them seriously. Nine soldiers werekilled in combat within the Gaza Strip (our by IDFre). 113 Israelis were wounded, one critically and20 moderately or seriously.[61]

In the atermath o Operation Cast Lead, Egyptorganized a conerence at Sharm El Sheikh on

March 2, 2009. The conerence concluded withinternational donors pledging USD 4.5 billionor the Early Recovery and Reconstruction Planor Gaza. Although President Abbas commentedthat money was “insufcient” without a politicalsolution, political change was not obligatory orrecovery and reconstruction.[62] Given that theblockade is ongoing, very little o the moneypledged has been able to reach the people o Gaza; the early recovery o Gaza is subject topolitical negotiations revolving around the releaseo Sta Sergeant Shalit. The continued blockadealso means that no materials necessary or earlyrecovery and reconstruction are allowed in, andthe situation has deteriorated to the extent that

some Gazans have no other option but to rebuildtheir homes rom mud.[63]

In the most recent threat to the oPt, on May 3,2009 the Israeli Ministry o Interior approved plansto begin expansion o the settlement at Ma’ale

Adumim just outside Jerusalem. The proposedconstruction will take place on the highlycontested area o land, reerred to by the Israeliauthorities as “E1”, in the Jerusalem Municipality.The expansion o Ma’ale Adumim will urther

[60] Report o the United Nations Fact Finding Mission onthe Gaza Conict (2009) ‘Human Rights in Palestine andother occupied Arab territories’ A/HRC/12/48, 15 Sep.2009.[61] B’tselem (2009) ‘Guidelines or Israel’s Investigation intoOperation Cast Lead 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009’,Feb. 2009.[62] BBC News (2009) ‘Billions pledged to rebuild Gaza’ (2Mar. 2009).[63] BBC News (2009) ‘Scant movement on Gaza blockade’,16 Jun., available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8101002.stm. While this is a testament tothe resourceulness and resilience o Palestinians, it isimportant to note that Palestinians typically build theirhomes with concrete.

disconnect East Jerusalem rom the northernand southern parts o the West Bank and severthe continuity between East Jerusalem and the

Jordan Valley.[64] The plans have been consistentlyblocked by international diplomatic interventionsand most recently, the Obama administrationhas requested a settlement reeze. Yet Israel’ssettlement policy continues: the number o settlersliving illegally in the West Bank and East Jerusalemhas increased rom approximately 426,487 in2005[65] to between 480,000 and 550,000 in 2008.[66] U.S. President Barak Obama appears to be usingthe issue o settlements as a litmus test or Israel’scommitment to peace, noting that “stopping

settlements and making sure that there is a viablePalestinian State” is in the long term securityinterests o Palestine, Israel and the U.S. [67]

The Palestinian unity talks hosted by the Egypt– headed by intelligence chie Omar Souliman– have been ongoing in Cairo since March2009, and are aimed at orming a national unitygovernment that can better achieve Palestiniansel-determination. Initially the talks involved13 Palestinian actions, plus independentacademics, politicians and businessmen, but in

the succeeding months, the talks were narroweddown to representatives o Hamas and Fatahalone.[68] The talks have, however, overlookedthe peace-building work that continues in oPtand Israel through civil society initiatives suchas the International Women’s Commission (IWC).[69] Representatives rom Palestinian civil society havealso been marginalized rom the discussions. Thethorniest points on the table at Cairo include:

[64] Human Rights Council (2008) ‘Israeli settlements in theOccupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,and in the occupied Syrian Golan’, Resolution 7/18, 27 Mar.2008.[65] B’tselem (2009) ‘Statistics’ on ‘Land expropriation andsettlements’ available at http://www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Statistics.asp.[66] UN Special Rapporteur (2008) ‘Situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, A/63/32625 Aug. 2008.[67] The Guardian (2009) ‘Obama: halt to new Israelisettlements is in America’s security interests’ (29 May.2009).

[68] Al Jazeera News (2009) ‘A slight pause or nationalunity’, Nour Odeh (22 Mar. 2009).[69] IWC available at see http://www.iwc-peace.org/.




Map 3: Jerusalem Barrier: Ma’ale Adumim Land Requisitioned

Source: OCHA-oPt, 2004

The political programme o a transitional•

national unity government

Reorming the security services in the oPt•

Political prisoners in the West Bank and•

Gaza Strip

Reorming the PLO•

Resistance and negotiation strategies•

including recognition o Israel, the

targeting o civilians, the prospect o hudna (a long-term truce) versus apeace treaty with Israel.

The aim o the Cairo negotiations was to producea transitional government o national consensusto act as a bridge until the next Palestinianelections, due to begin in January 2010. Thedeadlines or completion o these negotiationshave, however, consistently been broken.

1.5 couio

As the situation worsens, Palestinians o all agescontinue to try to live their lives with a semblanceo normality. Some, particularly those in civilsociety organizations, remain actively engaged inexploring peaceul solutions to the current impasse,both internal and vis-à-vis Israel. However, anexamination o the current human security situationo Palestinians reveals that both the security and

development gains o the past are being eroded.This Report aims to describe those mechanismsthat serve to promote insecurity in the hopes thatnaming the issues will help prevent the currentuneasy situation rom dissolving into chaos as theprolonged “transition to sel-determination” dragson.[70] The next Chapter provides details on thetrends and status o human development in the oPt

rom a human security perspective.

[70] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.



Pati Phaat’ y







the most signicant obstacles to humandevelopment in the oPt.[72] As this Reportillustrates, progress in terms o the human

development o Palestinians living underprolonged occupation, whilst not impossible, isextremely dicult.

2.2 Hua dvopt

Iiato[73]

The latest census conducted by the PalestinianCentral Bureau o Statistics (PCBS) estimatesthe total population o Palestinians in the oPt

to be 3,825,512, o whom 2,385,180 live in theWest Bank, and 1,440,332 live in the Gaza Strip.The number o Palestinians in the Jerusalemgovernorate is approximately 363,000. Thepopulation growth rate is approximately2.82 % per year; although this representsa signicant growth in population, thebirth rates rom 1997 to 2008 have actuallydeclined. The total ertility rate in the oPt hasdeclined with 4.6 births in 2007 compared to6.0 births in 1997. Regional disaggregation

indicates that the birth rate in the West Bank was 30.6 births compared to 35.6 births inthe Gaza Strip in 2008. As Figure 1 illustrates,the majority o the population are under 25years old. Overall, the average householdsize is 5.8, with the average household in theWest Bank having 5.5 members and 6.5 inthe Gaza Strip.

The HDI provides a composite measure o three dimensions o human development:living a long and healthy lie (measured by

lie expectancy), being educated (measuredby adult literacy and gross enrolment ineducation) and having a decent standard o living (measured by purchasing power parity,

[72] UNDP; Arab Fund or Economic and Social Development(2002) ‘Arab Human Development Report: CreatingOpportunities or Future Generations’; UNDP; ArabFund or Economic and Social Development; Arab Gul Development Programme or United Nations DevelopmentOrganizations (2005) ‘Arab Human Development Report:

Towards the Rise o Women in the Arab World’.[73] Unless otherwise indicated, all gures in this sectionare rom: PCBS (2009) ‘Palestine in Figures 2008’, May 2009.

PPP, income). The index is not in any sense acomprehensive measure o human development.It does not, or example, include important

indicators such as gender or income inequalitynor more difcult to measure concepts likerespect or human rights and political reedoms.What it does provide is a broadened prismor viewing human progress and the complexrelationship between income and well-being.The HDI or oPt is 0.737, which gives the countrya rank o 110th out o 182 countries with data, inthe medium human development range. [74] Thisindex is compiled using lie expectancy at birth(73.3), the adult literacy rate (93.8 %), combined

with the gross enrolment ratio in education (78.3%) and GDP per capita (USD 2,243). [75] Theseindices demonstrate that the oPt achieves abovethe regional (Arab) average in lie expectancy,

literacy rate and education, but lags behind inGDP per capita. The HDI places the oPt behind

[74] Inormation on HDI and GDI can be ound in Chapter2, or urther inormaiton see UNDP (2008) ‘HumanDevelopment Indices: A Statistical Update, 2008.[75] In the absence o an estimate o GDP per capita (PPPUS$), an HDRO estimate o 2,243 (PPP US$) was used,derived rom the value o GDP or 2005 in US$ and theweighted average ratio o PPP US$ to US$ in the ArabStates. The value is expressed in 2007 prices.

Figure 1: Population pyramid

Source: PCBS, 2009



35chapt ToTh ut tatu a t o hua vopt

Qatar (33), the United Arab Emirates (35), Libya(55), Oman (56), Saudi Arabia (59), Lebanon (83),and Iran (88), but ahead o Tunisia (98), Algeria

(104), Syria (107), Egypt (123), Yemen (140),Sudan (150) and Djibouti (155).

The GDI or 2007 ranks theoPt at 110, with a value o 0.714 (2006), revealing thatPalestinian women have ahigher lie expectancy thanmen (74.9/71.7), a highergross enrolment ratio ineducation (80.8/75.9), but alower literacy rate (90.3/97.2).The GEM rank and valueis currently unavailable o the oPt, but some o thecomponent ratings areindicative: women makeup only 10% o legislators,senior ofcials and managers,and 34% o proessional and technical workers.Income data disaggregated by gender would beinstructive but is currently unavailable.

2.3 eooy a poyt

With a growing population and a shrinkingeconomy, real per capita GDP is close to 30%,below its height in 1999.[76] The overall economicpicture is one o negative growth. PCBS estimatesthat the GDP in 2006 had negative growth rate o -6.6 % (see Figure 2).[77] It estimates that real GDPgrowth in 2007 was a mere 0.5 %, while resultsrom the rst quarter suggest that growth in 2008

is slightly negative.[78]

Similarly, the IMF recordeda drop in GDP to -0.5 % in 2007, and a modestgrowth o 0.8 % in 2008. This is probably due to acontinued yet marginal drop in economic activityin Gaza, given its already-low base, matchedwith a modest rise in economic activity in the

[76] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid,Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.

[77] PCBS (2007) ‘Economic orecasts or 2007’.[78] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid,Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.

West Bank. [79] These gures are representative o already severely limited economic activity beoreOperation Cast Lead, which, as it resulted in the

destruction o signicant remaining economicassets, means that urther decline is inevitable.

The International Financial Institutions highlightthat, even more troubling than the negative growthrates over the past ew years, is the changingcomposition o the economy: as GDP is increasingly

driven by government and private consumptiono donor aid and remittances respectively,investments have allen to dangerously low levels,leaving little productive base or a sel-sustainingeconomy.[80] The Palestinian economy is buttressedby enormous inusions o oreign aid: in 2008,budget support alone increased by nearly 80% romits 2007 level, and at close to USD 1.8 billion, wasequivalent to about 30% o GDP. By comparison, in2007 the estimated recurrent and developmentalbudget support added up to 5% o GDP.[81] This, inpart, reects the ‘West Bank rst’ policy pursued bythe international community in the atermath o Hamas’s takeover o the Gaza Strip.

The cost o living in the oPt rose signicantly overthe reporting period. The overall Consumer Price

[79] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid,Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.[80] World Bank (2007) ‘Two Years ater London: RestartingPalestinian Economic Recovery’, Economic Monitoring

Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, Sep. 2007.[81] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid,Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.

Figure 2: Real GDP growth 1997-2008

Source: PCBS and World Bank, 2009













and transportation.[112] The poverty line is NIS2,300 per month (approximately USD 581)or a amily o two adults and our children. In

2008, the number o persons living in povertywas just under one third o the population:approximately 477,360 people in the West Bank and 729,880 people in the Gaza Strip.

Poverty rates among Palestinian householdsduring 2007 totalled 34.5 %: 23.6 % or the WestBank and 55.7 % in Gaza Strip. The World Bank gures released in 2008 broadly reect PCBSndings; they note that the rate o poverty inthe West Bank ell rom 22 % in 2006 to just over19 % in 2007, but the crisis in the Gaza Stripmeant that poverty gures rose overall.[113] TheWorld Bank also notes that the percentage o Palestinians in Gaza living in absolute povertyrose rom 33.2 % in 2006 to 35 % in 2007 –equating to almost hal a million people. A highpercentage o the population in the oPt receiveood or cash aid. I this income through aid isdeducted, poverty rates would climb to 79.4% and 45.7 % or the Gaza Strip and West Bank respectively. [114]

Palestinians in East Jerusalem also experiencesignicant poverty levels. Whilst they arecompletely administered by the Israeliauthorities, they are socially, economically andinstitutionally marginalized in comparison totheir Israeli counterparts. Towards the end o 2008, over one third or approximately 35% o amilies in Jerusalem lived below the povertyline.[115] When disaggregated, 23% o Israeli

[112] Data on poverty in the oPt is politicised and variable.PCBS current work in Gaza and east Jerusalem isconstrained, thereore, World Bank estimates have beenalso been noted. Figures rom the Jerusalem Institute orIsrael Studies have been used to illustrate poverty levelsin Jerusalem; these are some o the only gures availablecomparing Israeli and Palestinian residents o the city. Assuch, the data presented requires some interpretation.[113] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects:Aid, Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.[114] World Bank (2008) ‘Palestinian Economic Prospects:Aid, Access and Reorm’, Sep. 2008.[115] Jerusalem Institute or Israel Studies (2009) available athttp://www.jiis.org.il/ cited in Nadav Shragai (2009) ‘Mosto Jerusalem>s non-Jewish children live below povertyline’, Haaretz, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1086819.html.

amilies, mostly ultra-Orthodox Jews, and 67%o Palestinian amilies live below the povertyline in Jerusalem. Figures released by the

Jerusalem Institute or Israel Studies indicatethat among children, 48% o Jews and 74% o non-Jews were dened as poor. According tothe study, there were 492,400 Israeli Jews orapproximately 65 % o the city’s population,and 268,400 Palestinians, estimated at 35%,living in the city.[116]

Evidence suggests that the gap between the richand poor in the oPt is widening. The insecurityo the economic and political contexts increasesthe probability that poor Palestinians, clustered just above the poverty line, will all into poverty.In addition, in the atermath o Operation CastLead and because o the ongoing blockade, itis likely that poverty gures will continue toincrease alarmingly in the Gaza Strip.

The coping strategies o Palestinian amiliesstruggling to navigate this economicallyinsecure reality include the pooling o resources,reducing expenditures and consumption, andrelying on public assistance and borrowing.

Individuals and amilies need to reorganise theirpriorities to maintain their integrity and seek better uture options where possible, and areoten orced to compromise their aspirations,with dierential impacts on people dependingon pre-existing social vulnerabilities.

Severe ood crises have not materialized inthe oPt as traditionally strong social ties tendto preclude the possibility o acute hunger.However, according to a WFP/UNRWA/FAO survey conducted in 2008, 38% o the

population is ood insecure, compared to 34%in 2006.[117] Food insecurity in Gaza is morewidespread, reaching 56%, while in the WestBank it is 25%. Reugees are more ood insecure(44%) than non reugees (33%). Food insecurity

[116] The use o “Jewish” rather than “Israeli” is reective o language used by the study rom the Jerusalem Instituteor Israel Studies.[117] For methodological inormation on the calculation o ood security, see WFP/UNRWA/FAO (2008) ‘Rapid Socio-economic and Food Security Assessment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’, May, 2008.




is 50% in camps.[118] In the West Bank, an averagehousehold spends 49 cents o every USD earnedon ood; a poor household spends two-thirds o

its income on ood.[119]

Figure 5: Food Security Levels, 2008 [120]

Source: WFP/ UNRWA/ FAO, 2008

No one dies o starvation in Gaza. Weeat what we can get and we rationour consumption o ood [….] We eat

the same meal or several days […]sometimes we only have one mainmeal every week and it is usually onFridays. I have not bought any meator more than three months.

Head o household, Ash Shati ReugeeCamp, Middle Gaza Governorate[121]

Food insecurity is embedded in economic andpolitical insecurity resulting rom the policies o the occupation as well as, and more recently, the

intra-Palestinian conict, the Israeli blockade

[118] FAO/WFP (2007) ‘Comprehensive Food Security andVulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) West Bank and Gaza Strip’,East Jerusalem, January.[119] FAO/WFP (2009) ‘Socio-Economic and Food SecuritySurvey Report West Bank’, PCBS Data Jan-Feb 2009, Aug.2009.[120] WFP/UNRWA/FAO (2008) ‘Rapid Socio-economic andFood Security Assessment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’,May, 2008.[121] FAO/WFP (2007) ‘Comprehensive Food Security andVulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) West Bank and Gaza Strip’,East Jerusalem, January.

o Gaza, and the accompanying sanctionso donor countries. Within the oPt, hal thepopulation in a WFP survey noted that they

had decreased their spending on ood, while89% reduced the quality o ood purchased,and almost all decreased their consumptiono resh ruit, vegetables and animal proteinor nancial reasons.[122] Rationing is anothercoping strategy used by amilies to adapt toood shortages. Palestinians are eating less, withparents reducing their ood intake to enabletheir children to eat.[123]

Photo 1: Cooking in Gaza in the atermath

o Operation Cast Lead

Source: Vanessa Farr, 2009

[122] WFP (2008) ‘Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping’, inFOOD SECURITY and MARKET MONITORING Report July,Report 19 http://www.relieweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.ns/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-7GP7VV-ull_reort.pd/$File/ull_reort.pd.[123] WFP/UNRWA/FAO (2008) ‘Rapid Socio-economic andFood Security Assessment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’,May, 2008.









one third o the respondents reported that ei-ther athers or husbands make the decision re-garding a emale household member’s access

to health care.[148]

The health eects o the prolonged occupationand the recent internal conict on Palestinianshave sombre implications and change the way inwhich health indicators should be approached.The constant exposure to threats in a conictsetting is in itsel a specic determinant o health status and can lead to disease.[149] As such,conventional indicators must be supplementedwith documentation on lived experiences andperceptions o health and quality o lie.[150]

2.6 euatio

The adult literacy rate in the oPt is 94.1%: Theliteracy rates amongst the reugee population,contrary to levels o poverty and unemployment,are the same and have been better than thoseo non-reugees: 5.7% o reugees 15 years andabove are illiterate compared to 6.5% o non-reugees.[151] For the academic year 2007/2008,

the number o pupils in schools was 1.1 million,o which approximately 549,000 were malesand 549,000 emales.[152]

Military occupations are another

appreciable curb on the human right to

education, the most egregious example

being the Israeli-Palestinian conict .[153]

A study across six districts in the oPt ound that“teachers and administrators overwhelminglybelieved that the quality o education they

[148] UNIFEM (2009) ‘Voicing the needs o Women and Menin Gaza Beyond the Atermath o the 23 day Israeli MilitaryOperations’.[149] Giacaman et al. (2009) ‘Health status and health servicesin the occupied Palestinian territory’ Lancet 373: 837-49.[150] See Chapter 3.[151] PCBS (2008) ‘Special Report on the 60th Anniversary o the Nakba’, 15 May 2008.[152] PCBS (2008) ‘Special Report on the 60th Anniversary o

the Nakba’, 15 May 2008.[153] Villalobos, Munoz (2005) ‘ Report o the UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education’, E/CN.4/2005.

could provide was being eroded”.[154] The Israelimilitary actions have had immeasurable costs tothe education system: damage to inrastructure

alone totalled more than USD 5 million in 2005.[155] During the recent Operation Cast Lead o 2008-2009, in less than one month 10 schoolswere destroyed and 168 were damaged, threeuniversities/colleges were destroyed and 14damaged;[156] 164 students and 12 teacherswere killed, and 454 students and 5 teacherswere injured.[157] Even beore the incursionmost schools were operating on a double ortriple shit basis to meet the needs o students.Similarly, in West Bank the quality o education

is compromised by schools operating in doubleshits, one held in the morning and another inthe aternoon.

There are ten universities in the oPt; one isprivate and nine are public. Seven are locatedin the West Bank and three are in the Gaza Strip.In 2005 there were 76,650 students almostequally distributed between the regions, withmore emales than males: 40,250/36,400.[158] The number o graduates was 9,927 or 2005:5,891 in the West Bank and 4,036 in the Gaza

Strip; 5,530 are emale and 4,397 are male;34% studied social sciences, business andlaw; 25% education; 16% humanities and arts;10% science; 9% engineering, manuacturingand construction; 6% health and welare; and1% agriculture and veterinary. The Ministry o

[154] Save the Children cited in Susan Nicolai (2007)‘Fragmented Foundations: education and chronic crisis inthe Occupied Palestinian Territory’, UNESCO International

Institute or Educational Planning, Save the Children UK.[155] Susan Nicolai (2007) ‘Fragmented Foundations:education and chronic crisis in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory’, UNESCO International Institute or EducationalPlanning, Save the Children UK.[156] Report o the Independent Fact Finding Committee onGaza: No Sae Place (2009) League o Arab States, 30 Apr.2009.[157] The Palestinian National Early Recovery andReconstruction Plan or Gaza 2009-2010, InternationalConerence o the Palestinian Economy or theReconstruction o Gaza, Sharm El-Sheikh, Arab Republic o Egypt, 2 Mar. 2009.[158] All gures on tertiary education rom European TrainingFoundation (2006) ‘Human Resources Development andits Links to the Labour Market in the West Bank and GazaStrip’.












2.8 eviot

Water is one o the most challenging issues

aecting environmental sustainability in theoPt. The global Human Development Report2006 noted that per capita Palestinians,especially in Gaza, experience one o thehighest levels o water scarcity in the world,with physical availability and governance o shared water contributing to this shortage.[193] The unequal sharing between Israel and theoPt o the aquiers below the West Bank is stark:average per capita water use by Israeli settlerson the West Bank is some nine times higher

than by Palestinians.[194]

With only 13% o allwells in the West Bank, settlers account or 53%o groundwater extraction.[195]

The management o the western and coastalaquiers demonstrates the problem. Part o theJordan Basin, the western aquier is the singlemost important source o renewable water orthe oPt. Nearly three quarters o the aquieris recharged within the West Bank and owsto the coast o Israel. Much o the water is notaccessible to Palestinians; this is a result partly,

o the stringent regulation o the quantity andalso depth o wells. Palestinian per capita accessto water resources in the West Bank is a quartero Israeli access and it is declining.[196] Thereare similar problems with the waters rom theCoastal Basin, which barely reach the Gaza Stripbecause o the high rates o extraction on theIsraeli side.

It is estimated that the over-abstraction o theCoastal Basin – to approximately double thesustainable limit in 2000 – is now reaching

dangerous levels.[197] Only 5% to 10% o the

[193] UNDP (2006) ‘Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and theglobal water crisis’, Human Development Report.[194] UNDP (2006) ‘Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and theglobal water crisis’, Human Development Report.[195] UNDP (2006) ‘Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and theglobal water crisis’, Human Development Report.[196] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Development’, Apr. 2009.[197] B’Tselem (2000) ‘Thirsty or a Solution: The Water Crisisin the Occupied Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement, Position Paper’, 10.

aquier yields quality drinking water.[198] Thelowering o the water table coupled withincreased salinisation via sea water intrusion

and pollution by raw sewage compromisesboth the quality and quantity o available water.The main contaminants in the water resourcesin the Gaza Strip are nitrates, chlorides, salinity,and potentially, ecal coliorms and ecalstreptococcus. [199] The Palestinian HydrologyGroup contends that the current pollutant ratesare our times higher than the 2005 gures.[200] Public health concerns due to this pollutioninclude water-borne diseases and acute,chronic and inectious diseases like Hepatitis-A,

diarrhoea and cholera. The West Bank is also atrisk rom contaminants.

In 2009 a third o Palestinian West Bank com-munities are unconnected to water networks:in the north one th o the population is notserved, and almost hal o the communities inthe south remain unconnected.[201] The Nablus,Jenin and Tubas governorates in the north arethe most poorly served; in the south, almost60% o communities in the Hebron governo-rate lack access to water.[202] Those not served

by networks have to pay a higher price or wa-ter despite the act that they live in some o thepoorest regions in the oPt: water rom non-net-work sources costs up to our times more thannetwork water.[203] A study conducted by USAIDrevealed that in the Nablus and Hebron gov-ernorates, the contamination level or tankedwater was 38% zero-level aecal coli orms and80% zero level aecal coli orms or piped wa-ter.[204] Ostensibly, water supply coverage is bet-

[198] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Development’, Apr. 2009.[199] PCHR interview with Abdul Rahman Tamimi, PalestinianHydrology Group, Ramallah, 21 Dec. 2008.[200] PCHR interview with Abdul Rahman Tamimi, PalestinianHydrology Group, Ramallah, 21 Dec. 2008.[201] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Development’, Apr. 2009.[202] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Development’, Apr. 2009.[203] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water Development’, Apr. 2009.[204] USAID cited in World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank andGaza Assessment o Restrictions on Palestinian WaterDevelopment’, Apr. 2009.

















Aa B• : includes 450 Palestinian towns andvillages in the West Bank. In these areas, asin Area A, the PA “will assume responsibility

or public order or Palestinians”. However,this area diers rom Area A in that “Israelshall have overriding responsibility orsecurity or the purpose o protectingIsraelis and conronting the threat o terrorism”.[225]

Aa c• : comprises the majority o theWest Bank – populated and unpopulated– including areas o strategic importanceto Israel and the settlements, whereIsrael retains ull responsibility oradministration, including zoning andplanning, land requisition, conscation,allocation, registration, and security.Area C is the only contiguous tract o theoccupied West Bank and it both surroundsand divides Areas A and B.[226]

The interim arrangements were designed to lastve years. The three zones were redened in theSharm El-Sheikh Agreement o 1999 as ollows:

“The Israeli Side undertakes the ollowing

with regard to Phase One and Phase Two o the Further Redeployments: On September5, 1999, to transer 7% rom Area C to Area B;On November 15, 1999, to transer 2% romArea B to Area A and 3% rom Area C to AreaB; On January 20, 2000, to transer 1% romArea C to Area A, and 5.1% rom Area B toArea A.”

In 2009, however, the PLO Negotiations AairsDepartment notes that, in violation o theseobligations, no such transer o lands has everbeen made.[227] By the time o the Camp DavidPeace Summit in July 2000, 59 percent o the West Bank was categorized as Area C andunder ull Israeli control, including the majorityo Palestinian armland; Israel controlled the

[225] Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank andthe Gaza Strip, ‘Oslo II’, Taba / Washington D.C. 28 Sep. 1995.[226] PLO Negotiations Aairs Department (2007)‘Negotiations Primer’.[227] PLO Negotiations Aairs Department (2009) ‘Israel’sviolations o the Oslo Agreements’ available at http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego_nego_16p.

security o an additional 23.8 percent o theWest Bank (Area B). As a result, by the time thesecond intiada broke out, Israel had complete

control o over 82.8 percent o the West Bank,leaving the PA ostensibly in partial control o only 17.2 percent o the West Bank territory.In 2002, Israel regained de acto control o allzones and began to build the Wall.[228]

The ragmented administrative systems articulatedby Oslo and exacerbated by Israeli policiesand action on the ground have very dierentimplications or Palestinians in the West Bank, EastJerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and even between thoseliving in Areas A, B and C. Though most Palestiniansin the West Bank reside in Areas A and B, Area C iscritical to Palestinian planning, development andlivelihoods. Palestinians living in Area C are undercomplete control o the Occupying Power.

Area C contains the land reserves necessaryor the expansion o Palestinian populationcentres, and the development o nationalinrastructure and the agricultural and privatesectors. Major water aquiers are also locatedin this area. Given that Area C is less densely

populated, it is the desired location o sanitarylandlls, waste-water treatment plants andother environmentally sensitive inrastructure.The bulk o Palestinian agricultural and grazinglands are located in this area. Moreover,because Areas A and B are composed o dozenso disconnected territorial units surrounded byArea C and the settlements, any inrastructureconnecting Palestinian communities such asroads, water and electricity networks, need tocross through Area C to be eective.[229] Attemptsby Palestinians to gain permission to build in

Area C are oten unsuccessul. For example,over 94 % o applications or building permitsin Area C submitted to the Israeli authoritiesbetween January 2000 and September 2007were denied.[230]

[228] EC-ECHO Food Security Inormation or Action Programme(2007) ‘Strengthening resilience: Food Insecurity and LocalResponses to Fragmentation o the West Bank’, Apr. 2007.[229] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Lack o Permit” Demolitions and

Resultant Displacement in Area C’, May, 2008.[230] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Lack o Permit” Demolitions andResultant Displacement in Area C’, May, 2008.







59chapt ThTitoia atatio a poitia poaizatio

3.3 doitio a

ipoio

The Israeli policy o demolishing Palestinianhomes and inrastructure is contrary tointernational law,[246] yet demolitions are usedroutinely, causing personal and amily insecurityand deeply racturing community cohesion.The Committee Against Torture has stated that“Israeli policies on housing demolitions may, incertain instances, amount to cruel, inhumaneor degrading treatment or punishment.”[247] Demolishing civilian homes or punitive

reasons, including when a amily member issuspected o having acted in resistance tothe State o Israel, also breaches one o themost undamental principles o justice: theprohibition on punishing one person or actscommitted by another. The Fourth GenevaConvention unequivocally prohibits collectivepunishments o this type.

The Israel Committee Against HousingDemolitions (ICAHD) denes:

Punitive•

demolitions as the destructiono homes as punishment or the actionso people associated with the house

Administrative• demolitions as involvingthe destruction o houses due to a lack o permit

Military demolitions as conducted•

by the IDF in the course o militaryoperations or the purpose o clearingo a piece o land[248]

Undened demolitions as those still•

under investigation by ICAHD. Themajority o these are believed to be

[246] Article 53 o the Fourth Geneva Convention Statesthat an Occupying Power is orbidden rom destroyingproperty, “except where such destruction is renderedabsolutely necessary by military operations.”[247] Committee Against Torture, ‘Conclusions andRecommendation o the Committee Against Torture: Israel’,CAT/C/XXVII.[248] Such demolitions represent 65.5 percent o alldemolitions. ICAHD (2009) ‘Statistics on House Demolitions(1967-2009)’ 7 Apr. 2009.

land-clearing operations, military andpunitive, occurring between 1967 and1982.[249]

Since the beginning o the occupation in1967, any Palestinian-owned structureslacking building permits were demolished byIsraeli authorities. However, ater Oslo suchdemolitions were restricted to Area C and EastJerusalem.[250] Given the near impossibilityo obtaining building permits rom the Stateo Israel in these areas, many Palestiniansno longer apply and instead, despite theever-present threat o demolition, build tomeet their needs. To date, more than 3,000Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank have pending demolition orders (which can beimmediately executed without prior warning).At least ten small communities across theWest Bank are at risk o being almost entirelydisplaced due to the large number o pendingdemolition orders.[251] At least 28 percent o allPalestinian homes in East Jerusalem have beenbuilt in violation o Israeli zoning requirements;based on population gures, this percentage isequivalent to some 60,000 Palestinians in East

Jerusalem who are at risk o having their homesdemolished.[252] Figure 6 highlights the numberso housing demolitions which occurred oradministrative and other reasons.

[249] Statistics on House Demolitions (1967-2009)’ (7 April2009).[250] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Lack o Permit” Demolitions andResultant Displacement in Area C’, May. 2008.[251] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Lack o Permit” Demolitions andResultant Displacement in Area C’, May. 2008.[252] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem:Understanding the Phenomenon o “Illegal” Construction’,Apr. 2009.





Fiu 6: Houi oitio o 2005 -2009[253]

PUNITIVE254

ADMINISTRATIVE255

MILITARY UNDEFINED TOTAL

2005256

4 211 75 290

2006

146

256

4022007 286 73 359

2008 291 79 370

2009 2 41 4,247257

4,290

TOTAL since

1967 1,523 4,694 11,798 6,130 24,145

[254] [255] [256] [257]

Box 3: Pyhooia ft o oitio o hi

chi’ xpi o hou oitio[258]

In a recent study o Palestinian children’s responses to ongoing house demolitions, the author ound “intimateconnections between history, economic activities, globalization, globalized social relations and new orms o

politics” operating in the oPt. A powerul sel-narrative o resilience in the ace o unair treatment was discovered.The author argues that, “in the context o economic sanctions, restricted movement, legalization o militarizedbureaucracies and active policing o the boundaries, children are urther marginalized. Children’s stories revealedthat those in power set the parameters or structural inequalities, using political and economic tools.”

In one response, 17-old Fatmeh described hersel as someone who had already learned how “to negotiate intensenotions o despair and empowerment….She lives her lie navigating between her identity as a victim and her identityas a rontliner and survivor who reuses to surrender. Her eelings o hopelessness and helplessness are countered andcompounded by her choice to never lose hope.”

When children were asked about their most painul incident, they reerred to losing their homes and becomingreugees in their own neighbourhood. For them this internal displacement was perceived as a ‘double suering’,in the sense that they were aficted both by the eects o the aggressive military occupation that caused thedestruction o their home and, subsequently, the social consequences o being vulnerable individuals in theirown societies. Their losses were accompanied by eelings o subjugation, desperation and oppression and they

expressed their disbelie that they were not, like other children in the world, being allowed to live in peace.Children’s narratives make explicit the connections between the personal trauma o the individual living in awar zone and the global decision-making that allows such suering to continue. The children interviewed sawthemselves as living in a world that continues to demonize Palestinians as ‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’, oten used to

justiy the violence used against them by the State o Israel. Remarkably, they retained a sense o commitment,poignantly expressed rom a child’s point o view, to keep ghting or Palestinian sel-determination.

As Hidaya, a young women, stated:How can the world live in peace when we suer every single minute? I am sure they pay a high price. See,every time they hear about our resistance, they eel weak. I believe that I, Hidaya, the very simple woman,is much stronger than all o them, otherwise why would they send a tank, big computerized planes andmachines to kill me. They ear the Palestinian child, and thereore we must stay strong, love each other, helpand support the needy, and be educated. They ear educated people that can speak English and tell the

world about their crimes.

[253] ICAHD (2009) ‘Statistics on House Demolitions (1967-2009)’ 7 Apr. 2009.[254] The Israeli policy o punitive demolition was suspended in February 2005. However it resumed on January 19, 2009. ICAHD(2009) ‘Statistics on House Demolitions (1967-2009)’ 7 Apr. 2009.[255] The majority o these demolitions (26 percent o total demolitions) happen in Area C. These demolitions are a clearviolation o international law, specically violating Article 56 o the Fourth Geneva Convention. ICAHD (2009) ‘Statistics onHouse Demolitions (1967-2009)’ 7 Apr. 2009.[256] The average Palestinian amily size is 5.8 persons; 5.5 in the West Bank and 6.5 in the Gaza Strip: PCBS, ‘Palestine in Figures’ (2009).[257] Estimated total houses completely demolished in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. Number provided by OCHA-oPtthrough email communication to ICAHD on 10 February 2009. All demolitions occurring during Cast Lead are listed in 2009,

despite several hundred occurring just beore the new year.[258] Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera (2009) ‘The Political Economy o Children’s Trauma: A Case Study o House Demolition inPalestine’, Feminism Psychology 19: 335-342.




3.4 Iai ttt a

th hii a hai

aap o th oPt

I the settlers are here there is no saety.

There is no saety; there is only ear.[259]

The International Court o Justice (ICJ), the UNSecurity Council, and the UN General Assemblyconsider that “the Israeli settlements in theOccupied Palestinian Territories (including EastJerusalem) have been established in breacho international law”.[260] The basis or this isarticle 49 paragraph 6 o the Fourth GenevaConvention which States “[t]he Occupying Powershall not deport or transer parts o its owncivilian population into the territory it occupies”.

[259] Christian Peacemaker Teams & Operation Dove (2008)‘A Dangerous Journey: Settler Violence Against PalestinianSchoolchildren Under Israeli Military Escort 2006-2008South Hebron Hills, Palestine’, Aug. 2008.[260] International Court o Justice in its advisory opinion:‘Legal Consequences o the Construction o a Wall in theOccupied Palestinian Territory’, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Reports, 2004.

Nonetheless, State o Israel-supported outposts[261] andsettlement encroachment

on the West Bank, includingEast Jerusalem, is relentlesslydividing the landscape– creating enclaves andrestricting movementsbetween Palestinian townsand villages.

[T]he government,

to this day, is ofering

preerential mortgages

to people who move to

certain settlements, such

as those near Nablus.

Those places are way, way

beyond the settlement

blocs and were built or

the expressed purpose

o blocking Palestinian

Statehood.[262]

In 2008 alone, Palestinian land taken by Israelor settlements, closed military zones (which

includes almost the entire Jordan Valley)and nature preserves, rendered 40 percento the West Bank inaccessible and unusableor residential, agricultural, commercial ormunicipal development.[263] In 2008, therewere approximately 200 ocially recognized –but illegal – Israeli settlements, approximately102 outposts, and 29 military bases.[264] Theeconomic cost to Israel o sustaining thesettlement network is approximately USD

[261] Outposts are inormal structures that serve as aprelude to a new settlement. They are unauthorized butunded by the Israeli government. UN (2008) ‘Report o theSpecial Rapporteur on the situation o human rights in thePalestinian territories occupied since 1967’, GA/ HRC, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[262] Derner, Larry (2009) ‘Rattling the Cage: Give Us aninch, we’ll settle a mile’, in The Jerusalem Post, 8 July. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1246443756942&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.[263] OCHA-oPt cited in UN (2008) ‘Situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, Reporto the Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, A/63/326 25, Aug. 2008.[264] Peace Now (2007) ‘Reports on the construction o outposts January to April 2007’.

Photo 3: Two little girls displaced in Operation Cast Lead play in

the ruins outside their ormer home






556 million per annum.[265] The number o settlers is estimated to be between 480,000and 550,000,[266] representing around 13

percent o the total population registered inIsrael,[267] and it is rapidly increasing. In 2008,the growth rate o Israelis illegally living inthe West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, was4.7 percent, considerably higher than that inIsrael itsel which was at 1.7 percent.[268] It isestimated that settlements, together withPalestinian land seized or the constructiono the Wall, have resulted in the conscationo a urther 14 percent o the territory o theWest Bank.[269] A study conducted in 2006

concluded that nearly 40 percent o the landheld by Israeli settlements in the West Bank isprivately owned by Palestinians.[270]

The government didn’t ofcially

expropriate that land - the olks at the

outposts just took it, the government

let them and the IDF guarded them.[271]

The logic and conguration o theragmentation o the West Bank – including

[265] UN (2008) ‘Situation o human rights in the Palestinianterritories occupied since 1967’, Report o the SpecialRapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/63/32625, Aug. 2008.[266] UN (2008) ‘Situation o human rights in the Palestinianterritories occupied since 1967’, Report o the SpecialRapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/63/32625, Aug. 2008.[267] The population o Israel is approximately 7.2 million(CIA gures available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-actbook/geos/is.html).[268] Peace Now (2009).

[269] UN (2008) ‘Situation o human rights in the Palestinianterritories occupied since 1967’, Report o the SpecialRapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/63/32625, Aug. 2008.[270] Peace Now (2006) ‘Breaking the Law in the West Bank -One Violation Leads to Another: Israeli Settlement Buildingon Private Palestinian Property’, cited in UN (2008) ‘Reporto the Special Rapporteur on the situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, GA/HRC,A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[271] Derner, Larry (2009) ‘Rattling the Cage: Give Us aninch, we’ll settle a mile’, in The Jerusalem Post, 8 July. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1246443756942&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull .

the mobility regime, checkpoints,demolitions, closures, and the Wall –appear to be more related to extending,

protecting and annexing settlements thanto ensuring State security within the GreenLine (the 1949 Armistice Line, including theterritory occupied by Israel ater 1967, nowregarded by many actors, including thePLO, as the legitimate basis or the borderso an independent Palestinian State).[272] Atthe time o the writing o this Report, anddespite calls or a settlement reeze rom theObama administration and the internationalcommunity, there is no indication that the

settlement policy will desist. On the contrary,in September 2009, the Israeli DeenceMinister has authorized construction o some 455 new homes. Politically, too, thesettlements are becoming more extremist,inhabited now more than ever beore by “akey yet oten ignored constituency – [Israel’s]growing and increasingly powerul religiousright.”[273]

On April 27, 2009 the Israeli authoritiesinitiated the conscation o what will

amount to 12,000 dunums o land romPalestinian towns, an area that is reerredto by the Israeli authorities as “E1”.[274] Theconscated land will be used to expand andconnect the Israeli settlements at MaaleAdumim and Kedar in the occupied WestBank. This new settlement will include 3,500apartments, 10 hotels and an industrial park,to accommodate 14,500 settlers, and will besituated adjacent to Maale Adumim.[275] The

[272] Institute o Women’s Studies, Birzeit University (2008)‘The Impact o Israeli Mobility Restrictions and Violence onGender Relations in Palestinian Society: 2000-2007’.[273] International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°89 –20 July 2009. Israel’s Religious Right and the Question o Settlements” p i.[274] UNDP interview with Nathan Derejko, Civic Coalitionor Deending Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (2009).[275] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, General Assembly, Human RightsCouncil, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.




expansion o Maale Adumim will have theeect o urther disconnecting East Jerusalemrom the northern and southern parts o

the West Bank and eectively severing thecontinuity between East Jerusalem and theJordan Valley.[276] Internationally recognizedas illegal, the development o E1 and theMaale Adumim settlement will cause urtherWest Bank territorial divisions as it will disruptcontinuity between the north and south.Reinorcing this discontinuity, the Wall willensure separation on the ground.

Previously Israel had been hamperedin its plans to build E1 by diplomaticinterventions,[277] and the presence o amain road rom East Jerusalem to Jericho,which is used by Palestinians. To overcomethis obstacle to its expansion, it has nowconscated Palestinian land in Sawareh,Nabi Moussa, and al-Khan al-Ahmar tobuild an alternative road or Palestiniansto travel to Jericho, thereby reeing thearea or the construction o E1. The roadis part o Israel’s broader plan to replaceterritorial continuity with “transportational

continuity,” by articially connectingPalestinian population centres throughan elaborate network o alternative roadsand tunnels, and creating an apartheidroad system or Palestinians.[278] The Stateo Israel has imposed a ban on Palestinianuse o 41 sections o road in the West Bank,covering an approximate distance o 700km, reserving these roads or the exclusivemovement o Israeli settlers, the militaryand internationals.[279]

[276] UN HRC (2008) ‘Israeli settlements in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in theoccupied Syrian Golan’, Resolution 7/18, 27 Mar. 2008.[277] Ma’an News Agency (2009) ‘Israel to expand largestWest Bank settlement’, Bethlehem, 26 Apr. 2009.[278] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, GA/ HRC, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[279] World Bank (2007) ‘Movement and Access Restrictionsin the West Bank: Uncertainty and Ineciency in the

Palestinian Economy’, 2007.

3.5 Th wa a hua uity

The wall is the perect [political]

crime because it creates the violenceit was ostensibly built to prevent. It’s

like sticking someone in a cage and

then when he starts screaming, as

any normal person would, using his

violent temper as justication or

putting him in the cage in the rst

place.[280]

The Wall is comprised o an eight metre highconcrete ortication with sections o electricand wire encing, ditches, trenches, barbed

wire, surveillance systems, and roads.[281] Thereis also a 30-100 metre-wide ‘no-go’ zone orPalestinians, with electried ences, trenches,sensors, armed sniper towers, and militarypatrol roads in some sections.[282] Constructionon the Wall began in 2002, ostensibly as a‘security measure’ to protect Israeli citizensrom the escalation o attacks during thesecond intiada. However, the idea o erecting just such a Wall had been discussed since the1990s.[283]

“Whilst the Court [ICJ] notes the

assurance given by Israel that the

construction o the Wall does not

amount to annexation and that

the Wall is o a temporary nature, it

nevertheless cannot remain indiferent

to certain ears expressed to it that

the route o the Wall will prejudge

the uture rontier between Israel and

Palestine.” [284]

[280] Nusseibeh, Sari (2007) ‘Once Upon A Country: APalestinian Lie’, Picador: New York, p. 511.[281] UN (2003) ‘Report o the Secretary-General’, GAResolution ES-10/13, 24 Nov. 2003.[282] CJPMA (2008).[283] B’Tselem (2003) ‘Behind the Wall: Human RightsViolations as a Result o Israel’s Separate Wall’.[284] ICJ, Legal Consequences o the Construction o a Wallin the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion o 9Jul. 2004, para. 121.





In 2004, the ICJ ound the construction o the Wall to contravene international law. Itstated that Israel must act in accordance

with international law and, inter alia, “dis-continue building, dismantle orthwiththose sections that have already been builtand make reparations.”[285] Nonetheless,construction continues. I completed, theWall will be 709 km long, more than twicethe length o the Green Line, with 85 per-cent o its planned route alling inside theWest Bank, at times encroaching some 22km into the oPt.[286] The total area locatedbetween the Wall and the Green Line is 9.5

percent o the West Bank, which includesEast Jerusalem.[287] The Wall cuts into theterritory o the West Bank; this act is con-rmed by the Israeli High Court o Justice inBeit Sourik Village Council vs. the Govern-ment o Israel.[288] 413 km o the Wall is con-structed, while 73 km is under constructionat the time o writing.[289]

The ICRC conrmed that the constructiono the Wall goes “ar beyond what ispermissible” or an Occupying Power

under international humanitarian law.[290] Inaddition, the construction o the Wall, andits associated regime, violates a wide rangeo provisions under international humanrights law,[291] or example, Article 12(1) o the International Covenant on Civil and

[285] ICJ in its advisory opinion: ‘Legal Consequences o theConstruction o a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 2004.

[286] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘The Olive Harvest In the West Bank & Gaza Strip’, Factsheet, Oct. 2008. OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘WestBank Wall Route Projections’, Jul. 2009.[287] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘West Bank Wall Route Projections’,Jul. 2009.[288] Israeli High Court Justice 2056/04, Beit Sourik VillageCouncil vs. The Government o Israel and Commander o the IDF Forces in the West Bank, IsrSC (2 May 2004).[289] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘West Bank Wall Route Projections’,Jul. 2009.[290] ICRC (2004) ‘Israel /Occupied and AutonomousPalestinian Territories: West Bank Wall causes serioushumanitarian and legal problems’, 18 Feb. 2004.[291] In the Advisory Opinion on the Wall the ICJ conrmedthat international human rights law is applicable,extraterritorially, in the oPt.

Political Rights[292] regarding the liberty o movement and reedom to choose one’sresidence. UNHCR comments that the Wall

also violates the right to work, to ood, tohealth care, to education, to amily lie,and worship, all o which are protected bythe International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights.[293] The denial o these basic rights undermines the abilityo Palestinians to live dignied and securelives.

The Wall surrounds 11.9 percent o the WestBank.[294] Approximately hal a million Pales-tinians in 92 communities are directly andnegatively aected by the route o the Wall.Approximately 27,520 people living west o the Wall (on the Israeli side) require permitsto reside in their homes and can only leavetheir communities through gates built intothe Wall over which they have no control,while 470,300 Palestinians, including thosein East Jerusalem living east o the Wall, areeither totally or partially surrounded by it.[295] I the Wall is based on the planned route,34 Palestinian communities, including the

majority o Palestinians with East Jerusa-lem IDs, will be located between it andthe Green Line, while communities insidethe municipal boundary –Kar Aqab andShu’at Camp –will be separated rom EastJerusalem. In the 660 km² Bethlehem gov-ernorate, only 13 percent o the land is stillavailable or Palestinian use and it is mostlyragmented. The completed section o theWall in the north entirely separates the cityo Bethlehem rom East Jerusalem.[296]

[292] See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm orthe text.[293] See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm or the text.[294] B’Tselem (2008) ‘Separation Wall Statistics’ with OCHA-oPt, May 2008.[295] B’Tselem (2008) ‘Separation Wall Statistics’ with OCHA-

oPt, May 2008.[296] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘West Bank Wall Route Projections’,Jul. 2009).




Box 4: Ioat a p:

ivi u th wa[297]

Nadia is a housewie living in Al-Ram. Sheholds a Jerusalem ID card, and her home islocated on the eastern side o the Wall.

“I have two children, both o them haveJerusalem ID cards like me. My daughterhas recently graduated rom universitybut cannot nd a job nearby. She cannotgo to Jerusalem on a daily basis, becausethe checkpoints have prolonged the tripby 30 minutes to one hour, and evenmore, depending on the circumstances.My son and my husband live in Al-Azariya,where they both work. They do not makemuch money.”

“Everything has changed since the Wall ishere. My main concern is money, becauseour dicult nancial situation aectsall aspects o our lives. I can hardly goanywhere, because o the checkpointsand the high cost o transportation. I move

around much less now than in the pastand rarely go to Jerusalem or elsewhere.”

“The whole amily can no longer reallyaord to go to Jerusalem. Our relativescome to visit us instead.”

“My children will have to marry someonewith a Jerusalem ID, because people witha West Bank ID will not be able to cross thecheckpoints to Jerusalem.”

“I spend most o my time in the house,

watching television, eeling very boredand sick. I oten have a headache, and Ioten cry, because I can hardly see my sonand husband. I eel lonely. O course theWall should be taken down, but what canI do to change the situation?”

[297] Badil (2006) ‘Displaced by the Wall: Pilot Study onForced Displacement Caused by the Construction o theWest Bank Wall and its Associated Regime in the OccupiedPalestinian Territories’, Sep. 2006.

The regime associated with the Wall, includingphysical, legal and administrative obstacles,contributes signicantly to increased human

insecurity or those Palestinians who aredirectly and indirectly aected by it. Thisregime consists o gates, permit systems, IDcards, and the destruction and conscationo property. The Wall has 66 gates (as o July2008) to enable contact between severedparts o the West Bank; 27 are closed, leavingonly 39 to serve Palestinians.[298] O the opengates, 20 are either used or daily crossing(some o which are open or a consecutiveperiod o twelve hours, some twice a day at

xed times, and only a ew around the clock)while others are agricultural gates which areopened two or three times a day. The other19 gates are opened seasonally, during olive-picking or harvest seasons; generally thesegates are opened two or three times a day,at xed times and according to a strict permitregime.

All permits must be obtained rom the IsraeliCivil Administration. They are not easilygranted and the administrative procedures

or obtaining them are humiliating andobstructive. [299] It is estimated that only 18percent o Palestinians who worked the landin the closed zone beore the constructiono the Wall received permits in 2008.[300] Dailyhardships experienced within the closedzone, and in the precincts o the Wall, havealready resulted in the displacement o 15,000 Palestinians.[301]

[298] All inormation about gates rom B’Tselem (2008)‘Separation Wall Statistics’ with OCHA-oPt, May 2008.[299] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, General Assembly, Human RightsCouncil, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[300] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, General Assembly, Human RightsCouncil, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[301] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, General Assembly, Human RightsCouncil, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.





Box 5: A nu’a via: a

xap o atatio[302]

Al-Nu’man village, with a population o 173, is a community north o Bethlehemthat was absorbed into the expandedmunicipal boundary o Jerusalem by theIsraeli authorities in 1967. However, theinhabitants were recorded as residentso the West Bank and as such issued withWest Bank ID cards.

In addition to the diculties caused byholding ID cards which, under Israeli law,do not permit them to reside in their ownvillage, al-Nu’man villagers are harmullyaected by Israeli settlement constructionand expansion in the area. Al-Nu’man isnow bordered on three sides by the Wall,isolating it rom the rest o the West Bank.The plight o the village was compoundedin May 2006 when the installation o apermanent checkpoint in the Wall becamethe only entrance to, and exit rom, thevillage.

The extreme restrictions on the movemento the villagers have implications or theiraccess to services, including education,and constitute a major disruption o amilylie. Systematic property destruction, landappropriation, annexation, physical andpsychological harassment, and restrictionson movement all combine to create livingconditions so unbearable and lacking indignity as to bring about the dispossessiono the residents.

In 2008, the Israeli High Court o Justicegave its nal judgment on the ate o thepeople o the al-Nu’man village, reusingto redress the ‘illegitimate’ status o theresidents o al-Nu’man who are nowdeemed to be illegal residents in Israel.

[302] Adapted rom Al Haq (2006) ‘Al-Nu’man Village ACase Study o Indirect Forcible Transer’ Nov.; OCHA-oPt,(2009) ‘Shrinking Space: Urban Construction and RuralFragmentation in the Bethlehem Governorate’, May 2009.

The act that 83 percent o the West Bank settlerpopulation and 69 settlements are enclosedwithin the Wall supports the idea that it was

never intended to be merely a security measurebut also a means to include settlements withinits territory. In May 2009, the head o Shin Bet,Yuval Diskin, suggested that there was noneed to continue building the Wall becauseIsrael already had enough security measures toprevent any attack rom the West Bank.[303]

3.6 chpoit a vioatio

o o o ovtIn February 2009, 626 obstructions to reedomo movement in the West Bank were identied:93 manned and 533 unmanned checkpoints.[304] Checkpoints comprise o two elements, aninrastructure obstructing vehicular andpedestrian trac, and the permanent presenceo Israeli security personnel, such as the IDF,the Border Police, the Civil Police, and privatesecurity companies. Armed security personnelcheck the documentation o Palestinians

crossing checkpoint and search their vehiclesand belongings. This is oten a time consumingand humiliating exercise (Box 4 outlinesvarious physical impediments to Palestinianmovement).[305] At the Qalandia checkpointin the West Bank, or example, the waitingtime can range rom 20 minutes to 1.5 hours. Thousands o temporary checkpoints, knownas ying checkpoints, are set up every year byIsraeli army patrols on roads throughout theWest Bank or limited periods ranging romhal an hour to several hours. Checkpoints

ensure compliance with the permit regime. They prevent the reedom o movement o Palestinians in the West Bank, including EastJerusalem, and bring ear, humiliation anddisruption to daily lie.

[303] Al-Jazeera (2009) ‘Spy chie dismisses West Bank Wall ’,available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/05/200952091911790297.html.[304] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘Implementation o the Agreement

o Movement and Access and Update on Gaza Crossings’,Report No. 85, 04-17 Feb. 2009.[305] Adapted rom OCHA-oPt (2008) OCHA Closure Update.




Box 6: Physial measures restriting Palestinian movement in the

west Bank [306]

Patia hpoit are made up by similar inrastructure as checkpoints, but are notpermanently staed. Frequently, the partial checkpoint inrastructure is installed onroadsides and does not directly obstruct the trac. When staed, partial checkpointsunction as ull checkpoints.

Fyi o ao hpoit are improvised and mounted by the IDF to conductrandom stops and searches o Palestinian people and vehicles.

eath ou are mounds o rubble, dirt and/or rocks put in place by IDF bulldozers toprevent vehicle movement along a road or track.

roabo are constructed rom one or more concrete blocks about one meter cubedand, similar to earth mounds, are used to prevent vehicular access to land or roads. In allother respects they unction in the same way as earth mounds.

Th are dug across at land or along the side o a road to prevent vehicles romgoing around a closure obstacle on the road.

roa gat are metal gates used to block Palestinian access to a route. Many o themare permanently closed.

roa wa are composed by a continuous earth Wall, a ence, or a concrete Wall runningalong the side o a road.

wa gat[307] are gates in the Wall which are used or Palestinians to cross; they areopened:

(i) Daily: generally 15-60 minutes; 3 times a day;

(ii) Weekly/seasonally: 1-3 days a week; 3 times a day;

(iii) Seasonally: daily during olive harvest only;

(iv) With prior coordination: seasonally/several days weekly through priorcoordination; access is dependent on ID cards and a list o names at the gate;

(v) Closed Area CP: or Palestinians in communities that are blocked by the Wall toaccess the outside world;. generally open during the day and closed at night.

[306] Adapted rom OCHA-oPt (2008) OCHA Closure Update.[307] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘West Bank Wall Route Projections’, Jul. 2009.





Photo 4: Roadblock in the West Bank

Figure 7: Travel times within West Bank

routes under current movement restrictionsconditions[308]

3.7 military incurion and curfewClosure and military incursions are mechanismsthat break down the abric o Palestinian society,urther contributing to the disintegration o social and economic lie in the oPt. Militaryincursions have intensied since 2007, e.g.,during the month o November 2007, the IDF

[308] Adapted rom World Bank (2008) ‘West Bank and Gaza:Palestinian Trade: West Bank Routes’, Report No. 46807 –GZ World Bank Finance and Private Sector DevelopmentGroup, Social and Economic Development Department,Middle East and North Arica Region.

carried out 786 raids in the West Bank comparedto 656 incursionsin November 2006.[309]

During the course o the 2007 incursions,one person waskilled, 67 injured,and 398 arrested.[310] Incursions into theGaza Strip, includingduring the ceaseres,are commonplaceand involver e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,

arrests, destructiono property and land,and targeted killings.The PalestinianCentre or HumanRights documented

two incursions and the arrest o ten shermenduring one week in April 2009.[311]

From 2005 to 2009, the UN Special Rapporteurson the oPt have drawn attention to the plighto those living in Nablus, an “imprisoned”

city,[312] where closures and incursions arecommonplace. For example, rom 26 June tolate July 2008 the IDF carried out a series o nightly military operations in Nablus whichled to the deaths o several young Palestinians,the arrests o dozens o men, women andchildren, the conscation and destruction o property, and the creation o an atmosphereo ear.[313] Damage included the destruction o

[309]

UN (2007) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, GA/ HRC, 29 Jan. 2007.[310] Palestinian Monitoring Group, Monthly Summary, Nov.2007, cited in UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteuron the situation o human rights in the Palestinianterritories occupied since 1967’, General Assembly, HumanRights Council, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[311] PCHR (2009) ‘Weekly Report on Israeli Violations o HumanRights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 02 -08 Apr. 2009.[312] UN (2006) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on thesituation o human rights in the Palestinian territoriesoccupied since 1967’, A/61/470 (27 Sep. 2006).[313] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on theOccupied Palestinian Territory the situation o humanrights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’,A/63/326 25, Aug. 2008.




charities, schools, clinics and an orphanage allo which were providing essential services tothe population o Nablus. These military actions

took place without any explicit charges beingbrought against residents. Cities and townswhere Hamas’ inuence is believed to be strong,as evidenced by success at the municipal levelin the 2006 elections, have been placed underparticular pressure through requent militaryincursion.[314]

In 2005, the oPt was placed under 1,514 hourso curew imposed by the IDF. In 2006 thiswent down to 696 hours, rising again in 2007to 873 hours, and the latest gures or 2008(excluding November and December) indicatethat 2,132 hours were spent under curew.[315] The governorate o Nablus is consistently andexcessively targeted or curews and has hadto endure longer hours under curew than anyother area in the oPt during the reporting period(95 hours).[316] Curews and other restrictionshave had an extremely detrimental eect onthe economy, particularly in trade centres likeNablus city.

In 2009, although the overall number o closureobstacles has remained relatively constant, thereis some evidence o a relaxation o movementand access in the West Bank. Consequently,this has contributed to a signicant reductionin travel time between major cities, as well asa decrease in the points o riction betweenPalestinians and Israeli security orces. Forexample, during June 2009, our checkpointscontrolling access to main cities (Nablus,Qalqiliya, Ramallah and Jericho) ceased tobe permanently staed and became “partial

checkpoints”, staed on an ad-hoc basis. At thebeginning o September 2009, one o the ourcheckpoints controlling access to Jordan Valley(Ma’ale Eraim) became a partial checkpointtoo, easing access between the northern West

[314] UN (2008) ‘Report o the Special Rapporteur on theOccupied Palestinian Territory the situation o humanrights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’,A/63/326 25, Aug. 2008.[315] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Protection o Civilians summary

data tables’, Oct. 2008.[316] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘Protection o Civilians summarydata tables, Oct. 2008.

Bank and certain areas o the Jordan Valley.[317]

In spite o these positive developments,

the continued presence o checkpointinrastructure makes any improvementsreversible, proving it dicult to predict accessconditions beyond the immediate period.[318] Also, over the latest reporting period (June toSeptember 2009), the checkpoint at Qalandiahas been signicantly expanded, with graveimplications or the movement and access o Palestinians coming to, and rom, Jerusalem.Diculty o access is compounded by the new‘PA visa’; the stamp (issued by the State o Israelat international borders) gives access onlyto Area A o the West Bank, thus precludingcertain oreigners and Palestinian diasporarom entering Israel, including Jerusalem. Thenew ‘PA visa’ represents one more unacceptableencroachment on reedom o movementand is viewed as yet another means by whichthe Israeli authorities are consolidating theannexation o Jerusalem.[319]

3.8 Th ia axatio o eat

Jua

The illegal annexation[320] o East Jerusalemand its increasing separation rom the rest o

[317] OCHA-oPt (2009)‘The Humanitarian Monitor’ (Aug. 2009).[318] OCHA-oPt (2009)‘The Humanitarian Monitor’ (Aug. 2009).[319] Civic Coalition or Deending Palestinian Rights inJerusalem (2009) ‘False Symbols o Sovereignty and the“Palestinian Authority Only Visa”’, Press Release, 13 Aug.

2009.[320] Ater annexing East Jerusalem in 1967, in 1980 theKnesset reinorced claims to the city by ratiying Basic Law:

Jerusalem - The Capital o Israel which States: “Jerusalem,complete and undivided, is the Capital o Israel,” Article1, Basic Law: Jerusalem - The Capital o Israel, 1980. Boththe United Nations and the international community havequashed this declaration, with the Security Council call ingsuch a move “invalid” and “null and void,” UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 478, 1980. The EU Heads o Missionhave recently admitted that the Sol is «actively pursuingthe illegal annexation» o East Jerusalem, reported bythe Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions (23Mar. 2009) available at http://www.icahd.org/eng/news.asp?menu=5&submenu=1&item=691. According toArticle 3 o Palestinian Basic Law; “Jerusalem is the Capitalo Palestine”. During the Oslo process the question o Jerusalem was let or the nal status negotiations.










Figure 8: Number o demolition orders, East Jerusalem[334]

Source: PHDR, 2009

There is also evidence o neglect in the provi-sion o inrastructure, acilities and servicesto East Jerusalemites. Despite the act that allresidents o Jerusalem, both East and West, paymunicipal taxes, the services they receive inreturn dier enormously. East Jerusalem resi-

dents, who make up 34% o the population o Jerusalem, receive 7% o the budget, while 64%o the population who reside in West Jerusalemreceives 92% o the budget.[335] Furthermore,the settler population in East Jerusalem is subsi-dised by the State o Israel.[336] This allocation o

[334] ICAHD, ‘East Jerusalem Stats’ (2004-2008).[335] Margalit ,Meir (2008) Allocation o Municipal ResourcesEast and West Jerusalem.[336] A 2009 report by the Macro Center o the IsraeliEuropean Policy Network entitled «Historical Political andEconomic Impact o Jewish Settlements in the OccupiedTerritories» ound that, «While Israeli municipalities asa whole receive 34.7 percent o their income rom [thegovernment] and obtain another 64.3 percent rom theirown income, settlement municipalities obtain 57 percentrom the [government], and only 42.8 percent romtheir own income». Israel>s government «allocates 4.1percent its total budget or municipalities to settlements,although they constitute just 3.1 percent o the total Israelipopulation», the report adds. «In the past 20 years, despiteongoing peace negotiations, the population o settlers inthe West Bank has more than doubled, at a growth ratemuch higher than that o the general Israeli population,»it says, concluding that this “increase could not have beenachieved without the active support o all o the Israeligovernments in this period.» Haaretz, 21 July 2009. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1101829.html

budgetary resources has resulted in substantialand very visible inequalities be-tween East and West Jerusalem.

In addition to inrastructuredeciencies, the provision o essential services is also unequalin East Jerusalem, which receivesonly 23% o the total allocatedbudget or medical services inJerusalem.[337] Moreover, only7 postal acilities exist to servethe 250,000 residents o EastJerusalem, while the 500,000residents o West Jerusalem have50 at their disposal.[338] Finally,there is a shortage o an estimated1500 classrooms, leaving 9000children in East Jerusalemwithout a place at school. [339]

The policies applied in Jerusalem have led tothe displacement o thousands o Palestinianresidents. Such actions have legal implications:many constitute serious violations o interna-tional human rights and humanitarian law.[340]

As this Section has discussed in some detail,the restriction o movement characteristico the entire oPt plays out in particular waysin East Jerusalem. Regular and apparentlyarbitrary restrictions are placed on themovement o Palestinian Jerusalemites andPalestinians travelling to Jerusalem and theyoten have a particular avour reecting thereligious importance o the site to PalestinianMuslims.[341] In one regularly repeated exampleo movement restrictions, in October 2009 –

[337] Margalit ,Meir ;Allocation o Municipal Resources Eastand West Jerusalem2008[338] The Association o Civil Rights in Israel ,The State o Human Rights in East Jerusalem ,May40 ,2009[339] Jibril, Samir; Education Rights in Jerusalem, CivicCoalition or Deending Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem,February 2008, 16.[340] Nathan Derekjo (2009) ‘Aggressive Urbanism: UrbanPlanning and the Displacement o Palestinians Within andFrom East Jerusalem’, Civic Coalition or the Protection o Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (Unpublished work).[341] This is a violation o Article 12 o the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights which states, interalia, that everyone has the right to liberty o movement.





in response to increased tensionsin East Jerusalem – Israeli securityorces prohibited Palestinian men

under 50 rom entering the oldcity and especially the Haram al-Shari (site o the al-Aqsa Mosque),allowing in only Palestinian menover 50 who hold Jerusalem IDs,along with women o all ages.[342] Israeli authorities also imposed ageneral closure on the West Bank in which Palestinians with permits,with a ew exceptions, were barredrom entering East Jerusalem.[343]

For most Palestinians access to EastJerusalem has been orbidden since1993, unless they possess a dicult-to-obtain entry permit issued bythe Israeli authorities. The Wall nowsevers many Palestinian villages inthe Jerusalem municipality romJerusalem, leaving approximately 25percent o Palestinian Jerusalemitescut o rom the city.[344] In placessuch as Abu Dis, the Wall runs right

through Palestinian communities,separating amilies and neighbours.Palestinians can only enter Jerusalemthrough our o the 16 existingcheckpoints to the city, and onlyby oot, making it dicult to accessschools, hospitals, university, work,and holy sites. As is discussed above,permits become invalid whenever ageneral closure is declared, usuallyduring Jewish holidays and times o security alerts.[345]

[342] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘Protection o CiviliansWeekly Report’, 30 Sep to 06 Oct. 2009.[343] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘Protection o CiviliansWeekly Report’, 08-14 Apr. 2009.[344] UN (2008) ‘Report o the SpecialRapporteur on the situation o human rights inthe Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’,

GA/HRC, A/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008.[345] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘West Bank Wall RouteProjections’, Jul. 2009.

Box 7: dia o utua iht i eat

Jua

Jerusalem was declared the Capital o Arab Culture2009. This, in addition to protecting and preservingits Arab cultural identity, had a number o objectives.Firstly, restoring its prominence as a city o cultural,historical and religious signicance. Secondly,reactivating cultural activity in order to address itsisolation. Thirdly, rehabilitating its socio-culturalinrastructure and providing job opportunities.Lastly, enhancing cooperation and launchingan advocacy campaign with regional Arab and

international actors to educate them about, andrearm, East Jerusalem as capital o a uture Stateo Palestine.[346]

During the opening ceremony on March 19, Israelipolice entered a number o community centresand schools, including the privately owned St.George‘s Boys School and Schmidt Girls School,and prevented sports and cultural activities romtaking place. Organizers were arrested and peaceulgatherings were aggressively dispersed.[347] Theseobstructions orced the relocation o the opening

ceremony to Bethlehem.

The Israeli administration described the plannedevents as an “attempt to demonstrate Palestiniansovereignty in Jerusalem in an illegal manner,” andasserted that Palestinians are obliged “to respectthe sovereignty o Israel within the boundaries o the State o Israel, including East Jerusalem.”[348]

Similarly, on May 23, 2009 Israeli ocials also shutdown the Palestinian National Theatre in EastJerusalem during the Palestine Festival o Literature,

preventing international writers and poets romaddressing the audience.[349]

[346] Adapted rom the strategic goals or the celebration o al-QudsCapital o Arab Culture website available at http://www.alquds2009.org/etemplate.php?id=96.[347] Al-Haq (2009) ‘A Culture o Repression: Israeli authorities ban PalestinianCultural Festival in East Jerusalem’, Press Release, 21 Mar. 2009.[348] Al-Haq (2009) ‘A Culture o Repression: Israeli authorities ban

Palestinian Cultural Festival in East Jerusalem’, Press Release, 21 Mar. 2009.[349] Ma’an News Agency (2009) ‘Armed soldiers, police, attempt to shutdown Palestine Festival o Literature opening night’, 23 May 2009.




3.9 Poitia poaizatio

We have triumphed. Gaza won its

independence rom the West Bank.One people now have two States, two

prisons who don’t greet each other. We

are victims dressed in executioners’

clothing. (Palestinian poet andpolitical activist, Mahmoud Darwish)

An end to violence cannot be rmly

secured solely by putting the Palestinian

house in order, or the simple

reason that any cessation to violent

conrontation remains predicated on

a settlement o the conict with Israel,an end to the occupation, and a two-

State solution.[350]

Despite the harsh realities o the physical andadministrative architecture o the occupationlaid out in this Chapter, in 2007, or the rsttime since the occupation, more Palestinianswere killed by intra-Palestinian ghting thanby IDF activity.[351] At least 500 were killed as aresult o internal ghting while 394 died romIDF related activities. The division o Palestiniansociety into isolated cantons, villages, andcities by checkpoints and security Walls nowhas a political parallel. Palestinians no longerhave a single political leadership to identiywith and coordinate around. The geographicragmentation is thereore mirrored inpolitical and social dissolution.[352] The currentpolitical polarization, its resultant violenceand consolidation o two power bases indierent parts o the territory, does nothing but

[350] ICG (2006) ‘Enter Hamas: The Challenges o PoliticalIntegration’, Middle East Report No. 49, 18 Jan. 2006.[351] PCHR (2007) ‘Annual Report 2007’. See Chapter 3 oradditional details.[352] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.

compound human insecurity.[353]

Mounting obstacles to the two-State solution

have produced conicting internal strategiesin response to the prolonged occupation,and neither negotiations nor violence haveborne success. Although political polarizationessentially stems rom internal Palestiniandisagreement, it is at the same time producedand exacerbated by the occupation. Theinternal political deadlock has become morepronounced as the protracted ‘peace process’has dragged on, and has intensied since thesecond intiada and the legislative elections.[354]

The legacy o Oslo and the increasingencroachments o the occupation, includingthe physical eects o the Wall, the settlementsand their inrastructure, the containment o Gaza and severe restrictions on movementand access are dividing Palestinians rom eachother. Israel’s actions results in complicatingattempts to Palestinian political unity. Oneexample is the imprisonment o members o the PLC: by the end o 2008, Israel had detainedmore than 40 members, including the Secretary

and the Speaker, thereby preventing the PLCrom reaching quorum in almost two years orunctioning with any political coherence.[355]

The 2006 elections in the oPt institutionalizedthe polarity in the Palestinian political system,which became increasingly territorialized aterHamas’ take-over o the Gaza Strip in 2007 when

[353] Generally speaking, political polarization typically

takes place between two popular political movements.It tends to occur outside national political institutions,when one or both parties reuse to settle their disputesthrough constitutional terms or existing national charters.This situation can become chronic in the absence o athird party capable o compelling the disputing parties toresolve their dierences. It is the nature o the conict as apower struggle that drives political sloganeering and thecreation o alliances with regional and international powercenters. In the Palestinian case, and within the Palestinianpolitical eld, the two parties to the conict are Fatah andHamas, see Jamil Hilal (2008) ‘Severe Polarization in andFragmentation o Palestinian Society’, background paperor the PDHR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.[354] Jamil Hilal (2008) ‘Severe Polarization in and

Fragmentation o Palestinian Society’, background paperor the PDHR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.[355] PCHR (2008) ‘PCHR Annual Report, 2008’.





Hamas eectively removed Fatah opposition romGaza, either violently or through neglect o theirofcial capacity. The elections, described by the

Quartet as “ree, air and secure,”[356] saw Hamaswinning 74 o the 132 available seats. Fatah, theparty which had long dominated both the PA andthe PLO, won 45 seats and was then positionedas opposition party. In March 2006, the new PAgovernment, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya,gained parliamentary condence, marking thebeginning o a new stage in Palestinian politics.The ingredients o a democratic system wereapparently present: there was a plurality o partiesoperating within a national consensus and despite

signicant ideological dierences, accepted eachother’s legitimacy.[357] However, the transition didnot produce a comprehensive change o leadershipsince Hamas took control o the PA governmentand parliament while Fatah retained power overthe PA’s presidency as well as the PLO. To someextent, dual political authority was institutionalizedin this process; but missing were State sovereigntyand the democratic institutions, such as anindependent judiciary and distinct legislative andexecutive authorities, necessary to bring this initialcomposite into a unctioning reality.[358]

Opposition between the parties becameincreasingly bitter and progressively more violent,bringing Palestinians to the brink o civil war.[359] The National Dialogue launched in late May o 2006 to orge political consensus and resolve thecrisis appeared to be as much about pressingpartisan advantage as about securing a strategiccompromise.[360] From May to June 2007 theGaza Strip became the ocal point o the politicaldivisions that are maniested in mutual conictbetween Hamas and Fatah. The eventual Hamastake-over o Gaza took place on June 14, 2007. The

[356] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: PullingBank rom the Brink’, Middle East Report No. 54, Jun. 2006.[357] Nathan J. Brown (2005) ‘Evaluating Palestinian Reorm’,Carnegie Papers No. 59, 14, Jun. 2005.[358] Hilal, Jamil (2007) ‘Palestine: the last colonial issue’, inJamil Hilal Ed. ‘Where Now or Palestine? The Demise o theTwo State Solution’, London: Zed Books.[359] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling

Back From the Brink’, Middle East Report No. 54, 13 Jun. 2006.[360] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: PullingBack From the Brink’, Middle East Report No. 54, 13 Jun 2006.

subsequent isolation o the Gaza Strip by Israeland the international community compoundedthe siege conditions that Israel had set up ater its

disengagement, and contributed to the physicalterritorializing o what was at that point mainly aseparation in the realm o ideology.

Box 8: Th o poaizatio

From the 1970s until the signing o the OsloAccords and the creation o the PA with limitedsel-rule, the PLO ormed the majority o thePalestinian political eld.[361] The PLO aced

both internal (rom the orces that rejectedthe Oslo Accords and reused to participatein PA institutions) and external challenges, yetit presented itsel as the only actor capable o transorming the national political eld into anindependent State. Its ailure to deliver, coupledwith the igniting o the second intiada in late-September 2000, strengthened the role o Hamas and the emergence o serious politicaldivisions between the two major players: theIslamist movement represented by Hamas andthe nationalist, secular movement representedby Fatah. Smaller parties, whose politics rangerom communist to socialist to centrist, havebeen overshadowed by the clash o these twoTitans.

Hamas did not monopolize the dierentorms o resistance used during the secondintiada; the Fatah movement and otherpolitical parties also played a role in armedresistance. However, in the end, the Fatahleadership sought a political resolution

through negotiations, while the Hamasleaders continued to apply a policy o (armed)resistance. These dierences remain the basisor the division between the two movements:Fatah’s stated belie in negotiation is seenby some as capitulation to the occupyingorces, whilst Hamas’ stated support o armed

resistance is seen as counterproductive.

[361] The PLO consists o many o the major political orcesin the oPt, including Fatah, the Popular Front or theLiberation o Palestine, and the Democratic Front or theLiberation o Palestine. Hamas remains outside the PLO.




Israel, the EU and the U.S. consider Hamas to be aterrorist organization, with Brussels and Washingtonrenewing their bans on the movement in October

2005.[362] The policies o Israel and the U.S towardsHamas are clear: in addition to criminalizing anymaterial assistance to the movement, they ormallyreject any contact with them.[363]

For the past teen years (1993-2008), the oPthas been one o the highest recipients o percapita oreign aid in the world; it is estimatedthat in the excess o USD 14 billion have beendisbursed since 1993/94.[364] Unsurprisinglythen, the PA is very reliant on internationalunding; there is perhaps no entity as dependanton assistance rom the outside world.[365] Immediately ollowing the 2006 elections, theU.S. and the EU and roze their unding withthe EU electing to bypass the PA and channelaid to beneciaries o their own choosing.The Ministry o Finance’s lack o control overmonetary circulation resulted in the breakdowno the nancial system in the oPt. In parallel tothe loss o control over nancial disbursementswas the loss o control over security orces. [366] Thus, the reezing o donor contributions tothe newly elected government had severehumanitarian, developmental, economic, and

political repercussions.In concert with the U.S. and the EU, the Quartetnoted that “all members o a uture Palestiniangovernment must be committed to non-violence, recognition o Israel, and acceptance o previous agreements and obligations, includingthe Roadmap”. [367] The Quartet concluded thatit was inevitable that ‘’uture assistance to any

[362] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling

Back From the Brink’, Middle East Report No. 54, 13 Jun. 2006.[363] ICG (2006) ‘Enter Hamas: The Challenges o PoliticalIntegration’, Middle East Report No. 49, 18 Jan. 2006.[364] Anne Le More (2008) ‘Security or Harm? An examinationo the role o the international community in Palestiniandevelopment and State-building process’, backgroundpaper or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.[365] World Bank Ocial cited in ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians,Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink’, MiddleEast Report No. 54, 13 Jun.2006.[366] Mary Kaldor & Mient-Jan Faber (2007) ‘Report on HumanSecurity in Palestine’, Case Study or the Madrid Report o the Human Security Study Group, The Centre or the Study

o Global Governance, London School o Economics .[367] The Quartet was established in 2002 and is made up o the EU, Russia, the U.S. and the UN.

new government would be reviewed by donorsagainst that government’s commitment” tothese “principles”.[368] To date, the Quartet does

not work with Hamas.

In their eorts to inuence Palestinian politics,international actors including the U.S., the EU,specic Arab and Gul States, and Israel, have ocusedon nancial and economic leverage. For example,the U.S. nancially supports Fatah’s led PA in theWest Bank, the EU has a West Bank rst policy withthe aim o promoting economic development, andHamas raises nances rom undisclosed sources.

Figure 9: Factors contributing to political

polarization

The use o violence by the politicalmovements, adopting opposing strategieso resistance in a situation o oreigndomination (internal-external)

The international boycott o the PalestinianAuthority ater the elections in 2006 (external)

Lack o State sovereignty; impotenceo Palestinian legislature and judiciary(internal and external)

Israeli occupation (external)

Partisan interests o regional actors withopposed strategies (external)

Palestinian political parties inability toreaching consensus; prioritizing partisanover national interests (internal)

Leadership vacuum created by: the deatho Yasser Araat; the imprisonment o majorpolitical players e.g. Marwan Barghouti(internal and external)

Failure o the Quartet and regional powercentres’ attempts to enorce reconciliationplans (external)

Political agenda inherent in the provision anddistribution o aid (internal and external)

Dependence on oreign aid as a result o prolonged occupation and marginalizingo the Palestinian economy, control o natural resources and trade (external)

[368] ICG (2006) ‘Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: PullingBack From the Brink’, Middle East Report No. 54, 13 Jun. 2006.





The eects o the blockade and the internationalsanctions on the Hamas-led government in theGaza Strip have been damaging,

both or Palestinian human securityand political reconciliation in theoPt. As noted in a recent report bythe Euro-Mediterranean HumanRights Network, one o the mostsignicant eects o EU policies in2006-7, alongside those o the U.S.and Israel, was to contribute to thedivisiveness between Fatah andHamas.[369] The Palestinian politicaleld is also subject to the pull o

regional power structures as theywrestle to determine the uturedirection o the regional systemand its political dynamics. Thiscomplex construction and the maintenanceo regional and international alliances havein part been crucial to the consolidation andterritorialisation o political division in the oPt.[370]

The two main Palestinian political organizationshave resorted to external regional powercentres to mediate and resolve their disputes,

thereby inviting intererence in the aairs o thePalestinian political eld. Hamas elicits supportrom, and allies with Iran, Syria, the LebaneseHezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Fatahhas joined orces with the so-called ‘moderate’axis led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.This means the Palestinian political eld is alsosubject to the pull o regional and internationalpower structures as they wrestle to determinethe uture direction o the regional system andits political dynamics. It is this construction andthe maintenance o regional and internationalalliances that critically underpins the severepolitical polarization between the twomain Palestinian parties.[371] Figure 10 oersPalestinian perspectives on the reasons behindthis political division.

[369] Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2009)‘Active but Acquiescent: the EU’s Response to the Israeli

Oensive in the Gaza Strip’, May. 2009.[370] UNDP interview with Jamil Hilal (2009).[371] UNDP interview with Jamil Hilal (2009).

Figure 10: Reasons behind internal political division

Source: UNDP, 2009

3.10 Fo poitia poaizatio

to oia atatio?

There is a concern that territorial ragmentationand political polarization are having a divisive

social eect on Palestinian society but thedepth o this division certainly bears scrutiny.While the results o a recent UNDP surveyindicate that Palestinians are increasinglyapathetic to political processes and bodies,[372] a response that may reect growing despairand hopelessness amongst Palestinianswho perceive little hope or a solution in theoreseeable uture,[373] in answer to a questionregarding how Palestinians rom the WestBank and Gaza Strip eel about each other, overthree quarters o Palestinians have positive orvery positive eelings towards those rom theother region (see Figure 11).[374]

[372] UNDP (2009) ‘Human Security Survey’, commissionedor the PHDR by UNDP, Jerusalem.

[373] UNDP interview with Jamil Hilal (2009).[374] UNDP (2009) ‘Human Security Survey’, commissionedor the PHDR by UNDP, Jerusalem.

Regional influences

[n=259] 8%

Occupation

[n=1002] 29%

Power struggle

[n=1101] 32%

Personal interest

[n=569] 17%

Different ideologies

[n=211] 6%

Media influences

[n=24] 1%

Other reasons

[n=259] 8%




Figure 11: Feelings towards residents o two regions (the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

Very positively

[n=834] 24%

Positively

[n=1835] 54%

Negatively

[n=596] 17%

Very negatively

[n=157] 5%

Source: UNDP, 2009

In other words, Palestinians may be growing tired o non-representative political parties andunresponsive institutions, but they do not mistake these entities as representing real people, withwhom they still, despite signicant physical obstacles to unity, eel a deep anity. Another positiveindicator is that they continue to respect diversity in political opinion: the vast majority o Palestinianswould support a riend who was aliated to a political party that they didn’t like (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Support or riend’s political belies

Would accept it

[n=3125] 92%

Would end friendship

[n=268] 8%

Source: UNDP, 2009

In general, Palestinians remain broadly tolerant o each other’s political belies. Fatah supporters werethe least tolerant o a riend’s political aliation, with 15% suggesting they would end a riendshipover politics. O the Hamas supporters surveyed, only 6% would end a riendship (this was the sameresult as those with no political aliation); while those rom parties outside the two dominant groupswere most tolerant, with only 5% saying they would end a riendship over politics.

The diculty, then, stems not rom intolerance rom ordinary Palestinians, but rom a perceived threat

to personal security or individual political belies that seems to be based in ear o the political partiesthemselves: the majority o survey respondents reported being araid that they would be abused ortheir political belies whilst only 32% reported that they are never araid (see Figure 13).





Figure 13: Fear o political discrimination

Often

[n=1537] 38%

Sometimes

[n=734] 18%

Rarely

[n=462] 11%

Never

[n=1288] 32%

Source: UNDP, 2009

Unsurprisingly then, there is also a signicant mistrust o political parties. Palestinians rom the West Bank demonstrate higher levels o distrust in political parties (70 percent trust no political group or party) than thosein the Gaza Strip (60 percent). A signicant majority, 65% o respondents, trust no action (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Factional trust

Fateh

[n=739] 23%

Hamas

[n=235] 7%

PFLP

[n=42] 1%

Islamic Jihad

[n=26] 1%

Others

[n=54] 2%

I trust no faction

[n=2058] 65%

Source: UNDP, 2009

UNDP ocus group discussions in the Gaza Strip oered a somewhat dierent and more worryingperspective on the eects o political polarization on social ragmentation. Participants argued thatpolitical divisions may now be restructuring Palestinian society along actional lines. This view is partiallyinormed by knowledge o, and experience with, the nepotistic tendencies o the authorities as well asthe recent campaigns o arrests, torture and murder by political actions in the West Bank and Gaza.The outcome o the ocus group discussions suggests a real danger that political polarity could beprooundly divisive. The discussions suggested that a key gauge o the severity o the social division canbe measured by Palestinians’ experience o political violence resulting rom internal polarization.

On the whole, the UNDP survey results show that, though political polarization has not yet severelyeroded social cohesion, it has generated distrust and disaection towards political parties andmovements. As will be explored later in this Report, there is still a high enough level o anity and

trust between Palestinians in dierent parts o the territory that, with places to direct their energy,individuals may still be able to nd productive and socially coherent social structures through whichto continue their struggle or sel-determination.




Box 9: Poitia poaizatio a hua iht vioatio

Politically motivated killings o political activists, ugitives, prisoners and detainees, injuriescaused by violence, torture and misuse o weapons, the imposition o house arrests, andrestrictions placed on civil society organizations have reached unacceptable levels in boththe West Bank and Gaza Strip[375]. Such tactics undermine political reconciliation talks takingplace in Cairo and endanger the social abric o Palestinian society by exposing and wideningsocial divisions.

There are widespread reports o extra-judicial killings (at least 33 Palestinians were killedin this manner in the rst hal o 2009), and the detention o suspected collaborators andprisoners. [376] Dozens o testimonies rom survivors and eye witnesses claim that victimso internal political violence are typically abducted rom their homes, taken to unknowndestinations, blindolded, severely beaten and shot in the eet.[377] There is also evidence o

politically motivated killings in the West Bank, e.g., in Qalqilya armed clashes on 31 May and4 June 2008 resulted in the deaths o our members o the ‘Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades, ourmembers o the PA security, and one civilian.[378]

The PA security services waged an arrest campaign targeting dozens o Hamas members,including journalists, public gures, municipal council members, imams, NGO representatives,university lecturers and students. According to Hamas, Palestinian security services in the WestBank have detained at least 500 persons.[379] Between 28-29 June 2009 alone, 46 arrests weredocumented in Qalqilya, 7 in Bethlehem, 25 in Hebron, 7 in Jenin, 24 in Nablus, 9 in Ramallah,and 17 in Salt.[380] Similarly, in Gaza, between 28-29 June 2009, the Internal Security Servicessummoned 41 Fatah activists in Northern Gaza, 70 in Central Gaza, 200 in Khan Younis and30 in Raah. Aside rom intensive questioning, a number o those summoned were orced to

stand under the sun, humiliated, and deprived o ood and water. Most o those summonedwere later released.[381]

Human rights organizations working in the oPt have documented the use o severe torturetechniques including the beating, kicking, punching and hitting o a victim with rie buttsand the shooting o their eet and knees. In addition, a combination o methods used orprolonged periods, reerred to as Shabeh, is also deployed. Shabeh entails sensory isolation,connement in small, dark cells (2 x 3 m), sleep and rest deprivation, prolonged interrogations,the iniction o pain by orcing detainees to stand or long periods o time against a wallwhile liting both hands and one leg, deliberate exhaustion, verbal abuse and deamation,threats and intimidation, overcrowding o cells, denying contact with layers and amilies,

[375] PCHR (2009) ‘Special Report: Inter-Palestinian Human Rights Violations in the Gaza Strip’, Feb. 2009[376] Al Haq (2009) ‘Overview o the Internal Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Jun. 2009.[377] PCHR (2009) ‘Special Report: Inter-Palestinian Human Rights Violations in the Gaza Strip’, Feb. 2009.[378] PCHR (2009) ‘PCHR Is Concerned Over Arrest Campaigns against Fatah Activists in Gaza and against Hamas Activists in theWest Bank’, Press Release, 08 Jun. 2009.[379] PCHR (2009) ‘PCHR Is Concerned Over Arrest Campaigns against Fatah Activists in Gaza and against Hamas Activists in theWest Bank’, Press Release, 08 Jun. 2009.[380] PCHR (2009) ‘PCHR Calls or an end to political arrests and or measures to ensure the success o unity dialogue’, PressRelease, 30 Jun. 2009.

[381] PCHR (2009) ‘PCHR Calls or an end to political arrests and or measures to ensure the success o unity dialogue’, PressRelease, 30 Jun. 2009.





and preventing detainees rom washing.[382]

Other documented abuses include,arbitrary and secret detentions, excessiveuse o death sentences,[383] and violationso: (i) the reedom o association; (ii) thereedom o movement; (iii) the reedomo expression; (iv) judicial decisions; and(v) the right to a air trial.[384]

The ocus group conclusions, inormed by

a deepening concern with both the leveland intensity o the internal politicallymotivated violence and a lack o condencein the political reconciliation talks, suggestthat an indigenous and grassrootsreconciliation mechanism is necessary toacilitate Palestinian political reconciliationand strengthen social cohesion. Althoughthe majority o Palestinians are not directlytouched by the extreme political violence,a growing number o individuals, amiliesand communities have been, and are being,negatively aected by the internal politicalconict. Without a process o reconciliationthat is aimed at individuals and amilies, anddriven by Palestinian civil society, eorts tobroker political reconciliation by the majorparties will ail to bring unity and security tothe oPt.

[382] Al Haq (2009) ‘Overview o the Internal Human RightsSituation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Jun. 2009.

[383] B’tselem reports that 71 death sentences have beenhanded out under the PA, not all have resulted in execution.Recent gures rom the Gaza Strip are unclear, as there issome evidence o extra-judicial execution taking place.B’tselem (2008) ‘Palestinian Authority court imposes deathsentence on a man convicted o collaborating with Israel’,Press Release, 27 Nov. 2008.[384] Al Haq (2009) ‘Overview o the Internal Human RightsSituation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Jun. 2009.

3.11 conlusion

Having described the status o developmentin Chapter 2, Chapter 3 has attemptedto diagnose the actors contributing tothis predicament. Fragmentation andpolarization have been highlighted as twocorrosive inuences on Palestinian societyin the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The divide between Fatah and Hamashas aected social cohesion, a problemaggravated by an increase in political violence

and the suppression o civil rights by theauthorities in both territories. Nonetheless,the results o the UNDP survey reveal that themajority o Palestinians rom both territorieseel apathetic and alienated not rom eachother but rom the posturing o their politicalparties. Results demonstrated high levelso tolerance or political diversity, whichbodes well or reconciliation and suggeststhat a national reconciliation process mightovercome the damaging eects o politicalviolence, re-build solidarity and redress the

marginalization o ordinary Palestiniansrom the political process.

The territorial ragmentation o the oPt hasseverely weakened the central authorityo the PA. Israeli control over internalsecurity matters aects external borders,airspace, trade and macro-economic issues,livelihoods, health care and a range o othervital issues. A territory carved into small,disconnected enclaves, subject to militaryand economic closures, unable to oer justiceto its dispersed people, and without its mostsacred symbols o religion and identity, canhardly be viable and unctioning. The morethe authority and institutions o governanceare eroded, the greater the potentialor political polarization. The nationalinstitutions, or example the PLC, are unable







85

Fo o at,o o a

a o to iv

i iity: hua

uity i th oPt

4

4.1 Itoutio

[Palestinians] endure the daily humiliations large and small

that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: thesituation or the Palestinian people is intolerable.[385]

It is clear rom the preceding Chapters that sustainable developmentis not taking place in the oPt. Chapter two highlights the act that inmany sectors the oPt is actually experiencing de-development andChapter three explores the multiple barriers preventing Palestiniansrom ullling their basic needs and rights.

What can be done to move orward? In this Chapter, a new matrix oradvancing development in the oPt is elucidated, based on the principleso human security which are most simply described as a perected

“triangle o development, reedom and peace.”[386]

Chapter 4 beginswith an analysis o how human insecurity is maniest in the oPt, oeringillustrative examples. It then discusses some instances o micro-initiativesaimed at establishing human security conditions. Lastly, it ocuses on themacro level by proposing a strategic direction through which humansecurity could become more entrenched.

Political conditions on the ground in the oPt are inimical to humandevelopment because they undermine the promotion o security and

[385] Barack Obama (2009) ‘Cairo Speech’, Egypt, 4 Jun. 2009.[386] UN (2005). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, S ecurity and Human R ights or all .UN Secretary General Report to the General Assembly.





the respect or human rights.[387] Nonetheless,even in the ace o the ongoing complexcrisis, conventional development approaches

continue to be applied. It is necessary toacknowledge the inappropriateness o thedevelopment agenda to date, with its emphasison building bureaucratic-technical capabilities,i new approaches are to be designed. Thehuman security paradigm is presented here asan important entry point to this process.

The model o human security on which thisChapter is based derives rom the UN HumanSecurity Unit’s 2009 report Human Security in

Theory and in Practice and also, the UN’s 2005Report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,

Security and Human Rights or all , in which theinterdependence o “the reedom rom want,the reedom rom ear and the reedom to livein dignity” is rst expounded. In Larger Freedom argues that “development, security and humanrights go hand-in-hand” and that they areimperative and reinorce each other. From thisperspective, economic progress (reedom romwant) cannot be delivered i many or most peoplein a society suer rom high levels o conict

(are not ree rom ear). It contends that armedconicts and wars, in turn, cannot be addressedi the institutions attempting to resolve themare not recognized as legitimate, i people aresubject to authoritarian policing and socialcontrol, and i there is no protection o vital civil,political, economic, social, environmental andcultural rights (all o which promote the reedomto live in dignity). A human security approachcommitted to promoting the basic goals o reedom rom want, reedom rom ear, andreedom to live in dignity, could bring multiplebenets to the particular situation o the oPtbecause it suggests that alternative strategiesand programmes can be devised which willcreate the conditions to reconstruct and revitalizePalestinian politics and society in the longer term.To begin with, since it promotes a Do No Harmapproach, it allows neutral donors to ask whattypes o programmes could address Palestinian

[387] Khan, Mushtaq H. (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem; see alsoIn Larger Freedom.

human security needs without undermining thelegitimacy o Palestinian political representativesand institutions – a problem that has grown

worse rom the Oslo years to the present.[388]

What ollows is an assessment o the multi-aceted insecurities aced by Palestinians.It does not attempt to be exhaustive but isindicative, giving examples o threats aced byPalestinians in order to show how their “larger”reedoms are being daily undermined.

4.2 Fo to iv i iity

4.2.1 Health security

The health situation o Palestinians isincreasingly insecure, with the erosion, andin some cases reversal, o many health gains.[389] Psychological health is a signicant indicator o the poor levels o overall health security in theoPt: qualitative measures reveal rising eelingso depression, stress, ear and humiliation.[390] The recent split between the two main politicalparties is compounding the permanent stresso the ongoing occupation. The last two yearshave seen injuries and deaths o Palestinians atthe hand o other Palestinians, the duplicationo services, and the politicization o the healthsector. Children and youth are particularlyvulnerable to trauma as they witness thehelplessness o their parents and other adults.According to a study conducted by Sharek, anNGO or youth, 81% o Palestinian youth areeither extremely depressed or depressed.[391] Inchildren, anxiety is classically exhibited through

symptoms such as nightmares, sleepingdiculties, anxiety, lack o concentration,

[388] Mary B. Anderson (1999) ‘Do No Harm: How AidCan Support Peace – or War’, Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers.[389] See Chapter 2 or details.[390] Horton, Richard (2009) ‘The occupied Palestinianterritory: peace, justice, and health’ in The Lancet, Vol. 373,

Issue 9666, pp. 784 - 788, 7 Mar. 2009.[391] Sharek (2008) ‘The Youth Talk: perceptions o Palestinian youth on their living conditions’, May, 2008.



87chapt FouFreedo fro want, freedo fro fear and freedo to live in dignity: huan ecurity in the oPt

withdrawal, and the need to cling to caregivers.[392] The realities o occupation and internecineconict prooundly threaten long term physical,

emotional and social well-being. Palestinianyouth, particularly young men, struggle witheelings o anger, helplessness and humiliation.

Figure 15: % of youth reporting depreion,according to ex, region and place of reidence

Extremely depressed 39%

Depressed 42%

In between 6%

Not depressed 9%

Not depressed at all 5% 394

433

57

90

49

Source: Sharek Youth Forum, 2008

Compounding this situation is a ragmentedand weakening health care system that aces aunique set o challenges. Health care is oeredby at least ve dierent sectors ocused ondierent populations in diverse locations:the PA’s Ministry o Health in the West Bank;the Hamas Ministry o Health in the GazaStrip; UNRWA, serving reugees. The servicesthey supply are supplemented by NGOs andthe private sector. Health care governance,unsurprisingly, is contradictory and ineective.[393]

The political division between the administra-tions o the West Bank and Gaza Strip has a-ected health services across the oPt. The oc-cupation and Palestinian political disunity are,in act, proving a lethal combination: the Stateo Israel’s practice o withholding taxes and cus-

[392] Giacaman et al. (2009) ‘Health status and health servicesin the occupied Palestinian territory’ Lancet 373: 837-49;UNDP (2009) ‘Inside Gaza: Attitudes and Perceptions o theGaza Strip residents in the atermath o the Israeli military

attacks’, Jerusalem.[393] Giacaman et al. (2009) ‘Health status and health servicesin the occupied Palestinian territory’ Lancet 373: 837-49.

toms duties, coupled with the withdrawal o in-ternational aid ater the 2006 elections, has cre-ated a severe nancial crisis and let the PA un-

able to pay the salaries o 165,000 civil servants.This has led to intermittent strikes, includingby health personnel, and resulted in worseningservice provision, shortages o essential medi-cation and equipment, and an overall health-system crisis.[394]

Health care services in the Gaza Strip have beenparticularly nega-tively aected. Evenbeore OperationCast Lead, the healthsecurity o people inGaza was severelycompromised. In ad-dition to the impacto strikes, health se-curity is underminedby the lack o accessto quality healthservices resultingrom the blockade

and containment policies. Essential medical

items are restricted, including nitrous oxide gaswhich is used or anaesthetics,[395] while the sup-ply o basic utilities, such as electricity, is unre-liable and oten results in damage to medicalequipment.[396] Both the protracted rationing o uel and the recurrent power-cuts in the GazaStrip negatively impact on the unctionality o health acilities and contribute to the deterio-ration o living standards and increasing socialdistress.[397]

[394] Horton, Richard (2009) ‘The occupied Palestinianterritory: peace, justice, and health’ in The Lancet, Vol. 373,Issue 9666, pp. 784 - 788, 7 Mar. 2009.[395] United Nations. 2008. ‘’Human Rights Situation inPalestine and other Occupied Arab Territories,’’ Report o the Special Rapporteur on the situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, JohnDugard. A/HRC/7/17, 21 January.[396] International Committee o the Red Cross. 2009.‘’Gaza: 1.5 million people trapped in despair’’. InternationalCommittee o the Red Cross.[397] WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping FOOD SECURITYand MARKET MONITORING Report July 2008:Report 19http://www.relieweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.ns/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-7GP7VV-ull_reort.pd/$File/ull_reort.pd .





Box 10: mutip ii i gaza’ hath vi

Strikes o health care workers in the Gaza Strip began on August 31, 2008 with 48 percento all sta at the Ministry o Health hospitals and 68 percent at the primary health careacilities (PHC) on strike during the rst week.[398]At hospital level, two Ministry hospitals,the Gaza Psychiatric Hospital and the Kamal Edwan Hospital, declared a state o emergencyor two weeks. This resulted in the suspension o elective surgical operations, the closure o outpatients’ clinics (except one to treat emergency cases) and the limitation o diagnosticservices to emergency cases. Consultations at public health clinics (PHCs), reerrals abroad,and essential drugs supplies also ell. The Ministry in the Gaza Strip produced a reportwhich criticised the PA in Ramallah or instigating strike actions in Gaza, claiming thatthey had adopted punitive policies aimed against health ministry employees who didnot obey orders to stop work.[399] The Minister o Health or the Gaza Strip argued that thestrike was politicised, demanding that all employees continue their work and disregard thecall to strike. He also requested those involved to make the national interest prevail overpartisan interests.[400] Human rights groups reacted with alarm because the employer (thePA in Ramallah) ostensibly supported the strikes, compelling employees to commit andthreatening those who did not with dismissal and/or deprival o their salaries.[401] Even moregravely, political wrangling over control o the External Treatment Department in the GazaStrip, which halted eective operation or over three weeks in early 2009, resulted in thedeterioration in health o 800 patients and the deaths o ten.[402]

The already-weakened state o health services deteriorated even urther as a result o Operation Cast Lead. Health sta and acilities were seriously aected, with 16 healthworkers killed and 25 injured while on duty while ve hospitals, 41 public health clinics,

and 29 ambulances were either damaged or destroyed.[403]

Limited access to quality healthcare due to shortages o medical supplies and medication during 2006 and 2007 wasdocumented by the WHO[404] and the ICRC recorded a similarly grim situation in 2009.[405] O all respondents to UNDP’s 2009 survey, 65% indicated that either they or their householdmembers were unable to receive appropriate treatment due to the unavailability o services

or medical expertise in their area.[406]

[398] WHO, ‘Gaza Health Workers Strike Impact o the Strike on Health Care Provision’ (Aug. / Oct. 2008).[399] Ministry o Health (Gaza Strip), ‘Impact o the Israeli Closures o the Gaza Strip on the Health Sector’, Jun. 2007 –Dec. 2008.[400] Dr Basim Naim, Minister o Health, Gaza Strip, News item rom the Palestinian Inormation Centre, 31 Aug. 2008.[401] PCHR, ‘PCHR Concern at Ongoing Gaza Strikes’, Press Release, 02 Sept. 2008.[402] PCHR (2009) ‘10 Patients Die and Health Conditions o Hundreds Deteriorate as Gaza’s External Medical Treatment CrisisContinues; PCHR hold Minister o Health in Ramallah accountable and calls on Palestinian President to Intervene’, Press Release,19. Apr. 2009.[403] World Health Organization. 2009.’’Rapid health acility survey,’’ conducted or UNDP’s damage and needs assessment.’’January.[404] Awad; Mataria; Rana Khatib; Cam Donaldson; Thomas Bossert; David J Hunter; Fahed Alsayed; and Jean-Paul Moatti.2009. “The health-care system: an assessment and reorm agenda, ‘’ in The Lancet, Volume 373, Issue 9670, Pages 1207 - 1217,4 April.ccvcvc[405] International Committee o the Red Cross. 2009. ‘’Gaza: 1.5 million people trapped in despair’’. International Committeeo the Red Cross.[406] United Nations Development Programme. 2009. ‘’Palestinian Perception toward the Human Security Situation in theoccupied Palestinian territory.’’ A report or the Palestine Human Development Report, Commissioned by UNDP’s Programmeo Assistance to the Palestinian People. Jerusalem.




Health security in East Jerusalem isalso in crisis, being beset by politici-sation and the discriminatory appli-

cation o medical insurance provisionby the State o Israel. An individualmust be an “Israeli resident” to receivesocial benets and health insurancerom the National Insurance Institute(NII). The NII holds the position that,unless proven otherwise, Palestin-ian residents o East Jerusalem arenot residents, and that they in eectseek to take improper advantage o the State and benet rom its servic-

es without being lawully entitled tothem. In almost every instance wheresuch a resident submits a request oran allotment or or health insurance,the next to individuals to veriy thatthe applicant actually resides in Jeru-salem. The Israeli human rights organ-isation, B’tselem, contends that theNII investigations breach principleso proper administration and grosslyviolate the rights o residents. The in-vestigations are supercial, deny the

individual>s right to due process andprivacy, and are motivated by pre-conceived notions o behaviour inPalestinian society.[407] Even thoughthe claim or health insurance isgranted in most cases, investigationstake months, during which time theclaimant is eectively denied his orher entitlement to health insurance.Denial o health insurance to a resi-dent o Israel violates the law; none-

theless, Physicians or Human Rightsestimate that there are currentlysome 10,000 children residing in EastJerusalem who are not covered bymedical insurance at all.[408]

[407] B’tselem (2009) ‘East Jerusalem: Therevocation o social rights and health insurance’.

[408] B’tselem (2009) ‘East Jerusalem: Therevocation o social rights and healthinsurance’.

Box 11: micro-initiative tackling health

inecurity: PA Health Inurance schee

In early 2009, the Ministry o Health (PA) announceda new health insurance scheme or Palestinians. In2008, the Minister o Health described this policyas both important and innovative; it is hoped thatthe scheme will provide universal health insurancein the oPt. The scheme is to be nanced by a 5%contribution rom the registered income o everyPalestinian household. In March 2009, the Ministryo Health created a ‘Health Insurance Unit’ with threeprincipal aims:

To collect money to provide people with•

medical services through a health insurancesystem to support the Ministry’s budget

To improve administrative procedures, to•

provide sta and develop their administrativeeciency and English language prociency

To improve the computerised health insurance•

system to cover all areas and branches o the Ministry departments and acilitate the

processing o citizens’ contributionsHealth proessionals have welcomed this schemeas a “antastic” idea, i it proves workable.[409] One o the obstacles acing the success o the new policy isthe ability o the PA to collect unds. However, i itworks, the new social health insurance scheme willimprove equity and general health security amongstPalestinians.

4.2.2 Environmental securityEnvironmental security in the oPt is increasinglyprecarious because o both a lack o autonomy over directenvironmental resources and negative environmentaldecisions taken by both, the State o Israel and the PA,including the appropriation o water resources andthe ailure to provide adequate sewage acilities. Therecurrent destruction o trees, private homes and publicinrastructure by the Occupying Power creates a permanent

[409] PCHR (2009) ‘Respect or Human Rights in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory an Internal Palestinian Perspective’, Background paper or thePHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.





state o environmental insecurity. Because theterritory lacks contiguity and is shrinking in size,access to areas that Palestinians once lived and

worked in and/or visited is now either highlyrestricted or denied.[410]

Environmental resources and access to themare closely linked to the livelihoods, healthand overall human security o any population.Land is the most common means o storingwealth. It is also an economic asset, providinga oundation or activity in sectors as varied asagriculture, industries, housing and tourism,as well as being a key actor in the unctioningo markets, e.g. as security against credit, aswell as non-market institutions, such as localgovernments. Environmental insecurity inthe oPt is inextricably linked to the absenceo sovereignty over land and other naturalresources. This has implications or planningand preservation, both o which are criticalor environmental security and sustainabledevelopment. Given the creeping nature o the occupation and the provisions o the OsloAccords, Palestinians are ast losing control andstewardship over what remains o their land

and other natural resources.

There is an increasing decline in water availableto Palestinians. The State o Israel completelycontrols the West Bank’s water resources (asis mandated in the Oslo Accords) and hasestablished systematic restrictions that arenegatively impacting the development o waterresources, inrastructure and services in theoPt. Over-extraction rom deep wells combinedwith reduced recharge has created risks orthe aquiers and a decline in water available

to Palestinians through shallower wells.Palestinians abstract 20% o the “estimatedpotential” water resources in the West Bank,while Israel abstracts 80% and overdraws itsagreed quota by more than 50%. Although

[410] The World Bank. 2008. ‘’The Economic Eects o Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank.’’ Social andEconomic Development Group Finance and Private SectorDevelopment Middle East and North Arica Region. TheWorld Bank. The World Bank. 2009. ‘’West Bank and GazaAssessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water SectorDevelopment.’’ Sector Note. Report No 47657-GZ. MiddleEast and North Arica Region. The World Bank.

agriculture aords a bigger share o economicoutput and overall employment in the oPt thanin Israel, the Palestinian per capita water budget

or agriculture is one th that o Israel. In theEastern Aquier, there is evidence o deep Israeliwells negatively impacting Palestinian wellsand springs. Some West Bank communities arenow resorting to unlicensed drilling to obtaindrinking water.[411]

Box 12: di [412]

At Bardala, in the North Eastern corner o Tubas Governorate, eight Palestinian wellswere constructed beore 1967 or bothdomestic and agricultural purposes, withdepths ranging rom 30 to 65 m. Ater the1967 war, Israel constructed two deep wells(Bardala 1 in 1968 and Bardala 2 in 1979) aew hundred meters rom the Palestinianwells. As a result, the water level in thePalestinian wells dropped at the rate o 2 m per year and salinity increased. Nowthese wells are dry, as are most o the local

springs used by Palestinian consumersor domestic and agricultural purposes.At Fasayil in the Jericho governorate,Israel has drilled six production wells. Theyield o the single Palestinian wells in thearea has allen to zero and the ormerlyabundant local springs have dried up.At Auja, the very productive Auja spring,which ormerly discharged up to 9 MCMa year, is dry or months on end throughthe action o ve nearby Israeli production

wells. A ormerly water abundant villageis now orced to buy water rom nearby

settlements.

[411] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessmento Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development’,Sector Note. Report No 47657-GZ. Middle East and NorthArica Region.[412] Adapted rom: World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and GazaAssessment o Restrictions on Palestinian Water SectorDevelopment’, Sector Note. Report No 47657-GZ. MiddleEast and North Arica Region.




Water in Gaza is becoming so scarce that the armworkers oten get paid in it.[413] Approximately10% o Palestinians are struggling without any

tap water as a result o the damage caused towells, pipes and waste water acilities duringOperation Cast Lead. According to the CoastalMunicipalities Water Utility (CMWU), ‘’requestsvia the International Committee o the Red Crossto the Israeli military […] to allow shipments o construction materials and spare parts to repairwells and acilities damaged during the war weredenied.” The CMWU estimates that 50,000 peoplelack tap water ater losing their homes, while aurther 100,000 have had their water cut because

o damage to the water supply network. Eleveno Gaza’s 150 wells, the only source o drinkingwater or Gaza’s 1.4 million people, apart romexpensive bottled water and water trucked inby aid agencies, are not unctioning. Six werecompletely destroyed. Many residents in the northand in Raah only have tap water every 4-7 days.One resident noted, “We have trouble bathing,washing our clothes, and cooking.” [414] In a 2009Report prepared by UNEP, a particular concernwas raised about the high levels o nitrates in thewater supply ater tests at nine private wells ound

many with nitrate concentrations exceedingWHO guidelines o 50 milligrams per litre. Highlevels o nitrates can cause a orm o anaemiain inants known as ‘blue baby syndrome’, aproblem that had already been documented in astudy published in 2007, which ound that hal o the inants tested had worrying levels o the ‘bluebaby’ indicator protein, methemoglobin. UNEPexpressed concern that levels o nitrates in watermay perhaps have become worse as a result o Operation Cast Lead and is urging the launch

o a massive campaign to improve Gaza’s waterquality and educate parents on how to protecttheir babies.[415]

[413] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessmento Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development’,Sector Note. Report No 47657-GZ. Middle East and NorthArica Region.[414] IRIN (2009) ‘Over 150,000 Gazans still without tapwater’, 7 Apr. 2009 available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=83818.[415] UNEP (2009) ‘Environmental Assessment o the GazaStrip ollowing the escalation o hostilities in December2008 -January 2009’, available at http://www.unep.org/publications/contents/pub_details_search.asp?ID=4058.

Map 6: Access to resh water or Palestinians

Source: UNDP, 2007/2008





The absence o adequate waste water acilitiesposes a urther threat to environmentalsecurity. Only 31% o Palestinians in the

West Bank are connected to a seweragenetwork. Just our major municipalities havewastewater treatment plants and even theseare only producing poor quality efuent.

There is no planned or regulated reuse o efuent. In the West Bank, 25 MCM o rawsewage is being discharged each year in 350locations. Settlements are also dischargingraw sewage into the environment.

The blockade severely limits sanitationservices in Gaza. For almost two years, suppliesnecessary to rehabilitate and upgrade Gaza’ssewage networks and treatment plants havenot been allowed through the borders. Inaddition, strategic reserves o spare partsand materials needed to maintain anddevelop sanitation inrastructure are eitherseverely or totally depleted. Attempts bythe international community and the PAto persuade the Israeli authorities to treatthe discharge o sewage into the sea romGaza as an important humanitarian issue

have so ar ailed. As a result o this, alongthe coast o Gaza, 16 sewage outalls godirectly into the sea, releasing approximately70-80,000 m³ o waste water daily; aecalcoliorm bacteria cluster around the outalls;the coastline is contaminated; while thelivelihoods o those who depend on marineresources or their income are jeopardized.

This problem is taking its environmental tollnot only in Gaza and southern Israel, but isaecting the Mediterranean more broadly.[416] Highlighting the extent o water and sewageproblems acing the region, UNDP SpecialRepresentative to the oPt commented thatthere is a need to “remove environmentalissues rom the ‘pending peace process’tray and upgrade them to ‘urgent’. “These

[416] The Guardian, (2009) ‘A War o Water’, Jens Toyberg-Frandzen, 6 Jun. 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisree/2009/jun/06/gaza-strip-water-supply.

problems will not go away or wait until theresumption o serious peace talks,” he said.[417]

The Mediterranean is a shared resource, due

to currents, Gaza’s raw or partially treatedsewage discharges will begin to have sub-regional and regional impacts.[418] As theUNEP Executive Director remarked ater thecompletion o the environmental assessmentollowing Operation Cast Lead:

Many o the impacts o the recent

hostilities have exacerbated

environmental degradation that

has been years in the making –

environmental degradation that does

not end at the borders o the Gaza Strip

but also aects the health and welare

o those living beyond.[419]

Sewage also contaminates agricultural land.During Operation Cast Lead, Az Zaitounwastewater treatment plant was damaged and,as a result, 55,000 m² o agricultural land wascontaminated with 100,000 m³ o waste waterand sludge, with severe repercussions or theenvironment, health and livelihoods o Gazan

armers. UNEP recommends that the areaneeds to be re-assessed and corrected beorereplanting.

[417] Toyberg-Frandzen Jens (2009) ‘’A War o Water,’’in The Guardian, 6 June http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisree/2009/jun/06/gaza-strip-water-supply.[418] World Bank (2009) ‘West Bank and Gaza Assessmento Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development’,Sector Note. Report No 47657-GZ. Middle East and NorthArica Region.[419] UNEP (2009) UNEP News Centre West Asia, available athttp://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Deault.asp?DocumentID=596&ArticleID=6303&l=en&t=long.




Box 13: mio-iitiativ tai

viota iuity:

Patiia wat Authoity

As part o the PA, the Palestinian WaterAuthority (PWA) is mandated to: secureenvironmentally sound and sustainabledevelopment o water resourcesthrough ecient and equitable watermanagement; dene the optimum wayto manage, protect, and conserve limitedwater resources; and benet rom water

resources development by raising waterservice to levels which provide or ahealthy environment and economicdevelopment.

The PWA strategy involves:

securing Palestinian water rights•

strengthening national policies and•

regulations

building institutional capacity and•

developing human resources

The PWA is an example o a decent andimproving Palestinian institution, withgood structure, capacity and organization.Its inability to provide decent water andsanitation to the majority o Palestiniansis directly related to the restrictionsplaced on the authority – both in terms o accessing water sources and areas wheredevelopment and repair o inrastructureis required – by the Israeli administration.

The Head o the PWA commented: “Whilethe PWA continues to work to provideaccess to water or Palestinians, politicalsupport must be mobilised in order tochange the dynamic o Israeli control intoone o eective cooperation. The Israelipublic must realise that water should notbe used as a political tool in this conict tourther hinder Palestinian development andthe undamental right to clean water andsanitation or all. In efective cooperation

lies the beginning o good neighbours.”

4.3 Fo o at

4.3.1 Economic securityPalestinian policy makers do not

have any instruments or monetary,

exchange rate and trade policies or

even a complete set o scal policy

instruments.[420]

The economy in the oPt lacks sovereignty and iscontained and ragmented. [421] Overall economicgrowth is negative, with per-capita incomecontinuing to decrease despite donor unding.

The growth in aid dependency is counter-productive as “aid cannot ully compensate orthe loss o sel-reliance.”[422] Within this macro-economic context, the Palestinian private sectoris constrained rom operating as ully and reelyas a market system should. For example, Israel isresponsible or both the collection o customsduties on imported goods destined to the oPt, aswell as or the transer o monies to the PA. Thispolicy gives Israel control over Palestinian civilservices, including health care and education,which are unded by tax revenues.[423] In addition,

Palestinian producers have been eectively cuto rom the world market and rely on Israelimiddlemen. The unpredictability o occupation-related policies plus internal Palestinian divisionsserve to undermine business condence anddomestic and international willingness to investin the oPt.

Territorial ragmentation curbs theperormance o the private sector in the West

[420] United Nations Conerence on Trade andDevelopment (2006) ‘The Palestinian War-Torn Economy:Aid, Development and State Formation’, UNCTAD/GDS/APP/2006/1 quoted in Gisha: Legal Center or Freedom o Movement (2007) ‘Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Statuso Gaza’, Jan. 2007.[421] The containment o the Palestinian economy becamepervasive when the Israeli army eectively reoccupiedthe West Bank in early 2002 and enclosed the Gaza Striptowards end 2005.[422] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, Background Paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.[423] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, Background Paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.





Bank. It inhibits the expansion o businessesbeyond urban centres, chokes o markets inareas that are physically and administratively

contained, separates sellers rom consumers,and prevents small businesses rom achievingeconomies o scale because o increasedtransaction costs. The ragmentation o theWest Bank limits the ow o commoditiesbetween the north, central and southernregions, and severs the agriculturallyproductive Jordan Valley rom its absorbingmarkets.[424] East Jerusalem, once an integralpart o the Palestinian market, has been cuto by the Wall and increased intra-regional

transportation costs.In terms o macro-economic instruments,Palestinians ace severe limitations in usingeconomic, scal andmonetary policy toolsto address the growingeconomic insecurity; theProtocol on EconomicRelations (the ParisProtocol) gave economicsovereignty o the oPt to

the State o Israel.[425] Israelhas ull control o the oPt’smonetary policy as the PAcannot introduce its owncurrency, leaving the NewIsraeli Shekel as the de actocurrency. This leaves theoPt vulnerable to economicshocks which impact Israel.

The lack o sovereigntyat the macro-economic level and limited

autonomy at the meso level translates intoeconomic insecurity at the micro level.[426] Economic insecurity is seen in high levelso unemployment due to the erosion andstagnation o the private sector, shrinking

[424] FAO / WFP (2007) ‘Comprehensive Food Security andVulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) West Bank and Gaza Strip’,Jerusalem.[425] The Paris Protocol was signed in April 1994 as part o the Oslo ramework to govern economic relations between

Israel and the oPt during the ve year interim period.[426] This is not to deny the existence o nancially stableand wealthy Palestinians.

livelihoods opportunities and in some casesthe complete lack o livelihoods due to loss o access to agricultural land and shing rights,

and destruction and/or loss o economicassets, including water wells, greenhouses,crops and houses.[427] The most insecureworking conditions are typically in the inormalsector where workers are neither aordedsocial protection nor possess entitlements.[428] As one older resident o Gaza put it, “one o the worst orms o insecurity aced by athersand sons nowadays is their work building andrunning tunnels. I call this ‘suicide in the nameo work’. It aects about 25,000 people.”[429]

Photo 5: View o a tunnel in Gaza

Source: Louise Dear, 2008

[427] WFP (2006) ‘WFP Operational Update: oPt’, availablehttp://www.wp.org/stories/wp-operational-update-opt[428] Hilal, Jamil (2009) ‘Severe Polarization in, andFragmentation o, Palestinian Society’, Background Paper

or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.[429] Interview with older men in a ocus group on humansecurity in Raah, conducted or UNDP in July 2009.




Box 14: Ioa ooi

ativiti

The increased economic hardshipexperienced by the Palestinians hasnecessitated a greater reliance on theinormal sector. The clandestine natureo this activity, sometimes conductedunder the radar o both Israel and thePA, means that there is not extensiveresearch available. However, in 2006the Palestine Economic ResearchPolicy Institute (MAS) conducted

research which indicated that in 2006the inormal transportation sector –the transportation o passengers andgoods by road – employed 11,837people (8,636 in the West Bank, and3,022 in the Gaza Strip) and was worthUSD 81.6 million.[430] During 2006, theimproved value added o inormaltransportation activities in the oPt ledto an increase in productivity o 6.5%(USD 6,890.0 per worker, compared toUSD 6,471.1 in 2005) with productivity

per worker in the remaining WestBank at a higher rate than in Gaza.

The transportation system is justone example o inormal economicactivity with a signicant value addedto the Palestinian economy. Othernotable sectors include: inormal /seasonal agricultural work, the tunneleconomy, and workers travelling‘illegally’ into Israel. Although inormal

economic activities are providing animportant saety net or strugglingindividuals and amilies, inormalworkers are exposed to the relevantrisks. Threats include: job instability / insecurity; no workers rights,contract, protections associated withormal employment; danger o acingcaution or arrest rom the relevant

authorities or illegal activities.

[430] MAS / PNA / PMA (2008) ‘Quarterly Economicand Social Monitor’ Vol. 11. Feb. 2008.

At the micro-level, a concerning number o Palestinian households eel that their presentsituation is not economically secure in the long-term.

As demonstrated by Figure 16, 58% o those surveyedby UNDP elt that they could not keep up nanciallywhile an alarming 42% were already in a serioussituation or barely coping.

Figure 16: Ability o the household to keep upnancially

For more than one year

[n=800] 23%

For about one year

[n=621] 18%

For only a few months

[n=581] 17%

Can barely manage now

[n=1083] 32%

Situation is serious

[n=336] 10%

Source: UNDP, 2009

There is some evidence to suggest that economicinsecurity is translating into ood insecurity acrossthe oPt. The survey highlighted that 39% o respondents were managing to meet their oodconsumption needs with diculty, while 4% notedthat their amily had an insucient amount o oodor daily consumption.

The olive industry is another indicator o economicinsecurity. Tens o thousands o olive trees havebeen destroyed by settlers; increasingly as part o a“price-tag” campaign used by settlers to protest their

removal rom settlement outposts; and each year,settlers attack Palestinians attempting to harvesttheir olives.[431] Palestinians who live on the easternside o the Wall but whose land lies in the closedzone ace serious economic hardships as they areunable to access their land to harvest crops or graze

[431] Lourdes Garcia-Navarro (2009) ‘Evicted Israeli Settlers Attack Palestinian Land’, 16 Oct., 2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113811498





their livestock without permits.[432] TheWall’s route undermines the olive industryby separating armers rom their olive

groves, and trees are also uprooted or theconstruction o the Wall.

The IDF has installed gates in the Wall andimplements an associated permit regimeto allow access but permits are dicult toobtain, are routinely rejected and oten donot meet armers’ and workorce needs.[433] Many suering repeated reusals arediscouraged rom re-applying. I permitsare granted, they are not always issued tothe most appropriate person, leaving olderamily members unable to eectively carryout the work while the more able-bodiedare orced to remain idle at home. Permitsonly remain valid or short periods so thatarmers are orced to be inactive in theperiod between the expiry o their currentpermit and its (hoped or) renewal. In thenorthern West Bank, 80% o the agriculturallabour orce, isolated by the Wall, does notreceive permits and individuals with securityrecords have no hope o receiving permits at

all. Residents eel that the permit and gaterestrictions are: “a policy intended to createdespair among the armers, hoping thatthey will cease working their land west o the Wall.”[434]

In addition to the permit regime, gateplacements, limited opening hours andrestrictions on agricultural vehicles,equipment and materials place severe

[432] OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘”Lack o Permit’’ Demolitions andResultant Displacement in Area C’, OCHA-oPt Special Focus,East Jerusalem. May. 2008.[433] For example, agricultural gates are opened daily,generally or one hour early morning; noon; and lateaternoon to allow armers holding valid permits toaccess their land. See OCHA-oPt (2008) ‘OCHA ClosureUpdate’, 30 Apr. - 11 Sep. 2008; see Chapter 2 ordetails.[434] UN (2008) ‘The Humanitarian Impact o the Wall: Fouryears ater the advisory Opinion o the International Courto Justice on the Wall’, Update No. 8, Aug. 2008.

constraints on armers and are orcingthem to adopt less eective agriculturalpractices. Although longer opening hours

are allowed during the olive harvest, 30o the 64 gates built into the Wall remainclosed throughout the year.[435] Restrictiveaccess prevents essential activities, such asploughing, pruning, ertilizing and pest andweed management, rom being carried out,which has severe implications or the qualityand quantity o agricultural production.Some armers cope by dismantling theirgreenhouses and changing to lower-maintenance but lower-yield crops. It is

estimated that once completed the Wallwill enclose a total o 38 Palestinian villagesand approximately 50,000 Palestinianswill either have restricted or no access totheir agricultural land, public services andmarkets.[436] In Jayyus, the result has beenincreased unemployment, evidence o displacement especially among young men,and increased hunger in a community whichormerly exported ood items.[437]

[435] OCHA-oPt and UNRWA (2008) ‘The HumanitarianImpact o the Wall Four Years ater the Advisory Opiniono the International Court o Justice on the Wall’, UpdateNo. 8, 20 Jul. 2008; UN (2008) ‘The Olive Harvest in theWest Bank and Gaza’; UN (2008) ‘The Humanitarian Impacto the Wall: Four years ater the advisory Opinion o theInternational Court o Justice on the Wall’, Update No. 8,Aug. 2008.[436] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘The West Bank Wall’.[437] UN (2008) ‘The Humanitarian Impact o the Wall: Fouryears ater the advisory Opinion o the International Courto Justice on the Wall’, Update No. 8, Aug. 2008.




Box 15: mio-iitiativ ai

ooi iuity: soutio o

dvopt couti co: ITajua

InTajuna, or ‘Solutions’ (based in Ramallah) believesthat Palestinian economic sustainability depends onreedom, security, planning, and concerted eortsby all sectors o society; understanding structuraleconomic weaknesses and acknowledging thehigh level o resilience o the Palestinian privatesector and people; and acknowledging that smalland medium size enterprises o the Palestinian

economy must be nourished in order to survive,grow and ourish. It is particularly valuable becauseit is aimed specically at promoting Palestiniangoods and services thus decreasing reliance on theIsraeli economy.

InTajuna aims to enhance the Palestinianconsumer’s perceptions o locally producedPalestinian products, in particular, processed ood,beverages, and personal care and householdconsumables. The InTajuna approach tacklesproblems in the promotion o Palestinian products,

such as a lack o points o sale and poor supportor local manuacturers. The InTajuna methodrelies on the accumulation o industry insight intothe ast-moving consumer-goods market. Theproject investigates Palestinian household needs,concerns, motivations, and emotions through aocused consumer survey in ve major cities in theWest Bank and Gaza Strip. Ten to teen companiesare selected to lead the way as producers o qualitylocal products.

InTajunaworks by leading the design o a consumer

campaign in coordination with key stakeholdersthat include companies, points o sale, andcommunications specialists. Communicationsstrategies and plans include an inormation andawareness building campaign, in-store displaysand a promotional campaign. The ultimate aimso InTajuna are to make the Palestinian economymore sel-sustaining and to reduce reliance on theIsraeli economy by improving Palestinian goodsand services and making them competitive withIsraeli ones. This project is an excellent example o

Palestinian entrepreneurial potential.

4.3.2 Macro-strategy: addressingwant; re-shaping the economicagenda

The reedom rom want hastraditionally been addressed throughaccelerating economic developmentand ensuring a air distribution o the benets o growth. However,developing economic capabilities ina territory in which closures can beenorced at short notice by an externalpower is a new type o challenge.Traditional industry and agriculturerequire stable access to inputs and

markets, so production collapses andentrepreneurs ace crippling losses inan economy subject to containment.This has been a particular problem inGaza since 2007, but also aects largeparts o the West Bank where the Wallhas isolated Palestinians in a semi-permanent way. Improved movementand access are imperative to Palestinianeconomic recovery and growth.

The challenge is to supplementexisting strategies with a much moreeective promotion o local economicsel-suciency and to provide eectivemechanisms or rapidly deliveringrelie and supplies to large populationsin isolated pockets who may suddenlybe cut o. It would not be rational toprioritize such strategies i the conicteconomy was likely to be short-lived, but it is likely that many will becompelled to remain reliant on these

alternatives or a long time. While itmay appear that such adaptationstrategies are a means to orceacceptance o the ragmenting eectso the occupation, the promotion o alocalized, sel-sustaining economy willbenet Palestinians in the short andlong term, both under occupation andwhen they are ree rom occupation.

Alternative strategies need tocomplement but not supplant the

traditional economic strategies o





the PA that have been based on developmentmodels appropriate or a State in a normaleconomy. Commitment to the development o

inrastructure and export-oriented agriculturestill has a role to play, or example, even thoughthe history o closures and containment showsthat these strategies cannot be exclusively reliedon in the Palestinian context. Indeed, Israel’scapacity to destroy Palestinian inrastructure hasbeen powerully demonstrated many times andIsraeli border controls disrupt trade links withlittle or no notice. The challenge is to developlong-term institutional responses to ensure thereedom rom want in the ace o the crisis.[438]

4.4 Fo o a

4.4.1 Personal security

Palestinians ace major threats to their personalsecurity starting with the occupation and settlerviolence, but increasingly including the eectso the conict between Fatah and Hamas, and,in the Gaza Strip, between Hamas and dissident

Islamic movements. The greatest determinant o this insecurity is the inability o Palestinians toully enjoy the right to sel-determination. Thisright is an integral part o achieving personalsecurity; perhaps no other aspect o humansecurity is so vital. The social contract betweenindividuals living in sovereign States requires thatthe State protects an individual’s human rights(an obligation to which an Occupying Power isalso held), and when States ail to honour thiscompact, citizens become prooundly insecure.Palestinians are being ailed twice: they can

depend neither on the Occupying Power nor thede acto administrations in the West Bank and theGaza Strip to guarantee their personal saety.

The extent to which the State o Israel restrictsthe sel-determination o Palestinians is evidentin the matrix o Military Orders it has put inplace. Since 1967, it has issued over 1,500

[438] UNCTAD (2006) ‘The Palestinian War-Torn Economy:Aid, Development and State Formation’, Document No.UNCTAD/GDS/APP/2006/1. United Nations Conerence onTrade and Development, 2006.

military orders governing dierent aspects o Palestinian lie, including setting the age o criminal responsibility at 16 or Palestinians.[439]

In reality, even this is not a guarantee thatchildren will not be arrested as the IsraeliMilitary Authorities routinely violate their ownlegislation: some seven hundred children a yearare detained without access to a lawyer andprosecuted in two military courts operating inthe West Bank, and children as young as 12 or13 years old can receive sentences o up to 6months imprisonment.[440]

The imprisonment o an individual poses themost undamental challenge to the exerciseo sel-determination. According to the UNSpecial Rapporteur on the Situation o HumanRights, some 700,000 Palestinians have beenimprisoned over the orty years between 1967and 2007. Human rights organizations have alsohighlighted ill-treatment and torture in Israelidetention centres,[441] with poor treatment o minors also reported.[442]Some prisoners are heldwithout habeas corpus under administrativerather than military detention, the ormerbeing detention without charge or trial, and

authorized by administrative order rather thanby judicial decree. This high level o detentiono Palestinians has serious implications orother areas o security, including economicsecurity and amily livelihoods during and aterincarceration. Even i they are released romdetention without being charged, ormerlydetained Palestinians are subject to ‘securitypreventions’ which may preclude them romobtaining permits to access designated areas(regardless o amilial or land ties).[443]

[439] The age o criminal responsibility is 18 or Israelicitizens, including illegal settlers living in the oPt.[440] For more detail, see DCI (2009) ‘Palestinian ChildPrisoners: The systematic and institutionalised ill-treatmentand torture o Palestinian children by Israeli authorities’,Jun. 2009.[441] Hamoked & B’Tselem (2007) ‘Absolute Prohibition:The Torture and Ill-Treatment o Palestinian Detainees’,Jerusalem: B’Tselem.[442] DCI (2009) ‘DCI concerned by sharp increase indetention o children’, Press release, 11 Mar. 2009.[443] Hamoked & B’Tselem (2007) ‘Absolute Prohibition:The Torture and Ill-Treatment o Palestinian Detainees’,Jerusalem: B’Tselem.




O the 7,834 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel,only 56 are women, which is less than 0.6%.Since the beginning o 2009, 18 women have

been released. This means that an additional 14women have been arrested since the beginningo 2009. As o August 2009, three women arebeing held under administrative detention(detention without charge or trial).[444]

A majority o Palestinian prisoners are held in jails in Israel, violating article 76 o the FourthGeneva Convention which requires personsrom an occupied territory to be detained inthe occupied territory, and i convicted, to servetheir sentence therein. As a result o restrictionson movement, amily visits are difcult andrequently impossible. In addition, all visits o amilies rom Gaza to their relatives detained inIsraeli prisons were suspended on June 6, 2007.[445]

The gendered eects o high detention rates aremaniold and it is crucial to consider women’sand men’s dierent roles and responsibilitiesin dealing with the eects o death, injury andimprisonment o amily members. Men andboys are detained in ar larger numbers than

women, yet prison looms large in the dailylives o women as the main visitors o prisonersand those who shoulder the responsibility o maintaining households and raising childrenwhen male amily members are detained.[446] The major burden o caring or prisoners andtheir amilies alls, thereore, on women’sshoulders. The psychological and nancialcost o such care-giving work, in such dicultcircumstances, is impossible to calculate.

The greatest threat to personal security is

violation o the right to lie, and systematicthreats to the lives o Palestinians in Gaza were

[444] Personal correspondence, Magda Mughrabi, AddameerAssociation, 31 Aug. 2009.[445] UN (2008) ‘Human Rights Situation in Palestine andother Occupied Arab Territories’, Report o the SpecialRapporteur on the Situation o Human Rights in thePalestinian Territories occupied since 1967, John DugardA/HRC/7/17, 21 Jan. 2008; The ICRC is also denied visitsto these prisoners. ICRC (2009) ‘Gaza: 1.5 million peopletrapped in despair’.[446] Birzeit University (2008) ‘The Impacts o Israeli MobilityRestrictions and Violence on Gender Relations in PalestinianSociety: 2000-2007’.

immeasurably escalated during OperationCast Lead. Investigations aterwards show thatmale atalities vastly outnumbered those o

women and children even though the evidencesuggests that only a small minority o menkilled were combatants.[447]The inability to movereely in and out o Gaza denied civilians o theirmost basic response to personal insecurity: toee. In addition, the places in which civilianssought shelter and reuge, such as schools runby the UN, were also hit.[448] This meant thatwithin blockaded Gaza options or sae ightwere severely restricted. For the entire durationo the incursion civilians were trapped in an

extremely dangerous environment.[449]

The persistence o the blockade to date means thathumanitarian convoys aced severe restrictionsto entry into the Gaza, while Palestinian in-ghting is urther disrupting weakened servicedelivery and decreasing the individual securityo those who oppose the de acto authority.The ongoing ring o rockets out o the GazaStrip also intensies community insecurity as itleads to more Israeli attacks and reinorces theargument that security conditions on the ground

do not allow or the liting o the blockade.

Visiting the Gaza Strip immediately ater OperationCast Lead, the UN Under-Secretary General orHumanitarian Aairs John Holmes stated:

[T ]he destruction I saw was devastating

– both in human and material terms.

The magnitude o loss o lie and injury

to the civilian population is bound

[447] Al Haq report that the majority o those killed duringOperation Cast Lead were men. In total, 237 combatantswere killed (13 o whom were under 18). O the 1172 non-combatants who died, 342 were children and 111 women.Civil police (all male) constituted another 136 dead. Theexact number o male deaths is possibly higher as the dataon children are not sex segregated (http://www.alhaq.org/pds/gaza-operation-cast-Lead-statistical-analysis%20.pd ).[448] Such as the attack on 6th January on the UNRWA schoolwhere civilians who ed their homes ollowing air orcebombings where seeking reuge. http://www.btselem.org/english/gaza_strip/20090111_bombing_unrwa_school.asp[449] UN OHCHR (2009) ‘Statement O Special RapporteurFor The Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967,Presentation to The Special Session O the Human RightsCouncil On The Situation In the Gaza Strip’, 9 Jan. 2009.






only o the Occupying Power, but also o the Palestinian Government, which will be an importantmeasure o the success o a uture Palestinian State.

IcHr ocuses its work on three strategies, namely monitoring human rights violations, enhancingrespect or human rights and seeking their protection, especially those rights enshrined in thePalestinian Basic Law and saeguarded by international human rights conventions.IcHr receives,ollows up and handles complaints related to violations o citizens’ rights, proposes legislationsthat ensure basic human rights and reedoms, and monitors PA actions as well as those o otherpublic institutions or authorities in relation to human rights violations. IcHr also inorms andeducates citizens o their rights and their protection in accordance with international humanrights declarations and conventions as well as national laws and legislations.

An important part o ICHR’s work concerns education and awareness, disseminating a culture o human rights and democracy amongst the Palestinian public. To achieve this aim the securityservices, teachers, journalists, social counsellors, employees in health sector, students, women,children and disadvantaged and marginalized groups are especially targeted.

Human rights have come to represent the moral will o the international community; they arealso recognised as integral to human development and successul Statehood. Since a respect orhuman rights in the oPt will contribute to the liberty o its peoples, and will assist the movement o the uture State o Palestine rom ragmentation to cohesion, a ully unctioning and progressive

ICHR is crucial.

4.4.2 Community securityAccording to UNDP’s 2009 survey the majority dene personal security in amily terms rather thanrelating it to individual saety and well-being (some young unmarried women and men have moreindividual perceptions). It is not surprising, then, that 91% o respondents indicated that they eared,to varying degrees, or both their amily saety and their personal security (see Figure 22).

Figure 18: How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of

your family?

Often

[n=2044] 48%

Sometimes

[n=1325] 31%

Rarely

[n=525] 12%

Never

[n=405] 9%





Disaggregated or the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions

Region

West Bank Gaza StripOften 46% 48%

Sometimes 32% 29%

Rarely 12% 14%

Never 10% 10%

Source: UNDP, 2009

Palestinian community lie is constantly threatened by sudden, unpredictable violence rom the Stateo Israel and its citizens, including illegal settlers. Some communities suer nightly raids by the mili-tary which are requently accompanied by curews rom dusk to dawn and the use o tear gas and liverounds. The night raids on the West Bank village o Bil’in have been particularly requent and violentin 2009. On October 6th an Israel soldier was arrested on suspicion o beating the Palestinian head o the Bil’in Committee against the Wall during a night raid o the village.[452] Night operations are particu-larly requent in reugee camps due to Israeli concerns that camps are sites resistance. In the rst vemonths o 2008, the UN Reugee Works Agency recorded 183 search operations in West Bank camps.

Photo 6: Old city o Hebron: walkway connecting top foors o houses occupied by settlers, with wirenetting to protect Palestinians rom projectiles thrown by settlers


[452] OCHA-oPt (2009) ‘Protection o Civilians Weekly’ 30 Sep – 06 Oct, 2009.




Settler harassment o Palestinian communitiesranges rom taunting, stone throwing, shooting(including o children going to school, livestock

and dogs), harassment and violence against in-ternational aid workers, damage to livelihoodassets such as green houses, and destruction o harvests.[453] The number o settler and militaryassaults on civilians in the West Bank has stead-ily grown. ICRC indicates that oences morethan tripled during 2002-2007; however, com-plete police investigations are rare and mostoten conclude that “the culprits could not beidentied;”[454] leaving Palestinians with no re-course to justice.[455] In addition to threats romsettlers, Palestinians are also subject to threats

rom Israeli Border Police; such instances – likeattacks perpetrated by settlers – commonly,Palestinians have no recourse to justice atersuch actions. In the latest example o this ap-proach, several lmed incidences o abusesperpetrated by Israeli Border police againstPalestinian men were dismissed in an Octo-ber 2009 decision as justiable within the law.The Israeli Deputy State Prosecutor Shai Nitzanstated: “They were light blows that do not causereal damage, are not illegal.”[456]

When Palestinian victims o settler attackschoose to le complaints, they ace severalphysical and bureaucratic challenges. They mustlodge complaints with an Israeli police ofcerat the nearest District Coordination Ofce: butDCOs are located within settlements, makingthem difcult, i not impossible, to access with-out prior coordination; and testimonies are o-ten recorded in Hebrew despite being conveyedin Arabic, thereby excluding the possibility o re-view by complainants not uent in Hebrew.[457]

Palestinians do not le complaints or a number

o reasons. First, there is a lack o condence in

[453] Peace Now (2008) ‘Settlements in Focus: 2008 – theYear in Settlements in Review’; DCI (2008) ‘Under Attack:Settler Violence Against Palestinian Children in theOccupied Territory’, Nov. 2008.[454] ICRC (2007) ‘Dignity Denied in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories’, Geneva: ICRC.[455] DCI (2008) ‘Under Attack: Settler Violence AgainstPalestinian Children in the Occupied Territory’, Nov. 2008.[456] BBC News (2009) “Israel Rejects Police Probe”. 22 Oct. 2009,

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8318926.stm[457] DCI (2008) ‘Under Attack: Settler Violence AgainstPalestinian Children in the Occupied Territory’, Nov. 2008.

the law enorcement system. Second, there is agenuine ear o reprisals and uture harassmentby settlers. Third, there is the ear that special

permits and/or licenses to enter specic areaswill be revoked. Fourth, there is a ear o beingdetained, or accused o either attacking settlersor ling a alse complaint.

East Jerusalemites, too, ace consistent and insti-tutionalized personal and community insecurity atthe hands o the Israeli administration and settlers.In just one o many new incidents to promote set-tlement in East Jerusalem, on 2 August 2009, Israeliriot police orcibly evicted two Palestinian amilies(50 people) rom their homes in the Sheikh Jarrahdistrict, allowing Jewish settlers to move into the

properties. Israeli police who carried out the evic-tion order against the Palestinian amilies cited aruling issued the month beore by Israel’s SupremeCourt that says that the houses belong to Jewsand that the Arab amilies, who had lived there ormore than 50 years, were doing so illegally. Rob-ert Serry, the UN special coordinator or the Mid-dle East peace process, described the evictions as“totally unacceptable,” saying that they “heightentensions and undermine international eorts” tocreate conditions or successul peace negotia-tions.[458] In Silwan, a neighbourhood close to the

Old City in which 55,000 Palestinians live, 88 am-ily homes are under threat o demolition to createmore settlements (aecting more than 1500 peo-ple). Government signs, including in Arabic, openlycall the neighbourhood the “City o David” and theactivities o nationalist religious organisations suchas ElAd (the Hebrew acronym or City o David)receive public government support. In 2008, theJerusalem municipality approved plans or theconstruction o a 104 unit settlement, including asynagogue, in nearby Ras Al Amud. This settlementis rapidly nearing completion and appears to bepart not only o a plan to link the Old City to Ma’aleAdumin, one o the largest West Bank settlements,but a clear statement o Israel’s intention to ringPalestinian East Jerusalem and take it over.

As i these threats were not enough, the politicalpolarization between Fatah and Hamas has alsoresulted in personal and community insecurity,with politically motivated arrests, torture andill-treatment in detention by both sides. From2007 onwards both political parties have beeninvolved in a tit-or-tat conict that has included

[458] The Guardian (2009) ‘50 Palestinians Evicted From theirJerusalem homes’, Ben Hubbard, 02 Aug. 2009.





their military orces executing captives, killing in-dividuals not involved in hostilities, and engag-ing in gun battles.[459] In July 2008 Hamas orces

in Gaza and PA orces in the West Bank carriedout a wave o unlawul arrests against their op-ponents. In Gaza, Hamas orces also closed anestimated 100 organizations considered to beallied with Fatah. Similarly, West Bank authoritieshave closed dozens o organizations suspectedo having Hamas ties.[460] This trend appears to beincreasing. In 2009, there have been reports o anescalation in the war o words, as well as killings,beatings and torture, including the shooting o individuals in the legs and eet.[461]

Security orces rom both sides (Fatah

and Hamas) have targeted activists

and organizations o the other party.

Their abusive behaviour has victimized

Palestinians rom all walks o lie and

weakened the rule o law.[462]

Palestinians also all victim to low level criminalactivities: robbery is perceived to be a greateroverall threat in West Bank communities, whilethe use o arms and violent crime are seen asslightly more prevalent threats in Gaza. In a

2008 UN human rights report, 55% o respond-ents indicated that they do not eel sae trav-elling to another city within Gaza or the WestBank. More than one in ten respondents saidthey elt endangered to some extent by sexualassault, while domestic abuse threatens onein ve. The latter gures indicate that gender-based violence is a serious concern in the oPt.[463]

[459] HRW (2007) ‘Gaza: Armed Palestinian Groups Commits

Grave Crimes’ 12 Jun. 2007.[460] HRW (2008) ‘Occupied Palestinian territory: newarrests highlight abuses by Hamas, Fatah’,’ July 29: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/07/29/occupied-palestinian-territories-new-arrests-highlight-abuses-hamas-atah.[461] HRW (2009) ‘Gaza: Hamas should end killings, torture’, April20: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/20/gaza-hamas-should-end-killings-torture ; Maan New Agency (2009) ‘Hamasdenies plot to kill West Bank PA ofcials’, July 2: http://www.maannews.net/en/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=38980 .[462] HRW (2008) ‘Occupied Palestinian territory: newarrests highlight abuses by Hamas, Fatah’,’ 29 Jul. 2008.[463] UN (2008) ‘Human Rights Situation in Palestine and otherOccupied Arab Territories’, Report o the Special Rapporteur on theSituation o Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories occupiedsince 1967, John Dugard A/HRC/7/17, 21 January. See also UNIFEM(2009) ‘Voicing the Needs o Women and Men in Gaza’.

Box 17: mio-iitiativ

ai ouity

iuity: stut diaou

A collaboration between UNDP, theCarter Centre and Sharek Youth Forumaims to promote a culture o dialogue,reconciliation and unity among maleand emale university students in theGaza Strip. The programme is specicallytargeted towards student communitiesthat have traditionally held dierent

political belies and aliations. The objective o the student dialoguesis to encourage debate, argument,conict resolution and unity amongmale and emale students. This willbe achieved by convening a ‘StudentAssembly’ representing two o the mainUniversities in Gaza, Al-Azhar and theIslamic University. The Universities aretraditionally considered to be polarisedalong political lines. The ‘Student

Assembly’ will address the specicand common concerns o studentsincluding tuition, acilities, teaching,course oerings, and so on. The airingo political agendas will be discouraged.By addressing concerns commonto all students, it is hoped that theprogramme will counter behaviours thathave impinged upon and stunted thedevelopment o Palestinian civil societyand political culture. Ultimately, suchconditions and behaviours constrainopportunities or students to ull theiraspirations and are a contributing actorin the current political impasse in theoPt. The Student Dialogues programmewill give students the chance to developskills in the mediation o conict andreconciliation and teach them how toair their dierences without resortingto violence, giving them the chance touniy at a grassroots level.




4.4.3 Political security

The Oslo Accords were initially perceived as

a promising means to promote Palestinianpolitical security. However, when the Oslointerim period expired in 1999, ailing to yieldpeace and prosperity, the domestic legitimacyo the PA suered a severe blow. This is in partbecause State-building, a la Oslo, ocused onlimited administration, moved eorts andattention away rom the national liberationstruggle towards, and prioritized the securityo the State o Israel. Thanks to Oslo, the PAcan only operate as a transitional authoritywith limited jurisdiction; it has established

State-like institutions but plays the role o ‘’state in waiting,’’ able only to inuence andshape the political system and institutionsin limited ways.[464] Since the outbreak o thesecond intiada in 2000, Israel’s consolidationo control over the West Bank, and the politicalpolarization between Fatah and Hamas, the PAhas been conronted by an almost continuousstate o political, socio-economic and scalcrisis.[465] Trust in the government has beensteadily eroding as the PA is unable to deliver

on the promised peace dividend.

The PA’s lack o political sovereignty isexemplied in several ways:

The Occupying Power determines•

who may vote in Palestinian electionsthrough its control over the PalestinianPopulation Registry

The State o Israel controls nances•

and movement, aecting the abilityo Palestinian governmental oces tounction properly[466]

[464] Khalil, Asem (2008) ‘Dierent Concepts o the Separationo Powers’, in The Contours o a Future State: A multi-partcompendium o Palestinian Thinking. Commissioned bythe Institute o Law. Birzeit University.[465] See Khalil, Asem (2008) ‘Dierent Concepts o the Separationo Powers’, in The Contours o a Future State: A multi-partcompendium o Palestinian Thinking. Commissioned by theInstitute o Law. Birzeit University. Despite the challenging contextthe PA has recorded some achievements, including ree and airelections, which are testament to the capacity o Palestinians to

build democratic institutions with international support.[466] Gisha: Legal Center or Freedom o Movement (2007)‘Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status o Gaza’,

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)•

has been unable to reach quorum inalmost two years due to the imprisonment

o some o its members: by the end o 2008 the State o Israel had detainedmore than 40 members, including theSecretary and the Speaker[467]

As this Chapter has shown, the all-out rom the2006 elections and the Fatah/Hamas divide iscompounding political insecurity because o abreakdown in coordination o administrativeunctions at the oPt-wide level; violent clashesand labour strikes resulting in disruptions in, andduplication o, the provision o basic services,including health care; intimidation, injuries anddeaths, and violations o human rights. Thedegree o the internal strie is evident in thestrong perceptions o threat, discrimination andalienation elt by Hamas and Fatah supportersdepending on where they live. About two-thirdso the population eel politically alienated andtrust neither o the major Palestinian politicalparties: Hamas appeals to only 7%; while Fatahis trusted by 23% o the respondents. The recentyears o intra-Palestinian disunity have also

let a particularly negative impression on theyounger generation o Palestinians: only 22%o the 18-24 age cohort reported eeling thatPalestinians in the West Bank and Gaza think very positively o each other[468].

Restrictions on movement undermine thepotential or short-term political and socialunication o the political actions. For example,travel restrictions prevent PA employeesrom meeting other government ocialswithin the oPt, inhibiting the coherence and

coordination o government policies andplanning, which undermines service delivery,legal and administrative systems, and precludesexploitation o economies o scale.

With neither the Palestinian State norinternational law providing protection,Palestinians are turning to the government,

[467] PCHR (2008) Annual Report.[468] Sharek (2008) ‘The Youth Talk: perceptions o Palestinian youth on their living conditions’, May, 2008.





amily and kin-based solutions or support.[469] Few now rely on ocial protective and judicialservices to resolve disputes, reecting a lack

o condence in the rule o law. There appearsto be widespread political disenchantmentin the oPt and a prevalent eeling being thatexisting political parties are insucientlydemocratic and accountable.

In Transparency International’s 2004Corruption Perception Index, the PA ranked108 out o 145 countries surveyed, whichsuggested that public perceptions o corruption, i not corruption itsel, remainedvery high.[470] However, Le More contends thatdespite widely acknowledged clientelism andthe misuse o public unds by the PA since itsinception – including avouritism, unequalopportunities, abuse o power, monopolies,the private pocketing o public resources andthe mismanagement o public unds by wayo lavish personal spending by PA and PLOocials – the extent o corruption in the PAhas been exaggerated or political reasons.According to the World Bank, corruptionoccurred less oten in the oPt than in other

developing countries.[471] Despite this, in2006 the Palestinian Attorney Generalreported in an inquiry into widespreadcorruption that he had the thet or misuse o USD 700 million o public unds.[472] AlthoughHamas were elected partly on the basis o their ‘cleaner’ image and promises o scalsobriety, it appears that their own nancial

[469] Johnson, Penny (2009) ‘Towards a New Social Contract:

Renewing Social Trust and Activating Social Capital orPalestinian Human Security’, background paper or thePHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem;

Khalil, Asem (2008) ‘Dierent Concepts o the Separationo Powers’ in The Contours o a Future State: A multi-partcompendium o Palestinian Thinking. Commissioned bythe Institute o Law. Birzeit University.[470] Le More, Anne (2008) ‘International Assistance tothe Palestinians Ater Oslo Political Guilt Wasted Money’,London: Routledge.[471] Le More, Anne (2008) ‘International Assistance tothe Palestinians Ater Oslo Political Guilt Wasted Money,London: Routledge.[472] Le More, Anne (2008) ‘International Assistance tothe Palestinians Ater Oslo Political Guilt Wasted Money,London: Routledge.

base (worldwide Islamic organisations,including radical oundations in Syria andIran) is extremely opaque.[473]

A disquieting sixty seven percent o respondents to a 2009 UNDP survey donot trust local leaders to put the peoples’interests over their own. In terms o reedomo expression, about a quarter o respondentssay they oten ear being hurt by others i they express political opinions, while 16%noted that they sometimes eel such ear.Respondents also tend to be most criticalo the government’s ability to guaranteereedom o association and human rightsconstrued more broadly. Only a minorityo respondents elt that the government tosome degree guaranteed human rights.

The UNDP survey ound that 60% o respondents cited a variety o social actorsas signicant obstacles to human rights:33% said that culture and traditions weretheir biggest concern, while 11% citedsocial restrictions, 10% said the educationalsystem, 14% cited the existing law and only

19% directly cited the government as beingthe biggest problem. These responses givesome sense o the degree to which existinglaws reproduce social restrictions and thoseaspects o culture and tradition that areprejudicial to human rights.

[473] Le More, Anne (2008) ‘International Assistance tothe Palestinians Ater Oslo Political Guilt Wasted Money,London: Routledge.




Box 18: mio-iitiativ ai poitia

iuity: coaitio o tapay a

ouptio AmAn

AMAN-Coalition or Integrity and Accountability wasestablished in 2000 by a number o Palestinian civil societyorganizations working in the elds o democracy, humanrights, and good governance. The program was designed topromote the values o integrity, principles o transparencyand systems o accountability in the various Palestiniansectors with the aim o building a national integrity system.

AMAN’s purpose is to advocate and provide support or

a united Palestinian eort to combat corruption, which isound at the highest level among public sector ocials,where misuse o positions or personal interests is a pervasiveand common phenomenon, coupled with avouritism andnepotism in the various sectors. Its strategic objectivesinclude:

Promoting a popular culture that supports anti-•

corruption initiatives in public institutions

Promoting anti-corruption among leaders and•

public service employees and institutions

Contributing to the building o eective institutions,•

initiatives, and legislations capable o combatingcorruption at the local level

Improving AMAN’s perormance to ensure the•

achievement o its mission and vision

AMAN’s working strategies are: adopting a positive,participatory approach with various partners rom thepublic and civil society sectors; ocusing on the causes,maniestations and eects o corruption; adopting anindependent, non-biased and proessional approach in the

implementation o its activities; and encouraging publicparticipation in activities that combat corruption andpromote an environment o anti-corruption. AMAN alsogives an integrity award to model employees in severalsectors who are courageous enough to come orward withdocumented cases o corruption in their own institutions.

The work o AMAN is particularly important in view o theinternal conict between the major political parties in theoPt, which has caused increased nepotism and avouritismby political members o the governing authorities in boththe West Bank and Gaza Strip.

4.4.4 Addressing ear: theimportance o credibleliberation strategies

During the Oslo period, lit-tle attention was given to theull breadth o human securityneeds. This has been damag-ing or the polity and or thelegitimacy o the PalestinianState-building process. Free-dom rom ear – personal,community and political se-curity – was not discussedduring the Oslo years, but it

is a crucial requirement ortolerable human lie, includ-ing in an occupation and pro-longed transition. I the State-building project in the oPt hadhad widespread legitimacy,security capabilities (policingand etc.) may well have beenpart o the critical capacity ac-quired by the emerging Stateto sustain its legitimacy. How-

ever, in the stalemate o Oslo,the ocus on security led onlyto a vicious cycle o declin-ing legitimacy and eventuallygreater internecine violence.

From 2005-2010, ill-conceived acts o resistanceby Palestinians haveprovoked disproportionateIsraeli attacks on denselypopulated Palestinian centres.

Such attacks, coupled withthe everyday grind o theoccupation, are the mostobvious sources o ear andinsecurity or Palestinians.It should be understood,however, that the lack o acoherent oppositional strategyis due, in part, to the absenceo a national liberation strugglewhich ordinary Palestinians

nd credible.An important consensus





emerging rom workshops conducted byorganizations like the Palestinian StrategyStudy Group is that the peace-making and

State-building discourses initiated by Osloailed to achieve national goals. Nor havesporadic acts o violent resistance helped.As this Group and others have pointedout, Palestinians actually have importantalternative sources o bargaining power,including, in particular, their demographicweight. What is missing is a clear, nationally-owned sense o how to use these alternativesources o bargaining power eectively.Lacking a unied approach makes it more

dicult or eective and credible orms o resistance grow, or instance, through theestablishment o civil rights movements tochallenge the occupation. Freedom rom earcan only be achieved i leaders and strategicthinkers come up with plans or ending theoccupation that attract both popular support(thereby avoiding the risk o civil war) and arelegitimate (thereby reducing desperate acts o resistance and asymmetric Israeli responses).Clearly, in the vicious cycle o ailure that theoPt nds itsel in, a reliance on policing and

security in the narrow, traditional sense isnot going to achieve reedom rom ear orPalestinians, or even or Israelis occasionallyacing violent resistance. What Palestiniansneed most now is perectly captured in In

Larger Freedom:

Larger reedom implies that men and

women everywhere have the right to

be governed by their own consent,

under law, in a society where all individuals can, without discrimination

or retribution, speak, worship and

associate reely. They must also be

ree rom want — so that the death

sentences o extreme poverty and

inectious disease are lited rom their

lives — and ree rom ear — so that

their lives and livelihoods are not

ripped apart by violence and war. [474]

[474] UN (2005) ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,Security and Human Rights or all’ UN Secretary GeneralReport to the GA.

4.5 couio: uthi

iity

The Palestinian territories ace a deep

human crisis, where millions o people

are denied their human dignity […]

every day. […] Nothing is predictable

or Palestinians. Rules can change

rom one day to the next without

notice or explanation. They live in an

arbitrary environment, continuously

adapting to circumstances they cannot

inuence.[475]

A lie with dignity requires ormal or inormalprotection o vital political, civil, economic,social, environmental and cultural rights. Itrequires all seven aspects o basic humansecurity: economic, ood, personal, community,political, health and environment. In thePalestinian case, the reedom to live in dignityis palpably absent. This reedom is probablythe most important or a population underoccupation because the ailure to recognize itultimately undermines every other element o human security.

Two strategies that Palestinians could employto achieve basic dignity can be proposedhere: 1) a Palestinian campaign or civiland political rights or a subject populationor whose saety and security the IsraeliState is responsible. This could be seen as acontinuation o the non-violent resistancethat was practiced during the rst intiada;

and 2) a campaign or the right to sel-determination as a political right o a subjectpopulation. It is probable that without suchstrategies and the mass movements on whichthey would rely, the right to basic dignitywill remain elusive or Palestinians. The Osloprocess bypassed the possibility o popularmobilization by assuming that there wasa clear and eective strategy or achievingPalestinian sel-determination that did notrequire mass buy-in rom the people. It alsoassumed that there was no need to pressIsrael to recognize the undamental civil and

[475] ICRC (2007) ‘Dignity Denied in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories’, Geneva.




political rights o the subject population sinceoccupation was soon to end. The outcomewas that, while the pressure on Israel to accept

responsibility or the Palestinian populationwas seriously diluted, sel-determination hasstill not been achieved teen years later.

The interdependence o processes that granthuman dignity with the other reedomsunderpinning the human security agendais clear. A Palestinian civil rights movementwith broad popular support and legitimacyis not only a mechanism or promotingthe reedom to live in dignity, it is the mostpowerul way o underpinning new strategieso political legitimization and policy buildingwhich can lead to the reedom rom ear(personal, community and political security).Given that the State o Israel has routinelyneglected its responsibilities to provide (orallow the development o) economic and

ood security – achieving reedom rom want– emancipation will need to be anchored inthe promotion o political and civil rights.

This Chapter has outlined some o the majorhuman insecurities aced by Palestiniansrom the perspective o achieving a largerreedom derived rom development, securityand human rights. It has spotlighted certainmicro-initiatives that are actively improvinghuman security and suggested the beginningso macro-policy aimed towards alleviatethese insecurities: building a sel-sustainingeconomy, working on consensus regardingliberation strategies and galvanizing a popularmovement aimed towards the realization o civil and political rights. Chapter 5 will takethese issues orward, discussing popularmobilization and participatory State-buildingas crucial to the attainment o basic human

security in the oPt.



Pati subi



111

Toa cohio:Ivti i Hua

suity i th oPt

5

5.1: Itoutio

Only prompt and courageous political action can change the

harsh reality o this long-standing occupation, restore normal

social and economic lie to the Palestinian people, and allow

them to live their lives in dignity.[476]

[M]uch o the evidence we received points towards the need or

an end to occupation—or a political solution, as a preconditionor development.[477]

As this Report has outlined, the on-going realities o occupation andpolitical polarization create a situation in which people in the oPt acemultiple risks and threats, and live with broad-based insecurity. As aresult many Palestinians are losing hope or the uture.[478]

As noted by members o the international community including theInternational ICRC and the World Bank, the end o the occupation is anecessary precondition or sustainable human development. Whilethis Report strongly endorses the call or a sovereign Palestinian State,

at the time o writing a timeline or ending the occupation has not

[476] ICRC (2007) ‘Dignity Denied in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, Geneva.[477] House o Commons International Development Committee (2007) ‘DevelopmentAssistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, Fourth Report o Session 2006–07Volume I. London.[478] Hilal, Jamil (2009) ‘Severe Polarization in, and Fragmentation o, Palestinian Society’,background paper or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.





been established.[479] Accordingly, this Chapterwill lay out a pragmatic approach to acilitateand strengthen the conditions that promote

human security under occupation. It willmake recommendations responsive to currentrealities such as mounting land acquisitionand settlement building, and intensiyingadministrative policies and procedures thatviolate basic human rights. This pragmaticapproach is not an endorsement o the statusquo, which, as the preceding Chapters illustrate,is untenable.

Human security will be unachievable in theshort to medium term i the ragmentation o the oPt intensies, with the worst case scenariobeing a collapse into internal warare. Internalevents in Gaza in the last two years are awarning that the seeds o such disintegrationalready exist. Given their deep involvementin the genesis o the internal crisis, externalactors must now make great eorts to enablethe PA to promote security and peacebuilding,to protect and rebuild the internal cohesion o the oPt.

Assuming a prolonged transition[480]

tosovereignty and sel-determination within astate o internal incoherence, and reiteratingthe emphasis on popular mobilisation inChapter 4, the recommendations in thisChapter ocus on how participatory State-building can promote political and socialcohesion and overall human security in theoPt. The recommendations are directed

[479] We note the speech given by President Barack Obamain Cairo in which he endorsed a two State solution. Wealso note newspaper reports which indicate that PresidentObama has signalled the year 2011 or the creation o a Palestinian State: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1091465.html.[480] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.

to Palestinian government and non-governmental actors and leaders, as wellas the international community: as the

legitimate guardians o the disenranchisedand dispossessed as well as the ultimatestewards o the occupied land and its naturalresources, they must ensure that the laws o armed conict are upheld and that the basicand strategic needs o Palestinian people areaddressed. The Chapter also outlines broadmeasures that are necessary to acilitateand/or strengthen the human security o Palestinians as they strive to live in dignityand reedom.

5.2 Pottia o ita hai

a oia ohio

Focus group discussions hosted by UNDP in2009 suggest that Palestinians are in need o a national reconciliation mechanism capableo bringing people together despite theragmentation o the territory. One meansto do this would be through an indigenous

conict resolution model, known as sulha,which is traditionally used to mediate disputesbetween individuals and amilies. I adapted toaddress the national context, this mechanismcould address the violations and grievancesstemming rom the current internal politicalragmentation, and curb their potentiallydevastating social consequences. A nationalprocess, drawing on the concept o sulha, hasthe potential not only to resolve conicts thathave occurred as a result o political divisionsand violence, but to contribute to overall

social cohesion in the oPt. Opening a spaceor truth-telling and reconciliation couldstimulate dialogue on uture strategies oravoiding conict and on movements towardsnational liberation.







Sulha is used to achieve orgiveness andreconciliation and to remove the need orrevenge between aggrieved amilies. I expanded

and applied as a truth-telling mechanism ina political context, sulha could acilitate theestablishment o an eective internal means torebuild cohesion and promote a more eective,contemporary resistance movement. It could alsoprotect the legitimacy o the central authority.A National Sulha should be an independent,impartial and equitable institutional setting thatwould hear testimonies, record the sueringo individuals, amilies and communities, andconsider modalities o compensation through

which to build reconciliation and restoreinternal social cohesion. The elected Chair(s)should be widely respected and Palestiniancivil society should drive the process rom theoutset. The international community shouldplay a supportive role.

The concept o a National Sulha has a numbero potential benets. It could:

Revitalise traditional individual, amily•

and community reconciliation processes

and expand these to encouragePalestinian political unity and uniedresistance to the occupation

Promote social healing and oer closure•

to victims, amilies and communitieswho have experienced political violence

Discourage revenge and retaliatory•

attacks by amilies or political parties– which may currently be consideredessential in Palestinian society tomaintain amily honour

Include Palestinian individuals, and•

civil society more broadly, in theongoing attempts to achieve politicalreconciliation in Cairo

Establish a culture o reconciliation,•

tolerance and peace

Demonstrate to a global audience that•

Palestinians are committed to peaceulreconciliation and steadastness in the

ace o occupation

Nurtured by careully placed international aid,

a National Sulha could promote what MaryAnderson calls the “unctional harmony” o communities by producing “shared interests

and common practices” based in the “setso institutions, systems, and processes in allsocieties that link people across subgroupdivisions”.[482] As a starting point, the internationalcommunity should urgently endorse the DoNo Harm principle and redouble its short- tomedium-term investments in Palestinian civilsociety as a way o reinorcing social cohesionand strengthening individual capabilities andresilience. Such an investment strategy will allowor resources to work rom the ground up.

To promote human security, the mass civilsociety movement or sel-determination thatwas supplanted by the Oslo process needs to berevitalised. A Palestinian civil rights movementwith broad popular support and legitimacy willnot only be a mechanism or promoting thereedom to live in dignity, but will also help totackle ear and want.[483]

5.3 stthi ohio

thouh ivi oity

patiipatio

Democratic participation can directly

enhance security through supporting

human dignity .[484]

Twenty percent o Palestinians surveyed byUNDP in 2009 believe that the public needsto be more involved in politics, while thirty sixpercent think that current parties need to become

more democratic and transparent (see Figure

[482] For more on the Do No Harm approach, see Mary B.Anderson (1999) ‘Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace– or War’, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.[483] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formation sincethe Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paper or thePHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.ople. Jerusalem.[484] Sen, Amartya (2000) ‘Why Human Security’, Text o Presentation at the «International Symposium on HumanSecurity’, Tokyo, 28 Jul. 2000.



115chapt FivToa cohio: Ivti i Hua suity i th oPt

18).[485] These responses show that Palestinians believe in civil society participation and want to besubstantively involved in the economic, social, cultural and political processes that aect their lives.

Figure 18: How can trust in political or religious actions be re-established?

4%

36%

20%16%

8%

16%[n=133]

[n=1083]

[n=598][n=483]

[n=248]

[n=482]

There is a need for new parties/factions

The current parties and factions need to become more democratic and transparent

The public need to be more involved in politics

Stricter laws governing parties should be introduced

Improving the educational system

Other actions

Source: UNDP, 2009

The Global Human Development Report 2003 analysis reveals not only that such civil society participationis a cornerstone o human development, but that achieving it requires increased inuence and control andindividual economic, social and political empowerment, as ollows: (i) in economic terms, reedom to engagein legitimate income-generating activities; (ii) in social terms, ull participation in all orms o community liewithout regard to religion, colour, sex, age, physical and mental ability, or race; and (iii) in political terms,reedom to engage in political processes at all levels.[486] These orms o participation are interlinked andneed to be considered holistically in order to promote sustainable and socially inclusive development.[487]

Figure 19: What is the most important need o your community?

Employment

[n=827] 23%

Food

[n=305] 8%

Health

[n=133] 4%

Financial assistance

[n=173] 5%

Housing and re-housin

[n=82] 2%

Infrastructure

[n=295] 8%

Law and order

[n=288] 8%

Security

[n=1269] 35%

Sanitation[n=14] 0%

Education,

[n=160] 4%Community cohesion

[n=81] 2%

Psychosocial support

[n=40] 1%

Source: UNDP, 2009

[485] UNDP (2009) ‘Palestinian Perception toward the Human Security Situation in the occupied Palestinian territory,’ report or

the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.[486] UNDP (1993) ‘Human Development Report 1993: People’s Participation’, New York: Human Development Report.[487] UNDP (1993) ‘Human Development Report 1993: People’s Participation’, New York: Human Development Report.





In the oPt, none o these conditions canbe met in ull: respondents to the 2009UNDP survey, as is illustrated in Figure 19,

identied insecurity and unemployment astheir oremost concerns. [488] Their responsesare unsurprising in an economy basedon industrial and agricultural productionthat lacks stability and predictable accessto markets or reedom o movement andassociation. Nor are aid organizations ableto deliver many o the goods and servicesrequired or projects addressing humanitarianneeds whose successul implementationwould boost employment and promote

security.This Report proposes that increased civil societyparticipation is one o the most promisingways to acilitate reedom rom ear, reedomrom want, and the reedom to live in dignity.Most importantly, a dynamic civil society isthe best means to re-build condence in stateinstitutions, as is illustrated in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Human security through participatory State-building

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

To promote human security, Palestinian civilsociety and the international community mustconsider a range o issues and identiy theirinterconnections. For example, promotingreedom rom ear requires engagementin internal political dialogue and the re-establishment o legitimate political and socialgoals, while protecting the civil and political

[488] UNDP (2009) ‘Palestinian Perception toward theHuman Security Situation in the occupied Palestinianterritory’, A report or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP

/ PAPP, Jerusalem.

rights o Palestinians as a people living underoccupation will promote their reedom to livein dignity.[489]

Multiple political actors in the oPt and outsideneed to work together, on two ronts, to ensureprogress towards achieving these rights. In theabsence o a State and in the current crisis o condence, cultural belies and practices thatlead to the marginalisation o women, elderlyand young people, the disabled, Bedouin andother minority groups, must be challenged.At the same time, a systematic and sustainedstrategy to strengthen positive and inclusivelocal practices that protect and promotepersonal, community, economic, political, ood,health, and environmental security in the oPtmust be strengthened.

One such indigenous practice, sumud , lies atthe root o the struggle or dignity and sel-determination or many Palestinians. Sumud isthe motivation to persist through steadastnessand a sense o connection with the land inorder to achieve sel-reliance and navigate alie under occupation. During the 1970s and

1980s it inormed the movement o nonviolentresistance, led largely by women and youngpeople, which acilitating the mobilization,organization and creation o socio-economicand protective support systems including thedelivery o services ranging rom day-carecentres to income generation projects. [490] Thepopular and proactive nature o sumud canonce again sustain Palestinians as they continueto resist prolonged occupation.

We come to school every day because

it is a challenge against occupation…even under stress; we go the next day

and continue.[491]

[489] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.[490] This section is inormed by discussions with GeorgeGiacaman.[491] Nguyen-Gillham, Viet; Rita Giacaman; Ghada Naser; andWill Boyce (2008) ‘Normalising the abnormal: Palestinianyouth and the contradictions o resilience in protractedconict’, in Health and Social Care in the Community, 16(3):291–298.




Sumud can be expressed in various waysand through several types o organizations,including agricultural, health and labour

unions, students and women’s groups, andproessional associations, and is characterisedby a strong tradition o volunteerism.Indeed, a cornerstone o Palestinian social,economic and political survival is the multi-aceted volunteer work done by women’sassociations, which have not only organizedto promote peace and political change butalso implemented practical projects targetedto support communities to meet their dailyneeds. These associations have undertaken

diverse work including establishing nurseryschools and kindergartens in an attempt toacilitate women’s integration into the publicsphere, improve parenting practices andoer a better standard o care to children;oering legal advice; challenging patriarchalassumptions about women’s capacities andrights including through popular educationcampaigns; organizing protests and buildingstrategic partnerships with Israeli women inthe peace movement to ensure that globalattention remains ocused on the plight

o Palestinians.[492] Such initiatives, in theabsence o a nation-State, were guided byan ethic o social support and a pragmaticrealization that it requires the eorts o allPalestinians to create the momentum orsocial change.[493] They helped provide acomplex network o services connectingPalestinians across the oPt.[494]

Sumud , and especially its basis involunteerism, was weakened in the 1990sas the Oslo process took o and Palestiniansexperienced a period o relative calm withinthe ongoing occupation. During this period,

[492] See Jamal, Manal A (2008) ‘Gender and HumanSecurity: Palestine Revisited’, Working Paper Series No.08-09, Dubai School o Government. Cynthia Cockburn(2007) ‘From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism andFeminist Analysis’, London: Zed Books.[493] See Taraki, Lisa (2006) ‘Living Palestine: Family Survival,Resistance and Mobility under Occupation’, Syracuse:Syracuse University Press.[494] Hilal, Jamil (2007) ‘Palestine: the last colonial issue’, inJamil Hilal ed. Where Now or Palestine? The Demise o theTwo State Solution. London: Zed Books.

civil society continued its work as botha necessity and a means o shoulderingnational responsibilities.[495] However, a

new orm o organization – the NGO –appeared on the scene. These NGOs were,and continue to be, dierent rom the civilsociety associations o the 1970s and 1980sas they ocus on and provide services inspecialized areas such as education, health,agriculture, development and women’s andhuman rights.[496] Crucially, they are alsomore proessionalized and dependent oninternational unding or survival.

An unortunate eect o the post-Oslo ocuson State-building is the reezing o thoseinstitutions and associations which werein part acilitating the practice o sumud ,as the ocus o both the internationalcommunity and Palestinians shited todeveloping the institutions o the State-in-waiting. Encouraging a renewed drivetowards political and social engagementthrough volunteerism, dialogue and civicaction would be a good way to re-energizethese institutions and revitalise sumud

today, especially as it would give theyounger generation opportunities to learnabout this important indigenous tradition.

A reinvigoration o sumud could begin thetransition rom ragmentation to cohesioncalled or in this Report.

Accompanying the weakening o localinstitutions and associations, the 1990s alsowitnessed an erosion o secular leadership

[495] Giacaman, George (2000) ‘Perspectives on Civil Societyin Palestine’, Paper presented at the conerence on PNA-NGO Relations organized by the Welare Association,Ramallah 14-16.[496] Giacaman, George (2000) ‘Perspectives on Civil Societyin Palestine’, Paper presented at the conerence on PNA-NGO Relations organized by the Welare Association,Ramallah 14-16. Jamal, Manal A (2008) ‘Gender and HumanSecurity: Palestine Revisited’, Working Paper Series No. 08-09 Dubai School o Government.





and legitimacy, especially that o women. [497] In the 21st Century, the elections o 2006oer the strongest evidence o this slide:

while some note that these elections werean important indicator o democraticunctioning in Palestinian society,[498] otherspoint out that democratic participation wasin act severely limited as only Palestiniansinside Gaza and the West Bank includingEast Jerusalem were allowed to participate,while reugees were eectively let out.

Whether democratic and participatory ornot, the 2006 election results in Gaza led tosystematic diplomatic and economic sanctionsrom the international community. Theconsequences have been severe, resulting indecreased capacity and ragmentation o publicservice provision. Political inghting betweenHamas and Fatah has intensied, culminating inclashes in summer 2007 and a state o uneaseand even open hostility ever since.[499] Thepotential or peacebuilding between Israelisand Palestinians is increasingly weak. The ruleo law is being urther eroded and incidenceso political manipulation and violations o

human rights are rising. Spatial and politicaldivisions are creating and reinorcing multipleconstituencies with dierent political identities.The issue o collaboration – o Palestinianswith the State o Israel – is a sensitive one andevidence suggests that this phenomenonurther erodes community cohesion, negatively

[497] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background

paper or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP, Jerusalem.ople. Jerusalem. Khan, Mushtaq; George Giacaman andInge Amundsen eds (2004) ‘State Formation in Palestine:Viability and governance during social transormation’,London: Routledge Curzon. See also Marianne Torres(1989) ‘Women in the Intiada’ Published online as part o the Palestine Papers, http://www.sonomacountyreepress.com/palestine/women2.html.[498] Brown, Nathan J. (2005) ‘Evaluating Palestinian Reorm’,Carnegie Papers No. 59, 14, June.[499] PCHR (2009) ‘Respect or Human Rights in theOccupied Palestinian Territory: An internal Palestiniananalysis’, background paper or the PHDR, commissionedby UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.

impacting on sumud as a source o socialsolidarity. [500]

All o these problems illustrate the complexragmentations in Palestinian society. Today,dialogue and popular mobilization areincreasingly dicult – both within oPt andwith Israel itsel. It is illegal or an Israeli totravel inside Area A or inside Gaza; the siegeo Gaza means that some Palestinian amiliescannot see their relatives at all; the WestBank Wall symbolically and physically dividesamilies, riends and communities. Undersuch circumstances new methods o popularmobilization must be sought, or example(or those who have access) via the internet,through journalism, blogging and other ormso social networking.

Another signicant consequence o ragmentation, polarization and de-legitimization o the PA is that amily andclan relations, not broader social ties orstate institutions, have become the mostsignicant site o Palestinian security. Thishas had the eect, particularly in Gaza, o

increasing amily/clan violence.[501]

As Figure21 illustrates, more than 50% o surveyrespondents in a UNDP study indicate thatthey would receive help rom relatives i theiramily were in serious trouble, while only 29%stated that they would get assistance romthe relevant authority.[502] This response maypartly reect the act that the PA has little

jurisdiction over those issues that promotesecurity or Palestinians in the oPt.

[500] Nguyen-Gillham, Viet; Rita Giacaman; Ghada Naser; andWill Boyce (2008) ‘Normalising the abnormal: Palestinianyouth and the contradictions o resilience in protractedconict’, in Health and Social Care in the Community, 16(3):291–298.[501] ICG (2007) ‘Inside Gaza: The Challenge o Clans andFamilies’, Middle East Report No. 71, 20 Dec. 2007.[502] UNDP (2009 ’Palestinian Perception toward the HumanSecurity Situation in the occupied Palestinian territory’,A report or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP,Jerusalem.







Fiu 21: I you aiy a i iou toub o outi you aa o i, hoou hp you ot?

No one

[n=356] 8%

Relatives

[n=2278] 52%

People from your party

[n=285] 6%

Anyone in my town

[n=202] 5%

Relevant authority

[n=1267] 29%

Source: UNDP, 2009

Clans are thus assuming a key role, along with the civil police, in matters related to protection (see Figure 22)and the maintenance o stability through inormal law enorcement and dispute resolution mechanisms. [504] As mentioned above, while there are some positive aspects o this trend in the absence o a nation-State,clan-based institutions may increase social exclusions and weaken non-kinship orms o afliation andsolidarity. [505] Because traditional cultural norms prescribe that it is a male duty to protect women andchildren and there are ew enorceable legal constraints on what a male head o household can do to hisown wie and children, women are likely to suer most rom the tendency to resolve interpersonal conictswithin the amily rather than through recourse to the rule o law.[506] Eorts made to strengthen spontaneouscoping mechanisms must, thereore, also strengthen the mechanisms that uphold the rule o law.

Figure 22: I you were to be a victim o a violent crime, who would you contact to seek protection?

Civil police

[n=1348] 40%

Other security body

[n=174] 5%

Community leaders

[n=49] 1%

Clan-based judges

[n=237] 7%Political party

[n=32] 1%

Armed groups

[n=44] 1%

Family/clan

[n=1354] 41%

Others

[n=94] 3%

Source: UNDP, 2009

[504] Nguyen-Gillham, Viet; Rita Giacaman; Ghada Naser; and Will Boyce (2008) ‘Normalising the abnormal: Palestinian youthand the contradictions o resilience in protracted conict’, in Health and Social Care in the Community, 16(3): 291–298.

[505] Johnson, Peggy (2009) ‘Towards a New Social Contract: Renewing Social Trust and Activating Social Capital or PalestinianHuman Security’, background paper or the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.[506] UNDP Social Development Assessment, Gaza, May-June 2009.




Throughout the 1970s and 1980s local governmentwas particularly strong in service provision andplayed a signicant role in the liberation movement.

An eective participatory State-building strategywould be incomplete without a consideration o how to capitalise on this strong tradition o localgovernment, but must proceed careully. While itseems logical that a participatory State-buildingstrategy would decentralise power and promotestrong local governance, strengthening localgovernment over the central authority o the PAmight risk more ragmentation. The best solutionis or local government to work closely with civilsociety and the central authority.

5.4 Opportunitie and contraintof state-building in the oPt

While this Report calls or a reactivation o a civilsociety movement in the oPt, it is not within itsremit to comment on the strategic direction such amovement might take: Palestinian aspirations mustultimately determine this. Mass organisation is onlythe beginning o the path to sel-determination,

and i there is also consensus that a Palestinian Stateis the best means to ensure human security thena State-building process must be ready and ableto deliver genuine reorm, with external technicalassistance where necessary. I it is an indigenousprocess, participatory State-building has thepotential both to generate and to reinorce a sharedidentity among peoples because, to be sustainable,it cannot be externally driven and must rely or itslegitimacy on the leadership o a cross-section o the people. To unction properly, the processesthat promote civil society participation in nation

and State-building must be interconnected andmutually reinorcing, or else, in situations wherethere is sovereignty, a strong State within a weak nation is vulnerable to ragmentation.[507]

Palestinians have been engaged in various aspectso nation building or several years, and since theOslo Accords, the international community has

[507] Lun, Mary Thida (2009) ‘Reconnecting Joined-upApproaches: Nation Building through State Building’,Strategic Policy Impact and Research Unit, OverseasDevelopment Institute. Working Paper 25. Apr. 2009.

supported the PA in the restoration and buildingo institutions as part o a two-State solution tothe Israeli/Palestinian conict. However, both the

increasing severity o the occupation and theeruption o the internal conict have underminedthese eorts and it is doubtul that the PA,within the limited sel-rule stipulated in the OsloAccords, can deliver human security and socio-economic development. In the ollowing sectionwe explore such space as is currently availableto the PA and consider whether it is sufcient toeectively promote Palestinian human security.

According to Ghani, et al,[508] the State has tencore unctions:

I. Legitimate monopoly on the means o violence

A primary criterion o Statehood is havingcontrol over the means o violence. In the caseo the oPt, this role is overwhelmingly held bythe Occupying Power, while the PA is allowed tohave a civil police orce with limited jurisdiction.The Oslo Accords note that, while it is the role o the PA to ensure the security o the State o Israel,

it cannot have any jurisdiction over the internalsecurity situation in Areas B and C and onlylimited control over the security situation in AreaA o the occupied territory. This limited mandate,compounded by the internal split between Fatahand Hamas, is eroding the legitimacy o the PA inthe areas o protection and rule o law.

To ensure the protection o Palestinians and theirassets, including homes, agricultural elds andbusinesses in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, andGaza, it is imperative that the PA acquires the

legitimate authority and the ability to deliverprotection and to administer the rule o law withinand beyond the existing limits o the occupation.

II. Administrative control

Administrative control is dened as both thebreadth and depth o the reach o a State’s

[508] The ollowing is adapted rom Ghani, Ashra; ClareLockhart and Michael Carnaha (2005) ‘Closing theSovereignty Gap: An Approach to State Building’, OverseasDevelopment Institute, Working Paper 253. Sep. 2005.





authority over its land. However, the OccupyingPower claims administrative control over themovement o goods, services and people in and

out o, as well as within, the occupied territory.With its barricades and checkpoints, permitregime, curews, and control over all macro-economic instruments, borders, land and water,Israel has eectively established and maintainsadministrative control o many aspects o economic and social lie in the oPt.

As Ghani, et al note, a ully unctioning Staterequires the ollowing: (i) the existence o acoherent set o rules; (ii) the recruitment o civilservants and technical expertise; and (iii) controlo resources. However, the PA in the West Bank and Hamas, as the de acto authority in Gaza, haslimited control over specic administrative mattersrelated to basic social services and utilities. As such,they have a limited ability to build trust that theirdeployment and enorcement o administrativerules is in the interest o the majority.

III. Management o public nances

The ratio o domestic revenue to oreignassistance in a State’s budget and the changesin this ratio over time provides a straightorwardmeasure o both State sovereignty and theextent to which it is increasing or decreasing. Asthis Report illustrates, however, practices suchas Israel’s collection and distribution o taxes areboth crippling the economy and keeping outpotential oreign direct investment. As a result,the bulk o the PA’s budget is composed o oreignaid and is principally used to pay salaries.

Despite the international community’s West Bank

First policy,[509]

it has not been possible or the PA toacilitate wealth creation due to its lack o controlover key macro-economic instruments and themeans o production, including land and naturalresources, as well as the severe restrictions placedon the movement o goods, services and personsby Israel. As a result, traditional indicators o State

[509] The West Bank First policy, adopted by the internationalcommunity in response to the ascendency o Hamas, involvedpolitical and nancial preerential treatment towards Abbas,the PA and the West Bank over Hamas in Gaza. See RobertMalley & Aaron David Miller (2007) ‘West Bank First: It Won’tWork’, The Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2007.

eectiveness such as economic prosperity andservice provision can only be used in a limitedway. Even within this limitation, however, the PA

has been involved in scal reorm. To engendertrust while strengthening governance practices,it remains necessary to ensure that the budget issubject to ormal oversight by the legislature and judiciary and is transparent to Palestinians.

IIII. Investment in human capital

Investment in human capital is critical or the viabilityo a State. In the oPt, this is an area in which thereis scope in both education and training. Investingin human capital will ensure that Palestinians

can contribute to economic, political and sociallie. The international community can supportelementary, secondary and tertiary education, thetraining o women and men, curriculum changes,and acilitate access to educational materials andequipment. Such investments will also requirechanges in current conditions on the groundincluding the ree movement o proessors andstudents and unimpeded access to educationmaterials and equipment across the oPt.

An educated and unctioning polity is able toengage productively with State institutions. Tothis end, specic investments in human capital,especially at the local level, should continue evenunder occupation. However, liting the economicblockade on Gaza, ensuring reedom o movementand creating a unity government are all prerequisitesor the development and implementation o acoherent and eective long-term approach. Inaddition to its critical importance to State-building,an educated polity plays a vital role in nationbuilding, especially in diverse societies. Without

investments in human capabilities dierent groupsare likely to become disenranchised, which couldhave ar-reaching implications or the viability o auture Palestinian State.

IV. Delineation o citizenship rightsand duties

Social policy is useul or the creation o equalopportunities and to promote cohesion across anincreasingly ragmented territory. Investments inthe social abric o Palestinian society, whether

through ormal policies or inormal practicessuch as volunteerism, can also help draw diverseconstituencies together under an umbrella o




unity and a shared belie in a common destiny.However, to support Palestinian eorts towardsunity and sovereignty, the international

community has to remain clear that limited sel-rule ultimately prevents cohesion.

In the current context o a lack o State sovereigntyand sel-determination, any discussion o citizenship rights and duties in the ormal senseis a merely academic exercise. However, thereis still space to partner with civil society andrelevant mechanisms o the interim governmentto reinorce civic duty and the rule o law.

V. Provision o inrastructure services

The predictable and efcient provision o basicutilities is an essential unction o any State assuch services are critical to economic and socialdevelopment. Reliable inrastructure and servicespromote economic participation at the local,regional and global levels, and most importantly,enable citizens to live in dignity. In oPt, however,the interim government has limited control oversuch services.

Furthermore, members o the private sector and

the international community involved in serviceprovision ace difculties due to Israeli restrictionson the importation o some maintenanceequipment. Due to the blockade, all inrastructureprojects are rozen in Gaza, while sensitive projectsin the West Bank are oten put on hold. To acilitatethe eective delivery o essential inrastructureservices, the international community will needto reassess its rules o engagement in the oPt andwith the State o Israel.

VI. Formation o the marketCreating an environment that enables the ormationand expansion o the legal market is criticallyimportant to States. Such an enabling environmentdepends on the establishment and protectiono property rights including the provision o predictable, enorceable and transparent contract,corporate, insurance, bankruptcy, land, employmentand environmental laws. As it lacks control overmacro-economic instruments including monetarypolicy, as well as natural resources such as land

and water, the PA has not been able to develop aully unctioning ree market system. However, theinternational community can immediately begin to

assist it to develop the necessary legal ramework to acilitate the ow o goods and services once aState is ormed.

VII. Management o the State’s assets

The management o tangible orms o capital,including natural resources, is important oreconomic growth; but because the PA haslimited or no jurisdiction over the managemento assets, the international community has acritical role to play in ensuring their protection.

VIII. International relations

A State’s authority over international relations includes the management o relations with otherStates, international bodies and private entities,and the authority and opportunity to enter intotreaties and obligations with them. While the oPtonly has observer status in several internationaland regional ora, it can enter into ormal relationswith States through special agreements. However,the State o Israel has still been able to determinethe extent o involvement though restrictions onmovement: or example, a representative o thePA was orbidden to travel to the inaugurationo the South Arican President. The internationalcommunity can contribute to the removal o restrictions in this core area through advocacywith the State o Israel.

IX. Rule o law

The constitution o the State through rules, and itscontinuing deployment o such rules, establishes thesystematic practice o the rule o law. Such a system isnot entirely possible in the oPt, and in some instancesthe realities on the ground only serve to underminethe practice o, and condence in, the rule o law.This is in part due to the limited legal jurisdictiono the PA, the limited capacity o the judiciary andsecurity services, the passing o unconstitutionaldecrees/executive orders in the West Bank and theGaza Strip by the respective authorities,[510] the extra-

judicial activities o the authorities and the parallellegal systems, including the Palestinian Basic Law,Ottoman Law, British Mandate law, Egyptian law,

[510] PCHR (2009) ‘PCHR has Reservations about RegulationsAdopted in the Context o Ongoing Political Fragmentation’,Position Paper, 23 Jun. 2009.





Jordanian law, Israeli military and civillaw, Sharia law and international law.[511]

Ghani, et al note that ‘’as long asrulers and politicians at various levelso authority in the State are voted inand out o ofce by preerence o thecitizens, the stability o the system o governance will not become an issueo concern to investors and citizens.’’Such an approach did not play outater the 2006 elections and today’sinternal political divisiveness isexacerbated because the internationalcommunity chooses to work onlywith Fatah/the PA in the West Bank.In an attempt to do no harm in thesecircumstances, it is important thatthe specialized agencies o the UNassume a neutral position ocused onaddressing the human security needso Palestinians.[512]

Because o its status as an occupiedterritory, international humanitarianlaw and international human rights

law are enorceable in the oPt, andthe international community has anobligation to ensure that relevant lawsand conventions are implemented.The international community mustinsist that the State o Israel complywith international law, particularlyits obligations under the FourthGeneva Convention. Indeed, as HighContracting Parties to the GenevaConventions, Member States maybe violating their legally binding

obligation “to ensure respect” or theConvention “in all circumstances” i they do not ensure compliance andaccountability.

[511] See box on the ‘Rule o Law’ in Chapter 2.[512] The Report is mindul that politicalwork at the level o the Secretary-Generaland his representatives has to continue, butstrongly endorses the call or a reassessmento the rules o engagement regardinghumanitarian aid and early recovery,recovery and reconstruction eorts.

Box 21: Ia a vioatio o th Fouth

gva covtio

The pre-eminent legal instrument relevant to assessing the rights andduties o an Occupying Power is the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative

to the Protection o Civilians in Time o War (1949), herein GCIV. [513]

UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the oPt, Richard Falk,ound that “evidence o continuous and deliberate violation o that

universally binding international treaty by Israel in its occupation

o the Palestinian territory [emphasis added]”.[514] The examples givenrepresent only a ew violations among many:

Article 3(1)(a)(c) o GCIV states that “violence to lie and person,in particular murder o all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment andtorture… outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliatingand degrading treatment” is absolutely prohibited against protected

persons (e.g. civilians). Between January 2001 and December 2008,over 600 complaints were led against

Israeli Security Agency (ISA) interrogators or alleged ill-treatment and

torture, many cases related to the treatment o children in detention.[515]

Article 49(6) states that transerring “parts o its own civilian populationinto the territory it occupies” is illegal. The settlement policy o theState o Israel is unequivocally in violation o article 49(6). The numbero settlers in the West Bank now exceeds hal a million and has led topinternational jurists to nd that “elements o the occupation constitute

orms o colonialism…which are contrary to international law”.[516]

Article 53 pertains to the destruction o property: “Any destructionby the Occupying Power o real or personal property belonging

individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or toother public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations,is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutelynecessary by military operations”. Israel routinely breaches this

provision in East Jerusalem, by demolishing Palestinian homes.[517]

Articles 65-68 and articles 71-78 provide or due process, penalstandards and protections in cases o assigned residence or internment(i.e., administrative detention). On 15 May 2009, the UN CommitteeAgainst Torture in its Fourth Period Review o Israel expresseddeep concern that the apprehension, detention and treatment o

Palestinians in Israeli prisons violate multiple provisions o GCIV.[518]

[513] Israel has not signed the Geneva Protocol Additional I o 1977 but asseveral provisions o AP I are now considered international customary law,Israel is necessarily bound by those provisions.[514] UN (2008) Report o the Special Rapporteur ‘Situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, Richard Falk, A/63/326,25 Aug. 2008.[515] DCI (2009) ‘Palestinian Child Prisoners The systematic and institutionalizedill-treatment and torture o Palestinian children by Israeli Authorities’,[516] UN (2007) Report o the Special Rapporteur ‘Situation o human rightsin the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’, John Dugard, A/HRC/4/17,29 Jan. 2007.[517] See Chapter 3, section on housing demolitions or urther

inormation.[518] Committee Against Torture (2009) ‘Concluding Observations o theCommittee against Torture Israel’, CAT/C/ISR/CO/4, 14 May. 2009.




When the ten unctions discussed above areperormed by a State in an integrated andcoherent manner, it can create a virtuous

circle which assures human security, promotesdevelopment, reinorces legitimacy andengenders trust and goodwill. By contrast,ailing to perorm one or more o theseunctions creates a vicious circle which resultsin opposing centres o power, multiple,contradictory and ineective decision-making processes, the loss o trust, the de-legitimization o institutions, and escalatingviolence between dierent actions. Thisdisintegration is in motion in the oPt, and thus

the call or action is an urgent one.What, then, lies beyond the current ocus onState-building? This Report suggests that arenewed ocus on civil society participationwould better address and redress thatwhich contributes to human insecurity inthe oPt. An overall strategy is needed thatis mindul o the importance o buildingand strengthening legitimate governanceinstitutions and civil society alike, to create anenvironment in which Palestinians will thrive.

Investment in institutional mechanisms thatpromote accountability and transparencywhile simultaneously ensuring substantiveparticipation o Palestinians is an essentialoundation or this work. Such an integratedstrategy could promote human security inthe economic, political, security, judiciary,administrative, environmental, and socialspheres. Initiatives can be designed that areoverarching across the oPt as well as tailoredto specic issue(s) and context(s). This Reportrecommends creating a participatory, Statebased strategy to tackle human insecurity inan occupation. Its aim should be to acilitatethe re-establishment and strengthening o trust and it should delineate the specic rolesand responsibilities o all stakeholders, withtimelines, benchmarks and indicators thatserve as goals around which civil society canmobilize. Creating consensus in a dividedsociety will be a signicant task, it is hopedthat a national Sulha is one such mechanismthat could open a orum or debate, agreement

and unity.

5.5 Ivti i a patiipatoy

stat-buii taty: toa

hua uity i th oPtThe primary meaning o democracy is that

all who are afected by a decision should

have the right to participate in making

that decision, either directly or through

chosen representatives… [T]o exclude

the losing groups rom participation

in decision-making clearly violates the

primary meaning o democracy.

Athu li, nob Piz i

Human security requires that individuals areempowered through the provision o the basicmeans or survival and livelihoods, that rightsare protected and dignity upheld.[519] Individualcapabilities to navigate insecurity and to copebetter must be enhanced, or example, througheducation and skills training. Communitybased organizations should be supportedto engage in civic education and advocacyso that individuals learn not only to managethreats but to prevent them rom escalating.

Appropriate and necessary mechanisms can beput in place to ensure the eective participationo civil society through community basedorganizations, better understanding and useo laws and legislations, and/or governanceinstitutions. For example, livelihoods activitiescan be coupled with protection strategies tobetter mitigate economic insecurity.

Promoting an environment in which there isreedom rom ear requires appropriate legal,economic and social policing as well as a

political process that encourages hope, ensurestolerance and requires substantive civil societyparticipation in discussions about the uture.The reedom to live in dignity requires a strategyon domestic and international mobilization,developed with Palestinians, to protect theirsocial, economic, political and civil rights.[520]

[519] Commission on Human Security (2003) ‘HumanSecurity Now’, Outline o the Report o the Commission onHuman Security.[520] Khan, Mushtaq H (2009) ‘Palestinian State Formationsince the Signing o the Oslo Accords’, background paperor the PHDR, commissioned by UNDP / PAPP, Jerusalem.





The latter can in part be achieved through theimplementation o relevant international law.

While the end o the occupation will provide thebest opportunity or development, internationallaw should be respected during the transition.Increasing donor assistance is not the answerto the human security challenges acingPalestinians. Instead, the necessary actions mustbe taken to dismantle the physical structuresand administrative procedures that lead to orintensiy human insecurity. The internationalcommunity should be courageous i itsintention is to do no harm. In particular, donorshave a responsibility to challenge violations o human rights and restrictions o humanitarian,early recovery and development activities.

Academics and policy makers have highlightedsome o the contradictions and consequenceso the actions o international donors in theoPt, remarking that international donors mayunintentionally undermine the responsibilitiesand accountability o the Occupying Powerand make donor governments complicit inthe policies o the occupation. Sometimes

donors change their proposed humanitarianand development activities; or example, bypostponing projects or deciding against certaininitiatives i State o Israel restrictions mightmake implementation dicult.

The State o Israel has binding obligationstowards the Palestinian people undercustomary international law, internationalhuman rights law, the law o state responsibilityor wrongul acts, and – as the OccupyingPower – international humanitarian law. Yet

the international community pledged USD 4.5billion at the Sharm el Sheikh Conerence inMarch 2009 without specic assurances romthe State o Israel that international law wouldbe upheld. External aid must not be seen torelieve the State o Israel o its obligations underinternational law and it should be monitoredto ensure its compliance to such law, becauseas High Contracting Parties to the GenevaConventions o 1949, individual donor Statesmay be violating their legally binding obligation“to ensure respect” or the Convention “in allcircumstances” should they underwrite anyillegal actions. A courageous challenge to

the current impasse is necessary. This Reportcommends UN Secretary General Ban orinitiating a process which holds the Occupying

Power accountable or damages caused to UNassets during Operation Cast Lead.

The impact o politicisation o aid has beenhighlighted in Chapter 3 (Political polarisation).Ater the election o the Hamas led governmentin 2006 the Quartet stated that “all memberso a uture Palestinian government must becommitted to non-violence, recognition o Israel,and acceptance o previous agreements andobligations, including the Roadmap”. As Hamasdoes not accept one or more o these provisions,the Quartet eectively assumed a partisan politicalposition in the Palestinian domestic arena. In theview o the authors, the U.S., EU and Russia arecompletely at liberty to take such a diplomaticstance, however, the UN – as a purportedly neutralhumanitarian and development actor –hasperhaps been compromised by association withthis position, which is now, however, reected inSecurity Council resolution 1850 .

Thus nally, there are questions as to whether

the UN membership o the Quartet compromisesand constrains its humanitarian, early recoveryand reconstruction eorts and overall assistanceto Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While remaining mindul o the signicance o engagement at the political level, the authorsbelieve that the work o the UN’s specializedagencies should be de-linked rom the work o its political body. Neutrality and credibility areessential or UN agencies working on the ground.

5.6 Patiipatoy stat-buii

pioiti

This Chapter argues that a strong, democraticallyelected (and democratically honoured) State,which adheres to the ten core unctions o State it describes, can best protect humansecurity in the oPt. As noted, a uture Statemust demonstrate: a legitimate monopoly onthe means o violence, administrative control,management o public nances, investment

in human capital, delineation o citizen’s rightsand duties, provision on inrastructure services,




ormation o the market, management o Stateassets, international relations and the rule o law.At present the PA is severely limited in its ability

to perorm these unctions; however, it mustprepare or sovereignty by demonstrating itswillingness and capability to do so in the uture.It seems likely, in act, that demonstrated abilitiesin these ten sectors, amongst other criteria, arebeing put orward as a pre-requisite to the endo the occupation. Imposing the conditions o successul Statehood on the Palestinian right tosel-determination is undoubtedly unair, butit reects the current negotiation strategy o Israel and the international community.[521]

To compliment the proposed State-buildingstrategy, and to ensure the transparencyo the Palestinian State, a coiio o

rptativ gova should beestablished to monitor implementation in theshort to medium term and to build accountabilityand credibility. The Commission should beindependent and national: civil society, politicalparties, unions and public institutions shouldbe represented to monitor the extent to whichinitiatives eectively encourage civil society

and local government participation, and setand strengthen the oundations o a utureState. The Commission should issue publicallyavailable annual eectiveness reports o itsactivities. Such reports could be coordinated bythe Independent Human Rights Commissionor another suitably respected Palestinian civilsociety organisation.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have led up to an argumentthat the acilitation o human security in the oPtrequires a participatory State-building strategy

that promotes: (i) territorial integration/contiguity;(ii) economic integration; (iii) social cohesion;and (iv) sovereignty and political reconciliation.The success o the participatory State-buildingstrategy and ensuing initiatives and projects willrequire the development and/or strengthening o appropriate governance and delivery mechanismsthat are linked to, and coherent with, oPt-wideadministrative structures.

[521] See ‘A Perormance-Based Road Map to a PermanentTwo-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conict’ (2003)PLO Negotiations Support Unit.

I. Titoia itatio/otiuity:

Chapter 3 highlights the act that territorial

ragmentation has severely weakened thecentral authority o the PA. Israel is dividingup the territory through settler activity andthe inrastructure that supports it, and itretains control over internal security, externalborders, airspace, trade and macro-economicissues, livelihoods, health care and a rangeo other vital issues. A territory carved intosmall, disconnected enclaves, subject to Israelimilitary and economic closures, unable to oer justice to its dispersed people and without itsmost sacred symbols o religion and identity

can hardly be viable and unctioning. Thereore,the creation o territorial integration/contiguitywill be an essential actor in a uture PalestinianState that can ull its core unctions, startingwith a basic monopoly on the use o violence.

Territorial integration/contiguity can beachieved through:

Dening and respecting territorial•

borders

Liting the siege on the Gaza Strip•

Ensuring that eorts to alter the•

demographics o East Jerusalem arestopped

Stopping urther construction o the•

Wall and dismantling stretches o itbuilt in Palestinian territory in violationo international law and UN resolutions

Stopping construction o new, and•

expansion o old settlements andoutposts and dismantling illegalsettlements and outposts

Allowing reedom o movement within•

the oPt by dismantling all checkpointsand obstacles that violate reedomo movement and abolishing theaccompanying permit regime

Investing in inrastructure, policies•

and training or transportation,communication, electricity, and water

networks at the local level

Providing legal assistance to Palestinian•





men and women to enable them toght or their rights

Protecting cultivated and uncultivated•

land and water used by armers

II. eooi Itatio:

Chapter 4 emphasises the need or eectivepromotion o local economic sel-suciencytogether with mechanisms or rapidly deliveringrelie and supplies to large populations inisolated pockets who may suddenly be cuto due to military incursion or restrictions onreedom o movement. It would not be rationalto prioritize such strategies i the conicteconomy was likely to be short-lived. However,lacking concrete indications o a move towardsindependent Statehood, it is a proactiveand pragmatic approach. Additionally, thepromotion o a localized, sel-sustainingeconomy will benet Palestinians in the shortand long term, both under occupation andwhen they are ree rom occupation.

Economic integration can be achieved through:

Ensuring Palestinian control o macro-•

economic instruments

Liting the economic blockade and•

containment o Gaza

Stopping illegal land and water•

acquisition through physical andadministrative means

Liting restrictions on movement o •

goods and persons

Opening the sea access o shermen•

to more than twenty nautical milesin order to improve the variety andvolume o their catch

Strengthening and protecting livelihood•

activities o armers, shermen andmicro-entrepreneurs

Strengthening the private sector,•

through training and nancial supportwhere necessary

Ensuring reparations are paid or•

damage to, and/or destruction o,livestock, elds, equipment andother assets used by individuals and

communities or livelihood purposes

Rebuilding the domestic market•

Supporting economic, education and•

training institutions

Strengthening the customs, courts,•

standards, and statistical institutions toensure competitiveness o the privatesector

Improving access or Palestinian exports•

Making the Palestinian economy more•

sel-sustaining, thereby reducingreliance on the Israeli economy

III. soia cohio:

Chapter 4 documents the absence o nationalliberation strategies which ordinary Palestiniansconsider credible. Today, achieving reedomrom ear also means addressing the threat o a

Palestinian civil war. At the very least, achievingthis goal requires that all Palestinians can expressthemselves without ear in order to reach a newconsensus about the legitimate goals o theirliberation struggle and the strategies throughwhich these goals should be pursued. To builda socially cohesive State, the rule o law and theprotection o rights are essential.

Social cohesion can be achieved through:

Working with civil society to implement•

a ‘National Sulha’ to promote an internaltruth and reconciliation process

Protecting human rights•

Stopping and dismantling the physical•

and administrative measures thatprevent movement and access

Liting the containment and economic•

blockade o Gaza

Preventing harassment•

Stopping housing demolitions•




Holding the State o Israel accountable•

or violations o international law

Supporting Palestinians to deploy•

quality social services

Strengthening the education system•

Promoting a culture o volunteerism•

Supporting Palestinian civil•

society organizations to promoteempowerment

Supporting an oPt-wide campaign•

or empowerment though a sense o

community and shared experiences

Reinorcing resilience to the policies•

and practices o occupation

Protecting the rights o the socially•

marginalised: women, children, theyouth, the elderly, the disabled,Bedouins and etc.

Supporting the development o civilian•

links between Palestinians and Israelis

IV. sovity a Poitiaroiiatio:

Chapter 3 describes how the erosion o thecentral authority and central institutionso government is exacerbating politicalpolarization and disunity. National institutions,or example the PLC, are unable to resolveconict democratically at present. As a result,political dierence is being addressed throughorce. The existing polarity can only be resolved

i a unctioning and empowered politicaleld is created, which requires reviving thedeunct legislature and judiciary systems andrestoring a legitimate central authority that hasadministrative, security and economic controlover the oPt.

Sovereignty and political reconciliation can beachieved through:

Ending the occupation•

Supporting the creation o a unity•

government

Accepting the act that Hamas has•

substantial support in the oPt and mustplay a role in the political process

Supporting Palestinian resistance•

strategies that are compliant withinternational law

Ensuring the accountability o •

belligerent parties or violations o international law

Working with civil society to implement•

a ‘National Sulha’ to promote truth andreconciliation

Providing legal assistance to those•

whose rights have been violated eitherby the occupation or actional ghting

Investing in Palestinian leadership,•

especially o women and youth

Strengthening accountability and•

acilitating transparency within the PA

Supporting the oundations o a•

uture political system that includes an

appropriate mechanism which separatesthe three main powers and regulatesthe relationship between them[522]

Supporting the oundations o a•

political system that includes anindependent judiciary, the rule o law,and the protection o civil liberties[523]

Facilitating the creation o legislation•

that reects equality in law, withoutdiscrimination based on religion, sex,

race, disability, age or other social statusAddressing deciencies in legislation, e.g.,•

property rights and quality standards

Extending police jurisdiction and•

increasing capabilities or enorcementand investigation

[522] Jarbawi, Ali (2007).[523] Khalil, Asem (2008) ‘Dierent Concepts o the Separationo Powers’, in The Contours o a Future State: A multi-partcompendium o Palestinian Thinking. Commissioned bythe Institute o Law. Birzeit University.





5.7 couio

This Chapter opens with a clear and unequivocal

statement that sustained development under asystem o occupation is unattainable. It arguesthat the prolonged occupation necessitatesthe use o a development strategy that is ableto respond to the unpredictable and multi-aceted threats to the human security o Palestinians, and outlines a pragmatic approachto the development and implementation o such a strategy. This approach is appropriateor a number o reasons: rst, because o theprolonged nature o the occupation; second,

because previous interventions to alleviatesuering and underdevelopment in the oPt havebeen inadequate; third, because Palestiniansociety – socially, economically and politically –is ill-equipped to withstand any intensicationo the occupation.

Proposing the best means to move thePalestinian territory and peoples romragmentation to cohesion is the central aim o this Report. It contends that a suitable responseto the current political impasse – also bearing

in mind the historical lessons o Oslo – is arenewed popular mobilisation o Palestinians.It argues that social, economic and politicalparticipation is crucial both to build a viablePalestinian State and to galvanise a large-scalecivil rights movement. To this end, two possibleresponses are highlighted: rst, a renewal o the well-established and proactive principleo sumud , and second, the establishmento an internal reconciliation mechanism, orNational Sulha, through which to repair someo the damages o the political schism and theresultant political violence.

I the Palestinian people agree that a two-Statesolution is part o the preerred resolution to theconict, then in order to be viable, a legitimatePalestinian State must be built that is not drivenby top-down or external actors. To assist theemerging Palestinian State, the internationalcommunity and particularly the UN mustmaintain their neutrality and adopt a Do NoHarm approach to the provision o aid, honour

their obligations under international law, andensure compliance to such law amongst all theconicting parties.

Framework or moving orward

A review o the daily realities o Palestinians

living in the oPt in the period covered by thisReport leads to the discomting realization thatwith every passing year, violence and violationso human rights are becoming increasinglyentrenched and normalized, while the thresholdor what is acceptable is getting lower eachyear. Such violence and violations are otenmet with silence and denial, translating intocomplicity and undermining the humanity o all. Determined and courageous actions arenecessary now to achieve the human security o Palestinians and ensure their sel-determination

and sovereignty. This ramework or movingorward ocuses on how to realise this goal.

During the third quarter o 2009, somecommentators have pointed towards signs o economic recovery in some parts o the WestBank. Nablus or example, is showing signso economic progress since the checkpointsaround the city have been removed. However,this purported recovery is only visible in veryspecic areas (area A) in the West Bank anddoes not aect those living in Hebron, KhanYounis, Qalqilya and most other parts o Area C.I development is taking place, it is inconsistentand parochial.

A challenge to implementing a developmentpolicy designed to promote human security isunderstanding how to make it inter-sectoral.The evidence suggests that it is not enoughto design programmes that address health,education, poverty reduction and etc. inisolation; including cross-cutting issues such

as gender or the environment is also essential.It is necessary to look at the relationshipsbetween sectors to perceive how interventionsin one sphere can have eects, both positiveand negative, on other areas, and to examinethe underlying causes o conict to designbetter human security interventions.[524] Acomprehensive, pluralistic approach is mademore dicult because o compartmentalisation

[524] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2005) ‘Human Security: TheSeven Challenges o Operationalizing the Concept’, Centreor Peace and Conict Resolution / UNESCO, 13 Sep. 2005.




between institutions, organisations and policymakers. In the oPt this problem is exacerbatedby communications problems between

Ministries, NGOs and the private sector.

The creation o a taskorce to establish acomprehensive Palestinian Emergency andDisaster Response Strategy is necessary i the human security agenda is to be madeoperational. The oPt is at risk o both natural orman-made emergencies, and in addition to theenvironmental challenges, the volatile politicalsituation, uncertain economic conditions, andneed to rely on transportation, technology, andcommunications, necessitates a comprehensivepreparedness strategy to saeguard humansecurity. Such a strategy should include:

Disaster mitigation•

Emergency preparedness•

Emergency response•

Disaster recovery services•

There are existing governmental and non-governmental actors that deal with emergency

and disaster issues, such as the PalestinianRed Crescent Society. Their activities shouldbe expanded and consolidated into a nationalstrategy that addresses multi-sectoralconcerns.

The ramework or comprehensivelyimplementing a participatory State-buildingstrategy through which to address humansecurity should include: (i) building consensusamongst the Palestinian population (ii) alignmentand cooperation between all stakeholders; (iii)mobilization o sufcient nancial, technicaland human resources; (iv) the establishment o appropriate processes and mechanisms suchas a National Sulha through which to promotereconciliation and social cohesion as an urgentpriority; (v) a realistic sequencing o policies,projects and programs that gives the overallstrategy credibility among civil society andresults in sustained changes; and (vi) the exerciseo strong leadership, eective management andsufcient political will.

Given the contradictory results o thepoliticization o aid, this strategy has to bede-linked rom the political process so that

institutional arrangements can be establishedto ensure that the rights o Palestinians areprotected and their needs are addressed. I these rights cannot be assured through thestructures o the PA then alternative deliverystructures need to be considered. Plans aimedtowards alleviating human insecurity and theestablishment o a Palestinian State must involveall stakeholders and be popularly agreed.

Transparent handover plans to appropriatelocal governance structures must be articulatedas it would be counterproductive to underminethe interim government. Multi-stakeholderpartnerships must be ormed to promote State-building in order to plainly outline the durationand scope o responsibilities, contingency plans,and clear exit arrangements through whichState institutions – once a State is created –would progressively take over responsibility oreach unction. Such engagement is critical tostrengthening the oundations or sovereigntyand sel-determination.

To acilitate management o the strategy,the establishment o a coiio o

rptativ gova to monitorimplementation in the short to medium termwill build accountability and lend credibilityto the approach. The Commission should beindependent and national: civil society, politicalparties, unions and public institutions shouldbe represented to monitor the extent to whichinitiatives eectively encourage civil societyparticipation, and set and strengthen the

oundations o a uture State. The Commissioncan issue publically available annualeectiveness reports o its activities. Suchreports could be coordinated by a respectedPalestinian civil society organisation.

The principle driver o human insecurity or1.4 million Palestinians is the siege o Gaza,compounded by massive military operationsover the reporting period which, according tothe Goldstone Report caused “unprecedentedlong term damage both to the people and their





development and recovery prospects”.[525] Themandate o the UN Fact Finding Mission onthe Gaza Conict very accurately evaluated

the ravages o Operation Cast Lead within theramework o the ongoing blockade o theGaza Strip.

This Report has shown that the human securitysituation in the occupied Palestinian territoryhas been deteriorating since the impositiono additional blockade measures ater the2006 elections. With a ew exceptions, humandevelopment gains are being reversed; theenvironment is in crisis; the territory is physicallyand politically ragmented; and violence, bothrom the occupying power and internally, isdevastating the population in mind and body.

The Report also, however, highlights the socialcapital and local responses, premised on sel-reliance, that remain the bedrock o Palestinianresilience and represent the best possibleresource or the uture. Palestinians continueto support one another through a strong ethico volunteerism, and indigenous reconciliationpractices exist which can overcome mistrust and

once more draw together a divided people.

[525] Report o the United Nations Fact Finding Mission onthe Gaza Conict, ‘Human Rights in Palestine and otheroccupied Arab territories’ A/HRC/12/48, 15 Sep. 2009.

The biggest obstacles to Palestinian unityremain the occupation, especially through itsimposition o limited movement and access

between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank andEast Jerusalem, and the current internalpolitical divisions. I these issues are addressedin line with international and Palestinianlaw, opportunities or reconciliation andnational unity will be improved. Ensuring theaccountability o political leaders, ending thesiege o Gaza and encroachments into the WestBank including East Jerusalem, are immediateand essential actions, and will hopeully have acatalytic eect on human security in the oPt at

large.As Ko Annan said in In Larger Freedom, allpeople should have “the reedom to choose thekind o lives they would like to live, the accessto the resources that would make those choicesmeaningul and the security to ensure that theycan be enjoyed in peace.” Even in this time o uncertainty and ragility, courageous actionscan be taken that will set in motion a newera o human security and ensure peace and

development or all Palestinians.









135Ax Ostatitia Ax Patiia cta Buau o statiti, PcBs



























143Ax ToHihiht o th Hua suity suvy 2009 143

Ax 2:

HIgHlIgHTs OF THe HUmAn secUrITYsUrVeY 2009[526]

[526] The survey was commissioned by UNDP/PAPP and carried out by Near East Consulting (NEC). For the complete surveyresults and report, visit: www.phdr.ps





mthoooy

The survey was conducted in March 2009 and was commissioned by the UNDP or the Human

Development Report: occupied Palestinian territory 2009/10. Near East Consulting (NEC), contractedby UNDP, was requested to utilize Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI), and employ randomdigit dialling o randomly selected household landlines in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,and the Gaza Strip.[527] In conducting the survey or this project, Human Development Report’s teamleader and NEC carried out a number o research steps and methods to ensure that Palestinian publicperceptions as reected in the questionnaire are accurately captured and conceptualized. Followingare the steps that were taken in the ullment o this task.

sapi a ap i

In principle, the survey target population consisted o all the households in the occupied Palestinianterritory (oPt) with listed residential telephones.[528] The households that had been contactedusing the sampling rame represented to a great extent all the characteristics o households inthe oPt. In drawing the sample, we ensured that the sampling rame took into consideration allthe communities in the oPt that were enumerated by the Palestinian Central Bureau o Statistics(PCBS) during the 2007 Census.

Since the penetration rate in the dierent parts o the oPt is not the same and due to the lack o homogeneity among the Palestinians, the oPt was divided according to geographical areas and theclassication o communities according to the characteristics o the population. The geographicalareas that were considered were: North West Bank, Middle West Bank, South West Bank, North GazaStrip and South Gaza Strip. The classication o communities also took into consideration the urban,

rural, and reugee camp characteristics as adopted by the PCBS and the Ministry o Local Government.About 1200 randomly selected telephone numbers were assigned to each region. Thus, in reality,ve samples were drawn as a result. Over 4700 interviews were completed successully rom the veregions o the West Bank and the Gaza Strip out o 6000 dialled numbers.

At a 95% condence level, the margin o error[529] or the total sample is +/- 1.43 %, +/-1.87 % or theWest Bank and +/- 2.38 % or the Gaza Strip. As or the dierent areas, the margin o error is +/-3.2 %or North West Bank, +/-3.23 % or Middle West Bank, +/-3.3 % or South West Bank +/-3.3 % or NorthGaza Strip and +/-3.3 % or South Gaza Strip.

Th Itvi poWhen the telephone number is called the interviewer asked or the person whose birthday comes rstin the household and who is over the age o 18 or an interview. I that individual was not available,the respondent who picked up the phone was requested to do the interview, provided, that he/shewas eligible to do the interview.

[527] For East Jerusalem, NEC used the phone prex there and added randomized our digits to select households. Commercialoces were excluded rom the interviews.

[528] The large majority o the Palestinian households have access to a landline.[529] The margin o error means that we are 95% condent that the results in the dierent levels o analysis should all withinthat range.



145Ax ToHihiht o th Hua suity suvy 2009

Fio pou o itvi

The team relied on a pool o well-experienced researchers. Most o the interviewers have a BA degree

in one o the disciplines in the social sciences. They are a mix o young women and men who weretrained extensively prior to this survey on how to administer this particular questionnaire properlyand methodologically. Supervisors were always present to provide the interviewers with instructionswhen required.

Th qutioai

The questionnaire was drated by in close cooperation with the UNDP and in the spirit o the terms o reerence and the mandate o the study. It was constructed to capture the inormation required by thecontracting party. Moreover, the questionnaire was constructed with special consideration to the household

structure in order to help in the analysis pertaining to the poverty status o the various respondents.The translation was carried out by the sta o NEC, approved by UNDP.

P-tti

The questionnaire was pre-tested in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (total o 60 interviews inboth regions) prior to the interviewing process. Ater consultation with the UNDP, NEC modied thequestionnaire slightly based on the outcome o the pre-test.

Fio

Once the questionnaire was nalized and pre-tested, the team proceeded with data collection.Surveying operation was unctional on a daily basis during March 2009 rom 9 am till 9 pm to ensurethat all household members were present.[530]

data ai , aipuatio a ihi

Ater the completion o the eldwork, data was checked and cleaned. Data cleaning was carried outin two stages: one by the supervisors while the interviewing process was taking place and another at

the end o the survey. The data was checked with respect to data entry and results were correlated inorder to ensure that no interview bias occurred.

Data were weighted when necessary to ensure proper representation o certain population subgroups.

Consideration o the statistical weights was calculated using data o PCBS population projections atthe regional level during mid-2007. Two variables were deemed important to consider or the analysis.The rst was the population size and the second was gender. Weighting according to gender wascarried out or all levels o analysis, but the population size was considered only in some respects.

[530] A signicant proportion o Palestinians move during the week to other districts, such as Ramallah, or employment andthey return home during weekends.





data aayi

The analysis included bivariate and multivariate analysis. The dependent variables were cross-

tabulated with a number o independent variables to determine whether perceptions o threatsand insecurities dier among the various sectors o the population. Some variables, such as povertylevel were constructed along with other variables. The analysis ocused primarily on statisticallysignicant relationships. Also, the team interpreted the missing data as part o the data analysis, wherenecessary.

In general, the analysis ocused on two sets o variables. The rst was on the basis o region o residenceo the respondents, and the second was according to the national level. When the analysis was carriedout at the national level, weighting according to population size was carried out in order to reect therepresentation o each region and also the actual size o the West Bank as opposed to the Gaza Strip.However, when the analysis was done according to each o the ve regions, the population size wasnot considered to ensure that the responses given by the ve regions were sucient to enable urther

analysis and a lower margin o error.

In sum, the ollowing variables were used, depending on their statistical relevance, as explanatoryvariables in the various parts o the study region: sub-region, governorate, place o residence, reugeestatus, gender, poverty level, age, educational level, and actional trust.

Po o sap Popuatio

In March 2009, 5 surveys each with a random sample o about 900 successully interviewed householdswere carried out in ve sub-regions o the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). The ve surveys were

combined in one large sample o 4500 respondents o 18 years and older. The margin o error or thistotal sample is +/- 1.5, and the condence level is 95 %.

Figure 1, below, illustrates the overall distribution o the sample population by governorate. O the 16governorates in the oPt, the most populous ones in the West Bank are Hebron, ollowed by Nablus,Ramallah, and Jerusalem. The least populous governorates in the West Bank are Toubas, Salt, andJericho. The most heavily populated governorate in the Gaza Strip is Gaza City, and the least populousgovernorate is Raah.

Figure 1: Place o residence: by governorate.

Jenin 6%

[n=287]Toubas 2%

[n=78] Nablus 8%

[n=358]

Salfit 2%

[n=94]

Qalqiliya 2%

[n=103]

Tulkarem 5%

[n=203]

Ramallah 8%

[n=374]

Jerusalem 8%

[n=354]

Jericho 2%

[n=73]

Bethlehem 5%

[n=243]

Hebron 14%

[n=632]North Gaza 6%

[n=249]

Gaza city 13%

[n=599]

Rafah 5%

[n=234]

Deir al-Balah 6%

[n=269]

Khan Younis 8%

[n=350]




In the total sample, 42% o respondents are men and 58% women; 44% are reugees; 58% live in cities,11% in reugee camps, and 31% in villages. The Gaza Strip contains 59% o all reugees and 72% o allreugee camp residents in the oPt.

In terms o the sample’s political prole, 2/3rd are politically alienated and do not trust any o the majorPalestinian political actions. Reugee camp residents are more likely than city dwellers and villagers tobe politically engaged. Hamas is trusted by 7% in the oPt, and Fatah by 23%. None o the other actionsattract more than 1% support among the Palestinian population.

Figure 2: Factional trust.

Fateh

[n=739] 23%

Hamas

[n=235] 7%

PFLP

[n=42] 1%

Islamic Jihad

[n=26] 1%

Others

[n=54] 2%

I trust no faction

[n=2058] 65%

Iiato o Hua suity

General eeling o insecurity

Overall in the oPt, 54% o Palestinians eel insecure. This sense o insecurity is considerably morepronounced in the Gaza Strip (65%) than in the West Bank (45%). As shown in the gure below, thehigh level o general insecurity and its importance in the public’s mind is urther underscored by35% o Palestinians seeing security as the most important community need, only to be ollowed in adistance by the need or employment (23%), and any o the other listed potential community needs.

Figure 3: The most important community need.

Employment

[n=827] 23%

Food

[n=305] 8%

Health

[n=133] 4%

Financial assistance

[n=173] 5%

Housing and re-housin

[n=82] 2%

Infrastructure

[n=295] 8%

Law and order [n=288] 8%

Security

[n=1269] 35%

Sanitation

[n=14] 0%Education,

[n=160] 4%

Community cohesion

[n=81] 2%

Psychosocial support[n=40] 1%





UNDP’s Human Security Denition

Human security as dened by UNDP consists o seven dierent types o security, including personal

security, community security, political security, economic security, health security, ood security, andenvironmental security. For Palestinians in the oPt, political insecurity is by ar the most threatening(39%), ollowed by economic security (28%), personal insecurity (10%), health-related insecurity (8%),and community insecurity (7%). Insecurities related to ood (4%) and the environment (4%) are theleast threatening to the Palestinian public.

Figure 4: The most threatening o the seven types o human security threats.

[n=363] 10%

[n=133] 4%

[n=142] 4%

[n=1377] 39%

[n=248] 7%[n=990] 28%

[n=298] 8%

Personal/ security

Environmental security

Food security

Political security

Community security

Economic security

Health security

External and Internal migration

Nearly every one out o three Palestinians (27%) would emigrate i given the chance. This is more thecase in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in the West Bank (24%). The wish to emigrate i the means to do sowere available is twice as high among 18-to-24 year olds (40%), which incidentally also are least otenully employed, than among 45-to-54 year olds (20%).

Figure 5: Wish to emigrate i the means to leave the oPt are available.

I would immigrate

[n=1002] 27%

I would stay

[n=2721] 73%

Nearly hal o those who would emigrate i they had the means, would do so in search o a better lie(45%); 27% would migrate to nd employment, and 18% would do so to live in a saer environment.Those three top-rated reasons or wanting to migrate vary signicantly in importance dependingon whether Palestinians reside in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. As detailed in the table below,Westbankers were over twice as likely than Gazans to want to emigrate in search or employment,while the latter were more than twice as likely than Westbankers to want to emigrate in search o asaer environment.




Tab 1: Th th ai ao o ati to iat: aoi to io o i

RegionWestBank GazaStrip

Searchforemployment 37% 18%

Searchforabetterlife 41% 47%

Searchforasaferenvironment 11% 24%

Actual emigration is considerably lower than the wish to do so. In one out o every eight Palestinian households,a amily member has actually emigrated since 2001. The percentage o migration abroad is highest in Ramallah(24%). Households that include members who have emigrated generally tend to be better-o.

8% o households include amily members who have actually moved to a dierent area within the oPtsince 2001. Internal migration is higher in the West Bank (10%) than in the Gaza Strip (6%), and highest inthe north West Bank where it reaches 13%.The single most important destination or internal migrantsin the West Bank is Ramallah, with nearly hal o them moving to this governorate (45%), ollowed byNablus (7%), and Jerusalem (6%). Within the Gaza Strip, the most common destination or those whomoved to a dierent area was Gaza City (15%), ollowed by Raah and Khan Younis, at 3% each.

Figure 6: The destination o those who have migrated internally since 2001.

Jenin 2%

[n=5]

Toubas 4%[n=11] Nablus 7%

[n=19]

Salfit 1%

[n=2]

Qalqiliya 0%

[n=1]

Tulkarem 1%

[n=4]

Ramallah 45%

[n=129]

Jerusalem 6%

[n=17]Jericho 3%

[n=8]Bethlehem 3%

[n=8]

Hebron 2%

[n=6]

North Gaza 3%

[n=8]

Gaza City 15%

[n=44]

Rafah 3%

[n=10]

Deir al-Balah 2%

[n=6]Khan Younis 3%

[n=8]

Poa suity

1/10th o the interviewees classied personal security as that element o their human security that iso most concern to them.

Nearly hal o all Palestinians (48%) oten ear or their personal saety or their amily’s. Westbankers areas likely as Gazans to ear or their personal or their amily’s saety. Personal security was signicantlyconditioned by ear o internal Palestinian violence. As detailed in the table below, a markedly higher

proportion o Fatah supporters than Hamas supporters in the Gaza Strip ear or their saety. Theopposite is to some extent the case in the West Bank.





Tab 2: Fquy o a o poa aty o that o th aiy: aoi to atioa tut i th

wt Ba a th gaza stip.

Region WestBank GazaStrip Factionaltrust Factionaltrust Fateh Hamas Others None Fateh Hamas Others None Often 41% 37% 57% 48% 56% 27% 44% 52%

Sometimes 33% 42% 18% 30% 29% 30% 51% 27% Rarely 14% 12% 16% 12% 12% 22% 5% 12% Never 11% 9% 9% 10% 2% 20% 0% 9%

In terms o more specic threats to personal security, 36% o survey respondents elt eitherextremely threatened o threatened by robbery, 28% by use o arms, 27% by violent crime, 20% bydomestic abuse, and 11% by sexual assault. Robbery was perceived to be a greater overall threatin the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. Use o arms and violent crime were slightly more prevalentthreats in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Domestic abuse prevailed most in extremely poorhouseholds.

Figure 7: Extent o threat in daily lie by domestic abuse, sexual assault, robbery, violent crime,

and use o arms.

4 %

2 % 7

% 6 % 7

%

1 6 %

9 %

2 9

%

2 1

%

2 1 %

5 4

% 5 7 %

4 7 % 5

4 %

5 3

%

2 6

% 3 2 %

1 7 %

1 9 %

1 9

%

D o m

e s t i c a b

u s e

S e x u

a la s s

a u l t

R o b b e

r y

V i o l

e n t c r

i m e :

a s s a u l

t

U s e o f a

r m s

Extremely threatened

Threatened

Not threatened

Not threatened at all

One out o every six Palestinians does not eel sae at home, and more than one in our Palestiniansdoes not eel sae to walk alone in the street during the day. As detailed in the table below, a muchhigher proportion o Gazans than Westbankers eel unsae at home and eel unsae walking in thestreet during the day. The majority o Palestinians (61%) do not eel sae walking alone in the street atnight. Again, this unsae eeling is much more pronounced in the Gaza Strip (68%) than in the West

Bank (54%). More than hal o Palestinians (55%) also do not eel sae when travelling to another citywithin the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.




Tab 3: la o i a 1 at ho, 2 ai ao i th tt ui th ay, 3 ai

ao i th tt at iht, a 4 tavi to aoth ity ithi th wt Ba o gaza stip:

Ova i th oPt, a aoi to io o i.

Lackof feelingsafe: oPt WestBank GazaStripAthome 17% 9% 29%Walkingaloneinthestreetduringtheday 27% 21% 36%Walkingaloneinthestreetatnight 61% 54% 68%Travelling to another city within the West Bank or GazaStrip 55% 55% 54%

couity suity

Crime in the Community

Crime strongly aects community security. O the various types o crime, thet is the most requentcrime aecting community security in the oPt, ollowed by beatings, gun ghting, murder, and drugabuse. Thet is more prevalent in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. Beatings, gun ghting, andmurder are crimes that signicantly more negatively impact community security in the Gaza Stripthan in the West Bank.

Figure 8: The two most requent types o crime that occur in your community.

5 %

3 4 %

7 %

5 %

3 %

7 %

1 2

% 1

3 %

1 4

%

8 %

1 9 %

7%

6 %

6 % 8

% 12

% 1 5 %

2 0 %

S e x u

a la s s a u

l t

R o b b

e r y / t h e f

t

P r o p

e r t y

d i s p u t e

s

K i d n

a p p i n

g

D o m

e s t i c

v i o l

e n c e

D r u g

a b u s

e

M u r d e r

S h o o

t i n g s /

g u nf i g h t i n

g

A s s a

u l t / b

e a t i n g

s

First Crime

Second Crime

Providers o Human Security

Only hal o Palestinians believe that the government is the Palestinian institution best able to providehuman security, while 33% believe that their amily is best placed to do so, and another 10% thinks the

community is most able to provide human security.Belie in the ability o the government to provide human security, however, increases with age. For





example, 41% o 18-24 year olds compared to 62% o those aged 55 and older see the government asbest able to provide human security. Instead, younger Palestinians are more likely to vest their trust inthe amily as a provider o human security.

Responses were also highly politicized. Whereas 59% o Fatah supporters in the West Bank singledout the government as best able to saeguard human security, this was the case or 32% o Hamaspartisans in the West Bank. To the opposite, 74% o Hamas supporters compared to 43% o Fatahsupporters in the Gaza Strip see the government as the best provider o human security.

Figure 9: The body best able to provide human security.

The government (N=1918)

50%

The family (N=1240)

33%

The community (N=377)

10%

The political party (N=46)

1%

Religious institutions (N=140)

4%

Foreign organizations (N=91)

2%

High reliance on the amily and the clan in Palestinian society is urther evidenced through the highpercentage o Palestinians who would seek protection o their amily (41%) i they were a victim o a violent crime rather than rom the police (40%). Again younger Palestinians are signicantly lesslikely than older ones to seek protection rom the police i they were to be a victim o a violent crime.In addition, the reliance on the police is also highly politicized with Fatah supporters in the Gaza Striprelying more on amily and Hamas supporters more on the police, and Fatah supporters in the WestBank more seeking protection rom the police and Hamas supporters there more likely seeking reugewith their amily or clan.

Figure 10: I you were to be a victim o a violent crime, who would you contact to seek protection?

Civil police

[n=1348] 40%

Other security body

[n=174] 5%

Community leaders

[n=49] 1%

Clan-based judges

[n=237] 7%Political party

[n=32] 1%

Armed groups[n=44] 1%

Family/clan

[n=1354] 41%

Others

[n=94] 3%




Even when Palestinians are in serious trouble within their local community, a higher proportionbelieves that their relatives (44%) rather than the relevant authorities (36%) would be most helpul.As illustrated in the gure below, trust that relatives will be most helpul rather than the relevant

authorities increases even urther when it concerns trouble or a conict outside the local community.

Figure 11: I your amily was in serious trouble rom a conict in the local community, who

would help you most?, and, I your amily was in serious trouble rom outside your area o residence, who would help you most?

No one

[n=405] 9%

Relatives

[n=1908] 44%

Relatives/neighbors

[n=284] 7%

Anyone in the town

[n=200] 5%

Relevant authority

[n=1549] 36%

No one

n=[356] 8%

Relatives

n=[2278] 52%

Relatives/neighbors

n=[285] 6%

Anyone in the town

n=[202] 5%

Relevant authority

n=[1267] 29%

If your family was in serious trouble from a

conflict in the local community , who would

help you most?

If your family was in serious trouble from

outside your area of residence , who would

help you most?

The high reliance and trust in relatives when in trouble - at least locally – can be understood inpart by the low level o trust Palestinians have in their local leaders. As illustrated below, 67%in varying degrees do not believe that local leaders can be trusted to put people’s interest overtheir own. This eeling o disconnection rom the local leadership is shared to an equal extent byWestbankers and Gazans.

Figure 12: Agree or disagree: Local leaders in my community can usually be trusted to put people’s interest over their own.

Strongly agree

[n=255] 6%

Agree

[n=1120] 27%

Disagree

[n=2017] 49%

Strongly disagree

[n=720] 18%





Social Fabric and Social Cohesion

Palestinians’ distrust o the government, police and relevant authorities, and the local leadership is

embedded in a general mistrust that is aecting Palestinian society with consequent negative impactson human security, and community security in particular. For example, 78% o Palestinians in the oPtdo not think that people can be trusted. Also, 52% are araid in various degrees to publicly expresstheir ideas about non-political issues.

Apart rom the impact o the Israeli occupation, and rather looking inwards, not many Palestiniansconsider government practices (19%) or the existing law (14%) as the oremost threat to humanrights. Rather, 50% o Palestinians pointed to various social and cultural issues, including culture andtraditions (33%), societal restrictions (11%) and amily restrictions (6%) as being the biggest threatto human rights in the oPt. Reerence to these three social and cultural issues as the main threats tohuman rights is much more prevalent among Westbankers (58%) than among Gazans (36%). Amongthe latter (27%), the perception that government practices are the main obstacle to human rights

prevails twice as much than among Westbankers (13%).

Figure 13: What is the biggest threat/obstacle to human rights, rom a Palestinian (not

occupation) perspective?

The educational system

[n=288] 10%

Culture and traditions

[n=983] 33%

Family restrictions

[n=182] 6%

Societal restrictions

[n=333] 11%Government practices

[n=563] 19%

The existing law

[n=413] 14%

Others

[n=220] 7%

Despite hal o the population considering social and cultural issues as the main obstacle to humanrights rom a Palestinian perspective, a large majority o the population in various degrees supportsthe principle o equality between men and women. As detailed below, well over 70-80% believes thatwomen should be equal to men beore the court, beore the law, at home, and at work. Concretely,

these attitudes towards women’s rights indicate that there should be strong public support or arevision o the legal code in order to boost women’s equality.

Figure 14: The extent to which men and women should be equal...

3%

3%

2%

3%

12%

9%

6%

10%

10%

10%

9%

10%

13%

12%

16%

13%

62%

66%

67%

64%

Before the courts

Before the law

At home

At workNot equal at all Not equal In between Equal Totally equal







Conict and general ear o conict very much aects Palestinians’ sense o political security. Over 3/4th o the Palestinian public considers another conict in the oPt within a year likely. Opinions over whatactor is most likely to cause this conict are split mainly between two main actors: (1) the internal

Palestinian political split (41%), and (2) the Israeli occupation (39%).

Figure 17: The likelihood o Palestine having another violent conict in the next year, and, the

actors that are likely to cause conict in the uture.

How likely is it that Palestine will have another

violent conflict in the next year?

Very likely

[n=786] 22%

Likely

[n=1759] 50%

Unlikely

[n=812] 23%

Very unlikely

[n=143] 4%

Occupation

[n=1295] 39%

The political split

[n=1361] 41%

Unemployment

[n=155] 5%

Poverty

[n=185] 6%

Corruption

[n=245] 7%

Other

[n=57] 2%

What factors are likely to cause

conflict in the future?

Even when examining opinions about the potential reasons or the internal Palestinian division, theIsraeli actor creeps in with 29% o the Palestinian public blaming the Israeli occupation or the internal

split. Only 6% o Palestinians believe that the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas owes to ideologicaldierences. The largest proportions o the Palestinian public, however, describe the current internaldivision as driven by either a power struggle (32%) or personal interest (17%).

Along actional lines, Fatah supporters (39%) and – to a lesser extent – the politically alienatedmajority (34%) are more likely than Hamas supporters (17%) to characterize the internal split as apower struggle. The latter, more so than any other Palestinian are most likely to describe the internalPalestinian division as an outgrowth o the occupation (42%) and ideological dierences (13%).

Figure 18: The main reason behind the current internal division among the Palestinians.

Regional influences

[n=259] 8%

Occupation

[n=1002] 29%

Power struggle

[n=1101] 32%

Personal interest

[n=569] 17%

Different ideologies

[n=211] 6%

Media influences

[n=24] 1%

Other reasons

[n=259] 8%




With a large majority o Palestinians currently not trusting any o the existing political or religiousactions, it is important to ascertain what might bring back the trust. Only 4% see a need to create newparties or actions. Instead, the most commonly suggested remedy or the present political malaise

is that the existing parties should become more democratic and transparent (36%), ollowed by thesuggestion that the public should become more involved in politics (20%).

Figure 19: The majority o the Palestinians do not trust any political or religious action, what will bring the trust back?

4%

36%

20%16%

8%

16%[n=133]

[n=1083]

[n=598][n=483]

[n=248]

[n=482]

There is a need for new parties/factions

The current parties and factions need to become more democratic and transparent

The public need to be more involved in politics

Stricter laws governing parties should be introduced

Improving the educational system

Other actions

Impact o Internal Confict

Conict and internal tensions take their toll on the population’s sense o security, which is maniestedin dierent ways. For example, 56% o Palestinians eel either insecure or very insecure because o pressure to take sides in the internal Palestinian conict. For 54%, insecurity in varying degrees iscaused by violence in the community.

Figure 20: The extent to which violence in the community and pressure to take sides afect your sense o security.

22%

28%

32%

28%

13%

13%

14%

14%

18%

17%

Violence in the community

Pressure to take sides

Extremely insecure Insecure In between Secure Extremely secure

More than 2/3rd o Palestinians are in varying degrees araid to express political ideas out o ear o being abused by those who disagree (68%). Also, 30% eel discriminated against. As or the type o discrimination, 59% o those who suer rom discrimination, describe it as being rooted in actional

politics. Both reported discrimination in general, and actional discrimination, in particular, are moreprevalent in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, respectively 39% versus 25%, and 75% versus 42%.





Figure 21: Do you eel discriminated against, and, what type o discrimination do you eel?

Do you feel discriminatedagainst?

Yes

30%

No

70%[n=1013]

[n=2340]

Factional

[n=625] 58%

Sexual

[n=75] 7%

Geographic

[n=39] 4%

Economic/ social class

[n=138] 13%

Religion

[n=55] 5%

Other)

[n=139] 13%

What type of discrimination doyou feel?

Governance and insecurity

Strong political insecurity and alienation undermine the belie that various pillars o governanceare unable to guarantee citizen’s rights and reedoms, and protect them rom harm. Irrespective o the capacity o the institutions, this insecurity stimulates people to revert to more traditional saetynets such as the amily and the clan or the provision o security, and undercuts their condence ingovernment.

As overviewed in the gure below, Palestinians’ evaluations o the government, the justice system,the police orces, and the security orces are critical. The proportion o people who believe that thegovernment guarantees reedom o belie is higher than those who think that the government cannotguarantee this reedom, but on all other rights, including human rights, reedom o association, reedomo expression, and right to a air trial, a higher proportion o people believe that the government ailsto guarantee those reedoms and rights.

The justice system in terms o its independence, airness, and eectiveness is evaluated positively by44-45% o the public, negatively by 37-39% o them, while 17-18% evaluate this system as average interms o these three essential aspects.

Slight majorities o the Palestinian public evaluate the police orces and the security orces positivelyin terms o their provision o help, and their provision o a sense o saety. Both the police orces andthe security orces scored more negatively in terms o their adherence to the law, and conducting theirwork without discrimination.




Figure 22: Evaluations of the government, the justice system, the police forces, and the

security forces.

23%

19%

25%

26%

24%

24%

20%

22%

21%

20%

18%

17%

16%

18%

17%

20%

18%

18%

18%

20%

15%

26%

20%

17%

19%

Human rights

Freedom of belief

Freedom of expression

Freedom of association

Right to a fair trial

No guarantee at all

No guarantee

In between

Guarantee

Total Guarantee

The extent to which the government guarantees...

16%

17%

16%

22%

22%

21%

17%

18%

18%

24%

23%

24%

21%

21%

21%

Independence

Fairness

Eeffectiveness

Very negative

Negative

In between

Positive

Very Positive

Evaluation of the justice system in terms of its...

13%

15%

15%

23%

18%

17%

19%

22%

12%

13%

15%

15%

25%

22%

23%

19%

32%

33%

28%

21%

The provision of help

Providing a sense of safety

Functioning according to the law

Dealing without discrimination

Very negative

Negative

In between

Positive

Very Positive

Evaluation of the attitude of the police forces in your area with respect to...

15%

17%

18%

24%

18%

17%

19%

21%

14%

16%

16%

15%

24%

22%

22%

19%

29%

30%

26%

21%

The provision of help

Providing a sense of safety

Functioning according to the law

Dealing without discrimination

Very negative

Negative

In between

Positive

Very Positive

Evaluation of the attitude of the security forces in your area with respect to...

eooi suity

O the seven types o security that characterize human security, 28% o Palestinians eel threatenedby economic insecurity.

EMPLOYMENT

Overall unemployment in the oPt stands at 23%, and part-time employment at 12%. 2/3rd o the labourorce is employed ull-time. Full-time employment is the lowest among 18-to-24-year olds (53%) andPalestinians over the age o 55 (51%). In other age categories, ull-time employment reaches 69-72%.





Figure 23: The labour orce.

Employed full- time

[n=1267] 65%

Employed part- time

[n=228] 12%Not employed

[n=455] 23%

The overall unemployment rates or the oPt mask sharp regional dierences. In the West Bank, 18% o the labour orce is unemployed; in the Gaza Strip, unemployment reaches 32%. Full-time employmentin the Gaza Strip (53%) is also markedly lower than in the West Bank (72%). There are no large dierenceswithin the Gaza Strip in terms o unemployment, but within the West Bank, unemployment rates aresignicantly lower in the middle West Bank (14%) than in the north (21%) and south West Bank (20%)sub-regions. In the West Bank on the district level, the highest rates o unemployment were recordedin the governorates o Qalqiliya (31%), Salt (25%) and Tulkarem (24%).

Table 4: Labour orce: according to region and sub-region.

Region

North

WestBank

Middle

WestBank

South

WestBank

North

GazaStrip

South

GazaStrip

WestBank GazaStrip

Fullyemployed 70% 78% 69% 51% 56% 72% 53%

Partiallyemployed 10% 8% 12% 16% 13% 10% 15%

Unemployed 21% 14% 20% 32% 31% 18% 32%

The government is the single largest economic sector in the oPt, employing 34% o the labour orce,ollowed by the sel-employed (29%), and the private sector (23%). In the Gaza Strip, 42% o the labourorce is employed by the government, with this gure reaching 52% in the south o the Strip. Publicsector employment is particularly reliable in the West Bank. Among Westbankers employed by the PA,only 5% are unemployed or partially employed. In the Gaza Strip, employment with an international

organization is the most secure orm o work.

Table 5: Employment category: according to region and sub-region.

Region

North

West

Bank

Middle

West

Bank

South

West

Bank

North

Gaza

Strip

South

Gaza

Strip

West

Bank

Gaza

Strip

PalestinianAuthority 30% 27% 27% 34% 52% 27% 42%

Internationalorganization 3% 3% 5% 7% 4% 3% 5%

LocalNGO 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3%

Privatesector 20% 30% 25% 26% 17% 24% 21%

Self

employed

37%

33%

35%

24%

18%

37%

22%

Smalltrade 8% 4% 7% 6% 7% 7% 7%







FINANCIAL INSECURITY

In addition to structural unemployment and chronic poverty, the Palestinian economy has been

subjected to crisis-within-crises, which has undermined the viability o the private sector, and led toa periodic inability o the government to pay the salaries o public sector employees. This has led to aconsiderable insecurity o pay among working Palestinians. As illustrated in the gure below, 42% o working Palestinians are in varying degrees insecure about receiving their income. Insecurity o pay ismarkedly higher among those in extremely poor households (62%) than among those in householdsabove the poverty line (37%).

Figure 25: Condence level about receiving the income rom current work.

Very confident

[n=352] 21%

Confident

[n=602] 37%

Not confident

[n=560] 34%

Not confident at all

[n=127] 8%

A signicant number o Palestinian households eel that their present situation is not economicallysustainable. In the oPt, 10% o households are in a serious situation and already do not have enoughto live on. Another, 32% can barely manage. The situation in the Gaza Strip is worse than in the WestBank: in the ormer 14% do not have enough to live on compared to 6% in the latter. Also, in the Strip35% can barely manage nancially compared to 29% in the West Bank.

Figure 26: Ability o the household to keep up nancially.

For more than one year

[n=800] 23%

For about one year

[n=621] 18%

For only a few months

[n=581] 17%

Can barely manage now

[n=1083] 32%

Situation is serious

[n=336] 10%




HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Despite the dire economic situation in the oPt, a relatively small proportion o Palestinian householdsaround 17% rely to various degrees on humanitarian assistance. As illustrated in the gure below, 35%say directly that they do not rely on humanitarian assistance. An additional 48% say that they do notreceive assistance. This last category, however, does not speciy whether or not they would actuallybe in need o humanitarian assistance. Incidentally, reliance on assistance among households who doreceive assistance is more than three times higher in households in the Gaza Strip (29%) than in theWest Bank (9%).

Figure 27: Household reliance on humanitarian assistance.

We do not rely on assi

[n=1305] 35%

Partially rely

[n=439] 12% Rely extensively

[n=113] 3%

Rely totally

[n=85] 2%

We do not receive any[n=1794] 48%

Hath suity

Health Status

Just below 1/10th o Palestinian households have someone in the household hospitalized. In the GazaStrip, this is the case or 13% o the households, and in the West Bank or 6%.

Extremely poor households in the oPt spend somewhat more on medical care than the relativelybetter-o ones.

Health Coverage

The PA is the main provider o health insurance in the oPt, with 70% coverage. UNRWA covers 8%, 6%o households have a private health insurance, 2% are covered by the Israeli health insurance, and 2%have their health insurance covered by charities.

As PA employees are automatically covered by PA health insurance, those employed by the PA aremost likely to be covered by such kind o policy. In the West Bank, 90% o government employees arecovered by PA health insurance; in the Gaza Strip, this number stands at 87%.





Figure 28: Providers o health coverage.

[n=2440] 70%[n=61] 2%

[n=277] 8%

[n=70] 2%

[n=204] 6%

[n=416] 12%

PA insurance

Israel health insurance

UNRWA insurance

Charities cover our insurance

Private insurance

We do not have insurance

In 23% o the households in the oPt, no amily member is covered by a health insurance scheme. In64% o the households, all amily members are covered by health insurance. Households in the GazaStrip (74%) were signicantly more likely than those in the West Bank (57%) to have all their amilymembers covered by health insurance. As detailed in the table below, within the Gaza Strip, amilies inthe north were less likely than those in the south to be covered by a health insurance scheme. Withinthe West Bank, residents in the southern West Bank are least likely to be covered or ully covered byhealth insurance.

There is a strong correlation between the likelihood o all household members in a household beingcovered by health insurance and the type o employment. In the West Bank, or example, 3% o government employees are uninsured, compared to 29% o the sel-employed and small traders. Inthe Gaza Strip, government employees and those working or international organizations are most

likely to have all household members covered by a health insurance scheme.

Table 7: Are the household members covered by a health insurance scheme? according toregion and sub-region.

RegionandSubRegionNorthWestBank

MiddleWestBank

SouthWestBank

NorthGazaStrip

SouthGazaStrip

WestBank Gaza

StripAll 60% 60% 51% 70% 79% 57% 74%

Most 6% 9% 6% 7% 5% 7% 7%

Some 7% 7% 8% 6% 5% 8% 6%

None 28%

24%

34%

17%

11%

28%

14%

Health Providers and Obstacles

Government health centres and hospitals are the single most important health care providers inthe oPt, with 48% o Palestinian households usually seeking care at such acilities. Nearly 1/5th o households go to private centres or medical care, 17% UNRWA, 14% to doctors’ private clinics, and1% to NGO centres.

Government centres care or roughly an equal proportion o Palestinians in the West Bank and theGaza Strip. In the Strip, however, respondents were over three times as likely as West Bankers to rely on

UNRWA centres, and hal as likely to seek medical care in private acilities.




Figure 29: Providers o medical care.

Government centers

[n=1909] 48%

NGO centers

[n=51] 1%

Private centers

[n=735] 19%

UNRWA

[n=690] 17%

Private doctors' clini

[n=549] 14%

Other

[n=33] 1%

More than one in three Palestinian households (35%) normally does not receive the appropriatetreatment. This is mostly the case in reugee camps (40%), among reugees (38%), and among theextremely poor (41%) in the oPt. Reported ailure to receive appropriate treatment is also higher inthe Gaza Strip (39%) than in the West Bank (32%). There are no dierences in the incidences within theGaza Strip sub-regions or not receiving the appropriate care, but within the West Bank, not receivingthe appropriate treatment is most common in the south West Bank (36%) and least common in themiddle West Bank (29%).

Figure 30: Do you and your household normally receive the appropriate treatment?

Yes

[n=2554] 65%

No

[n=1353] 35%

Among those households that did not receive appropriate medical care, 31% didn’t because therequired treatment is not available in their area, another 21% because the required health servicedoes not exist in their area, and respectively 15% because o poor health services and the high costo treatment.

High cost o treatment was more than twice as likely to be an issue in the West Bank (21%) than inthe Gaza Strip (9%). However, nearly twice the proportion o households in the Gaza Strip (42%) thanin the West Bank (22%) did not receive appropriate treatment because the required treatment doesnot exist in their area. Incidentally, the lowest percentages o households reporting that the requiredtreatment is not available in their area o residence is in the middle West Bank (15%), which includesthe governorate o Jerusalem with better access to specialized care.





Figure 31: I you or any o the household members did not receive the appropriate treatment,

why didn’t you receive it?

[n=213] 15%

[n=212] 15%

[n=290] 21%

[n=436] 31%

[n=99] 7%

[n=30] 2%[n=21] 1%

[n=103] 7%

High cost of treatment

Poor health services

Absence of required health service in my area

Absence of required treatment in my area

Absence of appropriate professionals

Inability to reach due to movement restrictions

Distance to place of treatment

Other (specify)

Foo suity

In the oPt, 43% o households can be qualied as ood insecure: 4% does not get enough ood tomeet their needs, and 39% only with diculty manages to meet their ood consumption needs. Foodinsecurity by this measure is signicantly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank: 5% o Gazansare not able to meet amily ood needs, and 52% are only able to do so with diculty; correspondinggures or Westbankers are respectively 3% and 30%.

Extreme ood insecurity diers dramatically across the West Bank’s governorates: in the governorates

o Toubas (9%) and Salt (8%) the inability to meet ood needs is three times as high as the WestBank average. The prevalence o households that are only able to meet their ood consumptionneeds with diculty is highest in the governorates o Qalqiliya (40%), Bethlehem (38%), and Tulkarem(36%). Within the Gaza Strip, ood insecurity is less varied than in the West Bank, but is highest in thegovernorates o north Gaza, and Raah.

Figure 32: Do you and your amily get enough ood to meet your needs?

Yes easily

[n=2125] 57%

Yes with difficulty

[n=1449] 39%

No

[n=132] 4%

Food insecurity does not only hit poor households: 29% o households above the poverty line alsohave diculty obtaining sucient ood, and 2% are unable to do so. These are likely households whoare very close to the poverty line, and illustrates how indigent many o these households are.




Table 8: Do you and your household get enough ood to meet your needs? according to poverty level.

Poverty Extremelypoor Belowpoverty Abovepoverty Yes,easily 28% 44% 70%

Yes,withdifficulty 62% 51% 29%

No 10% 5% 2%

Mean monthly ood expenditure in the West Bank is NIS 1876; in the Gaza Strip it is NIS 1647. Assumingan average amily size o 6.5 in the West Bank and 7.5 in the Strip. Monthly ood expenditure inhouseholds above the poverty line is NIS 2053, equivalent o US$ 2.6 per person per day; in poorhouseholds monthly ood expenditure is NIS 1656, equivalent o US$ 2.1 per capita per day. I.e. the percapita per day dierence in ood expenditure between those above the poverty line and those below

the poverty line is 50 cents.

Table 9: Average expenditure on ood and drinks: according to poverty level.

Poverty

Extremelypoor Belowpoverty Abovepoverty

Food&drinks 1461 1656 2053

In 90% o Palestinian households the household income is the main source that brings ood to thetable. O the remaining 10%, 5% relies on relie assistance and 5% relies on their extended amily.Reliance on relie assistance is ve times higher in the Gaza Strip (10%) than in the West Bank (2%), and

three times higher among reugees (9%) than among reugees (3%). Whereas 17% o extremely poorhouseholds rely mainly on relie assistance or ood, this is the case or 7% o poor households, and 2%o households that are nancially relatively better-o.

Figure 33: The main source o ood in the house today.

Relief Assistance

[n=198] 5%

Extended Family

[n=166] 5%

Own Income

[n=3313] 90%

eviota suity

Environmental security is o oremost concern within the Human Security ramework to 4% o

Palestinians, ranking it last in this respect along with ood security.






More than 1/5th o the population in the oPt eels insecure about the present availability o clean water.This sense o insecurity is higher in the Gaza Strip (28%) than in the West Bank (18%), and is higher inreugee camps (25%) and cities (24%) than in villages (16%). Despite the prevailing trends indicating

that the availability o clean water will become even more challenging in the region, the Palestinianpublic does not yet acknowledge this as their sense o insecurity about the availability o clean waterin the uture does not signicantly vary rom their insecurity about it presently.

Table 10: To what extent does availability o clean water now and in the uture afect your

sense o security? according to region and place o residence.

Region Placeof residence Concernnow

WestBank GazaStrip City Village RefugeecampVeryNegative 5% 8% 7% 5% 5%Negative 13% 20% 17% 11% 20%Average 14% 13% 14% 13% 11%Positive 19% 15% 17% 19% 16%VeryPositive 50% 44% 46% 51% 48%

ConcernforthefutureVeryNegative 5% 11% 9% 5% 7%Negative 14% 17% 15% 14% 15%Average 13% 12% 13% 13% 11%Positive 19% 16% 17% 20% 19%VeryPositive 49% 45% 46% 49% 48%

In case o a natural disaster, 41% o the Palestinian public eels in varying degrees secure that thenational government would provide assistance, and 38% eel secure that the government would doso. However, Palestinians have most aith in their amily and riends as 79% are secure that these wouldprovide aid in the event o a natural disaster.

Figure 36: In the event o a natural disaster, how secure do you eel that the ollowing will assist in providing aid...

17%

18%

4%

23%

24%

7%

19%

20%

9%

22%

21%

22%

19%

17%

57%

National government

Local government

Family and Friends

Extremely insecure Insecure In between Secure Extremely secure





Ax 3:

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