PT & T VS. NLRC Respondent Grace De Guzman was illegally dismissed from work

due to companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. Ruling: PETITION DISMISSED. Marriage is a special contract that cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Wheres a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such

policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

Respondent Escritor was charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband and having a child out of wedlock. However, she testified that she was already a widow when she started living with another man without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovas witness, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. Ruling:

CASE REMANDED TO THE SC OCAD FOR REHEARING.

Escritor cannot be held administratively liable. The Court held thus, Should the Court prohibit and punish respondents conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore, take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest wh ich can override respondents religious belief and practice.

GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA Petitioner wife filed an action against respondent husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile, due to the latters demand that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs which the wife refuses to perform, which just refusals of the petitioner would result to

maltreatment by words and deed and inflict injuries upon the different parts of her body, thus petitioner was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. Ruling: Petition granted (in favor of petitioner)

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a

marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfil his obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the

option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and

physical assaults of the defendant. Thus, petitioner may claim support from the respondent for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

BALOGBOG VS. CA

Respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition claiming they were the legitimate children of deceased Gavino Balogbog with their mother Catalina Ubas. Herein petitioners however opposed the petition alleging that their brother, Gavino, died single and without issue in their parents residence. Respondents presented two witnesses testifying to their legitimacy and the marriage between Gavino and Catalina, likewise the testimony of their own mother, however no

certificate of marriage was presented as the latter claimed that the same was burned during the war. Ruling: The decision appealed from is affirmed (in favour of private respondents) Although a marriage certificate is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence such as testimonies of witnesses may be presented to prove marriage. The presumption is that a man and a woman deporting

themselves as husband and wife are in fact married and this can only be rebutted by cogent proof to the contrary, which is not obtaining in the above-cited case.

COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

Respondent Judge Lucio Palaypayon was administratively charged for illegal solemnization of marriage for solemnizing marriages even without a marriage license which is a formal requisite of marriage. Ruling: The Court imposes a fine on respondent judge The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license, except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void

ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

Petitioner and respondent decided to get married and set a schedule thereof. Preparations for the wedding were made, but a day before the wedding, respondent left and was never heard from again, thus prompting petitioner to file an action for breach of promise to marry. Ruling:

The trial court judgment is affirmed (in favor of petitioner) A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite

different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY Respondent Judge Domagtoy was administratively charged with gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law for: 1) solemnizing a wedding despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife; and 2) performing a marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction as such respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the MCTC Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, while the wedding was solemnized at his resident in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Ruling:

Respondent judge is suspended for six months

1. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. In this case, the groom did not institute a summary

proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death, thus he remains married to his first wife and his second marriage shall render void for being a bigamous marriage.

2. Article 7 provides that marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8 which is a direct provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only with said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 of the Family Code, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

ARANES VS. OCCIANO Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law

for solemnizing her marriage without the requisite marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, when her husband passed away, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by her husband was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of her late husband. Ruling: Respondent judge is fined.

The SC held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void and that subsequent issuance cannot render or

even add an iota of validity to the marriage except in cases provided by law. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage and respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within

said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the

marriage may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO Respondent Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code after learning that his wife, who had been naturalized as an American citizen and thereafter obtained a divorce decree of their marriage and then married an American. There being no opposition filed in his petition, the trial court granted the same. Ruling: Petition for review granted. Decision of the trial court allowing

the divorced husband to remarry is set aside. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The SC held that in applying this provision two elements must exist: 1) that there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner; and 2) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In this case respondents wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between him and his wife. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of paragraph

2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus respondent, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it 1) must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it; 2) such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws; 3) respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

NINAL VS. BAYADOG

Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, mother of herein petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and Pepito, Jr. Teodulfa died as she was shot by Pepito in 1985. After 1 year and 8 months after the death of his wife, Pepito married Norma herein respondent Norma Badayog without any marriage license, however in lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempted from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident, which prompted herein petitioners to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito and Norma on the ground that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. Ruling: The petition is granted. The assailed order of RTC reversed and set aside and the case is reinstated.

The 5-year common-law cohabitation period is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the

years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is, unbroken. The 5-year period cohabitation invoked by herein respondent was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ Petitioner avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in 1966. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated. Respondent Judge alleged that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. He claimed that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for 7 years

already without the benefit of marriage. Ruling:

Respondent judge is fined.

Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

Jose Dayot and Felisa Dayot were married in 1986 solemnized by Rev. Tomas Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years. In 1993, Jose filed a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage against Felisa contending that their marriage is a sham as no marriage ceremony actually took place. He did not execute the sworn affidavit and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. Ruling:

The petition is denied. The marriage of Jose to Felisa is declared null and void.

Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

REPUBLIC VS. CA & MOLINA Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

against her husband Reynaldo Molina on the ground of psychological incapacity, as the latter showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers on whom he squandered money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that Reynaldo has no job and Roridel was the sole breadwinner of the family; that Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served. Ruling:

The SC reversed and set aside the assailed decision, holding the marriage of Roridel to Reynaldo subsisting and remains valid.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)

juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. The evidence adduced by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. the SC reversed and set aside the assailed decision, holding the marriage

of Roridel to Reynaldo subsisting and remains valid. From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and

nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. Interpretations given by the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which shall be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

SANTOS VS. CA Leouel and Julia got married on 1986. In 1988, Julia left for the US despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months later after her departure, Julia called up Leouel for the first time and promised to return

home upon the expiration of her contract in 1989, but she never did. Leouel visited the US and he desperately tried to locate or to somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get

Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint for voiding of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Ruling:

The SC denied the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed

independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to

Japan and after sending money to Lolita and their child for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support and abandoned them. The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of Lolita to Toshio null

and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court decision. Ruling:

The SC granted the petition for review, reversing and setting aside the Court of Appeals decision.

Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behaviour merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Lolita failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in

accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

ANTONIO VS. REYES Petitioner and respondent got married in 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36. In 1993, petit ioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void based on Article 36

of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila likewise annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties on the ground of due discretion on the part of the parties. However, the CA reversed the RTC judgment for insufficiency of evidence. Ruling: The SC found the present case sufficiently satisfied the guidelines in Molina, hence declared the marriage null and void.

First, petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the

psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behaviour. Second, the root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. Third, respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Fourth, the gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Fifth, respondent is evidently unable to comply

with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Sixth, the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Seventh, the final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

CHI MING TSOI VS. CA Respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi filed a petition for the annulment of her

marriage to herein petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity alleging that the latter is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and that there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them since their marriage on May 22, 1988 until their separation on March 15, 1989. The trial court declared the marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Ruling: The petition is denied. The marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. The Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the

parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

TE VS. TE

Ruling: