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Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyPeter of SpainFirst published Thu Apr 12, 2001; substantive revision Tue Sep 1, 2015

Peter of Spain (thirteenth century), exact identity unknown, was the author of a standard textbook onlogic, the Tractatus (Tracts),[1] which enjoyed a high renown in Europe for many centuries. His workson logic are typical examples of the type of manuals that gradually started to emerge within thecontext of twelfth­ and thirteenth­century teaching practices. Until recently he was also identified asthe author of a number of extant works on medicine.

1. Life and Works: Some Comments on the Historiography2. Origins of Peter's Works on Logic3. The Tractatus4. The Syncategoreumata5. Doctrinal Elements in Peter's LogicBibliographyAcademic ToolsOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries

1. Life and works: Some Comments on the Historiography

Peter of Spain has been established as the medieval author of a work that became widely known asSummule logicales magistri Petri Hispani (Collection of Logic Matters of Master Peter of Spain). Thegreat number of manuscripts and printed editions is evidence of the enormous success this work metwith throughout European universities well into the seventeenth century. An interpolated version ofhis Tractatus, by then known as the Summulae logicales, was used by John Buridan as a basic text tocomment upon. But finding out the true identity of the author of this influential Tractatus has provedto be a difficult task. For a long time it was assumed that he was a Portuguese who became Pope in1276, under the name of John XXI. There is also another, earlier tradition, according to which theauthor of the Tractatus was regarded as Spanish, and a member of the Dominican order. Yet anotherattribution, dating from the fifteenth century, was to a Petrus Ferrandi Hispanus (d. between 1254 and1259), which would be consistent with the idea that the work originated from the first half of thethirteenth century. According to still another attribution, the Summule was compiled by a Black Friarno earlier than in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century.

The ‘Dominican­thesis’ can be divided into three traditions:

1. The general view that Peter of Spain, author of the Tractatus, is someone who belonged toOrder of Black Friars,

2. The more specific view that the author of the Tractatus was a frater Petrus Alfonsi HispanusO.P.,

3. Another specific view that the Peter of Spain who created the Tractatus was the same Peter ofSpain as the one who wrote the Legenda sancti Dominici and the Office of the Saint's Feast,namely Petrus Ferrandi Hispanus O.P., who died in the 1250's.

Current research on the identity of Peter of Spain has once again taken up the idea that he must have

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been a member of the Dominican Order instead of Pope John XXI (D'Ors 1997, 2001, 2003).However, we are still in the dark about the true identity of Peter of Spain. The most recent informationwe have on this score is that a number of the Dominican candidates recently suggested as the authorof the Tractatus can be deleted from the list (Tugwell 1999, 2006). The lack of further informationalso makes it difficult to establish the dates and specifics of his carreer.

It is still not possible to establish the date of origin of the Tractatus, the work that has enjoyed suchenormous success. Recent scholarship suggests that it could have been written any time between the1220s and the 1250s (Ebbessen 2013, 68–69). It has universally been recognised as a work by Peter ofSpain. Another work that has been identified as Peter of Spain's is a Syncategoreumata (Treatise onSyncategorematic Words), which was probably written some years after the Tractatus.[2] Consideringthe fact that in all the thirteenth­century manuscripts the Syncategoreumata directly follow theTractatus, and the number of similarities between doctrinal aspects of these two works on logic, it isalmost certain that they were written by the same author. Both works seem to have originated fromSouthern France or Northern Spain, the region where we also find the earliest commentaries on thesetreatises.

Besides these works on logic, there are other works that have been written by a Peter of Spain. In thePetrus Hispanus papa tradition, he is the supposed author of a famous medical work Thesauruspauperum, as well as fourteen other works on medicine. Other works written by (a) Peter of Spain area Scientia libri de anima, and commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, De morte et vita and De sensu etsensato, and commentaries on works by pseudo­Denys the Areopagite. As yet there is no certaintyabout whether the Peter of Spain who wrote these works is the author of the Tractatus and theSyncategoreumata, or about the dates of their origin.

Another Peter of Spain, referred to as Petrus Hispanus non­papa, has been identified as the author ofthe Summa ‘Absoluta cuiuslibet’, a late twelfth­century handbook on syntax closely linked withPriscian's Institutiones grammatice, libb. XVII and XVIII, which became very popular later in theMiddle Ages under the name Priscianus minor (Kneepkens 1987). The chronology of this work seemsto rule out that this Peter of Spain is the same author as the author of the Tractatus.

2. Origins of Peter's Works on Logic

Peter's logic has its origin in the continental tradition. The educational carreer of the Tractatus appearsfrom two commentaries,[3] which contain short lemmata and a number of questions (questiones)together with their solutions. The tracts as contained in these texts are very similar to the ones in theTractatus. Typical of the Paris tradition is the separate treatment of ampliation, restriction anddistribution, and several other, doctrinal features.[4] Peter's Masters include Johannes Pagus (who issupposed to have been a Master of Arts in Paris in the 1220's) and Hervaeus Brito (who may havebeen a Master of Arts either before 1229, but possibly later, in which case he does not qualify as ateacher of Peter's). Besides these direct influences, the sources for Peter's works on logic can be tracedback to Boethian­Aristotelian logic, and authorities in the field of grammar such as Priscian andDonatus.

Like the Tractatus, the Syncategoreumata also displays a continental origin, and appears to havecontinued along the lines of a similar work by Johannes Pagus (which has been dated between 1225and 1235), later on further developed by Nicholas of Paris, who wrote his Syncategoreumata between1240 and 1250 (see Braakhuis 1979, Vol. I, p. 248).

3. The Tractatus

The Tractatus can be divided into two main parts. One part deals with doctrines found in the so­called

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logica antiquorum—i.e., the logica vetus (old logic) and logica nova (new logic)—and the othercontains doctrines covered by the logica modernorum—viz. the tracts that discuss the proprietatesterminorum (properties of terms).

The first main part of the Tractatus divides into five tracts. The first tract, De introductionibus (Onintroductory topics) explains the concepts used in traditional logic—nomen (noun), verbum (verb),oratio (phrase), propositio (proposition)—and presents the divisions of and the (logical) relationshipsbetween propositions. The second tract, De predicabilibus (On the predicables) covers matters dealtwith in Boethius's accounts of Porphyry's Isagoge. It gives an account of the concept predicabile andthe five predicables—genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens—i.e., the common features ofand differences between the predicables, as well as of the terms ’predicatio’ and ’denominativum’.Tract three, De predicamentis (On the categories), discusses the ten Aristotelian categories, as well assome items already dealt with in the previous treatise. The fourth tract, De sillogismis (On syllogisms)mainly goes back to Boethius's De syllogismis categoricis (On categorical syllogisms). It gives anexplanation of the basic element of the syllogism, i.e., propositio, and of the syllogism, and then goesinto mood and figure, the proper forms of syllogisms, and briefly deals with what are calledparalogisms. The fifth tract, De locis (On topical relationships), is derived from Boethius's De topicisdifferentiis (On different topical relationships) I and II. This tract starts off with an explanation of thenotions argumentum and argumentatio, and then proceeds to deal with the species of argumentation:syllogism, induction, enthymeme, and example. Next, it gives a definition of locus (the Latintranslation of the Greek topos): a locus is the seat of an argument (i.e., the locus is supposed towarrant the inference by bringing it under some generic rule.) The intrinsic loci (= the kind of locusthat occurs when the argument is derived from the substance of the thing involved) are covered first,followed by the extrinsic loci (= the kind of locus that occurs when the argument is derived fromsomething that is completely separate from the substance of the thing involved) and intermediary loci(= the kind of locus that occurs when the argument is taken from the things that partly share in theterms of the problem and partly differ from it). Examples are: intrinsic—the locus "from definition":‘a rational animal is running; therefore a man is running’; extrinsic—the locus "from opposites":‘Socrates is black; therefore he is not white’; intermediary—‘the just is good; therefore justice isgood’.

The second part of the Tractatus comprises subjects that were of major importance in the doctrine ofthe properties of terms. In the sixth tract, De suppositionibus, the theory of supposition is dealt with.The treatise begins with an exposition of significatio. The definition of significatio runs: significatio isthe respresentation of a thing by means of a word in accordance with convention. Next it gives adefinition of the related terms suppositio and copulatio, and the differences between the termssignificatio, suppositio and copulatio. Of these three suppositio and significatio are the most importantin Peter's semantics. Suppositio is defined as the acceptance of a substantive verb for some thing.Suppositio is dependent on significatio, because supposition can only occur via a term that already hassome significatio. Put in other words, significatio pertains to a word by itself, and supposition to aterm as actually used in some context.

The tract concludes with a division of suppositio. The first division is into suppositio communis(common supposition) and suppositio discreta (discrete supposition)—e.g., the terms homo (man) andSortes (Socrates) respectively.

The second division, suppositio communis, is divided into naturalis (natural) and accidentalis(coincidental). Suppositio naturalis is described as the acceptance of a common term for all thosethings that can share in the common universal nature signified by the term in question—e.g., homo(‘man’) taken by itself by its very nature is able to stand for all men, whether in the past, present orfuture; suppositio accidentalis is the acceptance of a common term for those things for which the termin question requires an additional term—e.g., in homo est (‘A man is’) the term homo stands forpresent men, whereas in homo fuit (‘A man has been’) and in homo erit (‘A man will be’) it stands forpast men and future men respectively, owing to the additional terms fuit and erit.

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The third division, suppositio accidentalis, is divided into suppositio simplex (simple supposition) andsuppositio personalis (personal supposition). Suppositio simplex is the acceptance of a term for theuniversal ‘thing’ it signifies, as in homo est species (‘Man is a species’, animal est genus (‘Animal is agenus’), in which the substantive terms homo and animal stand for the universal man and animal, andnot any one of their particulars. Suppositio simplex can occur both in the subject­ and in the predicate­term—e.g., homo est species (‘Man is a species’) and omnis homo est animal (‘Every man is ananimal’) respectively. Suppositio personalis is the acceptance of a common term for one or more of itsparticulars, as in homo currit (‘A man is running’).

The fourth division, suppositio personalis, is subdivided into either derterminata (determinate =standing for a certain particular) or confusa (confused = standing for any individual falling under thatname). Suppositio determinata occurs when a common term is taken indefinitely or in combinationwith a particular sign—e.g., homo currit (‘Man is running’) or aliquis homo currit (‘A /some man isrunning’). Suppositio confusa occurs when a common term is taken in combination with a universalsign (’Every man is running’).

The tract on supposition winds up with the discussion of a few questions regarding the attribution ofsupposition in a few cases.

The seventh tract of the Tractatus, on fallacies, which forms part of the Aristotelian­Boethian logic, iswritten in the tradition of the Fallacie maiores (Major fallacies). The eighth tract, De relativis (Onrelatives) deals with the relative pronouns as defined by Priscian in his Institutiones grammaticae. Therelative pronouns are devided into: relatives of substance, such as qui (who), ille (he), alius (another),and relatives of accident, such as talis (of such a kind), qualis (of what kind), tantus (so much),quantus (how much). The former are subdivided into relatives of identity (qui and ille) and relativesof diversity (such as alter and reliquus, both of which can be translated as ‘the other’). The relative ofidentity is defined in terms of supposition as what refers to and stands for the same thing. Theserelatives are either reciprocal or non­reciprocal. With regard to the relatives of identity, Peter adds adicussion of a number of questions about the rationale for using demonstrative pronouns, and someproblems concerning how the fallacy of a relative having two diverse referents comes about.

The tract on relatives continues with a brief discussion on the relatives of diversity, accompanied by arule about the supposition of the relative when it is added to a superior and an inferior in a premissand a conclusion, as in aliud ab animali; ergo aliud ab homine (‘Something other than an animal;therefore something other than a man’). With regard to relatives of identity a rule of the "ancients",who deny that a proposition introduced by a relative can have a contradictory opposite, is discussedand rejected. Another rule is given about the identity of supposition of a non­reciprocal relative andwhat it refers to. The tract concludes with short accounts of relatives of accident.

The ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth tracts of the Tractatus, i.e., the short tracts De ampliationibus(On ampliation), De appellationibus (On appellation), De restrictionibus (On restriction) and Dedistributionibus (On distribution) are in fact elaborations of the theory of supposition. Ampliation isan extension of the supposition of a term. It occurs when an expression is combined with a modalterm—e.g. homo potest esse Antichristus (‘A man can be the Antichrist’), and homo necessario estanimal (‘A man is necessarily an animal’)—in which case the supposition of the term ‘man’ isextended to more than just individuals existing in the present. The tract on appellationes is very short:appellation is considered no more than a special case of restriction, i.e., the restricted suppositionbrought about by a present­tense verb. In this tract the rules of appellation are in fact specific kinds ofrules of restriction. The subject of restriction in general is discussed in the eleventh tract. The rules ofrestriction are the same ones as were presented in the early Parisian textbooks on logic (see de Libera1982, pp. 176–177). The final tract, on distribution, deals with the multiplication of common terms asa result of their being combined with universal signs. These universal signs are either distributive ofsubstance (such as omnis, nullus), or of accidents (such as qualiscumque, quantuscumque). In thisdescription ‘substance’ is defined as substistent modes of being, and ‘accident’ as accidental modes ofbeing. Separate attention is given to the universal sign omnis (‘all’ or ‘every’) along with a discussion

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of the common rule that the use of omnis requires three appellata (particular things). The mostfrequently cited example in these discussions in the thirteenth century was the sophisma omnis phenixest (‘Every phoenix is’). According to Peter of Spain, the use of omnis does not call for at least threeappellata; an exception to this rule is found in cases in which there is only one appellatum, as is thephoenix­case. The tract also pays attention to a number of tongue­twisting sophisma­sentences.

4. The Syncategoreumata

Peter's treatise on syncategorematic words forms part of a separate genre that developed from thebeginning of the thirteenth century. The term syncategorema comes from a famous passage ofPriscian in his Institutiones grammatice II , 15, in which a distinction is made between two types ofwordclasses (partes orationis) distinguished by logicians, viz. nouns and verbs on the one hand, andsyncategoremata, or consignificantia, on the other. The latter are defined as words that do not have adefinitive meaning on their own, but acquire one only in combination with other, categorematicwords.

Like the treatises of the Tractatus kind, the Syncategoreumata were developed from the (twelfth­century) theories on fallacies, as well as from grammatical doctrines (from the same period). From thesecond half of the twelfth century, there was a growing interest in the linguistic elements that areconsidered to lie at the basis of ambiguity and fallacious reasoning. Hence the increase of treatisespresenting a systematic account of these terms. The connection these treatises have with Priscian'sgrammar can be gathered from the attention different authors pay to the signa quantitatis (orquantifiers), and the fact that considerable attention is given to the meaning and function ofsyncategorematic terms.

The list of words to be included among the syncategoreumata was not always the same. Generallyspeaking it comprised exclusive words tantum (only), solus (alone), exceptive words such as preter(except), nisi (unless), consecutive words such as si (if) and nisi (if not), the words incipit (begins) anddesinit (ceases), the modal terms necessario (necessarily) and contingenter (contingently), theconjunctives an (or), et (and), nisi (unless), in eo quod (in that), and quin (that not). In Peter's work wealso find a discussion of the terms quanto (‘how much’ or ‘as much as’) quam (‘than’ or ‘as’) andquicquid (whatever). Unlike some other authors (such as William of Sherwood and Robert Bacon), hislist does not include the word omnis.

In the opening of his Syncategoreumata, Peter presents his rationale for this investigation, viz. thatthere is a close link between the use of these kinds of words in sentences and their truth­value. Hisidea is that the syncategoreumata must have some sort of signification, but not the same as thecategorematic words. For this special kind of signification he uses the words consignificatio anddispositio.

The first two separate chapters of the Syncategoreumata are devoted to the words est and non, whichare said to be implied in all other syncategorematic words. Peter's account of the first word focuses onthe notion of compositio (composition), which is explained in great detail, by looking into thesignification of nouns and verbs (signifying a composition of a quality with a substance, and that of anact with a substance respectively). Considerable attention is given to the composition featuring in theverb ‘is’, in the form of the question of whether the composition involved can be counted amongbeings or not, considering the fact that it can be used to express different kinds of states of affairs. Thechapter on negation introduces the important distinction between an act as conceived of or in themanner of a concept (ut concepta sive per modum conceptus) and as carried out (ut exercita) (seeNuchelmans 1988). Among the former type we find the noun ‘negation’ and the verb ‘to deny’,whereas the latter is what is meant by the negative particle ‘not’. The remainder of the chapter dealswith the function of the negation, which is to remove the composition found in whatever it covers, anddiscusses some well­known sophisma­sentences which turn on the specific function of negation.

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The third chapter of the Syncategoreumata discusses the exclusive words solus and tantum. They arecalled exclusives because they carry out an exclusion, not because they signify one. An exclusion,furthermore, requires four things, namely, what is excluded, what is excluded from, the respect inwhich it is excluded, and the act of exclusion. The kinds of exclusion are divided into general andspecific: the former involves an exclusion from something generic, whereas the latter from somethingspecific. Questions that come up in this section have to do with the results of adding an exclusive termto different kinds of words, such as to a term falling under the category of Substance: does it excludeonly other substances, or does it also exclude from things listed under another category? And what ifit is added to a term listed under the category of Accident (such as colour, quantity, and so on)? Thenext question deals with the sorts of terms that can be meaningfully associated with an exclusion. Forexample, is it possible to exclude something from ‘being’ (as in ‘Only being is, therefore nothingother than being is’)? The tract proceeds with the kinds of things that can qualify for an exclusion.The fourth chapter, which deals with exceptive words, is compiled in a similar manner.

The fifth chapter is about the word si, which is said to signify causality in or via antecedence. Thechapter also contains discussions of the kinds of consecution or consequence, problems of inferenceconnected with the referents of terms used in consecutive sentences, and also on how to contradict aconditional sentence. Special attention is given to the problem whether from the impossible anythingfollows.

The chapter on ‘begins’ and ‘ceases’ is a good example of the way in which extra­logicalconsiderations found their way into medieval treatises on logic. Thus, apart from the semantics andinferential problems connected with the use of these words in propositions, the chapter also looks intothe notions of motion and time. An important part of Peter's ontological views can be gathered fromchapter seven, which covers issues connected with the use of modal terms. Chapter eight discusses thesignification and use of connectives, and the final chapter on syncategorematic words proper isconcerned with the expressions quanto, quam and quicquid. A very short concluding chapter of Peter'sSyncategoreumata deals with a somewhat isolated topic, i.e. the proper modes of response in anargument. The topics looked into are solution, the quantity and quality of syllogisms, and the ways togo about proving a syllogism.

5. Doctrinal Elements in Peter's Logic

One of the most important elements in Peter's logic concerns the doctrine of supposition. The theoryof supposition has its origins in the twelfth century, when the medievals showed a growing interest inthe ways in which words function in different contexts. This way of dealing with the semantics ofterms has been dubbed the “contextual approach” (see de Rijk 1962–67, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 113–117).

The primary semantic property of a word is its significatio, in Peter's definition, the "representation ofa thing by a word in accordance with convention". It is a natural property of a word, the presentationof some (universal) content to the mind. The significatio of a word depends on its imposition, i.e., theapplication originally given to the word in question. A word can have more than one significatio, if itwas originally applied to two or more distinct (universal) natures.

The counterpart of significatio, the formal constituent of every meaning, is the word's capacity to"stand for" different things (even though its significatio remains the same), depending on the contextin which it is used. In the early stages of the development of the theory on the properties of terms, thisfeature of a word was called appellatio. For instance, the words ‘man’ and ‘horse’ can be used tostand for different individual men or horses. But they can also stand for themselves, e.g., when theyare used in sentences such as ‘man is a noun’, or ‘horse is a noun’. Moreover, their meaning can differaccording as the words are used in combination with verbs of different tenses.

In the final stages of the development of the theory, the notion of supposition becomes the generallabel that covers all the uses of a noun (substantive or adjectival), to which other recognised properties

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of terms (appellatio, ampliatio and restrictio) are subordinated.

The theory of properties of terms shows a radical inconsistency, which has been explained as “thepersistent hesitation of medieval logicians between the domains of connotation (universals) anddenotation (individuals)” (De Rijk 1982, pp. 167–168). This inconsistency runs throughout Peter'saccount of supposition, and comes to the fore most prominently in what he says about naturalsupposition (suppositio naturalis). The main problem is in what way the property of naturalsupposition is related to the term's significatio, which was defined as the acceptance of a word for athing (res). By this definition, Peter's concept of significatio covers both the intension and extensionof a term, the universal nature of man and the individuals that have this nature in common. Suppositionaturalis, on the other hand, is described as "the acceptance of a common term for all those things thatcan share in a common universal nature"; for example, the term ‘man’ when taken by itself by its verynature stands for all the individuals that fall under it, whether they exist in the past, present or future.From this definition and the example just presented it appears that the extensional features ofsignificatio and suppositio naturalis overlap. The latter has been explained by interpreters as thenatural capacity of a significative word to stand for something.

There is a more telling difference between significatio and suppositio naturalis, however. Significatiois the natural property of any significative term to represent things, owing to its original imposition,whereas a term's supposition only enters the scene when it is used. The expression "taken by itself"(per se sumptus) found in Peter's account of suppositio naturalis, does not mean that no context isrequired, as is the case in significatio, but it merely indicates that for the moment the actual context isbeing disregarded. The link between significatio and suppositio is the following. When some word hasacquired a signification by an impositor (= someone who bestows a meaning upon a word), then itconnotes a univeral nature or essence, and acquires a natural capacity to stand for all the actual andpossible individuals that share in this common nature; it owes this capacity to its significatio. If,however, we disregard for a moment the actual context in which the term in question is used and lookupon the term as taken by itself (per se sumptus), then its supposition covers its entire extension. If wetake the factual context in which the term is used into consideration, then its extension becomeslimited, owing to the context. The context, or more precisely, the added significative term, can be ofthree kinds: the added significative term can be a predicate of a proposition in which the term at issueoccurs, the added significative term can be an adjective, or the context can be of a social nature (DeRijk 1971. See also de Rijk 1985, pp. 183–203).

The distinction between significatio and suppositio naturalis persisted throughout the thirteenth andfourteenth centuries. Behind it is the fundamental view that regardless of whether a word is used insome context or not, it always has a significatum, i.e., the universal nature or essence it signifies,which can be separated from what the word comes to mean in a specific context.

Besides suppositio naturalis, Peter's (and other medievals') conception of suppositio simplex alsoseems to hover between connotation and denotation. In the expression homo est species the term homohas suppositio simplex, but this is precisely too what the term homo signifies. So there scarcely seemsreason to separate signification from supposition on this score. The specific use of suppositio simplexfound in Peter of Spain and other medieval authors, as the representation of a universal nature, isrejected later on by authors such as William of Ockham. For the latter, the term homo in the examplejust given has suppositio simplex (for Ockham a special case of suppositio materialis) in that it standsfor the mental concept of man (Kneale & Kneale 1978, pp. 268–269).

Peter of Spain's logical works are commonly characterised as revealing a moderately ‘realistic’outlook. To explain the contents of linguistic expressions and the function of logical terms, he isinclined to focus on their relationships to some extra­mental reality. This can be shown from the wayin which he discusses the use of the word est (is), his account of suppositio simplex, and the way heanalyses the occurrence of the word ‘necessarily’ in propositions. Moreover, his conception of theconsecutive expression ‘if’ clearly shows his tendency to put the domains of reality and language on apar. (However, not all linguistic expressions are connected with extramental reality. Although

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ontology always plays a role in his accounts of language, it would appear that Peter is especiallyinterested in the contents of linguistic epressions. In that regard it seems more appropriate to speak ofan intensionalist semantics.)

In his Syncategoreumata, Peter analyses the significative function of the word ‘is’. To a certain extenthis findings are not confined to that term alone, but cover all verbs, in which the verb ‘is’ is alwaysunderstood. The most remarkable feature about his discussion of ‘is’ is his focus on the notion ofcomposition. What he is particularly interested in is the kinds of things affirmative propositionsfeaturing that verb can refer to, in his words, the type of composition involved in such propositions.

The notion of ‘composition’ plays a prominent role in Peter's semantics. Before embarking on thespecifics of the word ‘is’, he first looks into the compositiones involved in the noun and the verb.When it comes to the composition involved in the use of ‘is’, the starting­point for his account is thequestion whether the expression ‘is’ in a proposition of the form ‘S is P’ implies the ‘being’ of thecomposition. Whether it does or not depends on how we consider the composition. If we are talkingabout any composition whatsoever, in his words, the composition in general, the composition canindiscriminately be connected with beings and non­beings. This is because we can talk about boththings that are and things that are not by making use of the same affirmative propositions. Henceanything expressed by a proposition of the form ‘S is P’ expresses a being in a certain sense (ensquodammodo). The type of composition he is referring to here is the mental content of someaffirmation, which is something that only has being to a certain degree. However, the composition ingeneral, that is, the state of affairs involved in such expressions, is primarily connected with beingrather than non­being. It is when we talk about non­beings, such as chimaeras, that being in a certainsense once again enters the scene. Hence a distinction of the types of being referred to, or the types ofcomposition involved in affirmative propositions into being in the absolute sense (ens simpliciter) andbeing in a certain sense (ens quodammodo). The difference between these two types of being isillustrated by the distinction between two types of inference: from ‘A man is an animal’, in which thecomposition involved is a being in the absolute sense, it follows ‘Therefore a man is’, but from ‘Achimaera is a non­being’, in which the composition is a being in a certain sense only, it does notfollow ‘Therefore a chimaera is’.

The counterpart of Peter's discussion of composition is the section on negation. Peter specifically goesinto the question of what it is the negation denies. In his words, the negation removes the composition.The composition in this connection is identified with the affirmed state of affairs (res affirmata). Whatthe negation removes is not the state of affairs, but the affirmation that goes along with it. The basis ofboth composition and negation turns out to be the same state of affairs, i.e., something that isformulated in the mind, to which we can either assent or deny to be the case.

The focus on matters of ontology is evidenced in other portions of Peter's logic as well. For Peter, asfor Henry of Ghent (who also wrote a Syncategoreumata) the expression homo (man) in homo estanimal (‘Man is an animal’) has simple supposition: it stands for the universal nature of humanity.Accordingly, the expression is necessarily true, even if no man should exist. The term ‘necessarily’thus has ampliative force: it enables the subject term ‘man’ to refer to individuals not only existing inthe present ( which is the normal case when a present­tense verb is used), but also to those of the pastand the future. This analysis runs contrary to what is found in some other Syncategoreumata authors,like Johannes Pagus and Nicholas of Paris, who maintain that the term ‘necessarily’ does not haveampliative force. Hence the expression homo necessario est animal (‘A man is necessarily an animal’)is only true on the condition that a man exists.

A similar point is made in connection with the use of modal terms. For Peter of Spain, logicalnecessity is based upon ontological necessity, or, the necessity of propositions has its foundation inthe necessity of the things spoken about. Necessity is associated with different types of things, such asthe relationships between certain concepts (such as genera and species), and the specific things thenotions of which we come across in the different kinds of (scientific) knowledge (such asmathematical entities and their properties). His outlook on necessity is clearly revealed in his analysis

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of the inference homo necessario est animal; ergo Sortes necessario est animal (‘A man is necessarilyan animal; therefore Socrates is necessarily an animal’). In his view the inference is not valid, becausea transition is made from necessary being to a being at a certain time. For Peter then, the notion ofnecessity ultimately refers to a necessary state of affairs in reality, something that is always the case.[5]

A similar fusion of the domains of language and reality is found in Peter's account of the consecutive‘if’, which he explains as signifying causality. Like his contemporaries he looks into the question ofwhether from the impossible anything follows. In his account, the notion of ‘impossibility’ can betaken in two ways, viz. impossibility as such, or absolute impossibility, which amounts to nothing, orthe impossible state of affairs that is referred to when notions of things that do have a realityseparately but are incompatible are combined in statements. From the latter type of impossibility, suchas ‘A man is an ass’, something, but not anything can follow, e.g., ‘Therefore a man is an animal’.From impossibilities as such, e.g., ‘You know that you are a stone’, nothing can follow. Thefundamental idea is that in order to be able to have something follow, the antecedent in theconsecutive relationship must be a something (res) of some sort (see Spruyt 1993, pp. 161–193).

Bibliography

Primary Sources: Works by Peter of Spain

Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales, first critical edition from the manuscripts, with anIntroduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen: van Gorcum & Co., 1972.

Syncategoreumata, first critical edition, with an Introduction and Indexes by L.M. de Rijk, and withan English Translation by Joke Spruyt, Leiden/Köln/New York: Brill, 1992.

Summaries of Logic, Text, Translation, Introduction, & Notes, by Brian P. Copenhaver with CalvinNormore and Terence Parsons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Secondary Sources

Braakhuis, H.A.G., 1979. De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen (Volume I:Inleidende Studie; Volume II: Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parijs' Syncategoreumata), Dissertation(Department of Philosophy), Rijksuniversiteit Leiden.

Ebbesen, Sten, 2013. “Early Supposition Theory II,” Vivarium, 51: 60–78.Klima, Gyula, 2011. “Two Summulae, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of Spain's ‘Realism’ and

Buridan's ‘Nominalism’,” in Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West,500–1500, M. Cameron and J. Marenbon (eds.), Leiden/Boston: Brill, pp. 109–126.

Kneale, William and Kneale, Martha, 1978. The Development of Logic, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Kneepkens, C.H., 1987. Het iudicium constructionis. Het leerstuk van de constructio in de 2de helftvan de 12de eeuw. Een verkennende inleidende studie gevolgd door kritische uitgaven vanRobert van Parijs, Summa ‘Breve sit’ en Robert Blund, Summa in arte grammatica en door eenwerkuitgave van Petrus Hispanus (non­papa), Summa ‘Absoluta cuiuslibet’, Dissertation(Department of Philosophy), Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

de Libera, A., 1982. “The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic,” in Norman Kretzmann, AnthonyKenny and Jan Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174–187

–––, 1984. “Les Appellationes de Jean le Page,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen­âge, 51: 193–255.

Nuchelmans, Gabriel, 1988. “The Distinction actus exercitus/actus significatus in MedievalSemantics,” in Norman Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy:Studies in memory of Jan Pinborg (Synthese Historical Library. Studies and Texts in the Historyof Logic and Philosophy, Vol. 32), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 57–90.

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d'Ors, Angel, 1997. “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum,” Vivarium, 35: 21–71.–––, 2001. “Petrus Hispanus O.P, Auctor Summularum, Part II: Further documents and problems,”

Vivarium, 39: 209–254.–––, 2003. “Petrus Hispanus O.P, Auctor Summularum, Part III: ‘Petrus Alfonsi’ or ‘Petrus

Ferrandi’?,” Vivarium, 41: 249–303.Pinborg, Jan, 1972. Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick, Stuttgart­Bad Canstadt:

Fromann­Holzboog.de Rijk, L.M., 1962–67. Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic

(Vol. I: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallaciesl; Vol. II: The Origin and EarlyDevelopment of the Theory of Supposition), Assen: Van Gorcum & Co.

–––, 1968. “On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales I. General problemsconcerning possible interpolations in the manuscripts,” Vivarium, 6: 1–34.

–––, 1971. “The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Mediaeval Logic I. Natural supposition asnon­contextual supposition,” Vivarium, 9: 71–107.

–––, 1982. “The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms,” in Norman Kretzmann, AnthonyKenny and Jan Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 161–173.

–––, 1985. La philosophie au moyen­âge, Leiden/Köln/New York: Brill.Spruyt, Joke, 1989. Peter of Spain on Composition and Negation. Text, Translation, Commentary (=

Artistarium Supplementa V), Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.–––, 1993. “Thirteenth­Century Positions on the Rule ‘Ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet’,” in Klaus

Jacobi (ed.), Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen undsemantische regeln korrekten Folgerns, Leiden/Köln/New York: Brill, pp. 161–193.

–––, 1994. “Thirteenth­Century Discussions on Modal Terms,” Vivarium, 32: 196–226.–––, 2011. “The ‘Realism’ of Peter of Spain,” Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale,

36: 89–111.Tugwell, Simon O.P., 1999. “Petrus Hispanus: Comments on Some Proposed Identifications,”

Vivarium, 37: 103–113.–––, 2006. “Auctor Summularum, Petrus Hispanus OP Stellensis?” Archivum Fratrum

Praedicatorum, 76: 103–115.

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Related EntriesAristotle | Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus | Buridan, John [Jean] | medieval philosophy |sophismata [= sophisms] | terms, properties of: medieval theories of | truth

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