Peru - Justice Services Improvement Project II ...documents.worldbank.org/curated/pt/654451484074562650/... · Web view2016/12/22 · Not achieved. It is important to note that the

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR109073

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IBRD-7969)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$20 MILLION TO THE

REPUBLIC OF PERU

FOR A

JUSTICE SERVICES IMPROVEMENT PROJECT II

December 21, 2016

Governance Global PracticeLatin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2016)

Currency Unit = Peruvian Soles Nuevos (S/.)S/. 3.28 = US$1

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR Alternative Dispute ResolutionAGO Attorney General’s Office ALEGRA Free Legal Aid (Asistencia Legal Gratuita)AMAG Judicial Academy (Academia de la Magistratura) CNM National Judicial Council (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura)CPC Criminal Procedure CodeCPS Country Partnership StrategyMINJUS Ministry of Justice NCPC New Criminal Procedural Code FM Financial ManagementICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportIDB Inter-American Development BankIFI International Financial InstitutionIML Legal Medicine Institute (Instituto de Medicina Legal)M&E Monitoring and EvaluationMIS Management Information SystemOCMA Judiciary’s Anti-Corruption Office (Oficina de Control de la Magistratura)ODECMA Judiciary’s Deconcentrated Anti-Corruption Office (Oficina Desconcentrada de

Control de la Magistratura)PAD Project Appraisal DocumentPCU Project Coordination UnitPDO Project Development ObjectivePIU Project Implementation Unit SC Steering Committee TTL Task Team Leader

Senior Global Practice Director:Deborah L. WetzelPractice Manager:Arturo Herrera

Project Team Leader:Jorge Luis SilvaICR Team Leader:

ICR Main Authors: Ruxandra BurdescuRuxandra Burdescu, Pablo Andres Guzman Camilo Avila

Table of ContentsA. Basic Information...................................................................................................................................i

B. Key Dates............................................................................................................................................... i

C. Ratings Summary................................................................................................................................... i

D. Sector and Theme Codes......................................................................................................................ii

E. Bank Staff.............................................................................................................................................. ii

F. Results Framework Analysis.................................................................................................................ii

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs...............................................................................................v

H. Restructuring (if any)...........................................................................................................................vi

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design.........................................................................1

1.1 Context at Appraisal............................................................................................................................1

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved).........................3

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification...................................................................................................................................3

1.4 Main Beneficiaries...............................................................................................................................4

1.5 Original Components (as approved)....................................................................................................4

1.6 Revised Components...........................................................................................................................5

1.7 Other significant changes.....................................................................................................................5

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes........................................................................5

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry...............................................................................5

2.2 Implementation (including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)...................................................................................................6

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization....................................8

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable).........8

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase (including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable).........9

3. Assessment of Outcomes..........................................................................................................................9

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)....................................................................................................................9

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in annex 2).......................................................11

3.3 Efficiency (Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, for example, unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return).......................................................13

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency).................................................................................................................................................14

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above)........................................................................................................................14

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops (optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes).......................................................................................16

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.....................................................................................16

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance...............................................................................16

5.1 Bank Performance..............................................................................................................................16

5.2 Borrower Performance.......................................................................................................................17

6. Lessons Learned.....................................................................................................................................19

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners..................................20

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.....................................................................................................22

Annex 2. Outputs by Component.............................................................................................................23

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis.............................................................................................39

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes....................................40

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results.......................................................................................................42

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)...............................................................43

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR............................................44

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders..............................................45

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents..................................................................................................46

Annex 10. Perception of the Judiciary.....................................................................................................47

A. Basic Information

Country: Peru Project Name: Justice Services Improvement Project II

Project ID: P110752 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-79690ICR Date: 12/31/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: Technical Assistance Loan (TAL) Borrower: Republic of Peru

Original Total Commitment: US$20.00 million Disbursed Amount: US$20.00 million

Revised Amount: US$20.00 millionEnvironmental Category: CImplementing Agencies: Judiciary, Ministry of Justice, Judicial Academy, Attorney General’s Office, National Judicial CouncilCofinanciers and Other External Partners: NoneB. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised/Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/29/2008 Effectiveness: 03/14/2011 01/24/2011

Appraisal: 03/08/2010 Restructuring(s): 08/20/201512/11/2015

08/20/201512/11/2015

Approval: 11/18/2010 Mid-term Review: 06/03/2013 10/14/2013 Closing: 09/30/2015 06/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower RatingsQuality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of Supervision

(QSA): None

DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 100 100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Administrative and civil service reform 35 35 Managing for development results 45 45 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 10 10 e-Government 10 10

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Alberto Rodriguez Carlos Felipe Jaramillo Practice Manager/Manager: Arturo Herrera Gutierrez Veronica E. Zavala Lombardi Project Team Leader: Jorge Luis Silva Lisa L. Bhansali ICR Team Leader: Ruxandra Burdescu

ICR Primary Author: Ruxandra Burdescu, Pablo Andres Guzman, Camilo Avila

F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)The project development objective of the Justice Services Improvement Project II is to improve the quality of service delivery by the participating institutions and to enhance access to justice with a focus on citizens’ needs for justice services.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)During implementation of the project, no changes were made to the PDO.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Reduction in time/speed of trial (from beginning to end of trial process)Value (quantitative or 486 days 243 days 479 days

qualitative) Date achieved 12/7/2012 9/30/2015 06/30/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Not achieved. It is important to note that the result of this indicator was deeply affected by the Executive Branch’s decision to postpone the implementation of the New Criminal Procedural Code in Lima and Callao regions, which was outside the control of the counterparts in the Judiciary.

Indicator 2: Increase in number of consultations in legal aid centers administered by the Ministry of Justice

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

100,000 consultations 250,000 consultations

251,191 consultations

Date achieved 02/09/2011 9/30/2015 10/31/2016


Overachieved. By June 30, 2017, one year after project closing, the cumulative number of consultations in Free Legal Aid (Asistencia Legal Gratuita, ALEGRA) centers are projected to be at 370,800 consultations based on the implementation completion and results report (ICR) team’s trend analysis.

Indicator 3: For Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) activities, number of cases in which alternative sentencing options are applied


0 cases 27,758 cases Dropped

Date achieved 02/09/2011 9/30/2015 08/20/2015 06/30/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

Dropped as part of the first restructuring. However, it achieved 23,973 cases in December 2014, which accounted for nearly 80% of the target.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of courts and prosecutors’ offices providing information to district MISValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 5 5

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 06/30/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

Achieved. Currently, five courts and prosecutors’ offices provide information to the management information system (MIS).

Indicator 2: Reduction in the average number of days required in criminal justice processes in the 3 judicial districts with project intervention


835 days 209 days Dropped

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 08/20/2015 06/30/2016


Indicator was dropped. However, at the time it was dropped, the average number of days required for the processing of criminal cases reached 479 days, which represented 67% of progress toward the achievement of the target.

Indicator 3: Number of judicial districts with administrative staff trained in results-based management


10 29 31


Over-achieved. By the project closing date, 31 district courts in Peru had administrative staff trained in results-based management.

Indicator 4: Reduction of time taken by the IML to deliver expert technical opinionsValue (quantitative or qualitative)

20 days 1 day 45 days

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 06/30/2016


Worsened from baseline. By the project closing date, the Legal Medicine Institute (Instituto de Medicina Legal, IML) took an average of 45 days to issue technical opinions.

Indicator 5: New standards developed for evaluation of judges and prosecutorsValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 1 1

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 06/30/2016


Achieved. By the project closing, the National Judicial Council (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, CNM) had developed a standardized guideline for the evaluation of judges and prosecutors, which is currently in effect.

Indicator 6: Increase in percentage of judges and prosecutors evaluated by the new standardsValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0% 100% 100%


Achieved. By the project closing date 100% of judges and prosecutors were evaluated according to the parameters set in the Judicial Career Law.

Indicator 7: Number of lecture hours per participant and increase in number of participants trained according to their jurisdictional specialization


23 hours 35 hours 44 hours

Date achieved 12/7/2012 9/30/2015 06/30/2016


Over-achieved. The Magistrate Academy has implemented an e-learning platform to support specialized training programs. By the project closing date, these programs reported an average of 44 lecture hours, surpassing the target by 25%.

Indicator 8: Increase in the percentage of cases resolved through ADR mechanisms in the participating judicial districts


7,663 cases 50% increase51% increase

(3,957 additional cases)


Achieved. According to data from the Ministry of Justice, the number of cases resolved through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms increased by nearly 51%

by the end of the project with respect to the baseline of 7,663 cases established in December 2012.

Indicator 9: Increased number of ALEGRAs refurbished in peri-urban and rural areasValue (quantitative or qualitative)

25 49 49

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 06/30/2016Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. By the end of the project, 49 ALEGRA centers were established nationwide.

Indicator 10: Reduction in response time by OCMA to complaints filedValue (quantitative or qualitative)

21 months 10 months 10 months

Date achieved 12/7/2012 9/30/2015 06/30/2016


Achieved. According to data compiled by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), OCMA had an average response time of 10 months to the corruption complaints filed and accepted.

Indicator 11: 15 percentage point increase in the index of accessibility to information through the Internet (average of the 5 participating institutions)


70% 85% 87%


Over-achieved. According to data compiled by the PIU, the average Internet accessibility of the five participating institutions reached 87% at the end of the project.

Indicator 12: Percentage of core staff of the PIU, including procurement specialist, treasurer, accountant and project manager, recruited and in place


0% 100% 100%

Date achieved 01/24/2011 9/30/2015 06/30/2016


Achieved. The project core positions in the PIU were filled since the early stages of the project, and it comprised the core personnel of the first justice services improvement operation, which assured continuity.

Indicator 13: Annual project reports producedValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 4 5


Achieved. At project closure, the PIU had produced both annual and partial reports on a six-month basis.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements

(US$, millions)1 02/23/2011 Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 0.002 05/31/2011 Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 0.00

3 11/27/2011 Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 0.504 06/25/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.865 01/22/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.366 09/18/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.667 05/26/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.388 01/16/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.449 07/08/2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.8010 03/01/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 18.6711 06/29/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.00

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$, millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

08/20/2015 N S S 16.80

Extension of the closing date, reallocation and revision of the results framework to drop indicators related to the implementation of the new criminal procedural code in the Northern Lima districts.

12/11/2015 N S S 18.32

Extension of the closing date and reallocation of loan proceeds to take advantage of savings as a result of the depreciation of the Peruvian soles nuevos in relation to the U.S. dollar.

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Country and sector background.

2. In 2006 Legislature approved a new criminal procedural code (NCPC), which started being gradually introduced in courts between 2008 and 2010. The NCPC represented a major shift in the procedural arena and sought to speed up processing times and expand the prosecutors’ role in criminal procedures. As for the challenges faced by the Justice Sector, modern court management models were developed but only implemented in 10 out of 29 judicial districts under the previous project.

3. Another challenge for the Justice Sector in Peru was weak technical and professional development of the staff from both the Judiciary Branch and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). The latter had formal authority to fill vacant seats from the National Judicial Council (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura, CNM), which is the institution charged with the appointment of judges and prosecutors. However, no objective selection criteria were in place, and there was no clear system for performance evaluation, training, and removal of staff. Additionally, coordination between the services provided by different Justice Sector entities continued to be limited, although it was crucial for the successful implementation of the NCPC, which required specialized training for both prosecutors and judges and a merit-based selection process.

4. On the other hand, even though the main institutions of the Justice Sector need to interact and coordinate their work closely, this was not always the case. For example, the Judiciary, the Judicial Academy (Academia de la Magistratura, AMAG), and the CNM did not consider the process of selection, training, and evaluation of judges in its entirety, rather as individual steps with little or no connection to each other.At appraisal, the main challenges being faced by the Justice Sector were: (a) corruption and lack of transparency; (b) access to justice; (c) poor technical and professional development of the officers from participating institutions; and (d) coordination between Justice Sector institutions (continuation of the efforts initiated under the first project).

5. Rational for World Bank assistance. The previous phase of the project aimed to reengage in the Justice Sector in the aftermath of an authoritarian government. The project development objective was to set the foundation for a long term, participatory and sustainable reform process for Peru´s justice sector. Building on this, the second phase was designed to support the Government’s comprehensive modernization strategy in a context in which institutions were strengthening their newly found independence. In this new environment, aligned with regional trends, Peru began the implementation of oral proceedings. At appraisal, the main objective of the authorities was to ensure the effective implementation of the NCPC, which was formally passed by Congress in 2006 and whose implementation began in 2008. At the same time, procedural changes were still being introduced and the reform was in a very early stage. Given this new context, the project added a new beneficiary institution—the AGO.1 The

1 The AGO is the institution in charge of the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity and the interests of society. The general attorney is elected by a committee of seven attorneys elected by the CNM for a period of three

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AGO, the Judiciary, Ministry of Justice (MINJUS),2 CNM,3 and the AMAG,4 were the five key institutions, which requested the World Bank’s support with technical assistance and knowledge sharing. Building on the institutional arrangements established under the previous project, the Steering Committee (SC) was continued with the addition of the AGO and represented an important platform to foster collaboration, dialogue, and lead initiatives with a broad and interconnected scope. Nevertheless, while the project included the main institutions of the Justice Sector, the Judiciary was the main beneficiary of the project.5

years. The AGO is related to other institutions of the Justice Sector given that it is part of criminal cases (Judiciary), for training purposes (AMAG), and for appointment and removal of attorneys issues (CNM), as well as high-level public policy discussions (MINJUS).2 The MINJUS, which is part of the Executive Branch, is the institution in charge of promoting the human rights protection and access to justice (with an inclusive and trustworthy emphasize). Its main scope centers on defending the interests of the vulnerable population, as well as proposing legislative changes and defending the legal interests of the state. These objectives are met through a public defense system for vulnerable population (Defensores Públicos), representing public institutions in claims against them (through solicitors or procuradores), and providing free legal and social aid services to citizens. Based on its functions, the MINJUS interacts with other sector institutions to define the public policy related to the justice system, as well as define strategies in the interventions before courts (both with the Judiciary, for claims against public institutions and criminal cases, and the AGO for criminal cases). Given that the minister is appointed and removed by the president, it has no specific election period.3 CNM is the entity in charge of selecting and appointing and removing judges and prosecutors, through independent decisions of its board (comprised by one representative of the Supreme Court, one of the Board of Prosecutors, one from the presidents of public universities, one from the presidents of the private universities, and two representatives of other professional associations). Its president is elected among the board members for a period of one year. Based on its functions, its main relationship with other Justice Sector institutions is with the Judiciary, AGO, and AMAG.4 AMAG is in charge of training appointed judges and prosecutors, as well as auxiliaries of justice. Given that, as part of the promotion procedures, all judges and prosecutors must approve the specialized training designed for this purpose, AMAG has a close interaction with the AGO and the Judiciary. Its decisions are taken by a Board of Directors which include two Supreme Court judges, two Supreme Court prosecutors, a representative of the CNM, and its general director.5 The Judiciary is the institution in charge of administering justice in Peru through its jurisdictional organs (Supreme Court, high courts, first stage courts, and Justice of Peace courts). Its president, elected every two years by the other chief justices, is the President of the Supreme Court and the Executive Council of the Judiciary, which is the organ in charge of taking the main managerial decisions of the Judiciary. It has 32 judicial districts, each with a Superior Court/Tribunal, and chaired by a superior judge/magistrate, who is also elected as President of the Court for a period of two years. The Judiciary has its own anticorruption unit (OCMA). As the main institution in charge of administering justice in the country, the Judiciary has to discuss with other Justice Sector institutions’ policies related to access to justice (with the MINJUS), training and selection of judges (the AMAG and CNM, respectively), and parties involved in claims before the Judiciary (such as public defenders and solicitors, which are part of the MINJUS, or prosecutors, who depend on the AGO).

2

Figure 1. Peru’s Justice Administration System

Justice Services Improvement

II Project

Source: Own elaboration

6. The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the 2007–2011 period (Report No. 37913-PE) identified the modernization of state institutions as one of its key pillars, recognizing a special focus set on improving justice and reducing corruption in a context where the Government was centering its efforts in the modernization and service delivery in the Justice Sector. In this context, improving access to justice (understood both as having the possibility of presenting your claims before a competent authority as well as a timely process) was one of the main priorities of the Government. In particular, the Ministry of Economy and Finance requested the World Bank’s support to (a) scale up activities from the first project (which implemented model court management models only in 10 of the 29 judicial districts); (b) support the implementation of the NCPC; (c) continue efforts in the improvement of the training and management spheres; and (d) strengthen access to justice.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

7. The original PDO as stated in the Loan Agreement is to improve the quality of service delivery by the participating institutions and to enhance access to justice with a focus on citizens’ needs for justice services. The key indicators chosen to measure the achievement of the PDO were defined as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Project Development Objective Indicators s

PDO Indicators Target Values

Reduction in time/speed of trial (from beginning to end of trial process) 243 days

Increase in number of consultations in legal aid centers administered by the Ministry of Justice 250,000 cases

For Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) activities, number of cases in which alternative sentencing options are applied 27,758 cases

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

8. During implementation of the project, no changes were made to the PDO. However, a level 2 restructuring was approved in August 2015 as a result of the Government’s decision to

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postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area that entailed a revision of the Results Framework. Specifically, two indicators were dropped:6 (a) the PDO-level indicator related to the number of cases in which alternative sentencing options were applied for CPC activities; and (b) the intermediate results-level indicator related to the reduction in the average number of days required in criminal justice processes in the three judicial districts where the project intervened.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

9. The project’s participating institutions are the direct beneficiaries of the project. These are: the Judiciary, the CNM, the AMAG, the MINJUS, and the AGO. However, in addition to the direct beneficiaries mentioned above, it is important to note that the ultimate beneficiaries of the project activities were the users of the justice services provided by the participant organizations. For example, in the case of the Free Legal Aid (Asistencia Legal Gratuita, ALEGRA) centers, these included highly vulnerable segments of the population with high poverty levels and low educational levels, and provided service to the indigenous population who greatly benefited from alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms and enhanced support throughout the legal proceedings and who faced significant challenges in the access to legal services to resolve social or economic disputes.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

10. According to the Loan Agreement dated December 14, 2010, the original project components were as described in the following paragraphs.

11. Improved Justice Services Delivery. Overall, this component sought to strengthen: (a) the strategic planning and managerial capabilities of beneficiary institutions; (b) the operational capabilities of participating institutions; and (c) the capacity of the beneficiaries to implement the NCPC. Activities under this component were to include the application of case management procedures and the improvement of planning and budget management capacity, as well as the design and implementation of mechanisms for the coordination of administrative and jurisdictional functions, including monitoring and performance-based management. Among others, the activities also included the design and implementation of a case filing system for the Judiciary and electronic consultation kiosks for the Judiciary and the AGO.

12. Improved Human Resources Management Capacity. This component had the objective of strengthening the managerial capabilities of the beneficiary institutions. Activities included: (a) the design and implementation of professional development plans for personnel of the Judiciary; (b) human resources planning and management models for participating institutions; (c) support of the institutional capabilities of the CNM including the design and implementation of a system to evaluate judges’ and prosecutors’ performance; (d) the development of human resources administrative rules and procedures for the CNM; and (e) support for the development and implementation of integrated judicial training programs in the AMAG.

6 The indicators were dropped due to the decision of the Government to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in Lima and Callao until 2017 as reflected in the Decreto Supremo No. 003-2014-JUS.

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13. Enhanced Transparency and Access to Justice. The objective of this component was to strengthen the transparency and anticorruption efforts of the participating institutions and promote an equitable delivery of justice services for the poor. Activities under this component included: (a) the support of the disciplinary capacity of the Judiciary; and (b) support of OCMA in the development of managerial tools to improve he Judiciary’s efficiency and transparency, as well as the development of OCMA’s communication strategy. In addition, the component was expected to support the creation of a new ALEGRA center administered by the MINJUS, as well as the design and implementation of user-centered service delivery strategies and mechanisms.

14. Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation. This component sought to support the administration of the project, while at the same time strengthening the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) capabilities with regard to procurement, financial management (FM), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capabilities. Moreover, it also had the objective of strengthening the management, and M&E capabilities of the participating institutions to ensure the implementation of the project activities.

1.6 Revised Components

15. No revisions to project components were made during implementation.

1.7 Other significant changes

16. The project underwent two level 2 restructurings during implementation. The first restructuring was approved in August 2015 and was triggered by the Government’s decision to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area. The request also included a reallocation of funds from the implementation of activities linked to the implementation of the NCPC to boost other ongoing activities such as the electronic filing system and the e-notification system developed for the Judiciary Branch. In addition, the restructuring included a Government request to extend the project closing date from September 30 to December 30, 2015 to ensure the completion of the electronic filing system and e-notification system. This first restructuring resulted in the implementation of the e-notification system, as well as the e-filing system in the Northern Lima High District Court.

17. A second level 2 project restructuring was approved in December 2015 as a response to the Government’s request to extend the closing date for six additional months until June 30, 2016. The rationale for the request was based on windfall savings as a result of the depreciation of the Peruvian sol nuevo with respect to the U.S. dollar, which generated unused balances of up to US$300,000, to support the refurbishment and equipment of ALEGRA centers on sites identified and provided by municipal governments, particularly in highly vulnerable areas, and increase access to justice. The second restructuring resulted in the completion of one additional ALEGRA center.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

18. Project preparation. Overall, the project design and quality at entry is deemed Modest. The key elements of project preparation are described in the lessons learned during the previous

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justice project. As a follow-up operation, this second project benefited during the design stage from the analytical work and reforms advanced by the previous project as discussed in the following paragraphs.

19. Assessment of project design and quality at entry. The project was designed to enhance quality of and increase access to justice services, and scale up successful initiatives supported in the previous project, such as the ALEGRA centers, which were administered by the MINJUS. The project focused on improving the swiftness of justice services by supporting the implementation of the NCPC and improving case management in courts. Particular emphasis was laid on improving performance by continuing efforts to professionalize human resource management and enhancing access to justice at the national level. Enhancing speed and increasing attention to users focused on three judicial districts (Lima, Northern Lima, and Callao) that accounted for between 70 percent and 80 percent of the total case workload of the Peruvian Justice Administration System. The geographical focus was expected to maximize the impact of the project results and the participating districts were selected based on their significant weight with regard to case workload and demographic features.

20. With respect to the NCPC, project design considered the importance of well-designed communications strategies as part of the activities, to support the paradigm shift from judicial proceedings to oral procedures. However, project design proved to be too ambitious regarding the implementation of the NCPC, as the implementation was postponed in the Lima Metropolitan Area through a decision by the Executive Branch due to financial constraints in 2014. The risk of a potential postponement of the NCPC implementation was also not identified at project design, given the Government’s demonstrated commitment to this reform at entry and, as such, no mitigation measures were established, which could partially explain the inability to manage the crisis when it happened.

21. In addition, the project design kept in place the strong interinstitutional coordination mechanisms between the Justice Sector institutions, which were consolidated by the first Justice Services Improvement Project (P073438), and expanded them to include the AGO. These mechanisms were reflected in the establishment of the project SC. Moreover, with regard to the operational design, the PIU core team remained in place, and this proved to be critical to ensure timeliness in project implementation and smooth procurement and FM processes. In this regard, a key lesson learned was the importance of having an effective project coordinator in the PIU, a professional with a solid track record in leadership positions with different public agencies. This allowed smooth coordination among different project agencies and with external actors and facilitated the implementation of activities.

22. Finally, the Results Framework could have benefited from a review of the intermediate indicators to better reflect the impact of several activities executed. Likewise, additional efforts could have been made to collect baseline and target data for results indicators during the preparation stage. In this regard, while limited availability of reliable statistics for measuring the improvements was identified as a risk at appraisal, the implementation of mitigation measures were delayed and failed to sufficiently inform decision making.

2.2 Implementation (including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)

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23. The Government’s commitment and that of the executing institutions within the Judicial Branch was strong at the time of the project preparation and remained as such during project execution. Nevertheless, a tight budget restriction for the Government of Peru led the Executive Branch in 2014 to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area, considerably affecting the achievement of a key PDO indicator. The delayed rollout of the NCPC led to a restructuring of the project Results Framework of both the PDO and intermediate results indicators7. At the PDO level, this restructuring implied that the indicator related to the number of cases in which alternative sentencing options are applied could no longer be achieved before the then project closing date of December 2015. Also, the intermediate results indicator related to the average number of days required in criminal justice processes in the Lima Metropolitan Area had to be dropped to reflect new implementation arrangements by the authorities. Moreover, it turned out that due to the NCPC postponement, the other PDO-level indicator on reduction in time/speed of trial was also compromised, rendering its target value unachievable. However, this impact was missed in the restructuring.

24. The risk of delayed NCPC implementation was not identified in the project appraisal document (PAD) and while it envisioned greater coordination with executing agencies and the Ministry of Finance in particular, this was focused on ensuring the adequate flow of counterpart resources for the project. As a specific mitigation action, the PIU organized several training workshops to help pave the way for the implementation of the NCPC at a later date. In this regard, according to surveys carried out as part of the Project Impact Evaluation commissioned by the PIU to Consorcio Macroconsult & Instituto Cuanto, one of the main reasons behind the current negative perception in the sector is related to case processing delays, related to the freeze in the NCPC implementation. In addition, this report measured the processing time for 483 cases and found that the response time was on average well above the norms, generating unreasonable costs for the users, which particularly and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable.

25. An additional bottleneck during implementation was related to the difficulty by municipal governments to provide physical space for the ALEGRA centers, which caused delays but did not affect meeting the targets. These bottlenecks are not unusual for a project of this complexity, when analyzing data across similar projects, which involve infrastructure components. To address this challenge, the MINJUS acted promptly, by either directly providing physical space or leasing it. This facilitated the completion of the activities envisioned, resulting in 49 fully operational centers across the country. The MINJUS absorbed the costs associated with this measure into its current budget to ensure sustainability of the reforms. This was the basis for the creation of the so-called mega-ALEGRA centers in Lima and Arequipa. In this regard, the extension of the project closing date until June 2016 allowed the MINJUS to complete the procurement of equipment and refurbishment of one additional center since December 2015. Financing for this center was covered as a result of unforeseen savings resulting from the depreciation of the Peruvian sol nuevo in relation to the U.S. dollar.

26. The indicator referring to the reduction of time taken by the Legal Medicine Institute (Instituto de Medicina Legal, IML) to deliver expert technical opinion was not achieved. This

7 The delay was the result of the Government’s decision to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima and Callao regions until 2017 as per Decreto Supremo No. 003-2014-JUS

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was because the AGO focused on strengthening the environmental forensics laboratory, rather than core IML capacity. The change is focus was part of a shift in the priorities of authorities.

27. On the other hand, the PAD identified as a potential risk the fact that reforms in the Justice Sector are frequently subject to political debate, especially in the context of electoral dynamics. While this risk can be generalized for the situation in most countries, the project specific mitigation measures were effective. The operation, following the lessons learned in the previous project, continued the practice of the SC and expanded its membership to the AGO. In addition, a few challenges remained in defining the scope of activities, as a result of turnover in key leadership positions. This led to delays in implementation, particularly in the case of the electronic filing system and some discrepancies in the scope of activities. Nevertheless the establishment of the project SC was successful in maintaining the project’s high-level policy priorities and mitigate this risk. Moreover, a well-functioning PIU and a flexible implementation mechanism facilitated smooth implementation for activities within its control.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

28. Overall, M&E design is deemed Modest. With respect to M&E, the PAD identified the need for continued attention to M&E and highlighted the limited availability of reliable statistics for measuring improvements as a potential risk. While baseline and target information for some indicators was gathered under the first operation, some target and baseline values were not defined at appraisal and were only gathered by consultants hired under the project in 2012. It was envisioned that the indicators would be measured through periodic surveys and annual reports. In this regard, while the achievement of the indicators was properly documented through periodic internal reports presented to the World Bank, some inconsistencies were reflected in the implementation status and results reports; for example, regarding the measurement of target values for the intermediate level indicators linked to the reduction of time taken by the IML to issue technical opinions and the cases resolved through ADR mechanisms.

29. Moreover, while most of the indicators chosen were clearly linked to the objectives, the Results Framework would have benefited from a comprehensive revision during project restructurings to better reflect the impact of activities and the evolving situation on the ground. In this respect, M&E implementation and utilization can be considered as modest. Although the PIU established a mechanism for the collection of the information and some additional impact indicators to measure performance were established in the Project Operations Manual prepared by the PIU—which appear to have informed the Government to plan the implementation of activities and identify bottlenecks—these indicators were not formally included as part of the project restructurings and were measured in parallel by the PIU.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance (focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)

30. With regard to safeguards, no issues occurred during implementation. The project is classified as a category C operation, as was the case with the first World Bank-supported justice operation, due to minor civil works as part of the refurbishment of ALEGRA centers. It triggered the safeguard policy related to environmental assessment (OP/BP 4.01), requiring contractors to

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observe environmental standards when the rehabilitation of the offices was conducted. These standards were reflected in the contracts of civil works procured by the project.

31. As for the fiduciary arrangements, both procurement and FM responsibilities were in the hands of the PIU housed in the Judiciary, which retained its core equipment since the previous operation. In addition, the project’s FM and procurement performance have been consistently rated as Satisfactory based on the FM supervision carried out during the project lifetime. This provided reasonable assurance that the loan proceeds were used for the intended purposes, with an appropriate level of transparency. Moreover, the legal covenants related to FM were met, including the timely submission of interim financial reports and annual financial audits. All interim financial reports were considered acceptable to the World Bank. Regarding the external financial audit for 2015, the World Bank requested clarifications and corrections to this report and the project resubmitted the audit report in a satisfactory manner to the World Bank.

32. In the case of procurement, the PIU performance was consistently rated as Satisfactory during project implementation. Throughout the life of the project, there have been no major issues and the risk assessment of the PIU’s procurement capacity performed at entry was deemed to be moderate. Moreover, after the completion of the first operation, the PIU core team was well-versed in the World Bank’s policies and submitted the necessary information and supporting documentation to no-objection requests. With regard to the procurement of the software developer for the electronic filing system, the project encountered challenges regarding the management of the contract, due to discrepancies between the developer and the Judiciary regarding the scope and costing of the contract.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase (including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable)

33. Current discussions between the newly elected authorities and the World Bank indicate that there is interest to prepare a new operation to expand the implementation of the electronic file and e-notification systems to district courts beyond the area targeted by the project. Moreover, judicial reform appears to be a key area of interest for the Government as part of the president’s governance and anticorruption agenda and will likely be included in the new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY17-FY21, currently under preparation. On the other hand, to credibly address the low levels of trust by citizens, boosting the implementation of the NCPC will be key to reduce delays and cut excessive costs. In addition, ongoing reforms which tackle the economic, gender, linguistic, and cultural barriers through improved legal aid services and enhanced coordination between key agencies are critical and need to be institutionalized.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation (to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)Rating: Substantial

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34. The project objectives and design remained consistent with the Government priorities and the World Bank CPS for the 2007–2011 period (Report No.37913-PE), as well as with the CPS for the FY12–16 period (Report No. 66187-PE). Likewise, based on preliminary consultations, the project is aligned with the priorities considered to be included in the new Country Partnership Framework that is under preparation. At appraisal, the CPS explicitly recognized the need to improve the justice system in Peru, tackle corruption, and improve service delivery within the modernization of the State pillar. On the other hand, the FY12–16 CPS highlighted the support for the creation of an institutional framework that enhances mechanisms for better access to basic services. This emphasis was reflected on Results Area 1.3, which is devoted to improve the quality of justice services.

35. The project was also in line with the Government’s and the Judiciary’s efforts to address the challenge of increasing access to justice and improve service delivery. It was hoped that this would improve the perception of the users who have low confidence in the justice system, which they still perceive as corrupt and inefficient. While the Government and the Judiciary continue to address these challenges, the project contributed through its support to OCMA to increase transparency through the standardization of the complaints system and the design of a communication strategy of the services provided by the MINJUS.

36. In addition, the project activities that focused on the improvement of the justice service delivery had a positive impact on public perception in the target districts. According to an assessment performed by Consorcio Macroconsult & Instituto Cuanto as part of the project’s impact evaluation, a series of surveys was carried out to measure the perception of citizens regarding Peru’s Justice Administration System (details are attached in annex 5 of this Implementation Completion and Results Report [ICR]). Overall, the results of these survey suggest that while there was a modest improvement in the user satisfaction level over the last four years, it remains low. Indeed, user satisfaction ranges from 14 percent in the case of the Judiciary to 38 percent in the case of the MINJUS, and show only a slight improvement compared to the baseline, which hits levels of only 10 percent and up to 27 percent. However, when comparing the performance of the project beneficiary districts to the rest of the country, while overall satisfaction levels are still low, the improvements in the perception were evident and considerable. This is particularly the case of the MINJUS and the conciliation centers implemented within the ALEGRA centers.

Figure 2. Approval Rates of Government Branches

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Source: Consorcio Macroconsult - Instituto Cuanto. “Evaluación de los Resultados de la Segunda Etapa del Proyecto de Mejoramiento de los Servicios de Justicia” (2016).

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives (including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in annex 2)Rating: Substantial

37. The overall rating for the achievement of the PDO is Substantial. Overall progress toward the achievement of the project is deemed to be modest for one part of the PDO (quality of service delivery) and high for the second part (access to justice). The target value for the PDO-level indicator with respect to enhancing access to justice was overachieved. On the other hand, the target value of the remaining PDO-level indicator for quality of service was not achieved. With respect to the remaining intermediate outcome level indicators, most of which refer to the quality of service delivery, all but one (that is, IML delivery of technical opinion) have been either achieved or overachieved. As explained in previous sections, the achievement of the quality of service part of the PDO was affected by the Government’s decision to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area that led to the elimination of a PDO results indicator and one other intermediate level indicator, and negatively affected the achievement of the indicator related to the reduction in time of trials. A Results Framework table related to the PDO is included in annex 2 and some more details on results are included in box 1.

38. In terms of improving the quality of services, the project is rated as modest. The achievement of this objective was positively influenced through the successful implementation of the e-filing and electronic notification systems that translated into quicker and more secure processes since consultation of case files and judicial resolutions was virtual, saving time by eliminating the need for attorneys, judges, and prosecutors to request the physical file, and reducing the risk of loss or document tampering. In addition, in the case of the AMAG, the project successfully supported the development of a training program for magistrates and prosecutors, mandatory for promotions under the judicial career framework. The consolidation of the AMAG’s training programs for judges and prosecutors raised the technical capacity of legal service providers as evidenced by the increase in the number of average lecture hours per participant from 23 in 2011 to 44 hours in 2015. All the judges and prosecutors are evaluated according to the parameters set in the Judicial Career Law. Furthermore, the implementation of the online training platform allowed to increase the reach, as evidenced by the increase in the number of judges and prosecutors trained from 682 in 2011 to 4,798 by December 2015. The AMAG also developed guidelines for the implementation of a new labor procedural code to facilitate field work and has enhanced access to training courses through the development of an online training platform available nationwide. Additionally, the management of academic records (assistance, grades, payments, and support documentation) has been fully automatized through an Integrated Academic Management System, resulting in considerable time savings across AMAG processes.

39. Activities implemented by the CNM also allowed to improve the quality of services through the implementation of live video streaming of selection interviews and public hearings, which enhanced transparency throughout the process through live video streaming of hearings and facilitated the reporting of alleged corruption cases. Likewise, the project supported the strengthening of the Judiciary Control Office (OCMA) through the implementation of a call center and a web-based platform for the reception of complaints.

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40. Likewise, project activities with the Attorney General´s Office (AGO), supported the documentation and redesign of prosecution processes, as well as processes for the management of legal medicine and forensic evidence to align them with the NCPC. The AGO developed guidelines for the implementation of the NCPC targeting judges, public defense lawyers, and the National Police. In addition, the project provided an architecture design for the integration of the current AGO information systems with a service-oriented approach that collects citizen feedback. Finally, the information provided by the Crime Observatory resulted in the mapping and identification of 193 high crime incidents in the country, and the establishment of district coordination networks, including the judicial authorities, the National Police, and local governments to strengthen crime prevention.

41. Through the Ministry of Justice, despite the postponement in the implementation of the NCPC, the project supported the improvement of the quality of services through the development of a strategic plan for the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area, as well as 16 interinstitutional protocols aimed at consolidating and standardizing the implementation of the NCPC nationwide. Moreover, optimized processes for the provision of ADR methods were designed by the MINJUS with project support, including the provision of training for conciliators and the development of a web-based management system to follow up and systematize the ADR process (notifications, complaints, sanctions, and so on). In addition, the project supported the implementation of consultation modules for the Legal Information System, where citizens can access the current legal framework.

42. Finally, the Judiciary, with project support, identified the 10 types of cases that represented the highest workload in the Peru Justice Administration System, and developed proposals to simplify procedures to boost justice services delivery. For example, in the case of the provision of food supplies as part of family and child custody disputes, the average response time was reduced from 152 days to 77 days in the Ica District Court. Moreover, OCMA’s files were digitalized, leading to savings of over 60 percent in office supplies expenses and an average of 72 hours waiting time for the issuance of notifications and beginning of the claim processing in Lima (from a baseline of 6 days), and 10 days in the provinces (from a baseline of 20 days)8.* Furthermore, the digitalization allowed to reduce by 20 percent the time spent on misconduct and corruption investigations, and cut by 30 percent the time for the issuance of disciplinary measures. Furthermore, the Judiciary acquired a queue management system that was implemented in the judicial district courts, organizing the reception of case files and timing response times9.

43. Regarding the enhancing of access to justice, the ICR deems the achievements of the Project as high. This is particularly due to the successful expansion of the ALEGRA centers operated by MINJUS that facilitated the provision of free legal services across the country,

8 Estimations according to the Institutional Memoire report of the Judiciary covering the 2011–2015 period.9 For example, in the case of the Northern Lima District Court, waiting times were reduced from an average of 55 minutes to nearly 8 minutes. In addition, an internal management system was implemented in the Junín Judicial District, to improve workload allocation. This resulted in an average 10 month reduction in judicial processes and an 18 percent staff efficiency increase.

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expanding the ability of the Justice Sector to reach more beneficiaries, attending over 251,191 consultations by October 2016 compared to the 100,000 in 2011.

44. In addition, the Judiciary implemented a case follow-up and consultation system through service modules that allow inmates to consult and follow the status of their cases, and participate remotely from hearings through videoconference. For example, in the case of the La Merced prison, currently nearly 70 percent of the inmate population use the system, and yearly savings of approximately S/. 11,000 have been achieved in transportation costs. Moreover, the launching of the judicial electronic file system by the Judiciary facilitated the 24/7 consultation of files online and allowed to archive an average of 4,000 files on a single compact disc.

45. As for the e-filing system, it strengthened transparency and traceability in the processing of judicial files, and enhanced access to judicial information in a secure way. In addition, it reduced processing times as it allowed simultaneous consultation of files by different institutions of the Peruvian Justice Administration System, and consolidate all the case-relevant information in a single file. Implementation of the e-filing system are estimated to generate savings worth S/. 12 million (approximately US$3.6 million) according to the Judiciary Project Memoir. Likewise, as for the electronic notification system, it allowed an estimated 80 percent reduction time in the processing of notifications, which amounts to projected savings of nearly S/. 18 million per year to the Judiciary (approximately US$5.4 million) according to the Judiciary Project Memoir.

3.3 Efficiency (Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, for example, unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return)Rating: Substantial

46. Considering that this was a technical assistance project devoted to enhancing the quality and access to justice services, measuring the exact economic and financial rates of return is difficult. Regarding the financial impact, no specific fiscal impact was expected at appraisal since no substantial salary increases were envisioned. In addition, incentives for judges and judicial officials were to be provided ‘in kind’ according to the PAD.

47. Nevertheless, the project was expected to have a positive impact in the effectiveness of resource administration by the Judiciary through the provision of strategic planning tools for judicial districts which was reflected in a smoother budget preparation process. In this regard, the implementation of the electronic filing system in Northern Lima and the electronic notification system provides for an estimated yearly savings of nearly US$9 million since 2016, which is a substantial amount considering the total project financing (approximately US$31 million).

48. Moreover, through the wide use of ALEGRA centers, the project sought to provide savings to the users with regard to the transactional cost of resorting to the justice system. In this regard, 49 ALEGRA centers operated by the MINJUS have been built according tothe target set at appraisal, and the cases sponsored by MINJUS lawyers at ALGERA centers increased from 2,301 in 2012 to over 22,531 in 2015. Moreover, it is important to note that these centers also provide ADR services, which provide a faster solution to the vulnerable population, with special consideration to indigenous peoples, women, and children. Based on data reported by the MINJUS, out of the total consultations received at the ALEGRA centers, they sponsored a yearly average of 2,272 conciliation cases before they entered the formal justice system. This means

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that ALEGRA centers successfully reduced the strain of the justice system by an average of 2,272 potential cases to be filed in courts. If the majority of those cases are considered to be related to family matters, the average cost of one case is considered to be approximately US$1.93 per day, and each case is assumed to take nearly four years to be solved by the formal system, it implies a yearly cost per case of approximately US$704, which results in total yearly total savings of US$1,600,510.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating (combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency)Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

49. The overall outcome rating is deemed Moderately Satisfactory. The project’s objectives continue to be relevant and the new administration has indicated the desire to seek World Bank support with another follow-up operation. The achievement of the PDO is Substantial. Primarily, the PDO indicator related to access to justice was achieved and the indicators related to quality suffered setbacks due to the postponement of the NCPC, but other results achieved were significant with regard to quality improvements. Assessment of the project’s efficiency also allows for projections of savings over time.

Table 2-Project Overall Ratings

Relevance Efficacy

Efficiency Overall OutcomeObjectives Design

Objective 1 (Quality of

Service)

Objective 2 (Access to Justice)

Substantial Substantial Modest High Substantial Moderately SatisfactorySubstantial Substantial

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above)(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

50. With regard to poverty and gender impacts, one overarching theme addressed by the project was the provision of comprehensive free legal aid services, a reform for which support was initiated under the previous operation. This included conciliation services and support with legal cases by technical specialists through the ALEGRA centers, which gave special emphasis to attending family and labor cases.

51. The ALEGRA centers provide integral legal assistance following a one-stop shop approach. Services provided by the centers include conciliation services and public defense for criminal, family, labor, and other civil matters. Since 2015, the centers located in Lima and Arequipa (mega-ALEGRA centers) work with a multidisciplinary team of social workers and experts in medical forensics and other technical fields. They include special daycare facilities for children to attend while the parents receive assistance. This has been beneficial especially for single parents and, in particular, for single mothers for whom the cost of childcare was identified as a concern and an obstacle to accessing justice services. Overall, the services provided are of such high quality that citizens of all income levels have sought access. Accordingly, ALEGRA centers introduced income proof as part of the process to screen beneficiaries who would qualify for the services and restrict the free legal aid provision only to the poor and most vulnerable.

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This model has by now been recognized across the Latin America and the Caribbean region as best practice. Currently, ALEGRA centers are present in 27 out of 30 Judicial Districts in Peru.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development)

52. The project targeted institutional strengthening through a series of activities. Specifically, the capacity of the judges and prosecutors was enhanced through training and capacity building offered by the AMAG. The AMAG developed, with assistance from the project, formal training workshops required before promotions, as well as a web-based online training platform and an Integrated Academic Management System with the support of the project, substantially reducing the waiting times for the issuing of course certificates and transcripts and expanding coverage. This allowed participants to obtain their certificates or duplicates within minutes, versus months before, saving them transaction costs, particularly in the case of participants from outside Lima who no longer were required to travel to the capital to receive their certificate. In this regard, it also simplified the processing time for promotions, as participation in core curricula courses is mandatory for judges and prosecutors. This support was complemented by the development of an Institutional Strategic Plan for the Judicial Council, as well as a performance management framework to assess candidates selected for judges’ and prosecutors’ positions.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

53. The World Bank exercised its convening power to establish an SC with the participation of the different beneficiaries. Given that the SC was comprised of the heads of all the five participating judicial institutions (who could not delegate participation), the SC had a significant capacity to organize high-level discussions on justice reform initiatives with members of the SC and other policy-makers and decision-makers. This was the case of a seminar with the two second-round presidential candidates on May 6, 2016. With the facilitation of the project, an important dialogue started between the representatives of the Justice Sector and members of the Executive and Legislative Branches.10

54. The project has also supported the establishment of a Crime Observatory at the AGO, which has developed a business intelligence tool for the analysis of crime trends to feed legislative- and security-related policy and decision making. The Observatory was awarded two international public sector best practice awards since 2014 and together with Colombia became a regional reference for the development of evidence-based judicial decision making. The AGO is providing technical assistance to the El Salvador Judiciary for the establishment of a criminality observatory with support from the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo).

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops (optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes)

10 During the meeting, the Judiciary reviewed recent progress and remaining challenges in the sector under three main topics: (a) improvements in access to justice for the general population, with specific focus on the vulnerable population; (b) improvements in the performance of judges and prosecutors, as well as the efficient use of resources and compliance with judicial decisions; and (c) transparency in the services provided to citizens, with special focus on the fight against corruption in judicial cases.

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55. No beneficiary surveys or stakeholder workshops were undertaken for the preparation of this ICR.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

56. The risk to the development outcome is deemed to be Moderate. To some extent, the sustainability of several interventions is dependent on continuing reforms in the sector and budget availability. The Government has indicated to the World Bank that justice is a priority area and discussions about a potential follow-up operation are underway. In this light, the sustainability of the pilot interventions related to the improvement in the quality of justice services, and the broader implementation of the e-filing system in particular, promoted under the project will be safeguarded and existing interventions may be even scaled up.

57. The Government’s strong commitment to the project was reflected in the allocation of a considerable amount of its own resources to boost the scope and impact of the activities, particularly regarding the construction of ALEGRA centers, amounting to nearly US$1.4 million in addition to the US$10 million stipulated as borrower financing. Going forward, the authorities are interested in scaling up key activities such as the electronic file management system beyond the Northern Lima judicial district, yet the source of financing remains to be defined.

58. Continuing the reform efforts will be key in the next stage, especially in relation to the NCPC implementation delayed until 2017. In the case of the ALEGRA centers, they are yet to tackle language barriers, particularly in those districts with high indigenous populations, to facilitate access to services by some of the most vulnerable users. Finally, when considering the activities carried out by the AGO, the sustainability of the Crime Observatory is highly dependent on the continuation of its internship program, which provides the human resources necessary for the gathering and processing of information. Likewise, regarding the environmental forensics laboratory, the operation and maintenance of the technical equipment acquired may demand an additional budget.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at EntryRating: Moderately Satisfactory

59. World Bank performance to ensure quality at entry was considered to be Moderately Satisfactory. The project preparation was based on the past operation, for which a solid body of analytical work and data gathered helped develop a follow-up project design that was ready for implementation with very clear areas of intervention at project approval. An inclusive or participatory approach to the design is always deemed beneficial, as mentioned in the lessons learned and recommendations made by partner organizations. However, the achievement of the PDO relied to a great extent on the successful implementation of the NCPC, which was delayed through a decision by the Executive Branch, based on financial constraints, and could have been identified as an explicit risk. Likewise, adequate attention by the World Bank to the Results

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Framework and M&E arrangements could have been useful from the beginning and throughout implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

60. Quality of supervision was considered to be Moderately Satisfactory, while noting that the World Bank could have reacted sooner to the Government’s decision to postpone the NCPC implementation in the Lima Metropolitan Area. These events could have triggered a project restructuring as early as 2014. At the same time, throughout the project lifespan, coordination within the World Bank task team worked well and allowed the World Bank to identify procurement issues early on and act promptly to solve them. That said, the support provided to the environmental legal medicine laboratory was sizeable, though there was no clear cost-benefit analysis in place. Moreover, the World Bank performed field supervision missions on a regular basis and actively participated in the project SC sessions, which built trust with the members of the executing agencies and helped advance the policy dialogue.

61. At the same time, project supervision could have been more proactive during the midterm review and with the project restructuring when key decisions were made regarding the Results Framework. In this regard, the team could have addressed the risks to the achievement of the PDO as a result of the NCPC postponement. The delays in two critical districts started in 2014, but the restructuring was only pursued in late 2015. In addition, the World Bank could have actively promoted dissemination of project results and lessons learned to Justice Sector clients and the wider community, an aspect noted to be important in the PAD, during project implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

62. The project was conceived based on the results of the previous operation and effectively incorporated lessons learned. It however had shortcomings in developing a robust Results Framework and well-articulated set of baselines and targets for the results indicators and in assessing the risks. In general, the World Bank team could have improved its implementation support and could have made adjustments to the M&E framework based on the realities on the ground at the time of the midterm review and project restructurings. Given these missed opportunities, the World Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance(a) Government PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

63. Government performance is deemed Moderately Satisfactory. While the Judiciary Branch’s support to the project was constant throughout the design, appraisal, and implementation stages and the Ministry of Finance provided the necessary support regarding the allocation of resources as counterpart to the World Bank’s funding, the Executive Branch postponed the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area in 2014, almost two years before completion, due to financial constraints, and has not yet resumed it. This decision

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had a negative impact in the achievement of the PDO, particularly with respect to the indicator on expected reduction of trial times, which also influenced the project targets with regard to the improvement in the quality of justice services. Nevertheless, improving the quality of justice services continues to be a high priority for the new administration, as security and anticorruption (with focus on a new comprehensive criminal justice reform) is one of the four main areas of proposed reforms (together with social investment, growth and formalization, and effective state presence).

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Satisfactory

64. For the vital role played, the performance of the PIU is considered to be Satisfactory. The Project Operations Manual outlining responsibilities and processes was elaborated early on during project implementation stage. An excellently staffed PIU, which retained its well-trained and motivated staff from the previous operation, was well-positioned to play a critical role throughout project implementation, handling both technical and fiduciary matters and maintaining a vital line of communication with counterparts in each executing agency. This was particularly important considering that cumbersome coordination between different Government entities was identified as a salient feature during appraisal. Success in coordination was also the result of PIU leadership. It is worth emphasizing the role played by the head of the PIU, especially in an evolving context in which leadership changed in several executing entities. As for the executing agencies, the MINJUS had the sufficient capacity to carry out project implementation and ensure the sustainability of the interventions, particularly in the case of the ALEGRA centers which were key to enhance access to justice. Likewise, the Judiciary was able to implement most of the activities. However, it faced challenges regarding the administration of the software development contract signed with AYESA for the development of the electronic filing system. On the other hand, the AMAG and CNM have both the technical capacity and political support to implement project activities oriented at the strengthening of human resources capacity. Nevertheless, in the case of the AGO, the implementing agency experienced a shift in priorities regarding the activities of the IML, which compromised the achievement of the related intermediate result indicator compared to the baseline and target established at appraisal.

65. Overall, the flexible and pragmatic approach to deal with the new strategic directions emerging as a result of the changes in the Judiciary leadership was commendable. When activities departed from the original project design and PAD activities, restructuring of the project should have reflected these changes in the M&E framework. In addition, both the executing agencies and the PIU did not pursue an aggressive dissemination of project results and activities to address the citizens’ low perception of the Justice Administration System according to the perception surveys.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

66. Overall, the borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Client ownership from the five participating institutions remained strong throughout the project’s lifespan, and the SC facilitated implementation of key activities, in spite of changes in several leadership positions and the Executive Branch’s decision to postpone NCPC implementation. A certain degree of

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flexibility in the selection of activities was necessary to deal with the changes in priorities of the Judiciary, while the M&E framework should have been revised to reflect a changed political economy on the ground. Finally, it is important to highlight the high-caliber staffing in the PIU and the key leadership role played by the coordinator, who ensured successful execution, in spite of political and technical complexity.

6. Lessons Learned

67. Project design needs to balance the trade-offs between a broad versus narrow approach and should be adjusted based on evolving political economy and reality on the ground. Often stressed in justice reform projects is the trade-off between a more holistic approach, harder to implement but more effective to create long lasting institutional capacity and change, versus one favoring selected interventions, with limited scope, to deliver faster tangible results. The project was built on the results achieved in the previous engagement. Pilot interventions focused on some themes and areas but successful pilots were not sufficient to create sweeping reforms across the entire sector and positively influence the perception of users and stakeholders. This is particularly relevant because citizens in Peru continue to show very low levels of trust in the Government and Judiciary. The test of future reforms will lay in the ability of the authorities to successfully bring to scale reforms, engage a broad set of actors, from the public and private arena, and implement an adequate communication strategy. Reforming the Justice Sector is a complex, long-term process, progress is not linear, proper mitigation measures are key, and design should be adjusted when conditions on the ground change.

68. A strong M&E framework is key and it needs to reflect evolving project design. From an operational perspective, particular attention should be paid to revising and adapting the indicators to changes on the ground and shift of priorities, which should be reflected and made specific in the PDO-level indicators. If the restructurings had addressed this issue in a more substantive and timely manner, revising targets, and adding new indicators, the project evaluation would have been different. While this is generally true for any project, it is particularly relevant in a context where the reform priorities are complex and continuously evolving (institutional reform versus infrastructure development). Close supervision is key to assuring the relevance and sustainability of investments made, as was the case of the investments in the environmental legal medicine laboratory. Tools such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness studies, beneficiary surveys, needs assessments, sector indicators, and so on can be strategically used to strengthen supervision.

69. Strategic use of the World Bank’s convening power to build a coalition for reform. The establishment of an SC which represented the five key beneficiaries was key to ensuring strong commitment on behalf of the authorities and maintaining effective coordination between all executing agencies. The SC played a critical role in keeping the momentum of reforms alive even as changes took place in key leadership positions. Beyond the life of the project, it will be useful for the authorities to assure the sustainability of the coordination function assured through the SC. Beyond the SC, an important lesson learned was related to the importance of investing resources to strengthen communication with a focus on results and reach out to a broad audience. The results were noticeable in those districts in which the project pursued investments, and knowledge about several initiatives was on occasion limited to staff who were directly involved in the process or to direct beneficiaries. In addition, the World Bank can closely coordinate with

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other international financial institutions (IFIs) that are actively working in the justice area to bring to scale and deepen impact.

70. The role played by a strong, experienced staff in the PIU and its leader is vital. A fourth lesson learned in this project is related to the effective implementation arrangements. The project retained the staff of the implementation unit from the previous operation, which meant that people with a considerable amount of experience in World Bank guidelines and the area of justice reform were able to hit the ground running. The location of the PIU within the Judiciary was a strategic choice which paid off. The PIU was in a position to ensure smooth implementation in spite of bureaucratic hurdles. In addition, a very experienced PIU coordinator led the dialogue with the implementing agencies and assured continuity of reforms even as changes took place in key leadership positions.

71. Capacity building efforts are important but will have limited impact when key anticipated reforms are postponed. The Legislature approved in 2006 an NCPC, which was gradually introduced in courts between 2008 and 2010. The NCPC represented a major shift in the procedural arena and sought to speed processing times and expand the prosecutors’ role in criminal procedures. Although the procedural times were considerably shortened with the NCPC, the costs of litigation remained high. As a result of the Government’s decision to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in the Lima Metropolitan Area11 the borrower revised the Results Framework and focused many activities on capacity-building efforts, to pave the way for future NCPC implementation. Nevertheless, success of these efforts remains to be seen as the NCPC is now expected to be in place in 2017.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

72. As part of interviews carried out by the ICR team, staff from the PIU shared lessons of experience and recommendations. On the administrative side, it was beneficial to develop the Project Operations Manual early, as it focused not only on the administrative challenges but also on the provision of technical support to the executing agencies. In many cases, this addressed institutional capacity gaps and helped prepare technically solid terms of reference and supervise complex activities, such as the electronic filing system or the civil works executed as part of the refurbishment of spaces for the ALEGRA centers. In addition, the PIU highlighted that the use of the World Bank procurement framework meant that activities were implemented faster than when following the national procurement regulations and was welcomed by suppliers, who appreciated the transparency of the processes. A future dialogue with counterparts will address this challenge in connection to the World Bank’s new procurement framework and reliance on country systems.

73. Finally, while the head of the Judiciary, MINJUS, AMAG, CNM, and AGO rotated several times throughout project implementation, the establishment of an SC and the ample experience of the project coordinator helped maintain focus on the project’s objectives and momentum of reforms. In this regard, the project was key to spearheading closer interagency coordination within Peru’s Justice Administration System, through the inclusion of the AGO as a

11 The indicators were dropped due to the decision of the Government to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in Lima and Callao as reflected in the Decreto Supremo No. 003-2014-JUS.

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beneficiary and member on the SC. Excellent support received from the Ministry of Finance was considered timely, despite a few delays in the allocation of resources in December 2015. In addition, maintaining the core PIU staff after the closing of the first operation until the effectiveness of the second project allowed continuity. Through this arrangement, the Judiciary was therefore able to retain a critical mass of knowledge regarding the World Bank’s procedures, which was crucial for smooth implementation. The PIU raised the issue that future interventions should focus on one or two nationwide interventions, based on the success of the pilots pursued by the previous project, to achieve larger-scale impact and help address the issue of negative perception and low levels of trust in the Justice Administration System on behalf of the population at large.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

74. Several important partners are providing support to the justice reform agenda in Peru, among them the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In October 2016, the ICR team consulted with IDB colleagues to seek views and recommendations. In the opinion of the planning, M&E specialist working with the IDB justice project in Peru, who carried out an evaluation of the first phase of the World Bank’s project, the World Bank has supported investments in training programs, which will have a positive impact over the medium to long term. The project approach, focused on consultations with multiple stakeholders, was positive, as it fostered synergies among different initiatives and resulted in a more coordinated reform effort. The convening power of the IFIs was key in this sense. The ICR team agrees that the convening power of the World Bank played a critical role to help set up the SC, which increased coordination of the reform efforts.

75. Regarding the impact of the activities, two main lessons learned were mentioned. First, the project was able to complete implementation of important and complex initiatives due to the coordinated multi-stakeholder approach. This was the case, for example, of the big refurbishment work done in the Junín Judicial District. Carrying out this kind of initiatives within the time and budget provided was very difficult for the Judiciary, given the institutional bottlenecks and high number of existing protocols. A cost-benefit analysis is useful given the size of the interventions. Second, project design should be informed by consultations with a large group of stakeholders and partners, to avoid overlap. This was a significant challenge at the beginning of project implementation, which was overcome by the prompt intervention by partners and the Government. The ICR team believes that consultations are critical to the soundness of the project design and to assure ownership and will be important as a follow-up operation is being prepared.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, Millions equivalent)

ComponentsAppraisal

Estimate (US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (US$,

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

World Bank Funding

1. Improved Justice Services Delivery 16.66 20.48 123 13.37

2. Improved Human Resources Management Capacity

4.61 2.49 54 1.73

3. Enhanced Transparency and Access to Justice 5.76 3.96 69 2.75

4. Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation 2.97 4.48 151 2.15

Total Baseline Cost 30.00 31.41 105 20Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Total Project Costs 30.00Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Total Financing Required 30.00 31.41* 105

Note: * The difference in the total financing required was covered with counterpart resources.

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 10.00 11.00 110.00IBRD 20.00 20.00 0.00

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. Regarding the achievement of the PDO, table 2.1 depicts the results achieved and key activities implemented compared to the targets set, beginning with the first section of the PDO.

Table 2.1. Results Framework in terms of quality of service delivery

PDO Outcome Indicators Baseline Target Actual Comments

Objective 1: To improve the quality of service delivery by the five participating institutions (Rating: Modest)PDO Indicator 1: Reduction in time/speed of trial (from beginning to end of trial process)

PDO Indicator 3: Number of cases in which alternative sentencing options are applied

486 days

0 cases

243 days

27,758 cases

479 days

Indicator was dropped

Overall, one PDO indicator was not achieved and one dropped after restructuring but 80% progress was made

It is important to note that the result of this indicator was deeply affected by the Executive Branch’s decision to postpone the implementation of the NCPC in Lima and Callao regions, which was outside the control of the team and of the counterparts in the Judiciary.

Various reforms have significantly contributed to improve quality of service delivery in all five institutions participating in the project, as was discussed in section 3.2 of the core ICR. Moreover, it is important to highlight that the project also increased the AGO’s analytical capacity through the creation of a Criminal Observatory, which was an unintended output of the project not envisioned in the PAD. In addition, the project carried out a diagnostic of the current systems used by the AGO and proposed a new integrated system. In the case of the Judiciary, users in the Northern Lima Judicial District are now able to consult information on processes online, through access to digitalized documents, which reduced delays, cut costs, and further improved transparency and increased trust. Finally, in the case of the AMAG, the project consolidated training programs and protocols to improve and facilitate service delivery, and supported training activities and paved the way for the subsequent NCPC implementation.

Associated Baseline Target Actual Comments

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Intermediate Results Indicators

Number of courts and prosecutors’ offices providing information to district MIS

0 5 5This indicator was fully achieved. Currently, five courts and prosecutors’ offices provide information to the MIS.

Reduction in the average number of days required in criminal justice processes in the three judicial districts with project intervention

835 days 209 days 479 days

While this indicator was dropped, it achieved a reduction of 479 days by the time it was dropped, which represented 67% of progress toward the achievement of the target.

Number of judicial districts with administrative staff trained in results-based management

10 districts 29 districts 31 districts By project closure this indicator surpassed

the target.

Reduction of time taken by the IML to deliver expert technical opinions

20 days 1 day 45 days

This indicator was not achieved, and the end result worsened when compared to the baseline. Activities related to the IML were focused in supporting the environmental forensics laboratory which was not originally envisioned at appraisal.

New standards developed for evaluation of judges and prosecutors

0 1 1

This indicator was achieved, and the CNM has developed a standardized guideline for the evaluation of judges and prosecutors, which is currently in effect.

Increase in percentage of judges and prosecutors evaluated by the new standards

0% 100% 100%

By the project closing date, 100% of judges and prosecutors were evaluated according to the parameters set in the Judicial Career Law.

Number of lecture hours per participant and increase in number of participants trained according to their jurisdictional specialization

23 35 44

This indicator was overachieved. In addition, the Magistrate Academy has implemented an e-learning platform to support specialized training programs. Currently, certificates of the Magistrate Academy are shifted from a paper-based system to an electronic one, increasing data reliability and speed.

Increase in the percentage of cases resolved through ADR mechanisms in the participating judicial districts

7,663 cases 50% increase 51% increase

This indicator was overachieved. According to data from the MINJUS, the number of cases resolved through ADR mechanisms increased by nearly 51% at project closure (3,957 new cases).

Reduction in response time by OCMA to

21 months 10 months 10 monthsAchieved. According to data compiled by the PIU, OCMA had an average response time of 10 months to the corruption

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complaints filed complaints filed and accepted.15 percentage point increase in the index of accessibility to information through the Internet (average of the 5 participating institutions)

70% 85% 87%

This indicator was overachieved. According to data compiled by the PIU, the average Internet accessibility of the five participating institutions reached 87% at the end of the project.

2. Regarding the second objective part of the PDO, table 2.2 depicts the results achieved compared to the targets set.

Table 2.2. Results Framework in terms of Access to Justice


Objective 2: To enhance access to justice with a focus on citizens (Rating: Substantial)

PDO Indicator 2: Increase in number of consultations in legal aid centers administered by the Ministry of Justice




The target value of the PDO indicator was overachieved. According to the latest consolidated data from the MINJUS, by October 2016, 251,191 consultations were received and attended by the ALEGRA centers.

Training programs were delivered, including a training session for public defenders on procedural law, improving the capacity of public defenders and staff in the legal advisory centers (consultorios jurídicos). The training programs focused on the use of management tools to achieve a higher level of specialization that leads to improvements in service provision. Other workshops focused on public defenders in criminal cases, while a national event on legal defense focused on family and criminal matters.

MINJUS established 16 interinstitutional protocols aimed at consolidating and standardizing the implementation of the NCPC nationwide.

Likewise, the Judiciary implemented a case follow-up and consultation system

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through service modules that allow inmates to consult and follow the status of their cases, and participate remotely from hearings through videoconference. For example, in the case of the La Merced prison, currently, nearly 70% of the inmate population use the system, and yearly savings of approximately S/. 11,000 have been achieved in transportation costs.

Associated Intermediate Results

IndicatorsBaseline Target Actual Comments

Increased number of ALEGRAs refurbished in peri-urban and rural areas

25 centers 49 centers 49 centersAchieved. Overall, 49 ALEGRA centers were established and properly equipped.

3. With regard to the specific activities carried out, and the intermediate results the following sections contain a description of the activities by component.

Component 1: Improved Justice Services Delivery

Table 2.3 Achievement of Component 1 Intermediate Results Indicators.

Intermediate Indicator Target Value at Exit Status at closingNumber of courts and prosecutors’ offices providing information to district MIS

PAD indicated a baseline of 0 and target of 5

Achieved. Currently, five courts and prosecutors’ offices provide information to the MIS.

Reduction in the average number of days required in criminal justice processes in the 3 judicial districts with project intervention

PAD indicated a baseline of 835 days and target of 209 days

Indicator was dropped. However, at the time it was dropped, the average number of days required for the processing of criminal cases reached 479 days, which represented 67% of progress toward the achievement of the target.

Number of judicial districts with administrative staff trained in results-based management


Overachieved. By the project closing date, 31 district courts in Peru had administrative staff trained in results-based management.

Reduction of time taken by the IML to deliver expert technical opinions

PAD indicated a baseline of 20 days and target of 1 day

Not achieved. PAD target was for 1 day against a baseline of 20. By the project closing date, IML took an average of 45 days to issue technical opinions. The final result worsened from baseline.

Subcomponent 1.1: Strengthening of the Strategic Planning and Managerial Capabilities of the Participating Institutions

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(a) Planned output. Application of case management procedures and the improvement of planning and budget management capacity.

Delivered output. The Judiciary received support in this regard with two specific activities. The first one is related to the design and implementation of results-based budgeting indicators. The project supported evaluation, analysis, and impact analysis tools related to the Judiciary’s budget. The second one is related to the budget planning for court users. A projection tool was successfully implemented by the Junín High Court, specifically to design a projects bulletin board and an implementation and monitoring plan.

(b) Planned output. Design and implementation of mechanism for the coordination of administrative and jurisdictional functions and for monitoring and performance e-based management.

Delivered output. Four specific activities were carried out with the Judiciary. Three nationwide meetings (in 2011, 2012, and 2015) were organized with the participation of all presidents of the regional High Courts to set a common agenda for action and discuss specific technical subjects. In addition, the project financed the development of strategic guidelines and an operative plan and supported the office dealing with performance management issues, for which a set of indicators was developed. With respect to the CNM, support focused on developing the Institutional Strategic Plan 2013–2017 and specific guidelines to strengthen institutional management. Related to the MINJUS and human rights, two capacity-building activities were carried out. First, an international workshop on Criminal Policy and Human Rights was conducted, which was the first step to strengthen the National Criminal and Penitentiary Policy Council and the General Criminal and Penitentiary Policy Office within the ministry. The main outcome of this activity was reaching consensus and developing several interinstitutional scenarios, which was the first time this happened in Peru. The project also financed the development of the Strategic Plan 2012–2016 for the AMAG, which provided the basis for a broader sector strategy aiming to assure sector sustainability. Finally, the project supported the design of a general corporate communication strategy for the entire Justice Administration System, which was expected to promote organizational change and outreach both in the sector and with the Peruvian society in general.

Subcomponent 1.2: Strengthening of the Operational Capabilities of Participating Institutions

(a) Planned output. (i) Design and implementation of a case filing system in courts of the Judiciary; (ii) design and launching of technological platforms and statistical plans for case management for the Judiciary and AGO; and (iii) development and installation of an electronic consultation system of case files (‘information kiosks’) for the Judiciary and AGO, including minor civil works.

Delivered output. Since April 2012, several efforts aimed to improve service delivery focused on court users. Minor civil works were made in the Junín High Court so users were able to consult their cases in a multifunctional information kiosk. Other improvements targeted registration, such as convictions and criminal records and

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biometric identification of former convicts. A new case filing system was implemented in the Northern Lima High Court and the technological platform was improved. Some specific activities were: (i) the design of an Information Technology Strategic Plan for the Judiciary (which included the main guidelines for a user-oriented system through a new information system, microforms system, a system to publish the main judicial decisions of courts, and integrated videoconference systems); (ii) purchase of videoconference equipment for 31 high courts, the Supreme Court, and the General Management office for jurisdictional, training, and coordination purposes, as well as for the AGOs; (iii) civil works and purchase of technological equipment to implement a microforms and an e-filing system for the Lima Norte High Court; (iv) performance indicators for the budget related to the judicial digital filing system; and (v) development of a data gathering, evaluation, and analysis system. Besides the improved information kiosks available in the high courts, the project helped strengthen the information platform of the Judiciary’s webpage. Among the activities were the implementation of an integrated system for the high courts’ and Supreme Court’s statistics and jurisprudence (which facilitated the consultation process for external users as well), purchase of software and technological equipment to implement a high court and Supreme Court jurisprudence search and storage system, purchase of software for the judicial digital filing system, and implementation of an integrated administrative management system for the Judiciary’s General Management office.

Figure 2.1. Electronic Consultation of Labor Cases Files in the Northern Lima Judicial District

Figure 2.2. Paper Consultation of Criminal Cases Files in the Northern Lima Judicial District

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(b) Planned output. Development and implementation of service delivery mechanisms to support the reduction of processing time and the improvement of efficiency in attention of users by the Judiciary and AGO, including the design of regulations and a pilot plan for introducing oral proceedings in labor and civil cases by the Judiciary.

Delivered output. Important adjustments in infrastructure, technological equipment, and software were made to reduce the waiting time in the Mesas de partes of Lima, Lima Norte, and Lima Sur High Courts. These changes helped to improve the efficiency of the services provided in several high courts and AGOs. Additional interventions to strengthen the information offices were made in the Lima Norte, Ica, La Libertad, Puno, Lambayeque, and Cajamarca High Courts. To support the implementation of oral proceedings in labor and civil cases, the project developed a digital file system for labor cases in the Lima Norte High Court, as well as refurbishment of spaces for labor and criminal oral hearing rooms in the Junín High Court. The project also supported the design of regulations and a pilot plan for introducing oral proceedings in labor and civil cases by the Judiciary through: (i) analysis of the main processes under the New Labor Procedure Law; (ii) design of a judicial conciliation act model for alimony and domestic violence cases; (iii) design of conciliation guidelines for the New Labor Procedure Law; (iv) Improvement recommendations; and (v) training programs for officers in charge of implementing the New Labor Procedure Law.

Subcomponent 1.3: Strengthening of the Capacity of Participating Institutions to Implement the NCPC

(a) Planned output. Development of a case and administrative management system aimed at coordinating information managed by the participating institutions, including for the management of caseload data within and among participating institutions pursuant to the provisions of the NCPC.

Delivered output. One of the main activities of this section was a diagnosis of the current systems in the public ministry and proposal for a new integrated system for the NCPC. As a result of this activity, 53 operational and 36 technological improvements were proposed, as well as 6 proposals for regulatory changes. This included specific actions such as: integrating in one system the six existing ones in the AGO; a unique system for the whole national territory, integrating the current databases and available information, as well as standardization of functions and procedures; including mechanisms of controlling time limits in the processes; and control of electronic notifications. Related to this activity, a methodology to gather, analyze, and process information regarding oral hearings in criminal cases was designed. The reports produced under this activity allowed the AGO to identify good practices, lessons learned, and proposals to solve challenges related to the implementation of the NCPC. From the MINJUS side, an M&E system was developed to constantly monitor and evaluate the implementation process of the NCPC. This system was also an important input for the Ministry of Finance as part of the results-based budgeting program. The project also supported the implementation of the line production and microforms system in the Superior Prosecutor Coordination Office of the Specialized Anti-corruption Units. Users were able to consult information on processes online through access to digitalized

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documents. Related to standardized processes, new protocols were enforced for the NCPC in Lima with respect to workload, challenges, and opportunities that could lead to more effective implementation.

A diagnosis of the AGO administrative systems was carried out to identify the way in which the current administrative systems were working, as well as alignment with the internal regulations. This activity included an evaluation of the Integrated System of Administrative Management being used by the AGO. The main conclusion of this review was that the systems did not adequately support the administrative activities and they had to be replaced. Finally, the project aimed to support the design of the Implementation Plan of the NCPC in the Lima, Lima Norte, Lima Sur, and Callao districts, for which actual implementation was postponed through a decision by the Executive Branch. This plan was an integrated proposal considering all the institutions of the criminal justice system, providing guidelines that guaranteed the integration and sustainability of the implementation process. As a result of this, the MINJUS established 16 protocols between the relevant institutions.

(b) Planned output. Design and implementation of training activities on the NCPC procedural reforms for personnel of the participating institutions.

Delivered output. The main activities for this component centered on two main aspects. First, the project supported several workshops with relevant actors. For example, in November 2011, the project supported a national prosecutors meeting in Arequipa. This event was led by the attorney general and its main objective was to unify criteria and exchange experiences regarding the application of the NCPC; 127 prosecutors assisted and exchanged experiences during two full days. A second session of this meeting was held in November 2013 in the Annual Meeting of Prosecutors, where the focus was crime analysis. A second group of activities centered in the design and dissemination of guidelines. For example, in 2013, the project supported the printing and distribution of short NCPC guidelines for prosecutors. A total of 3,500 guidelines were developed and distributed. The project also supported the design of a methodology for conducting oral hearings under the NCPC. These two activities strengthened the capacity of prosecutors, MINJUS, and the Judiciary through training and a training needs assessment. It also provided the basis to analyze the job competencies and job descriptions for prosecutors and other relevant actors.

(c) Planned output. Carrying out minor works for the refurbishment, including equipping of courtrooms, AGOs, and MINJUS public defense offices required for the implementation of oral proceedings.

Delivered output. Minor refurbishment works in the AGOs included, among others: (i) the purchase of technological equipment to strengthen the AGO management, including 203 computers with the required software; (ii) design of the terms of reference and technical specifications for a data center, including safety measures and adequate storage capacity; (iii) refurbishment of an adequate space of work for the microforms for the anticorruption prosecution unit, including a total area of 18.44 m2 for storage with humidity control, as well as the purchase of a server and massive storage equipment that

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improved the capacity of production of microforms by around 30 percent; (iv) design and implementation of the applications for the production of digital microforms for AGO, including the necessary operating system; (v) purchase of technological equipment for the production of microforms in the headquarters of the AGO, which included 20 working stations, servers, data storage, scanners, and personal computers; (vi) refurbishment of working space for two corporative prosecution units; and (vii) purchase of equipment and licenses for the strengthening of the Criminality Observatory, mainly for data processing and its web platform.

Regarding the MINJUS, the project supported the design and implementation of a platform for the Judicial Information Peruvian System. Activities related to the NCPC within the MINJUS centered more on training activities rather than refurbishment works of public defense offices. The major activities regarding refurbishment of courtrooms were in the Junín and Lima Norte High Courts. In these districts, the project supported works in almost all the court, as well as an auditorium and technological equipment. Also, there were works carried out in the mesas de partes (such as issuing of ticketing system to reduce ques and improve service delivery), courts (reorganization of offices and working spaces to improve document management procedures), and in courtrooms (audio equipment, air conditioners, and furnishing).

(d) Planned output. Development and implementation of a joint communications strategy for the participating institutions, in coordination with the Commission for Implementation of the NCPC.

Delivered output. No activities were carried out related to this component. Initial coordination works were carried out but priorities in the Government changed and the implementation of this activity was postponed.

(e) Planned output. Carrying out minor civil works for the refurbishment of the legal medical institute within the AGO to establish a forensic laboratory.

Delivered output. The civil works for the refurbishment of the legal medical institute allowed to make a more efficient distribution of working spaces to fully operate an environmental forensic laboratory. The project supported the AGO with the purchase of high-tech equipment. This was the first laboratory equipped to carry out criminal investigation for environmental crimes in Peru.

Component 2: Improved Human Resources Management Capacity

Table 2.4. Achievement of Component 2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Intermediate Indicator Target Value at Exit Status at Closing

New standards developed for evaluation of judges and prosecutors

PAD indicated a baseline of 0 and target of 1 (at least one standard)

Achieved. By the project closing, the CNM had developed a standardized guideline for the evaluation of judges and prosecutors, which is currently in effect.

Increase in percentage of judges PAD indicated a baseline of 0% and Achieved. By the project closing

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and prosecutors evaluated by the new standards target of 100%

date 100% of judges and prosecutors were evaluated according to the parameters set in the Judicial Career Law.

Number of lecture hours per participant and increase in number of participants trained according to their jurisdictional specialization

PAD indicated a baseline of 23 hours and target of 35 lecture hours on average

Overachieved. The Magistrate Academy has implemented an e-learning platform to support specialized training programs. By the project closing date, these programs reported an average of 44 lecture hours.

Subcomponent 2.1: Strengthening of Managerial Capabilities of the Participating Institutions

(a) Planned output. Design and implementation of (i) professional development plans for personnel of the Judiciary; and (ii) human resources planning and management models for the participating institutions.

Delivered output. The project supported the design of job descriptions and competency profiles to strengthen the skills of directorate level officers in the MINJUS. As a result of this, 23 directors were evaluated. Also, the management tools of the public defense system within the MINJUS were updated, including an updated organizational manual. Finally, the project also supported the update and design of the job descriptions and competency profiles of the public defenders, conciliators, and solicitors to strengthen the capability of the MINJUS. This last activity included the design and implementation of 8 competency profile descriptions validated and approved, a performance evaluation system, an integrated system manual, feedback for the evaluator manual, 1,202 self-assessments, 34 trained officers to evaluate, and an assessment of the general working conditions.

(b) Planned output. Support of the institutional capabilities of the CNM to improve its human resources processes, including: (i) the development and validation of job profiles; (ii) the development and adoption of recruitment processes and instruments including registries and communication strategies; (iii) the design and implementation of a system to evaluate the judges’ and prosecutors’ performance in accordance with the relevant job profile; (iv) the identification of post-selection training programs, in coordination with the AMAG; and (v) the carrying out of minor civil works to refurbish the CNM central office to install new technological equipment.

Delivered output. The first activity for this component was an institutional diagnostic and the design of new organizational regulation, which established the guidelines for a reorganization and implementation recommendations. Regarding the second activity, the project supported the development of a software to register the users for each process, which made it more transparent. Also, an institutional profile program was carried out to improve the recruitment process. The project supported the design and implementation of a performance indicators system for the CNM to evaluate institutional capacity and progress toward achieving institutional goals. It also allowed to take decisions more objectively and on time, improving the results achieved by the institution. The project supported the design and implementation of virtual training courses, which reduced costs

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and eased participation. This consisted of concrete training modules to strengthen the capacity of staff after appointment. A videoconference system was implemented in the CNM headquarters, a useful tool to improve communications and carry out interviews regardless of geographic location. Also, a live streaming video system was implemented, along with minor civil works and the necessary equipment. This was an important tool for transparency since citizens have access in real time to all public hearings, interviews, and selection and appointment processes for judges and prosecutors. A server was also purchased to store the digital material. Finally, the project purchased technological equipment, mainly computers.

(c) Planned output. Support the managerial capacities of the CNM, including (i) the development of human resources administrative rules and procedures for the CNM; and (ii) the development and installation of information systems for the Judiciary and AGO to improve access to legal databases of their personnel.

Delivered output. Besides the institutional diagnosis and design of a new organizational and functions regulation, the project supported the design of an information technology baseline. This activity included the identification of the main requirements of the CNM and the interoperability with other institutions of the justice system. Also, for the second activity, a skills platform was developed to strengthen the personnel database. This system included the profiles of judges and prosecutors in a database.

Subcomponent 2.2: Development and Implementation of Integrated Judicial Training Programs through Training Programs

(a) Planned output. (i) Development of a specialized program for those interested in joining the Judiciary; (ii) development of planning and learning tools adapted to the needs of the personnel of the Judiciary, MINJUS’ public defense, and the AGO; (iii) design of an evaluation system for the training programs; and (iv) creation of electronic libraries and virtual information centers and carrying out minor civil works for the installation of conference facilities including videoconferencing.

Delivered output. A series of workshops and training activities were carried out. Among the accomplished objectives are (i) training in administrative law and legal argumentation for 35 officers involved in the selection, evaluation, and disciplinary control of judges and prosecutors; (ii) training of trainers for the Justice Sector certification course, including 83 trainers of the AMAG in 3 separate sessions; (iii) an international workshop, justice frontiers, which allowed to train 30 Supreme Court and high court judges and AGO officers; (iv) an international workshop on digital evidence, which allowed training of 40 judges on the regulation of digital evidence; (v) an informatics crimes, organized crime, and corruption certificate course, which included the participation of 89 judges; (vi) an international workshop on environmental law, which included 60 supreme judges and prosecutors who were trained on environmental regulations; (vii) a national workshop of peace and intercultural justice, which allowed training of 70 peace judges in robbery, violence, and peace justice regulations; and (viii) virtual courses on the structure of the oral procedure for labor cases, which included the training of 100 judges and jurisdictional personnel in the new labor procedural regulations.

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A coalition with universities was promoted and specific activities included: diagnosis of the learning curricula for the Peruvian law schools; a compared analysis of the professional profiles of graduate students; a set of protocols between the AMAG and law schools; training 39 deans and 48 judges on ethics—a scouting program with universities was designed and implemented; and 27 law professionals were incorporated into the Justice Administration System.

The project supported the development of specific training material. This included, among others: (i) a competencies document to link the AMAG to the Public Management National Plan, including training needs assessment of AMAG’s officers; (ii) the design of training materials for officers involved in ADR; (iii) the design of guidelines on the new Labor Procedural Code; (iv) the design of an environmental law dictionary for the AMAG to be distributed among judges and prosecutors; and (v) the design and implementation of a database of cases for training purposes with manuals and a case law publication (on civil, labor, criminal law, and so on).

Finally, the project supported a series of civil works and equipment purchases, such as: (i) refurbishment of the AMAG’s auditorium and training rooms to have a higher capacity for training sessions; (ii) purchase of technological equipment for microforms production for the AMAG; (iii) strengthening of the Academic Management Integrated System, which includes interconnecting with other Justice Sector entities systems, and redesign of the AMAG’s webpage; (iv) necessary infrastructure and training adjustment so that the AMAG could obtain the quality certificate, ISO 9001; (v) purchase of the necessary hardware to strengthen the Academic Management Integrated System and to adequately carry out physical training sessions; (vi) purchase of the hardware and software for the production of e-learning material; and (vii) implementation of a virtual training platform (Learning Management System) and its corresponding virtual courses, which strengthened, optimized, and expanded the use of a virtual platform that allowed the carrying out of training sessions in the national level with trained personnel to manage e-learning platforms.

Component 3: Enhanced Transparency and Access to Justice

Table 2.5. Achievement of Component 3 Intermediate Results Indicators

Intermediate Indicator Target Value at Exit Status at Closing

Increase in the percentage of cases resolved through ADR mechanisms in the participating judicial districts

PAD did not indicate a baseline; in 2012, a bas-line of 7,663 cases was established as was a target of 50% increase

Overachieved. According to data from the MINJUS, the number of cases resolved through ADR mechanisms increased by nearly 51% or 3,957 cases by the end of the project with respect to the baseline, which comprised 7,663 cases. Note that the baseline was established in 2012, after the project started.

Increased number of ALEGRAs refurbished in peri-urban and rural areas


Achieved. By the end of the project, 49 ALEGRA centers were established nationwide.

Reduction in response time by OCMA to complaints filed

PAD indicated a baseline of 21 months and target of 10 months

Achieved. According to data compiled by the PIU, OCMA had an average response time of 10 months to the corruption

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Intermediate Indicator Target Value at Exit Status at Closingcomplaints filed and accepted.

15 percentage point increase in the index of accessibility to information through the Internet (average of the 5 participating institutions)

PAD indicated a baseline of 70% and target of 85%

Overachieved. According to data compiled by the PIU, the average of Internet accessibility on the five participating institutions reached 87% at the end of the project.

Subcomponent 3.1: Strengthening of the Transparency and Anti-corruption Efforts of the Participating Institutions

(a) Planned output. Support of the disciplinary capacity of the Judiciary including: (i) the provision of anti-corruption training for personnel of the Judiciary; (ii) the establishment of institutional coordination mechanisms among administrative units in the Justice Sector; and (iii) the development of a mechanism to oversee the functioning of judicial institutions through joint activities with Peruvian civil society.

Delivered output. The main activities from this component focused on beneficiaries were (i) promoting values for the Judiciary campaign, which included programs and radio and television spots and involved the National University of San Marcos, San Martin de Porres University, and Pontific Catholic University of Peru; (ii) EXPOJUSTICIA campaigns, which consisted of an initiative of the Judiciary to present itinerary expositions (in Ica, Puno, Lima Norte, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Cajamarca, among others) for citizens to get familiar with the services provided by the Judiciary; (iii) a communications campaign in family law and domestic violence prevention for citizens to know their main rights in family matters and the potential actions to reduce domestic violence; (iv) the design and implementation of a communications strategy oriented to the promotion of an investment climate and national economic growth, which included journalistic, bibliographic, and graphic material to promote investment in the country; (v) decentralized public hearings ‘CNM hears citizens’ to receive citizens’ complaints against judges and prosecutors in Tacna, Lambayeque, Tumbes, Concepcion, Cajamarca, and Ayacucho, among others; (vi) the design of a book to disseminate activities carried out by the CNM so citizens can be informed of the main activities and achievements of the institution; and (vii) the design of six educational videos that strengthened the connection between citizens and the CNM. Under this subcomponent, the project also supported an international workshop on integrity and transparency that involved officers from the different institutions supported by the project.

(b) Planned output. Support of OCMA, including (i) the development and implementation of managerial tools to improve the Judiciary’s efficiency and transparency; and (ii) the development and implementation of a communication strategy.

Delivered output. Most of the activities of this component centered on developing and implementing tools to improve OCMA’s efficiency and transparency. Among the main activities were: (i) the purchase of technological equipment to strengthen the control and efficiency of the services provided by OCMA and deconcentrated offices(ODECMA); (ii) the training of officers through an international conference on judicial independence and anticorruption policies; (iii) encounters between OCMAS and ODECMAS to unify criteria and, in this way, provide a more coherent and better service; (iv) a course on

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audits in judicial management; (v) a proposal to improve the regulatory framework of the Judicial Control System; (vi) the standardization of the complaints system in OCMA; (vii) the implementation of an electronic notification system to improve the efficiency of the work carried out by OCMA; and (viii) the implementation of a call center in OCMA, which provides better, faster, and more personalized service to users in a remote manner. The project also supported the design of a communications strategy of the services provided by the MINJUS and the design of educational videos about the complaint’s mechanisms for corruption.

Subcomponent 3.2: Promoting an Equitable Delivery of Justice Services for the Poor

(a) Planned output. Support for the creation of new ALEGRA centers, including (i) the carrying out of minor civil works and the acquisition of equipment; and (ii) the development and implementation of training programs for legal aid providers and personnel of ALEGRA centers.

Delivered output. New ALEGRA centers were created and equipped in San Juan de Lurigancho, Comas, Villa el Salvador, Villa Maria del Triunfo, Caraz (Anchash), Camana (Arequipa), Cajabamba (Cajamarca), Lampa (Puno), Belen (Loreto), Lima, Acobaba (Huancavelica), Escudero (Piura), Ica, San Francisco de Ayna (Ayacucho), Qcapac Ñan (Cajamarca), Arequipa, Tarapoto, Chimbote (Anchash), Jaen (Cajamarca), and Puerto Maldonado. Also, training programs were developed, including a training session for public defenders on procedural law, improving the capacities of public defenders and legal advisory centers (consultorios jurídicos) through training programs that included management tools to achieve a higher level of specialization that contributes to an improved service, a training and criteria unification workshop for public defenders in criminal cases, and a national event on legal defense focused on family and criminal matters. Figure 2.3 and figure 2.4 depict the mega-ALEGRA center in Lima.

Figure 2.3. The Lima Mega-ALEGRA

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Figure 2.4. Attention in the Lima Mega-ALEGRA

(b) Planned output. Support of managerial capabilities of the MINJUS, including the dissemination of information of user-centered service delivery strategies and mechanisms.

Delivered output. Among the activities supported by this subcomponent were the design and production of a video that presents the ALEGRA centers; a redesign of the processes to optimize the conciliation services provided by the MINJUS, which included a manual and an analysis of the conciliation processes in the regions where this is needed before presenting formal claims (including Cusco, Piura, Huancayo, Cañete, Huaura, and El Santa); and the design of impact and management indicators to measure the services provided in the conciliation centers, and so on. The project supported the drafting process of a new conciliation law and the associated cost-benefit analysis and legal impact assessment. Additional training sessions for conciliation officers were carried out to strengthen their capacity and increase their knowledge in conciliation; as such, 100 percent of officers were trained and evaluated. The project financed the purchase of equipment for the centers. The free conciliation centers received a system that interconnects them and allows them to carry out conciliation through their web page. There was also the design of an implementation strategy for conciliation in labor cases based on a supply-demand analysis and the design of management, organizational, and procedural tools for it to fully operate. Finally, conciliation centers received printers and minor civil works were carried out to assure that the existing spaces are adequate to handle labor cases.

(c) Planned output. Support of the public legal education program, including the dissemination of information and consultation with community leaders, local authorities, and representatives of grassroots organizations.

Delivered output. The first step of this component was to carry out an assessment of the PRONELIS program in Lima, Ica, Piura, Pasco, and Ucayali. The results of the assessment showed the need for improving the institutional management of PRONELIS. The main findings were as follows: (i) the program has benefited mainly scholars, which gives the program a more preventive scope than promoting access to justice; and (ii)

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Lima has received the vast majority of users (35.4 percent), followed by La Libertad (7 percent), Ayacucho (6.2 percent), and Arequipa (5.8 percent). Based on this initial assessment, the project also supported the design of a communication system so citizens can be aware of this service, which was provided by the MINJUS. Finally, the project supported the design of manuals and booklets as educational material for the PRONELIS program.

Component 4: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

Table 2.6 Achievement of Component 4 Intermediate Results Indicators.

Intermediate Indicator Target value at exit Status at closing

Percentage of core staff of the PIU, including procurement specialist, treasurer, accountant and project manager, recruited and in place

PAD indicated a baseline of 0% and target of 100%

Achieved. The project core positions at the PIU were filled since the early stages of the project, and it comprised the core personnel of the first justice services improvement operation, which assured continuity.

Annual project reports producedPAD indicated a baseline of 0 reports and target of 4 annual reports

Overachieved. At project closure, the PIU had produced five reports due to extension of closing date. The PIU produced both annual and partial reports on a six-month basis.

Subcomponent 4.1: Conceptual and Functional Design of the Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System

(a) Planned output. Strengthening of the project implementation unit (PIU), including improving its procurement, FM, and M&E capabilities.

Delivered output. The PCU was involved in the M&E framework, especially with the baseline indicators, efforts to measure the goals of the project, and progress toward achieving the set targets. At the end of the project, a results evaluation was carried out, identifying the main results and the challenges to the fully successful execution of the project.

(b) Planned output. Provision of technical assistance to the PCU to carry out the independent financial audits.

Delivered output. All audits were carried out by the comptroller general’s office and supervised by the World Bank. They did not carry out independent financial audits because, by law, the comptroller general’s office must carry out these audits. However, the PCU was always monitoring all activities in parallel, even though it was not part of the formal audit process.

(c) Planned output. Strengthening of the management and M&E capabilities of the participating institutions for the carrying out of project activities.

Delivered output. Each institution had a liaison coordinator, as well as an adviser that supported the implementation process and helped advance the discussions. The project financed introductory courses on M&E mechanisms. Also, two specific courses on

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project management were delivered to strengthen the capacity to develop terms of reference. The officers who participated received a certificate as project manager so they could continue working in this field after the project closed.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. There is no clear or unique methodology used to measure economic impact of Justice Sector projects. For this reason, to carry out a coherent economic and financial analysis, this document centers its analysis in the savings that resulted out of interventions which aimed to improve and speed up processes.12

2. One of the main interventions carried out by the project was located in the Lima Norte District, so the analysis of the impact will focus mainly on this district. Based on the analysis conducted by an independent firm contracted by the PIU, the average time it takes for a social benefits case to be processed is 1,987 days. According to the same report, social benefits cases are the most common in this district, and they cost US$4,370 to be processed. However, after the intervention of the project, the associated costs dropped to US$3,240. This represented savings of US$1,130 per case. Considering that the Northern Lima Court receives an estimate of 1,200 such cases per year, there are approximate savings of US$249,089.

3. Regarding the ALEGRA centers, they also work as ADR mechanisms, since users may present cases for a faster solution. They target the vulnerable population, with special consideration to indigenous peoples, women, and children. Based on data reported by the MINJUS, out of the total consultations received at the ALEGRA centers, they sponsored a yearly average of 2,272 conciliation cases before they entered the formal justice system. This means that ALEGRA centers successfully reduced the strain of the justice system by an average of 2,272 potential cases to be filed in courts. If it is considered that the majority of those cases were related to family matters, that the average cost of one case is approximately US$1.93 per day, and that each case takes nearly four years to be resolved by the formal system, a yearly cost per case of approximately US$704 results, which in yearly total savings is US$1,600,510.

12 For this, the main unit of analysis will be the reduction in the number of days of a determined process (mainly labor and criminal cases), as a result of a direct project intervention which include the design of a biometric system, the digital filing system, electronic notifications, environmental legal medicine laboratory, and ALEGRA centers. Based on the reduction of days in the processes observed, a quantification of savings can be made based on number of officers involved and users’ costs. In addition, an important externality is related to the fact that the institutions’ reputation is boosted and the confidence among users increases as a direct result of improvements in service delivery.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team MembersNames Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending

Maria Gonzalez de Asis Lead Operations Officer GGHVP Task team leader (TTL) at appraisal

Patricia De la Fuente Hoyes

Senior Financial Management Specialist GGO22 FM

Maria Elizabeth Dasso Consultant LCSSOFrancisco Lazzaro Research Analyst GGO16 Operations support

Dianna M. Pizarro Senior Social Development Specialist GSU04

Maria Elizabeth Dasso Safeguards Specialist GSURR Safeguards Lisa Bhansali Adviser LCSOSPilar Elisa Gonzalez Rodriguez Senior Counsel LEGLE Legal support

Rosmary Marcela Cornejo Valdivia Extended Term Consultant LCSPS Technical support

Nancy Chaarani Meza Operations Officer OPSPQ Operations support

Francisco Rodriguez Senior Procurement Specialist GGO04 Procurement

Milagro Mayuri Temporary LCC6C Administrative support

Supervision/ICR

Jorge Luis Silva Mendez Public Sector Specialist GGO16 TTL during implementation and at closing

Selene del Rocio La Vera Procurement Specialist GGO04 ProcurementJuan Paulo Rivero Zanatta

Financial Management Specialist GGO22 FM

Nelly Ikeda Financial Management Specialist GGO22 FM

Félix Bajandas Consultant GGO16 ICT supportJimena Garrote Senior Counsel LEGOP Legal supportMaria del Camino Hurtado Operations Officer GGHVP Operations support

Ruxandra Burdescu Senior Public Sector Specialist GGO16 TTL of ICR

Camilo Andres Avila Ceballos Consultant GHN04 Operations/technical support and

ICR co-authorPablo Andres Guzman Abastoflor Research Analyst GGO16 Operations support and ICR co-

authorYesica Gabriela Morales Operations Analyst GGO18 Administrative support

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ZazuetaMontserrat Urquiola Ralero Temporary GGO16 Administrative support

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (World Bank Budget Only)

Number of staff weeksUS$, thousands

(including travel and consultant costs)

LendingFY08 0.68 59.50FY09 12.19 69.06FY10 15.14 110.85FY11 0.12 39.02

Total: 28.23 278.43Supervision/ICR

FY11 13.41 94.32FY12 25.66 104.88FY13 8.34 62.68FY14 13.69 58.95FY15 38.88 128.02FY16 21.06 95.36FY17 0.76 16.63

Total: 121.8 560.84

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

No beneficiary survey was performed.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)No workshop took place.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. The ICR was shared with staff from the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for Borrower comments.

2. Overall, according to the comments received, the PIU considers that the project was highly satisfactory in terms of its overall rating, as it achieved the majority of the targets set, as well as the objectives from the participating institutions. This is also in line with the results of the results of the Project Impact Evaluation report commissioned by the PIU to a private consultant firm (Macroconsult).

3. In addition, regarding the delays in the implementation of the New Criminal Procedural Code (NCPC) in the Lima Metropolitan region, the comments highlighted the fact the Project did not sought to implement NCPC, and activities focused on training of staff and capacity building to pave the way for later implementation were carried out, which was also in line with the project development objectives. Moreover, the comments highlighted that the decision to postpone NCPC implementation until 2017 was a political decision outside the control of the Judiciary and the Project Implementation Unit.

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

1. One of the most important IFIs supporting the justice reform in Peru is the IDB. In October 2016, the ICR team consulted with IDB colleagues to seek their views regarding the World Bank justice project. In the opinion of the planning and M&E specialist working with the IDB justice project in Peru, who carried out an evaluation of the first phase of the World Bank’s project, the main challenges for a second phase engagement were correctly focused on infrastructure and training needs. In his opinion, the second phase’s investments in training programs will have an impact over the medium to long term. After this initial diagnosis, he became a part of the IDB project team and continued to coordinate with World Bank colleagues. Based on his experience, any pilot approach has the disadvantage of being perceived as temporary, which does not lead to a complete and much-needed overhaul of the Justice Sector in the country. As such, small-scale interventions may be really useful for entities with small

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budgets, such as the CNM or AMAG, but for the larger institutions, a cost-benefit analysis is not clear and may not justify the cost of engagement. At the same time, for the nature of reforms promoted under the operation, including multiple stakeholders was a very good initiative because it allowed the development of synergies among different initiatives and resulted in a coordinated reform effort and system integration. This would have not been possible without the convening power of the IFIs.

2. One of the lessons learned, which was shared with the ICR team, was related to the program versus project approach (the World Bank designed a project, which was deemed preferable for smoother execution because the design is more flexible, while the IDB designed a program). Flexibility was deemed positive especially given the heavy bureaucracy of the Peruvian state institutions. Another lesson learned that differentiated the World Bank design versus the IDB design was related to the physical location of the PIU (for the World Bank, the PIU was located inside the Judiciary). When a project has multiple beneficiary entities, this can also be seen as a challenge. Functioning from within an entity implies that the PIU needs to adopt and adapt to the rules of the institution, which will, in exchange, provide physical space and access to different facilities. A close working relationship was developed, which can facilitate coordination and communication and can speed up the approval processes. The IDB shared the view that it is preferable for the project to have its own space outside any of the beneficiary entities and its own offices. A recommendation was made for the World Bank to monitor progress more closely and increase the frequency of its supervision activities. According to this one source, the IDB project team visits the IDB offices at least once a week to meet with experts or management, while in the case of the World Bank project, the visits were not as often although they increased toward the end of the implementation phase.

3. Regarding the impact of the activities, two main lessons learned were mentioned. First, that the project was able to complete implementation of important and complex initiatives only due to the multistakeholder approach. This was the case, for example, of the big refurbishment work done in the Junín Judicial District. Carrying out this kind of initiatives within the time and budget provided was very difficult for the Judiciary given the institutional bottlenecks and high number of existing protocols. A cost-benefit analysis would be useful given the size of the interventions. Second, the project design should be informed by consultations with a large group of stakeholders and partners, to avoid overlap. This was a significant challenge at the beginning of project implementation, which was overcome by the prompt intervention by partners and the Government.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Consorcio Macroconsult – Instituto Cuanto. 2016. Evaluación de los Resultados de la Segunda Etapa del Proyecto de Mejoramiento de los Servicios de Justicia.

Poder Judicial del Perú. 2016. Informe de Avance del Proyecto 2011-2016. Proyecto de Mejoramiento de los Servicios de Justicia.

World Bank Group. 2010. Project Appraisal Document of the Justice Services Improvement Project II. Report No. 56576-PE.

World Bank Group. 2010. Implementation and Completion Report of the Justice Services Improvement Project I. Report No. ICR00001204.

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Annex 10. Perception of the Judiciary

1. According to data from a national urban survey carried out by Ipsos Peru, and the Opinion Poll performed by Society for Consumer Research (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung) regarding the approval rates of the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary Branches, approximately 80 percent of the urban population is not satisfied with the functioning and the services provided by the Judiciary. Furthermore, according to the 2015 National Survey on Corruption Perception, 47 percent of the population considers the Judiciary as one of the most corrupt institutions during that year, followed by Congress (44 percent), and the National Police (42 percent).

2. The project did not promise to improve perception on the Justice Sector. However, this is an important concern for the administration and the Project Impact Evaluation study commissioned by the PIU included an assessment of the level of user satisfaction with services provided by the institutions of Peru’s Justice Administration System. The survey covered all judicial districts in Peru, and it showed an overall low level of satisfaction and perception of the services provided by the MINJUS and the Judiciary Branch. The following tables show a summary of the results obtained.

Table 10.1. Judiciary Branch

Total of Judicial Districts Results in the Districts Targeted by the ProjectPercentage SE Inf. Conf. 95% Percentage SE Inf. Conf. 95%

New Users Very bad 8.7 0.7 7.5 10.1 9.3 1.1 7.4 11.7Bad 28.2 1.1 26.1 30.4 29.4 1.7 26.1 32.9Regular 49.6 1.2 47.2 51.9 49.1 1.9 45.4 52.9Good 11.0 0.8 9.6 12.6 10.3 1.2 8.3 12.8Very good 1.2 0.3 0.8 1.8 0.9 0.3 0.4 1.9Excellent 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1No Response 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 1.7Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0Experienced UsersVery bad 9.8 1.0 8.0 12.0 13.8 1.8 10.6 17.8Bad 22.5 1.4 19.9 25.4 28.5 2.4 24.0 33.4Regular 56.6 1.7 53.2 59.9 51.5 2.7 46.3 56.7Good 9.4 1.0 7.6 11.5 5.4 1.2 3.4 8.3Very good 1.4 0.4 0.8 2.4 0.6 0.4 0.1 2.2Excellent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0No Response 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.0Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0

Note: SE = ; Inf. Conf. =.

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Table 10.2. Attorney General’s Office


New Users Very bad 6.0 0.6 4.9 7.2 6.1 0.8 4.7 7.9Bad 17.9 0.9 16.2 19.8 20.1 1.4 17.6 22.9Regular 58.9 1.2 56.6 61.1 59.1 1.7 55.8 62.4Good 13.7 0.8 12.2 15.4 12.5 1.1 10.5 14.9Very good 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.8Excellent 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9No Response 2.4 0.4 1.8 3.2 1.0 0.3 0.5 2.0Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 Experienced Users Very bad 3.8 0.7 2.7 5.5 4.5 1.1 2.8 7.1Bad 17.9 1.4 15.3 20.9 19.2 2.0 15.5 23.4Regular 56.8 1.8 53.2 60.4 58.0 2.5 53.0 62.9Good 19.0 1.5 16.3 22.0 16.8 1.9 13.4 20.9Very good 1.5 0.4 0.8 2.7 1.0 0.5 0.4 2.8Excellent 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 2.1No Response 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0


Table 10.3. MINJUS


ALEGRA UsersVery bad 5.1 1.2 3.2 8.1 5.6 1.4 3.4 9.1Bad 11.4 1.7 8.4 15.4 12.6 2.0 9.2 17.2Regular 58.7 2.7 53.3 63.9 56.1 3.0 50.1 62.0Good 20.2 2.2 16.2 24.9 20.4 2.5 16.0 25.7Very good 2.1 0.8 1.0 4.4 2.6 1.0 1.2 5.4Excellent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0No Response 2.4 0.8 1.2 4.8 2.6 1.0 1.2 5.4Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0Defense ServicesVery bad 6.8 1.5 4.3 10.4 5.5 1.7 3.0 10.0Bad 10.3 1.8 7.3 14.5 9.9 2.2 6.3 15.2Regular 53.7 3.0 47.8 59.5 58.8 3.7 51.4 65.8Good 22.1 2.5 17.6 27.3 19.8 3.0 14.6 26.3Very good 2.8 1.0 1.4 5.6 2.2 1.1 0.8 5.8Excellent 1.4 0.7 0.5 3.8 1.1 0.8 0.3 4.3No Response 2.8 1.0 1.4 5.6 2.7 1.2 1.1 6.5Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0Conciliation ServicesVery bad 2.2 1.5 0.5 8.4 1.7 1.7 0.2 11.5Bad 15.1 3.7 9.0 24.0 13.3 4.4 6.7 24.9Regular 40.9 5.1 31.2 51.3 36.7 6.3 25.2 49.9Good 32.3 4.9 23.4 42.6 38.3 6.3 26.7 51.5Very good 5.4 2.4 2.2 12.5 3.3 2.3 0.8 12.8Excellent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0No Response 4.3 2.1 1.6 11.1 6.7 3.2 2.5 16.9Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0


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