Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
This article was downloaded by: [University of Auckland Library]On: 18 November 2014, At: 17:37Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Australian Journal of International AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20
Perspectives on Australian foreign policy—1997Russell Trood aa Centre for the Study of Australia‐Asia Relations , Griffith University ,Published online: 20 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: Russell Trood (1998) Perspectives on Australian foreign policy—1997, Australian Journal of InternationalAffairs, 52:2, 185-199, DOI: 10.1080/10357719808445249
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445249
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1998
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
RUSSELL TROOD
(Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University)
Towards the end of 1996, an editorial in the Australian newspaper commented: 'Australianeeds the Federal Government to determine a clear set of priorities in foreign, defence andtrade policy' (Australian 17 October 1996; see also Weekend Australian 14-15 December1996). To date, the paper argued, the government had not done so. Within the context of avery ordinary first nine months of managing Australia's foreign relations, the Howardgovernment was perhaps fortunate that this 1996 critique was not more trenchant. Foralthough the newly elected government had some early foreign policy successes, the nearcollapse of Australia's relations with China; the loss of the campaign to secure an Australianseat on the United Nations Security Council; the controversy over Australian aid policy,particularly in relation to the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) scheme; and theinadequate management of the Hanson debate, all created a generally poor impression of itsforeign policy skills.1
Twelve months later, the government is showing far more assurance in its conduct ofAustralia's foreign relations. In 1997, it succeeded in placing its own particular stamp onAustralian foreign, defence and trade policy. A series of fresh policy assessments, includingthe first White Paper on Foreign and Trade policy recast Canberra's foreign priorities,effectively widening the rhetorical gap between the government's policy direction and thatof its Labor predecessors. Substantively, however, many of the same interests remain centralto Australia's international concerns. The new government's focus on Asia, the importanceof trade policy, the decline in resources going to the foreign affairs portfolio and a lessdeclamatory approach to human rights policy, all resonate with the recent past. They alsounderscore the bipartisanship which has long characterised the conduct of Australian foreignpolicy. The challenge, as the new government has perceived it, has been to design andconduct a foreign policy with a clearer focus on Australia's immediate national interests andto place them at the forefront of its international agenda.
This imperative helps to explain the stylistic contrasts which are now emerging betweenthe coalition's approach to foreign policy and that of its predecessor. As prime minister,Mr Howard has a less obvious interest in the field than either of his immediate predecessors.Nor does the new government share Labor's enthusiasm for the grand conceptual policyframeworks and 'big picture' designs which were such a recognisable feature of itspredecessors' policies. The new custodians of Australia's international interests are alert tothe dangers of global hubris and anxious that as a middle power Australia avoid pretensionin setting its international goals. Equally, the foreign minister, Alexander Downer, is lessgiven to the frenetic activism that often marked Gareth Evans's custody of the foreign affairsportfolio. Downer has not been unwilling to pursue new policy initiatives, but with the heavyhands of the Treasury and the Department of Finance all over the portfolio and consistently
1 For an account of Australian foreign policy in 1996, see Dalrymple (1997). For a review of Australia'sAsia policy, see McNamara and Bishop (1997).
0004-9913/98/020185-15 © 1998 Australian Institute of International Affairs 185
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
urging fiscal restraint (as they have been doing in relation to every other federal department)the opportunities for policy creativity have been distinctly limited.
Given these changes, it is perhaps not surprising that the government's foreign policy hashad its critics, particularly in relation to East Asia, where by the middle of the year acombination of regional developments and events at home appeared to several commentatorsto have reduced Australia's diplomatic standing in the region (Australian 19 February 1997;Australian Financial Review 31 October 1997). The extent of this decline is open toconsiderable debate. To be sure, the Howard government has not given as much rhetoricalemphasis to Asia, but in part this reflects the fact that compared to Labor, the newgovernment has failed to give the same attention or priority to foreign policy issues. Andwhile, overall, Australia has a long way to go to perfect its cooperative engagement with theregion, much of the inexperience that accounts for the early shortcomings of the govern-ment's approach have been overcome and the government is looking more assured in itsapproach to regional issues. Thus, it offered an immediate, strong and supportive responseto governments caught up in the Asian economic crisis in the second part of the year and hastaken a number of steps to strengthen bilateral relations in line with the intentions spelled outin its 1996 election policy.
The 1997 foreign policy calendar was a busy one for the government. The remainder ofthis review discusses the main issues and developments, but by way of introduction a rangeof other issues deserves brief mention. Consistent with the government's desire to establisha balance in the regional emphasis of its international relations, greater attention was givento relations with Europe. Although not always harmonious, largely because of the EuropeanUnion's trade protectionist trade policies, the government nevertheless signed a landmarkJoint Declaration on Relations between the European Union and Australia overcomingprevious problems over a human rights clause in the document (Downer 1997a). InNovember, the government reversed a position of its predecessor and announced thatAustralia would sigh the Convention on the Prohibition and Use, Stockpiling Production andTransfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction (the Ottawa Treaty) when it openedfor signature later in the year (Downer and McLachlan 1997). Relations with Indonesia andJapan remained a key element of Australia's East Asia policy with the prime minister havingseveral meetings with each of its leaders during the year, including at the Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation leaders' meeting in Vancouver in November. In relation to Japan, thefourteenth meeting of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee took place in Tokyo inAugust, the first in which Howard government ministers had participated. In June andSeptember, respectively, the government made decisions on the levels of future tariffprotection for the Australian car and textile, clothing and footwear industries (see reports inAustralian 6 June 1997; Weekend Australian 13-14 September 1997). In deciding to continuea measure of protection into the next century, the government did not please most of theeconomic commentators, but responded to strong public pressure for a softer line on the issueand departed from Labor's hard line on tariff reduction during its period in office. In themultilateral arena, the government welcomed the July expansion to nine countries of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In doing so, Canberra approved ofASEAN's decision not to admit Cambodia and reluctantly (after some unsuccessful highlevel representations), accepted Burma's entry (Australian 8 August 1997). The year also sawa meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers take place in Scotland in mid-October.Australia used the occasion to press its Commonwealth colleagues for support on a range ofinternational matters, including its controversial position on greenhouse gas emissions. At themeeting, Canberra was also strongly supportive of the consensus that emerged forthe Commonwealth to reinvent itself, at least in part, as a forum which gave closer attentionto the common economic and trade interests among its members. Finally, an interestingdevelopment occurred in the decision of the foreign minister to establish a Foreign Affairs
186
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
Council to provide outside experts with a means of injecting ideas into the foreign policyprocess. The Council will meet for the first time early in 1998 (Downer 1997b).
Reports and enquiries: establishing new priorities
Throughout 1997, the government received a succession of reports which are likely to shapethe direction of Australia's international relations into the foreseeable future.
The Mclntosh Review: restructuring the defence establishment
The first of the enquries to report was the Defence Efficiency Review, the Mclntosh Review.The inquiry into Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence (DefenceEfficiency Review 1997) was made public in early March and was intended to examineperceived shortcomings in the efficiency and effectiveness of the defence organisation.Perhaps not surprisingly, the report of the inquiry presented the Minister for Defence witha large number of recommendations (52 in number) for reform. These covered all aspects ofdefence organisation, including higher defence arrangements, management and finance,strategy and intelligence, capability development, acquisition, personnel and training, andeducation. Through a comprehensive range of organisational reforms and programefficiencies, the shedding of around 7800 military and civilian personnel and the sale ofsurplus defence assets, the report projected savings of billions of dollars to defence overseveral years. The government's intention was that these savings would be reallocated withinthe defence portfolio, allowing more resources to be directed to combat capabilities, or the'shape end' of defence, as the minister, Ian McLachlan, calls it.
The immediate press reaction to the report's findings and recommendations was highlycomplimentary (Weekend Australian 12-13 April 1997). However, the Executive Director ofthe Australian Defence Association, Michael O'Connor, was one of several specialistcommentators who expressed concern at the likely effects of the loss of personnel on theAustralian Defence Force's combat capabilities and the report's relative silence on improvingthe processes of decision making within the organisation. The 'new structure', O'Connorremarked, 'represents a rearrangement of the boxes in the organisational chart', but will dolittle to change the inefficient 'bureaucratic culture of defence' (Australian 18 April 1997).On the other hand, the minister appeared well satisfied with the results of the review andmade it clear that the implementation of its recommendations would be given a high prioritywithin his portfolio.
The Defence Efficiency Review made only passing reference to the strategic environmentin which Australia now had to pursue its security interests. It was clear from early in the year,however, that Mr McLachlan had some quite definite opinions on this subject and on theimplications for Australia's defence posture. Since coming to office in March 1996, he hasbeen more open than his immediate predecessor, Senator Robert Ray, in expressing publiclyhis concerns over a perceived deterioration in Australia's security environment. Australiamay not currently face any particular, immediate threats to its security, but the minister iswont to allude to the fact that history teaches the dangers of complacency, a lesson Australiacannot afford to ignore in a regional environment that is increasingly complex, uncertain anddemanding (Courier Mail 2 May 1997; Weekend Australian 26-27 April 1997). At times theminister's rhetoric appears somewhat exaggerated as Admiral Beaumont and GeneralGration, two former Chiefs of the Australian Defence Force, have pointed out (WeekendAustralian 26-27 April 1997). Nevertheless, the minister's strong views appear to haveplayed an important role in 1997 in shifting the foundations of Australia's strategic posture.By early in the year, it was evident that Mr McLachlan, and the government more generally,favoured a move away from the Defence of Australia concept so prominent in the 1987 and
187
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
1994 Defence White Papers towards a new strategy that would see Australia undertaking amore active, forward engaged role in the security of the region {Courier Mail 1 May 1997).
Strategic Policy Review
The shift became clear when the government released the public version of a new strategicreview early in December (Australia. Department of Defence 1997; see also McLachlan1997). It argued that Australia's previous strategic posture has been too narrowly focused onresponding to low level contingencies which effectively yielded the strategic advantage toAustralia's potential enemies. It is a mistake to assume that Australia's strategic interestsbegin and end at its shoreline. Since Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region, it needsto acquire a defence capability that will enable it to undertake a wide range of defence tasksboth in the region and in the defence of Australia. Australia's key security interests shouldbe seen to include avoiding destabilising competition between the region's major powers,preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon, maintaining stability in Southeast Asia,assisting neighbours to strengthen their security, and preventing the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction. The strategic review then went on to detail the capabilities necessary tosecure these ends, the priorities being intelligence, command and surveillance systems(the knowledge edge) followed by developing maritime capabilities, an enhanced strikecapability, and building land capabilities to defeat threats on Australian territory.
To date there has been little considered assessment of the new strategic analysis. Firstthoughts, however, were that it bore a rather striking resemblance to Australia's old strategyof forward defence, the strategy which underpinned Australian defence planning during theCold War (Weekend Australian 6—7 December 1997; Australian 3 December 1997; SydneyMorning Herald 29 December 1997). While the Minister strongly rejects this characterisa-tion, he is nevertheless comfortable with the new strategy being labelled 'forward engage-ment'. Beyond labels, the new strategy is likely to come under challenge on other grounds,not the least being the very ambitious tasks it establishes for the Australian Defence Forcein an era when the Defence portfolio is unlikely to receive any further allocation ofCommonwealth funds. In this respect, there has to be considerable doubt as to whether theslimmed down Australian Defence Force with a combat strength of around 50 000 personnelwill be capable of carrying out the security missions expected of it under the new strategy.Nor is it obvious that the regional security anxieties that appear to animate the new postureare as severe as Australia's defence planners seem to believe. That there are strategicuncertainties in the region is self-evident. That they add up to greater danger and a morethreatening regional security environment likely to seriously and adversely challenge Aus-tralia's interests to a degree not evident in the recent past, is, at the very least, arguable.Indeed, a plausible case can be made that the widespread political, economic and socialchanges that have taken place throughout East Asia over the last few decades has enhancedthe long term prospects for peace and stability. But these issues await a wider debate: for themoment, there can be little doubt that 1997 has been an important year in the evolution ofAustralian defence thinking and that the Howard government has placed its stamp on currentdefence policy.
Foreign aid: the Simons Review
The government also spent time considering foreign aid policy in 1997. In April the resultsof the Simons Inquiry, Australia's Overseas Aid Program, 1997-98 (1997), was presented tothe Minister for Foreign Affairs. The review offered the first comprehensive assessment ofAustralia's overseas aid policy for many years, but for all that, it made a relatively low keyappearance into the public domain, a mark perhaps of the public perception that foreign aid
188
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
is of declining importance in Australian foreign policy. Even so, Australia's aid budget isaround $1.5 billion annually and, according to the report, still makes a significant contribu-tion to the welfare of several recipient countries. Yet the report was clear that withAustralia's aid program now amounting to only 0.29 per cent of the national gross domesticproduct, it was time for Australia to abandon the pretence of being able to meet the UN goalof 0.7 per cent. The report recommended a more modest (unspecified) benchmark andsuggested that the existing program would be better targeted to development objectives morelikely to lead to the alleviation of poverty. More controversially, the report was seen by somecommentators as highly critical of tied aid, a position that earned it a rebuke asbeing 'muddle headed, woolly and unrealistic' from the foreign affairs editor of theAustralian, Greg Sheridan (Sheridan 1997; see also Weekend Australian 19-20 April 1997;Australian 15 May 1997: letters to the editor). Sheridan was rightly more sympathetic to therecommendation mat the government introduce a new type of concessional finance programto replace the Development Import Finance Facility program which was dumped at great costto the government's (and minister's) foreign policy credibility in 1996. DIFF representedboth good aid and good policy and was inexplicably made the subject of budget cuts, adecision the government now appears to regret. The Simons recommendation now offers thegovernment the means to retreat from the ill-advised position.2
The Foreign Policy and Trade White Paper
The most significant new report of 1997 was undoubtedly the government's Foreign Policyand Trade White Paper, entitled In the National Interest, released towards the end of August(Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1997). The preparation of a foreignpolicy White Paper had been a 1996 election promise of the government and was beingawaited with considerable expectation, in part because it was to be the first ever undertaken.The White Paper was prepared within the Department of Foreign Affairs and was shaped byan Advisory Panel of representatives from academe and business, with considerable input, itwas said, from relevant ministers, including the prime minister. According to its Forward, theWhite Paper was to be regarded as 'framework document', focusing on the conceptualfoundations of Australia foreign and trade relations over the next fifteen years.
The paper argued that the two most important influences on Australian foreign and tradepolicy over the next decade and a half would be globalisation and the continuing economicrise of East Asia. This meant that the region would become increasingly important toAustralia, would affect its relative standing in the area and affect its ability to achieve itsforeign policy goals. While the United States would remain the single most powerful countryin the world and continue to be fully engaged in East Asia, China's enhanced growth,increasing confidence and influence would be the most important strategic development overthe fifteen-year time frame. The paper went on to contend that while the region was thehighest priority, Australia was a country of global interests requiring policies of broad scope.Reflecting a strong prime-ministerial conviction, the White Paper repeated the view thatAustralians did not have to choose between their history and their geography. And while theyfaced an environment of opportunity and had every reason to be confident about their future,they faced a series of challenges which would have to be overcome with 'hard work andcreativity'. As strategies to deal with the challenges, the White Paper proposed strengtheningand improving the productivity of the Australian economy, greater emphasis on expandingbilateral relationships, particularly with four core states (China, Japan, Indonesia and the
2 Much latter in the year Australia's importance as a supplier of foreign aid was underscored by severedrought in Papua New Guinea.
189
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
United States), closer engagement with Asia, an unqualified commitment to racial equalityand a 'selective approach to the multilateral agenda'.
Commentators gave the White Paper a generally warm welcome with considerableattention focusing on the perceptible shifts in policy compared to that of the Laborgovernment (Courier Mail 19 August 1997; Weekend Australia 30-31 August 1997;Australian 29 August 1997).3 Most obvious in this respect was the tone of realism thatinfused much of the document; second, the priority given to economic interests as the keyelement of Australia's international personality; third, the emphasis placed on bilateralism, asdistinct from multilateralism as the primary means of Australia's international engagement;and fourth, the commitment to shifting the rhetorical balance away from Labor's perceivedpreoccupation with East Asia to one which gives the highest priority to the region in thecontext of a wider international agenda.
While some of this rightly came in for criticism there was almost no mention of a majorshortcoming of the White Paper; namely, its refusal to offer any insight into the government'sthinking on the rapidly shrinking resources being devoted to the conduct of Australia'sforeign relations. This failure is all the more curious for the fact that throughout its 100 oddpages the White Paper offers constant assurance that the government intends to maintain and,in certain cases, expand a whole range of existing international obligations and commitments.With Australia's diplomatic and foreign policy making capabilities having been in evidentdecline over the last five years, and now being further affected by severe cutbacks in twoHoward government budgets, the credibility of these assurances is open to considerable doubtand remains in need of a response.
It appears that the government acted on a political imperative in wishing to distance itsforeign policy from that of its predecessors, but the White Paper also reflects recognisablephilosophical differences between the parties on foreign affairs. The government, andperhaps Howard in particular, appears to believe that there was more than a little pretentious-ness in Labor's international posture and that its policies were poorly cast to advanceAustralia's key national interests. The White Paper was designed to focus attention on thething that matters most in foreign policy—advancing Australia's self interest—hence the title,In the National Interest. This, in turn, reflects the reality that Messrs Howard, Downer andFischer are by character and conviction realists, rather uneasy with liberal internationalistideas and suspicious of strategies, such as multilateralism, often used to advance them. Toparaphrase J.D.B. Miller, they evince a dogged low gear determination to press Australia'sinterests on the international stage conscious that, as a middle power at best, there are alwayslikely to be structural impediments to success. There is more than a little virtue in agovernment having a clear understanding of its nation's interests and the focused pursuit ofpolicy goals is hardly to be undervalued. But the international context is important and thedegree to which the post-Cold War world remains an arena for realist solutions to complexpolicy problems for a country like Australia is open to considerable doubt.
Australia's relations with East Asia
Australia's relations with the countries of East Asia have deepened appreciably in recentyears, but the progress has not always been linear. Events have often conspired to cause asetback in one or more relationship, serving to further underscore the immense challengeAustralia faces in accommodating to its Asian future. In this respect, 1997 was little differentto other years. While Australia maintained close and cooperative relations with mostcountries of the region, the quality and character of Canberra's regional diplomacy was
3 For more critical comentaries, see Courier Mail 3 September 1997 and Fitzgerald et al. (1997).
190
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—7997
frequently tested by events both at home and abroad. Most notable were the fallout from thefinancial crises facing several East Asian governments, the reconstruction of Australia'sbilateral relationship with China, the collapse of peace in Cambodia and the continuingimpact of the Hanson debate.
The East Asia financial crisis
As late as mid-1997 most economic analysts remained supremely confident that regionaleconomic growth in East Asia would remain at the spectacularly impressive levels of recentyears (Australian 20 May 1997). As a consequence, it was anticipated that Australia'sdeepening economic engagement with the region would also continue with trade andinvestment levels showing further growth into the foreseeable future. By the end of the year,however, this optimism had all but dissipated as an alarmingly long list of Asian countriesfaced a series of financial crises which seemed certain to retard severely their economicgrowth and perhaps even threaten some countries' political stability. At the same time,Australia seemed certain to be affected. In the most severely affected countries—Thailand,Indonesia and South Korea—the crisis unfolded in ways which reflected local economicconditions, but its causes were very similar in each case as the regions' high levels of foreigndebt, overvalued currencies, growing current account deficits, tight labour markets, poorlyadministered financial sectors and highly speculative property booms, created conditions thatmade international financial markets increasingly nervous (Weekend Australian 29-30November 1997). Currency speculators moved in, cutting billions of dollars off the value oflocal currencies, creating havoc on local stock markets and, perhaps of longer lasting impact,seriously undermining local and international confidence in the Asian economic miracle. Asthe year drew to a close the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been called to providefinancial rescue packages to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, with the possibility thatMalaysia may eventually also need assistance.4
Early official Australian reaction to the growing crisis on its doorstep was to downplaythe seriousness of the situation (Australian 9 October 1997). Beyond government, however,events were viewed with greater alarm. The National Institute of Economic and IndustryResearch for instance, commented that 'Asia will be in trouble over the next 3 to 5 years'(Australian 9 October 1997). In August, when Thailand, the first of the most severelyaffected countries, decided to call in the IMF, Canberra was quick to associate itself with therescue, offering to contribute $A1.3 billion in loan assistance (Australian 12 August 1997).In November, a further amount of $A1 billion was offered to assist Indonesia's bailout, andlater (in December), another $A1.5 billion for the South Korean package. Federal cabinetapparently had little difficulty agreeing on the need to contribute to the international programof action. Australia's growing economic interdependence with East Asia, including the realitythat approximately 60 per cent of its exports are now destined for the region, made the casefor participation a compelling one. This was not necessarily widely appreciated among thegeneral public where some opposition to Canberra's role could be detected.
At the time of writing the long term implications of the economic crisis in East Asiaremain unclear. There appears, however, to be something of a consensus that the effects onAsian growth and prosperity will be serious and likely to last at least several years. If so, theeconomic impact on Australia could also be severe with loss of export markets, particularlyfor primary products and commodities, loss of inbound tourism and a possible severesoftening in the Asian education market (Weekend Australian 25-26 October 1997). Aside
4 The unfolding events can be followed through the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review,note particularly the editions of 18 September and 6 November 1997.
191
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
from the direct affect on trade and economic relations with the region, the crisis has alreadyproduced some unhappy derivative affects. Over the last few months of the year, for instance,the Australian dollar came under pressure with the currency losing several cents in valueagainst the US dollar apparently against concerns that economic growth would be affectedby the nation's high commercial exposure to the events in Asia. Some commentatorsconsidered that the government's economic growth projections for Australia were looking toooptimistic and, eventually, the Treasury was forced to agree, though its downward adjustmentwas modest.
While recognising the deepening nature of the crisis, the government was determined tomake a virtue of the situation. The prime minister in particular highlighted the comparativestrength of the Australian economy and the way in which his government's economicpolicies, including the creation of a budget surplus, would enable the country to avoid theworst effects of crisis. Nor did Mr Howard miss making the point that his government'sresponse to the crisis had boosted Australia's standing in the region and underscored itsdetermination to be fully engaged in regional affairs (Courier Mail 22 November 1997;Australian 27 August 1997). He also insisted that events testified to the government'swisdom in broadening the foundations of Australia's foreign policy to give the highestpriority to East Asia, but not to be dependent on it, while reaching out to develop closerrelations with countries in other regions of the world.
Relations with China
As Colin Mackerras has noted, 1996 was one of the most difficult years in Sino-Australianrelations since the resumption of diplomatic recognition in 1972 (Mackerras 1997). Bycontrast, the year 1997 proved to be one of reconstruction in the relationship. As it was thetwenty-fifth anniversary of recognition, both sides appeared determined to celebrate, keen tounderline the continuing value and importance they attached to their links.
The renewed optimism in the relationship emerged during a series of reciprocal high leveldiplomatic visits which took place throughout the year. The prime minister visited Chinaearly in the year (March-April) and sought to clarify his government's approach to therelationship by avoiding all descriptions of it in the effusive, overly enthusiastic terms muchfavoured by some of his predecessors. While raising controversial topics such as humanrights, Tibet and the fate of James Peng, Howard said his government was 'very firmlycommitted to strong and mutually productive relationship' with Beijing. 'Inevitably there willbe differences', he noted, but by focusing on the 'goals we have in common ... we can havea truly effective partnership for growth for the next 25 years' (Australian 1 April 1997).Howard appeared keen to establish a business-like working relationship with the Chineseleadership, one devoid of unrealistic expectations that their two countries could ever share acomplete identity of interests, but sufficiently strong to permit cooperation over a wideagenda of issues. While Australian commentators offered mixed reviews of the visit, theChinese appeared to respond warmly to Howard's approach, enabling relations to stabiliseand move forward after the setbacks of 1996 (Weekend Australian 5-6 April 1997).
The prime minister's visit led to an agreement that the human rights agenda between thetwo countries be carried forward via a series of annual bilateral dialogue meetings. TheAustralian press tended to see this arrangement as Canberra taking a soft line on the humanrights issue. The government, however, was encouraged by the 'progress' made at the firstof the dialogue meetings in Beijing in August, despite any obvious movement in eithercountry's traditional stance on the matter (Australian 15 August 1997; Downer 1997c). ThatChina proved so cooperative in agreeing to talks on this subject may have been related to thefact that, for the first time since 1989, Australia decided not to co-sponsor an annual UNmotion condemning China's human rights record, despite strong pressure from the United
192
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
States to do so {Australian 16 April 1997). Canberra explained its position in pragmaticterms, a stance which now serves to underscore the clear differences in the Australian andUS approaches to matters of human rights in Asia.
Prior to the human rights meeting in Beijing, improved relations were further aided afterthe foreign minister made it clear that the Australian government intended to be representedat high level at the Hong Kong handover ceremony at the end of June. Once again Australiaseemed to be out of step with some other Western governments, including the US which hadattempted to orchestrate a boycott of the celebrations (Australian 12 June 1997). In the event,when the foreign minister attended the ceremony he found himself sharing the ceremonialdais with many of his other Western counterparts whose governments had reconsidered theirparticipation and decided it was desirable to be represented.
Later in the year, Howard's visit to China were reciprocated by several high level visitorsfrom China. In May, the Chinese Vice Premier, Zhu Rongji, the third highest rankingChinese leader, arrived in Australia and announced, among other things, that his governmentdid not view Australia's alliance with the US as a threat (Australian 28 May 1997). This wassignificant since it appeared to have been one of the factors that had soured relations in 1996.Later, in December, an equally as distinguished visitor, Li Rhuihuan, arrived as part of thetwenty-fifth anniversary celebrations. The year of reconstruction ended on a high note whenit was announced in late December that Australia would be designated one of only sevenofficial tourist destinations for Chinese and that the Chinese President, Jian Zemin, wouldvisit Australia in 1998, the first to be undertaken by a serving Chinese head of state(Australian 30 December 1997; Downer 1997d). Given the parlous state of the bilateralrelationship at the end of 1996, the scheduling of this visit marked a significant achievementand allows the government to claim the improvement of relations with China as one of themost successful arenas of its diplomacy in 1997.
Troubled Cambodia
The financial crisis to one side, one of the year's main events in Southeast Asia took placein Cambodia. Notwithstanding the considerable international effort devoted to bring peace tothat troubled part of the world in the early 1990s, the internal political situation remainedhighly unstable. In June, the political situation began to boil over when fighting again brokeout in the capital, Phnom Penh, after one of Cambodia's two prime ministers, Hun Sen,accused his coalition partner, Prince Ranariddh, of plotting a coup against him. With aruthless disregard of international opinion Hun Sen set about the military overthrow of hisopposition and forced the Prince into exile, raising widespread international concerns thatCambodia was again about to descend into yet another civil war.
Canberra's immediate concern was the safety of hundreds of Australian citizens caughtup in the strife and Australian airforce rescue flights were organised for those willing toleave. More complicated was the design of a diplomatic response. Canberra condemned thelawlessness of Hun Sen's actions and dispatched a senior diplomat to Phnom Penh, Mr JohnDauth, to reinforce its message of displeasure (Australian 2 September 1997). Shortlyafterwards it also suspended defence cooperation with the Cambodian government, althoughit left a $A32 million humanitarian aid program in place. Acknowledging ASEAN's centralinterests in Cambodia, Canberra supported ASEAN's decision to postpone consideration ofCambodia's membership of the Association until matters improved. The foreign minister alsocancelled a scheduled visit to the country (see Downer 1997e).
After this initial flurry of activity the task was to find ways to persuade Hun Sen tore-establish the foundations of law and order in his torn country, including the holding offresh elections. Amid some domestic unease reflecting concern over Hun Sen's dismal human
193
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
rights record, Canberra took an active, but not leading role in this process, largely contentto support' the careful diplomacy of ASEAN. Although not altogether happy with the rangeof diplomatic options it faced, the government accepted the advice of its ambassador inPhnom Penh and agreed to back Hun Sen and line up with ASEAN (Courier Mail 15 July1997). Downer reinforced Australia's position after a meeting of ASEAN representatives andother members of the international community in New York in September, and again inNovember, when he announced that Australia would provide $100 000 in aid to assist theUnited Nations to monitor the safe return of exiles. This was an amount in addition to a$500 000 package of electoral assistance already provided and designed to facilitate theholding of free and fair elections in the new year. As the year drew to a close, Canberraappeared optimistic that order would be restored to Cambodia following the elections, butgiven the Byzantine world of Cambodian domestic politics and Hun Sen's ruthless determi-nation to remain in power, this optimism was not being expressed too loudly.
The Hanson debate
Perhaps the most persistent theme in Australia's relations with the countries of Asia in 1997was the impact, both real and imagined, of the so-called Hanson debate. Triggered in 1996with the election of Ms Pauline Hanson to a Queensland House of Representatives seat infederal parliament, the debate gained in intensity during the early part of the year as MsHanson's popularity grew in a seemingly inexorable fashion. Hanson's extreme and clearlyracist view on Australian immigration policy, and on relations with the region moregenerally, was one of several factors that contributed to a widespread perception amongcommentators that Australia's official desire to become more deeply engaged in Asia was bymid-year faltering badly and in need of urgent salvation. It seemed to take a Septemberaddress to a Sydney audience by the Australian born president of the World Bank, JamesWolfensohn, to remind the country that engagement was indeed an important nationalobjective (Australian 30 September 1997).
As the year went on, Hanson seemed to be anxious to distance herself from the extremepositions she had taken up in 1996. Even so, her opponents in government, business, themedia and in academe were relentless in their condemnation of her position and the impactit was said to be having on Australia's standing in East Asia. The Deputy Prime Minister andtrade minister, Tim Fischer, along with his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wereamong the most consistent of critics. While both pronounced Hanson's views morallyrepugnant, their preoccupation was often with the practical effects of the debate and theperception, apparently growing in Asia, that Australia was a racist country, one where,among other things, random acts of racial vilification made the country unsafe for Asians tolive, work or play. Although Australian leaders sought to counter this impression duringtheir numerous trips to the region, reports from overseas were frequent that unless the debateended it would do Australia's reputation in the region lasting damage while also affectingits regional trade, tourism and educational relations (Australian 4 September 1997). Hardlyless serious was the growing level of racial intolerance evident within the Australiancommunity.
It was in this context that most commentators found the prime minister's position on thematter so curious (Australian 14 October 1997). As in 1996, he was forced throughout 1997to defend himself against charges of being soft on racism as a consequence of his failure tocondemn the Hanson agenda. On the face of it there was less to support the charge of theprime ministerial racism than some evidence that the prime minister's political opponentswere anxious to exploit an issue in the hope that it might yield them some valuable, if notentirely obvious, political advantage. Howard himself appeared to believe that the best wayto combat Ms Hanson and her new One Nation party was to avoid personal attacks lest they
194
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
attract sympathy for her cause while expecting that her minority appeal would soon collapse{Australian 7 May 1997). Eventually, though, Howard did offer a public repudiation ofHanson's ideas (and repeated it a few months later.) At a meeting of the Asia Society inSydney in May he referred to Hanson's right to be heard but went on to remark that she hasto be accountable for her views and could not 'evade the responsibility for the consequencesof her statements'. There then followed a series of rebukes of Hanson's positions on a rangeof public issues, including foreign investment, the likelihood of civil war in Australia, andthe danger of the country being 'swamped' by Asians. Hanson, the prime minister said,sought to exploit fear and without offering solutions or hope (Howard 1997). To the primeminister's most vociferous critics, this was still not strong enough and fell well short of thestatesman-like stance they expected from him on the issue (Australian 15 May 1997:editorial; Weekend Australian 9-10 May 1997).
While it is doubtful that the domestic political nuances of the debate were widelyunderstood in the region, it is nevertheless clear that the whole matter has attractedwidespread media and official attention in certain countries, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia andSingapore among them. But the impact is unclear. There has been anecdotal evidence thattourism and educational linkages are being affected, but for much of the year Australia'slevel of trade with the region remained strong. The case for general widespread harm toAustralia's regional economic interests is not easily proved, particularly in the light of theeconomic crisis which began to overtake the region in the second part of the year. Politically,however, the debate has done nothing to enhance Australia's reputation or the cause of closerdiplomatic and cultural relations with the countries of Asia. Indeed, it has probably enhancedthe perception, still remarkably widespread in Asia, that Australia has yet to become seriousabout its future in the region. Until this perception is overcome, Canberra's ability to makeprogress on certain aspects of its Asia agenda, such as becoming a party to the annualAsia-Europe Meeting forum, is unlikely to progress very far.
Climate change and the Kyoto conference
In recent years environmental issues have become an increasingly important part ofAustralia's foreign policy agenda. The challenge in 1997 was to develop a credible policy inpreparation for the international conference on climate change scheduled for Kyoto, Japan,in early December. The main aim of the conference was to secure international agreementon the legally binding targets to limit greenhouse gas emissions to enable implementation ofthe Global Warming Convention signed by Australia, among others, in Rio de Janeiro in1992.
From the outset, Canberra's stance on the issue was controversial. While accepting theneed for limits5 it was determined to secure a workable and fair outcome, one that wouldrecognise Australia's unique economic situation (including its high dependence on fossilfuels) and ensure that developing countries (expected to be high emitters of gases) by earlyin the next century make an appropriate contribution to gas reduction (Courier Mail 2 May1997). To these ends, Canberra found that by early in the year its emerging position wasopposed by several important developed countries, not least the United States, whichwas anxious to secure legally binding uniform targets, and the states of the European Unionwhich wanted an across the board 15 per cent reduction in emissions by the year 2015(Australian 13 June 1997). In contrast, Canberra wanted the international community toaccept the principle of differentiation whereby through application of a formula eachcountry's unique economic circumstances could be taken into account in setting limits. On
5 Although see Australian (19 September 1997).
195
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
this basis it could be expected that some countries, such as Australia, might be permitted toincrease emissions, provided an overall global reduction was achieved (Parer 1997).
Throughout the year, members of the Howard government, including the prime ministerhimself, were wont to argue that Australia's negotiating position was the only one whichproperly took account of the national interest. Based on research conducted by the AustralianBureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics, it contended that any less of a settlementwas likely to result in job losses of tens of thousands and place a burden of around $9000on every Australian. In a world where environmental awareness is greater than ever before,the government found that its position was difficult to sell both at home and abroad.Domestically, it could claim strong support from the mining lobby and some economiccommentators, but environmental groups were endlessly critical of the policy, arguing that itnot only failed to take account of the seriousness of the problem, but that the science andeconomic modelling on which it was based was unreliable (Australian Financial Review 27November 1997). Overseas, Australia had clearly taken up a minority position, and asidefrom sympathetic noises from Japan, was strongly opposed by all the leading developedeconomies. As a consequence, Howard's ministers spent a great deal of time and energy bothat home and abroad trying to secure support for their position.
The environment minister, Senator Hill, led the international charge, but the magnitudeof the diplomatic task faced by Australia frequently required prime ministerial intervention.On visits to the United States in July, the South Pacific Forum in September and theCommonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Scotland in October, Howard pressedAustralia's case to courteous, but not always sympathetic leaders. In the South Pacific, theprime minister's determination to stick to his position created considerable acrimony,encouraging commentators to report that it was the least successful and most discordantmeeting of the Forum members that anyone could remember (Courier Mail 20 September1997). As the December conference approached, however, it appeared that Australia mightbe making some headway with its policy. But while the American and European positionsappeared to soften somewhat, and other countries, among them Russia, were lookingmore favourably at Canberra's stand, Japan's position seemed to harden against Australia(Weekend Australian 26-27 July 1997; Weekend Australian 2-3 August 1997). There is littlecompelling evidence that Canberra's diplomacy directly encouraged these movements whichappear to reflect the impact of more local pressures. On the other hand, Canberra'sdetermination to continue the forceful advocacy of its policy against considerable odds waseventually to pay considerable dividends.
By the time the conference assembled in early December, the government had won awider measure of domestic support for its policy, but international support for its stanceremained limited. Over ten days of complex and exhausting negotiations, however, theAustralian delegation managed to secure a remarkable success. When the Kyoto protocol wasfinally issued on 11 December, Australia was one of only three countries (along with Icelandand Norway) permitted to increase emissions. By 2010, Australia will be allowed to increaseemissions 8 per cent from 1990 levels. In addition, it will be permitted to include the effectsof land clearing in calculating the figure (Australian 12 December 1997). The government,not surprisingly, was delighted with the result, the prime minister remarking that the dealwould protect local jobs while improving the environment. It was also widely hailed in thepress. The Australian, for example, noted that 'the Howard government had secured anoutcome which serves the national interest' (12 December 1997: editorial). But like manyothers, especially environmental groups, the paper was not particularly sanguine about theoverall results of the conference. While key developed countries had agreed to reductions(the US 7 per cent, the European Union 8 per cent and Canada 6 per cent, for instance)developing countries had managed to avoid any commitment and largely because of this,members of the US Senate made it clear within hours of the conference concluding that they
196
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
regarded the agreement as unlikely to be ratified. While this is hardly Australia's burden ofresponsibility, it does reflect the reality that Australia, like most countries participating in theconference, was motivated less by idealism and the need to rescue the environment, than bya more pragmatic desire to try and protect its own interests and in doing so, to yield onlyenough in concessions to make an agreement possible. On the other hand, as one analystcommented, the Kyoto protocol 'offers a modest, but politically important start' to takingglobal warming seriously (Australia 12 December 1997). Perhaps Australia can take somecredit for this.
Troubles to the north: Papua New Guinea.
In 1997, Papua New Guinea once again demonstrated that it remains one of the most severechallenges for Australian foreign policy. Further tension surfaced in the relationship in Marchwhen Canberra learned that Sir Julius Chan's Papua New Guinea government had signed a$31 million contract with a mercenary organisation, Sandline International, to supply menand military equipment to launch a military offensive against the separatist movement on theisland of Bougainville. The Howard government immediately made it clear that it wasimplacably opposed to the use of mercenaries in what it regarded as its region of strategicinterest and was strongly against the use of force to solve the Bougainville problem. Chanmade it no less clear that he resented Canberra's intervention in his government's affairs andthat he proposed to proceed with the contract. Weekend talks in Sydney between the twoprime ministers in mid-March and Canberra's dispatch of a group of senior envoys to PortMoresby for talks a little latter, failed to move the obviously determined Papua New Guinealeader (Age 14 March 1997 and 20 March 1997).
As Australia considered its options, progress towards a resolution of the situation onlybegan to occur when Chan confronted increasingly hostile opposition to his plan at home.The Papua New Guinea armed forces went into revolt, civil unrest and rioting developed inand around the capital, ministers resigned from his cabinet and opposition members ofparliament intensified their call for Chan to resign. In a rapidly deteriorating situation at theend of March, and with the parliament building under siege, on 27 March, Chan agreed tohold fresh elections (Age 27 March 1997). In a rather bizarre twist to events, the Australiangovernment agreed on 29 March to a PNG request to allow an aircraft en route to PNG, witha full load of military equipment for the mercenaries' use, to be diverted to an airforce basein northern Australia, there to await settlement of legal matters related to the Sandlinecontract (Age 29 March 1997).
Chan's defeat in the June elections brought Michael Skate to the office of prime minsterand with him a more realistic hope of a peaceful settlement of the Bougainville problem.Much of the running on this issue was undertaken by New Zealand, whose foreign minister,Don Mackinnon, managed to draw together many of the warring factions in a series ofmeetings that led to an agreement for a cease-fire and truce and a procedure for a longer termresolution of the conflict. With the Skate government prepared to accept the principles in the'Burnham Declaration', Australian began to give further thought to its role in a peacesettlement. Towards the end of August, Canberra announced it would be willing to provide$132 million over five years to promote peace through rehabilitation and reconstruction andthat it would consider support for truce monitoring activities (Age 26 August 1997). Inmid-November, Canberra confirmed that Australia would participate in the Truce MonitoringGroup and in early December, a group of nineteen Australians began their task withconsiderable logistical support from the Australian Defence Force (Downer and McLachlan1997).
The year closed with peace on Bougainville being a more realistic prospect for the firsttime in nearly a decade, but with difficult negotiations to be conducted between Port Moresby
197
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
RUSSELL TROOD
and the rebels early in the new year. Australia has a strong interest in the success of thesetalks and will no doubt play some role in seeking to ensure their success. In doing so, it willhave to pick its way through the many suspicions some parties harbour about its role andinterests. In the meantime, Canberra has been drawn to PNG's assistance in anotherway—assisting the government to deal with the country's most severe drought in over 100years, one in which hundreds of thousands people are said to be affected. In November,Canberra agreed to provide PNG with emergency aid worth $3 million to be delivered in partwith the assistance of 120 Defence personnel making air drops to the most severely affectedparts of the country (Age 10 November 1997). This assistance has helped to smooth relationsbetween Canberra and Port Moresby, but the relationship remains a very sensitive one andwill continue to require careful management in 1998, a year that already seems destined toconfront Australia with a long list of foreign policy challenges.
Conclusion
By the end of 1997, Australian foreign policy had recaptured some of the assurance andconviction that had characterised it during the years of the Keating government. After theshortcomings of political leadership and policy direction in 1996, the new government hadnot only managed to establish a new framework for Australia's foreign relations, butsucceeded in achieving several of its declared policy objectives, not least redressing thebalance of regional priorities. While this has involved a departure from several ofthe priorities of its predecessor, an underlying bipartisanship remains a key element ofAustralian foreign policy.
The more assured hand on the policy tiller is a welcome development, particularly in lightof the dangers posed by the collapse of economic self-confidence in Asia. This confrontsAustralia with one of its most serious external problems in over 25 years. The economicimpacts are already becoming clear and there may yet be some damaging political andstrategic fallout. This will test severely the ability of the Howard government to craftand implement a foreign policy reflective of Australia's own unique interests. To date, thegovernment's response has been deft, if not particularly creative, but almost certainly, moreserious challenges still lie ahead. The way they are managed will be one of the measures bywhich the Howard government's custody of foreign policy will be judged and, perhaps moresignificantly, will establish a direction for Australia's foreign relations into the twenty-firstcentury.
References
Australia. Department of Defence, 1997. Australia's Strategic Policy (Canberra: Defence Publications Centre).Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997. In the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade
Policy White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).Australia's Overseas Aid Program, 1997-98, 1997. (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service).Dalrymple, Rawdon, 1997. 'Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 1996', Australian Journal of International
Affairs 51, 2:243-54.Downer, Alexander, 1997a. Media release, Minister for Foreign Affairs (26 June).
1997b. Media release, Minister for Foreign Affairs (18 December).1997c. Media release, Minister for Foreign Affairs (14 August).1997d. Media release, Minister for Foreign Affairs (11 December).1997e. Media releases from the office of the foreign minister on Cambodia dated 30 June, 15, 18 July, 29
September and 5, 23 November.and Ian McLachlan, 1997. Joint media release, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence
(17 November).Defence Efficiency Review (Australia), 1997. Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence: Report
of the Defence Efficiency Review (Canberra: Defence Publications Centre).
198
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy—1997
Fitzgerald, Stephen, Nancy Viviani and Michael Wesley, 1997. Discussion Paper, A Response to In the NationalInterest (Sydney. Australia-Asia Institute, University of New South Wales).
Howard, John, 1997. 'Australia and Asia: An Enduring Engagement', address to the Australia-Asia Society (8 May).Mackerras, Colin, 1997. 'China', in Bernie Bishop and Deborah McNamara (eds), The Asia-Australia Survey
1997-98 (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education).McLachlan, Ian, 1997. Statement to the House of Representatives (2 December).McNamara, Deborah and Bernie Bishop, 1997. 'The Year in Review', in Bernie Bishop and Deborah McNamara
(eds), The Asia-Australia Survey 1997-98 (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education).Parer, Warwick, 1997. Media release, Minister for Resources and Energy (September).Sheridan, Gre.g., 1997. 'Aid Enquiry of Little Help to Downer', Australian (5 May).
199
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f A
uckl
and
Lib
rary
] at
17:
37 1
8 N
ovem
ber
2014
