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This article was downloaded by: [University of Guelph] On: 11 November 2014, At: 14:01 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Australian Journal of International Affairs Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20 Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2003 Brendon O'connor Published online: 27 Sep 2010. To cite this article: Brendon O'connor (2004) Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2003, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58:2, 207-220, DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000220088 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1035771042000220088 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions

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Page 1: Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2003

This article was downloaded by: [University of Guelph]On: 11 November 2014, At: 14:01Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Australian Journal of InternationalAffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20

Perspectives on Australian foreignpolicy, 2003Brendon O'connorPublished online: 27 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: Brendon O'connor (2004) Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2003,Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58:2, 207-220, DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000220088

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1035771042000220088

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2003

Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2,pp. 207–220, June 2004

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy,2003

BRENDON O’CONNOR*

Relations with the United States dominated Australian foreign affairs in 2003.Australia confirmed itself as one of America’s leading supporters in theincreasingly controversial global ‘war on terror’, went to war with the US inIraq, signed up to be a part of the US missile defence shield, underwent intensefree trade agreement negotiations with the US (finalised in February 2004), andthe political leaders of the US and Australia also made national visits—JohnHoward to George W. Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas and President Bushto Canberra. Looking back on the year in review, it is hard to find a timewhen Australian foreign policy has been more American-centric or whenAustralia has received so much individual attention from a presidentialadministration. Reflecting on the US-Australian alliance, Lyon and Towrecently described it as reaching a ‘new zenith’ under the Howard government(Lyon and Tow 2003). However, at the same time survey data reveal that theAustralian public feels considerable apprehension about America and itsinfluence in Australia. These anxieties are clearly discernible in opinion pollsabout Americanisation and the foreign policies of the Bush Administration(ABC 2003).

Such anxieties are of course not limited to Australia and similar concernshave been voiced across a wide range of societies (Pew 2003), undoubtedlycontributing to most of America’s traditional allies not supporting militaryaction in Iraq. Australia and the UK were notable exceptions but, even as theyjoined what the Bush Administration called the ‘coalition of the willing’,public support for such a move remained weak in both countries. In the earlymonths of 2003 a sizeable majority of Australians opposed Australian troopsbeing sent to war without UN endorsement (Newspoll 2003) although thegovernment did enjoy a swing toward its position in opinion polls on the eveof the war. Public concern culminated in record-breaking protests on theweekend of 14–16 February when over 500,000 people took part in anti-IraqWar rallies across Australia, including Australia’s largest ever demonstrationof around 250, 000 people in Sydney (Lawson 2003; Priest 2003).

The official engagement of Australian troops covered a 21-day period in

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/04/020207-14 2004 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000220088

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March/April in which Saddam’s regime was comprehensively defeated withouta single Australian soldier being killed. Despite Saddam’s defeat, lasting peaceremains elusive in Iraq in the post-war period. Howard’s shrewd commitmentof Australian troops for the duration of war only has seen Australia play amuch more limited post-war role1 but this has not alleviated the scepticalmood of the Australian public on not only the Iraq War, but also on the BushAdministration, and American influence in general. The result of this scepti-cism has been a limited public enthusiasm for the strengthening of theUS-Australia alliance afforded by Australia’s role in the ‘coalition of thewilling’. Unlike some of Howard’s other foreign policy decisions which werecalibrated for short-term domestic electoral gain (Flitton 2003; Wesley 2002),a closer relationship with the US has been a long term goal of the Howardgovernment. It is a goal that sits very comfortably with the Prime Minister’ssense of history and values; as he puts it ‘it is a relationship steeped in history,but it’s also a relationship that is built upon common values’ (Howard 2003f).The history that Howard is principally referring to is the shared service in thetwo world wars, a point he emphasised in his 23 October parliamentarywelcome to President Bush (Howard 2003g). Elsewhere Howard has com-mented that Americans ‘have a lot of the values and attitudes that we share’and that he is ‘a great believer that you should have close relations with thecountries whose way of life is closest to your own’ (Harries 2003). Thestrengthened alliance with the US has afforded Howard closer contact with thePresident than is typical for an Australian Prime Minister. Reflecting thischumminess, Bush described Howard as ‘a man of steel’ during Howard’s visitto Crawford and in Bush’s address to the Australian parliament during hisfleeting visit he proffered that ‘Prime Minister John Howard is a leader ofexceptional courage who exemplifies the finest qualities of one of the world’sgreatest democracies. I am proud to call him friend’ (Bush 2003). This lavishpraise, however, is not likely to win many votes in the forthcoming electionas lurking just beneath the surface in Australian politics is an ongoing concernabout what a closer relationship with the US would actually offer. Thisquestion was raised by commentators as Chinese President Hu Jintao ad-dressed the Australian parliament, just one day after Bush’s visit to Canberra(The Australian 2003). Paul Kelly suggested that although Hu’s visit providedless drama and sound bites than Bush’s, the tangible gains were much greater(Kelly 2003); something that reflects the increasing importance of China toAustralia, particularly as a trading partner and source of fee-paying inter-national students.

The Iraq war: the missing WMD

The Iraq War dominated foreign affairs in 2003, particularly the issue ofwhether armed intervention was justified. As its significance fades, futuregenerations may well ask why Australia sent troops just as Australians today

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might ask why Australia sent troops to fight in World War I. The simpleanswer to Australia’s involvement in the latter was our alliance with Britainand our lack of foreign policy independence. The simple answer to whyAustralia sent troops to fight in the 2003 Iraq War is our alliance with the USand, critics would add, once again a lack of foreign policy independence. Theofficial Australian government reason for the 2003 Iraq War was Saddam’sfailure to comply with UN resolutions mandating that Iraq rid itself of allweapons of mass destruction (WMD). Speaking in parliament the day Aus-tralian troops were committed to war in Iraq, Alexander Downer stated that‘The disarmament of Iraq is the “unfinished business” of the 1991 Gulf War’and was brought upon Iraq by Saddam Hussein’s failure to comply with 17UN resolutions including his obligations under the recent resolution 1441(Downer 2003a). According to the governments of the US, UK and Australia,this noncompliance was of such concern because there was evidence that Iraqhad maintained WMD. When officially announcing in parliament his decisionto ‘commit Australian Defence Force elements,’ John Howard moved that theHouse recognise ‘that Iraq’s continued possession and pursuit of weapons ofmass destruction, in defiance of its mandatory obligations under numerousresolutions of the United Nations Security Council, represents a real andunacceptable threat to international peace and security’ (Howard 2003c). Inmore overblown language Downer asserted in the same parliamentary sessionthat the ‘issue about Iraq’ was ‘about whether the world has any choice butother than to live in the constant fear of chemical, biological and nuclearweapons left in the hands of vicious dictators’ (Downer 2003a).

Connecting Iraq with the ‘war on terror’, the Howard government declaredon a number of occasions that Iraq’s WMD had the potential to be passed onto terrorists. In parliament on 4 February Howard stated that ‘Iraq’s historyof relationships with and support of terrorist organisations magnify ourconcerns. The rise of international terrorism adds a new and frighteningdimension to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological andnuclear weapons’ (Howard 2003a). Connecting the dots at the National PressClub in March, Howard suggested the failure to deal with Iraq meant other‘rogue states will believe they can do the same’ and this would ‘multiply’ the‘risk that they [WMD] may fall into the hands of terrorists’. This threat islinked to Australia with the statement that:

if terrorists ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction that will,in my very passionate belief and argument, constitute a direct, undeniableand lethal threat to Australia and its people, and that would be theultimate nightmare not only for us but other peoples in other nations.That, more than anything else, is the reason why we have taken the stancewe have (Howard 2003b).

However, the evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda (or other globalterror organisations) was rather limited; with the weakness of such claims

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apparent in Colin Powell’s 5 February presentation to the UN Security Council(Powell 2003). In Australia, cracks in the case against Iraq were highlighted byAndrew Wilkie who, on resigning on 11 March 2003 from his job at the Officeof National Assessments (ONA) where he had been working on intelligence onIraqi weapons, told the press:

Iraq does not pose a security threat to the US, to the UK, to Australia orany other country at this point in time… Their military is very small, theirweapons of mass destruction program is fragmented and contained, andthere is no hard evidence of active cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda(Barker 2003b: 48).

This dissent from within the intelligence community has more recently beenrepeated by former ONA employees Carl Ungerer and David Wright-Neville(Forbes 2004; Stewart 2004; Ungerer 2004). Moreover, intelligence communi-ties in Britain and the US have been shaken by similar claims of mistakes,weak evidence and government pressure to ‘sex up’ the evidence against Iraq.In the days before the war John Howard referred to Wilkie’s claims as adifference of opinion and that the government could not be expected toprovide what he called ‘Central Criminal Court in Darlinghurst’ or ‘OldBailey’ proof because ‘if you wait for that kind of proof, you know, it’svirtually Pearl Harbor’ (Howard 2003b). The Prime Minister at the NationalPress Club was pressed on this issue by political commentator Laurie Oakeswho asked Howard:

We read in the morning papers that you were going to present todayevidence from our intelligence agencies of a link between Iraq andterrorists. What happened to that evidence? Why isn’t it in your speech?And since you’ve made no attempt at all to demonstrate a link, are we toassume there is none?

In response, Howard simply repeated his line about ‘Darlinghurst or OldBailey proof’ (Howard 2003b). At year’s end many of these controversiesremained unresolved (particularly with regard to Australia’s intelligence agen-cies), but one thing has become clear—the government’s claims about WMDin Iraq lack credibility.

Where do these revelations, and the significant failure to find any WMD inpost-war Iraq, leave the Howard government? As with the Bush Administra-tion, victory in Iraq was prematurely declared. In May 2003 Howard told theparliament that a ‘decisive victory’ had been achieved and that the Australiadefence personnel commitment would be reduced from the initial 2,000personnel to 1,200 (Howard 2003d). Although the foreign minister continuedto claim he believed WMD would be found in Iraq (Downer 2003b), theofficial justification for war in Iraq in the latter part of 2003 shifted focus—with a new emphasis on the benefits to Iraqis of the end of Saddam’s regimeand on the message the war was sending to other rogue states such as Libya

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which had announced its intention to end its WMD program. In truth this hasbeen far from a foreign policy triumph for Howard, Blair, and Bush. (SeeO’Neil ,2003: 544 for the type of forces Australia provided. See also �http://www.defence.gov.au/opfalconer/� which provides a list of initial and im-mediate post-war Australian military involvements in Iraq). Since 16 July thedefence personnel commitments in Iraq have been titled Operation Catalyst,with details of this commitment available at: �http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/governments/� . At current writing, the honesty of the governmentis again under attack and is now the subject of an inquiry examining whetherAustralian intelligence reports were exaggerated and selectively read or, ascommonly described, ‘cherry-picked’ (Stewart 2004). Claims by Howard suchas ‘The Australian government knows that Iraq still has chemical andbiological weapons and that Iraq wants to develop nuclear weapons’ (Howard2003a) and other strong assertions from the government will be put under thespotlight. The likely fallout of the Iraq War on the US-Australian alliance isthat future American military actions in the Middle East or elsewhere arelikely to be met with even greater public scepticism than this conflict, leavingfuture Australian governments of all political colours probably less willing tojoin any US-led coalition. The image of the Howard government as a pliantdeputy to the Bush Administration definitely has traction in the community,and has no doubt gained further credence with the contents of the recent FTAdeal struck with the US.

The Iraq War failed to receive bipartisan support from its beginning. Alongwith the Vietnam War and the sending of troops to Malaya in 1955, it is onlythe third occasion where the main opposition party did not support thegovernment’s position on sending troops overseas. The ALP leader SimonCrean in his 18 March 2003 parliamentary reply described the Prime Minister’sdecision to send troops thus:

The Prime Minister today, in a reckless and unnecessary act, has commit-ted Australia to war. The Prime Minister had his moment of truth, andwhat did we see? We saw capitulation and subservience to a phone callfrom the United States President. This is a black day for Australia and itis a black day for international cooperation (Crean 2003).

As strong as they were, Crean’s criticisms took a step back from MarkLatham’s earlier parliamentary attack on a US-led war in Iraq. Latham on 5February had described Bush as the ‘most incompetent and dangerous presi-dent in living memory’. Latham claimed that ‘President Bush’s foreign policylooks more like American imperialism than a well thought through andresourced strategy to eliminate terrorists’ and dismissed Howard as a ‘yes-manto a flaky and dangerous American president’ (Latham 2003). These remarksand others by ALP politicians prompted US Ambassador J. Thomas Schiefferto briefly enter the political fray to express his disapproval of the ALP rhetoric(McKew 2003). This entry into domestic Australian politics by a foreign

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diplomat was widely criticised, and Schieffer retreated from making furtherpublic comments on party positions on the war. For his part Latham, onbecoming the leader of the ALP, was quick to praise the US-Australian alliance(Peake 2003), reflecting the power the alliance ultimately holds in Australianelite politics.

Latham’s comments on both the war and on the US-Australia FTA negoti-ations have raised claims of anti-Americanism. The government has certainlytaken this position on the ALP rhetoric with Howard suggesting during thelead-up to the war that the ALP displayed anti-American ‘prejudice’ (Howard2003a). Downer has also suggested this on a number of occasions (Lewis2004). However, while there are undercurrents of US bashing in some of theALP rhetoric, it mostly should be viewed as criticism rather than as the‘prejudice’ suggested by the government. While at times Australian commen-tary on the US displays a lack of sophistication and a persistent negativity(O’Connor 2003), its underlying characteristic is a healthy scepticism thatshould largely be encouraged. As Owen Harries (2003), who is hardly a radicalcommentator, has suggested in his recent Boyer Lectures, powerful allies areoften unreliable friends. An overenthusiastic pursuit of the US-Australiaalliance can lead to faulty decisions about Australia’s national interests or aninability to heed independent judgments and opinions from within Australia.

The debates over pre-war intelligence on Iraq and the US-Australia FTAbring these concerns to the fore. It has been suggested that Australia’s supportof America in Iraq would speed up trade negotiations between the twocountries (The Australian 2004) and help Australia secure important conces-sions from US negotiators on exports dear to Australia such as sugar and beef.However, reports in The Australian have it that Howard’s friendship withBush counted for little when it came to the crunch in the FTA negotiations(Wallace 2004). In 2003 the agricultural sector placed much hope (at theprompting of the government) in this bilateral FTA when at the end of the dayWTO reforms remain the key issue for Australian agriculture. At the 2003WTO trade talks in Cancun, agricultural and other claims were promoted bya new Group of 22 (G22) headed by China and India, which emerged as apotential counterbalance to European Union and US interests. Australia cansee much appeal in the G22’s rationale, particularly its demands for agricul-tural liberalisation. This issue raises the question of how Australia can betterpursue its national interests without feeling too beholden to its traditionalalliances.

Solomon Islands intervention: Operation Helpem Fren

In late June 2003 John Howard announced, with bipartisan support, thatAustralia would send Defence and Australian Federal Police personnel to theSolomon Islands. With a commitment promised of around 2,000 Australiansthis was a personnel commitment similar to Australia’s involvement in the

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Iraq War. However this time there was little public controversy over thedecision. Australian and New Zealand intervention had been called for by thepolitical leadership in the Solomons throughout 2003; earlier unanswered callswere made in 1998 (The Age 2003) and again in 2000 when Prime MinisterBart Ulufa’alu was ousted in a coup (O’Callaghan 2003a; Wielders 2003). InJuly 2003 the Solomon Islands parliament unanimously voted to accept anAustralian-led intervention force to help deal with well-armed militia andrestore the rule of law and security in the Solomon Islands; this legislation wasvery much a precondition for Australian involvement with Howard declaring‘If the legislation is not passed then we don’t go in’ (O’Callaghan 2003a,b).

On 24 July Operation Helpem Fren (Pidgin for help a friend), headed byAustralian forces in cooperation with a small number of soldiers from NewZealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga hit the beaches of the SolomonIslands, beginning the largest South Pacific military operation since World WarII. The soldiers arrived on historic Red Beach on the island of Guadalcanalwhere 61 years before American forces had fought the Japanese (O’Callaghan2003c). Although such historical analogies usually adorn Howard’s foreignpolicy speeches and form the backbone of his conception of Australian identity(Manne 2004), this intervention was sold in a reserved and pragmatic fashion.The pragmatism no doubt reflected the realisations of the long term challengesposed in possible nation building. In the short term, local security concernswere paramount, with Jon Fraenkel of the University of the South Pacificdescribing the conditions in the Solomons thus:

The low-intensity civil war that destroyed the nation’s economy between1998 and 2000 has ended, but former militants who refused to surrendertheir weapons are holding the nation to ransom (Fraenkel, 2003).

Responding to this breakdown, the Australian-led forces targeted weaponssurrender and policing as its first order priorities. Some success has beenachieved in this area with a joint declaration from the Foreign Minister andJustice and Customs Minister that by late October ‘over 3700 weapons hadbeen surrendered and 15 police posts have been established’ and leadingex-militants such as Harold Keke and Jimmy ‘Rasta’ Lusia had been arrested(Downer and Ellison 2003). At a more institutional level Australia hascommitted funding for judicial training and police training and for thecompletion of a new 300-bed Central Prison (Downer 2003c).

Possibly the more difficult challenge with the Solomons intervention is howto improve the governance of this island nation. Howard, during his lateAugust visit to the Solomons, pledged $25 million but warned that Australiawanted to see a ‘frontal assault’ on corruption (Tingle 2003). How theSolomons dealt with corruption was, he said, ‘a matter for the people andprocess of the Solomons—I’ve indicated what is our expectation’ (Forbes2003). Commenting on this, Alan Mitchell suggested that ‘Without using thedread words, … Howard appears to be extending the idea of mutual

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obligation to our Pacific aid program’ with future Australian aid tied clearlyto ‘improvements in governance and reductions in corruption’ (Mitchell 2003).Such relatively unglamorous actions in the Pacific are probably not seen by thegovernment as the most prudent use of resources. Reflecting this concern atthe end of September the Treasurer signalled that Australian troops would bepulling out of the Solomons, highlighting the significant expense of this andplans to place police in Papua New Guinea. (Forbes and Mercer 2003).

The Australian intervention in the Solomons can be told as a particularisticstory born out of the island nation’s colonial history, ethnic and regionalconflicts, internal migration, the rise of armed militias, economic hardship,and poor local governance (Callick 2003a,b; O’Callaghan 2003b; Wielders2003). The story can also be told as part of a wider set of concerns about‘failed states’ and security threats (Barker 2003a; Rudd 2003). Howard toldparliament on 25 June that inaction on the Solomons could allow it to becomea ‘failed state’ which was open to exploitation by ‘international drug dealers,money launderers, international terrorism’ (Howard 2003e). Both the particu-lar and general stories are important, the first for helping with the root causesof the problems in the Solomons and the second for motivating Australia toact (The Age 2003). The Howard government’s attitude towards the SouthPacific has been the source of frustration for some in the region, with a rangeof controversies arising from its behaviour in the Pacific Islands Forum. In themain it has been criticised for its indifference to South Pacific affairs. Theintervention in the Solomons and ongoing work in Papua New Guinearepresent an important tangible commitment to the region which shouldsilence some of this criticism, particularly given the generally proclaimedsuccess of the Solomons operation (The Age 2003).

Relations with Asian nations

To talk of Australia’s relations with ‘Asia’ is a misnomer as it homogenises adiverse range of nations with which Australia has quite distinct and individualrelations. However, as generalisations oil the wheels of journalism andpolitical discourse, opinions on Australia’s standing in ‘Asia’ or regularcriticism of the Howard government’s relations with ‘Asia’ are to be expected(Beeson 2003; Capling 2003; Garnaut 2002). On one level such generaliseddebates are important as they allow for easily digestible public exchanges onimportant issues. However, they unfortunately are often no more than politi-cal point scoring and fail to provide any detailed critique of the Howardgovernment’s policies with individual Asian nations. Talk of attitudes in Asiais probably only relevant on the broadest of issues such as when discussingBush’s remark that the US sees Australia as a ‘sheriff’ of the Asia Pacific.Naturally this remark did not play well across the region and reinforced theview that Australia is an American surrogate. It gave credence to the rhetoricof leaders like Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad who responded that Australia

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would not be accepted in the region while it continued to play ‘deputy sheriff’to the US. Mahathir went on to state that ‘We see Australia as some sort oftransplant from another region with the same thinking as the transplantedentity’ (Baker 2003). Such criticisms have helped Mahathir and others stopAustralia from gaining a seat on the Association of South-East Asian Nations.Nevertheless, beyond such controversies—that are at times more rhetoricalthan substantial—Australia has made important progress in its relations witha number of Asian nations in recent times.

In February 2003 Australia and Singapore signed a Free Trade Agreement,Australia’s first such agreement since 1983 when the Closer Economic Rela-tions agreement was signed with New Zealand. The Minister for Trade MarkVaile cited ‘easier access for Australian service suppliers into the Singaporemarket, and more choices of universities for Singaporeans wishing to studylaw in Australia’ (Vaile and Yeo 2003) as the principal benefits of the deal. InOctober an Australia-Thai FTA was also signed. The agreement was pro-moted as a boost for the Australian dairy, wheat, beef, and wine industries,and also for the Australian car industry which is now one of Australia’s topten merchandise exporters (DFAT 2003). Trade and diplomatic relations withChina have also strengthened significantly in recent years. To offer true insightinto Australia’s relations with its Asian neighbours, more differentiated anddetailed analysis is required by commentators. This is not to dismiss validcriticisms by commentators of the weaknesses of the Howard government’sapproach to foreign affairs. However, a creeping laziness in some criticaleditorialising talks too broadly of attitudes in ‘Asia’ and is based on assertionrather than evidence.

Criticism of the government’s dealings with Asia obviously registered withthe Prime Minister as he took time out in 2003 to rebuff the notion thatAustralia’s close relations with the US hinder its capacity to develop closerelations with Asian nations. Howard describes this criticism in one address as‘one of the great myths of the foreign policy and trade debate in this country’(Howard 2003f). This broad criticism has possibly led Howard to being moresensitive about Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. In the lead-up to the2003 Iraq War, Howard visited Indonesia in an attempt to reassure itsPresident that Australia’s position on Iraq was not ‘anti-Islamic’ and, in aNational Press Club address, he claims success in having this position acceptedby the Indonesian government (Howard 2003b). Although the Australian-In-donesian relationship still requires further effort, there should be relief that thepotentially volatile issues of the Iraq War, the Bali terrorist trials and the Balicommemoration ceremonies did not create serious diplomatic rifts between thetwo nations.

If, as de Tocqueville suggested, ‘trade is the natural enemy of all violentpassions,’ Australia should feel reassured about its relationship with China.Bilateral trade between the two nations has undergone a dramatic increase inrecent years, averaging an annual growth of 19% since 1997 (AEN 2003).

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However, foreign relations are rarely solely effected by bilateral relations, asis the case with China where the tension over Taiwan casts a shadow overrelations even while Australia steadfastly says it supports a ‘one China policy’(Howard and Jintao 2003). Although the question of Taiwan can not betotally forgotten Australia has, where ever possible, pursued non-controversialpolicies on China; this approach combined with a new set of economicallyadventurous Chinese leaders has undoubtedly strengthened relations betweenthe two nations in recent years. This fact was illustrated in October 2003 whenChinese President Hu Jintao became the first Asian leader to address theAustralian parliament. The Hu visit allowed the Howard government toannounce a series of economic developments including a probable $30 billionLNG deal and concrete steps toward an Australia-China FTA (Allard 2003).Paul Kelly enthused that ‘President Hu Jintao has offered the most sweepingvision from Beijing for Australia-China ties based on deeper economic partner-ship and broader cooperation’ (Kelly 2003). For its part, the Howard govern-ment not only avoided raising the issues of Taiwan, Tibet or a range of humanrights concerns but also made sure that Green Party Senators Brown andNettle were barred from the parliament and that the public gallery was freeof potential hecklers (Allard 2003; Kerin 2003).

Although strengthened economic relations were emphasised duringHu’s visit, interestingly there was also talk of ‘agreement to boost defenceties between China and Australia’, moving towards what Catherine Armitagedescribed as ‘potentially a step towards a radical plan for a NATO-styledregional security alliance’ (Armitage 2003). While this would seem someway off, startling progress has occurred in Chinese-Australian relations inrecent years in areas such as tourism and higher education in Australia.Chinese tourism to Australia has soared with numbers up from 9,000 in 1992to 120,000 in 2002, partially due to Australia making it on to the list ofofficially sanctioned holiday destinations. Education is also another area ofphenomenal growth with the number of Chinese students studying in Australiaincreasing from 8,859 in 1999 to around 34,000 in 2003, making China the topsource of foreign students in Australia, with Hong Kong in second place. Theimportance of education trade has possibly been under-recognised until itsrecent talking up as a $5 billion-a-year industry (Howard 2003h; Nelson2003).2

The movement of students and tourists has made SARS a major issue onAustralian university campuses and a hot media topic. Issues such as SARSalert us to the fact that foreign policy needs to be flexible and adept at dealingwith non-traditional problems. In the coming year it could well be virusesrather than terrorists that develop as the most pressing foreign policy problemfor most Australians. Problems such as sick chickens might not constitute thedream diplomatic assignment or offer the most stirring material for politicaladvertising in an election year but they may well prove to be at the crux ofthe most important foreign policy decisions as FTAs and increased tourism

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and education opportunities see our borders being crossed by more people andtrade than ever before.

Conclusions

In such a busy year of foreign policy activity, I have neglected many importantissues such as concern over North Korea3 and a series of issues regardingrefugees. The ongoing excising of islands off the mainland from Australia’snorthern migration zone is bad public policy from any number of angles4

and part of the regrettable Pacific Solution. Australia has a right to continueto set limits on immigration to Australia and try to deter illegal entryinto Australia and, whichever party is in power, an immigration policybased on limits and border protection is likely. However, the moral shortcom-ings of the Howard government’s overzealous and very inward-lookingrefugee policy leaves the government often sounding defensive and negative.This defensiveness seemed to spread across foreign affairs in general in2003. In different circumstances a Prime Minister who in the one yearreceives visits from the leaders of the US and China, and negotiates majornew economic agreements with both the world’s strongest national economyand its most populous country could expect significant public praiseand electoral support; but neither has offered such rewards. Possibly thislack of acclaim is the curse of foreign policy triumphs, which are oftenrather removed from the daily concerns of most Australians. For example,Keating believed he never received the public praise he deserved for negotiat-ing the Australia-Indonesia Security agreement. Foreign affairs, however,has forced its way into the living rooms of average Australians in recentyears. Although Howard has encouraged this attention and concern onissues such as global terrorism, in 2003 his stances increasingly seemedat odds with public opinion. This possibly reflects the discomfortmany Australians feel about Howard’s embracing of America and hispolitical friendship with President Bush which has meant involvementin a largely divisive and increasingly politically embarrassing war and,in terms of the FTA, has offered far less tangible gains than mostexpected. Coupled with Howard’s general lack of ability to sell recentforeign policy triumphs this has left him looking a largely defensivepolitical figure. For a government enjoying a third term, the defensiveness ofmany of Howard’s and Downer’s policy speeches in 2003 was revealing—withback-against-the-wall denouncements of the ‘myth of a little Australia’, the‘myth that they ignore Asia’ and the ‘myth of Australia being America’sdeputy sheriff’. If the Australian political tradition is seen as part youthfuloptimism and part stoicism and reverence for past suffering, the Howardgovernment’s foreign policy rhetoric was too often stuck in the latter mouldin 2003.

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Notes

* Thanks to Kara Touchie and Katherine Delaney for their diligent research assistance.1. See O’Neil (2003: 544) for the type of forces Australia provided. See also �http://

www.defence.gov.au/opfalconer/� which provides a list of initial and immediate postwarAustralian military involvements in Iraq. Since 16 July the defence personnel commitmentsin Iraq have been titled Operation Catalyst, with details of this commitment available at:�http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/�

2. Further, acknowledgement of the ongoing strength of the industry—which if these figuresare correct earns more for Australia than any agricultural export—can be probably be seenin the joint Nelson/Downer policy statement announcement Engaging the World throughEducation (Downer 2003d).

3. This subject is well covered by O’Neil (2003).4. It would seem to open up potential conflicts not least with Indonesia.

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