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Perspectives on Australianforeign policy, 2001Michael WesleyPublished online: 09 Jun 2010.

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Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 47–63, 2002

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy,2001

MICHAEL WESLEY

The year of the centenary of federation provided many with the opportunity tocelebrate and re� ect on Australia’s achievements and institutions . In the realm offoreign policy, the one hundred years to 2001 tell a tale of a more halting,ambiguous journey towards fully sovereign status and a comprehensive series ofrelationships with the outside world. Despite the signi� cance of the centenary,however, the carriage of Australian foreign policy in 2001 left little room forpondering the past. Indeed, it was the year that saw the fullest � owering yet of anew logic of foreign policy, more strongly determined by domestic politics and avision of Australian values than anything that has come before.

To be sure, the old style of foreign policy—the patient, calibrated nurturing ofrelationships and institutions in ways designed to further certain national andsocietal interests, little noticed and largely occurring alongside domestic politics—was much in use in early 2001. But as the year progressed, the new style of foreignpolicy, apparent at different times since 1997, slowly eclipsed the old in responseto a rising sense of crisis over unauthorised maritime arrivals of asylum-seekers andthe terrorist attacks on the United States. The new logic is one in which events inand relationships with the outside world are interpreted and responded to accordingto a certain conception of the values of the majority of Australian society; wheredomestic and international policy decisions are made according to a common,seamless set of political calculations. Even though 2001 was also a federal electionyear, this had only a marginal and late impact on the rise of the new logic. Theconsequence for Australia and its international relations in 2001 and beyond hasbeen a signi� cant re-imagining and repositioning of Australia in relation to the restof the world.

The ‘old logic’ of foreign policy

A New US Administration

Australian foreign policy during the � rst eight months of 2001 to a great extentfollowed established patterns and aspirations. The most signi� cant concern at thebeginning of the year was to establish a strong relationship with the new GeorgeW. Bush administration in the United States. The promise of closer bilateralrelations with the more ideologically-aki n Republican administration was raised by

ISSN 1035-771 8 print/ISSN 1465-332 X online/02/010047-1 7 Ó 2002 Australian Institute of Internationa l Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771022012083 8

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incoming Secretary of State Colin Powell’s widely reported re� ections on theUS-Australia relationship before the Senate Nominations Committee:

In the Paci� c, for example, we are very, very pleased that Australia, our � rmally, has played a keen interest [sic] in what’s been happening in Indonesia. Andso we will coordinate our policies, but let our ally, Australia, take the lead asthey have done so well in that troubled country.(Quoted in Alcorn 2001.)

Despite uncomfortably echoing the sentiments of the ‘Howard Doctrine’ of 1999,Powell’s comments were read as a sign that Australia was prominent among thoseUS allies that Bush had pledged to give greater priority than his predecessor. Thegreater attentiveness of the new US administration was demonstrated time andagain in 2001, in the appointment of a close associate of Bush as Ambassador toAustralia;1 in the high-level delegation sent to the AUSMIN consultations ;2 and inthe extent and level of access obtained by Howard to the President and seniorpolicy makers during his visit to Washington in September.3

When an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese � ghter jetover the South China Sea in March, reactions were more or less familiar: despitethe genuine discomfort that US-China tensions cause Australia’s regional diplo-macy, the Australian government provided strong endorsement of the US position.Also in March came signs of a US approach to foreign policy more akin to theCoalition’s focus on national self-interest when Bush announced that the US wouldnot ratify the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change until it included more developingcountries (Hordern 2001). The hardline American position was supported by theHoward government, which maintained throughout 2001 the position that theProtocol was unworkable without the participation of the United States anddeveloping countries (Taylor 2001).

As the year progressed, expressions of concern were raised around the worldabout what was seen to be a growing tendency towards arrogant unilateralism inUS foreign policy (Hartcher 2001 b). The Australian government, far from support-ing every move of the new administration , found itself taking different positions ofalignment with and opposition to a series of US policies in relation to multilateralcommitments. On the one hand, the Bush administration found in Australia one ofthe few defenders of its moves away from the Climate Change Convention and the1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the latter called into question by plans for anational Missile Defence Shield. The Australian government was not so sanguine,however, about the US announcement of its decision to review its position on the

1 Tom Schieffer, George W Bush’s partner in managing the Texas rangers baseball team, was appointed Ambassadorto Australia in August. (See Hartcher 2001 c.).

2 At the time, much was made of the attendance of both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld at the talks in Canberra in late July due to Rumsfeld’s famous dislike of travelling; manyinterpreted his attendance as a demonstration of the importance in which the Australian alliance is regarded bythe Bush administration. (See Australian Financial Review 2001).

3 Howard was granted considerably longer for talks with Bush than the reported 40 minutes he obtained with Clintonon his previous visit; he became the � rst Australian leader to address a joint sitting of Congress since Bob Hawke,and a range of senior Cabinet members, Senators, and judges attended ceremonial functions held in his honour;all in conspicuous contrast to Howard’s previous visit to Washington during Clinton’s tenure.

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Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2001 49

1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Australia’s commitment to the Conventionwas underlined by its vice-chairing of a committee established to draft a newmonitoring protocol. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was prepared, in the yearof the � ftieth anniversary of the signing of the ANZUS alliance, to be critical ofthe US position on this, and on its failure to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive NuclearTest Ban Treaty, in the negotiation of which Australia had played a vigorous andcreative role (see Downer 2001 b). The year also saw its share of familiarAustralia-US grievances over trade and investment barriers, with Australia pursuingand prevailing in attempts to scrap American quotas on the import of Australianlamb and on higher withholding taxes on investments between Australia and theUnited States.

Key Bilateral Relationships

Much of the year also saw patient attention payed to the strengthening of what the1997 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper had referred to as Australia’s four‘key’ bilateral partnerships: the United States, Japan, China, and Indonesia (seeCommonwealth of Australia 1997). Prime Minister John Howard visited each ofthese countries in 2001. Despite this attention, however, each of the bilateralrelationships developed in ways very much consistent with the patterns establishedsince the beginning of the tenure of the Howard government.

Bilateral relations with the United States were further strengthened in 2001, butonce again had to be managed in such a way as not to damage important Australianrelations with countries in East Asia. In defence terms, the Australian DefenceWhite Paper, adopted in December 2000, dovetailed very well with the strategicpolicy of the new US administration . Dubbed the ‘Powell Doctrine’, this based USstrategic planning on the need to be able to � ght two regional con� icts simul-taneously, while placing greater pressure on regional allies to contribute to thecollective effort. Powell’s comments during the con� rmation hearings emphasisedthis, as did the private comments made in 2000 by Deputy Secretary of State RichArmitage, when still an adviser to Presidential Candidate Bush, that a US at warwith China would expect Australia to contribute to ‘the dirty, hard, and dangerouswork’ (quoted in Hartcher 2001 a.). The AUSMIN talks in July resolved to deepenthe interoperability of Australian and US military forces and to extend theintelligence-sharing arrangements between the two countries. While at the AUS-MIN talks, Secretary of State Powell � oated in public the concept of closerconsultation between the three key US alliances in the Asia Paci� c: with Japan,South Korea, and Australia. While in private supportive of the proposal, evenraising it with Japanese Foreign Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Downer playeddown public speculation about an ‘Asian NATO’ in deference to the inevitablereactions from East Asia: Chinese sensitivitie s about being ‘contained’ by Amer-ica’s Asian alliances; and Southeast Asian criticisms of Australia’s role as the‘deputy sheriff’ for the US in the region (McDonald 2001).

Australia responded to the Bush administration’s trade strategy of pushing aheadwith the concept of a Free Trade Area of the Americas with an offsetting set of

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trans-Paci� c free trade agreements, by pursuing a bilateral free trade agreementwith the United States (Higley 2001). The proposal drew mixed reactions fromwithin Australia, ranging from the strong support of sections of the businesscommunity, to the National Farmer’s Federation’s wait-and see scepticism, to theopposition of economists who claimed it would detract from Paci� c and global freetrade agreements (Pearson 2001 a.). In the end it was reticence on the US side thatprevented Howard from initiating substantive progress towards the deal on his tripto Washington in September: the Bush administration urged deferment of negotia-tions while it attempted to gain fast-track trade negotiating authority from Con-gress. With Bush having gained fast-track trade negotiating authority in December,one of the major questions in the Australia-US bilateral relationship in 2002 willbe whether a bilateral free trade deal that is acceptable to both sides can benegotiated.

Howard’s visit to Tokyo in early August brought a � rst meeting with new PrimeMinister Koizumi, but did little to change the recent pattern of Australia-Japanrelations. Howard voiced encouragement for Koizumi’s commitment to reform ofthe Japanese economy, unable to resist making the usual observations about thestrength of the Australian economy due to the ‘many painful economic reforms’undergone by Australia over two decades (see Howard 2001 c.). The recent trendin the bilateral relationship—the gradual attenuation of a formerly close diplomaticpartnership in regional relations alongside a growing closeness in militaryand strategic consultations—was continued in 2001. The year saw on onehand Japanese criticism of Australia’s position on climate change and Australia’sexploration of bilateral free trade agreements with Singapore, Thailand, andthe United States, but on the other discussion of closer strategic consultationbetween the US allies in the Paci� c between the Japanese and Australian ForeignMinisters.

Relations with China also followed the pattern of previous years. Australia’ssupport for Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and China’s attempt to jointhe World Trade Organisation—both successful in 2001—gave the impression of aclose and mutually-supportiv e bilateral relationship. But the old tensions were notfar from the surface. The public � oating of closer strategic consultation between theUS and Australia, Japan, and South Korea drew a hostile response in the Chinesestate media. Seeing in the proposal an attempt by the United States to build anarrangement designed to ‘contain’ China, various media organs issued warnings toAustralia as well as Japan and South Korea. The Guangzhou Daily, for example,reportedly referred to Australia as America’s ma qian zu, a foot soldier tasked withprotecting the general of an army (Dwyer 2001). Downer was quick to reassure theChinese, assuring them that it had only been a proposal for closer ‘consultations’,and was in no way directed against China. Howard’s visit to China in October wasto attend the APEC Summit in Shanghai; shortly after the terrorist attacks on theUS and in the middle of a federal election campaign, there was no chance for himto use the visit to further develop Australia-China ties.

The test of the Howard government’s skill at building key bilateral relations in2001 was always going to be with Indonesia. Australia-Indonesia relations were

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probably at their lowest ebb since Confrontation in the early 1960s. Australia’s rolein urging the September 1999 plebiscite in East Timor, and its key role in thesubsequent INTERFET peacekeeping operation had caused deep ambivalencetowards the relationship from an Indonesia mired in economic crisis and totteringthrough the early stages of democratic transition. For the Australian government,the widespread public endorsement of the East Timor operation and the broadcondemnation of Indonesia’s role in the crisis, meant that efforts at rapprochementwould require careful packaging. In particular, any expression of apology for theAustralian role in the crisis would likely be deeply unpopular.

Attempts to rebuild the relationship were kept off-balance during the � rst half ofthe year by the on-again, off-again status of a planned visit to Australia byIndonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid. Much hung on this visit: for Australiathe symbolism of not being the � rst to initiate head-of-government contact wasmade necessary by an electorate that was cynical about previous governments’perceived over-eagerness to establish close relationships with Indonesia’s politicaland military elites; for Indonesia the ability of a democratically-elected Presidentto visit Australia without meeting the widespread public protests that had deterredSoeharto from visiting since 1975 was a crucial development. In the end, Wahidvisited on 25 and 26 June, meeting Howard and other members of the government,opposition and business communities. While delivering little in the way ofsubstantive outcomes, the visit was widely considered to be of great symbolicimportance. A month later, Wahid had been removed from power after impeach-ment proceedings and been replaced by Indonesia’s fourth President in three years,Megawati Sukarnoputri . Wahid’s visit had, however, broken the symbolic impasse,and Howard announced his intention to visit Jakarta in August to broad approval.Howard’s visit on 13 and 14 August was seen as ‘closing the circle’, establishingthe basis for normalising bilateral ties. While in Jakarta, Howard committed himselfto building a new relationship with Indonesia, based on ‘positive realism’: ‘arealistic appreciation of the differences between our two societies and cultures, butpositively focussed on our many shared interests and on a mutual respect for eachother’ (Howard 2001 d.). It was a doctrine and a relationship that was to besubjected to severe stress within the space of a month.

Multilateral and regional organisation s

Another pattern revisited in the � rst part of 2001 was the Howard government’scontinued ambivalent relations with various regional and multilateral forums. It hadcome to power critical of the Hawke-Keating governments’ obsession with ‘grandschemes’ of multilateral and regional organisation-building , determined to be‘practical’ in its multilateral and regional diplomacy and place more emphasis onbilateral relationships . While on the one hand appearing sceptical about new (andold) regional associations that excluded Australia, the Howard government in 2001appeared particularly active in relation to more traditional associations: drawingattention to the (eventually postponed) Commonwealth Heads of GovernmentMeeting in Brisbane in October, launching a ‘Virtual Colombo Plan’ on the � ftieth

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anniversary of the original’s inception, and of course celebrating the � ftiethanniversary of the ANZUS alliance.

The 1990s had seen Australia either excluded from or not invited to join severalemerging regional groupings: the Asian side of the ASEM process; linkage betweenthe ASEAN Free Trade Area and the Australia-New Zealand Closer EconomicRelations agreement; the ASEAN-plus-three process. The Howard government hadcommitted itself to maintaining the campaign to join the ASEM process,(Commonwealth of Australia 1997, p. 45) and was surprised but supportive whenASEAN proposed revisiting the AFTA-CER link in 1999. By 2001, it appeared thatlack of progress on these fronts had developed into an acceptance by Downer thatAustralia would remain outside these associations . He began to adopt a ‘good luckto them’ attitude, observing that ‘their emergence is an advantage to Australia,because they increase cooperation and foster dialogue more broadly in our region’(Downer 2001 a.). He rounded on critics of the government’s performance onregional engagement: ‘It is curious… that some commentators should make somuch of the fact that Australia is not a member of every single regional institution ,as if our regional credentials must live or die by the outcome of that single issue’(Downer 2001 a.). Australia’s acceptance of its exclusions, and its impatience withslow-moving regional negotiations seemed to be underlined by its pursuit ofbilateral free trade deals with Singapore, Thailand, and the US.

An element of the increasing distance between Australia and the regionalinstitutions of Asia was furnished by the continuing willingness of Howard andDowner to offer advice to the countries and institutions of the region. A legacy ofthe Asian crisis, when Australia’s economic growth had remained robust in themidst of the regional economic crisis, was the Australian government’s convictionof the superiority of Australia’s economic institutions and its willingness to offeradvice, solicited or not, to the region (Wesley 2002). In a speech to the SingaporeInstitute of International Affairs in July, Downer developed a critique of ASEAN’seffectiveness:

ASEAN has a culture of working around problems rather than confrontingthem. The limits of this approach have been exposed by the � nancial crisis, andby the way in which expansion has increased ASEAN’s political and economicdiversity… it is not clear that ‘enhanced interaction’… has brought about anypractical change in how ASEAN members interact with each other on sensitiveregional issues (Downer 2001 b.).

In the same speech, Downer blamed ‘ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-mak-ing system’ for the failure of the AFTA-CER linkage, a fault of the organisationthat ‘sent a strong—negative—signal to investors about the commitment of itsmembers to increasing regional economic integration’. While some of these arecommonplace observations in most commentaries on ASEAN, their statement bythe Foreign Minister of an external country had clear symbolic undertones inrelation to Australia’s perceptions of the usefulness and weight of ASEAN inregional politics. Downer’s comments also sent strong signals about the kind ofpotential member Australia may be if admitted to any of these emerging regionalgroupings.

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However, despite the resigned bravado, Australia remained interested in regionalinitiatives : ‘Australia remains a very interested observer of the ASEAN 1 3grouping—and we continue to hope that we might play an active role in the group’swork in the future, should its members so desire and should Australia’s owninterests so dictate’ (Downer 2001 a.). Despite the demise of the latest attempt tolink AFTA and the CER, explorations were initiated of a ‘Closer EconomicPartnership’ between the two entities. And in the midst of APEC’s malaise after thefailure of the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation program, a promising new‘path� nder’ liberalisation initiative was adopted at the APEC Leaders Meeting inOctober, allowing accelerated liberalisation between some members, gaining en-dorsement from Howard as having the potential to re-energise APEC (Howard2001 k.).

Howard’s decision not to attend the annual Heads of Government meeting of theSouth Paci� c Forum in August reinforced the appearance of a waning Australiancommitment to multilateral and regional groupings. Many commentators saw thisas a questionable decision, considering the rising trend of instability in the SouthPaci� c in recent years, with coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000,recently-suspended con� ict in Bougainville and political murders in Samoa (SydneyMorning Herald 2001). Generally, the region faces problems of falling livingstandards, rising debt, corruption and mismanagement, and rising sea levels, whileseveral SPF states face the prospect of OECD action against tax havens. Many ofthe states of the Paci� c, which have traditionally relied on Australia and NewZealand as the regional powers, also questioned Howard’s commitment to theregion after the announcement of his non-attendance. Howard’s decision wasexplained by a number of commentators by the desire to avoid being embarrassedby the SPF’s criticism of the US and Australia over their stances on globalwarming, and the potential dif� culties created with Indonesia if West Papuanseparatist leaders attended as they did in 2000. Australia was eventually representedby Defence Minister Reith.

Later events in 2001 were to cause the government to reappraise its approach tothese institutions and regional groupings. The events of August and September shednew light on the importance of institutions such as APEC and the health ofrelationships in Southeast Asia and the Paci� c. But by the time these lessons werebeing brought to bear on the Howard government’s priorities in the conduct of the‘old’ foreign policy, the new foreign policy approach was asserting itself ever moreinsistently.

The ‘new logic’ of foreign policy

The conduct of Australian foreign policy in 2001 is a story of two parts. Thedecisive break between the � rst and second acts was furnished by two physicallyseparate, but eventually conceptually-relate d events. On Sunday 26 August, aNorwegian-registered cargo ship, the MV Tampa, en route from Perth to Singapore,responded to a signal issued by an Australian search and rescue plane of a boat indistress just outside Australian territorial waters. Diverting course, the Tampa

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rescued 434 people from a sinking � shing boat, identifying those rescued asseeking asylum in Australia. Originally intending to take them to an Indonesianport, the Tampa eventually changed course and made towards Christmas Island, anAustralian territory. Before it could reach Christmas Island, however, the Aus-tralian government gave orders for the Royal Australian Navy to intercept theTampa and prevent it from docking. A stand-off ensued, with the governmentremaining unmoved by domestic and internationa l criticism for its refusal toprocess the asylum-seekers on Australian territory. Then on 11 September twopassenger jets, piloted by hijackers, slammed into the twin towers of the WorldTrade Centre in New York City, another into the Pentagon in Washington DC, andyet another crashed in rural Pennsylvania, probably en route to the Capitol. Thedeath toll of these attacks—initially estimated at somewhere over 6,000—and theimmediacy of the media reports of them, provoked a widespread emotional reactionin Australia.

These events, occurring almost simultaneously , led to an overwhelming sense ofcrisis within Australia. One of their effects was to draw into stark relief anapproach to foreign policy that is distinctive of the Howard government. Elementsof this approach have been apparent since the accession of the Howard governmentin 1996, but have for the most part been downplayed or retracted due to moretraditional foreign policy interests. Prominent examples of the brief � owering andsubsequent retraction of the new logic occurred in September 1999, when Howardgave vent to the hubris of the Howard doctrine only to distance himself from itsubsequently ; and in April 2000 when Downer made his unscripted distinctionbetween ‘emotional regionalism’ and ‘practical regionalism’, a conceptual leap thatwas similarly later abandoned (Wesley 2002). The Tampa crisis and the 11September attacks seemed to remove the caution of enduring diplomatic interestsfrom Howard and his ministers, and the new logic of foreign policy emerged andendured through the � nal four months of 2001.

The new logic of foreign policy has three central attributes. The � rst is to makeforeign policy decisions according to the same political calculations as domesticpolicy. This tendency is at odds with the traditional logic of internationa l relations,which sees foreign policy calculations as necessarily different from those ofdomestic policy, and counsels that foreign policy should always be made free of thescrutiny or considerations of the domestic political arena.4 While some critics seethe new Howard government approach to foreign policy as a strategy to useinternational issues to boost domestic popularity (Williams 2001), at a deeper levelit re� ects Howard’s tendency to see relations with and events in the outside worldaccording to his experiences of and calculations about Australian politics.5

The second element is a strong conviction of Australia’s weight and importance4 The classic statement is that of Hans Morgenthau: ‘where foreign policy is conducted under the conditions of

democratic control, the need to marshal popular emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impairthe rationality of foreign policy itself’ (Morgenthau 1978 p. 7); but the tradition of foreign policy as an elite,secretive craft is of course much older

5 Howard was quoted in David Barnett’s and Pru Goward’s biography as saying ‘I always tended to look at thingsthrough a national perspective’ (Barnett and Goward 1997) referring to the national focus of his politicalcalculations, including, presumably, foreign policy calculations.

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in the world, as a signi� cant diplomatic player and a worthy example to othercountries. This conviction, based more on self-assessment rather than any externalappraisals of Australia’s role, developed most strongly during the period in whichAustralia weathered the Asian crisis. For Howard, Australia’s internationalstrengths were based on domestic virtues, ‘our robust national political institutions ,an impeccable commitment to the rule of law, high standards of corporategovernance, and a private sector and wider community that are con� dent in dealingwith a new information age’ (Howard 2001 d.), all of which contribute to ‘theincreased con� dence of our society’ (Howard 2001 b.). This was a theme eagerlyseized and expanded on by Downer: ‘After � ve years as Foreign Minister, I amstruck by the increase in Australia’s international standing… [its] achievements[during the Asian crisis] mean that Australia is listened to with increased interestand respect internationally’ (Downer 2001 a.). For Downer, a self-con� denceindependent of the opinions or performances of others was basic to any success inforeign policy:

When we came to government … . We said we should be con� dent about ourability to shape our future. We said that our foreign and trade policies couldonly ever be underpinned by our economic and political strengths at home. Weneeded to get our own house in order before we could expand and diversifyabroad… Thank goodness we escaped this mindset of defeatism and depen-dence—a reliance on the progress of others for the sake of ours—before theevents of the latter part of the 1990s (Downer 2001 d.).

This was a sense of self-belief that refused to be shaken by contradictoryopinions or events. Over time, and particularly during 2001, the government’sforeign policy performance has been criticised by members of the academic elitethat provided the intellectual justi� cation for and supported previous governments’foreign policies, particularly in regard to Australia’s regional engagement.6

Signi� cantly, these critiques, from those who once carried much weight in thepublic discussion and private formulation of foreign policy, have been comprehen-sively ignored by the Howard government, apart from the occasional dismissivecomment from Downer. In the second part of 2001, foreign policy calculationswere being made according to a different set of justi� cations, and attuned to thepresumed preferences of a different, ‘mainstream’ audience (Johnson 2000).

The third aspect of the new approach to foreign policy relates to the centralityof a conception of Australian values that inform relations with the outside world.In its foreign policy blueprint, In the National Interest, the Howard government hadde� ned values as relevant to the shaping of foreign policy almost as an afterthoughtto the all-important consideration of security and economic interests: ‘In a democ-racy, governments must also act to give expression to the aspirations and values of

6 Attacks on aspects of the government ’s foreign policy during 2001 came from a veritable roll-call of publicintellectuals and academics previously in� uential in setting the direction and providing rhetorical support forengagement with Asia: Ross Garnaut, Stephen FitzGerald, Stuart Harris, Richard Woolcott, Peter Drysdale, RobertManne, Malcolm Fraser, Gerard Henderson. Some of these, such as Woolcott, had been early contributors toCoalition foreign policy frameworks such as the White Paper.

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their national communities in foreign policy as much as in other areas ofgovernment’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997, p. 11). Yet over time, values havecome to rival, if not displace interests as central to Howard’s foreign policyrhetoric.7 The centenary of Federation celebrations gave him a chance to expand onhis de� nition of Australian values and their centrality in de� ning the nation:

… the values I [feel are] uniquely part of the Australian character [are] a desirefor self-reliance, the willingness to have a go, the capacity to pull together bothin good times and adversity and � nally an ethic which demands from each ofus and for each of us the giving and receiving of a fair go … In re� ning ourown values, we have … selected the best from our past and moved boldly awayfrom attitudes or practices we now feel are unworkable or unjust (Howard2001 a.).

To this list Howard added in various speeches through the year the characteris-tics of social cohesion, egalitarianism, tolerance, fair play, and mateship (Howard2001 j.).

Clearly for Howard, these values de� ned Australia’s place in the world because‘in the end our societies are judged by their values, they’re judged by the thingsthey are prepared to stand for and defend’ (Howard 2001 i.). The appropriatenessof a policy in terms of these Australian values became a compelling new yardstickfor determining Australian foreign policy, together with an unshakeable self-beliefin Australia’s virtue and importance in relation to the outside world. It was anapproach to politics of a kind with that practised in the domestic political arena.

The Tampa crisis

The issue of asylum-seekers had been prominent in Australian domestic politicslong before 26 August. Increasing numbers of refugees seeking to escape con� ictsin the Middle East and South Asia, in addition to rising numbers of economicmigrants, have become a global issue in the 1990s. Australia’s geographicalsituation—an island continent with vast unpatrolled coastlines situated close to acomplex and recently-unstable island archipelago—brings a unique national twistto this global issue. Some commentators would add that historical fears of invasionby non-white, impoverished people from Asia, add a particular sense of crisis andfear to the situation (see McMaster 2001). The issue of asylum seekers in Australiahad centred on an impassioned debate about the often harsh and remote detentioncentres into which these people were placed while their refugee status was assessed.The issue had attained some international aspects, speci� cally through UnitedNations criticisms of the detention centres and the efforts of the government toobtain an agreement with Indonesia to stop the � ow of asylum seekers through theIndonesian archipelago to Australia, but had not yet become a prominent foreignpolicy issue.

From its earliest days, the Tampa crisis was predominantly a foreign and defence

7 As noted earlier by Meg Gurry (2001).

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policy issue. The situation was immediately cast in terms of Australia’s security;the policy issues were cast in terms of ‘border protection’ of Australia’s vulnerablecoastlines from an array of new global threats:

The challenges Australia now faces in relation to border protection includes[sic] people smuggling, often on an international scale; internationally con-trolled rings of illegal drug traf� ckers; well organised and resourced terroristgroups; transnational crime syndicates; the relatively new phenomenon ofsophisticated cyber-crime; new outbreaks of old health challenges such astuberculosis; outbreaks of foot and mouth and other potentially devastatingdiseases; threats to wild life; and illegal � shing operations in Australia’s waters(Howard 2001 l.).

The spectre of transnational crime was raised by calling attention to people-smuggling syndicates: ‘we have a group of people who are running… people-traf� cking syndicates, and they are desperate to push people into Australia. They’recharging up to US$10,000 per person … I think it’s very important that we makeclear to them that they’re not going to pro� t at the expense of Australia …’ (Reith2001). The government’s response centred on the strategic goal of deterrence:‘Australia should not be regarded around the world as a country of easy destinationor a soft touch’.8 The policy of denying asylum-seekers the chance to land onAustralian soil was intended to cause severe credibility problems for the peoplesmugglers, who had presumably guaranteed asylum-seekers that they would deliverthem into Australian territory. The security response also saw the governmentrationalise its lines of defence. Its refusal to let the people aboard the Tampa landon Australian soil was intended to prevent them � ling asylum applications inAustralia. Subsequently , in order better to defend Australia’s coastline, ChristmasIsland, Ashmore Reef, Cocos Keeling Islands and other outlying territories wereexcised from the Australian migration zone by an Act of Parliament.9

But the asylum seekers issue was also cast in terms of the values of middleAustralia. From the start the people on board the Tampa were referred to as‘illegals’; for Howard it was important that ‘we will decide who comes to thiscountry and the circumstances in which they come’ Howard 2001 n.). It was partlyan issue of refusing to be exploited: ‘one of the reasons why there is risingresistance in Australia [to refugees] and understandably so [is] because they feelthat this country’s generosity has been taken advantage of’ (Howard 2001 e1). Alsofrequently labelled ‘queue jumpers’, they threatened the order and decorum ofsocial conventions: ‘There are proper assessment procedures for refugees and weare opposed to a situation where people can force their way to the front of thequeue, arrive illegally and having got to Australia in effect push other people outof the way’ (Howard 2001 e.). For Immigration Minister Ruddock, the fact that thepeople on board the Tampa had paid for their passage raised questions aboutwhether they were real refugees: ‘The hundreds of thousands of people who are

8 John Howard, Doorstop Interview, 8 September 20019 Joint Statement, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and the Minister for Justice

and Customs, ‘Government Strengthens Border Integrity’, 17 September 2001

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� eeing Afghanistan now do not have the money to engage people smugglers … thepeople who have an urgent need for resettlement places are not those who bypassother situations of safety’ (Ruddock 2001).

The government’s policy and justi� cations attracted strong public approvalwithin Australia, while at the same time stimulating international criticisms. TheAustralian media carried reports of media comment in Europe and North Americadescribing Australia as ‘an arrogant white fortress and an international bully’10 anddrawing comparisons between the Tampa and the infamous ‘voyage of the damned’where Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany were denied entry to a range ofcountries in 1939, eventually being sent back to the mercies of the Nazis.11 Howardrefused to countenance these criticisms, instead relying on his own assessment ofAustralia’s values and moral worth:

I totally reject some of the international criticism that we are inhumane. Someof that criticism is coming from countries and from people who are far lessgenerous in taking refugees than is Australia. On a per capita basis Australiatakes more refugees than any country other than Canada (Howard 2001 e1).

Norway expressed frustration at Australia’s � at refusal to countenance ‘anysuggestions or compromises’ (Martin 2001). Even appeals for a more humanitarianresponse from United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights MaryRobinson were rejected as hypocrisy:

… we won’t be the � rst democratic country to be attacked by sections of theUnited Nations. I mean, the Americans have been attacked, they’re regularlyattacked. It seems in the eyes of some in the United Nations that the reallydemocratic countries in the world are easy game for attack (Howard 2001 g.).

In speci� c terms, the most profound effect of the Tampa crisis on Australia’sinternational relations was on the relationship with Indonesia. Howard’s visit toJakarta in early August had established a relationship he de� ned in terms of‘positive realism’: ‘a realistic appreciation of the differences between our twosocieties and cultures, but positively focused on our many shared interests and ona mutual respect for each other’ (Howard 2001 d.). Given its own experiences withprocessing Indochinese refugees in the 1980s, and its recent troubles with anestimated 1.3 million internal refugees displaced by the effects of the Asian crisis,the Indonesian government was clearly unwilling to accept the refugees on boardthe Tampa (Dodd 2001). When Howard tried to telephone Megawati to encourageIndonesia to accept the return of the refugees, she was repeatedly unavailable totake his call. Downer conceded a clear Indonesian signal had been sent: ‘they madeit clear that they didn’t want illegals in Indonesia and they didn’t want to take thesepeople back. And so the Indonesians have established their position very clearly’(Downer 2001 c.). Here was ‘positive realism’ at work: in the absence of anyshared interests on the asylum seekers issue, it appeared Indonesia and Australiahad no relationship or dialogue between the countries’ respective leaders.

10 Quoted by Neil Mitchell in an interview with John Howard, Radio 3AW, Melbourne, 31 August 200111 A US news report replayed on Channel 9 television’s ‘60 Minutes’ program, 2 September 2001

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The next casualty of the Tampa crisis for ‘positive realism’ was mutual respect.Just as he would have done in domestic politics, Howard began to explain thephone call incident according to the rightness of his position and the wrongness ofthe Indonesians’:

It’s very interesting that this sort of analysis always assumes that when there’sa difference of opinion between Indonesia and Australia, Australia is wrong andIndonesia is right. Now, in this particular case those people should have beenaccepted back by Indonesia because that’s where they came from and that iswhere the Captain of the Tampa, let it not be forgotten, originally decided totake them… (Howard 2001 g.).

Howard was later to interpret Megawati’s refusal to take his call in terms of herJavanese culture: ‘I understand she didn’t feel able to accede to the request sheknew I was going to put to her, and it is in the nature of different cultures to avoidgiving negative responses because it is perceived as giving offence’ (quoted inAllan and Schauble 2001). The Indonesian response to Howard’s lecturing on theTampa and on the need to maintain solidarity with the US-led alliance againstterrorism was one of extreme irritation. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda ob-served, ‘There is a certain tendency in Australia to communicate through publicdiplomacy rather than a quiet one [sic]. This is certainly in many ways notacceptable at least in terms of our preference’ (Pearson 2001 b.). A delegation ofthe Foreign, Defence, and Immigration Ministers to Jakarta in September to discussa proposal for an Australian-funded refugee processing centre in Indonesia failedcompletely. Only after the tragic sinking of an overcrowded refugee boat in lateOctober did Indonesia signal any interest in negotiating with Australia over theproblem of asylum seekers, and relations had begun to be rebuilt by the time ofWirayuda’s visit to Australia in November.

The Australian government � nally brokered a deal providing for the processingof the claims of asylum seekers on board the Tampa and subsequent boats in anumber of Paci� c Island states: primarily Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and NewZealand. The Australian government funded the construction of a refugee-process-ing centre on Nauru, clinching the deal with a promise of $10 million in aid to itscorruption-mired economy, as well as providing emergency medical care for itsailing President (Wilkinson 2001). A triumphant Howard suggested that money wasnot the issue; his ‘Paci� c solution’ had been possible because of a sharedcommunity of values:

This is a truly Paci� c solution to a problem which involved the governments ofAustralia, New Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea and they have allworked together and I again express on behalf of the government and theAustralian people our thanks to the governments and the people of those threecountries for their willingness to cooperate… it just indicates that there’s acomity of values amongst the nations of the Paci� c and that we have goodrelations with those countries (Howard 2001 f.).

It seemed Howard had rediscovered his connection with the Paci� c in the monthsince his refusal to attend the South Paci� c Forum. Others were not so sanguine

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about the wisdom or the sustainabilit y of the ‘Paci� c solution’. The Secretary-Gen-eral of the South Paci� c Forum suggested it was an example of a less than benignexercise of Australian money and power:

While we in the Paci� c will always do what we can to help those in need, sucha substantial population [of asylum seekers] places extreme pressure on ouralready limited resources, exposing our small and vulnerable economies tofurther social and economic problems, which we can ill afford … I am con-cerned that the ‘Big Brothers’ of the Paci� c choose to see the smaller Paci� cnations as their outlet for refugees (quoted in Callick 2001).

11 September

The immediacy and clarity of the media coverage of the 11 September attacksprovoked a widespread public response in Australia. Howard, who was in theUnited States at the time, described its effect on him: ‘of all of the events that Ihave been in any way touched by in the 27 year [sic] that I’ve been in public life,none has had a more profound impact on me than has this’ (Howard 2001 l.).Immediately casting the attacks in terms of Australian values—‘In a very directway, September 11 was an attack on the right of Australians, especially youngAustralians, to go about their daily lives and to move around the world with easeand freedom and without fear’ (Howard 2001 l.).—Howard resonated with the massof public opinion in characterising the attacks as a foreign policy issue forAustralia. He conceived of the response to the attacks on America as ‘Australia’s� ght’: ‘If we left this contest only to America, we would be leaving it to them todefend our rights and those of all the other people of the world who have acommitment to freedom and liberty. We will not do that… Australians have alwaysbeen a people prepared to � ght their own � ghts’ (Howard 2001 l.).

The Australian government was quick to invoke Article IV of the ANZUS treatyon 14 September, indicating to the United States its willingness to consult inrelation to a coordinated response ‘to the limits of [Australia’s] capability’ (Howard2001 h.). Parallelling NATO’s invocation of its mutual defence provision, Howardclearly relished the chance to appear to be coming to the aid of the United States.It was a struggle for the values held in common: ‘at no stage should any Australianregard this as something that is just con� ned to the United States. It is an attackupon the way of life we hold dear in common with the Americans. It does requirethe invocation of ANZUS’ (Howard 2001 h.). As the United States assembled its‘Coalition Against Terrorism’ to attack in the � rst instance the Taliban regime andthe al-Quaeda network in Afghanistan, Australia pledged 150 SAS troops, navyfrigates, long-range maritime aircraft, tanker aircraft, and FA-18 aircraft to theCoalition.

Howard stressed the symbolic value rather than the strategic weight of thecontribution:

… an important message is sent to our enemies by the concentration of aninternational force against them. A coalition of national forces acting towards

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a single military aim is a tangible and utterly compelling demonstration of thesolidarity of world opinion and world resolve. The threat of terrorism hangsover each of our nations, and it is only fair that the costs of its eradicationshould be shared (Howard 2001 l.).

Former foreign policy practitioner Tony Kevin questioned whether Australia’sparticipation carried any symbolic coin at all:

The fact is that Australia is of zero diplomatic value to the US in its presentforeign policy challenge to build and maintain a complex coalition … Australianow has no diplomatic credibility to offer. We ran down the substantial ‘goodinternational citizen’ credentials we used to have as a result of our notorioussel� shness in the Kyoto global warming negotiations and our increasinglyabusive treatment of asylum seekers (Kevin 2001).

Australian reporters in the United States delighted in reporting that the Australiancontribution had largely gone unnoticed: ‘Although there has been endless anddetailed attention to the coalition of countries forming around the US, Australia’srole has rated precisely one mention in articles in the major papers’ (Hartcher2001 d.). Australia was subsequently reluctant to commit itself to a wider waragainst terrorism or a post-con� ict stabilisation force in Afghanistan (Barker 2001).

Even if Australia’s contribution to the ‘Coalition against Terrorism’ had beenlittle noticed, 11 September had major resonances for domestic politics and publicperceptions of Australia’s international relations. The Middle Eastern origin of the11 September hijackers and the fact that most of the asylum seekers were identi� edas coming from Iraq or Afghanistan began to run the Tampa and 11 Septembercrises together in the public mind, as if those seeking asylum were potential Islamicterrorists. Howard and his ministers did little to oppose this association, character-ising both in the same breath as national security issues: ‘When I speak of nationalsecurity I don’t just speak of the way in which this nation has properly andhonourably responded to the attack of the 11th of September … National securityalso importantly included effective protection of our borders … Protecting Aus-tralia’s borders against illegal immigration is an important national responsibility ’(Howard 2001 o.). As the federal election campaign got under way in October andNovember, national security became a major election issue for both parties, withHoward characterising it as one of the two overriding issues of the election, andOpposition Leader Beazley campaigning on a platform of ‘security at home,security abroad’.

Howard won the election, but at the end of 2001 the issue of security remainedparamount in the public mind. People � ows in a vast silent wave were predictedto crash upon Australia as Immigration Minister Ruddock warned Parliament ofthousands of asylum seekers that were in the pipeline through Southeast Asia.12 Asanthrax attacks through the US postal system spread fear in Australia, terrorismalso appeared to be an ever-present possibility . A series of pieces of legislationwere put in place to protect Australia’s borders and to provide Australia’s security

12 Question Time, Commonwealth House of Representatives, 30 August 2001

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organisations with increased surveillance powers. By the end of 2001, as additionalnaval patrols were tasked to guard the waters between Australia and SoutheastAsia, Australia’s relations with the outside world seemed to have changed fromthose of engagement and openness to watchfulness and security.

Conclusion

By year’s end, Australia, vulnerable to the evils of the outside world, but � ercelydetermined to protect its values, seemed a very different place in relation to theoutside world than it had at the start of 2001. The question that remains is whetherthe new approach to foreign policy and the changed attitude to the outside worldwill endure, or whether the old logic of foreign policy will reappear with theinevitable waning of attention from the issues of asylum seekers and terrorism. Theevents of 2001 demonstrated how destructive the new logic of foreign policy canbe to important relationships ; but at the same time how important stocks ofdiplomatic capital can be when dealing with unforeseen crises. It is hard to imaginethat the imperatives of key relationships and openness to the outside world will notbecome compelling again in 2002. Yet the story of Australian foreign policy in2001 demonstrated the ease with which Australia’s international relations can bere-aligned to a different set of imperatives emanating from a different audience;what remains to be gauged are its enduring costs.

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