ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORPGR 128690 JANUARY 21, 1999

FACTS:

In 1992, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, through its vice president Charo Santos-Concio, requested Viva Production, Inc. to allow ABS-CBN to air at least 14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant to this request, a meeting was held between Viva’s representative (Vicente Del Rosario) and ABS-CBN’s Eugenio Lopez (General Manager) and Santos-Concio was held on April 2, 1992. During the meeting Del Rosario proposed a film package which will allow ABS-CBN to air 104 Viva films for P60 million. Later, Santos-Concio, in a letter to Del Rosario, proposed a counterproposal of 53 films (including the 14 films initially requested) for P35 million. Del Rosario presented the counter offer to Viva’s Board of Directors but the Board rejected the counter offer. Several negotiations were subsequently made but on April 29, 1992, Viva made an agreement with Republic Broadcasting Corporation (referred to as RBS – or GMA 7) which gave exclusive rights to RBS to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially requested by ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific performance against Viva as it alleged that there is already a perfected contract between Viva and ABS-CBN in the April 2, 1992 meeting. Lopez testified that Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and he (Lopez) even put the agreement in a napkin which was signed and given to Del Rosario. ABS-CBN also filed an injunction against RBS to enjoin the latter from airing the films. The injunction was granted. RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer for moral damages as it claimed that its reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows that they promised to their viewers. RBS relied on the ruling in People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB which states that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation”. The trial court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE:(1) Whether or not a contract was perfected in the April 2, 1992 meeting between the

representatives of the two corporations.(2) Whether or not a corporation, like RBS, is entitled to an award of moral damages upon

grounds of debased reputation.HELD:

(1) No. There is no proof that a contract was perfected in the said meeting. Lopez’ testimony about the contract being written in a napkin is not corroborated because the napkin was never produced in court. Further, there is no meeting of the minds because Del Rosario’s offer was of 104 films for P60 million was not accepted. And that the alleged counter-offer made by Lopez on the same day was not also accepted because there’s no proof of such. The counter offer can only be deemed to have been made days after the April 2 meeting when Santos-Concio sent a letter to Del Rosario containing the counter-offer. Regardless, there was no showing that Del Rosario accepted. But even if he did accept, such acceptance will not bloom into a perfected contract because Del Rosario has no authority to do so.

As a rule, corporate powers, such as the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. But this power may be delegated to a corporate committee, a corporate officer or corporate manager. Such a delegation must be clear and specific. In the case at bar, there was no such delegation to Del Rosario. The fact that he has to present the counteroffer to the Board of Directors of Viva is proof that the contract must be accepted first by the Viva’s Board. Hence, even if Del Rosario accepted the counter-offer, it did not result to a contract because it will not bind Viva sans authorization.

(2) No. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. No moral damages can be awarded to a juridical person. The statement in the case of People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB is a mere obiter dictum hence it is not binding as a jurisprudence.

LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALSGR L-54598 APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS Violeta Delmo who was supposed to graduate magna cum luade was not allowed to do so

because of her act of lending money to members of organization of which she was a member. According to the school authorities, that act was against school rules and regulations. This the President of the state college did, despite her qualifications and the Bureau of Public School’s instruction not to deprive her of the honors due to her, but just the same, she was graduated as a plain student. The Supreme Court said that she went through a painful ordeal brought about by the President’s neglect of duty and callousness. Hence, moral damages and exemplary damage were proper. The basis of the decision was article 27, NCC, where a person suffering material or moral loss because a public employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action of damages and other relief again the latter.

ISSUE:Whether or not the president would be liable for damages under Article 27.

HELD:

It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.

The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision XXX and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE

GR 137567 JUNE 20, 2000

FACTS:

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar

HELD:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

BANAL VS TADEO, JR.

GR 78911-25 DECEMBER 11, 1987

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the stated criminal cases.

Fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913,were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does notp rovide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order." The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor

HELD:

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.