1. Constantino vs. Mendez

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages.  The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.  Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man.  In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.  Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.     

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.  Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.  More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and

not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

CONDE v. ABAYA

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child,

and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.

But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

Jison vs. CA

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.  

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family.  It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.  Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.     

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. 

Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1.     That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former;

2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity.  With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to

such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.  Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.

GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

FACTS:Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors

and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to

give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

HELD: The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to

establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

6.

7. Malkenson v. Agrava

Facts:

On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified petition to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino

citizen in Madrid, Spain on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson who alone of his parents extended him recognition. 

The petitioners claim that the child concerned has been living with them under their care and custody since their marriage in 1972. Petitioner Frederick Malkinson is an American citizen, while his spouse is a Filipino citizen and owns a property in the Philippines. They claim that it is to the best interest of the child that he be adopted by the spouses who are qualified for such legal adoption.

Respondent Judge Hon. Corazon Agrava dismissed the abovementioned petition in November 1972 because the court opined that the position was insufficient due to the fact that the petitioner husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen of the country.

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien, who is neither a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines nor otherwise legally disqualified from adopting a Filipino. Respondent court again denied the same in December 1972.

Issue: WON an alien who is not legally disqualified may adopt a Filipino

 Held: 

If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided. Article 335 of the New Civil Code only provides that non-resident aliens and

resident aliens with whose government the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly disqualified and prohibited to adopt, while Article 339 provides that only an alien with whose state our government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be adopted.

Inclusio unius exclusion alterius (The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another)

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Ultimately, under the plain language of the law, alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner such as the petitioner-husband from adopting a Filipino child. Under Art. 338 of the Civil Code, the petitioner-wife who is also the natural mother, is authorized to adopt her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child while the petitioner husband is likewise authorized to adopt his step-child and that such

adoption would strengthen the family solidarity of the petitioner-spouses and the child.

8. Tamargo vs. CA

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.  

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are

responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

9.

10. Cang v. CA

Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the

only parent who gives consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption necessary.

Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

11. Santos v. Aranzanso

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and

hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.

Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.

Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.

Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

12. Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that

Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

13. Mariategui vs. CA

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3

marriages during his lifetime.  He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor.  He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.  Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.  Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.  On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana.  Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.  Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.  The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.

Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

14. Santos vs. Republic

Petitioner Santos spouses seek to adopt the 4-year old sickly brother of the wife.   It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-petitioner-wife is a nurse by profession. The parents of the child testified that they entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up.

Issue: Can a sister adopt her own brother?

Held:

Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.

15.

16. FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO ADRIANO, ET AL.,

FACTS:Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, three (3) daughters, and one (1) adopted

daughter, Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino countered that

Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.

ISSUE: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

HELD:

CIVIL LAW: article 305 in relation to article 1996

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.

In this connection, Section 1103 of the

Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;

CIVIL LAW: common law relationships

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.

In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a spouse having the right and duty to

make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:

x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.

In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply

to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance.

To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in

the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and indefinite.

Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.

17. Leouel Santos vs. CA

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.  The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.  The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound.  Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr.  Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs. 

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her.  Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.  Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.  He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.  Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.  Wherefore, his petition was denied.