Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21015             March 24, 1924

MIGUELA CARRILLO, for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of ADRIANA CARRILLO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs.JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.

Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for appellant.Salinas & Salinas for appellees.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven parcels of land, with one-half of the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite, containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000 which the seller admitted having received. Nine days afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of First Instance and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for the administrator and settlement of her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment of said contract of sale executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco. The defendants were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially in the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo performed acts which indicated that she was mentally deranged. We have made a thorough examination of the character of those acts, and believe that they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane. The same thing can be said as to her having entered the "Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San Jose," in the absence of an affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions, for while it is true that insane persons are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter persons who are not insane. Against the inference that from said acts the plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo in that time, there is in the record evidence of acts while more clearly and more convincingly show that she must not have been mentally incapacitated before the execution of the document sought to be annulled in this action. In January, 1917, her husband having died, she was appointed judicial administratrix of the latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath of office, gave the proper bond discharged her functions in the same manner and with the same diligence as any other person of knowingly sound mind would have done. Documents, were introduced which show complex and numerous acts of administration performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such as the disposition of various and considerable amounts of money in transactions made with different persons, the correctness of said acts never having been, nor can it be, put in question. We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo having executed contracts of lease,

appeared in court in the testate proceeding in which she was administratrix, and in fact continued acting as such administratrix of the estate of her husband until August, 1917, when for the purpose of taking vacation, she requested to be relieved from the office. On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and there she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the same year very much better off although not completely cured. Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor Ocampo answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him were responsive to the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only one-half of the body. After leaving the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr. Ramos Salinas, and there executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month. The notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he has been for some time with Adriana Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to the document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her countenance, which on the contrary, appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the questions he made to her without inconsistencies or failure of memory, for which reason, says this witness, he was surprised when afterwards he learned that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question.

It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most interested party in the case, being the plaintiff herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her husband in 1917. It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety for her. It must likewise be noted that the other witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time, when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents and the testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was mentally incapacitated.

The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently.

Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of being mentally capable, and consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a specified time is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, her capacity must be presumed.

Attention is also called to the disproportion between the price of the sale and the real value of the land sold. The evidence, however, rather shows that the price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an area of 33 hectares, represents it real value, for its is little more than P100 per hectare, which is approximately the value of other lands of the same nature in the vicinity. But even supposing that there is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for having made the sale under such conditions. Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both defendants, who are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her during the time she was there, and for such acts they may have won her gratitude. Under these circumstances there is nothing illegal, or even reprehensible, and much less strange in Adriana Carrillo's having taken into

account those services rendered her by the defendants and reciprocated thereof by a favorable transaction. Having no ascendants and descendents, she could, in consideration of all the these circumstances, have even given as a donation, or left by will, these lands to the defendants.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472            March 13, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.

William J. Rohde for appellant.Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together.

The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. they also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.

Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."

Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was."

Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy because he cut me."

Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."

The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.

There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.

The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.

In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and insanity as follows:

But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to

make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)

In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' "

The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise statement:

Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.

In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this court stated:

In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven.

Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):

But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof. This presumption however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)

What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.

In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):

One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.

The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3572             September 30, 1952

PAULINO DUMAGUIN, plaintiff-appellant, vs.A.I. REYNOLDS, E.J. HARRISON and BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, defendants-appellees.

Ernesto Sibal and Tañada, Pelaez and Teehankee for appellant.Juan L. Orbeta for appellee A.I. Reynolds.Basilio Francisco for appellee E.J. Harrison.Claro M. Recto for appellee Big Wedge Mining Company.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

For purposes of this decision, the following facts may be said to be agreed upon by the parties or to be without dispute. Because the plaintiff Paulino M. Dumaguin would appear to be the central figure in this case, we shall begin by making reference to his background and his status at the time he entered into the transactions and executed the deeds of conveyance whose legality is now the subject of the present petition.

Paulino M. Dumaguin was a teacher in the public elementary schools for a year and a half, and from 1916 to 1918 was the Manager of the Head Waters Mining Company in Baguio. As Manager of said mining company Paulino acquired some knowledge of mining. On or before May 21, 1929, he was a supervising line-man of the Bureau of Posts. On that date, (May 21, 1929) he was admitted to the Insular

Psychopathic Hospital at San Felipe Neri (now National Psychopathic Hospital), Mandaluyong, Rizal, said to be suffering from "paranoia". On October 15, 1929, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alienist of said Hospital, submitted the following memorandum:

"MEMORANDUM

To: the Alienist in Charge Insular Psychopathic Hospital, San Felipe Neri, Rizal.

Subject: Paulino M. Dumaguin. — Male, married, 33 years old, Ex-Supervising Lineman of the Bureau of Posts, admitted to the hospital at 11:25 a.m. on May 21, 1929.

1. The patient is well-behaved, oriented in all spheres, coherent in his speech and has no more illusion or hallucinations; but is having a delusion that one of the patients in the Hospital is trying to chloroform him. He consequently keeps away from the said patient.

2. He is not also sure that his former officemates whom he erroneously believed chloroformed him before, would not chloroform him anymore when he goes home.

3. This type of insanity which Paulino M. Dumaguin is suffering from is therefore that of Paranoia, which runs a very chronic course of usually a lifetime, but which may show improvement as the patient grow older. (See Exhibits 42, folio 195; Emphasis ours).

After Paulino's discharge from the Hospital on or about November 11, 1929, in order to enable his wife to withdraw his retirement gratuity from the government, on September 16, 1930, she filed guardianship proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Said court relying presumably on the report of Dr. Joson above-quoted, granted the petition and appointed her as Paulino's guardian.

On February 2, 1931, Paulino and his guardian in a joint motion before the Court of Camarines Sur among others alleged that —

4. Que en la actualidad, el citado Paulino M. Dumaguin, ya esta restablecido, por lo que se le ha permitido dejar el Hospital y ahora vive con su familia en esta localidad, que es su residencia.

5. Que el mencionado Paulino M. Dumaguin ha recibido un cheque del Gobierno por la cantidad de P412.38, como parte de su pension.

6. Que los comparecientes necesitan el importe de dicho cheque para atender a su subsistencia, pues se hallan en la actualidad faltos de todo necesario.

and asked that they be authorized to cash said check and use its proceeds for their support:

"Por tanto, suplican al Juzgado que se les autorice a cambiar el referido cheque, y disponer de su producto para su manutencion."

In 1934, the guardianship proceedings were closed.

In and before the year 1930, defendants A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison as gold prospectors had located some mineral claims in the Itogon District, sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province, known as the

"ANACONDA GROUP". They employed Fructuoso Dumaguin, brother of plaintiff Paulino, in their work as prospectors.

At the beginning of 1931, Fructuoso Dumaguin was thus working for said defendants Reynolds and Harrison relocating some of their mining claims previously located and locating new ones, for which work he was paid P5.00 a day. About the same time his brother Paulino M. Dumaguin, plaintiff herein, leaving his home in Camarines Sur went up to Baguio in search of work. To help him Fructuoso got him employed by the defendants and the two brothers worked together in the mining business for the defendants.

The theory of the plaintiffs that he was employed only to relocate defendants' mining claims in the Anaconda Group while the defense claims that like his brother Fructuoso, Paulino was employed not only to relocate mining claims within the Anaconda Group but also to stake and locate new mining claims for them. For said work Paulino was also paid by the day by the defendants.

During the months of May, June and July of that year 1931 the two brothers Fructuoso and Paulino staked and located ten mining claims or fractions thereof named Victoria, Greta, Triangle, Lolita, Frank, Paul, Leo, Loreto, Arthur and G. Ubalde, all said claims or fractions being late registered in the name of Paulino M. Dumaguin as locator in the office of the Mining Recorder. By virtue of an instrument (Exhibit A) entitled "Deed of Transfer" dated September 10, 1931, Paulino M. Dumaguin conveyed and transferred to defendants A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison nine of the ten mineral claims just mentioned, and in another instrument (Exhibit B) on the same date September 10, 1931, Paulino transferred and conveyed to defendant Reynolds the remaining claim Victoria.

Later, Reynolds as vendee of the mining claim Victoria by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit C) dated November 2, 1931 sold and transferred said claim to the defendant Big Wedge Mining Company the claims Frank, Paul, Leo, Loreto, and Arthur. In still another Deed of Sale (Exhibit J) Reynolds and Harrison sold and transferred to the same Big Wedge Mining Co. the Greta, Lolita and Triangle fractions or mineral claims. As a result all the ten mineral claims or fractions transferred by Paulino to Reynolds and Harrison, with the exception of the claim G. Ubalde were in turn sold and transferred to the Big Wedge Mining Co.. What was done to this last claim or fraction G. Ubalde, does not appear on the record, but it must still remain in the name of Reynolds and Harrison.

Plaintiff Dumaguin initiated this case in the Court of First Instance of Baguio by filing his original complaint on November 5, 1934, later amending it on July 26, 1939 and finally re-amending it on June 4, 1940. Under his re-amended complaint which contains three case of action, he alleges that when he executed the deeds of transfer (Exhibits A and B) he was under guardianship and did not possess the mental capacity to contract and so asked the court that the said two deeds be declared null and void. He also alleged that those two deed being void, Reynolds and Harrison had no title to transmit to the Big Wedge Mining Co., by virtue of the deeds of sale, Exhibits C and D (plaintiff evidently overlooked the deed, Exhibit J) and therefore those two deeds of sale (Exhibit C and D) should also be declared null and void, and that he, (Paulino) should be declared the owner of the ten mining claims or fractions in question. Finally, he claimed that the Big Wedge Mining Co., had illegally taken possession of the ten mining claims and profitably worked or operated them and so he asked that said company be ordered to render an accounting of its operations and profits made therefrom, and that the defendants should be

ordered jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiff such profits, as may have been derived by the Big Wedge Mining Co. as shown by its accounts.

Defendants Reynolds and Harrison fled their original answers on January 30, 1935 and April 12, 1935, respectively, both superseded by their amended answers on January 22, 1936. Defendant Big Wedge Mining Co., filed its answer on January 30, 1935 which was amended January 18, 1936 and later re-amended on February 5, 1940. Reynolds and Harrison claimed in their answers that plaintiff Paulino and his brother Fructuoso had been expressly employed by them to locate and stake mineral claims, and that said two brothers staked and located the ten mineral claims in question for them (defendants), and that there was an understanding between the two brothers and the two defendants that the said mineral claims so located would eventually be transferred to them. In its turn defendant Big Wedge Mining Co., followed the theory of Reynolds and Harrison about Paulino having been employed by them and having made the location of the mineral claims in question for their employers, and that the company was not aware of the alleged mental incapacity of plaintiff at the time that he executed the deeds of transfer in favor of Reynolds and Harrison, and that even if the plaintiff was under guardianship at the time, yet he confirmed and ratified the deeds of transfer by his acts and letters after his release from guardianship, and that said company bought the said mineral claims in good faith and for valuable consideration from the registered owners.

Hearing was held on July 31, 1940. The evidence submitted was mainly documentary. Only three witnesses took the witness stand. Atty. Alberto Jamir was presented by the Big Wedge Mining Co. to identify a copy of a decision rendered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendant Reynolds testified for the defense. For the plaintiff, only Fructuoso Dumaguin testified for his brother. Why Paulino, the plaintiff, did not take the witness stand, if not to support the allegations of his complaint, at least to refute the evidence for the defense particularly that which tended to show that he was employed by defendants Reynolds and Harrison to stake and locate mineral claims for them with the understanding that he would later transfer said claims to his employers, is not known to this court. After trial, Judge Jose R. Carlos before whom the hearing was held, rendered judgment on January 16, 1941, dismissing the complaint.

Paulino Dumaguin appealed from that decision. His Record on Appeal was approved on April 16, 1941 and the brief was filed on November 3, 1941 and the brief for the Big Wedge Mining Co. was filed or rather is dated December 31, 1941. It is not known whether defendants Reynolds and Harrison ever filed a brief. The fact is that the record of the case was lost or destroyed during the war and only copies of the record on appeal and the briefs were salvaged. As to the oral and documentary evidence which was lost, only those portions of the transcript and documents reproduced and appearing in the briefs are now available. But the parties have agreed to the correctness of these portions so quoted in the briefs.

After the reconstitution of the case, the Court of Appeals which had taken charge of the appeal found that the amount involved was beyond its jurisdiction and so certified the case to us. Neither Reynolds nor Harrison has appeared before the Court of appeals or before this Court. Appellant's attorney represented that Harrison's counsel could not appear in the appeal due to lack of authority, not having heard from his client since liberation and being of the belief that his client is dead. There was also information to the effect that defendant Reynolds had been killed during the early part of the occupation by the Japanese. So, only the Big Wedge Mining Co., is opposing the present appeal.

The decisive and pivotal question here is whether plaintiff Paulino M. Dumaguin and hid brother Fructuoso acting on their account staked and located these mining claims or fractions in dispute for Paulino, or whether they acting as employees and agents of defendants Reynolds and Harrison, staked and located said claims for and in behalf of their employers. We agree with the trial court that the great preponderance of evidence is to the effect that these claims were located for Reynolds and Harrison by Paulino and Fructuoso as employees, and that the latter were purposely employed and paid for this work. All the expenses incident to the skating and location of said claims and registration of the corresponding declarations of location were paid by Reynolds and Harrison. It is true that in one part of his testimony, Fructuoso claimed that he and his brother were employed merely to relocate the mining claims of the defendants within the Anaconda Group but later on, he admitted in his testimony and also in his affidavit (Exhibit 1) which was prepared before these proceedings were initiated in court that he and his brother Paulino working together were paid by the defendants Reynolds and Harrison to locate new mining claims outside the Anaconda Group; that as a matter of fact, Paulino engaged in this work at the beginning, but because he (Fructuoso) found that Paulino physically was not equal to the arduous work of climbing up and down mountains to stake and locate claims, he was placed in charge of the payroll of the defendants and detailed to do paper work which, it is presumed, included in the registration of the declarations of location of the mining claims in the office of the Mining Recorder, in his name. Fructuoso also admitted that there was an understanding before and pending the staking and location of said mining claims that they would eventually be transferred to their real owners, Reynolds and Harrison.

In consonance to this correct theory that these mining claims were located for defendants Reynolds and Harrison, as counsel for appellee well observes, Exhibit A and E are both entitled "Deed of Transfer". This conveys the idea that Paulino was merely transferring to the real owners property which technically and in name were registered as his own. Otherwise, if he really owned these mining claims, the two deeds (Exhibit A and B) would have been more appropriately entitled "Deed of Sale" and the body of said instruments should have stated that he was selling the mining claims. On the other hand, we have the instruments (Exhibits C and D) wherein Reynolds and Harrison sold said mining claims or fractions to the Big Wedge Mining Co., and the documents were each entitled "Deed of Sale".

It would really be unfair, even against public policy to allow a person employed to stake and locate mining claims for his employer to make locations on his own account and for his own benefit tho done outside hours of work or employment, because there is an obvious incompatibility and conflict of interest between those of the employer on the one hand and those of the employee on the other, unless there is a clear and express agreement to the contrary. Judge Carlos in his well-considered decision correctly states the fiduciary relation between Paulino and his employers Reynolds and Harrison and the sound and correct rule and public policy on this matter.

The fiduciary relation between the plaintiff and the defendants A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison, is very clear from the evidence. Fructuoso M. Dumaguin, has clearly stated that his brother, Paulino M. Dumaguin, was working under him while he was locating the claims in question for A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison. There can be no doubt that these claims in question were among those which these defendants wanted staked because, according to Fructuoso Dumaguin himself, they all adjoined the Anaconda Group, which ground he was specially instructed to stake for the said defendants. The plaintiff, herein, therefore, learned of the existence, especially of the fractional mineral claims, because he was with the party who staked the rest of the claims in that locality. To permit the plaintiff herein to assert his

claim of ownership over these claims in question would be tantamount to allowing him to violate and infringe all the sound and age-old rules which govern principal and agent. There can be no doubt that this relation existed because Fructuoso M. Dumaguin, the sole witness for the plaintiff, stated categorically in his affidavit Exhibit I that all the claims subject of this litigation, except G. Ubalde mineral claim, had been located and staked by him for A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison, though the same were recorded in the name of his brother Paulino. It is quite evident, therefore, that even if no transfers were made or Exhibit "A" and "B did not exist, these two defendants would still be entitled to an assignment of the said claims. The evidence of the fiduciary relation between plaintiff and the defendants A.I. Reynolds and E.J. Harrison was given by none other than Fructuoso M. Dumaguin, the brother the only witness of the plaintiff in this case.

Any act of an agent, the object or tendency of which is to commit a fraud or breach of the agency, should be discouraged. In the first place, such acts are condemned by public policy. They are against the morals; therefore, they should never be tolerated. An agent or trustee, or anybody who acts in a fiduciary capacity, should never be permitted to capitalize on his fiduciary position to mulct or take advantage of his principal or employer.

It has been the practice of miners to employ others to stake mining claims for them. This is usually done after the prospectors have assured themselves that a mine exists in a certain locality. The man who place the stake could easily leave fractional mineral claims in between the claims without reporting the existence of this fractions to his principal. Later he could stake and claim them. If this is permitted to happen, bona fide miners can easily be held up by the very man whom they have employed to stake their mining claims. If the mining industry shall be protected and the exploitation of the natural resource of this country encouraged, such practice should not be tolerated. The wrong or the damage that can be done is unlimited. If agents or employees or laborers are permitted to conceal or withhold certain mining claims ordered staked by their employer who gave them specific instructions to stake the entire ground in a certain locality, the effect will practically be the condonation and legalization of a holdup. For this reason Mechem on Agency, Sec. 1224, said the following:

"The well-settled and salutary principle that person who undertakes to act for another shall not be in the same matter, act for himself, results also in the other rule, that all profits made and advantage gained by the agent in the execution of the agency belong to the principal. And it matters not whether such profit or advantage be the result of the performance or of the violation of the duty of the agent if it be the fruit of the agency. If his duty be strictly performed, the resulting profit accrues to their principal as the legitimate consequence of the relation. If profit accrues from his violation of duty while executing the agency, that likewise belongs to the principal, not only because the principal has to assume the responsibility of the transaction, but also because the agent cannot be permitted to derive advantage from his own fault.

"It is only by rigid adherence to this rule that all temptation can be removed from one acting in a fiduciary capacity, to abuse his trust or seek his own advantage in the position which it affords him."

In view of our conclusion and holding that these mining claims were staked and located for the benefit of the defendants Reynolds and Harrison, the other points and questions involved in the appeal exhaustively, in detail and with a wealth of authorities, discussed by counsel for both appellant and appellee with ability and skill, become incidental and not of much if any relevancy whatsoever, although we may discuss one or two of them not so much to strengthen our decision but rather to render more clear our views.

Appellants contends that the deeds of transfer (Exhibits A and B) should be annulled for lack of mental capacity because at the time of their execution he was under guardianship for insanity. It is contended that altho in a case of execution of a will by a testator who was under guardianship for mental derangement, the presumption of insanity is only juris tantum, subject to rebuttal, and nevertheless, mental incapacity as regards contracts, particularly those transferring property, under similar circumstances, involves a conclusive presumption which cannot be rebutted by evidence, We have studied the arguments and authorities adduced by both counsel on this point and we are inclined to agree with counsel for appellee that the better rule is that even in the execution of contracts, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, the presumption of insanity and mental incapacity is onlyprima facie and may be rebutted by evidence; and that a person under guardianship for insanity may still enter into a valid contract and even convey property, provided it is proven that at the time if entering into said contract, he was not insane or that his mental defect if mentally deranged did not interfere with or affect his capacity to appreciate the meaning and significance of the transaction entered into by him.

Section 66. Generally. — Of course, not every substandard mentality or even every mental infirmity has the effect of rendering the afflicted person disabled for the purpose of entering into contract and making conveyance. . . . A reasonable test, suggested by several courts for the purpose of determining whether an infirmity operates to render a person incapable of binding himself absolutely by contract, is whether his mind has been so affected as to render him incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of his acts, or more exactly, whether his mental powers have become so far affected as to make him unable to understand the character of the transaction in question. . . . Some authorities take a view that a grantor may be competent to execute a deed notwithstanding his disability to transact business generally, provided he understands the nature of what he is doing and recollects the property of which he is making a disposition and to whom he is conveying it. Other authorities, however, take the position that to sustain a deed, the grantor must have the ability to transact ordinary business. In any event, if it appears that the grantor in a deed was incapable of comprehending that the effect of the instrument, when made, executed, and delivered, would be to divest him of title to the land covered by the instrument, it is not binding upon him. . . . (28 Am. Jur., Insane, etc., See Sec. 66, pp. 701-702.)

. . . Even partial insanity will not render a contract voidable unless it exists in connection with or is referable to the subject matter of the contract. Similarly, a delusion if unconnected with the transaction in question, is not sufficient to affect the validity of a contract consummated by the person thus affected. Monomania or a mental fixation or abnormality respecting a matter disconnected with the act of conveying property will not affect the validity of the conveyance. . . . (Ibid, p. 703.)

There are many case of persons mentally deranged who although they have been having obsessions and delusions for many years regarding certain subjects and situations, still are mentally sound in other respects. There are others who though insane, have their lucid intervals when in all respects they are perfectly sane and mentally sound.

In the case of Paulino M. Dumaguin, according to the doctor who observed and examined him, and who made his report on October 15, 1929, and that was more than two years before Exhibits A and B were executed, he (Paulino) while in the hospital was "well-behaved, oriented in all spheres, coherent in his speech and has no more illusions or hallucinations; but is having a delusions that one of the patients in the hospital is trying to chloroform him. He consequently keeps away from said patient and that he was "not sure that his former officemates whom he erroneously believed chloroformed him before would not

chloroform him anymore when he gets home". This was in 1929. The same year Paulino was discharged from the hospital presumably because his condition had improved, and on February 2, 1931, Paulino and his wife in a motion assured the court of Camarines Sur that Paulino was already re-established (ya esta restablecido). Several months later he went to Baguio looking for work. It is to be presumed that he was then no longer insane. It is equally to be presumed that his brother Fructuoso would not have recommended him for employment by defendants Reynolds and Harrison and actually let him work for them, at the beginning climbing up and down mountains to stake and locate claims for his employers; and if Paulino was then insane, it was not likely that Reynolds and Harrison would employ him to do the work of staking and locating claims to say nothing of taking charge of the payroll of their employees, and registering with the Mining Recorder the declarations of location of mining claims. There is every reason to believe as we do and hold that at least from about the beginning of the year 1931 when Paulino began working for his employers Reynolds and Harrison, and when he executed Exhibits A and B, he had the mental capacity to transact ordinary business and was mentally capable of validity entering into a contract even conveying property to another. But even assuming that at the time of executing Exhibits A and B, Paulino were still mentally incapacitated, still, because of his moral and legal obligation to transfer said claims to his employers, he could through his guardian have been compelled by the court to execute said transfer, or after termination of his guardianship obliged personally to execute said transfer to his employers. He acted as a trustee for his employers and the law will not allow him to invoke insanity or mental in capacity to violate his trust.

In relation with this alleged incapacity of Paulino, it is interesting to note that when he and his lawyers filed his first complaint in 1934, that is, about three years after executing Exhibits A and B, they said nothing about being mentally incapacitated in 1931. They did not ask for the annulment of the deeds of transfer (Exhibits A an B) on the ground of lack of mental capacity. They assumed and took it for granted and led others to believe that said deeds of transfer were valid. They only asked for the payment of damages. It was not until five years later in the year 1939 when they filed the first amended complaint that they raised this question of mental incapacity. It took him and his lawyers almost five years to discover and claim that he (Paulino) was not mentally capable to enter into a contra when he executed exhibits A and B. In view of all this, we may well and logically presume that all the time that Paulino was employed by Reynolds and Harrison to locate and register mining claims for them, and at the same time he executed Exhibits A and B and for several years thereafter when he continued in their employ, neither Fructuoso, Paulino's brother nor defendants Reynold and Harrison had any reason to suspect, much less, to believe that Paulino was other than a sane, responsible and mentally capable individual, able to take care not only of him and his interest but also of the interest of his employers. Neither did the other employees of Reynolds and Harrison to whom Paulino paid wages on pay-days, be being in charge of the payroll, and the Mining Recorder before whom he executed proper and valid affidavits of locations for purpose of registration, note any mental incapacity on the part of Paulino. All this goes to reinforce the finding that Paulino was mentally sane and capable in 1931.

Counsel for appellant next contends that Exhibits A and B should be declared void for lack of consideration. Said two deeds each mentions P1.00 and other valuable consideration, the receipt whereof was acknowledge, to be the consideration. We believe that consideration is sufficient, this aside from the provision of law (Article 1277 of the Civil Code), that consideration in a contract will be presumed and that it is licit, unless the debtor prove the contrary which Paulino in this case failed to establish. Furthermore, according to Reynolds, in consideration of the transfer of these mining claims, he had later

paid Paulino between P3,000 and P5,000. This was not refuted by Paulino. Moreover, under the view we take of the mining claims having been located for the benefit of defendants Reynolds and Harrison, by Paulino in his capacity as their employee, paid for that purpose, no consideration for the conveyances was even necessary. He was merely fulfilling an obligation and complying with a trust.

In conclusion we find and hold that Exhibits A and B were valid conveyances executed by one who was mentally capable. Consequently, Reynolds and Harrison had a valid title to convey as they did convey to defendant Big Wedge Mining Co., in Exhibits C, D, and J.1âwphïl.nêt

In view of the foregoing, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

April 18, 1952

G.R. No. L-3544THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EMETERIO SASOTA, ET AL., defendants;EMETERIO SASOTA and ALEJO SANCHEZ, defendants-appellants.

Sulpicio Platon for appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the two Sanchez brothers Pablo and Alejo, their nephew Juan Sanchez and one Emeterio Sasota were accused of murder for killing one Sabino Bucad. After trial, Emeterio Sasota and Alejo Sanchez were found guilty of the crime of murder and were sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabino Bucad in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the proportional costs of the proceedings. Their co-defendants Pablo Sanchez and Juan Sanchez died during the pendency of the case in the lower court and no motion of the Fiscal, the case was dismissed as against them. Alejo and Emeterio are now appealing from that decision.

It is not disputed that Sabino Bucad was taken from his house by four armed men, and thereafter he was never again seen or heard from. The witnesses for the prosecution point to the two appellants and their two companions (Pablo and Juan Sanchez) as four the individuals who not only took Sabino Bucad from his house to the Bato lake, ill-treating him all the way, but upon reaching there, took him with them for about ride on the lake, and while sailing, continued to ill-treat him until he died, and presumably thereafter secretly disposing of his body.

The two appellants disclaim any knowledge of, much less connection with the disappearance of Sabino, and insist that on the night of October 17, 1943, they were nowhere near his house. After hearing the

testimony of the witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense, and observing their demeanor while on the witness stand, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the Government witnesses and disbelieved that of the defense. We have gone over the record of the case and we see nothing in it to disapprove of this attitude and disturb this finding of the trial court as regards to the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, we believe the story told by the witnesses for the prosecution to be more natural and probable and therefore, more worthy of belief. Moreover, we see no reason why this Government witnesses should deliberately and falsely pin the killing on the two appellants and their co-defendants and accuse them of this serious crime of murder with its corresponding heavy penalty.

The evidence in the record shows that about ten o'clock in the evening of October 17, 1943, Sabino Bucad who was living with his common law wife Maria Evalla and his 18-year old son Arsenio Bucad in the barrio of Masoli, Bato, Camarines Sur, was awakened by calls from outside his house. Lighting an oil lamp, he took it to the window to see who was calling. Arsenio who was also awakened followed his father to the window and peeping, saw and recognized the two appellants herein with their two co-accused, Pablo and Juan, armed with bolos. Sabino inquired from his nocturnal visitors why they came, and the group requested him to come down so that they could all go to the house of the councilor. Reluctantly, Sabino complied with their request. According to Arsenio, as soon as his father had gone down, the four accused grabbed his hands and tide them and took him away. Not long thereafter Arsenio heard the sound of beating and the groans of his father. Because he was scared he did not dare leave the house to follow his father. Three days afterward Pablo Villez came and told him that his father had been taken to the lake by the four accused, placed in a banca and while sailing toward the opposite shore, was maltreated and killed by them.

While on their way to the lake the four accused and their victim Sabino Bucad were seen by a member of the ronda organization of Agos, who possibly, because of the extra ordinary spectacle of a man with his hands tied being led by four armed men and late at night, hastened to inform the barrio lieutenant named Eladio Barbacena who forthwith came and inquired from the four men what they intend to do with Sabino. The group was apparently, in no mood to answer questions or give explanations and Juan Sanchez even told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would be next.

Possibly, his curiosity and sense of responsibility as a barrio lieutenant prompted Barbacena to follow the group secretly, hiding behind tall grasses until they came to the lake where he saw the accused place Sabino in a banca and take him away in the direction of the opposite shore. He heard Sabino groaning as if in pain and asking for forgiveness. Barbacena also saw a man in a banca follow the boat occupied by the group and their victim.

Pablo Villez that same evening happened to be in the house of his father-in-law preparing to pound palay on the occasion of the wedding of his sister-in-law. The four accused and Sabino with hands tied passed by the yard and Pablo recognized the accused because they were fellow members of the guerilla organization. He secretly followed the group and upon reaching the lake he saw the four defendants place Sabino in a boat with them and sail; in the direction of the opposite shore. Villez took another banca and followed them at a safe distance and he saw the four accused take turns in beating Sabino who pleaded that he be forgiven because he had not committed any fault, to which appellant Sasota answered, "what forgiveness." Villez says that as a result of the beating Sabino died. Villez is the same person who as already stated, three days later informed Arsenio Bucad that he had seen his father being taken into a boat

to the opposite shore of the lake, in the meantime being maltreated until he died. Villez must have been the man who Barbacena had seen take a banca and follow the defendants as they sailed away with Sabino.

Another witness Roman Arbo, after fishing in the lake that same evening was on his way home when he heard a noise at the bend of the road and he immediately took cover behind tall grasses. From his hiding place he saw appellant Sasota puling Sabino whose hands were then tied, followed by Juan, Pablo and appellant Alejo. He saw Juan Sanchez beating the victim and he also heard Sabino asking for forgiveness. The following morning Arbo went to the house of Pablo Sanchez and asked the latter's wife where her husband was because he had seen him the night before taking Sabino away. When Pablo returned home and was informed by his wife of the visit of Arbo he got angry and that same afternoon, his wife went to Arbo's house telling him that her husband was mad at him for gossiping and spreading the news. Fearing that Pablo may do him harm because of his meddling, Arbo changed his residence and with to live on the other side of the City of Legaspi where he stayed until Liberation.

For the purpose of determining the criminal responsibility of the appellants, it is unnecessary to ascertain and find the specific criminal acts of each. It is clear that they and their co-accused confederated and helped each other and acted in concert from the time that they lured Sabino from his home to come down and tied his hands until they reached the lake where they placed him in a banca and then took turns in maltreating their victim until he died. In other words there was a conspiracy between all of them and consequently, appellants are responsible for the acts of each and every one.

The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that could not have committed the crime because in the day in question, particularly that time of the night, they were elsewhere. The trial court has analyzed the evidence in this regard and in our opinion correctly rejected this theory of alibi and we find no profit in further discussing it. Suffice it to say that aside from the inherent weakness of this kind of defense, the appellants were clearly identified by no less than four witnesses as the persons who took away Sabino from his home and liquidated him. The important point raised by counsel for the appellants is that of corpus delicti. He claims that inasmuch as there is no conclusive evidence of the death of the deceased, because his body was never found, neither was the place where he was supposed to have been buried indicated corpus delicti was not established. In a case of murder of homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. There are cases like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing it be proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstancial evidence. Wharton in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506, says:

. . . the rule now established by the weight of authority is that the element of death in the corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial evidence. Hence, in the case of the destruction of the body, or in the case of its disappearance, as in murder upon the high seas, where the body is rarely, if ever, found, death may be proved circumstantially. To establish the corpus delicti by circumstancial evidence, facts are admissible, to show the impossibility of rescue, as at sea; to show the existence and extent of wounds, and deceased's condition of health; and to show that the wound was sufficient to cause death, and that the party was reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown by the testimony of a witness that he saw the flash and heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the ground, declaring he was shot, and that accused did the shooting.

Francisco in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. III section 27, 1517, also has the following to say:

A conviction of murder cannot be supported unless the body has been found or there is equivalent proof of death. The more modern rule is that the fact of death as well as the other branch of the corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial or presumptive evidence. Thus is held that, where the body has been destroyed or is not recovered, it is competent to establish both elements by presumptive evidence . .

Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cases decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he had arrested or tortured or taken away, where the victims were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they were killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused, this, for the purpose of fixing the penalty.

There is nothing in the record to show that the witnesses for the prosecution had any reason for falsely imputing this serious crime of murder to them. Of course, appellant Alejo Sanchez insinuates that Arsenio Bucad had a motive to testify against him because he (Alejo) was a witness against him in criminal case in the Justice of the Peace Court for physical injuries where Arsenio was sentenced to arresto menor and to pay P60.00 damages. It turns out however that Alejo never testified in said case for the reason that arsenio Bucad pleaded guilty to the charge.

As regards motive behind the killing, there is evidence showing that defendant Pablo Sanchez was maintaining illicit relations with Sabino's common law wife, Maria Evalla, and that the former probably to have the woman all to himself, liquidated Sabino. Now, why did his co-defendants help him in carrying out his dastardly plan? The reason is not far to seek. Alejandro Sanchez was his brother, and Juan Sanchez was a nephew. As to Emeterio Sasota, he was a friend.

In view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, except the amount of indemnity of P2,000.00 which should be raised to P6,000.00, the same is hereby affirmed, with cost against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 31354, Director of Lands v. Abelardo et al., 54 Phil. 387

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

February 5, 1930

G.R. No. 31354DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant, vs.FELIX ABELARDO, ET AL., claimants. MANUEL LIBUNAO, ET AL., claimants-appellees. MAGDALENA DINO, ET AL., claimants-appellants.

Sumulong, Lavides and Mabanag for appellants.Pablo C. Payawal for appellees.No appearance for applicants and claimants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The litigation as presented in this appeal refers to lots Nos. 773 and 810, of the above entitled case adjudicated by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as follows: One-half of lot No. 773 to Manuel Libunao, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of said Libunao and his wife Lucia Evangelista; two-thirds of lots No. 810, to the conjugal partnership of Teodora Evangelista and Pedro C. Blas, subject to the right of Manuel Libunao and his wife Lucia Evangelista to repurchase the same for P13,892 within the period of five years from May 23, 1928, and the other third to Maria Gabriel.

These adjudications were made in separate decisions, which have now been appealed, the appellants assigning the following alleged errors as committed by the court, below:

1. The trial court erred in holding that a partition of the estate left by the deceased spouses Toribio Diño and Emeteria Ballesteros had already been made.

2. The trial court erred in holding that the failure of Fulgencia and Jose Diño by themselves or by their predecessors to register any claim or action until they presented their claims in these cadastral proceedings is evident proof that they have no right to the lands in question.

3. The trial court erred in not holding that the state of dependence of claimants Fulgencia and Jose Diño, who were born deaf-mutes, has prevented the running of any prescriptive period against them.

4. The trial court erred in dismissing the claims of Fulgencia and Jose Diño to both lots Nos. 773 and 810.

While the appellees contend that two lots in question, Nos. 773 and 810, belonged to Ciriaco Libunao and Tomasa Diño, from whom they were inherited by their children Manuel, Delfin, and Ines, and that the latter partitioned the inheritance in such a way that Manuel acquired from his brother Delfin the latter's portion of the lots in question, the appellants allege that these lots belonged to Emeteria Ballesteros, wife of Toribio Diño, grandparents of said Manuel, Delfin, and Ines, surnamed Libunao, as well as of the appellants Clemencia or Fulgencia, and Jose, surnamed Diño, and that the property of said predecessors pray that the two lots here in question be adjudicated to them.

In support of their respective allegations, the parties presented parol evidence. The appellees, in addition, presented documentary evidence.

It is a proven and undisputed fact that after the death of Emeteria Ballesteros, which took place in 1899, Ciriaco Libunao, the father of the appellee Manuel Libunao, and afterwards, his children, are the ones who possessed those lands until 1910, when Delfin Libunao sold his portion to Manuel Libunao, and the latter, in turn, in 1920, sold part of lot No. 810 to the spouses Pedro Blas and Teodora Evangelista, and later, Ines Libunao also sold her portion of said lot No. 810 to Maria Gabriel. After said conveyances, the spouses Pedro Blas and Teodora Evangelista and Maria Gabriel have possessed the portions purchased by each of them. Manuel Libunao has been in possession of the remainder of these lots up to the present time.

The appellees allege, and have introduced evidence to the effect, that lot No. 773 once belonged to Teodora Pineda, great-grandmother of the appellee Manuel Libunao, and that she donated the land to Tomasa Diño, wife of Ciriaco Libunao, these spouses being the parents of said litigant Manuel Libunao; that lot No. 810 was acquired by his father by purchase from Maximina, Francisca, and Perfecto, surnamed Macapagal Through the documents which constitute Exhibit A-4 (pages 24 to 37, of documentary evidence); Manuel Libunao adds that after the death of his mother Tomasa Diño, and when his father contracted a second marriage with Antonia de Leon, he delivered to him the possession of the lot No. 810, because he, Manuel Libunao, was the eldest child; that these lands were mortgaged to the spouse Gerardo Diaz and Petrona Encarnado, from whom they were redeemed about the year 1906 (Exhibits A-5 and A, pages, 38 and 1, respectively, of the documentary evidence) by Ciriaco Libunao and his children, among the latter the herein appellee Manuel Libunao; that in the year 1910, said father and children by his first marriage, perhaps in order to avoid possible difficulties arising from the said Ciriaco Libunao's second marriage, agreed to partition the property left by the deceased Tomasa Diño, wife and mother, respectively, and they executed the deed Exhibit B, pages 5-9 of the documentary evidence; that these lots have been assessed in the name of Manuel Libunao form the year 1906, there having been presented in support thereof, tax declarations Exhibits A-3 and X-1 (pages 23 and 40 of the documentary evidence).

These facts are, in our opinion, sufficiently proved, and it appears therefrom that Ciriaco Libunao and his children have possessed and still possess, and are making use of these lands, as the true owners since the time of the Spanish Government.

Celedonia Flores, witness for the appellants, testified that Emeteria Ballesteros was the one who had these lands tilled, and after her death, Esteban Diño, husband of said witness, had them tilled; that after Esteban Diño's death, Ciriaco Libunao, herconcuñado and father of the appellee Manuel Libunao, proposed to till them himself, as she, the witness, was a woman, and so said Ciriaco Libunao came into possession of the land; that the latter took the documents from her; that the appellants Clemencia and Jose Diño whenever they were in needs always appealed to their cousins Libunao, and if they failed to do anything, they went to Celedonia Flores and her relatives; that the Libunaos sometimes gave said appellants as ganta, sometimes two gantas, and even at times a cavan of unhulled rice. This testimony, in our opinion, preponderates the evidence presented by the appellees.

Julian Ignacio, another witness for the appellants, assets that it was Emeteria Ballesteros who started to till the lands and which, upon her death, passed to the possession of Ciriaco Libunao; that the appellants were given support, but not a share in the crops. We italicize these last words because they show that Libunao's possession of the lands in litigation was exclusive.

And we arrive at this conclusion, inasmuch as, even supposing that the evidence of the appellees in regard to the ownership of the lands did not preponderate (we believe it does), there is still the prescription in their favor inasmuch as the continued possession by the appellees of the land in question, which is exclusive as has been seen, not only because it so appears from the evidence of the appellees, but also because the appellants' own witness, Julian Ignacio, testified to that effect, operates as an extinguishment of any right which the appellants may have had to said lands, unless there is another legal reason to prevent this conclusion.

And this possible reason is merely the alleged incapacity of the appellants, due to their being deaf-mutes. Such a physical condition is no obstacle to the running of the prescriptive period; since it has been proved in this case that it was not accompanied by mental deficiency or any other legal incapacity. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive periods.

The old doctrine that a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer prevails, and such persons are now held capable of entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient mental capacity. (Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich., 36.)

Where one was born deaf and dumb, but had his intellectual faculties, though these were not improved by the modern system of education for persons of that class: Held, that he was not within the exception of the statute of limitations, which only exception of is non compos mentis. (38 N. C. Ire. Eq., 535.[[1]])

Finding no merit in the assignment of errors, the judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 445, Martinez v. Martinez, 1 Phil. 182

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

March 31, 1902

G.R. No. 445PEDRO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, defendant-appellee.

Carlos Ledesma, for appellant.Felipe Calderon, for appellee.

COOPER, J.:

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.

The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.

In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the complaint be entered in the property register of the province, which was done by order of the court.

The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and sets forth a state of facts quite inconsistent with those alleged in the complaint.

Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his administration.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.

The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil Code.)

The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs. (Art. 222 of the Civil Code.)

Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)

Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required for the support of the donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil Code.)

And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than what he can give by testament.

A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art. 636 of the Civil Code.)

Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.

Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to generosity.

There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by the defendant whose testimony it is unnecessary to recount.

The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support the allegations of his complaint. It was vague, indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.

The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels, two of which are steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties. This could have been easily done if such existed. Donations of real property must be made in a public deed (art. 633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a written instrument, and produces no effect with regard to third person if not recorded in the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)

There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal property, the transfer of which could not be easily traced.

The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue from the ships and rents from the city property.

The farms have been non-productive on account of the disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue from even these has been in part collected by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant's property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits in both courts is adjudged against the plaintiff.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.