Persons and Crim Case Digests

7/28/2019 Persons and Crim Case Digests

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TAADA VS. TUVERA Case DigestTAADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public

officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette

of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general or ders,

proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and

administrative orders.

Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case

dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal

personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is

submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are

personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-

publication of the presidential issuances in question.

Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is

not a sine qua non r equirement for the effectivity of the law where the

law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUES:

Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain specialprovisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the

Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the

legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the

date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,

which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law

itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the

Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its

effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of

general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential

decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation

or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue

measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which

apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as

administrative and executive orders need not be published on the

assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general

application, which have not been published, shall have no force and

effect.

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE vs. Vega

[GR 105364, 28 June 2001]

Facts: Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed with

Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance

in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (Case SP-32311).

Thereafter, the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E.

(PVBEU-NUBE), represented by Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for

accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-

3231. After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to

the employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on

the benefits, many remain unpaid. On 8 March 1991, PVBEU-NUBE

Fernandez moved to disqualify the Judge Benjamin Vega, Presiding

Judge of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, from hearing

the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. On

2 January 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act 7169 providing for

the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, PVBEU-

NUBE and Fernandez filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims

for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.

Republic Act 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine

Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act 3518, Providing The

Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes", which was signed into

law by President Corazon C. Aquino on 2 January 1992 and which was

published in the Official Gazette on 24 February 1992, provides in part

for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its

branches within the period of 3 years f rom the date of the reopening of

the head office.

The law likewise provides for the creation of a r ehabilitation co

in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of th

Pursuant to said RA 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submi

proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Boar

approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquid

Philippine Veterans Bank dated 13 March 1992 with Judge Vega

that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in

the passage of RA 7169. On 10 April 1992, the Monetary Board

Monetary Board Resolution 348 which approved the Rehabilitat

submitted by the Rehabilitation Committee. Thereafter, the M

Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certif

authority allowing the PVB to reopen. Despite the legislative m

for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, Judge Vega continued

liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, PVBEU-NU

Fernandez learned that the Central Bank was set to order the p

and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawy

PVBEU-NUBE's and Fernandez's claims have been frozen t

prejudice.

On 3 June 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Terminatio

Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank wit

Vega. PVBEU-NUBE and Fernandez, on the other hand, filed the

for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and ap

for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order. In a Resolution, date

1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Res

Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with t

On 22 June 1992, MOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA)

162 security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with pra

they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Res

Order issued by the Court. On 3 August 1992, the Philippine V

Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular

operations.

Issue: Whether a liquidation court can continue with liq

proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Cong

mandated its rehabilitation and reopening.


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Held: The enactment of Republic Act 7169, as well as the subsequent

developments has rendered the liquidation court functus officio.

Consequently, Judge Vega has been stripped of the authority to issue

orders involving acts of liquidation. Liquidation, in corporation law,

connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the

winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those

entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash,

discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. On the opposite end

of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or

reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate

life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to

its former position of successful operation and solvency. It is crystal

clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or

contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be

undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to

continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

263 scra 420

PublicationAdministrative Orders

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which

applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of

China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program

of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from

importing products from China on the ground that they were not able

to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order.

Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against

the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be

null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further

authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and

to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been

repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the P ITC filed a

certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such

order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2

of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states

that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall

be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days

after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general

circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be

published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.

157 scra 766

Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed

and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private

respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been

warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to

the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners

were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days

period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal

did not commit a grave abuse of discretio n when it denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down

inHabulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said

case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in

the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court

decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a

condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as

lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the

Supreme Court particularly where issues have been c

consistently reiterated and published in the advance rep

Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA

journals.

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commissions 4 SC

(1962)

Facts:

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its

No. 22 of the following tenor: "Effective November 1, 1

Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will tak

consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all

and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other m

remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuner

earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions

based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."

Petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc. wrote the Social

Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contrad

a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly e

overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employe

employees' respective monthly premium contributions. More

contended that due notice via publication was not c omplied wit

Issue:

(1) Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regula

contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowe

Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subje

approval of the President such rules and regulations as

necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."
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Held:

It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses,

allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base

pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the

term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the

amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security

Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination.

Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of theinterpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as

amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or

detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and

circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be

construed.

Mun. Govt of Coron vs. Carino GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987)

Facts:Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a

certain space the government then needed. The clearing of that spacewould require the demolishment of respondents structures. The case

was brought to court. After a series of postponements, a date for the

final hearing was set, during which respondents and their counsel failed

to appear. Upon petitioners motion that respondents failure to appear

be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine petitioners

witnesses and to present evidence, the case was s ubmitted for decision.

Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required

printed copies of their record on appeal. Respondents also failed to act

on the appellate courts directive to show cause why their appeal

should not be dismissed.

The resolution dismissing respondents appeal became final

and executory on September 27, 1982, and a writ of execution issued

on February 1, 1983.

BP 129 (Sec. 39): No record on appeal shall be required to

take an appeal...Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs.

18): ...the filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with...

(Sec. 19b): ...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance

with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple

appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of

appeal being required.

In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents

maintained that since, under the present law, printed records on appeal

are no longer required, the rule on technicalities should be relaxed and

their right to appeal upheld.

On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution

seeking to revive the case.

Held:The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be

exercised only in the manner provided for by law.

Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, Statues regulating the procedure

of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural rules are

retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Benzonan vs. CA GR no. 97973 (Jan 27, 1992)DBP vs CA and Pe GR no. 97998 (Jan 27, 1992)

Facts:Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued on

Oct 29, 1969. He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial loan, the

proceeds of which he used to build improvements upon the land. Upon

failure to pay back his loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage on June 28,

1977 and was the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was registered

with the Registry of Deeds on Jan 24, 1978. Pe leased the lot and itsimprovements from DBP but failed to redeem it within the one year

period. DBP then sold the lot to spouses Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979.

On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land from DBP.

Upon denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec 119 of CA

141. RTC and CA upon appeal both affirmed that the land should be

reconveyed to Pe.

Spouses Benzonan raised the issue of when to count the five-

year period for repurchase from date of foreclosure sale or from

expiration of one year period to redeem foreclosed property?

Section 119 of CA 141 provides: Every conveyance of land

acquired under the free patent or homestead provision, when proper,

shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal

heirs, within a period of f ive years from the date of conveyance.

In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the lot

was mortgaged, acquired in a foreclosure sale, and sold subsequently tothe Benzonan spouses, it was held that the five-year period should be

counted from the date of the for eclosure sale.

Reversing this decision was the Bellisiano case (1988) which

held that the five-year period should be counted from the day after the

expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an

extrajudicial foreclosure.

Held:Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for

doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view adopt

new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not

parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on t

thereof.


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NORMA DE JOYA vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY

G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003

Facts:

The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with violations of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Batangas

City. Despite conviction in the two separate criminal cases filed against

her, petitioner remained at large. In the meantime, the Court issued

Supreme Court Admin. Circular No. 12-2000. After five years, the

petitioner was finally arrested while applying for an NBI clearance. She

was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. She filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her urgentmotion with the Municipal Trial Court was denied, asking it to apply SC

Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the

Revised Penal Code.

Arguments:

Petitioner: Her detention was illegal. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000

deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and

allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to

apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent: The two (2) judgments of conviction against the

petitioner had long attained finality and could no longer be modified.

The SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified Admin. Circular No. 13-

2000 did not delete the penalty of imprisonment in BP 22 cases.

Issue:WON Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by Admin. No 13-2001

deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of BP Blg. 22

Held:

No. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, hence, Article 22

of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to

those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases

already terminated by final judgment.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is

not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down

a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in

B.P. Blg. 22.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of

preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such

that where the circumstances of both the of fense and the offender

clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of

negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the

more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of

whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests

solely upon the Judge.

EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.

FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of321 soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of

support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sentnegotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of

negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay

down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises

of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their

barracks.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and

recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with

coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department

of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding

Information against them.

Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent

General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest anddetention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed

the AFP to conduct its o wn separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Makati City an Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers,

Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other accused,

pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a

reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No.

625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the

propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of

Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles ofWar"), as amended, against the same military personnel.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243

(including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an

Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction

over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its F

Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, f

the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat be

RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for viol

the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stat

"all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are

declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtof the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proce

hear petitioners' applications for bail.

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his c apacity as officer-in-charge of th

reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Pa

recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood

including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court ma

violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen

of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to

their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed w

Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respond

ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 9

Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determinat

Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Arti

the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbe

crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel

submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over tho

have been criminally charged of coup dtat before the regular c

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD:

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected

expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No.

bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners conce

alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defe

Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such v


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allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In

short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or

behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-

connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same

dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court.

Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to

cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent

standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no

longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of

the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC inits Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather

absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat,"

hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration,

practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial

the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the

law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the

Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal,

body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can

do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative

enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of

the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it

to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of

discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore,

void.

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by

holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a

Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup

d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to

criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same

statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the

doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both

offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction

over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of

War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this

case.

US vs. Bull15 PHIL 7

FACTS:

H.N Bull, who was the master of a vessel transporting cattle,

carabao and other animals from Formosa to Manila, failed to provide

suitable means for securing the animals while they are in transit. Such

neglect was a violation of Act. No. 275 of the Philippine Commission,

which reads:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,

carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other

animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or

from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine

Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such

animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the

suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary

period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of

shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such

animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh waterat least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that

the animals are embarked to the time of their final

debarkation.

Bull contends that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction

over his offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over this case.

RULING:

When a vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which

embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within the territorial

waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime

committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the

Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines ifthe illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the

territorial waters regardless of the fact that the same conditions

existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on

the high seas.

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found

guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The People of the Phil. Island, plaintiff-appellant

vs

Wong Cheng (alias Wong Chun),defendant-appellee

Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney Gene

an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained

Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defenda

defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium, abo

merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said ve

anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of

In the said demurrer the defendant contended the lack of jurisd

the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismiss

case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts has jurisdiction

crime committed by Wong Cheng aboard merchant vessels anc

our jurisdiction waters?

Held:

Yes. The crime on the case at bar was committeinternal waters thus having our court the right of jurisdiction

offense committed. The court said Having the opium smoke

our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant s

breach of the public order, because it causes such drugs to

pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the dem

revoked and court ordered further proceedings

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.

LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU),Defendant-Appellant.

Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (sAugust 19, 1909)s everal persons, Jacks and Milliron, chiefdepartment of the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent

respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and s

cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendan

freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of o

Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in M


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Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times

for opium, he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the

evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality,

that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the

call ports in Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the

court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned

therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal asked that the maximum

penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the

considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not

lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within itsdistrict or the wharf of Cebu.The court ruled in favor of the government and against the defendant,

hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction overforeign vessels stationed in its port

Decision: Decision of the Court of First Instance is affirmed withmodification.

Held: The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a

general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on

account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own

nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is

prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case, a can of

opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus

committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place ofthe commission of the crime, only the court established in the said

place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement

under an international treaty. And that, even admitting that thequantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case,was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the twopenalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in themaximum degree.Original sanction: The court sentenced the defendant to five years'

imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of

the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs.

Revised penalty: reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to

six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the

judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against theappellant.

Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in thetreaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code

shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including

its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside

of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or

airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the

Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the

Government of the Philippine Islands;chan robles virtual law

library

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction

into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned

in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit anoffense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security

and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of

this Code.

corpus delictin. (corpus dee-lick-tie) Latin for the substantial fact that a

crime has been committed, and in popular c rime jargon, the

body of the murder victim.

U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)

Cf. French vs. English rule

FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a

steamship. The steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of

Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage

direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of

opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them

in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the

steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the

search found the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of

the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner

of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,

however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it

was his

intention to import the prohibited drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium

Philippine Islands has been proven?

RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that th

from which the drug discharged came into Philippine waters

foreign country with the drug on board. In this

case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any

who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug i

Philippine Islands Import and bring should be

construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into

without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importat

importation is not the making entry of goods at

the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port,

importation is complete before the entry to the custo

Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from

of the amount brought.

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana and Martin Atienza, defendants-appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical ele

Act/Omission

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second m

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from Mar

in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan

On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the p

Paombong, Bulacan a sworn c omplaint for adultery


7/7

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged

the municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and

urge him to withdraw the complaint

The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and

promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of

his complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case

The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former

marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Nio and followed him home to

Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)

Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her

and lived in the home of Nicolas

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and

the appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and

Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going

to set fire to it

He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the

people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery

against him and Romana

Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

The fire destroyed about 48 houses

Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of

arson

Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8

months, and 1 day of c adena temporal)

Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio

mayor)

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the

affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors

with reference to Romana:

The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice

The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient

evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt

Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an

accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission

of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor

cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it

would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of

the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material

cooperation and none of an agreement to commit the crime in

question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous

acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they

encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson;

and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it

does not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence

and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or

conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the

Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed

passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with

reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.
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