Personal and Business Networks Gerrit Rooks

“Never eat alone” Keith Ferrazzi (2005)

“no man is an island, entire of itself…” (Donne 1624).

About me

This lecture• A few tidbits about personal networks

– How many close friends do people have? How many acquaintances?

– Which persons have what kinds of networks?• The evolution of business-networks from

entrepreneurial networks• Network management

– Medici family– The Toyota supplier network

• Alliance networks: direct and indirect ties

Social Brain Hypothesis

Ronald Dunbar is famous for the social brain hypothesis: “human intelligence is the evolutionary result of the need for social coordination and cooperation”

Ronald Dunbar (1947), anthropologist and evolutionary biologist, University of Oxford

Personal network size• the number of social

group members a primate can track, appears to be limited by the volume of the neocortex region of their brain.

Dunbar, R.I.M. (1993), Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4): 681-735.

Dunbars number: 150

“Social units”• Support clique: people

who we seek personal advice from

• Sympathy group: special ties, frequent contact

• Band: acquaintances, less frequent contact

• Clan: all current contacts

• Megaband + Tribe: larger social units

Increased emotional closenessIncreased frequencty of interaction

Any group greater than 150 will become disfunctional

Company size = 75-200 Organizations > 150 need bureaucracy…

75-200

475-1000

50,000 +

20,000 to 45,000

10,000 to 15,000

20,000 to 45,000

Facebook friendships

Is Dunbars number still valid in this new media age?

• “We find that the data are in agreement with Dunbar’s result; users can entertain a maximum of 100–200 stable relationships. Thus, the ‘economy of attention’ is limited in the online world by cognitive and biological constraints as predicted by Dunbar’s theory”.

• Note: Dunbars theory is about maintaining relationships, not remembering faces (on average 1500)

(Explaining) variation in networks

Kalish & Robbish:Ego networks and triad census

Strong tie

Weak tie

Kalish&Robbish describe and explain the triad census

Strong tie

Weak tie

ego

Transitivity: “the forbidden triad”

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

= weak tie

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

The forbidden triad is a building block in Granovetters strength of weak ties theory

Reasons for transitivity

• Frequent interaction

• Similarity

• Structural balance / cognitive dissonance reduction

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

Only weak ties are bridges

Chris

Gerrit Uwe

= strong tie

Bert Önder

Koen

Kalish & Robbish try to explain network differences

Personal and business networks

The organizational life cycle

Hite & Hesterly. The Evolution of Firm Networks: From Emergence to Early Growth of the Firm Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Mar., 2001), pp. 275-286

Social network entrepreneur = firm network

`identity’ based networkshigh proportion of ties with some type of personal or social identification

Pre-existing ties, strong embedded network high in closure and cohesion

Early / Later growth

Calculative networksTies are primarily motivated by expected economic benefits

Weak ties that are more market like, less redundant

(Partly) result of pro-actively managing networks

Intentionally managed networks

• Firms and individuals can learn to create network value– Medici– Toyata– Alliance networks

Padgett, John F.; Ansell, Christopher K. (May 1993).

"Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434".

The American Journal of Sociology 98 (6): 1259–1319.

The Toyata supplier network• Japanese

automobile makers are more and more productive, US is lagging

• Dyer and Nobeoka:"Creating and managing a high performance knowledge-sharing network: the Toyota case"

Knowledge sharing routines• Dilemmas associated with knowledge

sharing1. how can self-interested network members

openly share valuable knowledge?2. how to prevent free-rider problems?3. how to maximize the efficiency of knowledge

transfers?

Overcoming knowledge sharing dilemmas

1. how can self-interested network members openly share valuable knowledge?

– Create a network 'identity' through network-level knowledge-sharing routines

2. how to prevent free-rider problems?– Network `rules' for knowledge protection and value

appropriation3. how to maximize the efficiency of knowledge transfers?

– Creating multiple knowledge-sharing processes and sub-networks in the larger network

Why create an identity?

• Many experiments demonstrate the powerfull effects of social identity, f.i.

– Randomly assign individuals to a blue and a green group

– Individuals were unknown to each other and were told that they would not meet again

– Group members evaluated each other more positively and were more willing to cooperate with each other than non group members

How did Toyata create a network 'identity'?

• Toyota's network is known (labeled) as the `Toyota group'.–philosophy within the Toyota Group

called ‘coexistence and coprosperity’• Toyota creates a shared network

identity by developing multiple groups, and “knowledge sharing routines”

Network identity

• Kyohokai: Toyota's supplier association was established in 1943– Information exchange– Socializing events

• Supplier association has regular meetings, fi– Quality committees.– Visit `best practice' plants– Quality management conference held once a year

Network identity

• Toyota's operations management consulting division– Direct free `on-site' assistance for suppliers

• Voluntary small group learning teams (jishuken)– Each group consists of roughly 5-8 suppliers– The group visits each member to develop

suggestions– Groups are frequently rearranged

Network rules for knowledge protection

• Creating an identity isn't enough to solve sharing and free riding problems

• Toyota sets a norm/rule by sharing its own knowledge– eliminating the notion that there is `proprietary knowledge'

• Suppliers must be willing to open their plants to other network members to other network members – reciprocal obligations: We will help you, but in return, you must agree

to help the network.– reciprocity norm is enforced by implicit threat of withdrawal of

business

Creating multiple knowledge sharing processes

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Alliance networks: Ahuja• Two types of ties• Direct ties

– knowledge sharing– complementary skills– scale economies

• Indirect ties– knowledge spillovers

Direct tie

Indirect tie

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Effects of direct ties

Many direct ties Fewer direct ties

Knowledge sharingComplementarity higher innovation output Economies of scale

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Effects of indirect ties

Many indirect ties Fewer indirect ties

Information gathering devices higher innovation output Screening device

40

Effects of indirect ties depend on the # direct ties

Many direct ties Fewer direct ties

Relative addition of new resources is smaller.

When many partners have indirect ties, information is likely less valuable. since it will reach many others

What is better for innovation output of firms: structural holes or network closure?

A B

What is better for innovation output of firms: structural holes or network closure?

A B

Ahuja finds that firms embedded in a closed / dense networkoutperform firms in a open network (B) in terms of patent production