Perrone, The Anxious Self in the Letters of Barsanuphius

8/12/2019 Perrone, The Anxious Self in the Letters of Barsanuphius

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“TREMBLING AT THE THOUGHT OF SHIPWRECK”:

THE ANXIOUS SELF IN THE LETTERS OF

BARSANUPHIUS AND JOHN OF GAZA

But we dream we are rooted in earth

(G. M. Hopkins, The Wreck of the Deutschland )

A ‘spirituality of anxiety’?

In early Christian literature too sea metaphors enjoyed a lasting success, as evidenced

among the many examples by Augustine’s elaborate prologue to De beata vita. In this very

first account of his conversion to Christianity, now viewed as the true wisdom vainly sought

by the philosophers, Augustine sketches his spiritual biography as a perilous navigation

across the sea of life to the harbour of beatitude.1 The same image appears in monastic texts,

often in connection with biblical narratives among which Jesus’s stilling of the storm (Mk. 4.

35-41 par.) assumes an especially paradigmatic value. Syncletica, one of the ‘Desert mothers’,

also regarded the sea as an allegory of the life of men, both monks and seculars, while

symbolically interpreting the soul as a boat dangerously sailing over it.2 In one of her sayings

1 Augustine, De beata vita 1. 1-5 (ed. W.M. Green, CCSL 29 [Turnhout, 1970], pp. 65-67).

2 Apoph. coll. syst. XI. 74 ( Les apophthegmes des Pères. Collection systématique. Chapitres X-XVI, intr.,

texte critique, trad. et notes par †Jean-Claude Guy, SC 474 [Paris, 2003], p. 178): hJ yuch; kaqav per nau'" pote;

me; n e[xwqen ejk tw'n trikumiw' n katapontivzetai, pote; de; uJ po; th'" e[ ndoqen ajntleiva" uJ pobruv cio"

giv netai.



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she warns against the idea that monks might feel more confident than laymen, since they have

chosen to navigate in more quiet waters. Though the monks voyage “under the guidance of

the Sun of justice” and the seculars do so “in the night of ignorance”, in many cases the latter

are saved in the middle of a storm by turning to God whereas the former sink into the abyss

for their lack of care. Amma Syncletica recalled Paul’s words: “if you think you are standing

firm, be careful that you don’t fall!” (1 Cor. 10. 12).3 The message, then, was that even for

monks there can never be ‘freedom from care’ (ajmevrimnon); one has always to be on his

guard, lest he lose the path to perfection.

The correspondence of the two Old Men of Gaza, Barsanuphius and John, in the first half

of the sixth century, shares similar images and feelings. The initial group of letters, those

addressed to John of Beersheva, is framed in terms of the appealing prospect of reaching “the

harbour of hesychia” as the ultimate goal of a monastic career in progress. Yet before John of

Beersheva attains to such a peaceful existence there are enough occasions for Barsanuphius,

as his spiritual director, to exploit sea metaphors in the exhortations addressed to him.4 If the

3 Apoph. coll. syst. XI, 75 (178): Ei\ pe pavlin: Oujk e[comen ej ntau'qa to; ajmevrimnon. Fhsi; ga;r hJ Grafhv:

JO sthvkwn blepev tw mh; pev sh/ (1 Cor. 10. 12): ej n ajdhvlw/ plevomen, qavlassa ga;r oJ bivo" hJmw'n uJ po; tou'

iJ eroyavltou Daui;d ei[rhtai: ajlla; ta; th'" qalavssh" ta; me; n kai; qhrivwn plhvrh ta; de; kai; galhnav. JHmei'"

ou\ n ej n tw/ ' galhnw/ ' mevrei th'" qalavssh" dokou'men pleei' n, oiJ de kosmikoi; ej n toi'" kindunwvdesin: kai;

hJmei'" me; n hJmevra" plevomen uJ po; tou' hJlivou th'" dikaiosuv nh" (Mal. 4. 2) oJdhgouvmenoi, ejkei'noi de; ej n

nukti; aj po; th'" ajgnwsiva" ferovmenoi. jAllÆ ej ndevcetai pollavki" to; n kosmiko;n ej n ceimov ni kai; ejn

kinduvnw/ tugcav nonta bohvsanta kai; ajgrupnhvsanta sw'sai to; eJautou' skav fo", hJma'" de; ejn galhv nh/

o[ nta" uJ po; ajmeleiva" buqisqh' nai to; phdavlion th'" dikaiosuv nh" afev nta".

4 See, for example, Letter 15, 15-18: eij" th; n zavlhn ejblhvqh" th'" qalavssh" uJ pomei'nai kinduvnou"

pollouv", kai; sunaqlh'sai pro;" th;n trikumivan tw' n kumavtwn. Kai; ou{tw" nikhvsa" bohqou'nto" tou' Qeou',

sunevrch/ hJmi' n eij" to;n th'" galhv nh" limevna. My references are to the following edition, quoting the letters by

number and line: Barsanuphe et Jean de Gaza. Correspondance (= C), Vol. I: Aux solitaires, Tome I: Lettres 1-



3

waves represented by material and spiritual difficulties now and then threaten to submerge

John on his voyage to hesychia, these letters convey a more confident tone by stressing the

consoling view of the “harbour of peace”.5

Elsewhere Barsanuphius has recourse to a prima

facie less encouraging imagery by insisting, like Amma Syncletica, on the dangers of

navigation and the eventual fate of shipwreck:

Those who sail at sea, even if they happen upon calm weather, yet while they are in the ocean, always expect

storm, danger, and shipwreck. Therefore, they could never benefit from a short period of calm. Then, and

only then, do they feel safe, when they actually enter the harbor. In the same way, a sinful person who is still

in the world must always tremble at the thought of shipwreck.6

If this is not yet in itself a ‘spirituality of anxiety’, it certainly lays down essential premises

for an attitude of this kind. The monks, who are expected to maintain throughout their life a

sharp consciousness of their being ‘sinners’, cannot as such avoid the constant fear that they

71, ed. François Neyt, Paula de Angelis-Noah, tr. Lucien Regnault, SC 426 (Paris, 1997); Vol. I: Aux solitaires,

Tome II: Lettres 72-223, SC 427 (Paris, 1998); Vol. II: Aux cénobites. Tome I: Lettres 224-398, SC 450 (Paris,

2000); Vol. II: Aux cénobites. Tome II: Lettres 399-616 , SC 451 (Paris, 2001); Vol. III: Aux laïcs et aux évêques.

Lettres 617-848, SC 468 (Paris, 2002). For an English translation I shall use: Barsanuphius and John. Letters I-

II, translated by John CHRYSSAVGIS, 2 vols (Washington D.C., 2006), citing volume and page numbers.

5 See my contribution: ‘Eij" to;n th"̀ hJsuciva" limevna. Le lettere a Giovanni di Beersheva nella

corrispondenza di Barsanufio e Giovanni di Gaza’, in Mémorial Dom Jean Gribomont (1920-1986) (Roma,

1988), pp. 463-86.

6 C 412, 19-27 (II, 47): OiJ ejn th/ ' qalavssh/ plevonte", ka] n sumbh/ ' aujtou;" galhniavsai, ajllÆ e[ ti ejn tw/ '

pelavgei uJ pavrcousi kai; prosdokw'sin th; n zavlhn kai; to;n kiv ndunon kai; to; nauavgion. Kai; oujde; n auj tou;"

wj fevlhsen hJ pro;" mikro;n galhv nh, tov te ga;r kai; movnon e[ cousi to; ajsfalev", o{ tan eij" auj to;n eijsevlqwsi

to; n limev na, polloi; de; kai; ej n auj tw/ ' tw/ ' stomivw/ ejnauavghsan. Ou{tw gou'n kai; oJ aJmartwlov", ej fÆ o{son

ejsti; n ej n tw/ ' kovsmw/, pav ntote trevmein oj feivlei to; nauavgion.



4

might make themselves the experience of shipwreck.7 Not incidentally Barsanuphius’s

statement occurs in a rather large group of letters that seem to exude an anxiety of the highest

degree. We shall of course try to find out to what extent such anxiety depends upon the

psychological situation of the correspondent. But we can already assume that his anxious self

does not constitute an individual case. Rather than being a peculiarity, it exemplifies a quite

common state of mind, which, on the one hand, was instilled as a paradigm of ascetic

behaviour and, on the other, was more generally shared in the spiritual atmosphere of Late

Antiquity, thus blending by the way personal and institutional religion. Its root or, better to

say, its main expression resides in a state of mind lacking an exact orientation on both

practical and theoretical issues while anxiously seeking it. In other words, it is a perplexity

concerning how one should act morally and religiously (or, more precisely in the latter case,

dogmatically) and consequently implies, at a deeper level, a fundamental anguish about one’s

own salvation.

A person of delicate conscience:

the inner troubles of a layman with a monastic vocation

Letters 399-449 are attributed to an unnamed filov cristo", that is, “a Christ-loving

layperson”, a description regularly used in the correspondence.

8

Due to such addressee they

7 On the constant recollection of sins in ancient monasticism see Brouria Bitton-Ashkelony, Aryeh Kofsky,

The Monastic School of Gaza (Leiden – Boston, 2006), p. 129.

8 Filov cristo" is the most common term starting already with the prologue (l. 12 [I, 22]: filocrivstoi"

lai>koi'", “Christ-loving laypersons”), though the correspondence also uses kosmikov", ‘secular’, to distinguish a

layperson from a cleric or a monk (see, for example, C 716, 5-6 [II, 257]: ou[ te klhrikov" eijmi ou[te schm̀a



5

have been exploited by Lucien Regnault to argue the thesis that there was no substantial

difference between the spiritual ideals of the monks and those of the laymen they inspired.9

As a matter of fact, this is a series of letters that has practically nothing to do with secular

affairs. Unlike the larger section of the correspondence devoted to laymen,10 it deals

exclusively with spiritual matters. Because of this distinctive characteristics one wonders

whether the identity of the correspondent does not gradually transform itself in the course of

the epistolary exchange, so that increasingly we come to face somebody with a monastic

vocation, if not a person already having a monastic status. The evidence offers some support

for this conclusion, as will be seen in what follows.

Beginning to trace a ‘portrait’ of the anonymous correspondent, we may first of all note the

tendency to a refinement of conscience that characterizes his dialogue with Barsanuphius

e[ cwn, ajllÆ a[nqrwpo" kosmikov", “I am neither a clergyman, nor do I have the monastic habit, but I am merely

a... layman”).9 Cf. Lucien Regnault, ‘Moines et laïcs dans la région de Gaza au VIe siècle’, in Christian Gaza in Late

Antiquity, ed. by Brouria Bitton-Ashkelony and Aryeh Kofsky (Leiden-Boston, 2004), pp. 165-72. According to

Regnault these letters prove that “les destinataires vivaient vraiment sous la conduite de leur Père spirituel”. The

editors of the correspondence introduce our group under the title: “À un laïc en quête d’une vie de prière et de

combat” (SC 450, p. 15).

10 According to Leah Di Segni, ‘Monastero, città e villaggio nella Gaza bizantina’, in Il deserto di Gaza:

Barsanufio, Giovanni e Doroteo. Atti dell’XI Convegno ecumenico internazionale di spiritualità ortodossa, ed.

by Sabino Chialà and Lisa Cremaschi (Comunità di Bose, 2004), pp. 51-80, the letters addressed to laymen

constitute more than a third of the total (p. 54). For an investigation of their topics see Jennifer L. Hevelone-

Harper, Disciples of the Desert. Monks, Laity and Spiritual Authority in Sixth-Century Gaza (Baltimore –

London, 2005); Lorenzo Perrone, ‘Aus Gehorsam zum Vater: Mönche und Laien in den Briefen von

Barsanuphius und Johannes von Gaza’, in Foundations of Power and Conflicts of Authority in Late-Antique

Monasticism, ed. by Alberto Camplani and Giovanni Filoramo (Leuven, 2007), pp. 217-43.



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from the outset. After confessing his sins to the Great Old Man (C 399), he declares a concern

regarding a spiritual insensitivity that results in his experiencing a lack of tears (C 400). To

the extent that we can ‘filter’ the ipsa vox of Barsanuphius’s disciple through the summaries

made by the redactor, he seems already here to comply with the monastic ideal of pev nqo",

‘grief’ or ‘sorrow’, the virtue encompassing most of all the penitent recollection of sins

together with katav nuxi", ‘compunction’ (C 428).11 He then goes on to ask for advice in

practical behaviour, though at the level of general principles rather than of concrete issues (C

401). If this reveals some ‘theoretical’ interest in defining the requisites of a morally

sustainable deed, Barsanuphius prefers to deal with him as an ascetic ‘worker’ ( ejrgav th"),

relying at the same time on his ability to follow an exegetical argument, which results in a sort

of monastic ‘midrash’.12 Yet the disciple is still a beginner in the study of the Bible, as

11 According to the definition of John the Prophet in C 730, 7 (II, 262): pev nqo" ejsti; n hJ kata; Qeo; n luv ph,

h} n tivktei hJ metav noia, “Mourning is godly sorrow, which is produced by repentance”. On the link between pev nqo" and tears see especially John’s response to Dorotheus in C 285, 4: Ouj to; pev nqo" dia; tw'n dakruvwn,

ajlla; ta; davkrua dia; tou' pev nqou" givnetai, “It is not tears that cause mourning, but rather mourning that

causes tears” (cf. also C 71, 125). On katavnuxi" see infra, n. 22. Iréné Hausherr, Penthos. La doctrine de la

componction dans l’Orient chrétien (Roma, 1944), remains the classic work on the subject. For recent research

and further bibliography see Martine Dulaey, ‘Les larmes dans les premiers siècles chrétiens: Ambroise et

l’Occident latin’, Adamantius, 16 (2010), 320-337.

12 Barsanuphius draws on several Old Testament passages (Is. 58. 5; Dt. 22. 9-11; Eccl. 9. 8) to support the

thesis that good deeds should always exclude any form of personal will. Apart from the helpful comments by

Luciana Mortari in her introduction to the Italian translation (Barsanufio e Giovanni di Gaza, Epistolario, a cura

di Maria Francesca Teresa Lovato e Luciana Mortari [Roma, 1991], pp. 56-64), the peculiar exegesis of the

correspondence still needs a thorough investigation. On the merits and limits of its characterization as ‘monastic

exegesis’ see my contribution: ‘Prayer as a Mirror of Monastic Culture in Byzantine Palestine: The Letters of the

Hesychast Euthymius to Barsanuphius’, Proche-Orient Chrétien, 60 (2010), 257-90.



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witnessed by his learning the Psalms by heart (C 402). Perhaps this fact could be valued as a

first sign that he has by now entered a monastic apprenticeship, but is not yet a sufficient clue

to it.13

Later on the correspondent will display a greater familiarity with the Psalms, though he

will still avoid raising questions about the interpretation of biblical passages. Moreover, in

this initial stage he modestly confesses that he is normally “slow in learning”. He further

scrutinizes himself regarding the purity of his intentions, then goes over to an issue of

theodicy: why are sinners rewarded with good by God (C 403)? A concern of the same kind

will later appear in the theologically interesting problem: does the Holy Ghost dwell in

sinners, and how are they preserved by God (C 420)?

The high spiritual standards of the disciple are again revealed in a question on what is the

worthy manner of thanksgiving. This question provokes a longer treatment by Barsanuphius,

well aware of the prospect of euj caristiva as a fundamental expression of prayer (C 404).14

After that the disciple touches a standard theme of monastic literature: the recognition of

demonic activity; but, in a more subtle approach, he considers the possibility that demons may

do good (C 405-406). At this point Barsanuphius addresses him, for the first and only time, as

ajgaphtev, ‘beloved one’, a term normally reserved for monastic brethren.15 Yet subsequently

we hear that he performs “a small act of charity” ( euj poii?a): does he retain his wealth as

13 For instance, in C 711 a layman confesses that when he recites the Psalms, he does not always understand

the meaning of the words.

14 On the importance assigned to the prayer of thanksgiving in monastic literature see especially Cassianus,

Conl. IX, 15, who regards it as the highest form in the range of prayers listed in 1 Tim. 2, 1.

15 C 406, 16-17 (II, 43): Tou' to de; mavqe, ajgaphtev, o{ti oJ Qeo;" oujk aj fei' tina peiraqh' nai uJ pe;r o}

duvnatai, “Learn this, too, beloved one: God does not allow anyone to be tested beyond his strength” (slightly

modified translation).





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already given an answer to his problem (C 412).20 Otherwise he replies firmly to him, when

he mentions a visionary experience (C 414) that includes also the appearance of Christ (C

415): A ‘sinner’ (aJmartwlov") – as the disciple professes himself to be21

– does not enjoy

visions from heaven; the demons must therefore be their instigators. Such demonic

phenomena continue to occupy the mind of the disciple in the letters that follow (C 416-419),

leading to a reported sight of demons besieging his heart like wild beasts, albeit

unsuccessfully. Our correspondence now turns to a more common casuistry related to the

monastic way of life. It is a set of letters in which the correspondent appears more and more

engaged in the monastic experience. We notice the place accorded to prayer (C 421-422) and

psalmody (C 423-424), though the disciple does not refrain from his usual attitude of spirit. It

is again out of his anxious approach that he asks whether he should continue to recite the

formulaic so-called ‘Jesus Prayer’ even when he is experiencing a peaceful time (C 425).

Worrying, on the one hand, about becoming an object of praise among people (C 426), on the

other hand, he regards the triad ‘prayer, reading and psalmody’ (C 427) as a means to realize

katav nuxi", ‘compunction’ (C 428).22 However, even the recitation of Psalms becomes for

20 See the beginning of the response in C 412, 5-6 (II, 46): Kai; h[dh ei\ povn soi o{ ti, eja;n sumbh/ ' se ei[ ti

dhvpote ajgaqo; n poih'sai..., “I have already told you that, if you happen to do anything good...”.

21 C 414, 1-2 (II, 48): jEa; n ou\ n giv nwntai ojptasivai aJmartwlw/ ', a\ra oujk oj feivlei o{lw" pisteuv ein o{ ti ejk

Qeou' eijsinÉ

22 C 428, 1-2 (II, 54): Pw'" ti" kta' tai katav nuxin ej n proseuch/ ' kai; aj nagnwvsei kai; yalmw/diva/É, “How

can one acquire compunction in prayer, reading and psalmody?”. The term occurs several times in our group of

letters (C 411, 428, 442, 444, 445), especially in connection with the attitude demanded by the ‘Jesus Prayer’ (C

442, 444). On the individual will as a hindrance to katav nuxi" see C 237, 13 (I, 242): J O kwluvwn ou\n th; n

katavnuxin ejlqei' n soi, to; qevlhmav sou ejstin, eja; n ga;r mh; kov yh/ oJ a[ nqrwpo" to; i[dion qevlhma, ouj ponei' hJ

kardiva, “So what prevents compunction from coming to you is your own will; indeed, if a person does not cut

off the individual will, the heart does not feel pain”; 43 (I, 242): Ta; triva tau' ta kov yon, qevlhma, dikaivwma,





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devotion to them, at least with a bow (C 433).26 His wandering about, as is implied here,

means perhaps that he is not staying in a monastic precinct? In any case, he has not changed

his habitual disposition, when he afterwards complains about attacks of ‘cowardice’ (deiliva)

that drive him to enter (a church or a cell?) for prayer (C 434-435). What, then, does

‘cowardice’ mean here if not, as elsewhere in the correspondence, a frightening concern or

discouragement with regard to his own salvation, which moreover harmonizes well with the

psychological profile of Barsanuphius’s disciple that we have traced so far?27 Not

26 C 433, 1-4 (II, 57): {Otan euJreqw' ej n tov pw/ e[nqa eijsi; leiv yana aJgivwn martuvrwn, ojclei' taiv mou oJ

logismo;" w{ste pollavki" aj piev nai kai; proskunei'n auj tav. Kai; oJsavki" eja; n parevlqw diÆ auj tw'n, uJpobavllei

moi th; n kefalh;n kli' nai, “Whenever I am in some place where there are relics of holy martyrs, my thought is

troubled so that I want to approach and venerate them many times. And whenever I pass by them, my thought

suggests that I should bow my head”. The term leiv yana appears again in C 742, where a layman asks how he

should behave in entering a martyr’s shrine (marturivw/).

27

See C 435, 2-3 (II, 58): Kai; o{te qevlw eijselqei' n kai; eu[xasqai peri; th'" ejmh'" swthriva", uJ pobavllei

moi th; n deilivan, “When, however, I want to enter [the cell] and pray for my own salvation, [the devil] suggests

cowardice to me”. According to C 232, 1-4 (I, 236), deiliva concerns the salvation: Poiv hson e[leo" metÆ ejmou',

devspota, kai; eij pev moi pw'" duv namai swqh' nai eij" to;n kairo;n tou' ton, o{ ti logismo;" deiliva" ajnevbh eij"

th; n kardivan mou, “Be merciful to me, master, and tell me how I can be saved at this time; for a thought of fear

has arisen in my heart”. In view of such concern Barsanuphius’ response underlines the essential aspects of the

ascetic praxis (C 232, 7-10 [I, 236]: Kata; pavnta kairo;n eja; n duv natai oJ a[nqrwpo" kov yai aujtou' to; qevlhma

ej n pa'si, kai; e[cein tapeinh;n kardivan kai; to; n qav naton dia; panto;" pro; oj fqalmw'n, duv natai swqh' nai

cavriti Qeou'. Kai; o{ pou eja;n h/ \, ouj katakurieuvei aujtou' hJ deiliva, “At every moment, if a person is able to

cut off the individual will in all things, and possesses a humble heart, holding death at all times before one’s

eyes, that person can be saved by the grace of God. And wherever that person may be, fear cannot dominate

him”). Our correspondent already in C 417 associates deiliva with fovbo". In C 683, 2-3 (II, 239-240) a pious

layman fears that he may be misguided by the devil: J O logismo;" ejmbavllei moi deilivan, o{ti Duv natai oJ

diavbolo" poih'saiv se aJmarth'sai, ka]n su; mh; qevlh/", “My thought sows cowardice within me, telling me that



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surprisingly, in view of his penchant for repetitive acts of devotion, he then confesses a

‘compulsion’ ( ej noclei' moi) to sign himself night and day with the sign of the cross (C 436).

And when he subsequently asks if it is permitted to sign oneself with the left hand, in the

event that the right hand is out of use, Barsanuphius’s response is not devoid of humour:

“Well, as for me, whenever I want to perform the sign of the cross over my right hand, I

certainly have to use my left hand to do so” (C 437).28

The set of ‘practical’ letters continues with a series of questions on how to pray (C 438-

440), especially when there are no ‘fathers’ available to guide one (C 440). Although this

detail could again lead us to suppose that we still are dealing with a layman, what follows

suggests that he has meanwhile become a monk. For we next encounter him sitting (in his

cell), reading and doing some handiwork, that is, carrying out the activities typical of a

monastic routine, while he is once again anxious about the way he should pray in such

situations, or when he has his head covered and is walking around (C 441). 29

the devil can force me to sin, even if I do not want to”. The role of deiliva in connection with sexual temptation

determines a longer response by Barsanuphius to Dorotheus in C 258, establishing the necessity of spiritual fight

and the limits of temptation. While deiliva often recurs in the correspondence of the two Old Men of Gaza, it is

mentioned only occasionally in Dorotheus’s Instructions. Interestingly, he provides an ‘Aristotelian’

categorization for it in Instr. X, 106: hJ aj ndreiva mevsh ejsti; th'" deiliva" kai; th'" qrasuv thto".

28 C 437, 5-6 (II, 59): jEgw; tevw" o{ tan qevlw sfragivsai th;n dexiav n mou, th/ ' ajristera/ ' tou'to poiw'.

29 C 431, 1-6 (II, ): { Ote kavqhmai ei[ te ajnaginwvskwn ei[ te ejrgovceiron poiw' n kai; qevlw proseuv cesqai,

diakrivnw kaqhvmeno" tiv poih'sai. To; auj to; pavscw ka] n e[ cw th; n kefalh; n ejskepasmev nhn. Kai; o{ te de;

peripatw' kai; qevlw proseuvxasqai, aj paitei' me oJ logismo;" prosevcein eij" ajnatolav", “When I am sitting

down, whether reading or doing my handiwork, and want to pray, I am not sure if I should in fact be sitting. The

same happens even if I have my head covered. And when I am walking about and want to pray, my thought

demands that I turn eastwards in order to do so”. Compare this text with Dorotheus’ description of the monastic



13

The epilogue to the correspondence provides further evidence for the inference we have

already anticipated: The disciple is definitely a monk, even if he is driven “to say with every

word, deed, and thought” that “he has sinned” (C 443).30

In fact, he now not only recites the

Psalms, though not without some distraction (C 443-444), but also listens to the recitation of

another brother (C 445) or “stands with the rest of the brothers during the chanting of the

Psalms” (C 447). However, the fact that he is in the choir of monks does not diminish his

anxious state of mind, inasmuch as he now feels sexually attracted to a brother reciting the

Psalms (C 446). In the last two letters he does not conceal his feeling of “a great burden in his

soul” (C 448), while he finally begs Barsanuphius to explain to him how he should “hurry

toward God without turmoil” (C 449).

The ascetic paradox:

Self-examination as self-annihilation

The above survey has shown the rich variety of topics emerging in this set of letters, as

frequently happens with the wealth of detail to be found in the correspondence of the two Old

Men of Gaza. It would be risky to presume that we possess the key to the ‘story of a soul’,

despite our impression of having followed, as it were, the ‘film’ of the spiritual adventure of

condition in Ep. 1: o{ te me;n kavqhtai ejn tw/ ' kellivw/, eu[cetai, meleta/ ', poiei' mikro;n ejrgovceiron, frontivzei

kata; duv namin tw' n logismw' n.

30 C 442, 1-3 (II, 61): Levgei moi oJ logismo;" o{ ti Eij" pavnta aJmartavnei" kai; oj feivlei" ejn eJkavstw/ lovgw/

kai; e[rgw/ kai; ej nqumhvsei levgein o{ti {Hmarton, “My thought tells me that I am sinning in everything [that I

do], and that I must say with every word, deed, and thought: ‘I have sinned’”.



14

Barsanuphius’s disciple.31 Yet we are able to isolate some dominant features therein, that not

only characterize an individual state of mind as particularly ‘anxious’, but more properly

circumscribe a definite vision of the ‘ascetic self’. In fact, most of the problems raised by the

anonymous correspondent, as well as the responses by his master, develop a discourse that

essentially turns on one fundamental issue: Under what conditions can deeds be qualified as

good from an ascetic point of view? Although Barsanuphius provides from the start what, in

his eyes, should be regarded as the decisive criterion for a morally positive action, the disciple

is confronted with the difficulties arising from its more or less direct application to a range of

particular cases. We might even say that by doing so he verifies the extent to which the

general principle laid down by his master can be implemented. Of course, this does not

happen simply as a result of ‘theoretical’ interest; the framework traced by our overview

provides ample evidence of his need to overcome a constant concern for his salvation. The

source and the means through which Barsanuphius’s disciple comes to manifest such concern

is self-examination of conscience, which is otherwise conducted precisely on the basis of the

ideals and values recommended by the monastic school of Gaza32.

31 According to an observation by Lucien Regnault reported in Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic

School of Gaza, p. 128.

32 For a thorough-going presentation of Gaza asceticism see Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic

School of Gaza. I tried to isolate its core in ‘The Necessity of Advice: Spiritual Direction as a School of

Christianity in the Correspondence of Barsanuphius and John of Gaza’, in Christian Gaza in Late Antiquity, pp.

131-49. Cf. also the important contribution of Claudia Rapp, ‘‘For Next to God, You Are My Salvation’:

Reflections on the Rise of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’, in The Cult of the Saints in Late Antiquity and the

Middle Ages: Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown, ed. by James Howard-Johnson and Paul Antony

Hayward (Oxford, 1999), pp. 63-82. A new investigation into the history of Gaza monasticism is Rosa Maria

Parrinello, Comunità monastiche a Gaza. Da Isaia a Doroteo (secoli IV-VI) (Roma, 2010).





16

making it a sort of ‘categorical imperative’ for an action that aims to be ‘pure’,36 calling on

the disciple “to be vigilant” against any intrusion of personal will into it. With his appeal to

nh' yi", ‘vigilance’, the Great Old Man indicates the inner disposition that is required to

enforce constant observance of the commandment on the ‘cutting of the will’. By practicing

his own self-examination the disciple will strictly follow Barsanuphius’s instruction, even if

this self-scrutiny leads him to generalize and overemphasize his suspicion as to the reasons

that may lay behind his deeds.

Consequently, nothing can be accepted as good. Even if at first sight it is perceived as

such, it demands careful inspection by the disciple. For instance, the facility with which he

learns the Psalms leads him to ponder its possible causes: Does it come “from God or from

the demons”?37 Moreover, while admitting his progress in learning, the disciple betrays the

awareness that to allow personal satisfaction could involve the risk of vainglory. A similar

alternative appears elsewhere, when he asks: “Is it possible for the demons to do good to

anyone? And how is it revealed whether this good comes from the demons? And what is the

School of Gaza’, Liber Annuus, 56 (2006), 321-346, mentions affinities between Augustine and Evagrius resting

on the critical approach of the former to free will as “human egoistic will” (p. 322).

36 C 401, 22-24 (II, 39): jEa;n ou\ n e[ch/ to; ginovmenov n ti tou' ijdivou qelhvmato" tou' poiou' nto", ejrrupwvqh

to; e[rgon kai; oujk e[stin ajresto;n tw/ ' Qew/ ', “if what is done also contains something from our own will, then

that work is polluted and is unpleasing to God”.

37 C 401, 2-4 (II, 39): \Ara ejk tou' Qeou' sunevbh moi tou' to h] ejk tw' n daimov nwn, i{ na e[lqw eij"

kenodoxivanÉ, “Tell me whether this has happened to me from God, or else from the demons in order that I might

come to vainglory”. Barsanuphius wisely replies (6-8 [II, 40]): { Osa parevcei soi oJ Qeov", mavqe meta;

tapeinwvsew", to; ga;r maqei'n eujcerw'" ta; lovgia tou' Qeou' oujk aj po; tou' diabovlou giv netai, spevrma gavr

eijsin tou' Qeou', “Whatever God grants you, receive it with humility. For to learn the words of God easily does

not actually come from the devil, but they are in fact a seed from God”.



17

difference between this and a divine gift?”38 It should be noted that this series of questions

comes shortly after Barsanuphius has stated as a general rule that “every good gift, as it is

evident, comes from God”.39

The Great Old Man then delivers a comprehensive response

which takes into consideration the opinion that demons may cause some good to one in order

to deceive him. It all depends on the process of unmasking their tricks (while experiencing

this deceitful good), which anyway demands a capacity for “knowledge and discernment”.40

The master’s response, observing among other things that “sinners only perceive the

difference at the end”, could not succeed in calming the disciple. This was even more the

case, insofar as he certainly embraced Barsanuphius’s recommendation of ajkrivbeia, ‘closer

examination’, and diavkrisi", ‘discernment’, both qualities held in high esteem not only

among monks but more generally in the religious atmosphere of that time. The disciple

therefore solicits a further clarification on “the supposed good of the demons” for the purpose

of escaping the danger hidden in it.41 Barsanuphius’s pedagogical reply here skilfully mixes

principles with practice, finally emphasizing the recourse to prayer for discernment through

38 C 405, 1-4 (II, 41): \Ara dunatov n ejsti tou;" daivmona" ajgaqopoih'saiv tiniÉ Kai; pw'" fanerou'tai o{ ti

daimoniwvdh" ejstivÉ Kai; tiv" hJ diafora; auj tou' kai; tou' qei>kou' ajgaqou' 'É

39 C 403, 5 (II, 40): Pa'sa dovsi" ajgaqhv, dhlonov ti ejk tou' Qeou' ejstin.

40 C 405, 6-9 (II, 41-42): jEndev cetai me; n dovxa giv nesqaiv tini ajgaqo; n pro;" aj pavthn ejk tou' ponhrou',

ajlla; pa' n ajgaqo;n ginovmenon ejk tou' diabovlou pro;" th; n aj pavthn tou' ajnqrwv pou, yhlafwvmenon meta;

ajkribeiva", euJrivsketai metaschmatismov", “There is a possibility, theoretically, that good can come to

someone from the evil one with the purpose of deceit. Every good, however, that comes from the devil in order

to deceive us, upon closer examination, is found only to be disguise”.

41

C 406 (II, 42-43).



18

God if the disciple does not himself succeed in exposing the demonic operation.42 In such a

case the master’s initial plea for activating the self through responsible ‘discernment’ again

ends in a form of self-denial, supported by the recognition of being still in the condition of a

‘sinner’.

Inner conflict between opposing thoughts with regard to the recognition of something as

good offers new opportunities for Barsanuphius’s counselling, though his advice falls short of

appeasing the disciple. The Great Old Man declares that a clear criterion for identifying a

good thought consists in the ‘affliction’ (qli' yi") that accompanies it, provided one first prays

to God and then carefully inspects his actual propensities in face of the conflicting thoughts.43

But then the disciple wonders whether a good deed accomplished by him without any

affliction should still be valued as such.44 In response, Barsanuphius restates his general

principle, without any concession, by once more inviting the disciple to carry out a ‘close

examination’ (ajkribologhvsasqai) of his mind in order to discover how and why the

affliction remains concealed, and to eventually bring to light the implicit danger of self-

estimation.45 Being conscious that such a peril is always present helps to define the limits

within which one should set the positive admission occasionally made by Barsanuphius

42 C 406, 18-19 (II, ): jEn panti; ou\n prosfevrwmen auj tw/ ' th; n iJkesivan, kai; auj to;" diakrinei' hJmw' n to;

ajgaqo;n aj po; tou' nomizomevnou ajgaqou', “So in all things, let us offer supplications to him, and he will

distinguish for us the good from the supposed good”.

43 C 407 (II, 43). Note here Barsanuphius’s suggestion to ‘make a test’ (l. 7 [II, 43]: ejk touv tou

dokimavzetai, “this is the way of testing”).

44 C 408, 1-2 (II, 43): Tiv ou\ n o{ tan givnhtai to; ajgaqo;n ajqliv ptw", oujk e[sti kata; Qeovn'É “So what

happens when good occurs without any affliction; is it not from God?”.

45 C 408, 7-8 (II, 44): jEavn ti" ajgaqo;n poih'sa" eu{rh/ to; n logismo;n a[qlipton, oujk ojfeivlei qarrh'sai

o{ ti a[neu qliv yew" parevrcetai, “If someone does something good and finds that the thought has not been

afflicted, then that person should not feel confident that it will completely pass without affliction”.



19

according to which “a person can think of something good from a movement of the natural

thought”. If the disciple may have imagined thus to find a positive role for personal initiative,

his master’s reply once more suppresses it: Even in such cases one has to ascribe the good

thought to God as Creator and avow that one is not able to fulfill it without the help of his

commandment.46 So there is no way of escaping the aporetic dimension of asceticism: On the

one hand, the self is called upon to improve itself by becoming more and more ‘good’ through

the critical involvement of his conscience; on the other hand, he has no right to experience it

personally in any way.

Having tried several times to preserve forms of individual responsibility, eventually the

disciple seems to have learnt the lesson of his master and become more eager than ever to

follow it, not eschewing an excess of zeal. Therefore, when he now does something good, he

wants to know in what manner he can humiliate himself;47 and, in observing a commandment,

he wishes to learn how he can comply both with “knowing that he has done a good thing” and

admitting that “he remains estranged from it” to avoid pride.48 In his growing concern for

46 C 409, 4-10 (II, ): Sumbaivnei me;n pollavki" aj po; kinhvsew" tou' fusikou' logismou' ej nqumei'sqaiv tina

to; ajgaqov n. jAlla; kai; tou' to ej pigrav fein dei' tw/ ' Qew/ ', hJ ga;r fuvsi" poivhma aujtou' ejsti. Ginwvskein de;

oj feivlomen o{ ti oujk a[gomen auj to; eij" tevlo", eij mh; dia; th'" tou' Qeou' ejntolh'", “It often happens that a

person can think of something good from a movement of the natural thought. It is necessary, however, to ascribe

this as well to God; for nature is his creation. And we should know that we cannot even bring it to fruition except

through the command of God”.

47 C 410, 1-3 (II, 45): {Otan poiw' ti ajgaqov n, pw'" ojfeivlw tapeinw'saiv mou to;n logismov n'É Kai; pw'"

bastavzw th;n ejmautou' me vmyin, pravxa" to; ajgaqov n'É, “When I do something good, how should I humble my

thought? And how can I bear blame on myself when I have done something good?”.

48 C 411, 1-3 (II, 46): { Otan poiw' ejntolhvn, pw'" duvnamai fugei'n th;n uJ yhlofrosuvnhn i {na oi\da o{ ti kai;

ajgaqo;n pra'gma ej poivhsa kai; ajllov triov" ei\mi aujtou'É, “When I keep a commandment, how can I avoid pride

so that I may know that I have done a good thing and yet at the same time remain estranged from it?”.







22

The quest for certainty:

ascetic and dogmatic trajectories

Perhaps our group of letters best exemplifies the ‘aporetic dimension’ resulting from Gaza

asceticism when calling for the self-control of the conscience. It is true that the main term for

it, suneivdhsi", never figures in these letters, so that one might at first glance wonder whether

the conscience is really considered to be a positive factor as in the Instructions of Dorotheus.

The most famous disciple of Barsanuphius and John of Gaza classically viewed the

‘conscience’ as the inner witness and judge of our moral conduct. The way in which

Dorotheus explains its functioning may even give rise to the impression that the conscience is

fully entitled to act as an autonomous and self-sufficient organ of control independently

capable of tracing a clear ‘distinction’ (diavkrisi"!) between good and evil. In principle, for

Dorotheus, the conscience always stands in contrast to “our evil will” instructing us on how

we should behave and reproaching us when we do not follow its dictates. 53 Yet this ideal

53 See Dorotheus, Didasc. III, 41 ( Dorothée de Gaza. Œuvres spirituelles, intr., texte grec, trad. et notes par

Lucien Regnault et Jean de Préville [Paris, 1963], p. 210, 9-12): au{ th aj ntivkeitai pav ntote tw/ ' qelhvmati

hJmw' n tw/ ' kakw/ ' kai; ejlevgcei hJma'" eij" o} oj feivlonte" poih'sai, ouj poiou'men: kai; pavlin, eij" o} mh;

oj feivlonte" poih'sai, poiou'men, kai; au{th kathgorei' hJmw' n; III, 42 (214, 29-31): Au{th ga;r ejlevgcei

hJma'"... eij" to; kalo; n kai; eij" to; kakov n, kai; deiknuv ei hJmi' n tiv poih'sai kai; tiv mh; poih'sai. Kai; au{th

pavlin kathgorei' hJmw' n kai; ejn tw/ ' me vllonti aijw' ni; IV, 54 (238, 28-30): JH me;n suneivdhsiv" mou marturei'

moi o{ti dia; diovrqwsin qevlw eij pei'n, ajllÆ aijsqavnomai o{ti kai; e[swqev n tiv pote wJ" logismo;" mevmiktai.

Dorotheus emphasizes the importance of suneivdhsi" by connecting this concept to his view of the history of

salvation: “Christ actually awaked our dormant inner man, or conscience – namely, the power of distinction

(diavkrisi") between good and evil. Dorotheus elsewhere specifies that this conscience (suneivdhsi") was a

divine gift bestowed upon Adam in paradise..., which constitutes the ideal natural law ( fusiko;" novmo") as

opposed to the later mundane written law. It was precisely the aim of Christ to teach men how to discern the



23

model is not devoid of tensions and limitations for Dorotheus himself. Essentially, one cannot

rely solely upon the voice of one’s own conscience lest it mislead one into believing that he

can govern himself alone.54

Since Adam’s fall it is indeed the conscience of a frail humanity,

in spite of the way to its restoration opened up by Christ’s salvific deed. So men always need

the help of God and with it of “those who govern” their conscience, more specifically the

monks among them, that is, their spiritual directors. Therefore, even within the pattern traced

by Dorotheus, the conscience comes to play a necessarily subordinate role, inasmuch as it has

to be thought of as operating in the framework of spiritual direction.55

The same situation is actually implied in the correspondence of the two Old Men of Gaza,

inasmuch as they generally refrain from positively exploiting the word suneivdhsi" (or its

synonym suneidov"). Undoubtedly, they are acquainted with its larger use in the New

mental mechanisms of committing sin and how to cleanse the passions leading to sin through the cultivation of

ascetic virtues” (Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School of Gaza, p. 143). For a comprehensive

assessment see Rosa Maria Parrinello, ‘Coscienza e direzione spirituale. Ruolo e funzione della suneivdhsi" nel

monachesimo palestinese’, in Maestro e discepolo. Temi e problemi della direzione spirituale tra VI secolo a.C.

e VII secolo d.C., ed. by Giovanni Filoramo (Brescia, 2002), pp. 275-316.

54 Dorotheus, Didasc. V, 61 (250, 4-9): blev pete tiv didavskei hJma'" hJ aJgiva Grafhv: ajsfalivzetai hJma'",

i{ na mh; stoicw'men eJautoi'", i{ na mh; e[cwmen eJautou;" sunetouv", i{ na mh; pisteuvwmen o{ti dunavmeqa

eJautou;" dioikh'sai. Crh/ vzomen bohqeiva", crh/ vzomen tw'n meta; Qeo;n kubernw' ntwn hJma'". Oujdev n ejstin

ajqliwvteron, oujde; n eujalwtov teron tw' n mh; ejcovntwn tina; oJdhgou' nta aujtou;" eij" th;n oJdo; n tou' Qeou'. As a

consequence, the ‘examination of conscience’, one of the recommended ‘spiritual exercises’ common both to the

disciples of philosophical schools (Pythagoreans and Stoics) and to the monks came to be connected with the

monastic system of spiritual direction as exemplified, for instance, in John Climacus (see Giovanni Climaco, La

scala del paradiso, Introduzione, traduzione e note di Rosa Maria Parrinello [Milano, 2007], pp. 90-107).

55 According to Irénée Hausherr, Direction spirituelle en Orient autrefois (Roma, 1955), pp. 172-77,

practically no monk is exempted from the system of spiritual direction.



24

Testament, but they prefer to have recourse to the particular meaning to be found in the First

Epistle to the Corinthians: It is then not so much one’s own conscience in its capacity for self-

government but rather “the conscience of the others” (1 Cor. 8. 12; 10. 29), prone to be

offended by any independent behaviour of ourselves that does not take into account their

sensitivities.56 Tellingly enough, this was the recommendation John the Prophet, the Other

Old Man of Gaza, used to impart every evening to his servant and disciple Dorotheus at the

end of his service by repeating to him a saying of Abbah Isaiah: “To have respect for the

conscience of the neighbour generates humility”57. Apart from this relational application, only

occasionally do we find its more active and personal meaning, as in a letter from Dorotheus to

56 See, for instance, C 3, 3-5 (I, 25): Sugcwvrhsov n moi dia; to; n Kuvrion, o{ti ej piqumw' tou' ijdei'n se, ajlla;

dia; tw'n a[llwn suneivdhsin, oujc euJrivskw ejleuqerivan, “Forgive me for the Lord’s sake, for I also desire to see

you, but for the sake of the others’ conscience, I am not at liberty to do this”. C 772 deals with the interpretation

of 1 Cor. 8. 4. 11. C 17, 29-30 (I, 36) significantly modifying Jas. 1. 14 (e{ kasto" de; peirav zetai uJpo; th'"

ijdiv a" ejpiqumiva" ejxelkov meno" kai; deleazov meno" ) as follows: Oujk oi\da" o{ ti { Ekasto" peiravzetai uJpo;

th'" ijdiva" suneidhvsew" , kai; tou' to tivktei aujtw/ ' th;n qli' yinÉ, “Do you not know that one is tempted by

one’s own conscience, and this is what brings about personal distress?”. An appeal to suneidov" as the judging

instance can be found in C 462, 30-32 (II, 76): jAllÆ o{mw" to; suneido;" marturei' moi, o{ ti ouj qevlw se

planh'sai o{lw" ej n oujdeni; pragmati, “My conscience, however, bears witness that I do not want to deceive

you at all in any matter”; C 593, 13-14 (II, 171): jEa;n de; sunecw'", eij pe; auj tw/ ': Ouj kataginwvskei sou to;

suneidov"É, “If, however, he visits continually, then ask him: ‘Does your conscience not bother you?’”.

Interestingly the correspondence never quotes the important passage on the conscience as inner ‘judge’ in Rom.

2, 15: oi{ tine" ejndeivknuntai to; e[ rgon tou' nov mou grapto;n ejn tai'" kardiv ai" aujtw'n, summarturouv sh"

aujtw'n th'" suneidhv sew" kai; metaxu; ajllhv lwn tw'n logismw'n kathgorouv ntwn h] kai; ajpologoumevnwn .

57 Dorotheus, Didasc. IV, 56 (240, 15-17): {Apax, a[delfe, oJ Qeo;" fulavxh/ th;n ajgavphn. Ei\ pon oiJ

Patevre": To; fulavxai th;n suneivdhsin tou' plhsivon tivktei th; n tapeinofrosuv nhn. Cf. Abbah Isaiah,

Asceticon XVI, 4 (ed. Augoustinos, Tou' oJsiv ou Patro;" hJmw'n aj bba' jHsaivou Lovgoi KQ [Jerusalem, 1911], p.

92): to; mh; plh'xai th; n suneivdhsin tou' plhsivon tivktei th; n tapeinofrosuvnhn.



25

John. Raising in his turn a dilemma that comes quite close to the spiritual situation described

by our anonymous correspondent, Dorotheus confesses to the Other Old Man:

Father, it is not that I consider myself to be beneath all creatures; however, when I examine my conscience, I

find myself responsible and obliged to be beneath all creatures. Is this, then, also a mocking [illusion] of the

demons?58

Only in this passage ‘conscience’ occurs in connection with the more typical verb for self-

scrutiny: ejreunw', ‘examine’. Nevertheless it is precisely the extensive use of this verb that

proves the extent to which self-examination was a recurrent exercise within the monastery of

Seridus. To ‘examine’ or ‘search’ thus implies the overall inspection of one’s own thoughts,

words and deeds, even if the text does not explicitly mention one of the many aspects

susceptible to such self-examination: for instance, ‘soul’ ( yuchv),59 ‘heart’ (kardiva),60

58

C 276, 1-5 (I, 276): Oujc o{ ti Pav ter, e[cw ejmauto; n o{ ti eijmi; uJ pokavtw pavsh" ktivsew", ajllÆ o{ tan

ejreunw' th; n suneivdhsin, euJrivskw eJauto;n uJ peuvqunon tou' ei\ nai uJ pokavtw pavsh" ktivsew". \Ara ou\n kai;

tou'to cleuvh daimovnwn ejstivnÉ

59 C 237, 10-12 (I, 241): To; ga;r eijselqei' n eij" to; kellivon th'" yuch'" ejsti kai; ejreunh'sai auj th; n kai;

sunavxai to;n logismo; n hJmw' n aj po; panto;" ajnqrwv pou, “For entering into the cell is a matter of the soul, of

searching it out and of gathering our thought from every person”.

60 C 20, 5-6 (I, 39): jEreuv nhson ou\n th;n kardivan sou ajpo; panto;" pravgmato", “Therefore, examine

your heart in regard to every matter”; C 614, 5-8 (II, 200): [Adelfe, ejreuv nhson th; n kardivan sou eij" to;

kellivon sou kata; seautov n, kai; euJrivskei" povqen soi sunevbh hJ sklhrov th" th'" kardiva" sou, “Brother,

when you are alone in your cell, examine your heart, and you will discover whence this hardness came to your

heart”. See also C 549, 30-31 (II, 134); 825, 7 (II, 311). As will be clear subsequently, special attention should

be paid to C 250, 7-9 (I, 254): Kai; ejreunw' th;n kardivan, eij kavqhmai koinovbion wJ" oiJ ajdelfoi; kai; ouj

plhroforou'mai, “I am examining my heart as to whether I am staying in the monastic community like the

brothers, but I have no assurance”.





27

term plhroforiva and the verbal expressions connected with it. Originally a word from the

New Testament, none of its occurrences therein (1 Thess. 1. 5; Col. 2. 2; Hebr. 6. 11 and 10.

22) are quoted in the correspondence of the two Old Men,65

but both the substantive

plhroforiva and even more the verb plhroforevw enjoy a rich usage.66 In addition, it is one

of the most significant uses in the ascetic literature of Late Antiquity, though the term is not

exclusive to monasticism. Due to the frequency with which plhroforiva occurs in our source,

we must restrict ourselves to some paradigmatic evidence, again going back first of all to the

anonymous correspondent, whose letters present two occurrences. The first has a negative

implication, insofar as it points to what Barsanuphius judges to be a manifestation of demonic

activity by means of visions;67 in this case, it has the meaning of evidence that offers a false

assurance and on that account does not deserve to be trusted. The second occurrence attributes

to the term a positive value by inculcating a spiritual attitude of primary importance for

65 C 493, 20 (Pepoiqovte" ou\ n prosevlqwmen auj tw/ ') perhaps presents only an allusion to Hebr. 10. 22

(prosercwv meqa meta; ajlhqinh'" kardiva" ejn plhroforiva /).

66 According to the statistics of TLG the correspondence has 71 entries including the following forms: the

substantive plhroforiva (17), the verbal forms of plhroforevw (53), the adjective plhroforhtikov" (1) which

is a hapax legomenon. On the New Testament usage see Gerhard Delling, in Theological Dictionary of the New

Testament , VI (Grand Rapids, 1968), pp. 310-311: “Lit. a. ‘supreme fulness’, though in non-Christian literature

we find only b. ‘certainty’” (p. 310).

67 C 415, 4-6 (II, 48): Tov te pollw/' plevon th;n auj tw'n ponhrivan kai; th; n plavnhn aj postrev fesqai kai;

aj naqemativzein oj feivlwmen. Mhdev pote ou\ n planhqh/ '", ajdelfev, eij" th; n toiauv thn daimoniwvdh

plhroforivan, “It is especially then that we should turn away from and anathematize their wickedness and deceit

even more so. Brother, never be deceived, therefore, by such demonic assurance”.



28

monastic perfection: the constant awareness of being a sinner.68 In this case plhroforiva

signifies a firm, unequivocal ‘conviction’, the opposite of the ambiguity to be found in the

first passage.

Outside of our set of letters the quest for certainty on moral behaviour predominates. A

letter that is part of a series to be considered a sort of ‘breviary’ of the ars interrogandi of the

two Old Men of Gaza eloquently illustrates the impact of plhroforiva for their spiritual

experience.69 It is the case of a layman who, before addressing the magistrate regarding a

matter involving another party sought for the advice of his spiritual fathers and these told him

what to do. He tried to act accordingly, but the matter took a course that differed from their

response, so that he fell into despair and no longer knew how to behave:

I was greatly afflicted and did not know what to do. Should I transgress? I feared to disobey. Should I wait?

For the result was not the same as they had said. What does this mean, father? Moreover, what should I have

done or thought after falling into such dismay and need? Could it be that the fault was mine, without myknowing it?70

The man is caught in the plight of an anxious dilemma (aj poriva!), revealing once more the

paradoxes of the ascetic self. While examining the alternatives at his disposal, he is not

68 C 442, 8-9 (II, 61): j Ofeivlomen pavntote plhroforivan e[ cein o{ti eij" pavnta aJmartav nomen kai; ej n

lovgw/ kai; ej n e[rgw/ kai; ejn ej nqumhsei, “We should always be convinced that we are in all things sinful, alike in

deed, word, and thought”.

69 For this very interesting breviarium see C 361-372, 373, 374-378, 379-389.

70 C 364, 8-13 (II, 9): jEqlibovmhn pav nu kai; oujk h[ /dein tiv poihvsw: Parexelqei' nÉ ej fobouvmhn th;n

parakohv n. jEpimei' naiÉ oujc eu{riskon th;n e[kbasin oJmoivan th/ ' aj pokrivsei. Tiv ejsti tou' to Pav terÉ Kai; ti v

ej crh'n me poih'sai h] logivsasqai eij" tosauvthn aj porivan kai; a j navgkhnÉ Mhv ti de; to ; aJmavrthma ejx ejmou'

h\ n kai; ejlav nqanev meÉ



29

willing to consider the possibility of appealing to an autonomous decision of his own

conscience. Though this conscience indeed appears to be very alert, it is so in response to an

external injunction, which results in being its ruling principle even in case of a failure. Apart

from that, the layman basically reinforces his attitude of inner subordination by not excluding

a misunderstanding of his own as the reason for his troubled conscience.

Responding to him, John the Prophet traces a manifesto of the ascetic ideal of the monastic

school of Gaza and indicates the ways in which one arrives at the desired ‘certainty’. Self-

blame should, as expected, come before any other consideration. If the response of the fathers

did not function, it certainly depended first of all upon the fact that the “heart took pleasure in

the matter” instead of leaving it entirely to the will of God.71 But John does not exclude that

the combination of factors involved in the concrete situation may have changed meanwhile

and this explains “why God is changing the details of the mandate”. Finally, if the spiritual

father is not at hand, there is nevertheless a method to involve him and maintain at the same

time the universally binding system of spiritual direction. One should pray to God in the name

of his director of conscience and ask that he himself may warrant the ‘certainty’ that the

spiritual father normally provides as God’s earthly intermediary:

You should pray to God and invoke the name of your elder, saying: “God of my elder, do not allow me to

wander away from your will or from your servant’s mandate, but inform ( plhrofovrhson = ‘assure’) me as

to what I should do”. Then you should do whatever he informs ( plhroforei') you, believing that God

71 C 364, 17-19 (II, 9): Prw' ton me; n mevmyasqai eJauto;n oj feivlei", mhvpote hjdunhvqh hJ kardiva sou ejn tw/ '

pravgmati kai; oujk aj fh'ka" to; pa' n tw/ ' Qew/ ', “First, you should blame yourself, in case your heart took

pleasure in the matter and you did not leave the matter entirely up to God”.





31

the Great Old Man elaborates an original model in order to cope with the problem of doctrinal

traditions and their validity from a dogmatic point of view. The problem is due mainly to the

fact that two such venerated Church Fathers as Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa

apparently cling to Origenist errors. Now Barsanuphius, though considering the genealogy of

Christian doctrines within the classic framework of a diadochè, a succession of schools as in

ancient philosophy, does not limit himself to appreciating the element of tradition as such. In

Barsanuphius’s opinion a theologian is led to develop his own ideas thanks both to his

‘studies’ (maqhvmata) and to the ‘tradition’ ( paravdosi") of teachings he has received from

his masters. But his theses have to be submitted to an ultimate criterion: their ‘confirmation’

by the direct ‘inspiration’ or ‘revelation’ of God (these three words all being practically

equivalent to plhroforiva) assured to a theologian the moment he asks for it through prayer.

Otherwise what we have to do with is personal ideas or school doctrines, which may even be

erroneous. Thus the spiritual factor, which of course for the Great Old Man essentially

supports and determines the intellectual one in theological elaboration, becomes the decisive

measure of dogmatic correctness75. Only when the theologian is illumined by the Spirit of

the Present , ed. by Josef Patrich (Leuven, 2001), 245-259, esp. pp. 251-255. For the Palestinian background to

the controversy see Daniël Hombergen, The Second Origenist Controversy. A New Perspective on Cyril of

Scythopolis’ Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism (Roma, 2001).

75 C 604, 130-137 (II, 187): {Otan ou\ n ajkouvsh/" tino;" auj tw' n o{ ti para; Pneuvmato" aJgivou h[kousen

a{ per lalei', tou'to plhroforiva ejsti; kai; oj feivlomen pisteu'sai. { Otan de; levgh/ peri; ejkeiv nwn tw' n lovgwn,

oujc euJrivskei" auj to; n levgonta tou'to, ouj ga;r aj po; plhroforiva", ajllÆ ajpo; maqhmavtwn kai; paradovsew"

tw'n pro; aujtou' didaskavlwn ejstiv. Kai; prosevcwn th/ ' gnwvsei auj tw'n kai; th/ ' sofiva/, oujk ej puvqeto tou' Qeou'

peri; touvtwn, eij ajlhqh' ejstin, “Therefore, when you hear that one of them received from the Holy Spirit

whatever he speaks, then this is a clear assurance and we ought to trust him. When, however, this person speaks

on those matters, it does not seem that he refers to the same kind of assurance, but rather to the teachings and



32

God do his doctrines fully meet the truth. Note that in delivering this answer Barsanuphius is

himself relying upon the ‘assurance’ ( plhroforiva) he received from God three days before

the monk submitted his question.76

There is no doubt that here we catch the interference or, better to say, the combination of

ascetic and dogmatic trajectories, both ultimately going back more or less directly to the

phenomenon of the late antique ‘holy man’ and the related system of spiritual guidance. To

support this argument one has merely to recall a work that originated not long before the

correspondence of the two Old Men in that same milieu of Gaza, that is, the Plerophories

collected by John Rufus in the first decade of the sixth century. 77 As programmatically stated

by its title, the work of the bishop of Maiuma pursues his extreme anti-Chalcedonian

polemics by exploiting a factor of the same nature as that invoked by Barsanuphius in his

response concerning Origenism. Indeed, in most of the stories the protagonists have no other

way to escape their lack of certainty in face of the dogmatic issues (which of course has

moral, religious, and political consequences often of the most dramatic kind) than by having

recourse to an ‘assurance’ delivered from heaven – that is, properly a revelation or an oracle

from God himself. Even if John Rufus does not always openly connect the plerophoric

activity to the system of spiritual direction, it is clear that the charismatic way for getting out

tradition of those who preceded him. In this way, while paying attention to their knowledge and wisdom,

nonetheless they did not ask God about these matters, as to whether or not they are true”.

76 C 604, 91-93 (II, 186): Kai; ajkouvsate th; n kata; Qeo; n plhroforivan, th; n pro; triw'n hJmerw'n tou'

grav yai uJma'" th;n ejrwthsin genomev nhn moi, “So listen to the assurance, which I received from God three

days prior to the time that you actually submitted your question to me in writing”.

77 Cf. Lorenzo Perrone , ‘Dissenso dottrinale propaganda visionaria: le Pleroforie di Giovanni di Maiuma’,

Augustinianum, 29 (1989), 451-95; Jan-Eric Steppa, John Rufus and the World-Vision of Anti-Chalcedonian

Culture (Piscataway NJ, 2002).



33

of the dogmatic impasse was rooted in the spiritual experience of ancient monasticism, in

Egypt and in Syria-Palestine.78 Not incidentally, the monk who queried Barsanuphius on

Origenism assented to his reply by quoting some anecdotes from the Sayings of the Fathers,

in which he was able to find eloquent parallels to the indications provided by the Great Old

Man.79

By way of conclusion:

Swimmers in dangerous waters

To retrace the conceptual genealogy of the ‘anxious self’ in Gaza monasticism would

demand a broader approach than the present occasion allows. Yet the novelty of its ascetic

input has been recognized by Aryeh Kofsky, while Guy Stroumsa has evoked the historical

constellation that gave birth to it by focussing on the transition from ‘teacher of wisdom’ to

‘spiritual master’ in Christian Late Antiquity.80 Certainly, the system of spiritual direction as

developed by the two Old Men of Gaza and continued by their disciple Dorotheus proved a

78 The Life of Peter the Iberian, written by the same author, provides further evidence of this, as I have tried

to show in ‘Pierre l’Ibère ou l’exil comme pèlerinage et combat pour la foi’, in Man near a Roman Arch. Studies

presented to Prof. Yoram Tsafrir , ed. by Leah Di Segni, Yizhar Hirshfeld, Josef Patrich, Rina Talgam

(Jerusalem, 2009), pp. 190*-204*.

79 C 605 quotes Apoph. Daniel 7-8. A full story of the term plhroforiva would demand investigation of its

use in the sense of ‘piece of evidence’ (i.e. quotation or document), as already shown in Cyril of Alexandria’s

homily after the deposition of Nestorius. Cf. ACO I, 1, 2, 93.32: bouvlei kai; eJ tevran plhrofori van ej pi;

tauvtai" devxasqai'É Note also Cyril’s recourse to the locution: eij" plhroforivan, ‘for documentation’ or ‘in

order to prove’ (ACO I, 1, 7, 65.5).

80 Kofsky, Renunciation of Will in the Monastic School of Gaza; Guy Gedaliahu Stroumsa, The End of

Sacrifice. Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity (Chicago – London, 2009).



34

powerful response to the new ‘age of anxiety’ that Eastern Christianity largely was in the

aftermath of the council of Chalcedon. The wide audience enjoyed by Barsanuphius and John

– comprising monks, clergymen, and seculars – bear witness to the remarkable spread of their

charismatic role and ascetic ideals. In the midst of religious and political conflicts they

succeeded remarkably in avoiding the dogmatic pressures of their time. They did so either by

pointing to the primacy of ascetic values as the most urgent duty of Christians, both monks

and seculars, or by appealing to a spiritual power as the means to attain ultimate assurance on

the truth of a doctrine. The disconcerting elusiveness of their supposedly Chalcedonian stance

provides ample evidence of their ability to peacefully sail through a period full of challenges

and turmoil.81

Dorotheus concludes his first Instruction with the exemplary story of a monk of Ascalon

who was sent by his geron to the monastery of Seridus. On his way back he unexpectedly

faced a torrent swelling after a fresh storm. The company escorting the monk, among whom

was Dorotheus himself, vainly tried to dissuade him from crossing the stream at the risk of his

own life. But the monk was loath to disobey his geron’s injunction to get back to his

monastery before sunset. After undressing, he jumped into the water and in full view of his

trembling spectators, started to swim until he reached the other shore. Dressed once again, he

bowed his head towards the relieved brethren and then ran on quickly to his further goal82.

Indeed, a moving icon of the ‘anxious self’, no less captivating than Dositheus, the heroic

81 Aryeh Kofsky, ‘What Happened to the Monophysite Monasticism of Gaza?’, in Christian Gaza in Late

Antiquity, pp. 183-194, rightly stresses this problem, though I do not share his view of a ‘crypto-

Monophysitism’.

82 Dorotheus, Didasc. I, 22 (180, 19-23): JHmei'" de; iJstavmeqa ejkplhv ttomenoi kai; trevmonte" mhv pw"

aj poqav nh/: e jkei'no" de; e[meine kolumbw' n kai; euJrivsketai paracrh'ma eij" to; a[llo pevran kai; e j nduvetai ta;

iJmav tia auj tou' kai; bavllei hJmi' n ejkei'qen metav noian kai; lambavnei paravqesin kai; aj pevrcetai trevcwn.



disciple of Dorotheus, with all his deeds of obedience. If, then, the monastic ideals of Gaza

entertained the ‘anxious self’ in an unprecedented way, they also gave him a unique chance to

avoid drowning in dangerous waters.

Lorenzo Perrone

“Alma Mater Studiorum” – Università di Bologna

Dipartimento di Filologia Classica e Italianistica

Via Zamboni 32, I-40126 Bologna

<[email protected]>

Documents

Perrone, The Anxious Self in the Letters of Barsanuphius