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Islamic Party No, Islamization Yes: The end of Political Islam?

Abdul Hakim, Director of Center for Islam and State Studies Indonesia

The failure performance of Islamic political parties over the past three election

cycles, in some degrees, proved the dictum Islam Yes, Islamic Party No! of late

Nurcholish Madjid forty years ago. In recent general election, Islamic parties failed to gain

the support of majority which decreased significantly compare to two previous elections

after the fall of Suharto. Is it a valid conclusion that the decline of Islamic parties was the

victory of secularism and a defeat for political Islam? Why Islamic parties lose in series of

fair and open elections in the largest Muslim country? And how we distinguish Islamic

political participation from Muslim political aspirations?

In this essay, I argue that the poor performance of Islamic parties over the three

election cycles is not the end of political Islam rather than the shift strategy of political Islam

in negotiating the agenda of islamization within Indonesian plural society. Moreover, non-

Islamic parties are accommodating the aspirations of political Islam and developed Islamic

wing to appeal Moslem communities. I also suggest that the failure of Islamic parties is not

the victory of secularism over political Islam whereas the influence of Islam increased

dramatically through the recent cases; the controversy of Jamaah Ahmadiyah, serial attacks

on churches, anti-pornography legislation, and the implementation of Shariah by-laws in

many regions across the country.

In the first part of the essay, I will elaborate the decline of Islamic parties based on

the result of the three general elections which held after the fall of Suharto and the rise of

political Islam aspirations. Secondly, I will discuss further the dominant approach on

political Islam whether Islam compatible with democracy or incompatible with democracy,

which I come into question, is there another alternative approach to look at the development

of political Islam in Indonesia out of the debate of compatibility of Islam with democracy?

Finally, I will sum up the essay that the recent development of political Islam proved that the

role and the influence of Islam remains significant in Indonesian politics although lack of

performance of Islamic parties.

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In this essay, I used the term political Islam which refer to a vision of Islam,

politics and society that find most favor among those Indonesian Muslims who are drawn

primarily to the Shariah perspective. Political Islam sees no distinction between religion and

politics. In this respect the vision of political Islam is achieving a synthesis of religion and

public life that seeks to reconcile todays modernity with past historical glories of Islamic

culture and civilization. Implementation of Shariah was a starting point to islamization of

public sphere which Islamists perceived there was no clear distinction between private and

public life.

The Poor Performance of Islamic Parties

The recent general election showed the big loses and poor performance of Islamic

parties within the largest Muslim country (Buehler, 2009; Amir 2003, Barton, 2006). Buehlerclassified Islamic parties into several categories: progressive Islamic parties, which included

the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera); orthodox Islamic parties, which

included the Crescent Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang); traditional Islamic parties, which

included the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (PPNUI, Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul

Ummah Indonesia), the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), and the

Reform Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang Reformasi); modernist Islamic parties, which

included the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional); and nationalist-religious

parties including the National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa).

The election result of Islamic parties such as PKB and PAN which have strong

association with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively, have fallen significantly.

In the East Java, PKB only gained 12% in 2009. Both PBB and PBR suffered decline

considerably fell below the 2.5% electoral threshold. PKS recognized as the most successful

Islamist Party in the 2004 election increased slightly from 7.3% to 7.8% between 2004 and

2009. Overall, Islamist Parties failed to gain the electoral traction and share of the vote 24%

compare to 2004 election which gained 32% of vote.How then explain the poor performance of Islamic parties since the first fair and

open election in 1999 after the fall of Suharto? The dominant explanation was the

disappearance of political streams (politik aliran) in current Indonesian politics (Effendi,2003;

Azra, 2004; Buehler, 2009). In the light ofpolitik aliran, political orientation can be explained

along sociological line and traditional loyalty which based on the divisions of santri (pious

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Muslims), abangan (nominal Muslims), priyayi(aristocracy). The aliran perspective was

not relevant in the context of current political Islam. The political repression on Islamic

Party in the New Older era contributed to the remarkably demise of politik aliran. On the

contrary, political Islam was characterized by the political interest even political

opportunism.

Secondly, Islamic political parties suffered by internal frictions and lack of cohesion

(Sherlock, 2009). One of the main reasons why Islam and democracy have entered into such

a joyous relationship in Indonesia is the fragmentation of Islamic authority in Indonesias

civil society. The absence of unified Islamic center is partially rooted in the countrys history.

Islamic party such as PKB which led previously by late Abdurrhaman Wahid suffered

internal frictions which affected the consolidation and cohesion of political party. As the

consequence of internal conflict, the result of election decreased significantly into lowerrank. United Development Party (PPP) fell into the lowest rank ever in recent election

because of the weakness of leadership and lack of directions.

Parties in present day Indonesia display personalistic characteristics. Party cadre at

local level are generally not affluent enough to run in elections, given the high cost the newly

democratic political environment imposes on candidates. Consequently, party discipline is

largely absent in Indonesia, despite attempt by national party leaders to control such

centrifugal forces through the centralization of party internal decision-making structures.

Moreover, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which well known by the militancy and loyalty of

cadres also reached the result under 10% while most of the partys leaders targeted roughly

20%.

The third explanation is the current political preference of voters in Indonesian

politics tend to be more rational and pragmatics. According to Fealy, the failure of Islamic

parties in establishing welfare program was one of main factor among others to explain why

so many Muslim voters turned away from Islamic parties (Fealy, 2009). Fealy cited the result

of political survey which conducted by Indonesian Survey Institute over past two years onthe interaction between perception of the Islamic-ness of a party and the capacity of Islamic

parties in establishing welfare and prosperity. Islamic parties such as PKS, PKB, and PPP

were lack of performance to bring welfare which the data showed that only 12.5 per cent for

community welfare. On the contrary, four main non-Islamic parties; Democratic Party

(PD), Indonesian Democratic Political Struggle (PDIP), Golkar and Gerindra perceived 43

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per cent by voters have community welfare much higher than Islamic parties. As the

consequence, Fealy came into conclusion that the discrepancy between religious identity and

poor economic performance which perceived by rational and pragmatic voters was the main

factors in explaining the failure of Islamic parties in the recent election.

In addition, the individualization and commercialization of Indonesia party politics

in combination with the low institutionalization of the party structures has had various

repercussion. Election campaign cluster around figures, not political entitites. As candidate

come and go from one election to another, so do parties. Hence, voters floating between

parties. This has not only crippled what weakly developed social roots Indonesian parties

had anyways, but has also made it increasingly difficult to mobilize voters base on the

programmatic platforms. Party platforms have become highly susceptible to outside

influences due to the fact that many of the candidates have only loose links to the party onwhose ticket they are running for political office. In such an environment it is very hard for

Islamic parties to push through certain ideological doctrines.

The fourth explanation is that the rivalry among Islamic parties unable them to

cooperate effectively (Abuza, 2007). Abuza suggested the Islamist and moderate Muslim

parties most likely remain divided due to personal rivalries and fundamental policy

differences keep from cooperation. PBB and PPP were apparently more committed to the

Islamic agenda such as Jakarta charter and the implementation of Shariah by-laws whether

PKS tried to promote the idea of clean government, caring and anti-corruption. Accordingly,

the failure of Central Axis settled on Abdurrahman Wahid as president in 1999, the political

grouping fell apart by 2000.

The four arguments mentioned above depend on the presupposition that the

characteristics of Indonesian Islam are heterogeneous, plural and has some qualities that

make Islam compatible with democracy. As the consequence, the voters also perceived there

is no single Islamic political parties could claim as the valid representation of Muslims in

Indonesia. In other hand, Islamic parties could not promote and campaign single-issue toextend the political constituency due to the diversity and plural Muslims.

Political Islam within Democratic Government

However, the decline of Islamic parties raised the subsequent question. Is it the end

of political Islam? Is it the victory of secularism over Islamism? How do Islamists negotiate

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Both process of normalization of Islamist parties and stealth Islamization were the

dynamic which interrelated in changing the nature of political Islam in Indonesia. Through

the first process, Islamis parties transformed themselves as ordinary political parties

alongside the nationalist parties such as Golkar and Democratic Party. On the other hand

through the later process, Islamist transform the political struggle within democratization

government which policies and laws changed substantively, in some degrees, contradict the

Indonesian constitution and the initial spirit of founding fathers who stand for the equality

and freedom.

Baswedan showed that the debate on the National Education Bill in the House of

Representatives in 2003 as good example of the strategic alliances between Islamist parties

and non-Islamist parties in accommodating the political Islam aspirations (Baswedan, 2004).

The National Education Bill stated that every public school and private school have to teachthe subject on religion according to the students religion and by a teacher of faith. In this

case, Golkar supported the Islamist parties to pass the Bill whereas PDIP oppose it.

Baswedan introduced the term secular-exlusive and secular-inclusive. The term secular-

exlusive refer to, the view that Islam strictly exludes any Islam-inspired agenda, and the

latters refers to the view that an Islam-inspired agenda is welcome to the extent that it

corresponds with and does not contradict Pancasila (Baswedan, 2003.p.7).

Both term secular-exlusive and secular-inclusive are helpful to understand the

dynamic of political Islam in Indonesia. The term secular-inclusive led Golkar to Islam-

friendly party, which explained the shift of Islamists political strategies within democratic

framework. The focus of Islamists no longer how to change the constitution of Indonesia,

but how to influence state policies accords with their agenda. Moreover, it is misleading to

perceive Golkar as a secular-nationalist party as well as PDIP. Golkar was dominated by

HMI activists since late 1980s when Suharto tried to reach political support from Muslim

communities across the country and supported ICMI, the Muslim Intellectual Organization

under New Order.The following paragraphs will discuss the examples of the influence of political Islam

in era of decentralization particularly the numbers of Shariah by laws which threaten the

democratic rights of citizens, the restriction on Ahmadiah sect and anti-pornography

legislation.

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The process of stealth islamization also reflected in the survey which conducted The

Center for Study of Islam and Society (PPIM). According to the 2002 nationwide survey,

67% of Muslim respondents agree that Islamic government is the best for Indonesia, and

70.8% of them agree that Indonesian state should require Indonesian Muslim perform

Shariah. This survey describe the majority of Indonesian Muslim support Shariah by-laws

even they still dispute how to implement Shariah (Liddle, 2003). The 2001 survey covered

the population of sixteen provinces and the 2002 survey covered the national population

minus Papua and Maluku. The survey of PPIM indicates the growth of Islamic religiosity in

Indonesian society. The surveys show the increasing number of people who pray in five

times a day always or very often from 77 percent in 2001 to 82 percent in 2005. The survey

found similar increases in manifestations of personal piety: reading the Koran, wearing

Jilbab, and fasting during Ramadhan.The decentralization that began after authoritarian regime has been a powerful force

in changing local politics. The explosion of local political aspirations including aspiration in

establishing Shariah by laws. The number of Shariah-based regional regulations increase

dramatically since ten years ago which described the influence of political Islam through the

country. Komnas Perempuan has identified twenty five regional discriminatory policies.

They include directives to wear Jilbab, provision for gender segregation in public school, the

outlawing of women seen in public without husband or male guardian, and allowing for the

arrest of women at the night on the pretext they might be prostitutes (Kim Andren, 2007).

Bush stated that the 78 regional regulations in 52 districts/municipalities can be

divided into several categories, some of which have not relation with the Shariah (Bush,

.2008). On the contrary, I argues that Bush undermine the fact that the 78 regulations in

many regions as the result of the Islamists aspiration which rooted in the Islamic thinking on

Islamic jurisprudences. Some of the regulations curtail the civil liberties and the rights of

citizens.

Secondly, the restriction on Ahmadiyah in many regions within the country,particularly West Java and Lombok. According to the report of International Crisis Groups

update briefing 7 July 2008, there are four factors were responsible on the restriction of

Ahmadiyah sect: (1) the systematic lobbying over the last five years of the bureaucracy,

particularly the religious affairs ministry, for actions against Ahmadiyah; (2) the search

hardline groups, including Hizbut Tahrir, for issues that would gain the public sympathy and

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extend the membership; (3) the unpredictable support came from Yudhoyono

administration to institution such as MUI and Bakorpakem, a body set up by attorney

generals office in the era of Soeharto to monitor the beliefs and sect; and (4) political

maneuvering related to national and local election (ICG, 2008). Abuza stated that

purification of religion was one of the common motive behind the attack and restriction on

Ahmadiyah sect. Islamists believe that purification of religion was primary objectives against

any impurities (Abuza, 2007).

Thirdly, Anti-Pornography Bill has been rejected on the several bases, not least as

infringement on Indonesian citizens civil rights. The Bill appears to be supported by various

prominent political figures and groups, including PKS, NU, and Muhammadiyah, with

implicit approval from President Yudhoyono himself. Debate over the Bill has split the

religious and political communities. Yudhoyono remained silent with regards to his personalopinion on the Bill. At the same time, the Democratic Party, has so far supported the

RUUAPP. The case of Anti-Pornography Bill also proved that Democratic Party appeared

more religious and tries to appeal Muslim people in supporting the Bill.

Fealy suggested that, Itwould be wrong to assume that the declining Islamic party vote signals

the disappearance of faith as a political factor. Rather, the 2009 elections show that Islams impact is more

diffuse and subtle than before and it can no longer regarded as the exclusive preserve of Islamic parties. All of

the major non-Islamic parties combine Islamic appeals in their campaign messages. For example, SBYs

Democrat Party, which describes itself as religious nationalist, had election advertisements celebrating the

anniversary of the Prophet Muhammads birth. The advertisement featured party leaders in Muslim attire

saying that Islamic values were important to PDs anti-corruption campaign..(Fealy, 2009). In this

respect, I argue that both Golkar Party and Democratic Party were not secular party.

Unfortunately, the decline of performance of Islamist parties should be interpreted in

difference way. It is not the proclamation of the end of political Islam due to the change of

Islamists political strategies under democratic government

Conclusion

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The decline of Islamic political parties in three election cycles is not the end of

political Islam rather than the shift strategy of political Islam in negotiating the agenda of

islamization. The dichotomy of Islamic parties and secular parties is not relevant in

explaining the current Indonesian political Islam. Nowadays, non-Islamic parties became

Islam-friendly; welcome to the aspirations of political Islam and developed Islamic wing to

appeal Moslem communities. I also suggest that the failure of Islamic parties is not the

victory of secularism over political Islam whereas the influence of Islam increased

dramatically through the recent cases; the controversy of Jamaah Ahmadiyah, serial attacks

on churches, anti-pornography legislation, and the implementation of Shariah by-laws in

many regions across the country.

The poor performance of Islamic parties could be explained in several ways. Firstly,

the dominant explanation was the disappearance of political streams (politik aliran) in currentIndonesian politics. Secondly, Islamic political parties suffered by internal frictions and lack

of cohesion. Third explanation is the current political preference of voters in Indonesian

politics tend to be more rational and pragmatics. The fourth explanation is that the rivalry

among Islamic parties unable them to cooperate effective. Several arguments about the

decline of of Islamic parties lies on the presupposition that the characteristics of Indonesian

Islam are heterogeneous, plural and has some qualities that make Islam compatible with

democracy. As the consequence, the voters also perceived there is no single Islamic political

parties could claim as the valid representation of Muslims in Indonesia. In other hand,

Islamic parties could not promote and campaign single-issue to extend the political

constituency due to the diversity and plural Muslims.

The process of normalization of Islamist parties and stealth Islamization were the

interrelated dynamic in changing the nature of political Islam in Indonesia. Through the first

process, Islamis parties transformed themselves as ordinary political parties alongside the

nationalist parties such as Golkar and Democratic Party. On the other hand through the later

process, Islamist transform the political struggle within democratic government whichpolicies and laws changed substantively. Recent controversies on Ahmadiyah, religious

blasphemy, Shariah by-laws and Anti-Pornography Bill indicates that political Islam much

more stronger and remained has great influence on the policy-making in the country. This

Argument counter the assumption that the decline of Islamic parties will weaken the political

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Islam aspirations. However, Islamists accept the democracy and change the battle ground of

political Islam into non-electoral struggle.

I sum up that largely, the Islamists movement in Indonesia accepted democracy and

work from within democratic government and prevailing establishment to enact their

political agenda. The benefits of such accomodationists strategy in driving the gradualist, or

creeping Islamization of Indonesian society. The Islamist political agenda and its political

idioms are now familiar in Indonesian politics and current Indonesian political environment

bodes very well for the success of islamization socio-political sphere. Islamist visions and

ideas are not radical proposition in Indonesian anymore and mostly accepted in the circle of

Indonesian elites of non-Islamist political parties.

The contemporary picture of Islam confirms the continued strong social and political

sway of Islam for most Indonesians. Political Islam has strong influence and so pervasive inIndonesian politics today. The development of political Islam must be taken into account as

the threat to Indonesias democratic country which base on the principle of impartiality,

non-discrimination and a house for every child of nations.

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