Performance Audit Fulfilling obligations in relation to

Performance Audit

Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers

Report by the Auditor GeneralJuly 2021

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 7Key issues 9Executive Summary 10

Chapter 1 – Introduction 15 1.1 Introduction 15 1.2 Theinternationalprotectionprocessreliesontheoperationofseveral entitiesandtheexecutionofdifferentprocedures 16 1.3 Theincreaseininfluxofasylumseekers 19 1.4 Theinternationalprotectionprocesscost26millioneurosduring2019 21 1.5 Returntocountryoforiginoffailedasylumseekersremainsa considerablechallenge 23 1.6 AuditFocus 25 1.7 Methodology 25 1.8 ReportStructure 26

Chapter 2 – Policies 28 2.1 Introduction 28 2.2 Nationalbudgets2018–2020focusedonconsiderablebudgetincreases foroperationsandservicesrelatedtointernationalprotectionprocessesarea 28 2.3 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants isnotfullysupportedbycomprehensiveplans 29 2.4 Conclusion 32

Chapter 3 – The Detention Process 33 3.1 Introduction 33 3.2 TheDetentionServiceswerenotawareofthelengthofstayofthe asylum-seekerswithinitspremises 34 3.3 Detentioncostsin2019totalledanestimated€5.5millionor€58perbednight 35 3.4 NationalauthoritiesandNGOsrecognisetheneedforbetterstandards withindetention 37 3.5 Stakeholdersacknowledgethatconditionswithindetentioncentres renderaccommodationproblematic 37 3.6 Lackofaccommodationwithintheopencentresresultedinprolongedstays inthedetentioncentres 41 3.7 AccesstoNGO,familymembers,andlegaladvisorsissporadicand subjectivelydecidedbytheDetentionServices 41 3.8 Ashortageofinterpretersandculturalmediatorshinderscommunication withindetentioncentres 42 3.9 CoordinationbetweentheDetentionServicesandstakeholderswas notoptimised 42

3.10 TheDetentionServicesarenotsystematicallymonitoringorfollowingupon theneedsofasylum-seekerswithintheirpremises 43 3.11 TheDetentionServicesareheavilyunderstaffedandunder-resourced 44 3.12 Conclusion 45

Chapter 4 – Open centres 46 4.1 Introduction 46 4.2 Atend2019,residentsatopencentresadministeredbyAWASincreased by34.6percentover2018,puttingafurtherstrainonconditionswithin thecentres 47 4.3 Atend2019,well-beingandpreparationforasylumseekers’integration withinsocietywerenotappropriatelyprioritised 49 4.4 Furtherco-operationandsynergyarerequiredbetweenAWAS, DetentionServicesandMHSEentities 52 4.5 During2019,AWASincreaseditsstaffby67personnelovertheprevious year,butrequiresfurtherrecruitment,especiallyatmanageriallevel 52 4.6 TheQualityAssuranceUnitisintheprocessofbeingset-upatAWAS 54 4.7 AccommodationcostsatopencentresadministeredbyAWASvariedfrom €14to€52perpersonpernight 54 4.8 Conclusion 57

Chapter 5 – The Office of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom) (now known as the International Protection Agency) 59 5.1 Introduction 59 5.2 EASOwasessentialinassistingRefComespeciallyduetotheheavy, pendingworkload 60 5.3 In2020,theRefCoMbecameanAgencytofacilitaterecruitmentand improveworkingconditions 60 5.4 During2019,RefComreceivedtwiceasmanynewasylumapplicationsasin2018 61 5.5 Attheendof2019,therewere3,574pendingapplicationstobeprocessed byRefCom 62 5.6 Asatend2019,therewereover800applicationspendingfrompreviousyears 63 5.7 DelayinRefCoMdecisionswasdetrimentaltobothapplicantsand governmentexpenditure 64 5.8 AlthoughRefCommanagedtoincreaseitsdecisionsthroughputby11percent,

newapplicationsincreasedby96percentin2019 66 5.9 DublinClosures,Inadmissiblecases,andpre-2018casesconstituted substantialpercentagesrelatedtothe2019decisions 68 5.10 In2019,RefComtookbetweennineandtwelvemonthstoconclude decisionswhichallocatedinternationalprotectionorwereinadmissible 68 5.11 TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerrevisedprocessesandprioritised caseswhichweredeemedroutineandmostinneedofprotection 69 5.12 During2019,eachconcludedcasecostRefComanaverageof€714.21 71 5.13 Conclusion 71

Chapter 6 - Refugee Appeals Board 73 6.1 Introduction 73 6.2 MostBoardmemberslackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperiencein asylummatters 75 6.3 Recruitmentofadministrativeandprofessionalstafftofacilitatethe RAB’soperationswasrequired 76 6.4 RABsessionswerenotcarriedoutaccordingtouniformproceduresandat thesamefrequencyacrossallChambers 76 6.5 SimilartoRefCom,theissuanceofappealsdecisionswereprolongedto thedetrimentofasylumseekersandincreasedcostsforGovernment 78 6.6 During2018and2019,therewasnoclearsystemtoprioritisependingappeals 82 6.7 ProceduresregulatingtheefficacyoftheMHSE’slegalaidservicewerenot clearlyestablishedforallstakeholders 83 6.8 Theaveragecostforeachdecisionamountedto€246.56during2019 84 6.9 Conclusion 85

List of Tables, Charts and Figures

Table1–Asylumcostsduring2019 22Table2–RelocationtootherMemberStatesandUSAbytypeofstatus(2018and2019) 24Table3–Elementsfeaturingwithinthenationalstrategicframework 30Table4–Residentsindetentioncentre(2018and2019) 35Table5–Detentioncosts–SafiBarracks(2019) 36Table6–Deficienciesindetentioncentresidentifiedbystakeholders 38Table7–Typeofresidentsasperopencentres 47Table8–Residentsaccommodatedatopencentresasatend2019 48Table9–BedNightscapacityatopencentresfor2019 49Table10–StaffatAWAS(2018to2020) 53Table11–Opencentrescosts(2019) 55Table12–DailyAllowances 57Table13–NewapplicationsreceivedbyRefComduring2018and2019 61Table14–PendingapplicationsatRefComasatend2018and2019 62Table15–DefinitionsofdecisionsbyRefCom 65Table16–DecisionstakenbyRefComduring2019byyearwhenapplicationwaslodged 67Table17–DurationofRefComdecisions(2019) 70Table18–CostsincurredbyRefComtoprocessapplications(2019) 71Table19–CasesoverviewofworkatRAB(2018and2019) 73Table20–CategoriesofRABdecisions 79Table21–BreakdownofdecisionsatRAB(2018and2019) 80Table22–DecisionsbyRABin2018and2019 81Table23–RABdecisionsof11randomlyselectedcases 81Table24–Numberofpendingappealsasatend2018and2019 83Table25–LegalAidcasesin2018and2019 84Table26–CostsincurredbyRABtoprocessappeals(2019) 85

Chart1–First-timeasylumapplications,relativechangebetweenQ32018andQ32019 21Chart2–Casesfiledbetween2016and2018andawaitingafinaldecisionatend2019 63

Figure1–Flowchartdepictingthestagesandscenariosrelatedtotheinternational protectionprocess(2018–2019) 17Figure2–Applicationsforinternationalprotectionin2019relativetopopulationsize (2019),countrysize(2015)andGDP(2018) 20Figure3–RABprocedures(2019) 74

NationalAuditOffice-Malta \| \\| 7

List of Abbreviations

AIDA AsylumInformationDatabaseAFM ArmedForcesofMaltaAMIF Asylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundAPO AssistantPsychologyOfficersAWAS AgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekersCEO ChiefExecutiveOfficerDIL Daril-LiednaDS DetentionServicesEASO EuropeanAsylumSupportOfficeECHR EuropeanCourtofHumanRightsEU EuropeanUnionEUROSTAT StatisticalOfficeoftheEuropeanUnionGDP GrossDomesticProductGREVIO GroupofExpertsonActionagainstViolenceagainstWomenandDomesticViolenceHFO Hal-FaropencentreHOC HangaropencentreHR HumanResourcesHTV Hal-FarTentVillageIPA InternationalProtectionAgencyIPAT InternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalIRC InitialReceptionCentreIT InformationTechnologyJRS JesuitRefugeeServicesMEC MaltaEmigrantsCommissionMHAS MinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurityMHSE MinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcementMOU MemorandaofUnderstandingMS MemberStatesNAO NationalAuditOfficeNASMS NationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystemNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNSO NationalStatisticsOfficeOPCAT OptionalProtectiontotheUNConventionagainstTorturePPPN PerPersonPerNightPIO PrincipalImmigrationOfficerPL PeaceLabRAB RefugeeAppealsBoard


8 || NationalAuditOffice-Malta

RefCom OfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerSCSA SocialCareStandardsAuthoritySOP StandardOperatingProcedureSPO SeniorPsychologyOfficerTHP TemporaryHumanitarianProtectionTCN thirdcountrynationalsTCNU ThirdCountryNationalsUnitUAM UnaccompaniedMinor(s)UMAS UnaccompaniedMinorAsylumSeekersUN UnitedNationsUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

List of Abbreviations cont..


1,5262018

1,6972018

635

2019

Irregular migration and the international protection process have been among the more sensitive issues which Malta had to contend with.Irregular migration brings about complex humanitarian, social, economic, financial and administrative ramifications.

Key IssuesIncrease in irregular migration

2,045

4,022

47

1,579

1,890

2,008

569

106

24

20

1,445

3,405

2,281

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total number of irregular immigrants arriving by boat

Malta is carrying a disproportionate burden

Malta’s ratio of international protection seekers in proportion to population and surface area has consistently been among the highest. In 2019, costs related to the International protection process amounted to around

€26 million

The international protection process

Applications

2018

New applications received by RefCom (now known as International Protection Agency) during 2018 and 2019:

2019

5042018

DetentionCenter

Number of relocations or resettlement to other Member States and USA during 2018 and 2019:

102018

Residents in detention centre as at end 2018 and 2019:

1,0842019

Pending applications at RefCom as at end 2018 and 2019:

3,574

2019

1,937

2019

Residents accommodated at Open Centres as at end 2018 and 2019:

Accommodation Relocations or Resettlements



Executive Summary

1. TheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)embarkedontheperformanceaudit‘Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers’totracetheefficacyofalltheprocedureswhichanypersonwhosubmitsanapplicationforasyluminMaltagoesthrough.Thisreviewfollowedtheperformanceaudit‘Dealing with Asylum Applications’publishedinJuly2011butwentbeyondinscopeasitexaminedtheinternationalprotectionprocess,specificallytheoperationsandoutputsofthereceptionanddetentionprocess,thesituationwithintheopencentres,theworkcarriedout by the formerOffice of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom1), now the InternationalProtectionAgency,andtheRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB2)nowknownastheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal.Unlessotherwisestated, this reportprimarily focuseson theperiod2018-2019.

2. Theauditobjectivesaimedtoestablishthedegreetowhich:

a. thestrategies,policiesandplansinplacearecomprehensiveandupdatedinrelationtoallaspectsoftheinternationalprotectionprocess;

b. themainprocesses,suchasreception,detention,accommodationatopencentres,aswell asprocesseswithin the remitof the formerCommissioner forRefugees and theRefugeeAppealsBoardwereexecutedwithoutdelay,fairlyandeffectively;and

c. resourcesandmechanisms inplaceenableeffectiveoperationsandmonitoringoftheservicesprovidedbytheentitiesinvolvedintheasylumprocess.

3. This report has emphasised the complex humanitarian, social, economic, financial andadministrative ramifications/repercussions brought about by irregular migration – aphenomenon that Malta has been increasingly facing since 2002. Since then, Malteseauthoritieshaveinvestedheavilytoestablishanoperationalframeworkandsetupvariousentities and units to accommodate and integrate asylum seekers, process internationalprotectionapplications,orreturnunsuccessfulapplicants.

4. The international protection process comprises various interdependent stages. Differentgovernmententitiesare responsible forand influence thestayof theasylumseekersandirregularmigrantsfromtheirarrivalinMaltauntiltheirintegrationortheirdeparturefromMalta.Delaysinonephaseoftheprocessinvariably,andwithimmediateeffect,impactsthe

1 TheOfficeoftheCommissionerforRefugeeshasbeenchangedtotheInternationalProtectionAgencyinthethirdquarterof2020.2TheRefugeeAppealsBoardbecametheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalin2020.


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legal,administrative,andoperationalaspectsoftheothers.Thisinturnleadstohumanitarianandsocio-economiceffectsandplacesfurtherstressonnationalresourcesandtheapplicant.

5. Over the years, subsequent administrations have substantially increased resources toaddresstheirregularmigrationphenomenonbutprogresshasnotbeenwithinreachforalltheentitieseveninviewoftheextremelyhighnumbersofarrivalsofirregularmigrantsonMalteseshoresincertainyears.Moreover,areasofinefficiencieswithinsomeoftheentitiesresponsiblefortheimplementationoftheinternationalprotectionprocessprevail.Entitiesinvolvedinthisprocessarefullyawareofthesesituationsandarecontinuouslyseekingtomitigate these circumstances through process reengineering involving the recent settingupof InternationalProtectionAgency (formerlyRefCom)and the InternationalProtectionAppeals Tribunal (formerly theRAB), upgradedmedical facilities and improvement in theavailabilityofpsycho-socialservices.

6. Whilstacknowledgingthecomplexitiesanduncertaintyinvolved,theauditdeterminedthefollowingmajorinefficiencieswithintheentitiesandtheiroperations:

a. Thestrategicframeworkinrelationtothereception,detentionandaccommodationofinternationalprotection seekersand irregularmigrants isnotdeemedcomprehensiveanddetailedenoughtodetermineresourcesrequired.

b. Thedetentionperiodofasylumseekerswasrenderedmoretaxingasthedetentioncentrewasovercrowdedandpoorlymaintainedaswellassubjecttosignificantstaffshortages,lackofInformationTechnology(IT)systemsandrecord-keepingweaknesses.

c. OpencentresrunbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)wereoperatingat,orcloseto,capacity.Theseweregenerallycharacterisedbyover-crowdingandrequiremoreadministrativeandprofessionalstafftoprovidethedesiredlevelofservicetotheasylumseekers.

d. 2019provedtobeadifficultyearforRefComasithadtodealwithanabnormalnumberofapplicationsdespiteshortageofstafftoprocessapplicationsfrom2019andpreviousyears,resultingin3,574applicationsoutstandingatendof2019.

e. MostoftheRefugeeAppealsBoard’smembers lackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperienceinasylummatters.

7. Due to current restrictions brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, this performanceauditwas largely constrained to rely on secondary information rather than in-depth self-observation of the conditionswithin detention and open centres. As far as possible, theobservations/findingsweremainlyconfirmedbythemanagementoftheentitiesconcerned.



8. Thisperformanceauditcannotbutacknowledgetheextensivepracticaldifficultiesfacedbytheentitiesconcerned.Inmostinstances,theyencountersituationswhereasylumapplicantsdo not have any personal documentationwhich can confirm their identity or nationality.Issuesofpublichealthandsecurityalsoremainatoppriorityfortheseentities.Moreover,matters pertaining to returns are severely hampered through the absence of nationaldiplomaticmissions inThirdCountriesor thenon-cooperationof these states–where incasesthisstretchestothepointthatdespitetheconclusiveevidence,theyarenotwillingtorepatriatethepersons involved.Atthesametime,thisOfficeacknowledgestherecentsignificantbreakthroughs that thenationalauthoritieshavemade in the returnsof thoseirregularmigrantswhoseapplicationforasylumhasbeenrejectedatthefirstandsecondinstances.Thisisconsideredasaverybigstepintherightdirection.

Overallconclusions

9. Irregularmigrationisoneofthemostcomplicatedissuesthatsocieties,theworldover,alwayshavehadtoface.Nonetheless,thisauditclearlyshowsthatMalta,asthesmallestEuropeanUnion(EU)MemberState,iscarryingadisproportionateburdenduetotherelativelyhighnumberofirregularmigrantsarrivingonourshores.Malta’snationalentitieswillcontinuetostruggletocopewithoutthetangibleandmaterialsupportofotherEUMemberStates.Itishightimethatinternationalsolidarity,throughafairandpracticalprocessofburden-sharing,movesfromwordsanddeclarationstoaction.

Recommendations

10. Inviewofthefindingsandconclusionsemanatingfromthisperformanceaudit,theNAOisproposingthefollowingrecommendations:

General Processes

i. TheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)isencouragedtoestablishaworkinggrouporcommitteethatoverseesthewholeasylumprocessmanagedby thedifferententities inorder tomake theasylumprocessesas seamlessandefficientas possible, minimising unnecessary delays. Towards this aim, periodical review andenhancements of business processes employed towards increased outcomes and outputlevelsshouldberesortedtobyMHSE.

ii. Each entity should ensure that its operations are governed by clear Standard OperatingProcedures(SOPs)andwrittenprocedures.

iii. MHSEistoembarkonarobustmonitoringset-upforallservicestoensurethatdelaysarekepttoaminimumandinterventionsorservicesaredeliveredinatimelyandefficientmanner.Monitoringistoconsiderfulltraceabilityofinterventionsorservicesprovided.


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iv. TheNationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystem(NASMS)informationsystemshouldbemorecomprehensiveandfacilitatetrackingofinformationrelatedtotheasylumseekersandirregularmigrants’stayinMalta.AnyunnecessarystepsthroughtheThirdCountryNationalUnit(TCNU)shouldbeavoidedandonusputonentitiestocontrol informationfromtheirend.

Strategic framework

v. MHSEisencouragedtodraftandadheretoarevisedandcomprehensiveexpandednationalstrategythatissupportedbydetailedactionplansthatareupdatedperiodicallyandaccordingto need.

Relocation and Repatriation

vi. RecenteffortswithEUMemberStatesandThirdCountries,whichledtopositiveoutcomes,aretobecontinued.Tothisend,considerationistobegiventofurtherbroadendiscussionstoensure thatMalta’s case,as the smallestEUMemberState, and thedisproportionateeffectofirregularmigrationonitssocio-economicfabric,isbetterunderstoodbystakeholdersandcontributes todeliberationsandaction leading toa fair andpracticalburden-sharingagreement.

Detention process

vii. TheDetentionServices (DS)andtheconcernedentities involved in thedetentionprocessneedtoensurethattheprovisionssetwithinthelegislationandthestrategicframeworkareindeedachievableandareacteduponthroughtherequiredfundingandsupportfromMHSE.

viii. DSshouldnotbereactiveintheirinvolvementduringthestayoftheasylumseekerswithintheir care. Hence, this Office recommends better coordination with the other entitiesinvolvedtoensurethattheyareactivelyawareofthehistoryoftheasylumseekerswithintheircareandfacilitatetheservices,careandcontactwithrelatives,acquaintancesorlegalaidrequired.

ix. DSshouldensure that livingquartersandconditionsprovide the required levelsand thatdeficiencies identified by the Monitoring Board, the Non-Governmental Organisations(NGOs)andbyEuropeanandinternationalstakeholdersare,asfaraspossible,rectified.

x. TheDSistoascertainthatanyprovisionsforlifeafterdetentionaremadeavailablethroughappropriateeducationalactivitiesandcoordinationwithAWASandotherentities.



Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS)

xi. MHSEisencouragedto,asfaraspossible,continuesupportingAWASwithitshumanresources(HR)requirements.

xii. Measuresrelatedtomentalhealthandpsycho-socialneedsaswellasintegrationaretobecoordinatedwithallotherconcernedentities.

International Protection Agency (IPA)

xiii. As far as possible, MHSE is to consider expediting the reengineering process envisagedthroughthechangeoverfromRefComtoIPA,suchasbetterworkingconditionsandmoreattractivesalarypackageswhichcouldattracttherequiredquantityandqualityofhumanresources.

xiv. IPA is to revisit itsprocessesand identifyand rectifyany inefficiencies toensure that theprocessisnotprolongedunnecessarily.

International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT)

xv. TheTribunalistoestablishclearproceduresthatleadtofairandwell-deliberateddecisionswithoutunnecessarydelay.

xvi. Therecruitmentofcompetent,ancillarystaffistobegivenitsdueprominenceandpriority.


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Chapter 1| Introduction

1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 Irregularmigration and the international protection process have been among themoresensitiveandchallengingissueswhichMaltahadtocontendwithsince2002,whenover1,600personsreachedMalta’sshoresthroughunregisteredboats.Intheyearsthatfollowed,theproblemofirregularmigrationpersistedwithregularfrequency.Statisticsshowthatduringtheperiod2018to2019,4,850personsreachedMaltairregularlyby59boatslandings.3 The vastmajorityofthesepersonsappliedforinternationalprotection.

1.1.2 WhileconsiderableworkwascarriedoutsinceMalta’saccessiontotheEuropeanUnion(EU)in2004toreinforcetheinternationalprotectionsystemadministrativelythroughtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom4)andtheRefugeeAppealsBoards(RAB5)aswellasthrough reception,detentionandaccommodation inopen centres, thisOfficenoted thatthefulfilmentofGovernment’svisionandstrategiescouldnotalwaysbesupportedbytheappropriate levelof resourcesdedicated to thisongoingsituation.Thesituation inclosedandopencentreswasnotoptimalastheywereoverwhelmedbydemandwiththeendresultbeingthatthesecentreswerenotfulfillingtheirrolecompletely.Theprocesstodetermineinternational protection status was significantly prolonged mainly due to the resourcesallocatedandthenumberofcasestheRefComandRABhavehadtodealwith.Moreover,thisauditcouldnotunderestimatehowthereturn,resettlementandrelocationprocessesremainheavilydependentonthewillingnessofandcooperationwithEUMemberStatesandThirdCountries.

1.1.3 The resources, human and financial, thatMalta has had to invest in to deal with thesematterswereandstillareconsiderable.Furthermore,onecannotunderscoreenoughtwootherconcernsstemmingfromirregularmigrationandtheinternationalprotectionprocess.Thefirstoneisthat,internationalprotectionseekersarenotjustthethirdcountrynationals(TCNs)whoarrivethroughboatsorarerescuedbytheArmedForcesofMalta(AFM)atsea

3 Source:TheNationalStatisticsOffice(NSO),NewsRelease101/2020,page2,19June2020.4 TheOfficeoftheCommissionerforRefugeeshasbeenchangedtotheInternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)inthethirdquarterof2020.Asthis

reviewwasconcernedwitheventsupto2019,forpracticalreasonsthisreportwillrefertoRefComratherthantothenewlyestablishedAgencytheIPA.

5 TheRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB)becametheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalin2020.Asthisreviewwasconcernedwitheventsupto2019,forpracticalreasonsthisreportwillrefertoRABratherthantothenewlyestablishedAgencytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal(IPAT).



butalsoincludeTCNswhowouldhaveenteredregularlyorirregularlythroughotherwaysthanbysea.Hence,theinternationalprotectionapplicationsthattheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)hadtoprocessgobeyondthosepersonsarrivingirregularlybyboat.Between2018and2019,fromthetotalof6,067whoappliedfor internationalprotectionwithRefCom,only3,231werepersonswhoarrivedirregularlybyboat.ConsideringthesizeofMalta(316squarekilometres)andapopulationofover514,564persons,availabilityandallocationofresourcesarenotonlytheconcerns.Accommodationand logisticalconcernsaswellasintegrationorlastingresolutiontotheinternationalprotectionseekers’statusarealsohighonthenationalagenda,be itatgovernmentandcitizen level.Thisall themoreso sinceMalta’s ratio of international protection seekers in proportion to populationhasconsistently been among thehighest, and very often thehighest, among all EUMemberStates.Furthermore,sufficientevidenceshowedthatanumberofinternationalprotectionseekerscontinuedtoresideinMaltafollowingthenegativeoutcomeoftheirappeal.Thisismainlydueasformanyyearsitwasextremelydifficult,ifnotpracticallyimpossible,toreturnsuchpersonstotheircountryoforiginortransit.

1.1.4 TheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)embarkedonaperformanceaudittotracetheefficacyoftheprocedureaninternationalprotectionseekergoesthrough,fromreceptiontointegrationwithinthecommunityortheirreturn,resettlementorrelocation.Thisauditfollowedanotherperformance audit ‘Dealing with Asylum Applications’ published in July 2011 and wentbeyondinscopeasitexaminedtheinternationalprotectionprocessinitsentiretyratherthanfocusingonlyontheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerandtheRefugeeAppealsBoard.

1.1.5 ThisintroductoryChapterdiscussesthefollowing:

a. thebackgroundandcontextoftheinternationalprotectionprocessesandproceduresinMalta,

b. auditfocusandmethodology,andc. reportstructure.

1.2 The international protection process relies on the operation of several entities and the execution of different procedures

1.2.1 Figure1showstheprocessesandpossibleoutcomesfromeachprocess.Theflowchartreferstotheremitofthedifferententitiesinvolvedintheinternationalprotectionprocess.


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1.2.2 ThemainstageswithintheMalteseinternationalprotectionprocessincludethefollowing:

a. Reception:WheninternationalprotectionseekersarerescuedwithinMaltesewatersbyAFM, theyare taken to the InitialReceptionCentre (IRC)where they receivemedicalattention and undergo health checks. Moreover, the Police perform identificationprocedures.Regularandirregularmigrantswhodonotarrivebyboat,donotusuallystarttheir international protectionprocedurewithin the IRCas theyusuallywould alreadyhaveaplaceofresidencewithinthecommunity.

b. Detention:Allinternationalprotectionseekers,except,vulnerableonessuchasminorsand familieswith children,who enterMalta irregularly are detained at Safi or LysterBarracksuntiltheyaretransferredtoopencentresorwithinthecommunity.Onthelapseofnine months6,anypersondetainedshouldbereleasedfromdetentionifapplicationisstillpending.Ontheotherhand,detentionintermsofthereturnprocedureisofsixmonths,whichmaybeextendedbyafurther12months.7

Over the course of 2019 and 2020, asMalta experienced a surge in the number ofarrivals,acontingency/emergencymeasurehadtobeputinplacewherebysectionsofthedetentioncentrehadtobeusedasIRC.

c. Accommodation within open centres:Opencentreshostinternationalprotectionseekersfor several months depending on availability and their family and personal situation(e.g.iftheyaresingleorhavefamilymembers).Withintheopencentres,internationalprotection seekers receive allowances, food, accommodation aswell as psycho-socialservices.

d. Receiving and processing applications related to international protection: Until thethirdquarter2020,theOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerwasresponsibleforthispartoftheprocess.8

e. Appeals related to international protection status: Until 2020, the Refugee AppealsBoard9 considered appeals that international protection seekers would have enteredclaiming wrongful rejections, a lesser status or due to their transfer to another EUMemberStateagainsttheirwill.

f. Return:This refers to the return to thecountryoforigin,ofTCNswhoare irregularlypresent in Malta, including former applicants for international protection. This ispursuant to subsidiary legislation under the Immigration Act (Cap. 217). Returnmay

6Source:ReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations,SubsidiaryLegislation420.06,paragraph6(7).7Source:StrategyfortheReceptionofAsylumSeekersandIrregularMigrants,pages10and11.8ThisperformanceauditwillmostlyrefertotheRefCominviewofthe2018-2019periodcovered.9TheRABwasreplacedbytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal.


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alsobevoluntaryandmayincludeAssistedVoluntaryReturnprogrammeswherebytheprospective returnee is offered incentives to return voluntarily.Malta has had such aprogrammeinplacesince2007.

g. Relocation: A possible final stage of the process could include the settlement of aninternationalprotectionseekerinanotherMemberState.

h. Resettlement:Alternatively,aninternationalprotectionseekercouldbetransferredtoaThirdCountrysothatheorshemaybeintegratedinthatcountry.

i. Integration:Uponbeinggrantedprotectionstatus,the internationalprotectionseekercanstartbenefittingfrommeasuressuchasaccesstosocialbenefitsandemploymenttohelphim/heradjustandadapttolifeinMalta.

1.3 The increase in influx of asylum seekers

1.3.1 EuropeanUnion(EU)statisticsshowthatMalta’sratioofinternationalprotectionseekersinproportiontopopulationandsurfaceareahasconsistentlybeenamongthehighest.AccordingtotheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)2020Asylumreport,Maltareceivedthemostapplicationsrelativetoitsarea(85timeshigherthantheEU+baseline,whichrepresentsthetotalnumberofapplicationsrelativetoavariable),despitereceivingjust0.5percentofallapplicationslodgedinEUMemberStates.

1.3.2 The EASO report also specifies that “while one country may receive fewer applications than another overall, its capacity to absorb more applicants may not be comparable. This perspective gives a more proportional interpretation of the current situation of international protection seekers and reinforces the essential role of solidarity and sharing responsibility within the context of asylum in Europe’’.

1.3.3 Figure2portraysthreesocio-economicindicators,whichrankthenumberofapplicationsforinternationalprotectionrelativetopopulationsize,theareaofacountryandthenationalGrossDomesticProduct(GDP).Thepopulationandcountryareacanprovideaperspectiveonthecapacitytoabsorbapplications,whiletheGDPcan indicateacountry’scapacitytointegrateinternationalprotectionseekers.

1.3.4 TheMemberStatesshadedinbluereceivedarelativevolumeofapplicationslowerthantheEU+baselineandyetinabsolutenumbers,severalofthesecountriesregisteredmanymoreapplicationsin2019thanin2018.ItisnoteworthythatthefigureclearlyshowsthatMalta’sparticular circumstances, particularly its area, indeedas theEU’s smallestMember State,togetherwithanextremelyhighpopulationdensity,precludesitfromhostingalargenumberofasylumseekers.



Figure 2 - Applications for international protection in 2019 relative to population size (2019), country size (2015) and GDP (2018)

1.3.5 According to the Statistical Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT), whencomparedwiththethirdquarterof2018,Maltarecordedarelativeincreaseof143percentoffirst-timeinternationalprotectionseekersinthesamequarterof2019.In2019,intermsofapplications,thismeantthatmorethan4,000applicationswerereceived.10Relativetoitspopulationsize,Maltareceivedthemostapplicationsforinternationalprotectionrelativetoitsarea.Chart1refers.

Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union

84

Figure 4.22 Applications for international protection in 2019 relative to population size (2019), country size (2015) and GDP (2018)

Notes: Countries are sorted by the number of applications relative to population size (from higher to lower volumes, indicated by the arrow). The shades indicate the number of relative applications received compared to the EU+ baseline. Source: Eurostat.

A large number of cases pending with bodies examining applications at second or higher instances was likely the main explanation for the high number per capita in Austria and Sweden. Both countries received a considerable volume of applications between 2015 and 2016 but much fewer since. The remaining countries with more pending cases than the EU+ average were all subject to rising asylum trends in 2019 and, in turn, had increases in the number of open cases.

Similar considerations can be made for EU+ countries falling below the EU+ baseline. In spite of a low absolute number of pending cases, Iceland (425) seemed to be subject to a relative pressure higher than for France or Italy. Most Eastern European countries had a very low number of pending cases, both in absolute and relative terms, resulting in limited pressure on their national asylum systems.

Source:EASOAsylumReport2020,page84,2020.

10Source:EASOAsylumReport2020,page59,2020.


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Chart 1 - First-time asylum applications, relative change between Q3 2018 and Q3 2019

1.4 The international protection process cost 26 million euros during 2019

1.4.1 Governmentexpenditurerelatingtotheinternationalprotectionprocessamountedto€23,855,961in2019.Furthermore,governmentexpendedafurther€1,907,45811 (highlightedingreyinTable1andasindicatedinFootnotes13,14and15)throughEU funds (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund [AMIF]). The expendituremostlyrelatedtotheinternationalprotectionapplicationprocessasmanagedbyRefComandthesubsequentappealsprocessundertheresponsibilityoftheRAB,accommodationwithin the closed and open centres, and procedures related toreturns,relocationorresettlementasindicatedinTable1. It istobepointedoutthat,overall,Maltawasapproximatelyallocated€20.8million,throughtheAMIFFundwhichwassetupfortheperiod2014-20,ofwhichtillOctober2020,€11.5millionwerepaid.

11Thisvaluepaidbytreasuryduringyear2019isthe100percentoftheEUFunds,meaningthat75percentareEUfundsand25percentarenationalfunds.

Source:EUROSTAT,Asylumquarterlyreport,page6,March2020.



Table 1 - Asylum costs during 2019

Description of cost Cost €The Office of the Refugee Commissioner:CostsincurredbyRefComtoprocessapplications(2019) 1,365,535Improvingandstrengtheningtheasylumdeterminationprocedurethroughthetrainingand

fundsforinterpretersatRefCom166,967

ThesettingupofaunitatRefCom 49,47512 Refugee Appeals Board:CostforprocessingappealsbytheRAB 144,486Detention centres:Accommodationandrelatedcostsindetentioncentre 5,490,68413 Open centres:Accommodationandrelatedcostsinopencentres 12,156,68014 Other Costs:EducationalCosts 857,716PrimaryHealthCare 100,590SocialAssistancepaidbytheDepartmentofSocialSecurity 4,506,421RenovationoftheHangaropencentreandHal-FarFamilyCentre 100,445NewopencentreinHal-Far 66,956ThirdCountryNationalsUnit 92,117ForcedReturn 170,63215 RestartVIProject 118,439VoluntaryRelocationofMigrants 224,995PerDiem(forpeoplelivingintheCommunity) 151,281Total cost incurred during 2019 25,763,419

1.4.2 The biggest costs in 2019 were at over €17.6 million. As expected these related toaccommodationatopencentresanddetentioncentresandsocialbenefitsforinternationalprotection seekers. These amounts related to the 3,405 international protection seekersarriving by boat and their accommodation at the centres.Moreover, 1,355 internationalprotectionseekerswithprotectionstatus,benefitedfrom€4.5millioninsocialbenefits.

12 The€49,475referstothesettingupofaunitthatdealswithrequestsrelatedtoestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathirdcountrynationalorstatelesspersonfundedthroughtheAMIFproject.

13 Thetotalof€5,490,684includesanamountof€228,150fromEUfunds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.

14Thetotalof€12,156,680includesanamountof€1,070,655fromEUfunds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.

15 Thetotalof€170,632includes€106,371throughEUfunds.


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1.5 Return to country of origin of failed asylum seekers remains a considerable challenge

1.5.1 The scopeof thisperformanceauditdidnotextend to the return to countryoforiginoffailedasylumseekers.Itisfeltthatthecomplexitiesinvolvedmeritthatthesubjectmatterisaddressedinanadhocauditinduecourse.Nonetheless,thecriticalimportanceofthereturnchallengesmerits, at the very least, that this report outlines themain issues and recentdevelopments related thereto. Despite enquiries, NAO was not furnished with statisticsrelatingtotherateoffailedasylumapplications(includingtheappealsprocess)duringtheperiodunderreview.

1.5.2 PersonswithapendingremovalordermaybedetainedincustodyasnotedinParagraph1.2.2b, until removal from Malta takes place thus avoiding possible absconding. TheseRegulations apply as long as due diligence on the person in question is being pursued.Personswhoarenotreturnedfollowingtheirdetentionmaybetransferredtoopencentresand eventually theymay also seek alternative accommodation. This is however, withoutprejudicetothepossibilityoftheImmigrationPolicetoreturnthethirdcountrynationalsinquestiontocountryoforigin. Insuchcircumstances,thesepersonsareallowedtoseekemploymentuntilsuchtimeastheirreturnispossiblebutwouldnotentitlethemtowelfarebenefitsexceptforemergencyhealthcare.

1.5.3 UnderMaltesemigrationlaw,areturndecisionisissuedbythePrincipalImmigrationOfficer(PIO).Thereturndecisionisusuallyaccompaniedbyaremovalorder.OnceareturndecisionhasbeenissuedbythePIO,thepersoninquestionhastherighttoappeal,asperMalta’sImmigrationAct.

1.5.4 Nationalentitiesfacevariouschallengestoeffectareturntoafailedasylumseeker’scountryoforiginsuchasrefusalbythereceivingstate’sauthoritiestopositively identifythoseco-nationals,evenwhenaTCNwishestogobackbut lacksrequireddocumentation.MattersarefurtherexacerbatedbythelackofconsularrepresentationinmanyThirdCountriesandthelackofdirectflightstomostoftheThirdCountriesconcerned.Table2illustratesstatisticsrelatedtotherelocationorresettlementofasylumseekers.



Coun

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2019

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Belgium

60

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06

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5Fran

ce12

80

00

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825

60

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6Ge

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00

00

6626

10

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026

1Ire

land

260

00

026

110

00

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Lithua

nia

00

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03

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urg

200

00

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190

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Nethe

rland

s20

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206

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6Norway

70

00

07

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al67

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6751

00

00

51Ro

man

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00

00

03

00

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3Sloven

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00

00

02

00

00

2Sp

ain

830

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083

20

00

02

USA

0

177

12

810

016

00

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423

177

12

504

619

016

00

635

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1.5.5 AsevidencedbyTable2,thevastmajorityofrelocationsduring2018and2019concernedpersonswhoappliedforasylum.Relocationsgenerallynecessitatethevoluntarywillingness,usuallyonanadhocbasis,ofEUMemberStatestobeeffected.Theserelocationstatisticsareclearlyindicativeoftheurgentneedforaneffectiveburden-sharingpolicywithEUMemberStates.ThisOfficeacknowledgestherecenteffortsbynationalentitiestorelocateasylumseekers.DespitetherecentpositiveresultsattainedthroughagreementswiththeEUandThirdCountries,theissueofreturnsofunsuccessfulapplicantsremainamajorchallengenotonlyfromanadministrativeandlogisticalpointofviewbutalsofromahumanitarianaspect.Currently, thesystemfor returns tend tobebiased in favourof the last in,which impliesthattheprocesstoreturnasylumseekerswhoseapplicationwasnotpositivelyconsideredinpreviousyearsbecomesevenmorecomplicated.

1.6 Audit Focus

1.6.1 ThisauditsoughttodeterminetheextenttowhichMaltaisfulfillingitsobligationsrelatedto internationalprotectionseekers to safeguard their rightsduring thedifferent stagesofinternationalprotection.Tothisend,theauditobjectivesaimedtoestablishthedegreetowhich:

a. thestrategies,policiesandplansinplacearecomprehensiveandupdatedinrelationtoallaspectsoftheasylumseekers;

b. themainprocesses,suchasreception,detention,accommodationatopencentres,aswell asprocesseswithin the remitof the formerCommissioner forRefugees and theRefugeeAppealsBoardwereexecutedwithoutdelay,fairlyandeffectively;and

c. resourcesandmechanisms inplaceenableeffectiveoperationsandmonitoringoftheservicesprovidedbytheentitiesinvolvedintheasylumprocess.

1.6.2 The cut-off date for this performance auditwas end 2019 since themost complete dataavailablewhendraftingofthisReportcommencedwasthatof2019.Eventsandmeasurespost2019werenotsubject tothisperformanceaudit.However, for fairness’sake,wherepossiblethisReportprovidesanoutlineofnewinitiativesundertakenbygovernment.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Theattainmentoftheaboveobjectivesentailedanumberofmethodologicalapproaches.Theseincludedthefollowing:

a. Data analysis:Thisreviewanalyseddatamaintainedbythedifferententitiesresponsiblefor the internationalprotectionprocedures.Thisdata included integrated informationconcerninginternationalprotectionseekersmaintainedbytheThirdCountryNationalsUnit(TCNU)withintheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE).



b. Documentation review:Documentationreviewedincludedpolicies,reports,StandardsOperatingProcedures(SOPs),statisticsandstrategiesconcerninginternationalprotectionseekers.

c. Financial analysis: These evaluations enabled the determination of costs relatingto procedures undertaken by different entities concerning international protectionseekers.Thescopeofthisexercisewaslimitedtotheprocessesinvolvedleadingtotheinternationalprotectionseekersbeinggrantedprotectionstatusoralternativelybeingresettledorreturned.

d. Semi-structured interviews: Interviewswereundertakenwith keyofficials involved intheinternationalprotectionprocess.Tothisend,variousmeetingsandinterviewswereconducted with officials from Immigration Police, the Third Country Nationals Unit(TCNU),theOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),theRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB),theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)andtheDetentionServices.Furthermore, the NAO also interviewed other stakeholders namely, and the UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)andMigrationCo-Ordinator.

e. Tracer Study:Atracerstudywasundertakenonasampleof120internationalprotectionseekerswhoappliedwithRefComduring2018and2019.Theaimofthisstudywastotracktheinternationalprotectionprocessanddetermineitsoutputsandoutcomes.

1.8 Report Structure

1.8.1 Following this introductory Chapter, the Report proceeds to discuss the internationalprotection procedures and outcomes through a process-oriented ordering principle. Thefollowingrefers:

a. Chapter 2 – This Chapter discusses the extent towhich policies, strategies and plansconcerningtheasylumprocesscoverinternationalprotectionseekers’andgovernment’srightsandobligations.

b. Chapter 3–ThisChapterfocusesontheInitialReceptionanddetentioncentresandseekstodeterminetheextenttowhichservicesprovidedtointernationalprotectionseekersandthelegalobligationswerefulfilled.

c. Chapter 4–ThisChapterlooksintotheoperationswithintheopencentres,whichfallunderAWAS’responsibility.TheChapterpresentsthecomplexitiesofproceduresinplaceinboththegovernmentaswellasChurch-runopencentres.

d. Chapter 5 –ThisChapterexaminestheeffectivenessofmechanismsemployedbyRefComindeterminingtheprotectionstatusofinternationalprotectionseekers.


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e. Chapter 6 –ThisChapterdiscusseswhether theappealsprocessadministeredby theRefugeeAppealsBoardwastimelyandemployedinaconsistentmanner.

1.8.2 TheoverallconclusionsandrecommendationsemanatingfromthisauditareincludedinthisReport’sExecutiveSummaryonpages10to14.



Chapter 2| Policies

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 ThejourneytheasylumseekersandirregularmigrantsgothroughfromtheirarrivalinMaltauntiltheirprotectionstatushasbeenpositivelydecidedortheirdeparturefromMaltaissetinmotionbydifferentgovernmententitiesinvolvedinthisprocess.TheMalteseinternationalprotectionsystemisquitecomplextonavigateespeciallysinceitallocatesresponsibilitiestoanumberofgovernmententities.Thisnotwithstanding, therearenonoticeableoverlapsin remits and duties between them. The asylum-related operations of these entities aregovernedbythreemainpolicydocuments,namely,theStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants, the National Integrated Border Management Strategy and the Integration = Belonging, Migrant Integration Strategy and Action Plan. The audit findings related mostly to the implementation of the Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants, since thereception,detentionandaccommodationprocessescoveredare outlined therein.

2.1.2 In linewiththeobjectivesandscopeofthisperformanceaudit,thisChapterfirstgivesanoverviewofthenationalbudgetmeasuresforthe2018-2020.TheChapterthendiscussestheextenttowhichthenationalstrategicframeworkcomprisesinitiativesaimedatfulfillingMalta’sobligationstowardsinternationalprotectionseekersandatimprovingconditionsforinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrants.

2.2 National budgets 2018 – 2020 focused on considerable budget increases for operations and services related to international protection processes area

2.2.1 Although, the government budgets of 2018, 2019, 2020 did not refer to new initiativesspecifictomigrationorinternationalprotectionissues,considerablebudgetincreasesweredevotedtotheDetentionServicesandtheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)whorunthedetention,InitialReceptionCentre(IRC)andopencentres.

2.2.2 Variousstakeholdersareinvolvedintheinternationalprotectionandimmigrationprocessandtherequiredrecruitmentandacquisitionofotherresources.Tothiseffect,in2020,significantchangeswereundertakenwithintheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)thereafterbecomingtheInternationalProtectionAgency.Thereareongoingplanstosimilarly,turntheDetentionServices intoanAgency.Despiteenquirieswithbothstakeholders,theNationalAuditOffice(NAO)wasnotmadeprivytothechangesrequiredtosustainthebudgetingandresourcerequirementsofthetwoagencieswhichwillrecruitadditionalstaff.


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2.3 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants is not fully supported by comprehensive plans

2.3.1 The Strategy was published in early 2016, along with amendments to the ImmigrationAct (Cap.217)andtheReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations(SL420.06).ThroughtheStrategy,theMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity(MHAS)aimedtostrikeabalancebetweentheneedforahumaneapproachontheonehandandthesafeguardingofnationalsecurityontheother,whileensuringMalta’scompliancewiththereceptionanddetentionprovisionsoutlined in theEuropeanUnion’s (EU’s) recastReceptionConditionsDirective16

andtheReturnsDirective17.

2.3.2 TheStrategygivesanoverviewofthelegalbackgroundandMalta’sobligations.Thisincludesinformation on the physical premises within the reception, detention facilities and opencentresaswellasinformationrelatingtowheninternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrantsmaybeaccommodatedineachofthesefacilities.TheStrategyoutlinesthegroundsuponwhich services are to be provided on the premises. This Strategy also portrays therelevant procedural landscapewhich constitute the initial stages international protectionseekersandirregularmigrantsencounter,namely,reception,detentionandaccommodationwithin the open centres. Information relative to other stages such as the application forinternationalprotectionstatusandbeyondarenotwithinthescopeofthisStrategy.

2.3.3 OneofthemainaimsoftheStrategywastotakeintoaccounttheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR) rulings againstMalta.Within this context, subsequent legislativemeasureswereintroducedtoaddresstheserulingsagainstautomaticdetentionandinfavourofrightsofdetaineessuchastheintroductionoftheconceptofalternativestodetention,therighttoknow one’s reason fordetentionandpossibility tochallengesuchreasons.Chapter3,whichfocusesondetentiondiscusses indetailthedifficultiesthatnationalauthoritiesareencounteringtofullyembracetheseprovisions.

2.3.4 TheStrategydoesnotprovidepossiblesolutionstorecurrentissuesprevalentinreceptionanddetentioncentresaswellaslivingconditionswithinopencentres.TheStrategyisratheranexplanatorydocumentoflegislativemeasures.Furthermore,theStrategydoesnotcaterfordifferentscenariossuchasheavyarrivalsthroughboatsorthroughothermeans;althoughthis hasbeenpartlymitigatedby the contingencyplandraftedby theMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)in2021.

2.3.5 This performance audit adopted a number of criteria to assess how deeply the nationalstrategic framework covers the obligations that Malta has to adhere to in terms ofinternationalprotectionseekers’rights.Therelevanceofthisassessmentisthatastrategy

16Directive2013/33/EUoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013LayingDownStandardsfortheReceptionofApplicantsforInternationalProtection.

17 Directive2008/115/ECof16December2008onCommonStandardsandProceduresinMemberStatesforReturningIllegallyStayingThird-CountryNationals.



iskey tomarshalling resources in themostefficientandeffectivemanner toattainpolicyobjectives. Thediscussionwithin this Sectiondoesnot focus in anywayon the technicalcontentofthenationalstrategicframeworkbutseekstodeterminetheextenttowhichthecompilationofthestrategyfeatureelementswhichadheretogenerally-acceptedpractices.Table3refers.

Table 3 - Elements featuring within the national strategic framework

Criteria Yes NoStrategycompiledbyexpertsandspecialists YesOutlinesvision,missionandrelativeobjectives YesDevelopmentofasupportingbusinessplan NoAssignsresponsibilities YesIncludesmilestonesandtimeframes NoReferstooutcomesandmeasurableoutputs NoRelatesimpacttoKeyPerformanceIndicators NoDeterminesthedemandandsupplyforservicesovertime NoEconomicfeasibilityofspecificinitiatives NoIncorporatessidestrategiesrelatingtotheimplementationofspecificmeasures No

2.3.6 The strategy does not comprehensively refer to aspects relating to implementation

responsibility,demandandsupplyforservicesaswellasoutcomesandimpactsofstrategicinitiatives. Moreover, this document does not make additional policy recommendationsfortheadoptionordevelopmentofstrategiesrelatedtootheraspectsoftheinternationalprotectionprocess.

Thestrategicplandoesnotdelveindetail intothesupplyanddemandfortheservicesunderreview

2.3.7 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrantsdoesnotdiscusscomprehensively the anticipated demand in relation to adequate service provisions forinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrants.Understandablystatisticalprojectionsorextrapolationsasaclearbasisforplanningofferanumberoflimitationsasarrivalsdependonmany changing variables.Nonetheless, the Strategydoesnot refer to actions and thedemandforvariousservicesrequired,dependingonthenumberofarrivalsinagivenperiod.Anothercomplexityinthisregardisthatanysuchreferenceswouldneedtoconsidertherateatwhichasylumseekersarereturningtocountryoforigin.AsoutlinedinParagraph2.3.4,therecentlydraftedcontingencyplanwouldalleviatesomeoftheseissuesasthisdocumentseekstoguidenationalentitiestoaddressfluctuationsinarrivalsandtheensuinglogisticalissues.


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2.3.8 In turn, such an information gap within the strategic framework prohibits the nationalcompetentauthoritiesfromestimatingtheresourcesrequiredtoaddressthelevelofsupply.Inpractice,thisisleadingtodisequilibriumbetweendemandandsupplyinserviceswithinIRC,detentionandopencentresaswellasprocessingoftheprotectionstatusandpossibleappeal.

Theimplementationofthestrategyonreceptionisnotbasedonconcretetimeframesandmilestones

2.3.9 Timeframesandmilestonesareakeyfeatureinastrategysincetheyprovideimplementationguidelines. Such a broad implementation timeline does not appropriately guide nationalauthoritiestoplaneffectivelytherein,nortomeasurehowappropriatelytheyareinterveningandhowtheycanimprovetheiroperationsinatargetedmanner.Nonetheless,thesettingof timeframes and milestones still needs to consider an environment governed by theunpredictabilityofarrivalofanumberofasylumseekers.

TheReceptionStrategydoesnotbaseitsinitiativesonprojectedoutputsandoutcomes

2.3.10 Thestrategicplanonreceptiondoesnotlinkthepolicyrecommendationsoutlinedthereintooutputsandoutcomes.Intheabsenceoftimelinesandsupplyestimates,thestrategywouldbeconsequentlyunabletophaseoutputsoverpredeterminedperiods.Suchasituationleadstonationalauthoritiesbeingreactiveratherthanpro-activeintheiroperations.

2.3.11 Similarly, the Strategy omits references to quantifiable outcomes.While the plan’s mainobjectiveisforinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrantstobeaccommodatedinanappropriatemanner,suchoutcomesarenotsupportedbykeyperformanceindicators.

2.3.12 Recent Developments–ThisOfficeacknowledgesthat inpartthe issuesdiscussed inthissectionhavebeenaddressedbytheMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)throughtherecentcompilationofanationalcontingencyplan.Theplandiscussesanumberofscenariosbasedonthenumberofpersonsinvolved.

2.3.13 Another strategy that impacts asylum seekers peripherally is The National Integrated Border Management Strategy. This strategy is aimedat covering issues related tobordercontrolratherthantheinternationalprotectionprocess.Itoutlinesthemainstakeholders’dutiesinvolvedinbordercontrolsandthelegislativeobligations.Thisstrategywasdeemedperipheraltotheaudit’sscope.



2.3.14 The Integration = Belonging, Migrant Integration Strategy and Action Plan is a strategicframeworkfocusingon legislative instruments,on-goingandplannedmeasuresaswellasinitiativesthataresupportiveorconducivetointegration.Thisstrategyplanissplitintotwoparts,withthefirstpartprovidinggeneralinformation.Therestoftheframeworkisanactualactionplanspecifyingwhatthemeasureis,thetimelinesduringwhichthemeasurewillbecarriedout, andwhichentitiesareexpected toownand implement themeasures.AkeyelementoftheStrategyandtheActionPlanisthatithascleartimelinesanddesignatesclearresponsibilitiesontheimplementationofmeasuresandinitiatives.

2.3.15 However,theactionplandoesnotprovidedetailsofthemeasuresorportrayinformationabouttheexpectedreach,outputandtheoutcomesofsuchmeasuresbutreferstoperiodicreportsonprogressmadeonthemeasures.

2.4 Conclusion

2.4.1 Whilstacknowledgingthecomplexitiesanduncertaintyinvolved,overwhichtheauthoritieshavenocontrol,thestrategicframeworkinrelationtotheinternationalprotectionseekersand irregular migrants falling within the scope of this audit is not deemed sufficientlycomprehensive.Statementsandpolicyrecommendationsthereinarenotsupportedbyin-depthdetails about the approach tobe adoptedaswell asdetailedpresentationsof themeasurestobeimplemented.Thisstateofaffairsconstrainsthedeterminationofresourcesrequired.Theforegoingraisestherisksthatpolicyrecommendationswillremainonpaperbutsomewhatlackingattheimplementationstage.

2.4.2 Theopportunityexistsforafutureandcomprehensiveexpandednationalstrategythatdelvesintoissuesaffectinginternationalprotectionseekerswhichsofarhavenotbeendiscussedthoroughlywithinthestrategies.Moreover,itiscriticalthatthenationalstrategiesare,asfaraspossible,supportedbyacomprehensiveroadmapwhichwouldenableittobetterattainitsobjectives.

2.4.3 The forthcoming Chapter discusses the extent to which the provisions of the ReceptionStrategywereembracedbythenationalentityinvolved.Tothisend,thenextChapterwilldelvedeeperintothepracticalaspectoftheimplementationofthisStrategy.


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Chapter 3 | The Detention Process

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Followinganegativeoutcomeofanassessmentbyeither thenationalhealthauthoritiesor immigrationpolice, upon their arrival inMalta, third countrynationals (TCNs) arrivingirregularlyaresubjecttoamaximumofninemonthsindetentionprovidedthattheywouldhavesubmittedanapplicationforinternationalprotection.ThelengthofstayindetentionalsovariesbetweenTCNs.Someofthereleasesareprolongedbecauseofdelayfrommedicalclearance fromhealthauthorities in termsof reception regulationswhich refer tohealthlegislation.Thisinvolvesmigrantswithinfectiousdiseasessuchastuberculosis.Ontheotherhand,asylumseekerswhoaredeemedvulnerableorareconfirmedasminorsfollowinganageassessmentarealsoreleasedtoanopenfacility.

3.1.2 Detention is regulatedbyReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations,SubsidiaryLegislation420.06andthenationalStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants. Also,accordingtotheprovisionsofSubsidiaryLegislation217.12,thefollowingcircumstancesrelatingtodetentionprevail:

a. (12)Detentionshallbemaintaineduntiltheconditionslaiddowninsub-regulation(6) are fulfilledand it isnecessary for removal tobecarriedout:Provided,however, theperiodofdetentionmaynotexceedsixmonths.

b. (13)Theperiodofsixmonthsreferredtointheprecedingprovisomaybeextendablebyafurthertwelvemonthswhere:

i. thereislackofcooperationbythethird-countrynational;orii. therearedelays inobtaining thenecessarydocuments formthe thirdcountry in

question.

c. (14) Whereitappearsthatareasonableprospectofremovalnolongerexistsforlegalorotherconsiderationsortheconditionslaiddowninsub-regulation (6) nolongerexist,detentionceasestobejustifiedandthepersonconcernedshallbereleasedimmediately.

3.1.3 Duringdetention,national authoritiesareobliged toprovide for irregularmigrants’basicneeds,includingfoodthatisculturally-appropriateaswellasclothing.Moreover,nationalauthoritiesaretorespectethnicandculturaldiversityandprovideeducational,recreationalandpastimeactivities.



3.1.4 Thisperformanceaudithasrevealedthatthesituationin2019wasfarfromidealwithinthedetentioncentres.Overall,effortsandinvestmentinmakingthedetentionprocesssmoothandwell-organisedwerenotdeemedsufficient.Thelackofstaff,inadequatebuildings,poorrecord-keepingandInformationTechnology(IT)systemshavehighlightedtheobviouslackofanaudittrailfromtheDetentionServicesaswellasappropriatemonitoringofthedetainees’staywithinthecentres.Theseshortcomingspotentiallymadethewholestaymorechallengingthannecessaryespeciallysinceneedsofasylum-seekerswithintheirpremisescouldnotbeimmediatelyaddressed.

3.1.5 Againstthisbackground,thisChapterdiscusses:

a. thelengthofstayofthedetentionperiod;b. thecostsofdetention;c. standardswithindetentioncentres;d. theconditionswithinthedetentioncentres;e. lackofaccommodationindetentioncentres;f. accessbyasylumseekerstoNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs),familymembers

andlegaladvisors;g. shortageofinterpretersandculturalmediators;h. coordinationbetweendetentioncentresandstakeholders;i. monitoring and follow-up on needs of asylum seekers, within the detention centres

premises;andj. staffingatdetentioncentres.

3.2 The Detention Services were not aware of the length of stay of the asylum-seekers within its premises

3.2.1 TheReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations(SubsidiaryLegislation420.06)stipulatesclearlythesixreasonswhichcouldbeusedtodetainasylumseekers,namely,

a. inordertodetermineorverifyhis/heridentityornationality;b. inordertodetermineelementsonwhichtheapplication isbasedwhichcouldnotbe

obtainedintheabsenceofdetention;c. in order to decide on the applicant’s right to enterMaltese territory in terms of the

immigrationact;d. when the applicant is subject to return procedure and is delaying or frustrating the

enforcementofthereturndecision;e. forreasonsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder;andf. whenanasylumseekeristobereturnedtoanotherMemberStatetodeterminehis/her

asylumapplicationasthereisariskofabsconding.

3.2.2 TheaboveimplythattheissueofdetentionordersarewithintheremitoftheImmigrationPolice.Tothisend,theStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants


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alsoprovidesanAnnexwithguidelines forpoliceofficers,detailinghowthesesix clausesshouldbe interpreted.The strategyalso states thatasylumseekers shall notbedetainedformorethanninemonthsunlesstheirapplicationwouldhavebeenrejectedandwouldbeundergoingareturnsproceduremakingtheseformerasylum-seekersliabletosixmonthsindetention,withapossible12-monthextension.

3.2.3 TheMinistry for Home Affairs, National Security and Law Enforcement (MHSE) contendsthat, theDetention Services (DS) does not decidewho is detainedor for how long. ThatdecisionistakenbythePoliceintermsoftheReceptionConditionsRegulationsortheReturnRegulations.TheDetentionServiceshasnoinfluenceandconsequentlyalackofvisibilityastowhendetaineesaretobereleased.Withinthiscontext,theDSarewhollydependentoninformationanddocumentationfromtheImmigrationPolicetopromptfurtheractionwhichwould result in theasylumseekersbeing released fromdetention.Thepotentialproblembroughtaboutbythelackof informationonthedurationofdetentionattheDS’disposalarises when asylum seekers remain within detention despite their being cleared by theHealthauthoritiesandtheImmigrationPolice.Intheeventthatsuchsituationsmaterialise,thisbreachof legislationwouldnotonlybeprolongingaccess to the freemovementandpossible integrationoftheasylumseekersbutmightresult inredressbeingsoughtbytheasylumseekers through legal action.To thiseffect, anumberof caseshavealready ruledagainstsuchshortcomings.

3.3 Detention costs in 2019 totalled an estimated €5.5 million or €58 per bed night

3.3.1 In2019,theperiodwithwhichtheauditwasconcerned,onlySafiBlockBwasinuseduetotherelatively lowernumberofarrivalsduringthatyear.18Table4showsthenumberofresidentsinthemaindetentioncentrein2018and2019.

Table 4 – Residents in detention centre19 (2018 and 2019)

Description 2018 2019Newresidentsduringtheyear 152 2,362Residentswholeftduringtheyear 147 1,278Residentsasatendofyear 10 1,084

3.3.2 ThefigurespresentedinTable4weresourcedfromtheDetentionServiceswithintheMinistry

forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement.ThisapproachwasdeemedtobethemostreliabledespitesomeminorvariancesnotedbythisOffice.

18 In2020,detaineeswerealsoaccommodatedwithinChinaHouseinHalFar,theHouseCompoundwithinBBlockaswellasthenewCBlockatHalSafi,LysterBarracks(alsoknownasHermes)untilDecember2020.DuetoCOVID-19protocols,allnewarrivalsarecurrentlyhousedatHIRCforquarantine.ThentheyaretransferredtoSafi.

19Duringtheyears2018and2019onlytheSafiBarrackswashostingresidentsinthedetentioncentre.



3.3.3 On the other hand, 2019 statistics derived from the report of theMonitoring Board forDetainedPersonsquotethat242personsspenttimeattheSafidetentioncentre. Inviewofthesevariances,forthepurposeofthisreport,theNationalAuditOffice(NAO)baseditscalculationsuponthefiguresprovidedbytheDetentionServices.

3.3.4 Intotal,during2019,nationalauthorities incurredanexpenditureofaround€5.5million.Thistranslatesto€58perpersonperbednight.Table5refers.

Table 5 - Detention costs – Safi Barracks (2019)

Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost

€ €SalariesandNationalContributions 3,993,942 72.7OperationalandManagement(ContrServ-Others) 1,077,421 19.7OperationalandManagement(Others) 305,072 5.6OperationalandManagement(ProfServ-MedicalServices) 108,926 1.9OperationalandManagement(WasteDisposal&CleaningService) 5,323 0.1Total costs 5,490,68420 100.0Total asylum seekers days 93,490Cost per asylum seeker per day €58.73

3.3.5 Table5 indicates that thesalariesandnationalcontributionsamounted to73percentofthetotaldetentioncosts.Thesecostsmostlyrelateto137securityofficersaswellastwoadministrativestaffemployedbytheDetentionServices.

3.3.6 TheDetentionServicesdidnotmakeavailableinternalpoliciesstipulatingsecuritystaffingrequirementsineachoftheblocksusedfordetention.Nonetheless,theDSlamentedthatithadencounteredsecurityofficershortagesandsubmitteda request to theMinistry forHome Affairs, National Security and Law Enforcement (MHSE) to strengthen its securitystaff complement. Consequently, staff costs increased further during 2020-2021 sinceDSembarkedonaheavyrecruitmentprogrammewhichseekstoincreasestaffmembersbyafurther220officers.TheMinistrycontendsthat90officershavebeenrecruitedandtrained.

3.3.7 For safety reasons and structural limitations, DS contends that the practice to date hasbeen that securityofficers andmaintenance staff intervene indetentionareasminimally.Consequently, security and maintenance within the detention centres is limited andrestrictedonlytocertainareas.Tothisend,therecruitmentofsecurityofficersremainsanurgentnecessityinthelightofthenumberofpersonscurrentlyindetention.Thiswillenablesecurityandmaintenancetobeeffectedthroughoutallareasofthedetentioncentres.

20Thetotalof€5,490,684includesanamountof€228,150asEuropeanUnion(EU)funds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.


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3.4 National authorities and NGOs recognise the need for better standards within detention

3.4.1 TheservicesprovidedbytheDetentionServicesareaccommodationandprovisionofbasicneedssuchasclothing,bedding,rationitemsandmedicalattentionmainlyforsinglemales,whoareasylumseekersandthirdcountrynationalsand/orwhowouldhaveoverstayedtheirvisa.TheexpenditureinrelationtotheseservicesareallcateredforbycentralMHSEfundsastheDetentionServiceshasnodirectbudget.

3.4.2 Ontheotherhand,theDetentionServicescontendthatitisnotwithintheirremit:

a. toinformtheasylumapplicantsoftheirrights–DSclaimthattheyfacilitateassistancebylegalprofessionalsandNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs)suchastheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR);

b. toguaranteeaccommodationtoTCNsundertheprotectionofDSaccordingtothesocio-politicalneeds;and

c. tobe informedwhendetaineesaretoberelocatedtoanotherMemberState(MS)orreleasedfromdetentiontofacilitateDS’splanningprocess.

3.4.3 DuetotheCovid-19pandemic,thisOfficecouldnotconducton-sitevisitsatdetentioncentrestogatherfirst-handevidencethroughtheobservationofconditionstherein.ThislimitationwasmitigatedthroughthereviewofreportsdraftedbytheNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs)andotherinterestedparties,suchasthegovernmentappointedMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.Moreover, informationcollatedwas toagreatdegreecorroboratedwith interviewsheldwithDSmanagement, entitieswithin theMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)andtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR).

3.4.4 TheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)maintainedbytheEuropeanCouncilonRefugeesandExilesreportedontheconditionsofreceptionanddetentionfacilities.Inthe2018and2019reports,AIDAreportedthatconditionsindetentionwerebelowtheexpectedstandard,whichrenderedtheasylumseekers’staymorechallenging.

3.5 Stakeholders acknowledge that conditions within detention centres render accommodation problematic

3.5.1 Government is obliged to safeguard detainees’ welfare while in detention. DetentionguidelinesissuedbyUNHCRin2012stipulatethat,asaminimum,detentioncentresshouldprovide appropriate living conditions, which take into consideration cultural diversity,detainees’ dignity and human rights as well as access to family and community. These



principlesarereplicatedinthenationaldocument:TheStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants.Thisdocumentspecifiesthatdetentioncentres“aresecurefacultieswhichareadministeredbytheDetentionServiceswhich:

a. respectthepersonalsafetyandconfidentialityofalldetainedpersons;b. provide for the basic needs, including food that is culturally appropriate, as well as

clothing;c. respectethnicandculturaldiversity;andd. provideeducational,recreationalandpastimeactivities”.

3.5.2 Moreover,asasignatory to theOptionalProtocol to theUnitedNations (UN)ConventionagainstTorture,theMalteseauthoritieshavealsoappointedaMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.Stakeholderswhohavehadfirst-handaccesstothedetentionprocesshaveraisedvarious issuesofconcernregardingthephysicalconditionsaswellas thebasic rightsandrequirements of detainees. These stakeholders include the afore-mentioned MonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons,UNHCRandotherNGOs.Table6refers.

Table 6 – Deficiencies in detention centres identified by stakeholders

Deficiencies Monitoring Board

(2018)

Monitoring Board

(2019)

Other NGOs

(2019 – 2020)Accesstofamilyandcommunity * * *Accesstointerpreters,psycho-socialstaff * * *Accesstolegaladvice *Accommodationappropriateness * * *Dignity *Issuesconcerningfood * *Lackofstaff * *Lengthofstay * * *Lackofwarmclothesandadequatebedding * * *

Clothes,privacyandadequatelivingconditionsarenotguaranteedatthedetentioncentres

3.5.3 The DS management confirmed reports by NGOs that there is over-crowding and livingquartersarecrammedwith the result thatneitherprivacynorstoragespace forpersonalpossessionsarepossible.Whilstdetaineesareprovidedwithabedeach,thereislittleroombetweenbedsorplaceswheretheymaystoretheirpersonalpossessions.

3.5.4 The premises require upgrading for comfort and security reasons especially when it ishousingmorenumbersthan itwasplannedto.Stakeholders’reportsalsonotethatthereispoorheatingandventilation,exposingdetainees toweatherconditionswithoutproperprotection. Limited and run-down sanitation and hygiene facilities also allow no privacyorproperpersonalcareofthedetainees.Mostimportantly,itisalsodifficultforproperorfrequentcleaningandmaintenanceservicestobecarriedout.The2019AIDAreportclaimsthatdetaineesareprovidedwithcleaningmaterialsandareexpected to takecareof the


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cleaningofthecentre.DSmanagementconfirmedthatthepremisesdonotlendthemselvestopropercleaningandmonitoringinviewofthewaytheyarestructuredandthenumberofdetaineeswithinthem.

3.5.5 The2019AIDAreport,basedonissueswitnessedbyNGOs,alsoclaimedthatmostoftheclothingwasdonatedonacharitablebasistotheDetentionServicesmanagementandthendistributedaccordingly.TheDetentionServicescontendedthatdonationsofclothingonlyamounted to a small portion of the total amount needed to supply the residents in thedetentioncentres sinceclothesandsuppliesaregiven tomigrantsasneeded.Before thestartofthecoldandhotmonths,residentsarealsosuppliedwithnewsetsoftherelevantattiretogetherwithshoes.Expenditurefrompublicfundsonclothingamountedto€20,924and€66,689onbedding.

3.5.6 The Detention Service are not directly responsible for providing the mental health andpsychologicalsupport for thedetainedasylum-seekerswithintheirpremisesassocialandpsycho-social servicesareprovidedby theAWASstaffpool. Such issuesarenot routinelyscreenedforbutonlyaddressed if theDetentionServicesstafforthedoctorsalertAWASandtherelevantauthoritiesorifAWAScaseworkersareawareofcertainissuesfromtheInitialReceptionCentre(IRC)stage.During2019,AWAS’AssistantPsychologistsvisitedSafionaverageonceaweektoconductassessmentsthere.ThisOfficedeemsthatsuchanumberofassessmentsneedstobeincreasedwhenoneconsidersthehardshipstheasylumseekerswould have been put through before arrival toMalta and also whilst in detention. Thissituationhasbeenpartlyresolvedasdiscussedinparagraph3.5.8.

3.5.7 TheAIDA2019reportclaimsthatthevastmajorityofapplicantsweredetainedinapplicationofHealthRegulationsandunderwentmedicalexaminationwhichonlyconsistedofX-rayschecks for tuberculosis. There was no systematic screening for other medical or mentalhealth issues.Migrantsandasylumseekers requiringmorespecialisedcarewerereferredto thegeneralhospital. In casesofemergencies, thedetaineeswereusually taken to thenearesthealthcentre.Communicationwiththehealthprofessionalswasnotalwayspossible,inviewoflanguageissuesespeciallysincetheservicesofatranslatororculturalmediatorwere not available. These pointswere all confirmed by the DSmanagementwho statedthat the situationwasongoing throughout2020.They recognised theneed for improvedandincreasedavailabilityofhealthservicesandwereworkingonincreasingavailabilityofmedicalprofessionalsthroughoutthedetentioncentresatthetimeoftheaudit.

3.5.8 Recent Developments:In2020,theDSengaged:

a. ACoordinatorforWelfareandMedicalServicestaskedwithfacilitatingandcoordinatingassessmentsandinterventionswhenneeded.Furthermore,in2020,AWASincreaseditsserviceswithinthedetentioncentres.

b. Anotherseniorgeneralpractitionerwas loaned fromthePrimaryHealthDepartment.Together with the Coordinator for Welfare and Medical Services, during 2020, the



foundationsforanewmigranthealthservicewereputinplace,anewclinicwasbuiltandfurnishedtomakethenewmigranthealthservicefullyoperationalasanin-househealthcentre.Thisisintendedtoimprovetheefficiencyandimprovetheservicewhichisoffered to residents including through specialised clinics suchas tuberculosis clinic,ophthalmic,genitourinaryandgermatologywhichwillbecarriedout in thedetentioncentres by visiting specialists. The recruitment of a charge nurse, responsible for thismigranthealthservicetogetherwiththemedicalteamhasalsobeeninitiated.

Limited educational, recreational and past time activities are delaying integrationopportunities

3.5.9 TheDetentionServicesalsoconfirmedAIDAcontentionsthattheeducational,recreationaland pastime activities were not allocated their due importance. DS contended that thiswasmainlydue to two reasons. Firstly, theexpectedbrevityof the stayof thedetaineeswas deemed notworth thewhile to organise such events. Secondly, the uncooperativeor disinterested attitude shown by certain detainees made investment in such activitiesunfeasible.Nonetheless,DSclaimedthatitstrivestomakeavailablebookstomigrantsinitsfacilitiesthroughdonationsandeducationalmaterialsfromtheMaltaLibraries.

3.5.10 DSnotedthatwhateverwasprovidedtothedetaineesintermsofrecreationalmaterialoractivitiesseemstohavebeenbasedonthemanagement’sowndiscretion.Themanagementinsistedthatwhateverrecreationalobjects,suchastelevisions,wereprovidedwereeitherdestroyedormisusedandthatevenbasicobjectslikebedsandshoeswereeitherdismantled,unusedorusedasweaponsincertaincases.DShasdocumentedevidencerelatingtosomeoftheseincidents.

3.5.11 Thenational strategy stipulates that detainees shall have “access to open air for at least once every day and for not less than one hour”.DSandotherstakeholderscontendthatsuchaccesswasunavailabletoallinaconsistentmannerforspaceandsecurityreasons.

3.5.12 Recent Developments:DS contends thatbyend2020,all detaineeswithin thedetentioncentreswereallowedaminimumofone-hourrecreationaltime.Inthisregard,around70percentofresidentswithindetentioncentreswereallowedaccesstoopenspacesfromdawntilldusk.TheDSalsopermitsreligiousactivitieswhicharecarriedoutbyspiritualdirectorsofvariousreligiousdenominations.

3.5.13 Additionally,DSconfirmedstakeholders’concernsthatGovernmententitiesarenotprovidingeducationalmaterialoractivitiesofanykindinaccordancewiththeprovisionofthenationalstrategyondetention.TheprovisionoftheseservicesaretotallydependentonNGOsandotheroutsidevisitors,whenpermittedbytheDS.Thisentityalsoconfirmedthatinternetandcomputeraccessarenotavailabletodetainees.ThissituationprevailsdespitetheStrategyspecifyingthatthedetentionfacilitiesshouldcompriseorhaveaccessto“facilities for leisure and the delivery of education programmes”includinglanguagetraining.


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3.6 Lack of accommodation within the open centres resulted in prolonged stays in the detention centres21

3.6.1 Lengthofstayswasinfluencedbytheshortageofaccommodationwithintheopencentressincedetention centreswerebeingused to replace suchaccommodation. Theprolongedstaywithinthedetentioncentrewouldhaveaffectedseverelythefreedomofmovement,jobopportunities,contactwiththeoutsideworld,socialinteractionsingeneral,aswellasmentalhealthofthedetainees,especiallyiftheywouldhavebeenheldwithoutclearcommunicationregardingreasonforandinformationaboutlengthofstay.

3.6.2 MHSE contend that during 2019, the Detention Services released 1,287 third countrynationals.Fromthese1,287 releases,264were releasedwithinamonth,895within fourmonths,125withinninemonths,twowithintwelvemonthsandonewithinsixteenmonths.Itispertinenttonotethatduring2020,theCourtsofJusticehaveruledagainstexcessivelengthofstaywithindetentionwithoutjustifiablelegalreasonsandcriticisedthenon-adherencetotheStrategy,inmorethanonecase.StatisticsforwardedtothisOfficedidnotdifferentiatebetweenthestatusofthepersonsinvolved.

3.6.3 Insuchsituations,itisdifficulttoassignresponsibilityfortheexcessivelengthofstayonthePoliceCommissionerortheHealthDepartment(theformerhavingtheultimateauthoritytoissuereleasedocumentationfollowingmedicalclearancebytheHealthDepartment).ThisassertionconsiderstheGovernmentemergencypolicyofaccommodatingwithindetentioncentreswhentherearenovacanciesattheopencentres.

3.7 Access to NGO, family members, and legal advisors is sporadic and subjectively decided by the Detention Services

3.7.1 Theauditfoundnoevidenceofformalisedproceduresorhabitualpracticesthroughwhichdetaineescouldbevisitedbytheirfamilymembersandacquaintanceswhileindetention.VisitsdependonthediscretionoftheDSmanagement.Thisimpliesthatdetaineescannotanticipateorbecognisantoftheirrightstosuchvisitsandtheirfrequency.

3.7.2 ThesituationwasslightlybetterwhendetaineesneededtoreachNGOs,UNHCRandlegaladvisors.However,DSdidnotmaintainrecordsastothenumberoftimesdetaineesaccessedtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),UNHCR,theEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO),NGO’sandlegalprofessionalservicesandwhethermeetingsbetweenthetwosideswerealwaysheldwhenrequested.

21Paragraph5.3.12oftheNAOReport“A review of implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 1: Malta’s efforts at alleviating poverty’’issuedinDecember2020alsoreferstostayswithindetentiondespitetheReceptionandDetentionStrategy.



3.7.3 Moreover,regularityofaccessdependedonDSManagementdiscretionandwasnotoutlinedinformalisedproceduresorcommunicated.Detainees’lackofclearunderstandingregardingtheirsituationandmeansofcommunicationrendereddetentionmorechallenging.

3.7.4 Recent Developments:In2020,visitshadtoberestrictedduetoCOVID-19.Inthelasttwomonthsof2020,visitsincreasedinfrequencywithUNHCRandotherNGOsholdingatotalof39visits,21visitsbylawyerswhilsttheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)heldaroundthreeassessmentsperweek.Atthesametime,EASOhelddailyinterviewsfromMondaytoFriday.

3.8 A shortage of interpreters and cultural mediators hinders communication within detention centres

3.8.1 Communicationwithinthedetentioncentrewasandremainsproblematicsincethere isachroniclackofinterpretersandculturalmediators22.Mitigatingsuchcircumstancesentailedthatanotherdetainedpersonwiththenecessarylanguageskillswasusuallyrequestedtoactasaninterpreter.Suchpracticesdonotlendthemselvesfullytothesafeguardingofpersonalandconfidentialinformation.Whilesuchpracticesareacceptableinemergencysituations,inroutinesituationstheriskalsoexiststhatmiscommunicationmayoccurintheabsenceofprofessionalinterpretersandculturalmediators.

3.8.2 The lackofcommunicationarisingfromtheabsenceofprofessional interpretersbecomesmore evidentwhen detainees are unable to comprehendDS’ notices in relation to theirdetention.Thisisparticularlyproblematicsincesuchcircumstancesusuallyoccurduringtheearlydaysofdetentionandwhenthedetainees’movementsarerestrictedbyorderoftheChiefMedicalOfficerforpublichealthreasons.Moreover,asylumseekersareinformedofsuchconditionsthroughadocumentwhichisoftenreproducedinalanguagethattheasylumseekerdoesnotunderstand.Thedetaineesaregenerallyalsonotinformedwhethertheycanchallengesuchdetentionconditionsbytheauthorities.23

3.9 Coordination between the Detention Services and stakeholders was not optimised

3.9.1 TheHealthDepartment,thePolice,theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS),theInternationalProtectionAgency(formerlyknownastheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Non-GovernmentalOrganisations (NGOs) suchas the JesuitRefugeeServices (JRS)andAditus,andtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)alsoprovidetheirserviceswithinthecentres

22 Source:StrategyforthereceptionofAsylumseekersandirregularMigrants,page22.23 ThispracticeofdetainingasylumseekersinapplicationofHealthRegulationspersistedeventhroughout2020whenasylumseekersfigures

werehigherthan2019.Sincedetentiononhealthgroundsisnotaformaldetentionregime,whereasylumseekersareissuedwithadetentionorder,theyarenotentitledtoappealagainstthedecision,incontraventionoftheReceptionConditionsDirective.


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includingfacilitatingmeetingswithlawyersandthecarryingoutofinterviews,andnecessaryassessments. The audit foundnoevidenceofMemorandaofUnderstandings (MOUs) forentitiesthatarenotDStocarryoutdutieswithinorprovideservicesDS-rungrounds.Duetothecomplexityofcoordinationinvolvedinthemanagementofdetentionservices,MoUswouldhaveprovideda frameworkweresuchentitiescouldembarkonconcertedefforts,whichtranslatesintoincreasedefficiencyandcost-effectiveness.

3.9.2 Thisauditelicitedanumberofcaseswerecoordinationbetweenstakeholdersinvolvedinthemanagementandoperationsofthedetentioncentrewaslacking.Thefollowingrefers:

a. TheDetentionServicesdidnothaveaccesstotheNationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystems(NASMS)databasemaintainedbytheThirdCountryNationalUnit(TCNU)withintheMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity;suchaccesswasgrantedin2020.Thisdatabasehastraceabilitydetailsconcerningtheasylumseekers,evenwhenindetention.ThelackofaccessweakensthepositionofDetentionServicessinceitdidnotcontributeinformationtothisdatabase.

b. Weak coordination between the Detention Services and the stakeholdersmentionedin paragraph 3.8.1. prevailed. Thiswas apparent as the former is not involved in theprovision of services that detainees may require from the other entities except forlogisticalcoordination.

c. There is scope for the Detention Services to be more proactive and participativethroughcooperationandcoordinationwithAWAS,UNHCR,EASOandNGOs.The lackofcoordinationbetweentheentitiesincreasetherisksthatdetentionisrenderedmorechallenging fordetainees.Aproblematicdetentionultimatelydeviates from the2015ReceptionandDetentionStrategy.

3.9.3 Recent Developments: Work has been carried out in this regard and the coordinationbetweenAWASandDShas facilitateda largenumberof releasesat theendof2020andbeginningof2021.

3.10 The Detention Services are not systematically monitoring or following up on the needs of asylum-seekers within their premises

3.10.1 Immigration detention operations are monitored by both official and non-governmentalentities. In 2007, Malta designated two entities as National Preventive Mechanisms, inaccordancewiththeOptionalProtocoltotheUNConventionagainstTorture(OPCAT),whichMaltaratifiedin2003.ThesearethePrisonBoardandtheMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.

3.10.2 TheoperationsoftheDetentionServicesandwhetherthedetainedasylum-seekersarebeingawarded their rights, should bemonitoredby theBoardof Visitors forDetained Persons



pursuant to theBoardofVisitors forDetainedPersonsRegulations, Subsidiary Legislation217.08. In2019, theMonitoringBoardmet13timesandvisitedSafidetentioncentre35times.Themostcommoncomplaintsraisedbydetaineesrelatedtolengthofstay,inadequateclothinginwinter,andthequalityoffoodanditslackofvariety.TheBoardnotedfoodwastageandrecommendedthatstandards inrelationtofoodareobserved.Mostsignificantly,theBoard commented upon the overcrowding, dilapidated and unsanitary conditions withinroomsandbathroomsandlackofproperdiningfacilitieswiththedetainedbeingforcedtoeatinacorridorsubjecttorain,windsandweatherconditionsaswellaslackoffurnitureandspaceforpersonalbelongings.

3.10.3 FurthertotheMonitoringBoardinspections,itisevidentthatthesituationsoutlinedintheBoard’sreportprevail.Moreover,theDetentionServicedidnotcarryoutmonitoringofitsown.Hence,nodeficienciescouldbeidentified,budgetedfor,andrectifiedinatimelyandefficientmanner.

3.11 The Detention Services are heavily understaffed and under-resourced

3.11.1 The NAO noted that there was a lack of management and administrative staff whichpreventedappropriateoperational planning andexecutionwithin theDetentionServices.Theafore-mentionedStrategyfortheReceptionofAsylumSeekersandIrregularMigrantsclearly outlines that “[a]ll members of the Detention Service are subject to the terms, standards, disciplinary procedures and conditions laid down in the “standing Instructions for the Detention Services: Detention Centre Rules” which have been issued to all officers in the Detention Service by the Head of the Detention Service”.

3.11.2 However,theacutestaffshortageswithinthisentitypreventeditfromroutinelyoperatingintermsofanyStandingInstructionsorStandardOperatingProcedures(SOPs).Suchascenarioadditionallyimpliedthatin2019,reviewsofDSstaffperformance,trainingandoperationalresourcessuchasappropriateequipmentandITsystemswerealsonotallocatedtheproperprioritytothedetrimentofstaffanddetainees.ThiswasconfirmedbyDSmanagementwhowereworkingonupgradingtheiroperationaltoolsatthetimeoftheaudit.

3.11.3 Withinthiscontext,themanagementestimatedalackofstaffofcirca220personsincludingarangeofprofessionalsandstaffrequiredtorunthecentresincludingkeypersonssuchasdetentionserviceofficers,managerialandadministrativegrades,interpreters,maintenancestaff, electricians, security experts, health and safety officers, logistics officers, storepersonnelanddrivers.Informationastowhetherandwhenthesewillberecruitedremainedunavailable.

3.11.4 The substantial recruitment deemed necessary indicates that human resources werestretchedtothelimitandthattheservicesbeingprovidedwerefarfromoptimalandcouldhaveexposedstaffanddetainees tounwarrantedsafetyandsecurity risks, suchas thoserelatedtobreakouts.ThelackofrecruitmentdirectlyalsopreventedtheDSfromfulfillingitslegalobligationsinrelationtothedetainees’needs.


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3.11.5 TheDSmanagementemphasisedthatrestructuringandrecruitmentareinthepipeline.ThiswillenabletheDetentionServicestoperformitsdutiesinamoreefficientandeffectiveway.

3.12 Conclusion

3.12.1 ThisChapterdeterminedthatthedetentionperiodofasylumseekersisbeingrenderedmoretaxingasthedetentioncentreisovercrowdedandsubjecttosignificantstaffshortages,whichraisesecurityandhealthriskstobothdetaineesandemployees.Thissituationmaterialisesdespitetheprovisionsofnational legislationandtheStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants,whichstipulateGovernment’sobligationstowardsdetainees.

3.12.2 In addition, the detention phase is severely hampered by lack of adequate standards.Moreover,withinthedetentioncentres,poorconditionsessentiallyduetolackofadequatespaceandover-crowdingmadethesituationevenmoreproblematic.Inpart,thissituationhasbeencompoundedby the lackofkeyhumanresources, IT systemsaswellas record-keepingweaknesses.

3.12.3 TheDSmanagementcontendedthatthedetaineeshaveimmediateaccesstomeals,healthservicesandbasicneedsbutalsoconfirmedmostconcernsreportedbytheNGOsandtheMonitoringBoardaswellasUNHCR.Thesituationisrenderedmostdifficultinviewoflengthyrecruitmentprocessesandbudgetaryconstraints.

3.12.4 TheCOVID-19pandemicrestrictedtheNAO’saccesstodetaineesandthedetentioncentre.Nonetheless, the issues raised by various stakeholders regarding the conditions withinthe centreaswell as theextent towhichdetainees’ rightswerebeing safeguardedweregenerallyacceptedbyDetentionServicesmanagement.Onitspart,theentityisplanningareengineeringofit’sstructureandoperations.However,notimelineforthesechangeswasprovided.

3.12.5 ThisChapterdidnotseektodiscusstheprosandconsofthedetentionofasylumseekerssincethisistantamounttoGovernmentpolicy,andthussuchdiscussionfallsoutsideNAO’sremit.Nonetheless,itisevidentthatMalta,theEU’ssmallestMemberState,isfindingtheaccommodationofsuchadisproportionatenumberofasylumseekersextremelyproblematic.The challenges brought about by irregular migration are extremely complex and multi-facetedandthus,tobedulyaddressed,theserequireafocusedandconcertedinternationaleffort,includingthesolidarityofallEUMemberStates.Withoutsuchinternationalsolidarity,addressingsuchchallengeswillremainimmenselytaxingforMalta.



Chapter 4 | Open centres

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Asylumseekerswhorequireaccommodationaftertheirreleasefromtheinitialreceptionordetentioncentresareaccommodatedwithinopencentresforaperioduntiltheyaredeemedindependent.Residentsinopencentresmayseekemploymentafteraperiodofninemonthsfollowingthelodgingofanasylumapplicationandarealsoissuedwithaperdiemallowance.Thesecentresactasareferencepointfortheasylumseekersseekinginformationandaccesstobasicservicessuchaseducationandhealth.

4.1.2 TheserviceprovidedbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)wasofferedforamaximumperiodof12monthsin2019,unlesstherewerehumanitarianreasonsrequiringalengthierstay.However,thelargenumberofasylumseekersrequiringsuchaserviceledtocircumstanceswhereaccommodationcouldnotbeofferedforsuchaperiod.Tothisend,Governmentsoughttomitigatethissituationthroughtheallocationofallowancestoasylumseekerswhowerenotresidingwithinopencentres.

4.1.3 An increased staff complement brought about a more robust administrative capacity,puttingAWASinabetterpositiontocaterforasylumseekers’needsandtopreparethemfor independent living. Moreover, over time, AWAS managed to develop good workingrelationships with established Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and otherstakeholders. Nonetheless, a number of factors still contribute to a challenging stay byasylum seekers at open centres. Thismainly relates to anovercrowdedenvironment andconsequently,theimpossibilityofthefacilitiestocopewithhighvolumesofresidentswithinthe various open centres.Within this context, this Chapter discusses the followingmainpoints:

a. theopencentresarecharacterisedbyover-crowding;b. preparationforasylumseekers’integrationwithinsocietyismostlydependentonNGOs’

intervention;c. cooperation and synergy need to be enhanced between AWAS, Detention Services

(DS)andtheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)entities;

d. despiteimprovementsinrecruitment,keyvacanciesprevail;e. asylumseekersentitlementswhileresidingatopencentres;


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f. costsperresidentincurredbyGovernmentaremainlyinfluencedbyresidentcohort;andg. occupancyratesandpartnershipagreementswithNGOs.

4.2 At end 2019, residents at open centres administered by AWAS increased by 34.6 per cent over 2018, putting a further strain on conditions within these centres

4.2.1 TherearethreemodelsofopencentreswhichcouldbeadministeredbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)orNGOs.Theseare:

a. thoserundirectlybyGovernment;b. opencentresownedbyGovernmentbutwhoseday-to-dayrunningissub-contractedto

third-parties,andc. NGO-runopencentres,receivingfinancialassistancefromGovernment24.

4.2.2 Open centres are planned to accommodate specific groups, whenever possible, such assinglemalesorfemales,families,andUnaccompaniedMinorAsylumSeekers(UMAS).Table7showsinmoredetailtheresidentswithinthedifferentopencentres,whichareinuseatthetimeofpublishingofthisreport.

Table 7 – Type of residents as per open centres

Type of open centre Open centre Type of ResidentsRundirectlybyGovernment Hal-FarTentVillage(HTV) SingleMales/MinorsMale16+

RundirectlybyGovernment Daril-Liedna(DIL)FemaleandMaleMinors

andVulnerableMinors(under16)

RundirectlybyGovernment Hal-Faropencentre(HFO)FamilyUnits/Single

Mothers/SingleFathers

RundirectlybyGovernment Hangaropencentre(HOC)SectionA:FamilyUnitsand

SingleMothersSectionB:Singlemales

Privately-runopencentres,

receivingfinancialassistance

fromGovernment

MaltaEmigrantsCommission

(MEC)–Balzan

FamiliesandSingle

Females/Mothers

Privately-runopencentres,


fromGovernment

MaltaEmigrantsCommission

(MEC)–HousesMixedclientgroups

RundirectlybyGovernment InitialReceptionCentre(IRC)

Mixedclientgroups

particularlyVulnerable

CategoriesPrivately-runopencentres,


fromGovernment

PeaceLab(PL)MalesincludingVulnerable

Males

Source:AWAS.

24 Therearecurrentlynocentressub-contractedinthismannerbutin2020,theRedCrossopenedatemporarycentretoaccommodateCOVID-19residents.



4.2.3 Asatend2019,therewere1,937asylumseekerswithintheInitialReceptionCentre(IRC)and thesevenopenoentres.TheHangaropencentre (HOC)wasnot inuse in2019.Thisconstitutesan increaseofover14.1percentover the1,697 residentsasatendof2018.Themajorityof this increasewasabsorbedbyAWASopencentres (HTV,DIL,HFO).Asatend2019, therewere1,262 residentswithin these threecentres,which isan increaseof325(34.6percent)overthepreviousyear.Thisstateofaffairsstemsfromthefactthattheincreaseindemandforaccommodationrelatedtounaccompaniedmales,whoaregenerallyaccommodatedatAWAS-runcentres.Suchanincreaseinoccupancyratesfurtherstretchedresourcesatthesecentresandnegativelyimpactedthequalityofaccommodationduetotheresultantovercrowding.Table8refers.

Table 8 - Residents accommodated at open centres as at end 2019

Year Hal-Far Tent Village (HTV)

Dar Il-Liedna

(DIL)

Hal-Far open centre

(HFO)

Malta Emigrants

Commission (MEC) – Balzan

Malta Emigrants

Commission (MEC) - Houses

Initial Reception

Centre (IRC)

Peace Lab (PL)

Totals

2018 772 45 120 64 155 515 26 1,6972019 1,091 50 121 49 164 436 26 1,937

Source:AWAS.

4.2.4 GiventhatoccupancyratesincreasedinthethreeAWAS-runopencentresin2019over2018,andthattherewerenomajor infrastructural improvements,theremarksportrayedintheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)2018reportremainedvalidfor2019.Thereportstatesthat the livingconditions in theopencentres, specifically those inHalFarare“extremelychallenging” characterised by over-crowding, inadequate structure (specifically the pre-fabricated container housing units with poor ventilation and high temperatures in thesummermonthsandinadequateinsulationfromcoldtemperatureinthewinter)andpoorhygiene.AWAScontends that in2019, thenumberofcleanersand thatofavailableskipsincreased;fullpestcontrolcoveragewasalsointroduced.In2020,anewpurchasingexerciseresultedintheacquisitionofnewcabinswithbetterinsulationproperties.

4.2.5 Ariskassessmentreportineachcentrewascarriedoutandrecommendationsweretakenonboard.Moreover,in2019,arefurbishmentprocesswasstartedtocleanupareasand,asfaraspossible,transformthemintorecreationalones.Table9showstheoccupancyrates,intermsofbednightsatthevariousopencentres.

4.2.6 During2019,occupancyrateswithintheHTV,DILandHFOvariedbetween77to89percent.On theotherhand,during thesameperiod, theotheropencentreshadoccupancy ratesrangingfrom63and89percent.Although,stillmarginallyaveragingbelowfulloccupancyrates, overcrowding in these centres prevails. The physical structure of these centres attimesprohibitthefullutilisationofroomstherein.Acaseinpointrelatestolargerrooms,whichcannotbeutilisedfullyastheyareusedtoaccommodatefamilymemberstogethertosafeguardtheirprivacy.HencetheoccupancyratesdepictedinTable9donotreflecttherealsituationwhereinreality,givenMalta’slimitedresourcesandspace,itisverydifficulttoincreasebeds.


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Table 9 - Bed Nights capacity at open centres for 2019

Source:AWAS.

4.2.7 The statisticsalso show that the longest stayswerewithin the centresnot runbyAWAS.The reason for this situation relates to thehigher turnoverof residentsatAWAScentres.On theotherhand, the longer staysat theotheropencentresarises since thesecentresaccommodatethemorevulnerablepersons,suchasfamilies,singleparentsandminors.

4.3 At end 2019, well-being and preparation for asylum seekers’ integration within society were not appropriately prioritised

4.3.1 ItisconsideredimportantthatAWAScontributesconsiderablymoretothewell-beingandpreparationforasylumseekers’ integrationwithin theMaltesecommunity.ThiscommentapplieseventhoughspecificprocessesrelatedtofacilitatingintegrationfallwithintheremitofMinistry for Justice,EqualityandGovernance.Theneed foramoredirectcontributionregardingthewell-beingandpreparationforintegration,stemsfromthepracticalrealitythatmostasylumseekerswill remain inMaltaforaconsiderableperiod– irrespectiveoftheirprotectionstatus.Discussionswithnationalentitiesaswellas literaturereviewsandNGOdocumentationenabledtheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)toelicitthekeyelementsaffectingthewell-beingofasylumseekerswithinopencentres.Thefollowingrefers:

Description

Hal-Far Tent

Village (HTV)

Dar Il-Liedna

(DIL)

Hal-Far Open centre (HFO)

Malta Emigrants

Commission (MEC) – Balzan

Malta Emigrants

Commission (MEC) - Houses

Initial Reception

Centre (IRC)

Peace Lab (PL)

Totals

Totalnumberofbedsduringtheyear(averagecapacity)

1,044 58 128 132 160 531 40 2,093

TotalnumberofpersonsaccommodatedatthecentresbetweenJan.-Dec.2019

2,424 127 245 140 148 4,162 32 7,278

Averageofbednightsperperson

127 129 169 217 350 42 331 87

Bed nights ccupancy rates

80.6 77.3 88.5 63.0 88.8 89.3 72.5 82.5



a. Lack of interpretation–Asignificantbarrier facedbyasylumseekers inopencentresrelatestothelimitedavailabilityofprofessionalinterpreters.Insufficientinterpretationhampers asylum seekers’ ability to communicate particularly with public authorities,NGOsand locals. TheGREVIO202025Reportwhichwasproducedunder theauspicesoftheCouncilofEurope,highlightthat interpretationlimitationsareevidentatMaterDeiHospital, particularly following the cessationof the previously available hospital’smigrantunit,whichwasresourcedwithtrainedmedicalinterpreters.

b. Psycho-social Services - Following the experiences encountered by asylum seekers intheirhomelandandwithintheirnewenvironment,thedemandforpsycho-socialservicesbecomesmore pronounced. The AIDA 2019 Report laments the non-identification oftheasylumseekersrequiringinterventionaswellasthelackoffull-timementalhealthprofessionals.

4.3.2 A step in the right direction resulted when AWAS initiated the provision of therapeuticservicesinmid-2019.TheUnitcomprisedsixAssistantPsychologyOfficers(APOs),oneSeniorPsychologyOfficer (SPO), twocounsellors,onepsychologistand four interpreters (French,Somali,TigrinyaandArabic).TheAssistantPsychologyOfficersconductedassessmentsinthefollowingcentresin2019,inIRC,HTV,HFO,DILaswellasSafidetentioncentre.

4.3.3 TheroleofAPOsistoconductpsychologicalassessmentswhicharecompiledofthefollowing:

a. Socio-demographic questionnaire aimed at gathering information about the clients’psycho-social wellbeing prior to migration, during their migration journey and post-migration.

b. Hopkins Symptoms Checklist which is a psychological tool that assesses for signs ofanxietyanddepression.

c. PCL-5 which is a psychological tool that assessed for signs of post-traumatic-stressdisorder.

4.3.4 In 2019, 543 psychological assessments were conducted whilst 115 interventions werecarriedoutbystafffromthetherapeuticservicesunit.AnAPOwaspresentinIRCandHTVdaily(Mon-Fri)andinHFOandDILonaveragethree-fourtimesaweek.APOsvisitedSafionaverageonceaweektoconductassessmentsthere.

4.3.5 Despite these activities, AWAS still consider that the number of professionals employedwithinthisUnitrequirestobeaugmented,atleastbythreeseniorofficers.Thisrecruitmentshouldalleviateproblemsconcerningwaitingtimetoaccessthisserviceandamelioratethereachandqualityofservices.

25 Source:TheGroupofExpertsonActionagainstViolenceagainstWomenandDomesticViolence(GREVIO),GREVIONovember2020Report“Baseline Evaluation Report Malta”,page15,paragraph20.


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4.3.6 Two APOs were assigned to work in HTV, two in IRC, one in DIL and one in HFO. Thepsychologistworkedwithclientswhodisplayedseriouspsychologicaldifficultiesandhadahistoryofhospitalisation.Counsellorswereassignedtoworkinthedifferentcentresandwithspecificcohorts–oneworkingwithminorsandwomen,andoneworkingwithadultmales.In2019,64clientswerereferredtotheUnit’spsychologist,andcounsellorshad61and57referralsrespectively.

4.3.7 Sincethisservicewas in its initial stages inmid-2019, thisOfficebelieves that thefiguresachievedwereonthewholesatisfactory.ThisOfficeanticipatesahigherratebasedontheUnitbecomingbettermannedandthestaffbecomingmorefamiliarwiththeirclients.

4.3.8 Activities-Themajorityofcentresdonotofferanyformoforganisedactivitiesforresidents,yet asylum seekers are able to freely leave the centre.26 Nonetheless, AWAS facilitates anumberofvocationaltrainingcourseswhichareconsideredasusefulforasylumseekers.Suchcourses includeMalteseandEnglish language training.Eligibility conditionsvarybetweencoursesandgenerallyreflecteligibilitycriteriaforMaltesenationals.27ThesecoursesarenotspecificallyorganisedforresidentsofopencentresorwithinopencentresunlessNGOstakeitupon themselves toorganise suchcourses.AWASmade it clear thatwhile theentity isdisposed to facilitate and inform, the onus to attend courses and participate in activitiesremainsfullyonasylumseekers.

4.3.9 Educational assessments and access to formal education –Article13(2)of theRefugeesAct (Cap.420) states thatasylumseekers shallhaveaccess to state-fundededucationandtraining.TheReceptionRegulationsalsostatesthatasylum-seekingchildrenareentitledtoaccesstheprimaryandsecondaryeducationsysteminthesamemannerasMaltesenationals,andthismayonlybepostponedforuptothreemonthsfromthedateofsubmissionoftheasylumapplication.Thisthree-monthperiodmaybeextendedtooneyear“where specific education is provided in order to facilitate access to the education system.”AWASisentrustedtofacilitatechildren’sassessmentandplacementwithinthenationaleducationalsystem.

4.3.10 The2018and201928AIDAreportslamentthedelayinaccesstoeducationduetodifficultieswith the registration of asylum applications as well as the practical difficulties faced byasylum-seeking children in theabsenceofa formalassessmentprocess todetermine themostappropriateeducationalentrylevelforchildren.Moreover,theabsenceofpreparatoryclasses;possible limitedornoeducationalbackgroundand languagedifficulties is furtherconducivetoincreasedhardshipsforchildren,withpossibleimplicationsontheirlong-termdevelopment.

4.3.11 This Section highlighted weaknesses in crucial elements which contribute to the well-beingofasylumseekers.Theseelementsconstitutethebuildingstepstowardsaneffective

26Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page51,31December2018.27Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page52,31December2018.28Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page60,31December2019.



integration.The foregoing implies thatpublicauthoritiesandstakeholdersneed to,as faraspossible,allocatemoreresourcestoenabletheappropriateprioritisationofsuchissues,whichinturnensuresthatMaltaisinapositiontofulfilitsobligationsinaccordancewiththenationalandinternationallegalframework.

4.4 Further co-operation and synergy are required between AWAS, Detention Services and MHSE entities

4.4.1 PursuanttoLegalNotice205of2009‘Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers Regulations, 2009’, theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers (AWAS)shouldbethe implementingentityinrelationtonationallegislationandpolicyconcerningthewelfareofpersonsenjoyinginternationalprotectionandasylumseekers.Inpractice,AWASmanagesreceptionfacilitiesand open centres.More importantly, AWAS facilitates the delivery of services to asylumseekers and beneficiaries of international protection through referrals, information andtrainingprogrammesandgeneralaccesstoserviceprovidersandpracticalassistanceintheareaofemployment,housing,health,welfareandeducation.

4.4.2 MuchofAWAS’workiscontingentonpoliciestakenatnationalgovernmentandtheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)andonotherentitiessuchas theDetention Services for the time asylum seekers arewithin detention, awaiting forinternationalprotectionstatusortobereturned.AWAShavenosay intheprocessesanddelays by the International ProtectionAgency in deciding cases of asylum seekerswithinthe InitialReceptionCentre (IRC)oropencentres.AlsoAWAS’work isenhancedbyNon-GovernmentalOrganisations’(NGOs)andinternationalandEuropeanbodies’contributiontothewholeasylumprocesssincetheseentitiesareintegralinaidingasylumseekerswiththeirlegalrights, interpretationservicesandprovidingthemwith informationandprogrammesrelatedtotheirstayinMalta.

4.5 During 2019, AWAS increased its staff by 67 personnel over the previous year, but requires further recruitment, especially at managerial level

4.5.1 ThecurrentAWASChiefExecutiveOfficer(CEO)tookoverhisroleatthebeginningof2019.Facedwiththenewchallengeoftheresurgentboatarrivals,AWASembarkedonanevaluationexercise to address the staffing situation. Therewasdireneedof recruitment tobeef upalready-existingsectionsandpopulatenewoneswhichweredeemednecessary.Table10refers.


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Table 10 - Staff at AWAS (2018 to 2020)

Position Staff as at

end 2018

Staff as at

end 2019

Staff as at

March 2020

Additional Staff

requested for 2020CEO 1 1 1 0ServiceManager 1 2 2 3SeniorPsychologyOfficer(EUProject) 0 1 1 0ClinicalPsychologist(EUProject) 0 1 1 0AssistantPsychologyOfficers(EUProject) 0 7 7 0Counsellors(EUProject) 0 2 2 0WelfareOfficers(EUProject) 0 4 529 14UnitLeaders 5 6 5 3ProjectExecutives 2 3 3 0Executive 1 3 3 0Coordinators 8 9 9

5SeniorAdministrator 0 0 0SeniorTechnicalOfficer 0 0 0SocialWorkers 4 8 9 20Administrators 5 1030 1231 10SeniorSupportWorkers 0 14 13 0SupportWorkers 63 74 72 0ReceptionFacilitiesOfficers 0 12 55 0Handyman(Multi-SkilledFitters) 4 4 4 0Totals 94 161 204 55

Source:AWAS.

4.5.2 Table10showsthenumberanddesignationofthestaffin2019.AsperTable10,during2019,AWASincreaseditsstaffby67personneloverthepreviousyear.Therewereconsiderableincreasesinmiddlemanagementpostsandreceptionfacilitiesofficers.ItisworthnotingthatstaffrecruitmentinrelationtomentalhealthissueswasalsodependantheavilyonEUfunds.

4.5.3 As shown in the Table 10, up toMarch 2020,AWAS increased its staffwith a further 43personneloverthepreviousyear.However,AWASrecognisestheneedforfurtherrecruitmentespeciallyofsocialworkerswhoplayapivotalroleinthereceptionservices.

29IncludesfourEuropeanUnion(EU)fundedpersonnel.30IncludesoneEUfundedpersonnel.31IncludestwoEUfundedpersonnel.



4.6 The Quality Assurance Unit is in the process of being set-up at AWAS

4.6.1 AQualityAssuranceUnittomonitorandenhancetheperformanceofAWASstaffandtheirreceptionserviceswassetupattheendof2020.

4.6.2 TheQualityAssuranceUnitismainlyresponsiblefor:

a. evaluationofReceptionServicestobeinlinewiththeEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)receptionguidelinesandserviceindicators;

b. internalmonitoringofresidencesinaccordancewiththeSocialCareStandardsAuthority(SCSA)standards;

c. handlingofclientcomplaintsandothercomplaintsrelatedtoservicesandoperations;and

d. theformulationofplansandrecommendationsforReceptionServices.

4.7 Accommodation costs at open centres administered by AWAS varied from €14 to €52 per person per night

4.7.1 During 2019, the accommodation-related costs incurred in all open centres amounted toover€12million.Variousfactorsinfluencethecostsperpersonpernight(pppn),includingthespecificneedsofresidentsaccommodatedatthecentres.Economiesofscalebroughtaboutbythenumberofresidentsoroccupancyratesincentresalsoinfluencepppncosts.AnothervariablerelatestowhetherthecentreisoperatedbyAWASorbyNGOs.Withrespecttothelatter,thisperformanceauditcouldonlyevaluatecostsincurredbyNGOsbasedontheallocationofpublicfundstotheseorganisations.Table11refers.

4.7.2 ThegovernmentaccountsandtheAWASauditedaccountsservedas themainsourcesofinformationforthisOfficetoworkoutthecostingsrelatedtooperations,salaries,mealsandperdiemamongstthemaincategories.OtherdatawassuppliedbyMHSE.Furthermore,sincetheinformationwascompiledspecificallyforthisexercise,certaincostshadtobebasedonestimates.


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Table 11 - Open centres costs (2019)

Description Total Bed

Nights

Meals Costs

€

Other Costs

€

Total Costs

€

Meals average

cost pppn €

Other average

cost pppn €

Total average

cost pppn €

Open centres:

InitialReceptionCentre(IRC) 173,038 695,618 4,036,632 4,732,250 4.02 23.33 27.35

Hal-FarTentVillage(HTV) 307,097 934,048 3,303,649 4,237,697 3.04 10.76 13.80

Hal-Faropencentre(HFO) 41,368 100,981 869,472 970,453 2.44 21.02 23.46

DarIl-Liedna(DIL) 16,355 104,031 745,966 849,997 6.36 45.61 51.97

Total 537,858 1,834,678 8,955,719 10,790,397 3.41 16.65 20.06

Non-AWAS open centres32:

EmigrantsCommission 51,836 n/a 320,420 320,420 n/a 6.18 6.18

BalzanHome 30,345 n/a 106,489 106,489 n/a 3.51 3.51

PeaceLaboratory 10,582 n/a 20,000 20,000 n/a 1.89 1.89

Total: 92,763 n/a 446,909 446,909 n/a 4.82 4.82

Total AWAS and non-AWAS open centres costs:

630,621 1,834,678 9,402,62833 11,237,306 2.91 14.91 17.82

Other Costs:

PerDiem(IRC,HTV,HFO,DIL) n/a 850,890 n/a

PerDiem(Non-AWASopencentres)

n/a 68,484 n/a

Total overall costs: n/a 12,156,680 n/a

Source:AWASandMHSE.Note that ‘pppn’ refers to per person per night.

4.7.3 Table 11 highlights the range of costs incurred by Government to accommodate asylumseekers in open centres. At the outset, Table 11 distinguishes between costs incurredbyGovernmentinhostingandmanagingAWASpremisesdirectlyandexpenditureincurredbytheGovernmentintermofgrantstoNGOs.

4.7.4 Government grants to NGOs-Governmentincurredanaverageexpenditureof€4.82pppnfor operational costs, amounting to €446,909 in 2019 in funds to NGOs accommodatingasylumseekers.Thevariancebetweenthisamountandtheestimatedaverageof€20.06pppnincurredbyGovernment-runopencentresclearlyhighlightsthefinancialburdenassumedbyNGOstoaccommodateasylumseekers.During2019,NGOsaccommodatedasylumseekersfor92,763bednights,whichamountto14.7percentoftotalbednightsspentinlocalopencentresthroughoutthisyear.

32Thesecentresaccommodatethirdcountrynationals(TCNs)whohaveeitherleftIRCorwerewithinthecommunity.33Thetotalof€9,402,628includesanamountof€1,070,655asEUfundstobereimbursed.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterial

aidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.



4.7.5 Value for money of AWAS-run open centres–TheNAOsoughttoassesstheextenttowhichthecostincurredtorunthefourAWASopencentresfulfilvalue-for-moneyconsiderations.Tothisend,thisperformanceauditcomparedthepppncostsofthesecentreswiththebed-only rates (withoutmeals, securityandprofessional services) chargedby localhostels, asadvertised in theMalta TourismAuthority’s portal. Thebed-only rate at anAWAS centrecostanaverageof€10.68whilethatatahosteloratwo-starhotelwasanaverageof€12.Althoughnotaperfectcomparison,therateof€20.06incurredbyAWASpppnwhichincludesmeals,securityandprofessionalservices,comparesfavourablytothe€12ratechargedpernight on bed-only basis at local hostels and two-star hotels. This consideration is baseduponthefactthatAWASprovidesmeals,security,professionalservicesincludingaccesstohealth,educationalandpsycho-socialsupportforthelengthoftheirstayintheopencentres.Furthermore, although not includedwithin the €20.06, staying at an AWAS open centreimpliesthereceiptofaperdiem,unlesstheasylumseekerwouldbeinemployment,aswellaseasieraccesstofamilymembersandasylumseekerssharingthesamebackground.

4.7.6 Intotal,thefourGovernment-runopencentresincurredanexpenditureofover€10.7millionin2019.TheoperationalcostsincurredwithinAWASrunopencentresreflecttheoverheadsassociatedwiththeseresidences.Table11showsthatHal-FarTentVillageincursthelowestoperationalcostspppn.Thisphenomenonisinpartattributedtothephysicalcompositionoftheresidences,namelymobilehomes,whicharenotasdemandingonmaintenancecostsas theotherGovernment-runopencentres.Overheadcostsarealsosignificantlyaffectedthroughadministrativeandother support staff.The relativelyhighcostspppn incurredatDaril-Liednaismainlyassociatedwiththespecialrequirementsofthevulnerablepeoplethisresidenceaccommodates,whereincases,thisalsoincludeschildrenandyoungpersons.

4.7.7 Another levelofanalysisof thefinancial informationpresented inTable11 relates to therangeofpppncostswithinGovernmentopencentres.ThenumberofbednightsaccumulatedbytherespectiveGovernment-runopencentresalsoinfluencethepppncosts.Economiesofscalealsoinfluencepppncostsineachoftheopencentres.Thismainlyoccursasrespectivecentres’fixedcostsaredividedbyahighernumberofbednights,whichinturnbringdownunitcosts.

4.7.8 Table11alsoprovidesinformationonthecostsincurredwithrespecttomealssuppliedtoasylumseekersresidinginAWASrunopencentres.Therateforbreakfastis€1.25excl.vat,Lunch€1.55excl.vat,Dinner€2.45excl.vat.Thisdoesnotmeanthateveryasylumseekerconsumesallthreemealsdailyasthisisdonethroughadailybookingsystem–hencethedisparityprojectedbyTable11inthepppncostsrelatingtomeals.Thisauditwasnotawareofseriouscomplaintsrelatingtotheprovisionofmeals,andconsequentlyitcanbeconcludedthatthecostsincurredbyGovernmentregardingthesupplyofthesemealsconstitutevalueformoneyas evenwhen the threedailymeals are considered collectively, their cost stillamountstoaroundamodesttake-awaymeal.


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4.7.9 Table12alsoportraysinformationaboutdailyallowancesreceivedbyasylumseekersresidinginopencentres.Asylumseekerswhoare inemploymentarenotentitledtotheperdiemallowances.Thedailyallowancesystemoperatesroundathreetimesregistrationperweekprocess,atsettimesoftheday;thesevaryslightlydependingonthecentre.Registrationhasthreepurposes:qualificationforthedailyallowance;securityofthebedallocated;topreventthoseworkingfromreceivingthedailyallowance.

4.7.10 The payments within the system are based on the resident’s status and any dependentchildren,wherepaymentsarereviewedonaweeklybasis.Attheendofeachregistrationoronaweeklybasis,thedatabaseisupdatedfromthephysicalsigningsheetsandattheendofthefour-weekcyclepaymentlistsareproduced.Table12showsthedifferentratesoftheperdiemallowances.

Table 12 – Daily Allowances

Payment StatusDaily Rate

€

Payment at 28 Days

€AsylumApplicant 4.66 130.48ChildOnly 2.33 65.24TemporaryHumanitarianProtection 4.66 130.48Refugeereceivingnosocialsecuritybenefits 4.08 114.24RejectedAsylum-seeker(grantedonlyinexceptionalcircumstances

tovulnerableindividuals)3.49 97.72

ReturnedAsylum-seeker(grantedtoasylumseekerssentbackto

MaltafromotherMemberStates(Dublintransfers)2.91 81.48

SingleParent 4.66 130.48

Source:AWAS.

4.8 Conclusion

4.8.1 This Chapter has shown that the cost of running open centres as accommodation forasylumseekersamountstoover€12million.Partofthisamountrelatestograntsprovidedby Government to NGOswho also accommodate asylum seekers in their own residents.Althoughonlycateringfor14.7percentofthebednightsspentinopencentresin2019,theforegoingunderlinesthefinancialandsocialcommitmentofNGOsinprovidingsupporttothisissueofnationalimportance.

4.8.2 ThisperformanceauditconcludedthatthecostsincurredbyGovernmenttohostanasylum-seekeramounttoaround€20pernight.While thisamount isconsideredreasonable, theAWAS-runcentresarecharacterisedbyover-crowding,whichinturnaffecttheenvironmentand conditions therein. To a large extent, this situation is brought about by the sporadicinfluxofasylumseekerswhich,onmanyoccasions,stretchavailableresourcestothelimit.Moreover, open centres are operating at or close to capacity. In cases, this gives rise tosituationswherebyasylumseekersaredetainedforlongerperiodsthannecessaryasthereisnoroomforthemwithinopencentres.



4.8.3 DespitetherelativelysignificantstaffingcostsincurredbyGovernment,theadministrativeandotherprofessionalservicesarestillnotattherequired level.This influencesthe levelandqualityofservicesthatcanbeofferedtoasylumseekers.Thisstateofaffairsmayreduceopportunities forasylumseekers toexpedite their integrationprocess.Given thatasylumseekersmaybegrantedprotectionstatusandthat return isasignificantly longandoftenproblematicprocesstheopportunityclearlyexistsforopencentrestooffermoreservicesaimedatfurtherfacilitatingtheintegrationofasylumseekerswithinMaltesesociety.


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Chapter 5 | The Office of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom) (now known as the International Protection Agency)

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 UptoAugust2020,asylumseekers,thirdcountrynationals(TCNs)orstatelesspersonswhowishedtoseekprotectionstatuscoulddosothroughtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom).Since,the7August2020,thisrolenolongerexistsinthelaw.TheInternationalProtectionAct now refers to the International ProtectionAgency (IPA). This performanceauditfocusedontheperiodupto2019;consequently,forpracticalreasons,thisReportwillcontinuetorefertotheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerastheentity,whichatthetimewasresponsibletoreceive,processanddetermineapplicationsforinternationalprotectioninMaltaandboundbytheobligationsassumedbyMaltaunderthe1951GenevaConventionrelating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, aswell as its obligations underEuropeanlaw.

5.1.2 TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerprovidedinformationabouttheasylumproceduretopersonswhoexpressedtheirintentiontomakeanapplicationforinternationalprotectioninMalta. Following the lodging of the application for international protection, theOfficeof theRefugeeCommissioner conducteda checkpursuant toDublin regulations toverifywhether Malta is indeed the Member State responsible for examining the applicationpursuanttotheDublinRegulation.TheRefugeeCommissionerwasboundbytheProceduralRegulations(SL420.07)34toconcludetheexaminationprocedurewithinsixmonthsofthelodgingoftheapplication.Thisperiodcouldbeextendedtoninemonthswhencomplexissueswereinvolved,whenalargenumberofthird-countrynationalssimultaneouslyappliedforinternationalprotectionorwhenthedelaycouldclearlybeattributedtothefailureoftheapplicanttocomplywithhisobligations.Thistimelimitcouldbeextendedbyafurtherthreemonthstoensureanadequateandcompleteexaminationoftheapplicationforinternationalprotection.However,theexaminationprocedurecouldnotexceedthemaximumtimelimitoftwenty-onemonthsfromthelodgingoftheapplication.

34SubsidiaryLegislation420.07,proceduralstandardsforgrantingandwithdrawinginternationalprotectionregulations.



5.1.3 As this Chapterwill discuss further on,most of the decisions taken by theOffice of theRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)were,inpractice,nottakenbeforethelapseofsixmonths.AswillbeoutlinedwithinthisChaptersuchstateofaffairswasinevitable.

5.2 EASO was essential in assisting RefCom especially due to the heavy, pending workload

5.2.1 Theyearunderreview,2019,wascharacterisedbyaconsiderable increase innumbersofTCNs applying for international protectionwith the Office of the Refugee Commissioner.The reason for suchamarked increasewasmainlydue to the3,405 irregular immigrantsarrivingbyboats,whichwasmorethandoublethe1,445boatarrivals in2018.OnemustalsobearinmindthattheRefComdidnotprocessonlyapplicationsfromsucharrivalsbutalsothoseofotherpersonswhowouldhavearrivedinMaltaregularlyorviaothermeans(i.e. arrived inMalta irregularlybutnot followinga searchand rescueoperation). Suchasharpincreasemeantthat,inviewoflackofrecruitment,theRefCom’sstaffendedupwithabackloginapplications.TheRefComstymiedthebacklog,improvedoperationaldeficienciesandcircumventedthelengthypublicservicerecruitmentproceduresthroughthetemporarydeploymentoftheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)interimstaffandMemberStateexperts.TheNAOpositivelynotesthatthiswasaresultoftheMaltaOperationalPlansignedbetweentheMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity(MHAS)andEASOfortheperiodJunetillDecember2019.

5.2.2 Recent Developments:Administrativecapacityconcernswithin thenewAgencyprevaileduptothetimeofwritingthisreport.While,thenewAgencycontendsthattheoperationalplan referred to in theprecedingparagraphwas renewed for2020and2021, theAgencyremainedreliantonthesesameoperationalagreements,whichnecessitatedEASOsupportintheareaofprocessingofapplicationsforinternationalprotection,duringtheregistrationand lodgingof theapplication, theDublinprocedure, interviewsand thedecision-makingprocessthroughthedraftingofEvaluationReportsonindividualapplicationssubmittedtoIPA.35

5.3 In 2020, the RefCoM became an Agency to facilitate recruitment and improve working conditions

5.3.1 DuringinterviewswithRefCommanagement,theproposedstructureofthenewInternationalProtectionAgencyaswellasrecruitmentwasdiscussed.TheAgencywasplannedtomovetonewpremisessinceitwasstilloperatingfromitspreviouspremises,whichwasstructurallyunsuitable tohosta largenumberofmembersof staffandapplicants.Suchamove tookplaceinthefirstweekofMarch2021.

35Source:2019Operational&TechnicalAssistancePlanagreedbyEASOandMalta,page3,24June2019.


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5.3.2 TheAgencywasplannedtohaveastaffcomplementofaround66personsinordertoexecutethedutiesefficientlyandreducethependingbacklog.Uptillend2020,therewere43postswhichwereyet tobefilled. Interimpersonnel recruitedbytheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)andMemberStateexpertsdeployedwithin the frameworkof theaforesaidMalta operational plan signed byMHAS and EASO,were also planned to fill in posts for2020and2021,untilrecruitmentwastobecompleted.Itbearspointingoutthatahumanresources(HR)planwhilsttechnicallyapprovedbytheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcements(MHSE),doesnotnecessarilytranslateintofilledpositionsforanumberofreasonsincludingessentially;

a. thelackofsuitableapplicants;b. budgetaryconstraints;c. lowsalaryscalesthatarenotcommensuratewiththeparticulardutiesandresponsibilities;

and d. thelackofpublicinterfacemakingtheRefComrelativelyunknowntothegeneralpublic.

5.3.3 Recent Developments:TheIPAiscurrentlyindiscussionwithunionsregardingtheadoptionofacollectiveagreement.Whilstauthorisationtoengagenewstaffasperpublicadministrationrecruitmentdirectiveshasbeengranted,therearestillimpedimentstosuchrecruitment.Inthisregard,discussionsareongoingbetweenMHSE,theOfficeofthePrimeMinister,andtheMinistryforFinanceandEmployment.

5.4 During 2019, RefCom received twice as many new asylum applications as in 2018

5.4.1 In2018,RefComreceived2,045newapplicationsforprocessing.Itissignificanttonotethat1,474applications(72.1percent)originatedfromTCNswhowouldhaveenteredMaltaviatheSchengensystem,orarrived inanotherwise irregularmanner,while571applications(27.9percent)werefromasylumseekerswhocametoMaltairregularlybyboat.

5.4.2 During2019,thesituationwasdifferentsincetherewerenumerousboatarrivals.Applicationslodgedbynon-boatasylumseekersamountedto1,362(33.9percentofthenewapplicationslodgedin2019,while2,660applications(66.1percent)weresubmittedbyasylumseekersarrivingbyboat.Itisimportanttospecifythattheyearofapplicationdoesnotnecessarilymean the yearof arrival inMalta. Furthermore,whenone compares the2018and2019figures,theworkloadoftheRefComdoubled,thusprolongingtheprocessingofapplicationsaswell.Table13providestherelevantfiguresfor2018and2019.

Table 13 - New applications received by RefCom during 2018 and 2019

Total/PercentagesNew applications during 2018 New applications during 2019

Non-Boat Boat Total Non-Boat Boat TotalTotal 1,474 571 2,045 1,362 2,660 4,022Percentages 72.1 27.9 100.0 33.9 66.1 100.0

Source:RefCom.



5.5 At the end of 2019, there were 3,574 pending applications to be processed by RefCom

5.5.1 Table14highlightsalltheapplicationsatRefCompendingasatend2018and2019andtheyeartheywerelodged.

Table 14 - Pending applications at RefCom as at end 2018 and 2019

Year application lodged with RefCom

Pending applications as at end 2018 Pending applications as at end 2019Regular &

Irregular (Non-Boat)

(Boat) TotalRegular &

Irregular (Non-Boat)

(Boat) Total

2013 1 0 1 1 0 1 2014 0 0 0 0 0 02015 0 1 1 0 0 02016 0 63 63 0 13 13 2017 4 297 301 0 117 117 2018 435 725 1,160 287 384 671

2019 not

applicable not

applicable not

applicable 2,032 740 2,772

Total 440 1,086 1,526 2,320 1,254 3,574 Percentages 28.8 71.2 100.0 64.9 35.1 100.0

Source:RefCom.

5.5.2 Atend2018,pendingapplicationsconsistedof440(28.8percent) fromnon-boatasylumseekers,while1,086(71.2percent)werefrompeoplearrivinginboats.In2019,therewasashiftinthetypeofTCNsseekingasylum,sincetherewasasubstantialincreaseinasylumseekersarrivingbyboat(66percentofthenewapplications) incontrastto2018.Bywayof policy, RefCom dealt with the applications by boat arrivals first. Hence, the pendingapplications,weremostlyfromnon-boatarrivals,amountingto2,320(64.9percent)ofthetotalpendingones.The remaining35.1per cent,1,254,were fromboatarrivals. Itbearspointingout that boat arrivals usually requiremore government intervention in termsofbasicneedsthanthenon-boatarrivals;also,theboatarrivalsusuallyarriveinMaltainlargernumbersthanthenon-boatones.Hence,RefComprioritisedtheapplicationsthatweremosturgentandneededimmediatefurtheractionratherthanactingonapplicationsbasedonachronologicalorder.

5.5.3 During2019,RefComreceived4,022newapplicationstoprocess,doubletheamountofthepreviousyear.RefComstaff,despitebeingaidedbyEASOinterimstaffandMemberState-deployedexperts,werenotinapositiontofinalisetheirprocessing.Thisnecessarilymeantthattherewasasignificantnumberofapplicationswhichremainedpendinguntilend2019,namely3,574applications.ThisresultillustratesthatpendingapplicationsatRefCommorethandoubled(increasedby2,048)overaperiodof12monthssincebyend2018therehadbeen1,526applicationspending.ThisOfficeacknowledgesthatevenintheeventthatafullcomplementisemployedtoprocessprotectionapplications,ahighnumberofapplications


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wouldstillresultinoperationaldelays.Thisimpliesthattodate,therecentlyestablishedIPAfacesaconstantchallengetobalanceoutthreecriticalinterrelatedvariablesnamely,staffinglevels,processefficiencyandratesofapplications.

5.6 As at end 2019, there were over 800 applications pending from previous years

5.6.1 AccordingtoEurostatdata,thevolumeofcasesawaitingafinaldecisionincreasedbyover300percentbetweenJanuary2016andMarch2019,thatis,from715to2,195.Until2019,RefComhadnotestablishedthestatusofover800applicationsasrepresentedinChart2:

Chart 2 – Cases filed between 2016 and 2018 and awaiting a final decision at end 2019

Source:RefCom.

5.6.2 The reasons for such delays were various and mainly related to complications with theindividual cases such as lack of documentation from the applicants’ side or necessaryexaminationof furtherdocumentationthatwouldhavebeenproducedbytheapplicants.Suchdelayspointtowardscertainconsiderations:

a. RefComhumanresourceswerefrequentlystretchedtothelimit.

b. Whileacknowledgingthattheasylumprocessisverytightlyregulated,theopportunityexists to re-evaluate the efficiency of some of the processes requiring managementendorsement.

c. Delaysandundecidedoutcomesmaketheasylumseekers’personalandfamilysituation

morechallengingsincetheywouldnothavebeeninapositiontoinitiate,planorevenbenefitfromanystepstowardsintegration.

13

117

671

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

2016

2017

2018

Applications Filed

Applications Filed



5.6.3 Furthertothelastpoint,thisOfficetriedtoestablishwhetherRefComacteduponcomplaintsreceivedbyasylumseekersconcerningsuchdelays.TheRefComcontendedthatwhilemostofthecomplaintsrelatedtodelaysandwerereceivedviaemails,thesewerenotrecordedastheywereconsideredaroutinepartoftheprocess.RefComnotedthatitwasnotuncommontoreceiveseveralemailsfromthesameapplicantaskingabouttheexpectedtimeframeforadecision.RefComfurthernotedthat,mostcomplaintsregardingdelaysweresubmittedbyapplicantswhoseprocedureisstillwithinthelegaltimeframesestablishedbylaw.Complaintswhichwerenotrelatedtodelayswereinvestigatedandaddressed.

5.7 Delay in RefCoM decisions was detrimental to both applicants and government

expenditure

5.7.1 WhiletheRefugeeCommissionerwasrequiredtoconcludecasesandissuedecisionswithinsixmonths of the lodging of the application, themaximum time limit allocated throughtheamendedProcedural Regulations is in fact 21months. Thetime limit is affectedbycomplexissuesoffactsorlaw,alargenumberofTCNsapplyingforinternationalprotectionsimultaneously, failure of the applicant to comply with his obligations, and when theexaminationprocedurecannotbeconcludeddue toanuncertainsituation in thecountryof origin. While the specific legislation cites ten specific reasons as to why extensionscan be resorted to, including in circumstances where heavy workloads at InternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)prevail,thisOfficebelievesthat,thesixmonthsshouldhavebeenadheredtoinmostcasesratherthantheexception,asthecurrentsituationshows.WhilethisOfficeacknowledgestheeffortsbyRefCom,andsubsequentlytheIPA,tostrengthenitsadministrativecapacity,thedifficultiesandchallengesrelatedtostaffrecruitment,referredtoabove,andtheensuingoperationalmattersisresultinginsuchextensionsbeingrepeatedlyresortedto.ThedatacollatedbytheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)withreferencetothetimetakentoissueadecisionbytheRefComwillbediscussedfurtheronwithinthisChapter.

5.7.2 NAOisconcernedthatthelongerittakestodetermineanasylumapplicationcarriesvariousconsequences and has a detrimental effect on the applicants and all the public entitiesinvolvedintheprovisionofservicestotheasylumseekers.

5.7.3 Suchconsequencesinvolveprimarilythepsychologicaleffectsontheapplicantsduetohis/herinabilitytoplanhis/herfuture,theeffectsonfamilydynamics,possibledelaysinaccessingeducationalandsocialresourcesaswellaseffectsonjobacquisitionandstability.

5.7.4 Furthermore,itheavilyaffectstheapplicant’snextstepswithintheasylumprocess,whichgenerallyinvolvesotherMaltesepublicentitiessuchastheformerRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB), now known as the International Protection Appeals Board and Social SecurityDepartment.Moreover,delaysattheapplicationreviewstageimpliesthatintegrationeffortsarealsoextended.


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5.7.5 From a government point of view, the time taken to review international protectionapplications affects public expenditure not only due to the possibility of asylum seekersstayinglongerwithindetentionandopencentreswhen,intheoryatleast,theyshouldhavebeenreturnedtotheircountryoforigin,butalsointermsofgeneraloperationalplanningandensuing implementation.Moreover, thereexists thepossibility that resettlementandrelocationprospectsofapplicantscouldalsoendupbeingjeopardisedassuchpossibilitieswouldnotbeavailableuntilsuchpersonsareregisteredasasylumapplicantsoraregrantedinternationalprotection.TheImmigrationPoliceandtheForeignMinistrywouldnotbeinapositiontotaketherequiredactionasanasylumseekerseekinginternationalprotectioncannotberefusedadequateconsiderationandclosureofhis/hercase.Furthermore,thereexiststheriskthatsuchasylumseekers,whowouldhavebeenawaitingadecisionforseveralmonthsoryears,wouldbemoredifficulttotrace.Table15presentabriefdefinitionbytypeofdecisiontaken.

Table 15 - Definitions of decisions by RefCom

Type of Decision Definition

AdministrativeClosure

Aclosurewhichisnotbasedoninternationalprotectiongroundsasestablishedby

law.Forinstance,incaseswheretheapplicantdiesbeforeadecisiononhis/hercase

isreachedORtheapplicantshowshis/herintenttoapplyforinternationalprotection

asper lawbuthe/shedoesnot lodge theapplicationor theapplicant lodges the

applicationbutisrelocatedtoanotherEuropeanUnion(EU)MemberStatebeforea

decisionisreachedonhiscase.

DublinClosureTheapplicantistheresponsibilityofanotherMemberStateandthathe/sheistobe

transferredthereinaccordancewiththeDublinRegulation.

ExplicitlyWithdrawnAdecisionwhich is issued after an applicant explicitly declares that he/she is no

longerinterestedinpursuinghis/herapplicationforinternationalprotection.

ImplicitlyWithdrawn

Adecisionwhichisissuedafteranapplicantfailstoadheretohis/herlegalobligations

(e.g. does not complywith reporting obligations, does not appear for a personal

interviewwithoutavalidreason,and/orabsconds)thusimplicitlyindicatingthathe/

sheisnolongerinterestedinpursuinghis/herapplicationforinternationalprotection.

Inadmissible

Adecisionindicatingthattheapplicationlodgedbytheapplicantwasnotadmissible

in accordancewithArticle 24(1)(a) of the International ProtectionAct (e.g.when

theapplicantalreadyhadinternationalprotectionfromanotherMemberState).Refugee The applicant is recognised as a refugee according to the grounds at law.Rejection The applicant does not meet the criteria to be granted international protection.

SubsidiaryTheapplicant isabeneficiaryofsubsidiaryprotectionaccordingtothegroundsat

law.TemporaryHumanitarian

Protection

AlocalformofprotectiongrantedinaccordancewithArticle17AoftheInternational

ProtectionAct.WithdrawalRefugee Removalofprotection.WithdrawalSubsidiary Removalofprotection.WithdrawnTemporary

HumanitarianProtectionRemovalofprotection.

Source:RefCom.



5.8 Although RefCom managed to increase its decisions throughput by 11 per cent, new applications increased by 96 per cent in 2019

5.8.1 During2019,newapplicationsincreasedby96.7percentover2018,anincreaseof1,977applications.ThisincreasewasnotmirroredinthenumberofconcludedapplicationssinceRefComconcluded2,215asylumapplications,orrather,22036(11percent)moreapplicationsthanthepreviousyearof2018.Table16showsthedecisionstakenbyRefComduring2019inaccordancewithyearthattheapplicationswerelodged.

5.8.2 Theprolongingofthegrantingofinternationalprotection,duetowhateverreason,hindersasylumseekersfrommovingonwithone’slifeandplanningtheirnextsteps.Suchprolongingalsoshowsthattherecouldbe:

a. lengthyprocedureswhichneedtoberectifiedespeciallywhentheinfluxofboatarrivalsisonerous;

b. possibleinformationgapsalongtheprocessingstageleadingtotheformerRefComand,now,therecentlyestablishedIPArequiringmoretimetoconcludetheexaminationandtakeadecisiononanapplication;and

c. theneedtoinvestincompetentstaffthatisspecificallytrainedinasylumprocedures.

5.8.3 Therecently-establishedIPAcontendthat,whiletheAgencyisrevisitingprocedurestoensurethatprocessefficiency,limitationatlawexistaseachapplicationmustbefullysubjectedtoitsdueprocess.

36During2018RefComregisteredatotalof1,995decisions.


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Tabl

e 16

- D

ecis

ions

tak

en b

y Re

fCom

dur

ing

2019

by

year

whe

n ap

plic

atio

n w

as lo

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Year

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om

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(Jan

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ecem

ber 2

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ve

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Dubl

in

Clos

ure37

Ex

plic

itly

With

draw

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plic

itly

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draw

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adm

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rary

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man

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ithdr

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man

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Tota

l

Yearoflod

ging

an

app

licati

on

nota

vailable

504

512

1813

311

51

913

144

2015

--

--

--

-1

--

--

1

2016

--

13

41-

5-

--

--

50

2017

--

-2

8211

2170

1-

--

187

2018

210

310

116

3413

5815

37

--

-49

6

2019

127

610

2664

213

1916

011

71

--

-1,

337

Tot

al

179

717

4219

738

856

247

352

141

913

2,21

5

Percen

tages

ofto

tals

8.1

32.4

1.9

8.9

17.5

2.5

11.2

15.9

0.6

0.0

0.4

0.6

100

Source:R

efCo

m.

37The

secasesareth

erespon

sibilityofa

notherM

embe

rState.



5.9 Dublin Closures, Inadmissible cases, and pre-2018 cases constituted substantial percentages related to the 2019 decisions

5.9.1 Asnoted inTable16, in2019,RefComconcluded2,215cases.Approximately50percentofthedecisionstakenduring2019relatedtoInadmissibleandDublinClosures.Thefiguresin Table 16 show that a high percentage (32.4 per cent) of these cases, 717 cases,wereDublin cases. The cases falling within this category are usually quite straightforward todecide sincedataon suchapplicants is alreadyavailablewithin theEuropeanUnion (EU)databases.Anothersignificantportionofthecases,388cases(17.5percent)weredeemedinadmissible.ThelargenumberofinadmissiblecasesconfirmedRefCom’sclaimthattherewerenumerouscaseswherebythirdcountrynationalstrytoseekinternationalprotectioninMaltadespitethefactthattheywouldalreadyhavebeengrantedinternationalprotectioninanotherMemberState.

5.9.2 Pre-2018casesconstituted382decisions(17percentofthedecisionswhichweredecidedin2019) indicatingthatsomecasesare indeedcomplexandmaydependonthirdpartiesfor documentation to be provided. The 17 per cent is referring to those cases forwhichnodateof lodgingwasmadeavailableandtothose lodgedbetween2015andend2017.Suchasignificantpercentagecouldalsobeindicativeoftheneedforalong-overduebetterprioritisation of cases and improved operational procedures namely in terms of moreexpedient vetting of international protection applications – a situationwhich is currentlybeingaddressed.

5.9.3 The ‘Refugee’, ‘Subsidiary Protection’ and ‘Temporary Humanitarian’decisionsamountedto56(2.5percent),352(15.9percent)and14(0.6percent)respectivelyofalldecisionstakenduring2019.Thisaudit’sscopedidnotcoverissuesrelatedtothetypeofdecisionsawarded.Consequently,NAOcannotcommentonthetypeofdecisionsbycategory.

5.10 In 2019, RefCom took between nine and twelve months to conclude decisions which allocated international protection or were inadmissible

5.10.1 During2019,onaverage,RefComrequiredbetweentwototwelvemonthsfromthelodgingofapplicationstoformalisedecisions.Table17refers.ThisTableexcludes144decisionstakenduringthisyearduetotheunavailabilityoftheapplicationlodgingdateasalreadyoutlinedinTable16.


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5.10.2 Table 17 also indicates that 238 (11.5 per cent) decisions taken during 2019, referredto applications lodged prior 2018. Applications with an ‘Administrative Closure’ and ‘Dublin Closure’ decisions, on average took nearly threemonths to be concluded whichisunderstandable as these casesaredeemed tobequite straightforward cases since therelevantinformationisusuallymuchmoreeasilyavailable.‘Explicitly Withdrawn’, ‘Implicitly Withdrawn’ and ‘Rejection’,onaveragetooknearlysixmonthstobeconcludedsignifyingareasonableamountoftimeallocatedtosuchcases.RefComcontendedthat,insuchcases,whenitwasconcludedthattheapplicanthaswithdrawntheapplication,abscondedorhasnotcompliedwiththelegallyprescribedobligations,adecisiontodiscontinueanapplication,isgenerallytakenwithinamatterofdays.

5.10.3 Theapplicationswhichtooklongesttobedecidedwerethose,which,duetotheirnature,arethemostdifficulttodeterminesincetheyresultinorthwartinternationalprotectionfrombeinggranted,namelythe‘Inadmissible’, ‘Refugee’, ‘Subsidiary Protection’ and ‘Temporary Humanitarian Protection’categories.Thesefourcategoriesconstituted763cases(36.8percentofalldecisionstakenduring2019)andrequiredanaverageofbetweenninemonthstoalmost12monthstoconclude.Inaccordancewiththelaw(SubsidiaryLegislation420.07[6.5(b)]),inthesecases,RefComwasstillobligedtoinformtheapplicantsconcernedwithinareasonabletimeofthereasonsforthepostponementintheexaminationprocedureorwhythe complexitiesof their casesmeritedextensions to the six-monthperiodprescribedbylegislation.

5.11 The Office of the Refugee Commissioner revised processes and prioritised cases which were deemed routine and most in need of protection

5.11.1 TheincumbentRefugeeCommissioner,appointedinOctober2019,recognisedtheneedtoreviseprocesseswhichwere lengthyand inefficient. In linewithEuropean standards, theRefCom revised the interview and assessment templates in order to process casesmoreefficientlyand inorder toexecuteaproper individualassessmentbasedon factsandtheappropriatelegalanalysis.

5.11.2 RefComconfirmedthatprioritywasgiventovulnerableapplicantsorthoseinneedofspecialproceduralguarantees.ApplicationslodgedbyapplicantsclaimingtobeBangladeshinationalsorMoroccannationals,andotherdesignatedsafecountriesoforigin,andapplicantswhoappliedforprotectionafterbeing issuedaremovalorderby ImmigrationPolicewerealsoprioritisedin2019.



Source:R

efCo

m.

Tabl

e 17

- D

urat

ion

of R

efCo

m d

ecis

ions

(20

19)

Year

app

licati

on

lodg

ed w

ith

RefC

om

All R

efCo

ms d

ecis

ions

(Jan

uary

to D

ecem

ber 2

019)

Adm

inis

trati

ve

Clos

ure

Dubl

in

Clos

ure

Expl

icitl

y W

ithdr

awn

Impl

icitl

y W

ithdr

awn

Inad

mis

sibl

eRe

fuge

eRe

jecti

onSu

bsid

iary

Tem

pora

ry

Hum

anita

rian

With

draw

al

Refu

gee

With

draw

al

Subs

idia

ry

With

draw

n Te

mpo

rary

Hu

man

itaria

n Pr

otec

tion

Tota

l

2015

--

--

--

-1

--

--

1

2016

--

13

41-

5-

--

--

50

2017

--

-2

8211

2170

1-

--

187

2018

210

310

116

3413

5815

37

--

-49

6

2019

127

610

2664

213

1916

011

71

--

-1,

337

Tot

al

129

713

3718

537

043

244

341

90

00

2,07

1

Averageda

ys

takenfora

de

cisio

n85

7317

117

226

626

916

635

828

4no

t a

pplic

able

not

appl

icab

leno

tap

plic

able

182


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5.12 During 2019, each concluded case cost RefCom an average of €714.21

5.12.1 During2019thetotalcostofprocessingasylumapplicationsamountedto€1,581,977.ThisfinancialinformationwassourcedfromGovernmentAccounts.Table18refers.

Table 18 - Costs incurred by RefCom to process applications (2019)

Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost€

SalariesofRefComstaff 880,487 55.7Professionalservices 349,56438 22.1Administrativeservices 351,926 22.2Total costs 1,581,977 100.0Total concluded cases in 2019 2,215Averagecostperconcludedapplications €714.21

Source:RefCom.

5.12.2 Table18showsthatthetotalcostincurredbyRefComduring2019amountedto€1,581,977.Thesecostsrelatedmainlytofixedcostssuchassalariesofpublicserviceofficersemployedbytheentity.Fromapurelyfinancialpointofview,RefCom’scostsweredependantontheefficiencyoftheapplicationreviewprocess.Consequently,thelongeracasetobedecided,thehigher thecosts.Moreover,costswouldhavecontinuedtoescalatebeyondRefCom’sbudgetsinceGovernmentwouldhavebeenobligedtoaccommodateapplicants–chargeswhichwouldbeincurredbyothergovernmententities.

5.13 Conclusion

5.13.1 RefCom,whicheventuallybecameIPA,playedacriticalrolewhenprocessingapplicationsforinternationalprotectionstatus.Theexaminationoftheseapplicationstouchesonlegalandhumanitarianaspectsaswellasadministrativeefficacyintermsofconsistencyandfairnessintheapplicationofpoliciesandprocedures.Thesetwoelementsarenotmutuallyexclusiveandmoreover,theyalsohaveabearingonnationalsocio-economicfactors.Asamaincogintheasylumprocess,itwasimperativethatRefCommaintainedastrongpositiontoexecuteitsmandateefficientlyandeffectively.Theyearreviewedforthepurposeofthisaudit,2019,provedtobeaverychallengingoneforRefComasithadtodealwithanabnormalnumberofapplicationslodgedinadditiontotheoutstandingrequestssubmittedinpreviousyears.

38The€349,564 includesamounts for the InternationalProtectionAgency is currently implementing twoEUco-financedprojectsunder theAsylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundwhichbothincludeinterpretationcosts.TheseareMT/2015/AMIF1.13Improving and strengthening the asylum determination procedure through the training and funds for interpreters and MT/2015/AMIF 1.14 The setting up of a unit that deals with requests related to Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 – establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or stateless person (recast).In2019,atotalamountof€214,442inrelationtointerpretationcostsonbothprojectswaspaidbytheTreasury.



5.13.2 ThisChapterhasshownthatat thetimeof this review,RefComlackedtheadministrativecapacitytobeabletokeepupwiththenumberofapplicationslodged.Giventhecomplexitiesinvolved and the thoroughness of the asylum procedure, RefCom’s shortage of officialstranscendedinprocessingdelays–whichincasessurpassedlegalrequirements.Asaresult,as at end 2019, therewere 3,574 applications outstanding. 802 (22.4 per cent) of theseapplicationsdatebackbetween2013and2018.

5.13.3 Apartfromthe legalandadministrative implications,theprolongingofreviewprocedures–albeitthroughissuesbeyondRefCom’scontrol–hasfarreachingimplications.Applicantsforinternationalprotectionremainuninformedonthestatusoftheircase,capacityrelatedpressuresatclosedandopencentresbecomeincreasinglymoreapparentandtherepatriationprocess,whereapplicable,wasdelayedandperhapsrenderedevenmoreproblematic.ThisimpliedthatthelikelihoodincreasesthatthosepersonswhoarenotentitledtoprotectionstatusstillremaininMaltaindefinitely.

5.13.4 InAugust2020,RefCombecameafully-fledgedAgency,theInternationalProtectionAgency.Themainaimwastobeefupitsadministrativecapacitytoenhancethroughput.Moreover,therewereplansthatthemainofficewastomovetomoreappropriatepremisestoimproveworkingconditionswhichultimatelytranslatestoenhancingcustomerinterface.ThismovehappenedinthefirstweekofMarch2021.

5.13.5 Around ten months since RefCom was afforded Agency status, the number of officialsemployedhasnotincreased–whichmeansthatthe66membersofstaffplanned,havestillnotmaterialised.EASO’sinputinthisregardhasbeenacriticalfactortominimiseapplicationprocessingtime.Thisauditacknowledgesthatsomechangestoworkpracticeshavebeenimplemented.Tovaryingdegrees,therecentlyintroducedproceduresoffast-trackingsomeapplicationshascontributedtoreducingthenumberofoutstandingapplications.Nonetheless,thesemeasuresmainlyrelatetothemorerecentapplications.Bythetimeofdraftingofthisreport,theInternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)wasstilllackingthecapacitytoexpedientlyaddressthehighnumberofoutstandingapplicationsforinternationalprotection.

5.13.6 ThenextChapterofthisReportdiscussestheappealsprocedures.Thisisanotherimportantphase in the quest of granting international protection to asylum seekers since the vastmajorityof rejectedapplicantsappeal to the InternationalProtectionTribunal, previouslyknownastheRefugeeAppealsBoard.

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Chapter 6 | Refugee Appeals Board

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Should asylum seekers have their application rejected by the International ProtectionAgency(IPA),formerlyknownasOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),applicantscanappealthroughamechanismgovernedbytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal(IPAT), formerly knownas theRefugeeAppeals Board (RAB).Additionally, asylum seekerswhobelievethattheyareentitledtorefugeestatusratherthan‘SubsidiaryProtection’or‘TemporaryHumanitarianProtection’,orwhowanttoappealtheDublindecisiontakenbyIPA,canalsoputforwardtheirappealwiththeIPAT.TheperformanceauditwillbereferringtotheRABratherthanIPATsincethisreviewisconcernedwith2018and2019.Figure3referstotheproceduresadoptedbytheRABasatend2019.

6.1.2 MostoftheRABdecisionstendedtoconfirmtheRefCom’srecommendations.Asprescribed

by law, the RAB’s decision was final. Following a negative decision, the police officersdelegatedbythePrincipalImmigrationOfficerwouldcommenceprocedurestoreturnformerapplicantstotheirrespectivecountriesoforigin.AppellantsmayhaveattemptedtooverturntheRefCom’sdecisionthroughahumanrightsclaimpursuanttotheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)and/ortheMalteseConstitutiononpointsoflawrelatedtoviolationofsomefundamentalhumanright.Appellants,attimesalsoseekjudicialredressthroughtheordinarycourtsbywayofjudicialreviewofadministrativeaction(Section469AofChapter12oftheLawsofMalta).

Table 19 – Cases overview of work at RAB (2018 and 2019)

Year New Appeals submitted at

RAB

Decided Appeals at RAB Pending Appeals at RAB

2018 929 717 4892019 764 586 668

Source:RAB.

6.1.3 Table19showsdataintermsofnewcasesthatwerereceivedin2018and2019aswellasthenumberofcasesthatweredecidedandpendingasatend2018andend2019.Thedecidedandpendingcategorieswerenotnecessarilycaseslodgedinthesameyear.

74 | National Audit Office - Malta


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6.1.4 ThisChaptersoughttodeterminetheextenttowhichtheRABfulfilleditslegalobligationsandprovidedefficientandeffectiveremedy.Againstthisbackdrop,thisChaptercoversthefollowingaspects:

a. thesuitabilityoftheBoardmemberstofilltheirrole;b. thelackofadministrativestaffandteammembersaidingtheBoards’operations;c. theproceduresrelatedtoRABsessionsandmeetings;d. thedelaysindecisions;ande. thesmallpoolofLegalAidresourceswhichprevailedforabriefperiod.

6.2 Most Board members lacked adequate legal background and experience in asylum matters

6.2.1 TheBoardsetupintermsoftheRefugeesAct(CAP.420)wascomposedoffourChambers;thefourthwassetupinApril2019.ItsremitwastohearandupholdoroverturnappealsagainstrecommendationsissuedbytheRefugeeCommissioner.EachChamberconsistedofachairpersonandthreememberswhowereappointedforthreeyearsoruntiltheirsuccessorswereappointed.OnememberunofficiallyfulfilledtheroleofsecretaryoftheChamber.ThemembersoftheChambersconsistedofachairperson(lawyer)andanothermemberfromthelegalprofession;theothertwomemberswouldhavehaddifferentandvariedprofessionalbackgroundssuchas intheeducationandemploymentsectorswithinpublicentities.TheChamberswerenominatedbytheOfficeofthePrimeMinister,intermsofArticle5oftheRefugeeActandwerechosenaccordingly:

“persons of known integrity who appear to him to be qualified by reason of having had experience of, and shown capacity in, matters deemed appropriate for the purpose:

Provided that at least one of the members of the Board shall be a person who

has practised as an advocate in Malta for a period or periods amounting, in the aggregate, to not less than seven years:

Provided further that one of the members shall be a person representing the disability sector”.

6.2.2 TheRABChairsdeemedsuchopencriterianotamenabletotheexpertiseessentialtoruleon such technical and life-changingmatters since therewasnoonusor requirements fortheBoardmemberstopossessanydirecteducationalorlegalpreparationorexperienceinasylummatters.Thislackoffamiliarityshownbythemembersinlegalinterpretationoftheappellants’casesresultedinthechairpersonsormembersfromthelegalprofessionwithintheChamberstopracticallydecidetheoutcomeoftheappellants’casesontheirown,withtherestoftheChambersimplyendorsingthedecisions.



6.2.3 SomeoftheBoardmembersreceivedtraininginasylumlegislationandproceduresthroughtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)andtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees (UNHCR), specifically on theDublin III legislation in 2017, attendance forwhichwasvoluntary.However,theBoardchairpersonsdidnotprovideconcreteevidenceoftheattendance, the frequency and efficacy of the training and theymade it clear thatmoretrainingwasrequiredespeciallyfornewmembersandthosewhowerenotlegalprofessionals.

6.3 Recruitment of administrative and professional staff to facilitate the RAB’s operations was required

6.3.1 The duties of the administrative staff of the former RAB were varied and wide-ranging.Whilst,theywerenotpresentattheRABsessions,theycarriedoutfollow-upworkoftheChamberssuchasupkeepoffilesanddatainputting,follow-upthroughprovisionofformsandinformationtotheappellants,generalcorrespondencewithasylumseekersandRefCom,settingmeetingswithasylumseekers, keeping information for theBoardanddistributingcasesamongsttheChambers.

6.3.2 Theadministrativestaffincludedfiveclerksandamessengerwhoalsocoveredworkrelatedto the ImmigrationAppealsBoard.At thetimeof theaudit, theadministrativestaffweremostlyquitenewtotheofficeset-upsincetherehadbeenstaffturnover.Furthermore,therewasnoofficeroccupying theroleofExecutiveSecretaryof theBoardandoverseeing theworkoftheadministrativestaffsincethepersonwhofulfilledtherolehadresignedin2018andhadnotbeenreplacedsince.Thisresultedinthestaff,especiallythoserelativelynew,workingwithoutanyclearguidanceorproceduresandworkingdifferentlyaccordingtotheneedsoftheRABchairs.

6.3.3 The RAB chairpersons indicated a lack of a pool of interpreters, research assistants and/orofficersthatcouldhavequalitativelyassistedtheBoardinitshearingsorinresearchinganddraftingdecisions.Nonetheless,formalrequestsforrecruitmentormemosdrawingtheattention to shortages inpermanentkey staff roles inadministrationandotherwisewerenotputforwardbytheChairstotheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement (MHSE) to enable the latter to initiate the recruitment process. This Officedeemsthisstateofaffairsamissedopportunityasthewholedecision-makingprocesscouldhavebeenimprovedbymakingitlessonerousontheChairpersons.

6.4 RAB sessions were not carried out according to uniform procedures and at the same frequency across all Chambers

6.4.1 An asylum seeker had two weeks’ time to start the appeal procedure through writtensubmissions to the Refugee Appeals Board, from the day the decision of the RefugeeCommissionerwouldhavebeenreceived.TheRefugeeAppealsBoarddidnotaccept lateappeals.Thelawdidnotgiveadeadlinefortheconclusionofanyparticularcase,exceptforinadmissibleand/ormanifestlyunfoundedcases; in suchcases theacceleratedprocedure


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appliedwherebytheChairpersonhada three-daytime limit, tocarryouta reviewof theRefCom’srecommendation.

TheChambersdidnotfollowanywrittenproceduresorharmonisedStandardOperatingProcedures(SOPs)

6.4.2 ChambersChairscouldhavedecidedtoholdanoralhearingthusprovidingtheappellantswithanopportunitytoputforwardanynewinformationordocumentationthatwouldnothavebeenavailabletohim/herwhilsttheRefComwasdecidingthecase.

6.4.3 TheaudittriedtoestablishwhethertherewereformalpreparationsfororalhearingsheldbytheBoard.Uponarequestforinformationandrecords,theNationalOfficeAudit(NAO)werenotprovidedwithconcreteinformationonthenumberoforalhearingsthatwereheldin2019andwhichcasesweredeemedworthyoforalhearingsornot.ThisOfficewasnotinapositiontoestablishifandhowmanytimestherelevantChamberwouldhavemetwiththe appellant for an oral hearing. The current Chair of the IPAT contends that the Boardwouldholdanappealworthyofahearingwhentherewasaparticularpointoflaworfactwhichneededclarification,orwheretherewasaspecificrequestbyappellant foranoralhearing.OneoftheChambersheldoralhearingforallcasesitdecideduponin2019.WhilstacknowledgingthatthelawprovidesfortheChairs’discretionwhethertoholdaformaloralhearingornot,suchdifferenceinproceduresraisesthequestionastowhetherappellantsarebeinggivenanequalopportunitytopresenttheircase.

6.4.4 ThisperformanceauditalsoestablishedthattherewerenowrittenproceduresthatguidetheChambers.TheChambersworkeddifferentlytodeterminedecisions.TherewereChamberswhichclaimedthattheymetandactuallydiscussedfilestogetherandagreeduponadecision.OtherChambersdistributedcasesandthenagreedondecisions.Thelatterpointshowsthatsuchpracticemeantthatnotallfourmemberswouldhaveviewedthefilesdeeplybutreliedoneachother’sopinions.ThecurrentChairoftheIPATcontendsthatthisisapracticewhichisusedevenbytheCourtofAppealandtheECHRandthatitislegitimateforonememberortwotolookintothedetailsofthecaseandreportfindingstotheircolleagues.

Record-keepingrelatedtotheRABsessionswasnotmadeavailabletoNAO

6.4.5 While themembersof theChamberswho fulfilled the roleof secretaries confirmed thattheirChambermetfrequently,norecordswerepresentedtoNAOwiththedatesandtimesofthesesessions.Furthermore,nofixedschedulesandagendasshowingwhatcasesweretobediscussedweremadeavailabletoNAO.Therewerealsonodocumentedminutessincesuchminutesweretaken informallyandretainedwithintherelevantChamber.Moreover,informationrelatingtocasesthatwouldhavebeendiscussedwasincludedinseparatefilespertainingtodifferentappellants,makingitdifficulttotracethetimelineofthespecificcaseandoutcomesofmeetings related to thecase.MHSEcontend that they restrictedaccess



to Board processes and decisions, including minutes due to the confidentiality of thesedocuments and to protect appellants. NAO cannot agreewith this position since variouslegislativeprovisionsgrantthisOfficereasonableaccesstosuchdocumentationtoenableittocarryoutitsauditassignments.

6.5 Similar to RefCom, the issuance of appeals decisions were prolonged to the detriment of asylum seekers and increased costs for Government

6.5.1 TherewasnotimelimitsetinlawfortheBoardtotakeadecisionpriortothesetupoftheIPA.ThedecisiongivenbytheRABwasbindingontheparties.AsmentionedwithintheRefComChapter,Paragraph5.8.2,theconsiderabletimeinissuingthedecisioncouldhaveresultedinasylumseekersstayinglongerinMaltathantheymighthavewantedwithoutanofficialinternationalprotectionstatus.Fortheasylumseekers,thiscouldhaveincurredprotectionchallengesandpotentiallyincreasedtheirsusceptibilitytodifferentformsofexploitationinrelationtopracticalandsocialissuessuchasrent,jobopportunitiesandtenureandsocialbenefits.

6.5.2 FromaMaltesegovernmentstance,theirstayingcouldhaveresultedinincreasedcoststoprovideadequatehousingandbasicneedsoveralongperiodsinceanasylumseekercannotberemovedfromMaltawhilstthefinaldecisiononhis/herappealispending.Furthermore,anunfavourableoutcomeofthedecisionafteranumberofmonthsandyears,couldmeanthat the authorities could be seeking return of asylum seekers whowould have alreadysettledinMalta;itwouldimplyanunnecessaryhardshipforappellantsandanextraburdenontheauthoritiestotracethem.

6.5.3 RABdecisionswerecategorisedaccordingtoTable20.


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Table 20 – Categories of RAB decisions

Confirmed THP

TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerconcedestemporaryhumanitarianprotection

toapplicantswhereitdeemsfit.Thistypeofprotectionhasbeenestablishedthrough

practice, not through law, and the Board does not have the remit to grant the

TemporaryHumanitarianProtection(THP).AppellantswouldgenerallyclaimthatTHP

status is not sufficient for them, and that they should have been granted refugee

statusorsubsidiaryprotection.Dismissed Appeal Anappealcanbeupheldordismissed/rejected.

Implicitly Withdrawn Caseswhereanappealisdeemedtohavebeenimplicitlywithdrawn.Thesecasesare

providedforinSection7(2)ofChapter420oftheLawsofMalta.

InadmissibleAppliestocasesforwhichtheacceleratedprocedureisapplied.Theseareregulated

bySection24ofChapter420.Inadmissible {Vulnerable

(UAM – Unaccompanied

minor(s)}

Caseswhichareacceleratedduetothefactthattheyinvolveanunaccompaniedminor.

Inadmissible RejectionsAppliestocasesforwhichtheacceleratedprocedureisapplied.Theseareregulated

bySection24ofChapter420.

Late AppealAnappealwhichwouldhavebeenfiledmorethantwoweeksaftertheappellanthas

beennotifiedwiththeRefCom’sdecision.Manifestly Unfounded Cases in the accelerated procedure, regulated by Section 23 of Chapter 420.Negative Adecisionforrejectionofappeal.

Positive [Dublin]

Adecisionwherebyappellantsuccessfullyprovesthathisasylumapplicationshould

be considered inMalta andnot in another state, in accordancewith theDublin III

Regulation.

Rejection [Dublin]

AdecisionwherebytheBoardrejectsappellant’sDublinappealandconfirmsthathis

asylumcaseistobeheardinanother jurisdiction, inaccordancewiththeDublin III

Regulation.

Referred back to Refcom Thesearecaseswherethereissomepointwhichisnotclear,andwhicharereferred

backtoRefComsothatthisofficeprovidesfurtherdetails.

Refugee Status DecisionswherebytheBoardgrantsrefugeestatustotheappellantbecauseofthe

reasonsprovidedforbylaw.

Sine Die

Whereacaseisputoffwithoutadate,inotherwords‘archived’,sinceeitherappellant

showsnomoreinterestinthecase,orelsewheretheBoardwouldhaverequested

informationfromappellantandthiswouldnothavebeenprovided.

Subsidiary BoarddecidestograntsubsidiaryprotectioninaccordancewithSection17ofChapter

420.Withdrawn Appellantwithdrawshisowncasethroughaletteroranact.

Source:RAB.



Thevastmajorityofappealsdecisionsin2018and2019wereclassifiedasinadmissibleorhadanegativeoutcome

6.5.4 ThefigureslistedinTable21showhowthemajorityofcaseswereinadmissibleand/orhadanegativeoutcome(almost98.0percentofalldecisionsin2018and96.1percentin2019).Themajorityofsuchappealsdecisionsweretakenundertheso-calledacceleratedprocedurewhichprovidesforathree-dayreviewforalldecisionsdeemedinadmissiblebyRefCom.Thisdecisionstillentailanassessmentoffactsandlaw,bothbyRefcomandbytheChairpersonoftheRABatreviewstage.

Table 21 - Breakdown of decisions at RAB (2018 and 2019)

Decisions 2018 2019Positive decisions 15 23 Refugee Status 2 5 Subsidiary 4 13 Temporary Humanitarian Protection 0 2 Dublin 9 3

Negative decisions 702 563 Inadmissible 596 320 Implicitly Withdrawn 1 50 Withdrawn 28 26 Others39 77 167

Source:RAB.

6.5.5 TheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)2019reportdeemssuchinadmissibledecisionsasgoingcontrarytotheAsylumProceduresDirectivesincethere isnoactualexaminationofallpointsoffactsandlaw.Furthermore,theAIDA2019reportspecifiesthatsuchapracticeimpedestherighttoaneffectiveremedyeventhoughthe2017amendmentoftheRefugeesActclassifiessuchareviewasanappeal.

6.5.6 On theotherhand,while thisOfficedidnot enter into the legalmeritsof such cases, inviewofthebacklogoftheRABChambersduring2018and2019,casefilesdonotreflecttheBoard’sdeliberationsonRefCom’s interpretationofpointsof law.MHSE contends that incasesadoptingtheacceleratedprocedure,theBoardneednotcarryoutanewexaminationoffactsinthefile.TheBoardisareviewbodyinacceleratedprocedure,notasecondinstanceexaminationforum.ThispositionhasbeenconfirmedinthejudgmentoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnioninthe‘Alheto’judgementof25July2018.

39The‘Others’categoryreferstodismissedappeal,inadmissible(vulnerableUAM),inadmissiblerejections,lateappeal,manifestlyunfounded,negative,rejection(Dublin),referredbacktoRefCom,andsine-die.


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VariousinternalissueswithintheChambersaffectedthethroughputanddecisiontimeofcasesduring2019

6.5.7 Itisworthnotingthatin2019,therewasathroughputofdecisionsthatamountedtoaround18per cent less than thepreviousyear.Whenone factors in that thehighestnumberofcaseswereinadmissibleandweretakinganaverageoffourdayseachtodecide,thetimetakenbytheBoardtodecidetheremainingcasesisdeemedtobeexcessive.Furthermore,information referred to the Office regarding case conclusion by RAB confirms that casesremainedactiveforaconsiderableperiod.Table22refers:

Table 22 - Decisions by RAB in 2018 and 2019

Year when appeal was lodged at RAB 2018 decisions 2019 decisions2013 4 02014 1 362015 5 162016 9 172017 49 282018 649 912019 n/a 398Totals 717 586

Source:RAB.

6.5.8 Table22portrays thenumberofcases that remainedactivesince2013.DespiteenquireswiththeRABandMHSE,whichmaintainstatisticalinformationrelatedtocaseprogress,NAOwasnotfurnishedwithjustificationsexplainingthereasonforthedelaystodecidethe19caseslodgedbetween2013and2016anddecidedin2018.

6.5.9 Tofurthervalidatetheinformationintheprecedingparagraph,theNAOcarriedoutatracerstudywhich considered120 randomly selectednewapplication lodgedatRefComduring2018and2019.ElevenofthesecasesweresubsequentlytobeanalysedbytheRABfollowinganappealsapplication.ThetracerstudyshowedthatuntilMay2020,onlytwooftheelevencaseshadbeendecidedbytheRAB.Table23refers:

Table 23 - RAB decisions of 11 randomly selected cases

Type of decision

by RefCom

(11 cases)

Appeal decided by RAB Appeal pending at RAB

Total

CasesRAB decision

Average days

from lodging of

Appeal at RAB until

decision is taken by

RAB

Pending

cases

at RAB

Average days

since lodging of

appeal at RAB

until 19 May

2020DublinClosure 1wasimplicitlywithdrawn 196 6 231 7Exclusion 1wasNegative 531 1 533 2Rejection n/a 2 478 2Totals 2 364 9 319 11

Source:NAOTracerstudy.



6.5.10 Table23showsthattheRABtookanaverageof364daystodecideuponeachofthetwocasespertainingtotheNAOtracerstudy.Ontheotherhand,aconsiderableperiodelapsedineachoftheundecidedninecases,whichwerestillactiveasatMay2020.

6.5.11 Suchdelaysdeviatefromtheprinciplethatjusticedelayedisjusticedenied.Thisdatafurthershowcasestheimportanceofdecidingcasesinamoreexpedientmannertosafeguardtheasylumseekers’rightsaswellasthefinancialburdenontheMaltesegovernmenttocontinuetosupportasylumseekerswhoareawaitingRABdecisions.

6.5.12 This performance audit identified twomain reasons contributing to these delays namelyoperationalissueswithintheChambersandtheabsenceoflegalprovisionsspecifyingcaseconclusiondeadlinepriorto2020.Thefollowingrefers:

a. TwomajorfactorscontributingtothelowerthroughputofdecisionsandconsequentlydelaysinRABdecisionsmaterialised:

i. One Chamber was affected by the resignation of a Board Member, who waseventuallyreplacedafterfivemonths.

ii. Theworkflow in another Chamberwas interrupted as a BoardMember did notinvolvehimselfinthedecision-makingprocess.ThisledtotheChamberinquestionto cease functioning for several months. Notwithstanding NAO’s enquiries, noevidencewasprovidedastowhetherMHSEintervenedonanofficialleveltoaddresstheissueofcasebacklogandincreasedwaitingfortheappellants.

b. Duringtheperiodunderreview,theprolongingofcaseswasinfluencedbytheabsenceoflegislativeprovisionsregulatingcaseconclusion.Therelevantlegislation(RefugeeAct,Chapter420)doesnot stipulateadeadlinebywhendecisions shouldbe issued sincethe date of lodging. However, following amendments to the legislation (InternationalProtectionAct, Chapter 420, Section 7{7}) in 2020, decisions taken by RAB are to bedecidedwithinthreemonthsunlesstherearespecificreasonsforextensions.

6.5.13 AnimportantconsiderationrelatingtothesefiguresinTable23relatestotheintroductionoftheDublinRegulationAppealswhichresultedintheworkloadoftheRABdoublingwhilstthenumberofmembersremainedthesameandtheadministrativesupportstaffactuallydecreased.

6.6 During 2018 and 2019, there was no clear system to prioritise pending appeals

6.6.1 Asatend2019,thenumberofpendingcasesattheformerRABamountedto668cases.Oneofthesecasesrelatedtoanasylumapplicationwhichwassubmittedin2009.Table24refers.


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Table 24 - Number of pending appeals as at end 2018 and 2019

Pending Cases TotalYear of lodging

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019Endof2018 489 1 0 0 1 7 40 20 30 77 313 N/AEndof2019 668 1 0 0 1 7 4 4 13 49 221 368

Source:RAB.

6.6.2 Table24showsthatasatend2018,176outof489casesremainedpendingforasignificantnumberofyears.Furthermore,300outofthe668cases(45percent),mostofwhichwerelodgedduring2017and2018andwerestillpendingasatend2019,hadbeenawaitingadecisionforaconsiderableperiod.Despiteenquiries,NAOwasnotinformedofthereasonsforsuchdelaysandatwhatstageoftheRABprocessthesecaseshadreached.

6.6.3 Table24illustratesthattheformerRABprocessedmostofthe2014,2015,2016and2017pendingcasesin2019.Nonetheless,caseslodgedin2013andbeforeremainedunprocessedbytheformerRABbytheendof2019.Thisstateofaffairswasmainlyduetotheconsiderableinflux of asylums seekers during these years. Despite requests, the relevant informationconnectedtosuchcaseswasnotreferredtoNAO.

6.6.4 DespitetheconsiderablenumberofoutstandingcasesattheformerRAB,therewasnotasysteminplacetoprioritisetheprocessingofcases.Uponenquiry,theadministrativestaffattheformerRABdidnotindicatethatcaseswereprioritisedbyanyformalcriteriasuchasinchronologicalorderorinaccordancewiththespecificitiesofthecase.

6.7 Procedures regulating the efficacy of the MHSE’s legal aid service were not clearly established for all stakeholders

6.7.1 Legal aid is fundamental for appellants to put forward facts surrounding their personalsituationtotheChambersduringtheappealsstage.SuchassistanceisallthemorenecessaryforthoseappealingfromdetentioncentressinceaccesstoinformationandMHSEentitiesisrestricted.Alawyercanbeengagedprivately,throughNGOsorprivatelegalpractitionersoralternativelyappellantscanseekfreelegalaidthroughMHSE.Interpretersarealsoassignedtoassist the lawyersduringtherelative interviewswiththeapplicants, ifnecessary.LegalaidlawyerscontractedbyMHSEwereforabriefperiodsubjecttoaconsiderableworkload.Renumerationwasalsonotalwayslookedatfavourablybyprospectivelawyersresultinginalimitedpooloflegalaidlawyers.MHSEconfirmedthatitspooloflawyersincreasedto10in2019.Moreover,theMinistryconfirmedthatremunerationpackagewasalsoimproved.MHSEalsonotedthattheremunerationisinaccordancewiththeminimumfeesstipulatedbytheChamberofAdvocates.MHSEremarkedthatitconsidersthepoolof10lawyersassufficient since this is commensuratewith thenumberof negativefirst instant decisions.Nonetheless,legalassistanceandexpertiseinthisareaprovidedbyNGOsremainsanaddedbonustoapplicants.



6.7.2 In2019,MHSEcontendedthat74percentofnewRABcasesrequestedalegalaidlawyerfrom theirpoolwhile the remainingwere representedbyNGOsandprivate lawyers.Thelawyerswere requested tofileappeal submissionwithin30days fromthe interviewwiththeappellant.SupervisionofprogressregisteredinthesubmissionofreportbythelegalaidlawyeralsofallswithintheremitofMHSE.Submissionscouldremainpendingatthelawyer’sendfordifferentreasonssuchasreschedulingofappointments.Whilsttheapplicants’caseswerethenreceivedbytheRABadministrativestaff,whoallocatedthecasestotheChambersforadecisiontobetaken,theadministrativestaffhadnocontroloverwhentheChambersbegandiscussionsanddecidedthecase.

6.7.3 Table25depictsthesituationwithregardtothenumberofcasesthatwerebeingmanagedbytheLegalAidlawyers.Thenewlegalaidcasesincreasedby144percentfrom134casesto327 from2018to2019.Suchadrastic increasewas theresultof thearrivalofasylumseekersduring2019.Thenumberofcasesthatwerefinalisedin2018and2019wereactuallycasesthatwerereceivedduringthesameyear.Thefourthcolumnshowscasesthatwerenotnecessarilystartedin2018and2019indicatingdelaysintheappealsubmission.

Table 25 - Legal Aid cases in 2018 and 2019

Year New cases assigned to Legal

Aid provided by TCNU

Cases finalised by the

appointed TCNU lawyers

Outstanding cases at

TCNU lawyers’ end

(includes carried forward

from previous years)2018 134 94 2272019 327 195 163

Source:MHSE.

6.8 The average cost for each decision amounted to €246.56 during 2019

6.8.1 Atend-2019,GovernmentAccountsshowthatthetotalcostincurredforAdministrativestaff’sSalariesandremunerationforthemembersofthefourChambersamountedto€109,766.Inaddition,MHSEincurredanexpenditureofapproximately€34,720withrespecttolegalaidengagedtoassistappellants.

6.8.2 Witha totalof586decisionsundertakenby theBoardduring2019, theaverage cost foreachdecisionamountedtoapproximately€246.During2019,thetotalcostfortheRefugeeAppeals Board (RAB) amounted to €144,486. A breakdown of the €144,486 RAB cost isprovidedinTable26.


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Table 26 - Costs incurred by RAB to process appeals (2019)

Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost€

Salary&NationalInsurancecostwithregardstotheadministrative

fourstaff(clerks,etc)

€26,457 18.3

RemunerationtothefourChambers&NationalInsurancecost €83,309 57.7LegalAid €34,720 24.0Total costs €144,486 100.0Total concluded appeals in 2019 586Average cost per concluded appeal €246.56

Source:RAB.

6.9 Conclusion

6.9.1 ThisChapterhasoutlinedthattheinternationalprotectionappealsprocesswascharacterisedbythelengthyprolongingofcasesin2018and2019.Admittedly,asalreadystated,duringthese years therewas ahigh influxof applications for international protectionaswell asappeals.Theimpactofthesecircumstancesisimmediateandrelatestohumanitarianaspectsfrom the appellants point of view and increased costs for Government to accommodateappellantsforalengthierperiod,especiallywithindetentioncentres.

6.9.2 ThebacklogofcaseswasprimarilybroughtaboutbytheChambers’workingmethodsand,in some cases, delays in the LegalAid’s submissionof reports.Moreover, apart from theChambers’Chairs,mostBoardmemberslackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperienceinasylummattersmakingtheseChamberslesseffectiveandconducivetoafairdecisionoftheappellants.AdministrativeandprofessionalstafftoaidRABresearchandcontributetowardstheconclusionofdecisionswerealsofewinnumber.

6.9.3 WhilenotseekinginanywaytodelveintotheBoard’sdecisions,thisauditshowedthattheChambersadopteddifferentapproachestodealwithpendingcases.Moreover,thelevelofdocumentationincasefiles,generally,didnotprovideafullaudittrailsupportingtheBoard’sdetaileddeliberationsbackingorsupportingthedecision.Thisentailsthepointsoflawthatwere invoked.Similarly, this reviewdidnotelicitconclusiveevidenceonthefrequencyofBoardmeetings.Consequently,theauditcouldnotdeterminethenumberofhearingswithinagivenperiod.

6.9.4 SimilartoRefCom,theissuanceofdecisionswasdelayedtothedetrimentofasylumseekersand ultimately, resulting in increased costs for Government. In these circumstances, onecannot ignore thenotion that justicedelayed is tantamount to justicedenied.Thus,NAOfeelsthateveryeffortshouldbeundertakentoaddresssuchissuesinthebestinterestofallconcerned.

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NAO Annual Report and Financial Statements

May2021 NationalAuditOfficeAnnualReportandFinancialStatements2020

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July2020 AnauditofmattersrelatingtotheconcessionawardedtoVitalsGlobal HealthcarebyGovernmentPart1-Addendum

October2020 Follow-upReportsbytheNationalAuditOffice2020VolumeII

November2020 InformationTechnologyAudit:PlanningAuthority

November2020 PerformanceAudit:AnanalysisofMaltaMedicinesAuthorityrecruitment process

November2020 InformationTechnologyAudit:MaltaIndustrialParksLtd

November2020 ReportbytheAuditorGeneralontheWorkingsofLocalGovernmentfortheyear2019

December2020 ReportbytheAuditorGeneralonthePublicAccounts2019

December2020 AreviewofimplementationofSustainableDevelopmentGoal1-Malta’s effortsatalleviatingpoverty

January2021 PerformanceAudit:IsLESAsuitablygearedtoperformitstrafficenforcement functionadequately?

February2021 PerformanceAudit:TheeffectivenessofplasticwastemanagementinMalta

April 2021 ThecontractawardedtotheJCLandMHCConsortiumbytheStVincentde PaulResidence forthemanagementoffourresidentialblocksthrougha negotiatedprocedure

May 2021 PerformanceAudit:Preliminaryreview:NAO’sroleinreviewing Government’smeasuresrelatingtotheCOVID-19pandemic

June2021 Follow-upReportsbytheNationalAuditOffice2021VolumeI

Documents

Performance Audit Fulfilling obligations in relation to