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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Performance Analysis Subcommittee Status ReportMaggie Peacock, PAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• PAS Work Plan Update Annual metric review in progresso In Progress
– M-1 Reserve Margin– M-2 BPS Transmission Related Events Resulting in Loss of Load– M-6 Disturbance Control Standard Failures– M-7 DCS Greater than Most Severe Single Contingency – M-11 Energy Emergency Alerts
o To Review– M-8 IROL Exceedance– M-9 Correct Protection System Operations– M-12/M-13 Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed Protection System
Equipment / Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Human Errors– M-14/M-15 Automatic Outages Initiated by Failed AC Substation Equipment / Automatic
Outages Initiated by Failed AC Circuit Equipment– M-16 Element Availability Percentage (APC) & Unavailability Percentage
Performance Analysis Subcommittee
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• PAS Work Plan Update Continued Annual metric review in progresso Possible development
– Generation WEFOR; year, seasonal, interconnection, region, etc.– Resilience
In Progress: SOR after action review with subcommittees and work groupso Survey sent to entire PAS roster and the leadership of the EAS, RS, GADSWG,
TADSWG, and MIDASWG o Survey responses due August 31
• Work Group Updates (GADS, TADS, DADS, MIDAS) Steady state, no changes to the work plans
Performance Analysis Subcommittee
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Tim Fryfogle, RAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeStatus Report
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
Summary• 2019 Long Term Reliability Assessment• 2019 Winter Reliability Assessment • Probabilistic Assessment Working Group• Schedule
Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeOutline
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2019 Long-Term Reliability Assessment
Date Milestone
Feb 22 NERC Posts 2019 LTRA Materials to NERC RAS Webpage and sends Request Letter to Regional ExecutivesFeb 23 – June 21 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas Collect Data and Develop Narratives
May 1 – June 21 Individual Assessment Webinars: Upon request, NERC and Individual Assessment Areas / Regions Discuss and Address Data / Narrative Issues
June 21 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas submit Preliminary Data Sheet and Preliminary Narrative to NERC on RASSharepoint
June 26 Peer Review Comment Period Begins: NERC Staff posts Preliminary Narratives and Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS Sharepoint
July 5 Peer reviewers post completed Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS SharePoint
July 9-11 RAS Face to Face Meeting: Assessment Area Presentations, Review of Narratives, Discuss Initial Responses to Feedback
July 19 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas post completed Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS Sharepoint
July 26 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas post the Final Narratives, Area Summaries and Final Datasheet on RAS Sharepoint -Preliminary drafts of the front section and dashboard highlights and writeups to RAS
August 27-28 RAS Face to Face Meeting: Review Front Section Full Dashboards due to RASSeptember 3-6 NERC Staff update front section and Dashboards according to RAS Feedback September 6 NERC Staff provides RAS (by email?) rough draft of report and initial key findings for OC/PCSeptember 10 – 11 PC Webinar: NERC Staff Present Initial LTRA Key Findings to OC/PCSeptember 13 RAS Webinar: Review LTRA Draft (page turn) and RAS to provide Informal Feedback on Key FindingsSeptember 17 NERC to send Draft LTRA Report to PC and RASSeptember 17 – 27 PC Review of Draft LTRA Report September 27 PC provides feedback to NERC by COB on September 27September 30- October 4 NERC Staff Reviews PC FeedbackOctober 7 NERC Staff Sends Updated Report with Comment Matrix to the PCOctober 14 PC Webinar: NERC Staff Hosts Webinar with PC on Updated Report; Discuss Any Remaining FeedbackOctober 14 – 18 PC Electronic Vote for Report AcceptanceOctober 21 – November 8 NERC Technical Publications and NERC Executive Management reviewNovember 11 – 22 NERC Board of Trustees Review of LTRAFirst week of December NERC Board of Trustees Approval of LTRADecember 9 Target Release
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2019-2020 Winter Reliability Assessment
Date Action
August 9 NERC sends information (winter summary) request to Regions
September 18 Data updates due to NERC
September 18 –October 1
NERC drafts WRA report using provided summary and data
October 2 – 9 NERC sends report to RAS for review
October 9 – 11 NERC incorporates RAS comments
October 10-11 NERC management and publications initial review
October 14-25 PC review
October 28 – 31 NERC responds to PC feedback; finalizes comment matrix
Week of November 4 PC webinar to review final report and comment matrix
November 4 – 8 PC e-mail vote to approve report
November 4 Report sent to publications for final review
November 11-15 NERC executive management review of report
Week of November 18 WRA release
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Data collection approaches and recommendations report PC endorse Q4
• Provide a forum for the discussion of probabilistic studies across industry groups and stakeholders Host Q4
• Develop recommendations for LTRA enhancements to incorporate probabilistic analysis White Paper developed Pilot study started
• Develop a schedule and scope for the 2020 Probabilistic Assessment
PAWG Work Plan
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
August 27-28 Pittsburg, PA• Review front section of LTRA
• WRA update
November 12-14 Miami, FL• Review LTRA data form and instructions for 2020
Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeSchedule
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
PRC-019-2Compliance Implementation Guidance
Mark Gutzmann, System Protection & Control Subcommittee ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
Entity PRC-019-2 Questions
• Synchronous Resource Guidance
• Synchronous Condenser Guidance
• Inverter Based Resources
Need for Compliance
Implementation Guidance Document
Would Provide Guidance for Current PRC-019-2 Standard
Purpose
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Additional comments addressed by small team• SPCS Approved Draft Document to Request PC Reviewers
Steps Taken Since June 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Subcommittee Leadership Reports and PC Work Plan UpdatesSystem Protection & Control Subcommittee
Mark Gutzmann, System Protection & Control Subcommittee ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
Recent Activities
• Last Meeting: August 27-28, 2019• Current Initiatives: PRC-019 Draft SAR PRC-019 Compliance Implementation Guideline o Ready for PC Reviewers
• PRC-023 Draft SAR
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Synchronized Measurement Subcommittee (SMS) Status ReportTim Fritch, Vice-ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• White Paper Status • January 11th Oscillation Follow-ups• Future Activities
Summary
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Recommended Disturbance Monitoring for IBR Conducted several meetings to discuss how to implement changes and
questions from PC reviews Paper reformatted into two broad categories:o Potential requirement of synchronized high speed recording at the terminals of
unitso Potential requirement of high speed recording within the units
Still under review
White Paper
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• CIP PMU Evaluation Concise implementation guidance on application CIP-002 for PMUs and
related assets Informally reviewed by NERC CIP assurance team and received commentso More real-world details needed to explain assets in the diagramso More focus on assetso Cohesive with past guidelines
Requesting review by PC
White Paper
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Eastern Interconnection Oscillation event on January 11th• NERC SMS will host webinar on January oscillation event on
September 13th • NERS SMS continues to work with NERC ORS and other industry
forums to provide information from January 11th event and results from survey
• Involved in efforts like Eastern Interconnection Awareness Monitoring Systems to identify potential tools for providing oscillation detection for interconnections
Oscillation Event
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
• September 13, 2019 - Oscillation Webinar
• October 31, 2019 – SMS Meeting (Dominion)
Future Activities
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
NERC System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee Updates
Evan Shuvo, SAMS Vice ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Node Breaking Modeling Group Node-Breaker Representation in Planning Modelso Phase two underwayo The proposal document revised and under review, will advise PCEC of changes
• Modeling Improvement Initiatives Modeling notificationso Model Usability and Accuracy Testing for MOD-026-1 and MOD-027-1 (PPMVTF)o Dispatching DER Off of Maximum Power during Study Case Creation (SPIDERWG)
NERC Acceptable Models Listo SAMS approved the PPMVTF updates to the NERC Acceptable Models List
System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Survey Case Creation Practices (MOD-032-1) for Interconnection-Wide Modelso Deadline extended for the survey until September 14, 2019
• Whitepaper Clarify “Load Loss” terminologyo RS (under OC) to provide Operations’ perspective/feedback
• White Paper + SAR Adding Transmission-Connected Dynamic Reactive Power Resources to
“Applicable Facilities” section in MOD-025, MOD-026, MOD-027, PRC-019, PRC-024o Comments and suggestions from the PCEC under review
System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (continued)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• Phase One – CMLD test Complete:o Work with DOE to develop load composition data for EI and ERCOTo Develop Load Model Data Tool (LMDT) for CMLD data managemento Mapping of base case loads and Load Type by EI and ERCOT TPso Schedule CMLD Regional Workshops to kick-off CMLD test at SERC, PJM and
MISO, NPCC, ERCOT
• DER Modeling Complete:o Benchmarking of DER by NERC SPIDER and EPRI as part of CMLD
• Phase Two – Modular CMLD Structure Complete: o Conference call with software developers (PTI, GE, Power Tech, Power World) to
discuss the long-term plan and timeline for modular CMLD implementation
Load Modeling Task Force
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Whitepaper Implementation of NERC Standard MOD-025-2o Approved by PPMVTFo Under review by SAMS
• Reliability Guideline MOD-032-1 Generator Data Requestso On track; target date changed to Q4, 2019.
Power Plant Modeling and Verification Task Force
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
Meetings (A Day & A Half each) Locations
LMTF to meet January 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet January 29-30, 2020
Tampa, FL (FRCC)
PPMVTF to meet April 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet April 29-30, 2020
New Orleans, LA (Entergy)
LMTF to meet July 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet July 29-30, 2020
Seattle, WA (Seattle City Light)
PPMVTF to meet October 27-28, 2020SAMS to meet October 28-29, 2020
Austin, TX (TRE)
Future meetings
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
NERC SPIDERWG Update
Ryan Quint, NERC, SPIDERWG CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• SPIDERWG: System Planning Impacts of DER Working Group• Purpose: to address aspects of increasing penetration of distributed
energy resources (DER) related to system planning, modeling, and reliability impacts to the bulk power system
SPIDERWG Overview
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
SPIDERWG Sub-Groups
Modeling Verification
Studies Coordination
• DER Verification Guideline• DER Forecasting Practices
Guideline
• DER Modeling Survey• DER_A Parameterization
Guideline• DER Data Collection
Guideline• MOD-032-1 Review/SAR• Modeling Notification
• Guideline on BPS Planning Practices with DER
• White Paper: TPL-001 Standard Review
• Recommended Simulation Improvements
• UFLS/UVLS with DER Guidelines
• White Paper: Beyond Positive Sequence
• IEEE Std. 1547-2018 Review and BPS Recommendations
• Guideline on Communicating across T-D Interface
• Education Materials• Coordination of Terminology• NERC Standards Review• Tracking DER Growth
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
• Overall: SPIDERWG chairman transition All sub-group tasks proceeding as expected
• Modeling: DER_A Guideline – seeking final approval Data Collection Guideline – getting started MOD-032-1 SAR – responding to PC comments
• Verification: DER Performance and Model Verification Guideline – in progress
• Studies BPS Planning with DER Guideline – in progress White Paper: TPL-001 Review – nearing final first draft Guidelines on UFLS and UVLS Studies with DER – in progress
High Priority/Near TermWork Plan Updates
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8
• Coordination: White Paper: IEEE Std. 1547 BPS Perspectives – nearing final first draft Guideline on T-D Coordination – in progress Educational Materials and Outreach – in progress NERC Standards Review – getting started
High Priority/Near TermWork Plan Updates
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9
• Next meeting scheduled for October 8-9 Finalizing work products to bring to PC o IEEE 1547 White Papero TPL-001 Reviewo MOD-032-1 SAR
Possibly seeking PC review between meetings (?)
• Lots of involvement in sub-group calls and discussions Great participation from DER SMEs Continued effort to reach out to Distribution Providers Initial stages of focusing on battery energy storage as an upcoming high
penetration DER
Next Meeting
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
GMD Task Force Update
Ian Grant, TVAPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Purpose: continue investigating and evaluating the risk to the bulk power system posed by geomagnetic storms
• Membership: over 50 regular stakeholder participants Representatives from NERC-registered entities are members Subject matter experts from government, manufacturers, vendors, and
research partners contribute as observers
• Work Plan Activities: Vet results of the NERC GMD Research Work Plan Support implementation of the approved NERC Rules of Procedure Section
1600 Data Request for GMD Data (GMD Data Request)
• Meetings: Two in-person meetings per year
GMDTF Overview
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• GMD Research Work Plan is progressing on-track NERC made informational filing to FERC in July Update and interim results discussed with GMDTF August 14
• NERC Staff and GMDTF continue development of draft Data Reporting Instruction
• NERC Standards Drafting Team (SDT) has posted draft TPL-007-1 to address Order No. 851 standards directives
Significant Updates
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• Issue: Scaling factors used in TPL-007 to account for varying GMD intensity with geomagnetic latitude are based on limited data
• EPRI published an interim report called for in the GMD Research Plan in June 2019
New EPRI Report: Latitude Scaling
Report is the result of EPRI collaboration with NASA to examine recent research into latitude effects on geoelectric fields
Highlights methods that will be used in completing the GMD Research Work Plan task to analyze the latitude scaling factor used in TPL-007
• Next Steps: EPRI and research collaborators continue analysis of geomagnetic field data
and simulations Publish a final report in Q1 2020
Latitude Scaling Factor
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Data Reporting Instruction (DRI) is being developed by NERC Assists NERC and reporting entities in
fulfilling the GMD Data Request reporting requirements
Specifies processes, formats, and timelines for data collection
• NERC discussed draft with GMDTF during August GMDTF meeting
• Applies to Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data
• Anticipate collection to begin in 2020
Data Reporting Instruction
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
• Draft TPL-007-4 addresses FERC Order 851 Regulatory Filing Deadline of July 2020
• The Commission directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2:(1) to require the development and implementation of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and (2) to authorize extensions of time to implement corrective action plans on a case-by-case basis
• Formal initial posting 45-day comment period | June 26 – September 9, 2019 10-day ballot period | August 30 – September 9, 2019
GMD Standards Update (Info)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order initiates further actions to address geomagnetic disturbances (GMD)
• Two-year research effort with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Funding support from participating utilities Promotes further knowledge of severe
GMD event impacts Expected completion Q1 2020
• EPRI makes reports and tools available to the public at no charge
NERC GMD Research Plan
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9
NERC GMD Research Plan Objectives
Improved Earth Conductivity
Models
Improved Harmonic Analysis
Capability
00.20.40.60.8
11.21.41.61.8
2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
pu fl
ux
Current, pu
Per Unit Saturation Curve
Harmonic Impacts
Transformer Thermal Impacts
Spatial Averaging
Latitude Scaling Factor
Geoelectric Field Evaluation• EPRI Project is scheduled to
address all Order No. 830 objectives by Q1 2020
• Support TPL-007 standard• EPRI publishes technical
reports for each objective
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY10
• NERC Board approved Rules of Procedure Section 1600 data request for collecting GMD data in August 2018 Responds to FERC Order No. 830 directives
for collecting data to “improve our collective understanding” of GMD risk
NERC developed the GMD Data Request with GMD Task Force (GMDTF) and technical committee input
GMD Data Collection Background
Approved by NERC Board in August 2018
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY11
• Data will be collected for GMD events that meet or exceed KP-7 Including historical events back to May 2013 On average, 200 KP-7 GMD events occur in
11-year solar cycle
• Applies to Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data
• Anticipate collection to begin in 2020
GMD Data Collection Update
Approved by NERC Board in August 2018
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Electric Gas Working GroupUpdate
Todd Snitchler, CEO, EPSA; EGWG Vice ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Scope approved at June Planning Committee Meeting• 125 Roster members across ISO/RTOs; vertically integrated
utilities, NERC Regions, industry trade organizations• Reliability Guideline to be developed by October and brought to
Planning Committee for comment posting• Ongoing activities to monitor effectiveness of Guideline and
other fuel related issues
Update
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Electric Generation Fuel Supply Primer• Fuel Assurance Principles• Fuel Assurance Risk Analysis
Guideline Components
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Reliability GuidelineDER_A Model Parameterization
Ryan Quint, NERC, SPIDERWG CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
This Reliability Guideline…• Provides TP/PCs with more detailed
understanding of the DER_A dynamic model and how to use it
• Provides recommendations for developing parameters values for the model
• Provides guidance pertaining to modeling U-DER and R-DER effectively
• Builds off of the existing NERC DER modeling guidelines developed by NERC LMTF
Guideline Overview
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• June PC Mtg Presented for authorization to post• June–Aug Comment period• Aug SPIDERWG response to comments• Sept PC Mtg Seeking final PC approval• Sept Publication/posting• Oct/Nov Possible information webinar
Timeline
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• Technical subject matter clarifications and questions –addressed throughout guideline.
• Questions related to IEEE 1547-2018 standard requirements and linkage to model parameters – clarifications made.
• Addition of boilerplate language up front.• Definition of DER across industry – linkage to DERTF definition
and prior LMTF guidelines on U-DER and R-DER for modeling.• Applicability of DP for providing DER information – response to
comment highlighting DERTF SAR to address this.• Question on protection implications – coordinated with NERC
SPCS.• Multiple positive comments regarding guideline and content (!).
Response to Comments
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• SPIDERWG is seeking approval from the NERC PC on the presented final version of the Reliability Guideline.
Request
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Reliability GuidelineImprovements to Interconnection Requirements for BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources
Ryan Quint, NERC, IRPTF CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Inverter-based resource response dominated by controls, not physics need for clear and consistent performance specifications
• Guideline serves as resource for: TOs developing interconnection requirements (FAC-001-3) TPs/PCs performing interconnection studies (FAC-002-2)
• Builds off prior IRPTF guideline*• Majority of newly interconnecting and proposed
inverter-based resources not subject to NERC Standards Due to size criteria in BES definition Need consistency across BPS fleet, not just BES resources
• References IEEE P2800 – bridge solution until IEEE P2800 fully developed, approved, and adopted.
• Recommendations for DER out of scope
Guideline Overview
* https://www.nerc.com/comm/PC_Reliability_Guidelines_DL/Inverter-Based_Resource_Performance_Guideline.pdf
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• June PC Mtg Presented for authorization to post• June–July Comment period• July-Aug IRPTF response to comments• Sept PC Mtg Seeking final PC approval• Sept Publication/posting• Oct/Nov Possible information webinar
Timeline
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• Many detailed technical comments related to terminology, applicability, technical questions – addressed with submitted reviewers throughout guideline.
• Question on applicability of TOs, TPs, TOPs, ISO/RTOs, PCs, etc. –addressed with ISO-NE (submitter) to add callout box on this
• Edits made to avoid ambiguity and ensure technical consistency• Questions on grid forming and fast frequency response –
clarifying responses and modifications to sections to ensure message is clear and concise.
• Clarification and discussion with submitting entities on open-ended questions (part of IRPTF discussions).
Response to Comments
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Question on use of “TO should” and use of Reliability Guidelines as “either internal controls or the means for assessing performance under Reliability Standards” While CMEP may consider use of Reliability Guidelines in their determination
of risk, not following Reliability Guidelines does not in any way put one in a position of non-compliance.
NERC Standards staff and NERC leadership reviewed Reliability Guideline to ensure no overlap with compliance-related activities.
IRPTF and NERC staff developed response to comments, highlighting the Preamble of all guidelines:o “The NERC OC, PC and CIPC develop Reliability and Security Guidelines, which include
the collective experience, expertise and judgment of the industry. The objective of the reliability guidelines is to distribute key practices and information on specific issues critical to promote and maintain a highly reliable and secure bulk power system. Reliability guidelines are not binding norms or parameters to the level that compliance to NERC’s Reliability Standards are monitored or enforced. Rather, their incorporation into industry practices are strictly voluntary. Reviewing, revising, or developing a program using these practices is highly encouraged.”
Response to Comments
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
• IRPTF is seeking approval from the NERC PC on the presented final version of the Reliability Guideline.
Request
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
PRC-019 SARMomentary Cessation
NERC Planning CommitteeSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report• Recommendation 2 - The use of momentary cessation is not
recommended, should not be used for new inverter-based resources, and should be eliminated or mitigated to the greatest extent possible for existing resources connected to the BPS.
• Recommendation 4 - Voltage protection functions in the inverters should be set based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter itself and not based solely on the PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through characteristic. Within the “no trip” region of the curve, the inverters are expected to ride through and continue injecting current to the BPS. The region outside the curve should be interpreted as a “may trip” zone and not a “must trip” zone and protection should be set as wide as possible while still ensuring the reliability and integrity of the inverter-based resource.
Disturbance Report
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 1b: Work with their inverter manufacturer(s)
to identify the changes that can be made to eliminate momentary cessation of current injection to the greatest extent possible, consistent with equipment capability. For inverters where momentary cessation cannot be eliminated entirely (i.e., by using another form of ride-through mode), identify the changes that can be made to momentary cessation settings that result in: a. Reducing the momentary cessation low voltage threshold to the lowest
value possible. b. Increasing the momentary cessation high voltage threshold to the
highest value possible, at least higher than the NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve levels.
NERC Alert
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 3: Coordinate with their inverter
manufacturer(s) to set inverter voltage trip settings using the following principles: a. The region outside the “No Trip Zone” of the voltage (and frequency)
ride-through curves of NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 does not state that it is a “Must Trip Zone”.3
b. Inverter voltage trip settings should be based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter, as necessary. The PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve defines the baseline level of voltage trip settings rather than specifying required trip settings.
NERC Alert
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
• Purpose: To verify coordination of generating unit Facility or synchronous condenser voltage regulating controls, limit functions, equipment capabilities and Protection System settings.
PRC-019-2
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
• Requirement 1.1. Assuming the normal automatic voltage regulator control loop and steady-state system operating conditions, verify the following coordination items for each applicable Facility: 1.1.1. The in-service limiters are set to operate before the
Protection System of the applicable Facility in order to avoid disconnecting the generator unnecessarily. 1.1.2. The applicable in-service Protection System devices are
set to operate to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits.
PRC-019-2
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY11
NERC Alert II
• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY12
NERC Alert
• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY13
NERC Alert
• Q10: Can the inverters be updated to COMPLETELY ELIMINATE the use of momentary cessation?
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY14
NERC Alert
• Q9a/12a: If you cannot eliminate momentary cessation, can you change the settings to < 0.40 or are the existing settings < 0.40?
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
BPS Reliability Performance Metrics Approval and Implementation Procedures: Request for Reviewers
Maggie Peacock, PAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Background Developed by the Reliability Metric Working Group (RMWG) to provide
process guidance for metric development. Original document provided:o Background for metric activitieso Metric development processo Data collection, analysis and reporting processo Metric recommendationso Metric trends
Approved by the PC in September 2009
Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Highlights of changes: Added the Performance Analysis Subcommittee - replaced the RMWG Expanded stakeholder engagement beyond original proposed groups Updated the SOR metrics development process and timeline to align with
current state Removed the proposed metrics and trending sections - covered in the SOR
and on the NERC reliability Indicator webpages Moved the Metric Template to an appendix and provided guidance and
expectation of the information necessary to submit a metric proposal. Added a metric comment form as an appendix to use during metric
proposal development Removed the proposed metrics and trending sections - covered in the SOR
and on the NERC reliability Indicator webpages
Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• Next steps Process gap identified:o Create metric review process document
Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
White Paper: CIP PMU Evaluation Responsible EntitiesSynchronized Measurement Subcommittee(SMS)
Tim Fritch, Vice-ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Develop a white paper that provides additional guidance on applying CIP-002-5.1a to assets relating to synchrophasors
• Supplemental to existing CIP papers –neither paper address classification of assets where data is aggregated and used by different entities(TOP, RC)
• Guidance and classification examples on delineation of assets when synchrophasordata is shared between RC and TOP
Objectives
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• Purpose• Background• Guidance• Examples TOP and RC with non-BES Cyber Assets TOP with non-BES Cyber Assets and RC with BES Cyber Assets
Main Sections
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
Proposed timeline• September 10 – Present draft to NERC PC• September 17 – October 31 – PC Review period• October 31 – SMS Meeting(Dominion)• November 8-22 – SMS finalized draft• December 10 – Present final version for PC approval
Request Actions by the PC
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
Frequency Response Assessment with Inverter Based ResourcesEI Changing Resource Mix Analysis
Power System AnalysisSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• where n is the total number of online units in the case,• KI is the status of unit i (Ki = 1 for online, Ki = 0 for offline), • BI is the “baseload flag” for unit i• (Bi = 1 for non-frequency responsive, Bi = 0 for frequency
responsive),• Pmax,I is the maximum active power output of unit i, • Pgen,I is the active power output of unit i.
Definition of Frequency Responsive Reserves (FRR)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
• Frequency Responsive Reserves Definition Clarified• Chapter 1: Updated All Case Summary Tables and Graphs• Chapter 4: Updated Declining EI Synchronous FR Resources
Analysis Updated Assessment of Declining FR Resources in Two Steps Updated All Plots, Tables and Maps to Reflect Revised FRR Added Power Response Analysis
Major Updates to Address Headroom (FRR)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
• Chapter 5: Updated EI Grid Frequency Response IBR Penetration Analysis Added Case Description and Graph to Clarify Case Headroom Comparisons Added Synchronous Generation Disturbance Analysis Revised Plots and Tables
Major Revisions to Address Headroom (FRR)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8
EI Grid CRM Study Case FRR
• ERAG/MMWG Base Case Typical Modeled Droop Characteristics of 5%
• Scenario #1 – Replace 20,644 MW Synch Gen w/ IBRs Dispatch to 5% Headroom on Replacement IBRs IBRs Modeled with Droop Characteristic of 5% or 1%
• Scenario #2 – Replace 20,644 MW Synch Gen w/ IBRs Dispatch to 10% Headroom on Replacement IBRs IBRs Modeled with Droop Characteristic of 5% or 1%
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9
EI Grid Frequency Response for Different Disturbance Levels
2,100 MW
4,500 MW
6,800 MW
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
2019 Long-Term Reliability AssessmentOverview
John MouraNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
NERC Reliability Assessments
• Reliability Resource Adequacy Operating Reliability
• Transmission adequacy• Demand and Generation forecasts• Demand-Side Management• Regional coordination• Key issues - emerging trends Technical challenges Evolving market practices System elements/dynamics Potential legislation/regulation
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• In ERCOT, Planning Reserve Margins are projected below Reference Margin Level for the entire first five year period due to coal unit retirements, planned generation project delays, and continued load growth.
• Ontario is projected to have Planning Reserve Margin shortfalls beginning in 2023.
• Increasing resource variability, energy limitations, and generator performance are increasing upward pressure on Planning Reserve Margin requirements. In addition, risk of not serving load is shown occurring in hours away from the tradition peak demand hour, both daily and monthly.
• As solar generation increases, larger amounts of flexible capacity are needed to support the increasing ramp and load-following requirements.
• Nearly 10 GW of battery storage in next 5 years; 25 GW of DER
Preliminary Key Findings
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall
Texas-RE-ERCOT Five Year RMs
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024Anticipated Reserve Margin (%) Prospective Reserve Margin (%) Reference Margin Level (%)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
Projected 2024 Peak Planning Reserve Margins
Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Anticipated Reserve Margin Prospective Reserve Margin Reference Margin Level
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6
• 10-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of demand increased for the first time in 15 years for North America. Summer growth is 0.63% and winter growth is 0.68%.
Key Finding: Demand Growth
0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.8%1.0%1.2%1.4%1.6%1.8%2.0%2.2%
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
1990
–99
1991
–00
1992
–01
1993
–02
1994
–03
1995
–04
1996
–05
1997
–06
1998
–07
1999
–08
2000
–09
2001
–10
2002
–11
2003
–12
2004
–13
2005
–14
2006
–15
2007
–16
2008
–17
2009
–18
2010
–19
2011
–21
2013
–22*
2014
–23
2015
–24
2016
–25
2017
–26
2018
–27
2019
–28
2020
-202
9
CAGR
GW
10–Year Summer Growth (MW) 10–Year Winter Growth (MW)
Summer CAGR (%) Winter CAGR (%)
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
• Load growth in all Assessment Areas is 2% or under, with three projecting negative load growth
Key Finding: Demand Growth
2.01%1.77%
1.55%1.31%
1.08%1.01%
0.83%0.83%
0.70%0.61%0.59%0.59%
0.52%0.51%
0.42%0.40%
0.22%0.08%
-0.25%-0.32%
-0.38%
Texas RE-ERCOTWECC-SRSG
WECC-NWPP-BCWECC-RMRG
FRCCNPCC-Ontario
MRO-Manitoba HydroWECC-NWPP-AB
SERC-NSPP
WECC-NWPP-USNPCC-Québec
MRO-SaskPowerWECC-CAMX
PJMSERC-E
MISOSERC-SE
NPCC-New EnglandNPCC-MaritimesNPCC-New York
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8
• On-peak natural gas-fired capacity has increased to 455 GW, up from 359 GW in 2009.
• 100 GW of Tier 1 gas-fired capacity is planned during the next decade.
Assessment Area
2024(%)
FRCC 78.1%WECC-CAMX 68.2%
Texas RE-ERCOT
63.3%
NPCC-New England
52.3%
WECC-SRSG 51.8%WECC-AB 51.8%
Changing Resource Mix: Increasing Gas-Fired Generation
-
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Existing Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9
• May 2017 – CAISO first Stage 1 Emergency in 10 years • October 2017 – EEA3 (demand response activated; no load shed)• March 2018 – Record breakers: All-time demand served by transmission-connected solar was 49.95% 3-Hour upward net-load ramp was 14,777 MW; 1-Hour 7,545 MW
• Larger ramps in shoulder seasons; however, supply scarcity more likely during summer conditions
• June 2019 – Two EEA3• Projected 2021 Maximum
3-Hour Ramp = 17,048 MW
Key Finding: Solar Increases Need for Flexible Resources
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY10
Key Finding: DER Projections
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Existing Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Storage Projected to Increase over Five Years
Ten Year Projected Total Installed DER/BTM Solar PV
- 10,000.0 20,000.0 30,000.0 40,000.0 50,000.0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
NATF UpdateNERC PC Meeting
September 10-11, 2019
Wayne VanOsdolNATF Program Manager, Operating Experience Reports and Surveys
[email protected]; 704-945-1925
Open DistributionCopyright © 2019 North American Transmission Forum. Not for sale or commercial use. All rights reserved.
Community Confidentiality Candor Commitment
Topics
• NATF Practices and Reference Document Development• Facility Ratings Practices Development• Resiliency and Transmission Planning Project• NATF-NERC-EPRI Planning and Modeling Workshop• Incorporating Planning and Modeling into NATF Peer Reviews• Leveraging Operating Experience Reports and Surveys
Open Distribution 2
Recently Published Documents• Supplemental Operating Strategies and
Resiliency Practices• Vegetation Management Notifications
Practice• PRC-026 Compliance Procedure and
Guidance Reference Document and Compliance Record Worksheet
• Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings (PRC-026-1) Evaluation Tools Reference 1.1 – Open Distribution!
3Open Distribution
Documents Nearing Completion• Protection System Cyber Security Practices• Pipe Type Cable One-Pager• CAP-OE Program Tracking Practices• CAP-OE Program Metrics Practices• Implementation and Use of Transient Cyber
Assets CIP-010-2 R4• Implementation Guidance for CIP-005-6
Vendor Remote Access• Vegetation Management Imminent Threat
Practices
4Open Distribution
Publicly available NATF materials and information:Planning-Related NATF Documents
Open Distribution
1. NATF CIP-014-2 R1 Guideline - Open
2. NATF EMP One-Pager
3. NATF EMS External Modeling Reference Document - Open
4. NATF HP Roadmap Overview
5. NATF MOD-033-1 Methodology Reference Document - Open
6. NATF Modeling Data Request MOD-032 Reference Document
7. NATF Power Flow Modeling Reference Document V.1.1.1-06-13 - Open
8. NATF Reference - DER Modeling and Study Practices - Open
9. NATF Reference Document Generator Specifications - Open
10. NATF Reference Document Reporting and Verification of Generating Unit Reactive Power Capability for Synchronous Machines
11. NATF Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings (PRC-026-1) Evaluation Tools Reference 1.1
12. NATF TPL-001-4 Reference Document - Open
13. NATF Transient Voltage Criteria Reference Document - Open
14. Transmission System Resiliency – An Overview
www.natf.net/documents
Publicly available NATF materials and information:
Open Distribution
Available on www.natf.net/documents
Publicly available documents relevant to Planning Committee indicated with
• Develop NATF Practices and/or Reference Document:• Describe leading practices for ensuring and maintaining
accuracy of transmission facility ratings • Address FAC-008-3 compliance requirements that are
applicable to the Transmission Owner (i.e., R6).
8
Facility Ratings Project Objective
Open Distribution
Facility Ratings Project - Key Topic Areas/Teams
• Is the Facility Rating correct when a new station or facility is being built?
• Is the Facility Rating correct when a storm/recovery event results in an unplanned change in the field?
• Periodic checks to ensure Facility Ratings are correct
• Tools of the Facility Rating trade
• Facility Rating key definitions and terminology
9Open Distribution
Facility Ratings Project - Progress to Date
• Team established: • 70 SMEs • 39 NATF member companies
• Identifying existing sources of information• Collection of company practices and procedures• Collection of relevant NATF member surveys
• Created five topic-area sub-teams• Target completion January 2020
10Open Distribution
Resiliency and Transmission Planning Project• Focus:
• Planning approaches and techniques • Improve transmission system resilience• Disperse risk – “demote” critical locations• Improve adaptability of system to extreme events
• Project objective:• Reference document, incorporating:
• current member activities, • framework for resiliency-based transmission
planning,• best practices to implement resiliency-based
transmission planning
• Target completion: January 2020
Open Distribution 11
2019 NATF-NERC-EPRI Planning and Modeling Workshop
• June 18-19, 2019• Novi, MI• Hosted by NATF
Member ITC• 148 Attendees
12Open Distribution
Key Topics:
• Modeling and Studies of the Impacts of DER on BPS Reliability
• Modeling and Studies of BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources
• Electromagnetic Transient (EMT) Modeling and Studies
• Node-Breaker Modeling Improvements
• Cascading Analysis Techniques and Studies
• Conventional Transmission Planning Study Improvements
• NERC Standards Updates Relevant to Transmission Planning
Workshop presentation materials are available on the NERC website
– PC/SAMS/Agendas.
Incorporating Planning & Modeling into Peer Reviews
Open Distribution 13
• NATF Principles of Operating Excellence (POE) establish basis for host self-assessment and peer assessment
• 10 attributes• First incorporated in peer reviews as pilot
in 2018, standard offering in 2019• 2019 – selected by members in 4 of 11
reviews• 2020 – selected by members in 4 of 10
reviews
Leveraging Operating Experience Reports• Perform data analysis for purpose of identifying
trends, themes and outliers, that may result in Practice Groups:
• Creating New or Revised POE Attribute and / or Practice• Identifying Benchmarking Opportunities• Identifying Continuous Improvement Initiatives
• Utilize NERC Cause Code Application Process (CCAP) for identifying the root and contributing cause(s)
• Practice Group applicability is identified in each OE Report
Open Distribution 14
Leveraging Surveys• Surveys provide ability for a company to obtain
information across the entire membership on a specific topic. Typically, the company:
• has a project underway• is creating a new process or procedure• is enhancing a work practice
• 50-60 surveys processed annually
Open Distribution 15
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY
PRC-019 SARMomentary Cessation
NERC Planning CommitteeSeptember 10-11, 2019
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2
• Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report• Recommendation 2 - The use of momentary cessation is not
recommended, should not be used for new inverter-based resources, and should be eliminated or mitigated to the greatest extent possible for existing resources connected to the BPS.
• Recommendation 4 - Voltage protection functions in the inverters should be set based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter itself and not based solely on the PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through characteristic. Within the “no trip” region of the curve, the inverters are expected to ride through and continue injecting current to the BPS. The region outside the curve should be interpreted as a “may trip” zone and not a “must trip” zone and protection should be set as wide as possible while still ensuring the reliability and integrity of the inverter-based resource.
Disturbance Report
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3
• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 1b: Work with their inverter manufacturer(s)
to identify the changes that can be made to eliminate momentary cessation of current injection to the greatest extent possible, consistent with equipment capability. For inverters where momentary cessation cannot be eliminated entirely (i.e., by using another form of ride-through mode), identify the changes that can be made to momentary cessation settings that result in: a. Reducing the momentary cessation low voltage threshold to the lowest
value possible. b. Increasing the momentary cessation high voltage threshold to the
highest value possible, at least higher than the NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve levels.
NERC Alert
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4
• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 3: Coordinate with their inverter
manufacturer(s) to set inverter voltage trip settings using the following principles: a. The region outside the “No Trip Zone” of the voltage (and frequency)
ride-through curves of NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 does not state that it is a “Must Trip Zone”.3
b. Inverter voltage trip settings should be based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter, as necessary. The PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve defines the baseline level of voltage trip settings rather than specifying required trip settings.
NERC Alert
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5
Reliability Guideline
Improvements to Interconnection Requirements for BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7
• Purpose: To verify coordination of generating unit Facility or synchronous condenser voltage regulating controls, limit functions, equipment capabilities and Protection System settings.
PRC-019-2
RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8
• Requirement 1.1. Assuming the normal automatic voltage regulator control loop and steady-state system operating conditions, verify the following coordination items for each applicable Facility: 1.1.1. The in-service limiters are set to operate before the
Protection System of the applicable Facility in order to avoid disconnecting the generator unnecessarily. 1.1.2. The applicable in-service Protection System devices are
set to operate to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits.
PRC-019-2