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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY Performance Analysis Subcommittee Status Report Maggie Peacock, PAS Chair Planning Committee Meeting September 10-11, 2019

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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Performance Analysis Subcommittee Status ReportMaggie Peacock, PAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• PAS Work Plan Update Annual metric review in progresso In Progress

– M-1 Reserve Margin– M-2 BPS Transmission Related Events Resulting in Loss of Load– M-6 Disturbance Control Standard Failures– M-7 DCS Greater than Most Severe Single Contingency – M-11 Energy Emergency Alerts

o To Review– M-8 IROL Exceedance– M-9 Correct Protection System Operations– M-12/M-13 Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Failed Protection System

Equipment / Automatic AC Transmission Outages Initiated by Human Errors– M-14/M-15 Automatic Outages Initiated by Failed AC Substation Equipment / Automatic

Outages Initiated by Failed AC Circuit Equipment– M-16 Element Availability Percentage (APC) & Unavailability Percentage

Performance Analysis Subcommittee

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• PAS Work Plan Update Continued Annual metric review in progresso Possible development

– Generation WEFOR; year, seasonal, interconnection, region, etc.– Resilience

In Progress: SOR after action review with subcommittees and work groupso Survey sent to entire PAS roster and the leadership of the EAS, RS, GADSWG,

TADSWG, and MIDASWG o Survey responses due August 31

• Work Group Updates (GADS, TADS, DADS, MIDAS) Steady state, no changes to the work plans

Performance Analysis Subcommittee

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Tim Fryfogle, RAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeStatus Report

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

Summary• 2019 Long Term Reliability Assessment• 2019 Winter Reliability Assessment • Probabilistic Assessment Working Group• Schedule

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeOutline

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2019 Long-Term Reliability Assessment

Date Milestone

Feb 22 NERC Posts 2019 LTRA Materials to NERC RAS Webpage and sends Request Letter to Regional ExecutivesFeb 23 – June 21 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas Collect Data and Develop Narratives

May 1 – June 21 Individual Assessment Webinars: Upon request, NERC and Individual Assessment Areas / Regions Discuss and Address Data / Narrative Issues

June 21 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas submit Preliminary Data Sheet and Preliminary Narrative to NERC on RASSharepoint

June 26 Peer Review Comment Period Begins: NERC Staff posts Preliminary Narratives and Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS Sharepoint

July 5 Peer reviewers post completed Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS SharePoint

July 9-11 RAS Face to Face Meeting: Assessment Area Presentations, Review of Narratives, Discuss Initial Responses to Feedback

July 19 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas post completed Peer Review Comment Matrix on RAS Sharepoint

July 26 Regional Entities/Assessment Areas post the Final Narratives, Area Summaries and Final Datasheet on RAS Sharepoint -Preliminary drafts of the front section and dashboard highlights and writeups to RAS

August 27-28 RAS Face to Face Meeting: Review Front Section Full Dashboards due to RASSeptember 3-6 NERC Staff update front section and Dashboards according to RAS Feedback September 6 NERC Staff provides RAS (by email?) rough draft of report and initial key findings for OC/PCSeptember 10 – 11 PC Webinar: NERC Staff Present Initial LTRA Key Findings to OC/PCSeptember 13 RAS Webinar: Review LTRA Draft (page turn) and RAS to provide Informal Feedback on Key FindingsSeptember 17 NERC to send Draft LTRA Report to PC and RASSeptember 17 – 27 PC Review of Draft LTRA Report September 27 PC provides feedback to NERC by COB on September 27September 30- October 4 NERC Staff Reviews PC FeedbackOctober 7 NERC Staff Sends Updated Report with Comment Matrix to the PCOctober 14 PC Webinar: NERC Staff Hosts Webinar with PC on Updated Report; Discuss Any Remaining FeedbackOctober 14 – 18 PC Electronic Vote for Report AcceptanceOctober 21 – November 8 NERC Technical Publications and NERC Executive Management reviewNovember 11 – 22 NERC Board of Trustees Review of LTRAFirst week of December NERC Board of Trustees Approval of LTRADecember 9 Target Release

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2019-2020 Winter Reliability Assessment

Date Action

August 9 NERC sends information (winter summary) request to Regions

September 18 Data updates due to NERC

September 18 –October 1

NERC drafts WRA report using provided summary and data

October 2 – 9 NERC sends report to RAS for review

October 9 – 11 NERC incorporates RAS comments

October 10-11 NERC management and publications initial review

October 14-25 PC review

October 28 – 31 NERC responds to PC feedback; finalizes comment matrix

Week of November 4 PC webinar to review final report and comment matrix

November 4 – 8 PC e-mail vote to approve report

November 4 Report sent to publications for final review

November 11-15 NERC executive management review of report

Week of November 18 WRA release

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• Data collection approaches and recommendations report PC endorse Q4

• Provide a forum for the discussion of probabilistic studies across industry groups and stakeholders Host Q4

• Develop recommendations for LTRA enhancements to incorporate probabilistic analysis White Paper developed Pilot study started

• Develop a schedule and scope for the 2020 Probabilistic Assessment

PAWG Work Plan

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

August 27-28 Pittsburg, PA• Review front section of LTRA

• WRA update

November 12-14 Miami, FL• Review LTRA data form and instructions for 2020

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeSchedule

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

PRC-019-2Compliance Implementation Guidance

Mark Gutzmann, System Protection & Control Subcommittee ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

Entity PRC-019-2 Questions

• Synchronous Resource Guidance

• Synchronous Condenser Guidance

• Inverter Based Resources

Need for Compliance

Implementation Guidance Document

Would Provide Guidance for Current PRC-019-2 Standard

Purpose

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Additional comments addressed by small team• SPCS Approved Draft Document to Request PC Reviewers

Steps Taken Since June 2019

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Next Steps

• PC Reviewers Requested

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Subcommittee Leadership Reports and PC Work Plan UpdatesSystem Protection & Control Subcommittee

Mark Gutzmann, System Protection & Control Subcommittee ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

Recent Activities

• Last Meeting: August 27-28, 2019• Current Initiatives: PRC-019 Draft SAR PRC-019 Compliance Implementation Guideline o Ready for PC Reviewers

• PRC-023 Draft SAR

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Synchronized Measurement Subcommittee (SMS) Status ReportTim Fritch, Vice-ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• White Paper Status • January 11th Oscillation Follow-ups• Future Activities

Summary

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Recommended Disturbance Monitoring for IBR Conducted several meetings to discuss how to implement changes and

questions from PC reviews Paper reformatted into two broad categories:o Potential requirement of synchronized high speed recording at the terminals of

unitso Potential requirement of high speed recording within the units

Still under review

White Paper

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• CIP PMU Evaluation Concise implementation guidance on application CIP-002 for PMUs and

related assets Informally reviewed by NERC CIP assurance team and received commentso More real-world details needed to explain assets in the diagramso More focus on assetso Cohesive with past guidelines

Requesting review by PC

White Paper

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• Eastern Interconnection Oscillation event on January 11th• NERC SMS will host webinar on January oscillation event on

September 13th • NERS SMS continues to work with NERC ORS and other industry

forums to provide information from January 11th event and results from survey

• Involved in efforts like Eastern Interconnection Awareness Monitoring Systems to identify potential tools for providing oscillation detection for interconnections

Oscillation Event

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

• September 13, 2019 - Oscillation Webinar

• October 31, 2019 – SMS Meeting (Dominion)

Future Activities

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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

NERC System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee Updates

Evan Shuvo, SAMS Vice ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Node Breaking Modeling Group Node-Breaker Representation in Planning Modelso Phase two underwayo The proposal document revised and under review, will advise PCEC of changes

• Modeling Improvement Initiatives Modeling notificationso Model Usability and Accuracy Testing for MOD-026-1 and MOD-027-1 (PPMVTF)o Dispatching DER Off of Maximum Power during Study Case Creation (SPIDERWG)

NERC Acceptable Models Listo SAMS approved the PPMVTF updates to the NERC Acceptable Models List

System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Survey Case Creation Practices (MOD-032-1) for Interconnection-Wide Modelso Deadline extended for the survey until September 14, 2019

• Whitepaper Clarify “Load Loss” terminologyo RS (under OC) to provide Operations’ perspective/feedback

• White Paper + SAR Adding Transmission-Connected Dynamic Reactive Power Resources to

“Applicable Facilities” section in MOD-025, MOD-026, MOD-027, PRC-019, PRC-024o Comments and suggestions from the PCEC under review

System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (continued)

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• Phase One – CMLD test Complete:o Work with DOE to develop load composition data for EI and ERCOTo Develop Load Model Data Tool (LMDT) for CMLD data managemento Mapping of base case loads and Load Type by EI and ERCOT TPso Schedule CMLD Regional Workshops to kick-off CMLD test at SERC, PJM and

MISO, NPCC, ERCOT

• DER Modeling Complete:o Benchmarking of DER by NERC SPIDER and EPRI as part of CMLD

• Phase Two – Modular CMLD Structure Complete: o Conference call with software developers (PTI, GE, Power Tech, Power World) to

discuss the long-term plan and timeline for modular CMLD implementation

Load Modeling Task Force

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• Whitepaper Implementation of NERC Standard MOD-025-2o Approved by PPMVTFo Under review by SAMS

• Reliability Guideline MOD-032-1 Generator Data Requestso On track; target date changed to Q4, 2019.

Power Plant Modeling and Verification Task Force

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

Meetings (A Day & A Half each) Locations

LMTF to meet January 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet January 29-30, 2020

Tampa, FL (FRCC)

PPMVTF to meet April 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet April 29-30, 2020

New Orleans, LA (Entergy)

LMTF to meet July 28-29, 2020SAMS to meet July 29-30, 2020

Seattle, WA (Seattle City Light)

PPMVTF to meet October 27-28, 2020SAMS to meet October 28-29, 2020

Austin, TX (TRE)

Future meetings

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

NERC SPIDERWG Update

Ryan Quint, NERC, SPIDERWG CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• SPIDERWG: System Planning Impacts of DER Working Group• Purpose: to address aspects of increasing penetration of distributed

energy resources (DER) related to system planning, modeling, and reliability impacts to the bulk power system

SPIDERWG Overview

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SPIDERWG Overview

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SPIDERWG Overview

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Foundational Building Blocks

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SPIDERWG Sub-Groups

Modeling Verification

Studies Coordination

• DER Verification Guideline• DER Forecasting Practices

Guideline

• DER Modeling Survey• DER_A Parameterization

Guideline• DER Data Collection

Guideline• MOD-032-1 Review/SAR• Modeling Notification

• Guideline on BPS Planning Practices with DER

• White Paper: TPL-001 Standard Review

• Recommended Simulation Improvements

• UFLS/UVLS with DER Guidelines

• White Paper: Beyond Positive Sequence

• IEEE Std. 1547-2018 Review and BPS Recommendations

• Guideline on Communicating across T-D Interface

• Education Materials• Coordination of Terminology• NERC Standards Review• Tracking DER Growth

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

• Overall: SPIDERWG chairman transition All sub-group tasks proceeding as expected

• Modeling: DER_A Guideline – seeking final approval Data Collection Guideline – getting started MOD-032-1 SAR – responding to PC comments

• Verification: DER Performance and Model Verification Guideline – in progress

• Studies BPS Planning with DER Guideline – in progress White Paper: TPL-001 Review – nearing final first draft Guidelines on UFLS and UVLS Studies with DER – in progress

High Priority/Near TermWork Plan Updates

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8

• Coordination: White Paper: IEEE Std. 1547 BPS Perspectives – nearing final first draft Guideline on T-D Coordination – in progress Educational Materials and Outreach – in progress NERC Standards Review – getting started

High Priority/Near TermWork Plan Updates

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9

• Next meeting scheduled for October 8-9 Finalizing work products to bring to PC o IEEE 1547 White Papero TPL-001 Reviewo MOD-032-1 SAR

Possibly seeking PC review between meetings (?)

• Lots of involvement in sub-group calls and discussions Great participation from DER SMEs Continued effort to reach out to Distribution Providers Initial stages of focusing on battery energy storage as an upcoming high

penetration DER

Next Meeting

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY10

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

GMD Task Force Update

Ian Grant, TVAPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Purpose: continue investigating and evaluating the risk to the bulk power system posed by geomagnetic storms

• Membership: over 50 regular stakeholder participants Representatives from NERC-registered entities are members Subject matter experts from government, manufacturers, vendors, and

research partners contribute as observers

• Work Plan Activities: Vet results of the NERC GMD Research Work Plan Support implementation of the approved NERC Rules of Procedure Section

1600 Data Request for GMD Data (GMD Data Request)

• Meetings: Two in-person meetings per year

GMDTF Overview

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• GMD Research Work Plan is progressing on-track NERC made informational filing to FERC in July Update and interim results discussed with GMDTF August 14

• NERC Staff and GMDTF continue development of draft Data Reporting Instruction

• NERC Standards Drafting Team (SDT) has posted draft TPL-007-1 to address Order No. 851 standards directives

Significant Updates

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• Issue: Scaling factors used in TPL-007 to account for varying GMD intensity with geomagnetic latitude are based on limited data

• EPRI published an interim report called for in the GMD Research Plan in June 2019

New EPRI Report: Latitude Scaling

Report is the result of EPRI collaboration with NASA to examine recent research into latitude effects on geoelectric fields

Highlights methods that will be used in completing the GMD Research Work Plan task to analyze the latitude scaling factor used in TPL-007

• Next Steps: EPRI and research collaborators continue analysis of geomagnetic field data

and simulations Publish a final report in Q1 2020

Latitude Scaling Factor

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• Data Reporting Instruction (DRI) is being developed by NERC Assists NERC and reporting entities in

fulfilling the GMD Data Request reporting requirements

Specifies processes, formats, and timelines for data collection

• NERC discussed draft with GMDTF during August GMDTF meeting

• Applies to Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data

• Anticipate collection to begin in 2020

Data Reporting Instruction

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

• Draft TPL-007-4 addresses FERC Order 851 Regulatory Filing Deadline of July 2020

• The Commission directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2:(1) to require the development and implementation of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and (2) to authorize extensions of time to implement corrective action plans on a case-by-case basis

• Formal initial posting 45-day comment period | June 26 – September 9, 2019 10-day ballot period | August 30 – September 9, 2019

GMD Standards Update (Info)

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8

• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order initiates further actions to address geomagnetic disturbances (GMD)

• Two-year research effort with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Funding support from participating utilities Promotes further knowledge of severe

GMD event impacts Expected completion Q1 2020

• EPRI makes reports and tools available to the public at no charge

NERC GMD Research Plan

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9

NERC GMD Research Plan Objectives

Improved Earth Conductivity

Models

Improved Harmonic Analysis

Capability

00.20.40.60.8

11.21.41.61.8

2

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4

pu fl

ux

Current, pu

Per Unit Saturation Curve

Harmonic Impacts

Transformer Thermal Impacts

Spatial Averaging

Latitude Scaling Factor

Geoelectric Field Evaluation• EPRI Project is scheduled to

address all Order No. 830 objectives by Q1 2020

• Support TPL-007 standard• EPRI publishes technical

reports for each objective

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY10

• NERC Board approved Rules of Procedure Section 1600 data request for collecting GMD data in August 2018 Responds to FERC Order No. 830 directives

for collecting data to “improve our collective understanding” of GMD risk

NERC developed the GMD Data Request with GMD Task Force (GMDTF) and technical committee input

GMD Data Collection Background

Approved by NERC Board in August 2018

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY11

• Data will be collected for GMD events that meet or exceed KP-7 Including historical events back to May 2013 On average, 200 KP-7 GMD events occur in

11-year solar cycle

• Applies to Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data

• Anticipate collection to begin in 2020

GMD Data Collection Update

Approved by NERC Board in August 2018

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Electric Gas Working GroupUpdate

Todd Snitchler, CEO, EPSA; EGWG Vice ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Scope approved at June Planning Committee Meeting• 125 Roster members across ISO/RTOs; vertically integrated

utilities, NERC Regions, industry trade organizations• Reliability Guideline to be developed by October and brought to

Planning Committee for comment posting• Ongoing activities to monitor effectiveness of Guideline and

other fuel related issues

Update

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Electric Generation Fuel Supply Primer• Fuel Assurance Principles• Fuel Assurance Risk Analysis

Guideline Components

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Reliability GuidelineDER_A Model Parameterization

Ryan Quint, NERC, SPIDERWG CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

This Reliability Guideline…• Provides TP/PCs with more detailed

understanding of the DER_A dynamic model and how to use it

• Provides recommendations for developing parameters values for the model

• Provides guidance pertaining to modeling U-DER and R-DER effectively

• Builds off of the existing NERC DER modeling guidelines developed by NERC LMTF

Guideline Overview

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• June PC Mtg Presented for authorization to post• June–Aug Comment period• Aug SPIDERWG response to comments• Sept PC Mtg Seeking final PC approval• Sept Publication/posting• Oct/Nov Possible information webinar

Timeline

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• Technical subject matter clarifications and questions –addressed throughout guideline.

• Questions related to IEEE 1547-2018 standard requirements and linkage to model parameters – clarifications made.

• Addition of boilerplate language up front.• Definition of DER across industry – linkage to DERTF definition

and prior LMTF guidelines on U-DER and R-DER for modeling.• Applicability of DP for providing DER information – response to

comment highlighting DERTF SAR to address this.• Question on protection implications – coordinated with NERC

SPCS.• Multiple positive comments regarding guideline and content (!).

Response to Comments

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• SPIDERWG is seeking approval from the NERC PC on the presented final version of the Reliability Guideline.

Request

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Reliability GuidelineImprovements to Interconnection Requirements for BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources

Ryan Quint, NERC, IRPTF CoordinatorNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Inverter-based resource response dominated by controls, not physics need for clear and consistent performance specifications

• Guideline serves as resource for: TOs developing interconnection requirements (FAC-001-3) TPs/PCs performing interconnection studies (FAC-002-2)

• Builds off prior IRPTF guideline*• Majority of newly interconnecting and proposed

inverter-based resources not subject to NERC Standards Due to size criteria in BES definition Need consistency across BPS fleet, not just BES resources

• References IEEE P2800 – bridge solution until IEEE P2800 fully developed, approved, and adopted.

• Recommendations for DER out of scope

Guideline Overview

* https://www.nerc.com/comm/PC_Reliability_Guidelines_DL/Inverter-Based_Resource_Performance_Guideline.pdf

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• June PC Mtg Presented for authorization to post• June–July Comment period• July-Aug IRPTF response to comments• Sept PC Mtg Seeking final PC approval• Sept Publication/posting• Oct/Nov Possible information webinar

Timeline

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• Many detailed technical comments related to terminology, applicability, technical questions – addressed with submitted reviewers throughout guideline.

• Question on applicability of TOs, TPs, TOPs, ISO/RTOs, PCs, etc. –addressed with ISO-NE (submitter) to add callout box on this

• Edits made to avoid ambiguity and ensure technical consistency• Questions on grid forming and fast frequency response –

clarifying responses and modifications to sections to ensure message is clear and concise.

• Clarification and discussion with submitting entities on open-ended questions (part of IRPTF discussions).

Response to Comments

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

• Question on use of “TO should” and use of Reliability Guidelines as “either internal controls or the means for assessing performance under Reliability Standards” While CMEP may consider use of Reliability Guidelines in their determination

of risk, not following Reliability Guidelines does not in any way put one in a position of non-compliance.

NERC Standards staff and NERC leadership reviewed Reliability Guideline to ensure no overlap with compliance-related activities.

IRPTF and NERC staff developed response to comments, highlighting the Preamble of all guidelines:o “The NERC OC, PC and CIPC develop Reliability and Security Guidelines, which include

the collective experience, expertise and judgment of the industry. The objective of the reliability guidelines is to distribute key practices and information on specific issues critical to promote and maintain a highly reliable and secure bulk power system. Reliability guidelines are not binding norms or parameters to the level that compliance to NERC’s Reliability Standards are monitored or enforced. Rather, their incorporation into industry practices are strictly voluntary. Reviewing, revising, or developing a program using these practices is highly encouraged.”

Response to Comments

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

• IRPTF is seeking approval from the NERC PC on the presented final version of the Reliability Guideline.

Request

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

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PRC-019 SARMomentary Cessation

NERC Planning CommitteeSeptember 10-11, 2019

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Voltage Limits, PRC-024, and PRC-019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report• Recommendation 2 - The use of momentary cessation is not

recommended, should not be used for new inverter-based resources, and should be eliminated or mitigated to the greatest extent possible for existing resources connected to the BPS.

• Recommendation 4 - Voltage protection functions in the inverters should be set based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter itself and not based solely on the PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through characteristic. Within the “no trip” region of the curve, the inverters are expected to ride through and continue injecting current to the BPS. The region outside the curve should be interpreted as a “may trip” zone and not a “must trip” zone and protection should be set as wide as possible while still ensuring the reliability and integrity of the inverter-based resource.

Disturbance Report

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 1b: Work with their inverter manufacturer(s)

to identify the changes that can be made to eliminate momentary cessation of current injection to the greatest extent possible, consistent with equipment capability. For inverters where momentary cessation cannot be eliminated entirely (i.e., by using another form of ride-through mode), identify the changes that can be made to momentary cessation settings that result in: a. Reducing the momentary cessation low voltage threshold to the lowest

value possible. b. Increasing the momentary cessation high voltage threshold to the

highest value possible, at least higher than the NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve levels.

NERC Alert

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• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 3: Coordinate with their inverter

manufacturer(s) to set inverter voltage trip settings using the following principles: a. The region outside the “No Trip Zone” of the voltage (and frequency)

ride-through curves of NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 does not state that it is a “Must Trip Zone”.3

b. Inverter voltage trip settings should be based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter, as necessary. The PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve defines the baseline level of voltage trip settings rather than specifying required trip settings.

NERC Alert

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

• Purpose: To verify coordination of generating unit Facility or synchronous condenser voltage regulating controls, limit functions, equipment capabilities and Protection System settings.

PRC-019-2

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• Requirement 1.1. Assuming the normal automatic voltage regulator control loop and steady-state system operating conditions, verify the following coordination items for each applicable Facility: 1.1.1. The in-service limiters are set to operate before the

Protection System of the applicable Facility in order to avoid disconnecting the generator unnecessarily. 1.1.2. The applicable in-service Protection System devices are

set to operate to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits.

PRC-019-2

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NERC Alert II

Alert I Alert II

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NERC Alert II

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NERC Alert II

• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY12

NERC Alert

• Q9a: If you answered "Yes" to Question (8), what is the existing low voltage momentary cessation voltage threshold?

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY13

NERC Alert

• Q10: Can the inverters be updated to COMPLETELY ELIMINATE the use of momentary cessation?

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY14

NERC Alert

• Q9a/12a: If you cannot eliminate momentary cessation, can you change the settings to < 0.40 or are the existing settings < 0.40?

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

BPS Reliability Performance Metrics Approval and Implementation Procedures: Request for Reviewers

Maggie Peacock, PAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Background Developed by the Reliability Metric Working Group (RMWG) to provide

process guidance for metric development. Original document provided:o Background for metric activitieso Metric development processo Data collection, analysis and reporting processo Metric recommendationso Metric trends

Approved by the PC in September 2009

Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Highlights of changes: Added the Performance Analysis Subcommittee - replaced the RMWG Expanded stakeholder engagement beyond original proposed groups Updated the SOR metrics development process and timeline to align with

current state Removed the proposed metrics and trending sections - covered in the SOR

and on the NERC reliability Indicator webpages Moved the Metric Template to an appendix and provided guidance and

expectation of the information necessary to submit a metric proposal. Added a metric comment form as an appendix to use during metric

proposal development Removed the proposed metrics and trending sections - covered in the SOR

and on the NERC reliability Indicator webpages

Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• Next steps Process gap identified:o Create metric review process document

Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Metrics Process

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

White Paper: CIP PMU Evaluation Responsible EntitiesSynchronized Measurement Subcommittee(SMS)

Tim Fritch, Vice-ChairPlanning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Develop a white paper that provides additional guidance on applying CIP-002-5.1a to assets relating to synchrophasors

• Supplemental to existing CIP papers –neither paper address classification of assets where data is aggregated and used by different entities(TOP, RC)

• Guidance and classification examples on delineation of assets when synchrophasordata is shared between RC and TOP

Objectives

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• Purpose• Background• Guidance• Examples TOP and RC with non-BES Cyber Assets TOP with non-BES Cyber Assets and RC with BES Cyber Assets

Main Sections

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Proposed timeline• September 10 – Present draft to NERC PC• September 17 – October 31 – PC Review period• October 31 – SMS Meeting(Dominion)• November 8-22 – SMS finalized draft• December 10 – Present final version for PC approval

Request Actions by the PC

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Frequency Response Assessment with Inverter Based ResourcesEI Changing Resource Mix Analysis

Power System AnalysisSeptember 10-11, 2019

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PC Reviewer Comments

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PC Reviewer Technical Comments

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• where n is the total number of online units in the case,• KI is the status of unit i (Ki = 1 for online, Ki = 0 for offline), • BI is the “baseload flag” for unit i• (Bi = 1 for non-frequency responsive, Bi = 0 for frequency

responsive),• Pmax,I is the maximum active power output of unit i, • Pgen,I is the active power output of unit i.

Definition of Frequency Responsive Reserves (FRR)

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• Frequency Responsive Reserves Definition Clarified• Chapter 1: Updated All Case Summary Tables and Graphs• Chapter 4: Updated Declining EI Synchronous FR Resources

Analysis Updated Assessment of Declining FR Resources in Two Steps Updated All Plots, Tables and Maps to Reflect Revised FRR Added Power Response Analysis

Major Updates to Address Headroom (FRR)

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Power Response Analysis

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• Chapter 5: Updated EI Grid Frequency Response IBR Penetration Analysis Added Case Description and Graph to Clarify Case Headroom Comparisons Added Synchronous Generation Disturbance Analysis Revised Plots and Tables

Major Revisions to Address Headroom (FRR)

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8

EI Grid CRM Study Case FRR

• ERAG/MMWG Base Case Typical Modeled Droop Characteristics of 5%

• Scenario #1 – Replace 20,644 MW Synch Gen w/ IBRs Dispatch to 5% Headroom on Replacement IBRs IBRs Modeled with Droop Characteristic of 5% or 1%

• Scenario #2 – Replace 20,644 MW Synch Gen w/ IBRs Dispatch to 10% Headroom on Replacement IBRs IBRs Modeled with Droop Characteristic of 5% or 1%

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9

EI Grid Frequency Response for Different Disturbance Levels

2,100 MW

4,500 MW

6,800 MW

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EI Grid Frequency Response for Different Disturbance Levels

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EI Grid CRM Study Case FRR

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2,100 MW Event Frequency Response IBRs with 5% FRR Headroom

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2,100 MW Event Power Response IBRs with 5% FRR Headroom

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2,100 MW Event Frequency Response IBRs with 10% FRR Headroom

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2,100 MW Event Power Response IBRs with 10% FRR Headroom

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2019 Long-Term Reliability AssessmentOverview

John MouraNERC Planning Committee MeetingSeptember 10-11, 2019

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NERC Reliability Assessments

• Reliability Resource Adequacy Operating Reliability

• Transmission adequacy• Demand and Generation forecasts• Demand-Side Management• Regional coordination• Key issues - emerging trends Technical challenges Evolving market practices System elements/dynamics Potential legislation/regulation

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• In ERCOT, Planning Reserve Margins are projected below Reference Margin Level for the entire first five year period due to coal unit retirements, planned generation project delays, and continued load growth.

• Ontario is projected to have Planning Reserve Margin shortfalls beginning in 2023.

• Increasing resource variability, energy limitations, and generator performance are increasing upward pressure on Planning Reserve Margin requirements. In addition, risk of not serving load is shown occurring in hours away from the tradition peak demand hour, both daily and monthly.

• As solar generation increases, larger amounts of flexible capacity are needed to support the increasing ramp and load-following requirements.

• Nearly 10 GW of battery storage in next 5 years; 25 GW of DER

Preliminary Key Findings

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Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall

Texas-RE-ERCOT Five Year RMs

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

45.00%

50.00%

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024Anticipated Reserve Margin (%) Prospective Reserve Margin (%) Reference Margin Level (%)

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Projected 2024 Peak Planning Reserve Margins

Key Finding: Anticipated and Prospective Planning Reserve Margin Shortfall

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Anticipated Reserve Margin Prospective Reserve Margin Reference Margin Level

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• 10-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of demand increased for the first time in 15 years for North America. Summer growth is 0.63% and winter growth is 0.68%.

Key Finding: Demand Growth

0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.8%1.0%1.2%1.4%1.6%1.8%2.0%2.2%

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

1990

–99

1991

–00

1992

–01

1993

–02

1994

–03

1995

–04

1996

–05

1997

–06

1998

–07

1999

–08

2000

–09

2001

–10

2002

–11

2003

–12

2004

–13

2005

–14

2006

–15

2007

–16

2008

–17

2009

–18

2010

–19

2011

–21

2013

–22*

2014

–23

2015

–24

2016

–25

2017

–26

2018

–27

2019

–28

2020

-202

9

CAGR

GW

10–Year Summer Growth (MW) 10–Year Winter Growth (MW)

Summer CAGR (%) Winter CAGR (%)

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• Load growth in all Assessment Areas is 2% or under, with three projecting negative load growth

Key Finding: Demand Growth

2.01%1.77%

1.55%1.31%

1.08%1.01%

0.83%0.83%

0.70%0.61%0.59%0.59%

0.52%0.51%

0.42%0.40%

0.22%0.08%

-0.25%-0.32%

-0.38%

Texas RE-ERCOTWECC-SRSG

WECC-NWPP-BCWECC-RMRG

FRCCNPCC-Ontario

MRO-Manitoba HydroWECC-NWPP-AB

SERC-NSPP

WECC-NWPP-USNPCC-Québec

MRO-SaskPowerWECC-CAMX

PJMSERC-E

MISOSERC-SE

NPCC-New EnglandNPCC-MaritimesNPCC-New York

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• On-peak natural gas-fired capacity has increased to 455 GW, up from 359 GW in 2009.

• 100 GW of Tier 1 gas-fired capacity is planned during the next decade.

Assessment Area

2024(%)

FRCC 78.1%WECC-CAMX 68.2%

Texas RE-ERCOT

63.3%

NPCC-New England

52.3%

WECC-SRSG 51.8%WECC-AB 51.8%

Changing Resource Mix: Increasing Gas-Fired Generation

-

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

500.00

600.00

700.00

09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Existing Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3

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• May 2017 – CAISO first Stage 1 Emergency in 10 years • October 2017 – EEA3 (demand response activated; no load shed)• March 2018 – Record breakers: All-time demand served by transmission-connected solar was 49.95% 3-Hour upward net-load ramp was 14,777 MW; 1-Hour 7,545 MW

• Larger ramps in shoulder seasons; however, supply scarcity more likely during summer conditions

• June 2019 – Two EEA3• Projected 2021 Maximum

3-Hour Ramp = 17,048 MW

Key Finding: Solar Increases Need for Flexible Resources

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Key Finding: DER Projections

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029

Existing Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3

Storage Projected to Increase over Five Years

Ten Year Projected Total Installed DER/BTM Solar PV

- 10,000.0 20,000.0 30,000.0 40,000.0 50,000.0

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029

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NATF UpdateNERC PC Meeting

September 10-11, 2019

Wayne VanOsdolNATF Program Manager, Operating Experience Reports and Surveys

[email protected]; 704-945-1925

Open DistributionCopyright © 2019 North American Transmission Forum. Not for sale or commercial use. All rights reserved.

Community Confidentiality Candor Commitment

Topics

• NATF Practices and Reference Document Development• Facility Ratings Practices Development• Resiliency and Transmission Planning Project• NATF-NERC-EPRI Planning and Modeling Workshop• Incorporating Planning and Modeling into NATF Peer Reviews• Leveraging Operating Experience Reports and Surveys

Open Distribution 2

Recently Published Documents• Supplemental Operating Strategies and

Resiliency Practices• Vegetation Management Notifications

Practice• PRC-026 Compliance Procedure and

Guidance Reference Document and Compliance Record Worksheet

• Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings (PRC-026-1) Evaluation Tools Reference 1.1 – Open Distribution!

3Open Distribution

Documents Nearing Completion• Protection System Cyber Security Practices• Pipe Type Cable One-Pager• CAP-OE Program Tracking Practices• CAP-OE Program Metrics Practices• Implementation and Use of Transient Cyber

Assets CIP-010-2 R4• Implementation Guidance for CIP-005-6

Vendor Remote Access• Vegetation Management Imminent Threat

Practices

4Open Distribution

Publicly available NATF materials and information:Planning-Related NATF Documents

Open Distribution

1. NATF CIP-014-2 R1 Guideline - Open

2. NATF EMP One-Pager

3. NATF EMS External Modeling Reference Document - Open

4. NATF HP Roadmap Overview

5. NATF MOD-033-1 Methodology Reference Document - Open

6. NATF Modeling Data Request MOD-032 Reference Document

7. NATF Power Flow Modeling Reference Document V.1.1.1-06-13 - Open

8. NATF Reference - DER Modeling and Study Practices - Open

9. NATF Reference Document Generator Specifications - Open

10. NATF Reference Document Reporting and Verification of Generating Unit Reactive Power Capability for Synchronous Machines

11. NATF Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings (PRC-026-1) Evaluation Tools Reference 1.1

12. NATF TPL-001-4 Reference Document - Open

13. NATF Transient Voltage Criteria Reference Document - Open

14. Transmission System Resiliency – An Overview

www.natf.net/documents

Publicly available NATF materials and information:

Open Distribution

Available on www.natf.net/documents

Publicly available documents relevant to Planning Committee indicated with

Facility Ratings Practices Development

Impetus for Action

Open Distribution

• Develop NATF Practices and/or Reference Document:• Describe leading practices for ensuring and maintaining

accuracy of transmission facility ratings • Address FAC-008-3 compliance requirements that are

applicable to the Transmission Owner (i.e., R6).

8

Facility Ratings Project Objective

Open Distribution

Facility Ratings Project - Key Topic Areas/Teams

• Is the Facility Rating correct when a new station or facility is being built?

• Is the Facility Rating correct when a storm/recovery event results in an unplanned change in the field?

• Periodic checks to ensure Facility Ratings are correct

• Tools of the Facility Rating trade

• Facility Rating key definitions and terminology

9Open Distribution

Facility Ratings Project - Progress to Date

• Team established: • 70 SMEs • 39 NATF member companies

• Identifying existing sources of information• Collection of company practices and procedures• Collection of relevant NATF member surveys

• Created five topic-area sub-teams• Target completion January 2020

10Open Distribution

Resiliency and Transmission Planning Project• Focus:

• Planning approaches and techniques • Improve transmission system resilience• Disperse risk – “demote” critical locations• Improve adaptability of system to extreme events

• Project objective:• Reference document, incorporating:

• current member activities, • framework for resiliency-based transmission

planning,• best practices to implement resiliency-based

transmission planning

• Target completion: January 2020

Open Distribution 11

2019 NATF-NERC-EPRI Planning and Modeling Workshop

• June 18-19, 2019• Novi, MI• Hosted by NATF

Member ITC• 148 Attendees

12Open Distribution

Key Topics:

• Modeling and Studies of the Impacts of DER on BPS Reliability

• Modeling and Studies of BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources

• Electromagnetic Transient (EMT) Modeling and Studies

• Node-Breaker Modeling Improvements

• Cascading Analysis Techniques and Studies

• Conventional Transmission Planning Study Improvements

• NERC Standards Updates Relevant to Transmission Planning

Workshop presentation materials are available on the NERC website

– PC/SAMS/Agendas.

Incorporating Planning & Modeling into Peer Reviews

Open Distribution 13

• NATF Principles of Operating Excellence (POE) establish basis for host self-assessment and peer assessment

• 10 attributes• First incorporated in peer reviews as pilot

in 2018, standard offering in 2019• 2019 – selected by members in 4 of 11

reviews• 2020 – selected by members in 4 of 10

reviews

Leveraging Operating Experience Reports• Perform data analysis for purpose of identifying

trends, themes and outliers, that may result in Practice Groups:

• Creating New or Revised POE Attribute and / or Practice• Identifying Benchmarking Opportunities• Identifying Continuous Improvement Initiatives

• Utilize NERC Cause Code Application Process (CCAP) for identifying the root and contributing cause(s)

• Practice Group applicability is identified in each OE Report

Open Distribution 14

Leveraging Surveys• Surveys provide ability for a company to obtain

information across the entire membership on a specific topic. Typically, the company:

• has a project underway• is creating a new process or procedure• is enhancing a work practice

• 50-60 surveys processed annually

Open Distribution 15

Questions?

Open Distribution 16

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

PRC-019 SARMomentary Cessation

NERC Planning CommitteeSeptember 10-11, 2019

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY2

• Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report• Recommendation 2 - The use of momentary cessation is not

recommended, should not be used for new inverter-based resources, and should be eliminated or mitigated to the greatest extent possible for existing resources connected to the BPS.

• Recommendation 4 - Voltage protection functions in the inverters should be set based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter itself and not based solely on the PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through characteristic. Within the “no trip” region of the curve, the inverters are expected to ride through and continue injecting current to the BPS. The region outside the curve should be interpreted as a “may trip” zone and not a “must trip” zone and protection should be set as wide as possible while still ensuring the reliability and integrity of the inverter-based resource.

Disturbance Report

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY3

• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 1b: Work with their inverter manufacturer(s)

to identify the changes that can be made to eliminate momentary cessation of current injection to the greatest extent possible, consistent with equipment capability. For inverters where momentary cessation cannot be eliminated entirely (i.e., by using another form of ride-through mode), identify the changes that can be made to momentary cessation settings that result in: a. Reducing the momentary cessation low voltage threshold to the lowest

value possible. b. Increasing the momentary cessation high voltage threshold to the

highest value possible, at least higher than the NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve levels.

NERC Alert

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY4

• NERC Alert II – May 2018• Recommendation 3: Coordinate with their inverter

manufacturer(s) to set inverter voltage trip settings using the following principles: a. The region outside the “No Trip Zone” of the voltage (and frequency)

ride-through curves of NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 does not state that it is a “Must Trip Zone”.3

b. Inverter voltage trip settings should be based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter, as necessary. The PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve defines the baseline level of voltage trip settings rather than specifying required trip settings.

NERC Alert

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY5

Reliability Guideline

Improvements to Interconnection Requirements for BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY6

2019 State of Reliability Report

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY7

• Purpose: To verify coordination of generating unit Facility or synchronous condenser voltage regulating controls, limit functions, equipment capabilities and Protection System settings.

PRC-019-2

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY8

• Requirement 1.1. Assuming the normal automatic voltage regulator control loop and steady-state system operating conditions, verify the following coordination items for each applicable Facility: 1.1.1. The in-service limiters are set to operate before the

Protection System of the applicable Facility in order to avoid disconnecting the generator unnecessarily. 1.1.2. The applicable in-service Protection System devices are

set to operate to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits.

PRC-019-2

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY9

Voltage Limits, PRC-024, and PRC-019

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Voltage Limits, PRC-024, and PRC-019

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