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U n i v e r s i t y   o f   S a n   D i e g o ;   C a p s t o n e   P r o j e c t   f o r   t h e   M A   i n   I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s  

Counterinsurgency  in  Nigeria:  A  New  Approach?    Alexandra  Perez              

Spring   15  

08  Fall  

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.  INSURGENCY  IN  NIGERIA  ..............................................................................................................................  3  2.  WHAT  HAS  NOT  WORKED?  ..........................................................................................................................  5  2.1  THE  SECURITY  SECTOR:  THE  MILITARY  AND  POLICE  .................................................................................................  5  2.2  DEVELOPMENT  COMMISSIONS  AND  ADVISORY  BOARDS  ............................................................................................  7  

3.  WHAT  HAS  WORKED?  ....................................................................................................................................  8  3.1  ACCOUNTING  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  INFLUENCES  ON  BOKO  HARAM  ....................................................................  10  3.2  ACCOUNTING  FOR  RECENT  REPORTS  OF  NIGERIA’S  SUCCESS  IN  COMBATING  BOKO  HARAM  ..........................  10  

4.  WHAT  DOES  THIS  MEAN:  A  NEW  APPROACH  TO  COUNTERINSURGENCY?  ...............................  12  5.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS  .............................................................................................................................  14  6.  APPENDIX  ........................................................................................................................................................  15  7.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  .............................................................................................................................................  16  

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African politics are often stigmatized with the notions of lack of central authority and general dysfunction. Indeed, numerous articles flood the media concerning the chaos and inability that preclude African states from maintaining central authority. Evidence provides itself in Nigeria, where the Islamic insurgent group Boko Haram has captivated international attention for its attacks against innocent civilians, best depicted in the April 2014 abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls. Indeed, Nigeria provides a particularly noteworthy study, as Boko Haram is the second insurgency to arise within the country’s borders. Nigeria’s southern Niger Delta region has also been plagued by insurgent petro-violence since the 1990s. While the Delta insurgency is ongoing, its stamina has greatly decreased.

The prolonged existence of insurgent groups suggests that there are foundational aspects within Nigeria that have inhibited the government’s ability to respond to insurgent violence in an effective manner. Indeed, corruption, lack of equipment, and deficient counterinsurgency training have undermined not only the military and police responses to the insurgencies, but also the advisory boards created by the state to address socio-economic problems within the insurgent regions. Despite these misgivings however, Nigeria has seen a reduction in Delta and Boko Haram insurgent violence with one, albeit morally questionable response; giving the insurgents money. As will be demonstrated, state payments have profoundly reduced the number of insurgent attacks in the Delta, and have negated Boko Haram attacks within certain states. While this policy has yet to serve as a comprehensive resolution to Nigeria’s insurgent problem, with further action by Nigeria, it has the ability to do so.

1. Insurgency in Nigeria As noted above, Nigeria is facing two insurgencies, one in the southern Niger Delta and the other in the northern region by Boko Haram. To give a contextual basis, an insurgency is best defined as an “…organized, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period that typically utilizes a number of methods, such as subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, in an attempt to achieve change within the state.”1 Indeed, both insurgencies exude varying degrees of these factors. To begin, the Niger Delta insurgency has its roots in the 1967 secession of Biafra, the eastern region of Nigeria. The secession and subsequent civil war stemmed from fears of political exclusion and repression from the north.2 While Biafra ultimately lost the civil war, as Nigeria achieved territorial reintegration in January 1970, many of the foundational problems of political exclusion and general repression were not adequately addressed. Indeed, this sense of political exclusion and regional distinctiveness in the southeastern region has cultivated in the Niger Delta insurgency, which geographically comprises much of the

                                                                                                                 1  Deane-Peter Baker and Lieutenant Colonel Mark O’Neill, “Introduction: Contemporary South Africa andCounterinsurgency,” in South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency: Roots, Practices, Prospects, eds. Deane-Peter Baker and Evert Jordan (Claremont: UCT Press), 2.  2 By way of background, during colonialism, the British favored the south, (the west and the east) by implementing western institutions such as education, which accrued greater access to jobs and wealth. The federal structure of the government at independence was unbalanced, as the majority of the states fell within the northern region. This created a competition between the two regions, as the north feared the south’s superiority, and the south feared the north’s potential domination within the government. Military coups and countercoups between leaders of each region occurred, coupled with murders and rape among the citizens of each region. Eastern leaders thus decided on succession as a means of political protection.

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area as Biafra. While the Delta insurgency is less a means of a political take over of the state than it is a sense of protest over control of the regions oil and its related revenues, it does have some political features. Notably, many of the ethnic minority groups in the region, the Ijaw in particular, have used the insurgency as a means of highlighting their underrepresentation at the government level. Indeed, the Ijaw National Congress served as a political transition program focused on the unification of ethnic minorities to justify the creation for new states.3 Other groups operating in the region include, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) the most prominent and organized insurgent group, The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, and various unorganized groups and ethnic militias.4 In order to achieve a greater share of the oil revenue, these groups have implemented a number of militant attacks including the bombing of oil pipelines and tankers, the kidnapping oil company employees, in addition to oil theft. The insurgent’s ability to steal oil and prevent oil from being exported has led to devastating losses in oil revenue. This is particularly damaging to the government’s funding as oil revenues represent 70% of the government’s budget. Indeed, a United States Institute of Peace report estimates the combined value of stolen and shut in oil as a result of insurgent violence to be $33.8 billion in 2008 alone.5 Given the fact that the insurgency targets the international oil companies, their workers, and the oil itself, many in the region are sympathetic to and support the insurgency’s cause. Further, violence is not typically directed at civilians, though civilian lives have been lost. For a timeline of insurgent activity, please refer to the appendix.

Next, the insurgency presenting the greatest national security threat to Nigeria today is Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group operating in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram began as a mission to eradicate western influence from Nigeria and has sense evolved into a quest to establish an Islamic state. Measuring Boko Haram’s political motivations is somewhat more challenging. Whereas specific fractions in the Delta are fighting for political representation in the existing state and federal structure, Boko Haram seeks a complete overall of Nigeria’s governmental structure in favor of a religious ideology and sharia law more specifically. It is often difficult to differentiate religious and political motivations especially in relation to Islamic structures. For the purpose of this paper however, the drive to create an Islamic state based on sharia law will be seen as a combined political and religious endeavor.

Boko Haram was established in 2002 and did not become particularly violent until 2009.6 It has further splintered into various fractions, some which are linked to international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. 7 Since 2009, Boko Haram has instituted a series                                                                                                                  33 Ibaba Samuel Ibaba, “The Ijaw National Congress and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta,” Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, ed. Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (New York: Zed Books), 71. 4 MEND’s specific goals include environmental and economic justice for its constituents through the payment of $1.5 billion as compensation to the Delta inhabitants, a return of half of the all revenue the federal government has earned from the oil, as well as a new means of allocating future profits 5 Judith Burdin Asuni, “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, August 2009: 6, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/blood_oil_nigerdelta_0.pdf 6 The sudden onslaught of violence can be traced to a traffic stop in Borno state. Security officials stopped members of Boko Harm for failing to wear helmets on motorcycles. The group’s members refused to obey the law, resulting in a clash between Boko Haram and security forces in which 17 members were killed. The state security members later went on a violent rampage, eventually capturing and killing Boko Haram’s leader,Yusuf. Violence escalated as a protest to the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram’s leader. 7 Iro Aghrdo and Oarhe Osumah, “The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 5 (2012): 859.

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of violent attacks on the northern public including but not limited to killings, kidnappings, bombings, and the outright destruction of northern towns. Indeed, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2014 saw 6,347 civilian deaths associated with Boko Haram.8 Accordingly, in light of the fact that most of Boko Haram’s victims are often Muslims, the very people that the group seeks to represent in a better way than the current federal government, Boko Haram does not have much domestic support or sympathy. Indeed, Boko Haram’s violent attacks have led to approximately 650,000 internally displaced people, and at least 150,000 refugees that have fled into neighboring countries.9 For a timeline of insurgent activity, please refer to the appendix.

Now that a general understanding of each insurgency’s cause has been established, Nigeria’s attempts at responding to and defeating these insurgencies can be considered.

2. What Has Not Worked? The prolonged existence of the Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, in addition to the increase in number of insurgent attacks within the past ten years (as noted in the appendix), suggests that Nigeria’s primary means of response have failed. Two examples will be considered in this section, the security sector and the creation of advisory boards.

2.1 The Security Sector: The Military and Police The military and police are essential to a government’s response to insurgent violence. Not only do security forces provide protection for civilians, but they so too act as the primary means to quell violence and defeat the insurgencies. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s security sector has been rather inept. To begin, consider the police. Transparency International’s corruption perception index highlights that 92% of survey respondents find the police to be highly corrupt, making the police one of the most corrupt institutions in Nigeria, second only to political parties. Moreover, 81% of respondents reported to having paid bribes to police.10 This is particularly damaging as the need to pay bribes may in fact deter reports of insurgent related violence because citizens do not have the means to pay the police to investigate their allegations. Moreover, demanding bribes to provide essential security services undermines the credibility of the police institution as a whole. The military has likewise contributed to Nigeria’s failure to end the insurgencies. The military is not only underfunded, due in part to Nigeria’s history of military rule and the fear of future military coups, but it is also corrupt. The result has been devastating for the military’s engagement with insurgents, as it does not have the proper equipment or training to defeat them. For example, the Nigerian navy is a particularly crucial force with respect to the Delta insurgency as many of the international oil companies partake in off shore drilling, one of the many targets of MEND and the like. Indeed, Nigeria has a maritime zone of 200 nautical miles. Yet despite the crucial need of the navy for defense, it has a significantly low presence in the

                                                                                                                 8 Mark Anderson, “Nigeria Suffers Highest Number of Civilian Deaths in African War Zones,” The Guardian, January 23, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/23/boko-haram-nigeria-civilian-death-toll-highest-acled-african-war-zones 9 “Nigeria: UN Agency Reports Ongoing Refugee Crisis Amid Boko Haram,” UN News Center, November 11, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49312#.VU_dqdpViko 10 Transparency International, The Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria, http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA

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Delta. Notably, the navy is not able to maintain bases in every state, as Bayelsa has only one forward operation base but not permanent naval presence.11 This is particularly troubling in consideration of the fact that Bayelsa has seen the third highest rate of MEND attacks in the entire Delta region.12 A further example of the Navy’s ineptitude involves the June 2008 withdrawal of the naval command from the Delta region for training, which was followed by MEND’s attack on the Bonga offshore oilfields. The attacks shut in 200,000 barrels of oil a day, causing the state to lose significant oil revenues.13 Had the navy been endowed with sufficient manpower and funding for resources, it could have sent another command to the area while their counterparts received training. The military has faced similar shortcomings with respect to its battle against Boko Haram. Notably, A CNN report contends that Nigerian soldiers do not have the weapons and ammunition to engage Boko Haram in combat. Specifically, Nigerian soldiers claim that they are often only given sixty bullets a day.14 Other reports claim that soldiers are forced to purchase their own uniforms, resulting in a high degree of variation among military personnel. Accordingly, when running from the target, one soldier noted that it is difficult if not impossible to tell a friend from a foe.15 Further still, civilians have reported seeing Nigerian forces fleeing from combat, many times without proper protective gear.16 Some reports note that it is corruption that has further dwindled the military’s capacity to combat Boko Haram. Indeed, J. Peter Pham, the director of the African Center, notes that the military has budgeted for arms and supplies but that they do not make it to the front lines because the equipment is diverted to the black market or the funds go towards personal use.17 Nigeria’s surveillance drones provide a salient example. The Israeli drones were not only paid for and delivered, but a budget was also allocated for their maintenance and upkeep. However, a few years later in the face of the Chibok school abduction, the drones were inoperable.18 Given the poor record keeping of the government, the actual use of these funds cannot be traced. Nevertheless, the time it took to bring in foreign drones wasted valuable time in locating the kidnapped girls and finding the insurgents.

Further, the military is not properly trained in counterinsurgency operations. Notably, Nigeria’s experience is found in conventional warfare and peacekeeping operations.19 Indeed, an Amnesty International report notes that Nigerian officials were warned of a possible attack up to four hours before Boko Haram members stormed the school in Chibok and kidnaped the

                                                                                                                 11 Charles Ukeje, “Changing the paradigm of pacification: oil and militarization in Nigeria’s Delta region”, Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, ed. Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (New York: Zed Books), 92. 12 The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project, http://www.acleddata.com/ 13 Ukeje, “Changing the paradigm”, in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, 92. 14 Nic Robertson, “Nigerian Military Disorganized, under-equipped in Battle Against Boko Haram,” CNN, January 15, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/africa/nigeria-military-families-boko-haram/ 15 Ibid. 16 Alexis Okeowo, “Inside the Vigilante Fight Against Boko Haram” The New York Times Magazine. November 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/magazine/inside-the-vigilante-fight-against-boko-haram.html?_r=0 17 Aryn Baker, “Nigeria’s Military Quails When Faced with Boko Haram,” Time, February 10, 2015, http://time.com/3702849/nigerias-army-boko-haram/ 18 Ibid. 19 Max Siollun, “Boko Haram: Six Reasons Why the Nigerian Militant Group is So Powerful,” The Guardian, May 14, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/boko-haram-why-nigerian-militant-group-powerful

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schoolgirls.20 Yet no army, police, or government officials attempted to prevent or combat the attack. This suggests that the military did not know how to prevent or address the allegations. Government officials have however, denied these claims.

Finally, Nigeria’s security forces are plagued by horrendous human rights violations. A Human Rights Watch report contends that the military is responsible for the complete destruction of Baga, a town in northern Nigeria. Following a clash between the military and Boko Haram in which one soldier was killed, military forces burned at least 2,000 homes and murdered 183 villagers.21 The pervasive use of violence by a government institution that is supposed to protect the integrity of the state and its citizens undermines its credibility among the citizens. Moreover, this example demonstrates the bias of the military in believing that all northern citizens are sympathetic or supportive of Boko Haram. The failure to understand the difference between Boko Haram and the northern public may lead to a lack of cooperation among the citizens and has the potential to further radicalize the average person against the government.

2.2 Development Commissions and Advisory Boards In addition to the security driven response, Nigeria has attempted to address the insurgencies from a bottom up strategy, or winning hearts and minds approach, by seeking to address socio-economic deficiencies in regions plagued by insurgent violence. Notably, with regards to the Delta insurgency, the government instituted various commissions, such as The Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). OMPADEC was established in 1992 and tasked with, among other things, rehabilitating and developing the oil-producing areas, tackling ecological problems, and liaising with the various oil companies on matters of pollution control.22 Similarly, with respect to Boko Haram, the government created the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) which seeks to address the root causes of the insurgency, including poverty, inequality, and unemployment. President Jonathan has also created the state schools initiative that seeks to encourage children to attend school in northern Nigeria, and the victims support fund that aims to empower and rehabilitate victims of terror.

Unfortunately, while the intent behind these commissions is admirable, the government has been unable to implement and sustain them. Notably, the OMPADEC was dissolved in 1999, a mere seven years after its establishment, because the chairman of the commission had funneled billions of the commission’s naira into either white elephant or non-existent projects.23 As a result, OMPADEC did not have the funding to implement any programs or meaningful changes in the region. Unfortunately, it is too early to tell whether the programs created for northern Nigeria in response to Boko Haram will have any meaningful and lasting response. However, in light of the fact that the Delta programs fell through, it is unlikely that NACTEST and the various initiatives will effect any meaningful change.

                                                                                                                 20 Vladimir Duthiers, Isha Sesay and Chelsea Carter, “Amnesty: Nigeria Warned of Boko Haram Raid at Girls School, Failed to Act,” CNN, May 10, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/09/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/ 21 “Nigeria- Massive Destruction, Deaths from Military Raid,” Human Rights Watch, May 1, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid 22 Kayode Soremekun, “Nigeria’s Oil Diplomacy and the Management of the Niger Delta Crisis,” Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, ed. Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (New York: Zed Books),105.. 23 Ibid., 106

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3. What Has Worked? Despite Nigeria’s seeming failure in combating these insurgencies through military engagement and socio-economic programs, there has been one method that has had an immediate and positive effect on insurgent violence; payments to insurgents. To begin, consider the Delta insurgency. In 2009, the government implemented an amnesty program in which MEND and other insurgents were given the opportunity to cease attacks and surrender their weapons. In return, the amnesty program rewarded insurgents with monthly payments of $400. While $400 a month may be low by western standards, it represents an 85% increase over the average monthly wage for Nigerians.24 The payments were therefore enticing for many.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, the government payments to insurgents decreased the number of attacks conducted. In the pre-amnesty period (2000-2009), MEND carried out 81 attacks, with other non-affiliated insurgents conducting 427 attacks. 25 After the payment program was instituted, the number of Delta insurgent related attacks decreased by 74% with respect to MEND and 19% with respect to unaffiliated group attacks. Figure 1: Delta Attacks Before and After Payments Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project

While the number of attacks certainly decreased, they did not cease all together. A number of factors can account for this discrepancy. To begin, authorities anticipated 10,000 insurgents would take part in the amnesty program and its corresponding payment package. 26 In reality however, somewhere between 17,000 and 26,000 people enrolled.27 Further, it was not only insurgents who signed up for amnesty, but unemployed youths, criminals, and ex-militants.28 The inability of the government to account for the popularity of the program and to moreover regulate who could enroll led to a deficiency in the funding available for disbursement.

                                                                                                                 24 Colin Freeman, “Have Nigeria’s Past Pay-Offs to Militants Encouraged Boko Haram,” The Telegraph, May 23, 2014,http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/colinfreeman/100272922/have-nigerias-past-pay-offs-to-militants-encouraged-boko-haram/ 25 The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Program 26 “Analysis: Nigeria’s Delta Amnesty at risk of Unraveling,” IRIN News, April 23, 2010, http://www.irinnews.org/report/88906/analysis-nigeria-s-delta-amnesty-at-risk-of-unravelling 27 Ibid. 28 Will Connors and spencer Swartz, “Nigeria’s Amnesty Program” The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124942256930505875

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Notably, some insurgents told reporters that the government payments were irregular and did not come on schedule, if at all.29 Without the guarantee of the $400 a month, the government was unable to weed out all insurgent activity in the Delta. Monetary payments have also been used to respond to Boko Haram and moreover, have also had a positive effect on curbing insurgent attacks. However, whereas payments were used to lower the level of insurgent attacks in the Delta, northern state governors have paid Boko Haram to prevent attacks all together in their states. For example, former governor of Kano state, Malam Shekarau paid Boko Haram a reported $25,000 a month in exchange for the group’s word to not conduct attacks within Kano. 30 In April of 2011, a new governor Rabiu Kwankwaso came into office and subsequently refused to continue payments to Boko Haram. As a result, evident in Figure 2, Kano saw a direct and sharp increase in Boko Haram related attacked. While Kano was paying Boko Haram, the state had no Boko Haram attacks. Once the payments ceased, attacks began, resulting in 57 Boko Haram attacks between May 1, 2011 and December 31, 2014.31  Figure 2 (left): Effect of Payment Termination on Kano Attacks Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project

Figure 3 (right): Effect of Payment Termination on Bauchi Attacks Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project

A similar example can be found in consideration of the Bauchi state, as noted in Figure 3.

Here, the state negotiated with Boko Haram in 2008 to pay the group $50,000 a month in exchange for peace.32 In mid 2011, (an exact date could not be found), the Bauchi state governor refused to continue payments to the insurgents. As a result, Bauchi saw an increase in the number of Boko Haram attacks. Specifically, during the payment period, Boko Haram conducted 7 attacks in the state. Yet when payments stopped, the number of attacks increased, with a total

                                                                                                                 29 Ibid. 30 Anissa Haddadi, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Blackmailing State Governors,” International Business Times, January 24, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-s-boko-haram-bankrolled-state-governors-286766 31 The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project 32 Emmanuel Aziken, “We’re on Northern govs’ Payroll- Boko Haram,” Vanguard , January 24, 2012, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/we-re-on-northern-govspayroll-boko-haram/

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of 22 attacks from July 1, 2011 through December 31, 2014.33 The fact that there were any attacks within the payment period can be attributed to the fact that Bauchi’s 2008 agreement with Boko Haram also included the use of the state’s mountain ranges for training and living purposes. In this sense, the initial 7 attacks may simply be traceable to Boko Haram’s presence and not indicative of Boko Haram’s ideological warfare.

3.1 Accounting for International Influences on Boko Haram It is hard to deny that the Arab Spring did not have an influence on Boko Haram’s activities, especially in consideration of the fact that the spike in attacks coincides with the Arab Spring. For one, the Arab Spring revolutions have resulted in the fall of many incumbent leaders. Not only did Tunisia’s president Ben Ali flee, but Egypt’s Mubarak stepped down from power in February 2011, and Libya’s Ghadiffi was executed in October of 2011. Further, religion has been a major winner of these downfalls, an important factor in consideration of the group’s religious ideology. Tunisia, a previously politically secular state, saw the rise to power of the Islamist Ennahda party. The Muslim Brotherhood similarly gained some power in Egypt. In this sense, the combined fall of longer established leaders in conjunction with the power of religion at the political level may have been a mobilizing factor for Boko Harm. While these factors may account for the general rise of Boko Haram attacks, they cannot account for the specific rise when the payments were terminated. In other words, the Arab Spring may have increased the intensity of attacks due to the factors noted above, but it did not cause the attacks all together. Indeed, 2010, a full year prior to the momentum of the Arab Spring, saw 35 Boko Haram attacks. Moreover, 2011 saw the sudden sweep of demonstrations across the Middle East. It is the year when the three leaders noted above fell and when religious parties began to gain influence. Yet, 2011 saw less Boko Haram attacks at 122, than 2012 at 303.34 Accordingly, the fact that there was a spike in attacks between 2011 and 2012 should be seen in light of the termination of payments to the group.

3.2 Accounting for Recent Reports of Nigeria’s Success in Combating Boko Haram This year, news reports on Nigeria and Boko Haram seem to highlight the military’s success in defeating Boko Haram. Indeed, a May 6, 2015 associated press headline reads: “Nigerian Troops Who Fled Boko Haram Now Have Them on the Run”. This seems a sudden turn around from the various accounts of the military’s ineptitude discussed above. A close examination of the number of military and police initiated attacks against Boko Haram, as noted in Figure 4 below, shows that there has also been a sudden increase in the military and police activity this year. Notably, whereas 2014 saw 150 military and police initiated responses against Boko Haram, 2015 as of May 2, has seen 145 military and police responses.35 If the security sector continues at this average of 36 attacks against Boko Haram a month, then the end of the year should see close to 450 direct responses by Nigeria. But what has influenced this sudden turnaround and does this have any bearing on the effectiveness of the payments to the insurgents. Indeed, these recent accounts seem to suggest that the robust military response has been more effective in curbing insurgent violence.

                                                                                                                 33 Ibid. 34 The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project  35 Ibid.

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Figure 4: Military and Police Responses to Boko Haram Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project

There are two substantial differences between 2015 and all of the previous years. The first is comprised of two aspects, the use of the multinational joint task force (MNJTF) in combating Boko Haram and the larger international influence and assistance given to Nigeria. The MNJTF, comprised of regional militaries from Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin has greatly expanded not only the number of military forces fighting the insurgents, but has also brought with it a wider array of military expertise.36 These factors have only aided Nigeria’s ability to respond to the insurgents. Further, the international community has contributed troops and training for Nigeria and the MNJTF. Notably, the US Special Forces began training the Nigerian Armed Forces in late 2014, with 2015 being the first year where these training methods have been implemented. 37 In addition, A New York Times article confirms that South Africans are playing a major operational role in combating Boko Haram.38 The international community has also been a compelling factor in regards to perception. Following the April 2014 abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls, international attention to Nigeria and Boko Haram specifically skyrocketed. Celebrities and other public figures propelled the #BringBackOurGirls campaign on social media that led to a demand for a swift and decisive Nigerian response. Yet, prior to this attention, President Jonathan had maintained that Boko Haram was a purely northern problem that did not deserve vast federal attention or resources. His wife further publically questioned whether the attack had truly occurred. The outcry for action

                                                                                                                 36 Michelle Faul, “Nigerian Troops Who Once Fled Boko Haram Now Have Them on the Run,” The Associated Press, May 6, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/nigerian-troops-fled-boko-haram-now-them-run-201033655.html 37 Richard Sisk, “Small Special Forces Unit Wil Deploy to Nigeria,” Military.com, May 12, 2014, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/05/12/small-special-forces-unit-will-deploy-to-nigeria.html  38 Adam Nossiter, “Mercenaries Join Nigeria’s Military Campaign Against Boko Haram,” The New York Times, March 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/world/africa/nigerias-fight-against-boko-haram-gets-help-from-south-african-mercenaries.html  

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among the international community forced a direct change to Nigeria’s official response to the Islamist group. The second factor influencing the increase in military and police responses this year is the commencement of $75 a month hazard payments for the military.39 While the international factor has undoubtedly had a strong effect on the military’s skillset and size, the payments can be seen as the domestic driving factor for the military’s recent subpar performance. Indeed, with adequate compensation, soldiers are more apt to not only perform their duties, but also perform them well. In this sense, the ability of the military payments to increase the military’s performance supports the notion that money is an important mobilizing tool within Nigeria. While it is impossible to anticipate whether the hazard payments alone would have had any meaningful effect on the military’s performance, it cannot be denied that this at least partially influenced the military’s sudden turnaround.

4. What does this mean: A New Approach to Counterinsurgency? As demonstrated in section three, government payments to insurgents have had a direct and positive effect on decreasing and preventing insurgent attacks in Nigeria. The notion of money as a driving force for change is also demonstrated within the Nigerian military and can account for its sudden turn around this year. However, while payments have shown immediate results, they have yet to demonstrate the ability to sustain peace and end the insurgencies completely. In this regard, are payments to insurgents the right counterinsurgency approach? In order to address this question, it is necessary to begin with a consideration of the underlying factors in Nigeria that have influenced the insurgents’ acceptance of government payments. For one, Nigeria has a relatively high poverty level, with the World Bank noting that in 2010, 46% of the population lived at or below the poverty line.40 Regionally, the north has the highest rate of poverty. According to a BBC report, the northwestern and the northeastern regions had poverty rates as high as 77.7% and 76.3% respectively in 2010.41 While the south had a lower poverty rate, 59.1%, many southern citizens perceive themselves to be living in poverty, especially in light of the vast oil wealth that surrounds them. Indeed, Ahonsi notes that the Delta falls behind other countries and regions with oil and gas resources in terms of poverty and general development.42 Secondly, Nigeria has high unemployment rates, with the national average standing at about 24% while youth unemployment rates are much higher at over 50%.43 These factors have also been sited as reasons for insurgent recruitment. Accordingly, in light of the fact that the majority of the population lives in poverty and the youth especially are unable to attain jobs, it should come as no surprise that both groups were willing to accept payments in exchange for ceasing attacks.

Despite these issues, the acceptance of money in return for reduced violence suggests that both Delta insurgents and Boko Haram value money over their respective ideologies and goals. One of the main demands of MEND and other Delta insurgents has been financial compensation                                                                                                                  39 Faul, “Nigerian Troops Who Fled” The Associated Press, May 6, 2015. 40 The World Bank Data, Nigeria, http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria 41 “Nigerian Living in Poverty Rise to Nearly 61%, The BBC, February 13, 2012 ”http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873 42 Babatunde A. Ahonsi, “Capacity and Governance Deficits in the Response to Niger Delta Crisis,” Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, ed. Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (New York: Zed Books),3 2. 43 Nigeria Unemployment Rate, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate

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for the region and its citizens in light of the environmental destruction and health problems associated with numerous oil spills. In this sense, the acceptance of payments in the Delta does not necessarily go against the group’s ideology. However, the amnesty payments were distributed on an individual basis and did not address the regional demands of the insurgency. Accordingly, the general notion of payments falls well within MEND’s goals yet the personal aspect of these payments did slightly undermine the greater cause of the insurgency.

The acceptance of payments seemingly has a greater implication for Boko Haram’s fundamental Islamist ideology. However, it must be noted that while the group was accepting payments in exchange for peace in Kano and Bauchi, it was still conducting attacks elsewhere. Indeed 2010, the last full year of payments to the group, saw 35 attacks.44 Accordingly, it is not as though Boko Haram gave up its ideological and religious war all together. Rather, Boko Haram’s acceptance of the Kano and Bauchi payments should be seen as a strategic move. The money provided Boko Haram with a steady income that enabled them to wage attacks else where in the north. Indeed, Bauchi alone provided Boko Haram with an estimated $2.1 million (based on a January 1, 2008 starting point and a June 30, 2011 ending point, with payments at $50,000 a month).

The fact that the payments actually bolstered Boko Haram’s financial resources and strengthened its ability to conduct attacks in other states, presents as one of the many downsides to this approach. In addition, giving money to insurgents rewards bad behavior and has fueled recruitment. Notably, Soremekun notes that the amnesty program created a rentier culture, resulting in the growth of self-serving militia whose sole purpose was not to contest environmental destruction and poor regional conditions, but was more so a means of achieving personal wealth. 45 This is partially explained by Nigeria’s vast network of patron-client relationships. This system, referred to in sub-Saharan Africa as neopatrimonialism, is characterized by a small circle of elite who hold the vast majority of wealth. In this sense, the extension of payments by the state and their acceptance by the insurgents further propels this cycle of inclusion and exclusion from the system. This is important because neopatrimonialism is a dominant and contributing factor to poverty in Nigeria.

In light of the facts considered in this section, issuing payments as a response to insurgent activity is not as simple as it may seem. Not only have these payments rewarded violent behavior, but they also have failed to address the underlying discontent each insurgency harbors. This is not to assert that the Delta insurgency and Boko Haram represent legitimate means of protesting the government. It is simply to suggest that the high levels of poverty and unemployment have increased insurgent recruitment not necessarily for ideological means, but as an outlet for Nigerians to protest their poor domestic conditions.

Accordingly, what Nigeria needs is a second and third phase to its payment plan that addresses insurgent rehabilitation and incentivizes law abiding behavior for the rest of Nigerian’s citizens. As has been demonstrated, paying insurgents has not led to the end of insurgent violence but it has had an initial positive result. If insurgents have the choice of receiving payments and rejoining society, some are likely to make this choice. Indeed, being an active member in an insurgency comes with high risks that for some may be negated with a payment and reintegration program. Indeed, not every insurgent is likely to accept such an offer,

                                                                                                                 44 The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project 45 Soremekun, “Nigeria’s Oil Diplomacy,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, 109.

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especially those who join for purely ideological reasons. Accordingly, the military factor of counterinsurgency will continue to be a central component in a states response to insurgencies.

In addition, Nigeria should incentivize the average citizen to not participate in such activity through payment and incentive based programs. This may include subsides for food, funding for housing with a fixed number of children, and education incentives such as job placement guarantees for graduates. Further, Nigeria would benefit from a welfare system that aids its citizens in the basic necessities of everyday life. The point here is to encourage good behavior and citizenship rather than reward insurgents for wrecking havoc on the government and its people. If the majority of the population is content and stable, recruitment into existing insurgencies becomes less appealing as the risk of personal safety increases. Moreover, the happier a society is, the less likely a new insurgent group is to arise.

While this is in many ways a superficial fix to a complex issue, it is a good place to start. A reduction in corruption is needed to ensure enough funding for welfare, payment programs and insurgent rehabilitation. In addition, good governance is needed to guide Nigeria on a path of self-development. Paying its citizens will not address the religious political aspect of Boko Haram. It does however aim to mend major hurdles in society that with time may lead to a decrease in current and future insurgent violence.

5. Concluding Remarks The concept of paying insurgents to stop attacks seems corrupt and unethical by western standards. Indeed, when reports surfaced that US money paid for cargo protection in Afghanistan was indirectly benefiting the Taliban, there was immediate backlash. Accordingly, the fact that Nigeria has directly paid its insurgents is a groundbreaking notion. As jarring as it may sound however, the payments have had a substantial effect on reducing violence. With further momentum, to include the continued military response and instituting multiple phases of the payment program, Nigeria could end its era of persistent insurgent violence.

 

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6. Appendix  

 

   

       

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7. Bibliography Aghrdo, Iro and Oarhe Osumah. “The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 5 (2005): 853-869 Ahonsi, Babatunde A. “Capacity and Governance Deficits in the Response to the Niger Delta

Crisis.” In Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad 28-41. New York: Zed Books, 2011.

Anderson, Mark. “Nigeria Suffers Highest Number of Civilian Deaths in African War Zones.”

The Guardian, January 23, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/23/boko-haram-nigeria-civilian-death-toll-highest-acled-african-war-zones

“Analysis: Nigeria’s Delta Amnesty at risk of Unraveling.” IRIN News, April 23, 2010.

http://www.irinnews.org/report/88906/analysis-nigeria-s-delta-amnesty-at-risk-of-unravelling

Asuni, Judith Burdin. “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta.” United States Institute of Peace, Special

Report. August 2009. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/blood_oil_nigerdelta_0.pdf Aziken, Emmanuel. “We’re on Northern govs’ Payroll- Boko Haram.” Vanguard, January 24,

2012, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/we-re-on-northern-govspayroll-boko-haram/ Baker, Aryn. “Nigeria’s Military Quails When Faced with Boko Haram.” Time, February 10,

2015. http://time.com/3702849/nigerias-army-boko-haram/ Baker, Deane-Peter and Lieutenant Colonel Mark O’Neill. “Introduction: Contemporary South

Africa and Counterinsurgency.” In South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency: Roots, Practices, Prospects, edited by Deane-Peter Baker and Evert Jordan 1-11. Claremont: UCT Press, 2010.

Connors, Will and spencer Swartz. “Nigeria’s Amnesty Program.” The Wall Street Journal,

August 5, 2009. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124942256930505875 Duthiers, Vladimir and Isha Sesay and Chelsea Carter. “Amnesty: Nigeria Warned of Boko

Haram Raid at Girls School, Failed to Act.” CNN, May 10, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/09/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/

Faul, Michelle. “Nigerian Troops Who Once Fled Boko Haram Now Have Them on the Run.”

The Associated Press, May 6, 2015. http://news.yahoo.com/nigerian-troops-fled-boko-haram-now-them-run-201033655.html

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Freeman, Colin. “Have Nigeria’s Past Pay-Offs to Militants Encouraged Boko Haram.” The Telegraph, May 23, 2014. http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/colinfreeman/100272922/have-nigerias-past-pay-offs-to-militants-encouraged-boko-haram/

Publishers, 2013. Haddadi, Anissa. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Blackmailing State Governors.” International Business

Times, January 24, 2012. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-s-boko-haram-bankrolled-state-governors-286766

Ibaba, Ibaba Samuel. “The Ijaw National Congress and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta.”

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“Nigeria- Massive Destruction, Deaths from Military Raid.” Human Rights Watch, May 1, 2013.

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid “Nigeria: UN Agency Reports Ongoing Refugee Crisis Amid Boko Haram.” UN News Center,

November 11, 2014. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49312#.VU_dqdpViko

“Nigerian Living in Poverty Rise to Nearly 61%,” The BBC, February 13, 2012.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873 Nossiter, Adam. “Mercenaries Join Nigeria’s Military Campaign Against Boko Haram.” The

New York Times, March 12, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/world/africa/nigerias-fight-against-boko-haram-gets-help-from-south-african-mercenaries.html

Okeowo, Alexis. “Inside the Vigilante Fight Against Boko Haram.” The New York Times,

November 5, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/magazine/inside-the-vigilante-fight-against-boko-haram.html?_r=0

Robertson, Nic. “Nigerian Military Disorganized, under-equipped in Battle Against Boko

Haram.” CNN, January 15, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/africa/nigeria-military-families-boko-haram/

Siollun, Max. “Boko Haram: Six Reasons Why the Nigerian Militant Group is So Powerful.” The Guardian, May 14, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/boko-haram-why-nigerian-militant-group-powerful

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Soremekun, Kayode. “Nigeria’s Oil Diplomacy and the Management of the Niger Delta Crisis.” In Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad 99-114. New York: Zed Books, 2011.

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http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate Transparency International, The Corruption Perception Index. http://www.transparency.org/ Ukeje, Charles. “Changing the paradigm of pacification: oil and militarization in Nigeria’s Delta

region.” In Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad 83-98. New York: Zed Books, 2011.

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in Africa.” World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 453-489 Cammack, Diana. “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?” Development Policy Review 25, no. 5 (2007): 599-614 Edewor, Patrick A. and Yetunde A. Aluko, and Sheriff F. Folarin. “Managing Ethnic and

Cultural Diversity for National Integration in Nigeria.” Developing Country Studies 4, no. 6 (2014): 70-76.

Hill, J.N.C. Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile?. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2012 Jardine, Eric. “Controlling Territory and Population During Counterinsurgency: State Security

Capacity and the Costs of Power Projection.” Civil Wars 14, no. 2 (2012) 228-253 Van de Walle, Nicholas. “The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in

Africa Today.” Center for International Studies, (2007): http://global.cornell.edu/sites/einaudi.cornell.edu/files/publications/03-2007.pdf