Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to the Mind-Body ... · miri lbhri Perennial Idealism A Mstical Solution to the Mind-Bod Problem philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 19,

volume19,no.44 october2019

Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to

the Mind-Body Problem

Miri AlbahariUniversity of Western Australia

© 2019 MiriAlbahariThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019044/>

Introduction

Anymetaphysicalsystemwillfacethechallengeofexplaininghowitsfundamentsaccommodatephenomenaastheyappeartous.Amongthemostsalientofsuchphenomenaisthatofourconsciousmindsinapparentinterfacewithwhatwetaketobeourbodiesandthemind-independentworld. This has come to be known as themind-bodyproblem.Canthemetaphysicsuccessfullyexplainthisinterface,orfitthemindseamlesslyintotheworld?Importantaswellisthequestionofhowourmetaphysicaccommodatestheworldnotonlyasitappearstoourunaidedsenses,butasitissaidtobebehindthescenes.Doesitdosufficientjusticetothearrayofscientificdata,suchasthatrevealedthroughneuroscienceandphysics?

Mostmetaphysicalsystemswillatsomepointappealtobrutefact.Abrutefactisafactthatisnotitselfbeingfurtherreducedorexplainedbutwhich isoftenreliedon toexplainother facts.There isnothingwronginitselfwithabrutefact.Most,ifnotall,metaphysicalsystemswillhaveatleastoneload-carryingbrutefact.Thecrucialquestioniswherethebrutefactsarebeingplaced.Aretheyinnocentlyplaced,oraretheypaperingoveracrackthatmarksacriticalinterface,suchasthatbetweenmind,worldandscience?Theextent towhichsuchacrackisbeingpaperedoverisacriticaldeterminantintheviabilityofametaphysicalsystem.

Withincontemporarymetaphysicsofmind,thedialectichasbeendriven by a desire to avoid what are commonly held instances ofcrack-papering in the competing positions.Most cracks are knownwellenoughtohavebecomenamedentities—e.g.“thehardproblem”for materialism, “the interaction problem” or “the causal exclusionproblem” for dualism, “the combination problem” for panpsychismandmostrecently“thedecombinationproblem”forcosmopsychism.Advocatesofeachpositionaredevotedtorepairingorperhapsdeny-ing their system’s fault-lines, which often yieldsmore nuanced ver-sionsoftheirposition.Totheextentthatthecracksareadmitted,itsadvocatesarehappytolivewiththem,deemingthemlessperniciousthanthoseoftheirrivals.Others,though,seethecracksasimploding

mirialbahari Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.44(october2019)

writingsofesteemedmystics.Remarkably, thereappear tobemanyfirst-personaccountsfrompeoplewhoclaimtohaveexperiencedandindeedpermanentlyestablished themselves inaperspectivalornon-dualconsciousness.2Althoughoftenfromdifferenttraditionsandcen-turies,thesemysticsaresaidtohavedirectly“awoken”totheirabidingnature as aperspectival consciousness, realising it to be none otherthantheultimategroundofwhatwetaketobetheworld.3Thisgroundisdepictedasunconditionedbysuchparametersasspace,timeorsen-soryandmentalqualities.Thecentralmetaphysicalcontentofthisal-legedly recurring insighthasbeen termedbyAldousHuxley (1946)andothersas “ThePerennialPhilosophy”.Thename “Perennial Ide-alism”denotesaphilosophicalextrapolationfromthisPerennialPhi-losophy.Anyattempttoarticulatethenotionofthisabidinguniversalconsciousnessmustthusincludereferencetothedirect,aperspectivalexperienceof itbymysticsasultimateandunconditioned.Even ifes-capingfulldiscursiveunderstanding,weneedenoughofahandleonthe requisite concepts for them tohave traction in the context of aphilosophicaldiscussion. In introducingPerennial Idealism,Iwillat-tempt,bywayofathoughtexperiment,todojustthis.Whatmakestheexercisesomewhateasier is the fact that if suchunconditionedcon-sciousnessiswhatitpurportstobe,thenitwillnot,asmanysuppose,beutterlydivorcedfromoureverydayconsciousstates.Fortherearesubtlebutdiscernibleaspectstooureverydayconsciousstateswhose

However,theydeliberatelyleaveunspecifiedtheunderlyingmetaphysic,al-lowingforthepossibilitythatitbeinterpretedalongeitherdouble-aspectedoridealistlines.AndinthefinalsectionofAlbahari(forthcoming,butwrit-tenbeforethisone),Isketcharudimentaryprecursortotheaccountonofferhere.

2. ForpurposesofthispaperIusetheterms‘aperspectival’and‘non-dual’inter-changeably.Whilebothdenoteanunstructured,undifferentiatedconscious-ness, the term ‘aperspectival’ suggests a useful contrast with the subject-bound“perspectival”modeofconsciousness.‘Non-dual’issuggestiveofbe-ingbeyondalldualities,particularlythatofsubjectandobject,butalsothatofone’sabidingessenceandtheultimateground.

3. Iusetheterm ‘mystic’ todenotethosewidelypurportedtohavehadan ir-reversible“awakening”experience,suchasalongthelinesdescribedinthispaper.

themetaphysic.Thisdrivesthedialecticforward,generatingnewpo-sitionsthataimtoavoidthefaultsoftheirpredecessors.Butthennewfault-linesappear.

In what he terms the “Hegelian synthesis argument”—namedbroadly afterHegel’s dialecticalmethodof identifying thesis, antith-esis and problem-avoiding synthesis—DavidChalmers (2016a) hasrecentlytracedtheevolutionofthemind-bodydialecticthroughvari-antsofmaterialism,dualismandpanpsychism.Thedialecticishead-inginadirectionthatplacesconsciousnesseverclosertothegroundofallbeing.Themostrecentpositionisabrandofpanpsychismcalled“cosmopsychism”thattakestheentireexternallyspecifiedcosmostobeaninternallyconscioussubject.Thispaperwillproposearadicalnew successor to cosmopsychism that I call “Perennial Idealism”. Inoutliningitspreliminarydialectic,Iwillnotfocusonthedetailsofma-terialism,dualismandpanpsychismbutwillinsteadidentifytheirkeystickingpoints,withaview toarguing thatPerennial Idealismover-comes them. I suggest that themost promisingway forward in themind-bodyproblem—navigatingaroundalltheproblemstodate—istorenouncethepervasivepanpsychistsuppositionthatfundamentalconsciousnessmustbelongtoasubject.Thisextendsthereachandscopeofconsciousness togroundnotmerely to the innernatureofthecosmos,buteverythingwetaketobetheworld,withitssubjectsandobjects.

Howarewetounderstandthenotionofauniversalworld-ground-ingconsciousnessthatlackstheencompassingperspectiveofasubjecttowhomexperiencesoccur?Totheextent thatsuchaviewiscoun-tenanced, little is saidabout it in contemporarywesternphilosophi-calliterature.1ItisherethatPerennialIdealismtakesitscuefromthe1. A notablemodern exponent of such ideas is integral theorist KenWilber

(2001).Hisextensivebodyofwork,however,seekstodevelopameta-theoret-ical,“neo-Perennialist”frameworkintowhichthesubjectmatterandmethod-ologyofdifferentdisciplinescanbeintegratedandunderstood,ratherthanadetailedmetaphysicalframeworkthroughwhichtheworld-groundingaper-spectival consciousnesscan itselfbeunderstood.Alongamorestandardlyphilosophical vein, Itay Shani and Joachim Keppler (2018) have recentlyattempted to groundexperience in an aperspectival cosmic consciousness.



tuallyconverginguponsucharealitywillbeincreased.Reciprocally,an internally consistent array of relevant mystical quotations fromdifferenttimesandtraditionswillprovideameasureofindependentevidentialsupportforthemetaphysic.ForifthePerennialPhilosophywerebothtrueandexperientiallyaccessible,wewouldexpecttoen-countermultipleinternallyconsistentreportsofsuchexperience.ThispotentiallymutualreinforcementofmetaphysicandconvergingdatafrommysticsthusprovidesfurtherincentivetoexplorePerennialIde-alismasanaturalsuccessortocosmopsychism.

Thepositionis,ofcourse,notwithoutitschallenges,twoofwhichcanbeidentifiedasprimary:onepositiveandonenegative.Theposi-tivechallengeistoshowhowtheworldasitappearstous,withitstables,trees,atomsandpeople,couldconceivablybeconstruedasamanifestation from the ground of aperspectival and unconditionedconsciousness.Constructingthis indetailwillbeasubstantialmeta-physical project,which thispaperwill begin to advance.Thephysi-calworld and its subjectswill be re-cast as anetworkof co-arisingsubjects,which turnout tobedispositional perspectives framedbyconfigurations of cognitive and sensory imagery.5 What is promis-ingaboutthisidealistavenueisthatthebrutefactstobebuiltuponareinpartobservable,notstraddlingcracksthatmysteriouslybridgeconsciousmindswithanon-consciousphysicalsubstrate.Thereisnohardproblemorinteraction/exclusionproblem.Andasourmindswillharbour consciousness in virtue of the aperspectival ground ratherthanother subjects, combination anddecombinationproblemswillbeaverted.Thepositionalsopromisestoaccommodatebothcommonsenseandscientificdata.Thereisawaytoaccountforthetruthof‘thetableistherewhenweleavetheroom’intermsofco-arisingsubjects,whilstnot ignoringdiscoveriesaboutatoms.UnlikeBerkeleyor the

5. Iremainneutralontheissueofwhethercognitiveimagery(suchasthatper-tainingtothephenomenal feelingofemotions,desires, thoughts,etc.)canbereducedtosensoryimagery(suchasthatpertainingtovisualsensations,auditorysensations,proprioceptivesensations,etc.).

essencejustmightturnout tobeunconditionedconsciousness.Thetrick,then,willbetonoticeandthenextrapolatefromthem.

Many scholars are sceptical that there is such a thing as the Pe-rennialPhilosophy,bothintermsoftherebeinggenuineconvergenceoveritamongstthereportsofmystics,andintermsofanysuchreportsbeingveridical.Thereports,afterall,areoftenexpressedinesotericortheisticlanguage.Additionally,thereisacurrentofthoughtwhichcon-tendsthattherecanbenosuchexperienceofpureunmediated(orun-conditioned)consciousness.4Somightmysticsacrossdifferenttimesandtraditionsactuallybealludingtoanunconditionedaperspectivalconsciousnessthatisbothourabidingnatureandthegroundofallbe-ing?Andifso,mighttheyreallyberight?ThequesttopresentPeren-nialIdealismasapromisingpositionwithinthemetaphysicsofmindnowtakesonabroadersignificance. Ifan independentcasecanbemadefortheposition’sviability,whichwouldincludetheavoidanceofproblemsbesettingitspredecessors,thenameasureofindependentsupportisgiventothemysticalreportsbothintermsofthehypothesisofconvergentexperienceandwithrespecttotheirveracity.For,iftheproposedmetaphysicturnsouttobebothplausibleandexperientiallyaccessible,thenthelikelihoodofcross-traditionalmysticalreportsac-

4. ThemostinfluentialproponentofsuchscepticismaboutaPerennialPhiloso-phyisStevenT.Katz.Katz’scentralclaimisthat“There areNOpure(i.e. un-mediated) experiences.Neithermysticalexperiencenormoreordinary formsof experience give any indication, or any grounds for believing, that theyareunmediated.…Thenotionofunmediatedexperienceseems,ifnotself-contradictory,atbestempty.Thisepistemologicalfactseemstometobetrue,becauseofthesortsofbeingsweare,evenwithregardstotheexperiencesofthoseultimateobjectsofconcernwithwhichmysticshaveintercourse,e.g.,God,Being,nirvāṇa;etc.”(1978,26).AcentralproblemwithKatz’sstatementisthatindecidingon“thesortsofbeingsweare”,hepresupposesallhumanexperiencetobeperspectival,manifestingasobjectsappearingtoasubject.ArelatedcriticismismadebyRobertForman(1997,15–16),whoaccusesKatzofpresupposing thatallexperiencehasaconstructed(henceconditioned)character.TheburdenofproofmightneverthelessliewiththePerennialisttoshowthat the ideaofaperspectival,unconditionedexperience is in factcoherent.Thispapercanbeseenasanattempttodemonstrateboththeco-herenceofaperspectivalunconditionedexperience,andthemetaphysicthatcouldbebuiltuponit.



readinawaythatisconsistentwiththePerennialPhilosophy.Section3beginstoextrapolatethemetaphysicbypresentingathoughtexperi-mentthatattemptstoclarifyitsgroundofaperspectivalconsciousness.It particularly aims to show how such consciousness could be con-ceivablyexperienced,inlinewithmysticalreports,asunstructuredbysubjectandobject,asunconditionedbyspaceandtime,asdevoidofmentalandsensoryimagery,andasmetaphysicallyultimate.Section4beginsthepositivechallengeofbuildingthemanifestworldoutofdis-positional imagery-boundsubjectsthatco-arisefromunconditionedconsciousness. Section 5 addresses theproblemof theoneand themany.

Section 1: Situating Perennial Idealism within the Current Dialectic

This section situates Perennial Idealism within the dialectic of thecurrentprincipalpositionsthathaveevolvedinthewesternanalyticmetaphysicsofmind.Incritiquingthem,Iwill focuslessupontheirspecificdetailsandmoreuponthetrajectoryofdeeperassumptionsheld in common by relatively opposing positions, to be renouncedunderdialectical pressure.Rather than attempt todemonstrate thattheproblemsfortheprevalentpositionsareinsurmountable,thestrat-egywillbetoidentifysomeoftheirwell-knownstickingpoints,withaviewtoarguingthat, inavoidingthem,PerennialIdealismholdsaprima facietheoreticaladvantageoveritsrivals.

Materialismcanbebroadlycharacterisedastheviewthatallfactsabout concrete reality, including those about conscious minds, aregroundedinfactsthatexcludeanyconsciousqualitiesfromtheirspec-ification.7Dependingontheproposedleveloffundament,ifany,suchfactsmaybeeitherthosepertainingtoquantum-levelphenomena,orthosedescribingthecosmosasawhole.Dualism,bycontrast,isthe

7. Inmodernmaterialism (sometimes called “physicalism”), the grounding isusuallyspelledoutintermsofmetaphysicalentailmentbetweenthefunda-mentalfactsandthosedependentonthem.Hence,ifmaterialismaboutcon-sciousnessistrueoftheactualworld,thereisnopossibleworldinwhichamaterialduplicateoftheactualworldlackstheconsciousphenomenalprop-ertiespresentwithintheactualworld.

BritishIdealists,PerennialIdealismaimstodothiswithoutappealtoanoverarchingconsciousobserversuchasGodortheAbsolute.

Thenegativechallengeistoavoidaseriousobjectionthatthreat-enstounderminethepositionbefore itgetsofftheground.For theexerciseofreconstructingourmetaphysicfromthewordsofmystics,inawaythatdoesnotcherry-pickonlywhatlookskosher,revealsadeepnewfault-line.Irefertothisas“theproblemoftheoneandthemany”.6Theproblemin factgoesbacktoancient times, facingsuchphilosophersasParmenidesandPlotinus,andsubsequentlySchellingandperhapshis forerunner Spinoza. If the ground, “theOne”, is asthemysticssayitis—completelyunconditionedbysuchparametersasspace,time,imageryandhenceplurality—howthencanitcoher-entlyinterfacewithwhatwetaketobeourworld,oritsimagisticap-pearance thereofwith itsmanyapparent subjectsandobjects?Con-cedingtheindependentrealityofamulti-facetedworld,evenif thatworldturnsouttobecomplexesofimagery-boundsubjects,enforcesa boundary between it and the One, undoing the purely uncondi-tionedstatusofagroundthatpermitsnosuchboundary.Thealterna-tiveisaustereexistencemonism,bywhichtheworldasweappeartoknowitdoesnotexist—onlythegrounddoes.Thiswouldnotonlydefeat the preceding explanation of theworld in terms of imagery-boundsubjects,butalsodenywhatseemstobetheobviousrealityofpeoplehavingexperiences.Iwillsuggestawayaroundtheproblemthat requires a radical rethinkingofhowwe construe reality, imply-ing an unconventional grounding relation between unconditionedconsciousnessandsubjects.Theproposedsolutiontakesitscuefrommystico-philosophicalwritingsofestablishedfiguresfromwithintheAdvaitaVedāntatradition.

Thepaperisstructuredasfollows:Section1attemptstomotivatePerennialIdealismbysituatingitfavourablywithinthecurrentdialec-tic.Section2presentsarangeofpassagesfromwell-knownmysticsofdifferenttraditionsandtimes,withaviewtoshowingthattheycanbe

6. Thisisnottobeconfusedwiththe“ProblemoftheMany”thatisassociatedwithPeterUngerandDavidLewis.



explaininghowsomethingsounexpectedasconsciousphenomenalqualitiescouldarisefromabasisthatutterlylacksthem.Asitseemsconceivablethatalltheneuralprocessescouldoccurwithouttheco-presenceofconsciousqualities,itisunclearhowsuchprocessescouldexplaintheirproduction.InGalenStrawson’swords,suchbruteandunexpectedemergence,not tobe foundanywhereelse in thephysi-calworld,seems“miraculous”(2006,18).Forthedualist,ontheotherhand,mysteryenshroudstheexactnatureofcausalinterfacebetweentwoverydifferenttypesofpropertyorsubstance.Consciousphenom-ena appear to have a two-way causal interactionwith physical phe-nomenasuchasourbodies,buthowcouldthisworkifoneconcedesconsciousphenomenatolackphysicaldimensionssuchasextensionorlocation?10Theintrusionofnon-physicalconsciouseventsintothephysicalworldremainsatheartamysteriousbrutefact,andappearstoalsoviolatewidelyacceptedphysicalprinciplessuchascausalclosure.11

Suchdifficultieshavemotivatedanumberofphilosopherstotakean alternative tack, propelling the dialectic away from dualist andmaterialist positions that keep conscious properties out ofmaterialfundaments, andmoving it towards panpsychist positions that sinkconsciousness into them.Consciousnessnowenters into thedefini-tionofmaterialbuildingblocks,suchasviatheinteriornatureofanotherwise externally specifiedquantumentity, ormore recently viatheinteriornatureofanexternallyspecifiedcosmos.Ourmindsareconsciousbyvirtueoftheconsciousnessbelongingtothefundaments.

10.OneoftheearliestrecordsofthisobjectionisfoundinPrincessElisabethofBohemia’scorrespondencewithDescartesinwhichshecritiquedhisinterac-tionistdualism(seeBennett,2017).

11. Theappealtocausalclosureformspartofthewell-known“causalexclusion”argumentagainstdualismandformaterialism.DavidPapineau,whooffersa detailed historical appraisal of the causal closure principle, presents thecausal exclusion argument as follows: “(1) Conscious mental occurrenceshavephysicaleffects…(2)[causalclosure]Allphysicaleffects[ortheirprob-abilities]arefullycausedbypurelyphysicalpriorhistories…(3)Thephysicaleffectsofconsciouscausesaren’talwaysoverdeterminedbydistinctcauses.”Fromthishesaysitfollowsthatconsciousmentaloccurrencesarephysicaloccurrences(2002,16–17).

viewthatfactsaboutconcreterealityaregroundedinfactsthataredi-videdintotwometaphysicalcategories:thosepertainingtomindandthosepertainingtomatter.Dualismandmaterialismarethusopposedinsofar as dualism keeps consciousness out of the physical worldwhilematerialismtriestofitconsciousnessintoit.Buttheybothsharethe deeper assumption that any fundamental constituents of physi-cal reality, whether specified microstructurally or macrocosmically,willexcludefromthatspecificationthephenomenalqualitiesthatweassociatewithconsciousness.8Thisleadstodifficultiesinreconcilingphenomenalwithphysicalproperties—eitherbywayofreductionoremergence,asperthematerialist,orbywayofcausalinterface,asperthedualist.Eachisfacedwiththeprospectofhavingtopositaload-carryingbrutefacttobridgeanexplanatorygap.

Forthematerialist,asubject’sconsciousproperties—ifnotimplau-sibly deflated to something that can be predicted from its non-con-sciousphysicalbasis—mustmysteriouslyemerge fromthisbasisashigh-levelunpredictablynovelphenomena.9TheyareleftwithwhatChalmers (1996) calls the “hard problem” of consciousness: that of

8. By“conscious/phenomenalquality/experience”Imeanthosesuchthatthereis,inNagel’sfamous(1974)phrase,“somethingitislike”tohavethem,usu-allyviathedifferentcognitiveorsensorymodalities.Examplesincludethetasteofchocolate,thefeelingofhope,thesmellofarose,thevisualappear-anceofasunsetor,morebroadly,thefeelingofbeingaunifiedsubjectwhoexperiencesseveralsuchqualitiesatonce.Later,Iusetheterm‘cognisensoryimagery’toconveythespecificqualitiesassociatedwiththedifferentspecificsensoryandcognitivemodalities.Mostbroadly,theterm‘consciousquality’includestheimagelessphenomenalqualitypertainingtothenatureofpureconsciousnessitself,aboutwhichthepaperwilllatergointodetail.

9. Whilethedeflationaryview(knownastypeAmaterialism)hasitsdefenders,theideathatconsciouspropertiescanbepredictedfromtheirphysicalbasescomesatthecostofrenderingtheconsciouspropertiestobefunctional/be-haviouralratherthanphenomenal,acostmanythinkistoohigh.Thenon-deflationaryversionofmaterialism(knownastypeBmaterialism)allowstheconsciouspropertiestobeproperlyphenomenal,butatthecostofmovingthebumptoanotherpartofthecarpet.Theythenhavetocontend,asindicat-edabove,withtheirbrute-necessityemergencefromapurelyphysicalbasis,generatinganexplanatorygapthathastakentheformsofvariousepistemicandconceivabilityproblems.Foramoredetailedaccountofthis,whichliststhemainproponentsofeachposition,seeChalmers(2016a,2003).



sincetobefundamentallymaterialis nowalsoandunavoidablytobefundamentallyconscious.Whetheralongtheseorotherlines,severalphilosophers, includingChalmers (2016a),haveproclaimedpanpsy-chism(oraparticularbrandthereof)tobea“synthesis”thatsidestepsthemajorproblemsbesettingmaterialismanddualism.

Butnownewchallengesarise.Aprimarychallengeisthatofhowto explain coherently our macro-mind’s relation to either the fun-damentalmicro-minds or the fundamental cosmicmind. Asmacro-subjects,wemust ultimately acquire our conscious experience andperspectivesfromthoseofthefundaments.However,itisveryhardifnot impossible toconceiveofhow this couldoccur.Theproblempertainingtoourmind’sinterfacewithmicro-fundamentsisknownasthe“combinationproblem”formicropsychism,whiletheproblemper-tainingtoourmind’sinterfacewiththecosmicfundamenthasbeenre-centlydescribedasthe“decombinationproblem”forcosmopsychism.Whilethereareseveralversionsofthecombinationproblem(Chalm-ers,2016b),whatareknownassubjectcombinationordecombinationproblemsarewidelyconsideredtobethemostintractable.15

Tounderstandhoweithersubjectcombinationordecombinationproblemsplayout,weneed tofirst get ahandleonwhat a subjectis.It isanotionthat,whileembellishedindifferentways,hashadalonghistoryacrossall themajor traditions.16Asasubjectwearees-

15. Theterm‘combinationproblem’isowedtoWilliamSeager(1995);foritsre-verseIendorsetheterm‘decombinationproblem’(forthcoming),althoughothertermsaresometimesinuse.Amongstthefirsttoarticulatesubjectver-sionsofeachproblemwasWilliamJames,whoposedthecombinationprob-lemformicropsychismin1890,andthedecombinationproblemforBritishandAmericanIdealismin1909(formoreonthelatter,seenote22).Iwillnotdiscussanynon-subjectversionsofeitherproblemexcepttonotethatnoneoftheproposedsolutionsarewidelyaccepted.

16. Thisnotionofasubject(andthemoreembellishednotionofselfgraftedontoit)isoperativeacrossthedifferentwesternaswellaseasterntraditions,andIdiscussitatlengthinAlbahari(2006).Itspeculiarlyelusivenature—suchthatitcannotobserveitselflikejustanotherobject—haslongbeenasourceofphilosophicalpuzzlement.For,ontheonehand,itescapesthetargetofstan-dardobject-directedmodesofsensoryandmentalawareness,asevidencedinthispassagefromRoderickChisholm:“Thetwogreattraditionsofcontem-porarywesternphilosophy—‘phenomenology’and‘logicalanalysis’—seem

Tomotivatetheirposition,panpsychistsoftenproposethefollow-inglineofargument,inspiredbyBertrandRussell(1927):12Whilephys-icstellsuswhatmatterexternallydoes,viatheabstractablerelationsthat an entityharbourswithin its own structure aswell as tootherentities,itdoesnottelluswhatmatterinternallyis,intermsofthespe-cificconcreteorcategoricalnaturethatimplementsthoseabstractablerelations.13Thismove isaccompaniedbya rejectionofstructuralordispositionalessentialism—theviewthatmattercanbeexhaustivelycharacterised inpurelydispositionalor abstract terms.Panpsychiststhennote thatwhile there isnowayofdetermining thekindofcat-egoricalnaturepossessedbythefundaments—bethismicro-entityorcosmos—considerationstodowithparsimonyfavourconsciousnesstobe that candidate.Afterall,wearealready familiarwith the inte-riorconsciouscharacterofourownabstractlyspecifiablebrain.Ratherthanmultiplytypesofcategoricalnaturebeyondnecessity,aswellascreateanotherexplanatorygapbetweenour consciousnessand theinnernatureoftheinscrutablefundament,whynotsupposethema-terialfundamentstohaveaninteriornaturethatisonthespectrumofconsciousness?14Likeourselves,theywillbeconsciousperspectivalsubjects—albeitwithexperiencesfarmoreprimitive(ifamicro-sub-ject)orperhapscomplex(ifacosmicsubject)thanourown.Asacat-egoricallyconsciousconcretebearerofabstractablerelations,eachfun-damentwillnowfitseamlesslyintothecausalfabricofmaterialworld,

12. Forlucidandaccessiblesummariesfromdefendersofthislineofargument,seeStrawson(2016),Goff(2017b,2017c)andMørch(2017b).

13. Theterms‘intrinsic’and‘extrinsic’areusedwidelyintheliteraturetoconveytheinnercategoricalandouterrelationalnaturesoftheentitiesinquestion.But these termsaremisleading insofaras theycarrymetaphysicalconnota-tionsoftheintrinsicbeingmorefundamentalthantheextrinsic.While“ide-alist”versionsofRussellianmonismdoholdtheinnerconsciousnaturetogroundtheabstractablephysicalrelations,“double-aspected”versionsregardthecategoricalandrelationalpropertiestobeequallyfundamental.Foradis-cussionofthis,alongwithataxonomyoffurthervariantsofRussellianmo-nism,seeChalmers(2016a).TheterminologyIusehereisintendedtoconveyaneutralitywithregardtothesedifferentvariants.

14. Forthisreason,Idon’tdiscussthepositionofpanprotopsychism,whichpos-itsanon-consciouscategoricalnatureforthematerialentity.



about theirbusiness,ormyconsciousexperience issomethingnewthat causally emerges from theirs.Perhaps the individual conscioussubjectsaredestroyedintheprocessofcombining,ortheysurviveit.

Howeveronethinksofthiscombination—whetherincausal,con-stitutiveoremergentterms—ithasanairoftheblackboxtoit.Forsubjectsjustdon’tseemtobethesortofthingswhoseconsciousex-periencesorpointsofviewcancombine.Theyarenotlikethosecom-binations thatwe can readilyobserveor easily imagine, andwhichappear as objects within our conscious purview: coloured dyes thatcombinetoproduceanewcolour,ingredientsthatblendintoacake,atomsthatcomposeamolecule,blocksthatcomposeatower,andsoon.Atbest,wesimplyhavenoactiveconceptionofhowtheseparate,unifiedperspectivalmicro-subjectscouldcombinetoyieldaunifiedmacro-subject. At worst, the prospect of micro-subjects combiningto yieldmacro-subjects, whilst retaining their perspectival integrity,seemspositivelyincoherent.17Asnoneoftheattemptedsolutionstodatehavebeenwidelyrecognisedasresolvingthecombinationprob-lem, each version is to some extent likely to posit a brute fact thatpapersoveracombinatorialcrack.Notwishingtoreturntoitsprob-lematicpredecessors,somephilosophershavetakenpanpsychismtothenextlevel.

Thisdevelopment, knownas “cosmopsychism”,hasgrownpartlyout of an attempt to avoid both the combination problem and thepitfallsofitspredecessors—dualismandmaterialism.Whilepanpsy-chismhastraditionallytakenonboardthecommonsuppositionthat

17. ThesubjectcombinationproblemhasbeenframedbyGoff(2009)andsub-sequentlyChalmers(2016a,2016b)intermsofaconceivabilityproblemthatisanalogoustothehardproblemofconsciousnessformaterialism.Theideaisthatwecanimaginetherebeingacombinationofmicro-subjectsobtain-ingwithoutthemacro-subjectobtaining.However,somethinktheproblemtobemoreserious than this: that it isnotmerelyconceivable that the rel-evantcombinationdoesnotobtain,but inconceivable that it could.For in-stance,Coleman(2014)arguesthattheattempttoconceiveofmicro-subjectscombining,bytheirsharingwithusthecontentsoftheirperspectives,leadstoacontradictioninsofarasthemicro-subjectscannotcoherentlymaintaintheirperspectives.AnanalogouschargeismadebyAlbahari(forthcoming)againstcosmopsychism,bywayofthedecombinationproblem.

sentially a localised conscious and seemingly-embodied perspective thatisawareofobjects,includingmostimmediatelythosethatformthedynamicarrayofmulti-modalsensoryandcognitiveexperiences.I call theseexperiences “cognisensory imagery”.Beingaperspective,thesubjectpresentsitselfnotasaviewableobjectamongstothercog-nisensoryimagery,butasthattowhichsuchimageryisviewed.Anysubject’s cognisensory imagery, by virtue of being present to a per-spectival locus, seems hermetically sealed into that perspective, un-available toanyothersubject. Insofaras thediverse imageryseemssimultaneouslygiventothesameperspective,theperspectiveconfersonthesubjectasenseofconsciousphenomenalunity,andinsofarastheimageryseemsunavailabletoanyotherperspective,theperspec-tiveconfersonthesubjectasenseofseparationfromothersubjects.

Under micropsychism, wemacro-subjects will ultimately inheritourconsciousexperience,with itsperspectivesandimagery, fromacombinationofmicro-entities.Theinheritancemaybedirectlyfromthe fundament,or indirectlyviacombinationsof “intermediate”sub-jectssuchasatomsorneurons,thatwouldinturninherittheirexperi-ence from intermediateor fundamental subjects.But if subjects arehermetic,itishardtoconceiveofhowthefundamentalmicro-subjects,or neural subjects (allowing for those of intermediate complexity),couldcombineinsuchawaythatconferstheirconsciousexperiencesonaunifiedmacro-subjectsuchasourselves.Thiswouldappear tobreak thehermetic seal and thus compromisewhat it takes tobeasubject. Yet, as panpsychists must endorse some form of combina-tion,theyhaveproposedanumberofwaysinwhichthismighthap-pen.Perhapsmymacro-consciousperspectivalexperienceisdirectlypartakinginthemicro-consciousperspectivalexperiencesastheygo

tomeet,unfortunately,attheextremes.Thepointofcontactisthethesisac-cordingtowhichoneisneverawareofasubjectofexperience”(1969,94).On the other hand, it seems to impress enough of itself upon our overallexperiencefortheexperiencetoappeardualisticratherthanexhaustedbyobject-experiences,asobservedbyAntonioDamasio:“Likeitornotwecan-notescapethefactthatthemindseemssplit,likeahousedivided,betweentheknowerandknown”(1999,191).



fromthecosmicsubjecttakinginalltheelementsofourexperience,it issymptomaticofamorebasicproblem.Justasmanyversionsofmicropsychismviolatethearchitectureofsubjectsbypuncturingtheirhermetic perspectival boundaries, so too does “transparent” cosmo-psychism in supposing that our sensory and cognitive experiencescouldfallwithinthepurviewofanotherperspectivebesidesourown.Italsoconfuses thebasicdistinctionbetweensubjectandobjectbysupposingthatthecosmicsubjectcouldcoherentlysubsumeperspec-tives as viewable objectswithin its field of conscious awareness. Aperspective,aswesaw,isbyitsverynaturenotaviewableobject,butthat to whichobjects—thoughts,sensations,pains, tablesandatoms,etc.—areviewed.Thehistoryofphilosophicalthoughtwilltestifytoastruggletoimaginehowaperspectivecouldevenbetheobjectofitsownpurview—letalonethatofanother’s(seenote16).Othervariantsof cosmopsychism, sometimes in addressing this problem, insulatemacro-subjectsfromthecosmicperspectivebylocatingtheminare-gionofthecosmicmindthatisbeyonditsconsciouspurview.Butnowan analogue of the hard problem of consciousness formaterialismarises.Forjustaswiththematerialist,ourconsciousmindsandexperi-encesarebeinggroundedinasubstratumthatlacksconsciousness.Toclaimthatourconsciousness“justarises” fromanon-conscioussub-stratumistopositabrutefactthatpapersoveraseriouscrack.Thisproposedsolutiontothedecombinationproblemthusdoesnobetterthantheotherversions.20

At thispoint,apanpsychistofeither stripemightdig theirheelsinandinsist:“Somuchtheworseforourstandardnotionofsubject.Casessuchasthosethatariseformicro-orcosmopsychismjustgotoshowthatweneedtoextendourconceptofsubjecthoodtoallowforpuncturedorelasticboundariesor forperspectives tobeviewedas

20.SeeMatthews(2011),Shani(2015)andKastrup(2017),forvariantsof“opaque”cosmopsychismthatadoptthisstrategy.Shouldanyoftheminsistthatourmindsarelocatedinaregionofitsconsciousfieldthatisneverthelessbeyondits consciouspurview, Iwouldconfess tohave lostanygraspofwhat theymeanby‘subject’sconsciousfield’andproclaimsuchamanoeuvreadhocforthereasonsshortlydescribed.IgointothisalsoinAlbahari(forthcoming).

any fundamentalentitiesproposedbyan idealphysicswilloccurattheleveloftheverysmall,therehasrecentlybeenresistancetothisas-sumption.IndependentlinesofargumenthaveemergedinsupportofapositionknownasPriorityMonism:theviewthatthereisonlyonefundamentalconcreteentity,usuallycontendedtobethecosmosasawhole.Awell-knownadvocateofPriorityMonism,JonathanSchaf-fer, for instance, holds that “there is amaximal actual concrete ob-ject—the cosmos—ofwhichallactualconcreteobjectsareparts”(2010,33).Manyversionsofcosmopsychismaccordinglyattempttounitethevirtuesofpanpsychismwith thoseofPriorityMonismby renderingtheinteriornatureofthecosmostobethatofaconscioussubject.Theconscious subject that is the cosmos in somewaygrounds the con-sciousperspectivalexperiencesofhumanmacro-subjects,aswellasthoseofanyotherentitythatwecommonlyregardasconscious.18

Withoutmicro-subjectshavingtocombineintolargermacro-sub-jects, there isno longer a combinationproblem.But a reverse chal-lengearises,whichwecancallthe“decombinationproblem”:Howcanasingleconscioussubject,suchasthecosmos,groundtheconsciousexperiencesofthesimplerhermeticmacro-subjectssuchasourselvesthataresomehowcontainedwithinit?Again,solongasthecosmosisrenderedasaconsciousperspectivalsubject,inaccordancewithmostversionsof cosmopsychism, theproposed solutionswill threaten tocompromisetheperspectivalarchitectureofsubjects.

Suppose, for instance, that the cosmic subject confers conscious-nessonallofusmacro-subjects(withourexperiences)byhavingaunifyingperspectivalexperiencethatsubsumes,aspartofitsoverallexperience,allofourperspectiveswiththeirexperiences.19WhileI’veargued elsewhere (forthcoming) that incoherences of content arise

18. Thingswedonotnormallyconsiderconscious,suchasstonesoratoms,neednotbepossessedofanindependentlyconsciousnature,buttheirinteriorna-turesmustneverthelessbearsomeimportantrelationtothecosmos’interiornature,suchas throughexistingasa thoughtorexperiencewithin itscon-sciousfield.

19. See Goff (2017a, forthcoming) for a defence of this “transparent”cosmopsychism.



ofintroducingagroundingconsciousnessthataltogetherlacksaper-spective.Isn’titsimilarlyadhoctosupposethattherecouldbesuchathing—andthatthenotioncouldmakeevenrudimentarysense?Itisherethattheappealtomysticalliteraturebecomesdialecticallyrel-evant. For, as indicated in the Introduction, renownedmystics fromacross different traditions claim to have undergone transformativeexperienceswhosecentral insight,arguably,appearscommensuratewith that of apprehending a universal aperspectival consciousness.Suchmystical consciousness is further proclaimed, by Perennialists,torevealwhatwouldappeartobeametaphysicallyultimategroundthat isunconditionedbytheparametersofspaceandtime.Assuch,themysticalliteraturecouldnotonlyofferavitalsourceofevidenceforsuchametaphysic,butshedfurtherlightonitsconceivability.Forinstance,whileappearingtoconcurwithcosmopsychismthatfunda-mentalconsciousnessisuniversalratherthanmicro-level,themysticsalsodepart fromapresuppositionheldbymanymoderncosmopsy-chists:thatthecosmosisinequalmeasures(externally)physicaland(internally)conscious.Inproclaimingallmanifestationtobeground-edinconsciousness,theiridealiststancebearsacloserresemblancetothe19th-centuryforerunnersofcosmopsychism,BritishandAmericanidealism, although these latter positions still adhere to the assump-tion of a cosmic subject.22 It is an out-and-out idealist metaphysic,

22. ProponentsofBritishorAmericanIdealismincludesuchfiguresasBradley(1893),Royce(1908)and,morerecently,Sprigge(2006). Theircosmicsubjector“absolute”isgenerallyidentifiedasthewholeuniversewithpantheisticat-tributes,whoseomnipresentexperiencesubsumesallthecomplexitiesofourfiniteexperiencesandperspectives.(ForagoodcomparativesurveyofBrit-ishIdealism,seeMander,2011).Asmentionedinnote15,WilliamJameswastheforerunnerofnotonlythecombinationproblemformicropsychismbutthedecombinationproblemforcosmopsychism.IncriticisingtheBritishandAmericanIdealists,hewrote:“Itisimpossibletoreconcilethepeculiaritiesofourexperiencewithourbeingonlytheabsolute’smentalobjects.…Theyarethereonlyfortheirthinker,andonlyashethinksthem.How,then,cantheybecome severally alive on their own accounts and think themselves quiteotherwisethanashe[theabsolute]thinksthem?Itisasifthecharactersinanovelweretogetupfromthepages,andwalkawayandtransactbusinessoftheirownoutsideoftheauthor’sstory”(1909,LectureV).

objects.”Whilethisisalineofargumentthatsomeprefer,itisfarfromanidealsolution.Forinbeingproposedforthesolepurposeofresolv-ingthe(de)combinationproblems,suchsolutionsbothareadhocandriskcollapsingthenotionof“subject”tothepointthatitishardtoseehowitcouldmeaningfullysurvivesuchdepartures.Itisacrack-paper-ingmanoeuvrethatpayslittledeferencetothenotion’scentralplaceinthehistoryofthoughtanditsgenesisinsomanypuzzles.Whilepan-psychismthusmovesintherightdirectionbyinjectingconsciousnessinto the fundaments,mostversionsalsobuy into theunderlyingas-sumptionthatfundamentalconsciousnessmustoccurintheguiseofaperspectivalsubject.Itmaybebetter,then,toleavesubjectsastheyareandabandoninsteadthesuppositionthatfundamentalconscious-nessmustbeperspectival.21Whynottreatfundamentalconsciousnessasaperspectival?Suchametaphysic,ifconceivable,mayhaveconsid-erabledialecticadvantageoveritsrivals.Withconsciousnessintrinsictothefundament,thehardproblemthatfacesmaterialistswouldnotarise.Neitherwouldthecausalinterfaceproblemsthatbesetdualists.Andbyrelinquishingthesuppositionthatfundamentalconsciousnesstakestheformofasubject,therewouldbenoneofthecombinationordecombinationproblemsthattroublepanpsychists.

Themillion-dollarquestion,ofcourse,iswhetherthemetaphysicis properly conceivablewithouttheintrusionofcrack-paperingprob-lems that are as bad as orworse than thoseof thepredecessors. Itmightimmediatelybeobjected,forinstance,thatjustasalteringtheestablishedparametersofasubjectisproblematic,sotooistheidea

21. Intheirvariantofcosmopsychism,NagasawaandWager(2016)proclaimtobeneutralontheassumptionthattheconsciouscosmosisasubject.Butastheyoffernopositiveaccountofcosmicconsciousness,itishardtoseehowtheirgrounding relationcouldwork.More recently (asmentioned innote1),ShaniandKeppler (forthcoming)haveproposedavariantof cosmopsy-chismuponwhichthefundamentalconsciousnessisaperspectivalandquitepossiblydouble-aspectedinsofarascanbedescribedinequalmeasuresasphysicalandconscious. Inbeing inequalmeasurephysicalandconscious,thiscosmicvariantofRussellianmonismwoulddepartfromthethoroughlyidealistrenderingthatisbeingproposedinthispaper.Acritiqueofthedou-ble-aspectedapproachisofferedinSection4.



wellasaperspectival)maycomethroughinreportsofitbeingdirectlyknowableasone’sinnermostnature,sometimesexpressedintermsofapureseeingorknowingwithoutthesubject-verb-objectstructureofseer,seeing,seen,orknower,knowing,known.Itspurportedstatusasunconditionedmaybeconveyednotonly through itsbeinganundif-ferentiated unity, but through its being beyond space and time, un-graspablebythesensesandintellect—themodesthroughwhichourconditionedworldisdescribedandcognised.Itisexperienced,somesay,asatimelesspresence.23

The oldest record of mysticism comes from the Upaniṣads—au-thoredby anonymous forest seerswho lived in India around 2,500yearsago.FromtheMandūkya Upaniṣad wefindoneof themoreex-plicitrenderingsofthemetaphysic:

Beyondthesenses,beyondtheunderstanding,beyondallexpression…isthepureunitaryconsciousness,whereinawarenessoftheworldandofmultiplicityiscompletelyobliterated.Itisineffablepeace.ItistheSupremeGood.ItisOnewithoutasecond.ItistheSelf.Knowitalone![Stace,1969,20].

The9th-centurymystic-philosopherAdiŚaṅkarawastheleadinghis-toricalproponentofAdvaitaVedānta.Hewas famous foremphasis-ingthenon-dual(Advaitameansliterally“not-two”)characterofthe upaniṣadicteachings,bywhichthedichotomyofknowerandknownis transcended.Māyā,a termthat frequentlyappears inhiswritings,referstotheveilingpowerofignoranceandillusionbywhichknowl-edgeofultimatereality isobscured,makingtheworldappear, in itsintrinsicnature,tobedifferentiatedanddivided.ThefollowingisfromVivekachūḍāmaṇi (The Crest Jewel of Discrimination),atexttraditionallyascribedtohim:

23. Foramoredetaileddefenceoftheseunconditionedattributesbeinginferredfromthemysticalpassages,seeAlbahari(2019).

built upon fundamental aperspectival universal consciousness andinformedbymysticalliterature,thatwillbetheproposedsuccessortocosmopsychism.

Section 2: Mystical Passages Consistent with the Perennial Philosophy

To go forward, the argument requires some initial evidence that arangeofwell-knownmysticalfiguresdidappear—asthePerennialistscontend—toundergoadirectexperienceof theirabidingnatureasnoneotherthanuniversalaperspectivalconsciousness.Inthissection,Iwillofferaselectionofsuchpassagesfromprominentmysticsacrossdifferenttraditionsandtimes.Therewillbenopresumptionthattheydoallunequivocallyalludetosuchafundament.Theaimatthisstageismerelytoshowthattheycanbereadinawaythatisatleastcon-sistentwithsuchanidea.Forthepurposesofourargument,thatisallweneed.

Asthecitedmysticsarefromdifferentagesandtraditions,wecan-not expect them to utilize the same terminology.Mystics from theAbrahamictraditionssuchasChristianityorIslamarelikelytoconveythefundamentintheologicaltermssuchas‘Allah’or‘God’,whiletheeasterntraditionofAdvaitaVedāntawillspeakof“Brahman”or“Self”.Beforepresentingthemysticalpassages,itwillthushelptohavesomecluesastohow,inspiteoftheidiosyncraticterminology,theycouldconceivablybealludingtoafundamentofpureconsciousnessthatisaperspectival(non-dual);unconditionedbyspace,timeandsensory-mentalquality;experientiallyrealisable;andtheessenceofwhatonetrulyis.Itscastingasafundamentishintedatthroughsuchtermsas‘absolute’, ‘supreme’and ‘fundamental’.The fundament’spurportedlyaperspectival(non-dual)aspectmaycomethroughinitsconveyanceasthenatureofapureunityoronenessthatlacksdifferentiation,includ-ing,mostespecially,thatbetweensubject/object,self/other,knower/known,seer/seen.Suchdistinctions,indicativeofasupposedsepara-tionbetweenourabidingnatureandthatoftheultimate,arecommon-ly depicted as illusory, obscuring apprehensionof identitywith theground.Thecluethatthefundamentisofthenatureofconsciousness(as



of varieties of forms in the totalmanifestation, but thesourceofallisthe[impersonal]consciousness.[1997,86]

Oncetheconcept“Iam”arises,thefundamentalunitygetsnotionallyseparated,assubjectandobject,induality.…Themistakenidentityispreciselythe“bondage”fromwhichliberationistobesought.[Balsekar(summarisingMaharaj),1990,66–67]

ThemostrenownedofAdvaiticmysticsinmoderntimeswasRamanaMaharshi(1879–1950),whowassaidtohavespontaneouslyawokentothisrealityattheageofsixteen.Hesaid:

In reality, saying, “Wemust seeBrahman in everythingandeverywhere”isalsonotquitecorrect.Onlythatstageisfinalwherethereisnoseeing,wherethereisnotimeorspace.Therewillbenoseer,seeingandanobjecttosee.Whatexiststhenisonlytheinfiniteeye.[Mudaliar,1977,166]

The“infiniteeye” is thenatureofpureconsciousness in itscapacityofpureapprehensionthatisbeyondthetripartitedistinctionofseer/seeing/seen.Henceitisamodeinwhichnoformsarediscernedasseparateobjects.Ramanasays:

Iftheeyethatseesbetheeyeofflesh,thengrossformsareseen;iftheeyebeassistedbylenses,theneveninvis-iblethingsareseentohaveform;ifthemindbethateye,thensubtleformsareseen;thustheseeingeyeandtheobjectsseenareofthesamenature;thatis,iftheeyebeitself a form, it seesnothingbut forms.Butneither thephysicaleyenorthemindhasanypowerofvisionofitsown.TherealEyeistheSelf;asHeisformless,beingthepureinfiniteconsciousness,thereality,Hedoesnotseeforms.[‘Who’,1973,p.72]24

24.ReaderswishingtofollowupRamana’sthemeofthe“infiniteeye”canconsult

Brahmanissupreme.Itisthereality—theonewithoutasecond.Itispureconsciousness,freefromanytaint.[It]istranquillityitself.[It]hasneitherbeginningnorend.[It]doesnotchange.[It]isjoyforever.

[It]transcendsappearanceofthemanifold,createdbyMāyā.[It]iseternal,foreverbeyondthereachofpain,nottobedivided,nottobemeasured,withoutform,withoutname,undifferentiated,immutable.[It]shineswith[Its]own light. [It] is everything that canbeexperienced inthisuniverse.

Theilluminatedseersknow[It]astheuttermostreal-ity,infinite,absolute,withoutparts—thepureconscious-ness.In[It]theyfindthatknower,knowledgeandknownhavebecomeone.

Theyknow[It]astherealitywhichcanneitherbecastaside (since [It] isever-presentwithin thehumansoul)norgrasped(since[It]isbeyondthepowerofmindandspeech).Theyknow[Itas]immeasurable,beginningless,endless,supreme, inglory.Theyrealisethetruth:“IamBrahman.”[1968, 84–85]

InmoderntimestherehavebeenrenownedmysticswithintheAdvai-taVedāntatraditionwhoaresaidtohaveawokentothissameultimatereality.NisargadattaMaharaj(1897–1981)isconsideredbymanytobeaprominentsuchfigurewithinthe20thcentury:

Understand that it is not the individualwhich has con-sciousness, it is theconsciousnesswhichassumes innu-merableforms.[1997,26]

Becauseofmistakenidentitywethinkofpersonalisedconsciousnessbutitisactuallyvastandlimitless.…Thesource of [personalised] consciousness is prior to timeand space.…Manifestation needs time and space, butthe source of [personalised] consciousness was therebefore manifestation took place. … There are millions



ChristianandtheIslamicworld,andhewasparticularlywell-knownforhiscontribution toSufimysticism. In thepiece “TheTreatiseonSingleness”,hewrote:

GlorytoAllah,beforetheonenessthatknowsnoprede-cessorotherthanAllahwhoisthatfirst.WithHimthereisnobeforenorafter,nohighnor low,nonearnor far,neitherhow,what,norwhere,nostateorsuccessionofmoments,notime,nospace,nobecoming.HeisasHewas,theOne,theSubduerwithoutOneness.……Bythistheprophetmeans,hewhokillshisselfhood,

thatishewhoknowshimself,seesthatallhisexistenceisAllah’sexistence.Heseesnochangeinhisinmostnatureorinhisattributes.HeseesnonecessityforhisattributesbecomingAllah’s,forhehasunderstoodthathewasnothimselftheexistenceofhisowninmostnatureandthathewasignorantofhisselfhoodandofhis fundamentalbeing.Whenyougettoknowwhatisyourselfhood,youarefreedfromyourdualism,andyouwillknowthatyouarenototherthanAllah.[1981,70,73]25

Ihavethuspresentedarangeofquotationsfromprominentmysticsassociatedwith different traditions and times.26 Although relatively

25. TheeditorsofThe Mountain Path,wherethispieceappears,includeaforwardthatreads:“Thiswork,sometimesknownas‘TheTreatiseonSelfKnowledge’or‘TheepistleconcerningknowledgeoftheLordbyknowledgeofoneself’,is traditionallyascribed tohim,although thereareother claimants for theauthorship.ItisoneofthemostmonisticworkstocomeoutoftheIslamicworld,andeversinceitsappearance,ithasbeenwidelycirculatedandreadinSuficircles”(1981,70).

26. IhavenotincludedanyquotationsfromBuddhistmystics(includingthehis-toricalBuddhahimself), as theemphasisofBuddhist teachings is to focusonlettinggoone’sattachmenttoconditionedobjectsratherthantorealiseone’sabidingnatureas theunconditionedground.However, thereare tell-ingpassageswithin theBuddhist canons that allude toanelement that isunconditioned, such as: “There is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to-being,anot-made,anot-conditioned.If…therewereno…not-conditioned,noescapewouldbediscerned fromwhat isborn,brought-to-being,made,conditionedˮ (Ireland, 1997, Iti, 2.16).While I contend the Buddhist suttas

Turningtowesterntraditions,oneofthemostfamous(and,inhistime,controversial)ChristianmysticswasMeisterEckhart(circa1260–1329).BorninGermany,hewrotethatournaturecarriesinitselfthedivineessencethatisbeyondalldistinctions:

There is in thesoul somethingwhich isabove thesoul,Divine, simple, a pure nothing; rather nameless thannamed,unknownthanknown.…Itisabsoluteandfreefromallnamesandallforms,justasGodisfreeandab-soluteinHimself.…Itishigherthanknowledge,higherthanlove,higherthangrace.Forinthesethereisstilldis-tinction.[Happold,1970,49,67]

Theknowerandtheknownareone.Simplepeopleimag-inetheyshouldseeGod,as ifHestoodthere,andtheyhere. God and I, we are one in knowledge. [Happold,1970,67]

…TheeyewithwhichIseeGodisthesameasthatwithwhichheseesme:myeyeandGod’seyeareoneeye,oneseeing,oneknowing,andonelove.[Sermon57,Walshe,298]

Nothinghindersthesoul’sknowledgeofGodasmuchastimeandspace,fortimeandspacearefragments,where-asGodisone!Andtherefore,ifthesoulistoknowGod,itmustknowhimabovetimeandoutsideofspace;forGodisneitherthisnorthat,asarethesemanifoldthings.GodisOne![Stace,1960,153]

Moyhiddin Ibn Arabi is known in Arabic as “The GreatestMaster”.Bornin12th-centurySpain,heisoneofthemostwidelyknownmysti-calfiguresintheSufiworld.Hiswritingshadmuchinfluenceinthe

Muruganar(2004),wherethesepassagesappear,amongstothers,inachap-tercalled‘SeerandSeen’.RamanawillbereturnedtoinSection5.



Since it is of course premature and indeed question-begging toconcludethattheyareinfacttobereadinthisway,Iturnnowtothestrategywhichwilloccupytherestofthispaper.Itwillworktowardsseeing if a plausible metaphysic, “Perennial Idealism”, can be inde-pendentlyextrapolatedfromthesurmised“PerennialPhilosophy”.Ifacoherentmetaphysiccanbeextrapolated,onethatdoesn’tintroduceproblemsonaparwithorworsethanthoseofitspredecessors,thenitwillprovideanindependentmeasureofsupportforthehypothesesoftheirconvergenceandveridicality.Thequotationswillinturnsupporttheproposedmetaphysicthroughbecomingamoreserioussourceofevidenceforit.NowIsay“worktowardsseeing”,asitiswellbeyondthescopeof thispaper topresentwhatwouldbea fullyarticulatedaccountofPerennialIdealism.Theaim,rather,willbetolayoutthefoundational structuresof thepositionwithaview to showing thatitwithstands amajor earthquake and isworthyof further construc-tion.ThetwobasicquestionsIaddressare:“What,inmostbasicterms,wouldsuchanidealistmetaphysiclooklike,suchthatitmayaccountforhowtheworldappears?” (Sections3and4),and “Can themeta-physicsurviveamajorchallengetoitsconceivability?”(Section5).

Section 3: Elucidating the Ground of Aperspectival Unconditioned Consciousness

Thefirststepwillbetoelucidatethecentralnotionofanaperspectivalunconditionedconsciousness,one thatmayserveas thegroundfortheidealistmetaphysic.Ifmysticshavealludedtosuchconsciousness,itwillhavebeenaccessedexperientially.Suchamodeofexperiencewillappear,initsessence,tolackanysensoryorcognitiveobjectsthatcouldstructureconsciousnessandsuggestdifferentiation.Itwillpres-entasamodeofpureobjectlessexperiencethatseemstobeuncon-ditionedbyparameterssuchasspace,timeandcognisensoryquality.

Itisindeedclaimedbycontemplativesthat,withenoughpractice,onecanenterintoamodeofconsciousnessinwhichtherewouldap-peartobenoobjectspresent.Whethertheyarerightindescribingthisconsciousnessasbeing trulyobjectless is aquestion Iputaside for

small in sample, I believe there is enough substance in them to al-layinitialfearsthattheproposalofpureaperspectivalconsciousness,asanultimateandunconditionedground,mustbeasadhocassup-posing that subjectscancombineordecombine.For thequotationsare, on the faceof it, at least consistentwith thehypothesisof theirculture-transcendentconvergenceandtheirveridicalitywithrespecttoadeeperreality.Theyareatleastopentobeingreadinsuchawaythatappearstopoint,inaccordancewiththePerennialPhilosophy,toanultimatetimelessgroundofpureaperspectivalconsciousnessthatcanberealisedasourabidingnatureoncethedeep-seatedillusionofourseparationfromitisdispelled.27

(discourses)tobethoroughlycompatiblewiththeabovemysticalpassages,manycontemporaryBuddhistphilosophers,suchasEvanThompson(2015),wouldtakeexceptiontothis.TheytaketheBuddhatohaveforcefullyreject-edtheupaniṣadicnotionsofĀtman (ourabidingnature,translatedas‘Self’)andBrahman (theunconditionedground),pitchingtheBuddha’smessagetobeatoddswithsuchpassagesas those fromŚaṅkara. Ihavearguedexten-sivelyelsewhere(e.g.inAlbahari,2002,2006,2019),thatthisisbothscrip-turallyandphilosophicallyunfounded.Forexample,BuddhistphilosophersoftenspuriouslyattributetotheBuddhaarejectionofĀtman (inthesenseofourunconditionedabidingnatureasaperspectivalconsciousness) throughequatingthisnotionwithnotionsofĀtman thatalludetoapersonalisedeter-nalself(suchasinSN22,transl.BhikkhuBodhi).Butthepersonalisedeternalselfisasubject-boundentitythatboththeBuddhaand Śaṅkarawoulddeny.

27. Theingeniousworkofneo-PlatonicphilosopherPlotinus(inThe Six Enneads, 250A.C.E.)mightalsobereadinawaythathassomeresonancewiththePerennialPhilosophy.However,whilePlotinuswaspurportedtohaveunder-gonemysticalexperiences,muchofhismetaphysicalsystemwasarticulatedwithinaneo-Platonicframework,andsoitisnotcleartheextenttowhichhiswritingsareowedtotheoreticalcommitmentasopposedtodirectmysticalinsight. (FormoreonPlotinus,seenote60.) ItshouldbenotedthatwhileŚaṅkarawasengagingindebatewithproponentsoftheIndianphilosophicaltradition,thewritingsattributedtohim(suchasthoseabove)arefarmoresuggestiveofsomeoneattempting toarticulatehisownmystical insight inrelationtoother“seers”whoappeartohavesharedit(suchasthosewithintheupaniṣadic tradition) thanof someoneextrapolating from it tobuild ametaphysicalsystemwithheavilyspeculativecomponents.TherelevanceofthistomyargumentwillbecomesalientinSection5.



restingupontheextenttowhichtheproposalismorecoherent,andlessproblematic,thanitspredecessors.

Toarriveatacoherentconceptionofnon-dual,unconditionedcon-sciousnessthatcouldpossiblyfitPerennialIdealism,wethusneedtoconceive of (although not perceptually imagine) undergoing an ex-perience of consciousness that could appear tomeet the followingdesiderata:

(a)beyondsubject/objectdivision,

(b) beyond space, time, and (cognisensory) qualitativelimitations,

(c)theself-subsistentgroundofallbeing.

What is thesubject/objectdivision?Asubject,asdefinedearlier,isminimallyalocalisedconsciousperspectivethatisawareofobjects,includingmost immediately thoseobjects that formthedynamicar-rayofmulti-modalsensoryandcognitiveimagery.Asubjectcanthusbethoughtofashavingatleasttwodefiningaspects:consciousness, andaperspectivefromwhichtheconsciousnessappearsandtowhichobjectsarepresented.Anobjectis,broadly,anythingthatcaninprin-ciple impinge attentively or inattentively on a subject’s awareness,whetherviaorasthemulti-modalcognisensoryimagery.29

Howmightweidentifyinourownmindsthesubject’smodus ope-randi ofconsciousness,orwhat I’veelsewhere(2009) referred toas“witness-consciousness”? G.E. Moore alluded to it as “diaphanous”yet detectable if “we look attentively enough” (1903, 450).Witness-consciousnessisdiaphanousbecause,ratherthanbeingjustanotherobjecttobefoundwithintheconsciousfield,itisthefieldofaware-nessitself.Itisthatpercipientaspectofmindwhichautomaticallyob-servesthecomingandgoingofobjectsfromwithinitsfield,whether

29. InAlbahari (2006) I definedanobject as anything that could inprinciplebe viewed attentively, buthave sincebeenpersuadedotherwisebyGalenStrawson(2011).Hecontendsthattheconsciousaspecttoasubjectcanat-tendreflexivelytoitself,althoughnotasanobject.Inowdefine‘object’ inaccordancewiththeabovedescription.

now.Instead,Iwillproposeathoughtexperimentwhichattemptstosimulatetheendresult(althoughnotmethod)ofathoroughlyobject-lessmeditation, one inwhich consciousness presents itself as aper-spectivalandunconditioned.28Ifconsciousnesscanconceivablybeex-periencedasaperspectivalandunconditioned,then,beinginherentlyexperiential,itwillconceivablybeaperspectivalandunconditioned.

Iwill thenattempt tomakesenseofhow, inkeepingwithmysti-cal literature,suchconsciousnesscouldcontinue topresent itselfasanunconditionedunderlay,oncephenomenaappeartoberegisteredagain.Formysticsdonotappear tostay forever immersed inanob-jectlessmeditation.Theywouldappeartocomeoutofit,tointeractagainwithobjectsintheworld,andtospeakoftheirexperience.Ofinterest toushere are those experiences thatdepict an irreversibleandunfadinginsightintowhatpresentsastheunconditionedgroundforallconditionedphenomena.Itistheleverthatweneedtousetostartconceivingofanaperspectivalunconditionedconsciousness initscapacityastheground.

Theexercisewill,alongtheway,utilizevariousconjecturesaboutthearchitectureofminds,someofwhichIhavearguedforelsewhere.Scepticalreadersshouldberemindedthattheargumentislargelyanexerciseinconceivability,withthecaseforitsplausibilityultimately

28.Thethoughtexperimentismerelyaheuristicdevicetohelpexplicatetheno-tionofaperspectivalconsciousnessandshouldnotbethoughtofasemulat-ingthefarmorenuancedmeditativemethodsthroughwhichtheobjectlessmodeisusuallysaidtobereached.Suchmethodstraditionallyaimtoeradi-cate the deep-seated psychological structures that generate subtle objectssubtending our sense of a self/other boundary—a boundary thatmysticsclaim inhibits our apprehensionof the ground.Truly objectless conscious-nesswouldarguablyrequirethecomplete irreversibledestructionof theseboundaries—aprocessthatisnotpassive,asdepictedinthethoughtexperi-ment.Inthisway,mytheoryisatoddswithRobertForman’snotionofa“PureConscious Experience”,whichhe describes as a “relatively common” statethatisneitherultimatenorsalvific(1997,8–9).IsuspectthatFormancouldbeconflatingwhatmightbeastatethatappearstolacksensoryandmentalimagery,butinfactharboursabackgroundsenseofself(withsubtleperiph-eralcognitiveimageryfeedingintothephenomenology),withamodethatistrulyaperspectivalandthusfreefromadualisticstructure.Formoreonthistheme,seeAlbahari(2019).



standpointthatprovidesthepointofviewthatmustcharacteriseanysubject, whetheritsobjectsareouterorinner,wakingordreaming.

Wemightnowask:What, fromaphenomenalstandpoint, imme-diatelycuesus intothesenseofoccupyingtheperspectiveofapsy-cho-physicalsubjectorself inaspatio-temporalworld?It isavastlycomplexarrayofmulti-modalsensoryandmentalobject-imagerythatappearswithinone’sfieldofconsciousness,attentivelyorinattentively.Cuingusrightnowintoasenseofbeinginanexternalspatialworldaresights,sounds,smells,tastes,touches,proprioceptions,andcogni-tive phenomenology.Cuing us right now into the sense of being aselfareproprioceptions,thoughts,memories,desires,imaginings,etc.Cuingusrightnowintotheimpressionofpassingtimeistheflowofimagery inall themodalities.The imagerycan includethephenom-enalcharacterofarepresentingvehicle(suchasasensationofcolourora taste),or thatof cognitivelygraspingwhat its content isabout.Theaimisnotyettotellastoryofwhatmoredistallycausestheap-pearancetousofthesesensoryandcognitiveobjectsinthemediumofspaceortime.31Itisrathertomakeclearertheextenttowhichsuchcognisensoryobjectsseemtoimmediatelyandphenomenallypartakein our perspectival senseof being an embodied subject in a spatio-temporalworld. For example,withno visual, auditory or tactile im-agery—or similar if dreaming—wouldwehave any sense of beinginawiderspatialworld?Withnochanging imagery inourpurview,couldweharbouranimpressionofpassingtime?Theclaim,then,is

31. Forexample,itcouldturnoutthatoursenseofpassingtimeisinnatelyim-posedby thestructureofconsciousness,asmanyphilosophers in thephe-nomenologicaltraditionuphold.Theaimatthisstageisnottoruleoutsuchapossibility,butrathertoshowthatsuchanimpressionasthatofpassingtimeseemsatleasttorequire(andconceivablyamountsto)thecomingandgoingofphenomenalobjectswithinone’sconsciouspurview.Thereadershouldberemindedagainthatthisismeantasastepintheexerciseofconceivingof anobjectless consciousness that, in linewithmystical claims, lacksanyimpressionofpassingtime,etc.Asitwillsoonbecomeapparent,Idon’tclaimtohavedefinitivelyshownthatsuchanexperienceasthatofpureobjectless,timelessconsciousnessisarealpsychologicalpossibility.Ionlyclaimtohaveprovidedenoughofaconceptionofitforthenotiontohavetractioninthediscussiontocome.

attentivelyorinattentively. Witness-consciousnesscarriesanintrinsicphenomenalcharacter,whichmightbedescribedasaluminositythatisunborrowedfromanyparticularsensoryorcognitivemodality.Themetaphor of light to describe consciousness, commonly deployedacrosstraditions,isforinstanceusedcontrastivelybywesternphiloso-pherswhendescribingphilosophicalzombies(behaviouralduplicatesofusthatlackanyinnerconsciouslife)as“alldarkinside”.Yetwhiletakinginvarioussensoryorcognitiveimageryasdirectobjectsofitsil-lumination,witnessingdoesnotilluminateitselfassuchanobject,butisneverthelessimmediatelyawareofitsownpresenceasthesource.Like the shining sun, self-effulgentwitness-consciousness automati-callyrevealsandknowsitselfsimplybybeingitself.Inphilosophicalparlancewecansaythatsuchimmediateandobjectlessknowingisbothreflexiveandintransitive.Itisreflexiveinsofarasitisself-reveal-ing, includingwhenrevealingotherobjects. It is intransitiveinsofarasitimplicitlyrevealsitselfnotasadiscretesensoryormentalobjectorreifiedsubject,butrathermorebasicallyassubjectivity,aluminoussenseofpresent-momentbeing.Insum,witness-consciousnessisper-cipient,object-revealing luminouspresence that imbuesallourcon-sciouslife,immediatelyknowingitselfbybeingitself.30

Withobjects in itspurview,witness-consciousnessdoesnotpres-entasaviewfromnowhere,but“looksout”throughanembodiedpsy-cho-physicalperspectivethat,whenidentifiedwith,becomesreifiedasasenseofself(Albahari,2006).Itlooksoutontoastructuredfieldwecall“theworld”,whoseexternalcharacterappearsspatio-temporalinnature.Thesubjectisadefinitiveperspectivallocusontheworld:a

30.For a detailed exposition anddefenceofwitness-consciousness as a basicelementofsubjecthood,seeAlbahari(2009).Thenotionhasalsobeende-veloped(althoughnotalwaysbythatname)inBrentynRamm(2019),EvanThompson (2015), Galen Strawson (2011),Wolfgang Fasching (2011), KenWilber(2001),BinaGupta(1998),RobertK.C.Forman(1998),ArthurDeik-man(1996),JonathanShear(1996)andDavidWoodruffSmith(1986).Vari-ants and aspects of this notionofwitness-consciousnesshavebeen exten-sivelydiscussedinthephenomenologicaltradition(e.g.inDanZahavi’sstud-iesofHusserl,suchashis2005)aswellasintheAdvaitaVedāntaandothermysticaltraditions.



object, consciousness remains. They will insist that consciousnessmustexittoo.34However,theirpositionhasnotbeenproved.Likeanunprovenmathematicalstatementthatstillmakesprima faciesense,weareinthedon’t-knowterritory.Hereiswhatwecansay:whilecarefulreflectionhasstilltoprovethingsonewayoranother,thereisnoobvi-ouscontradictionintheideathatconsciousnessstayswiththeexitofthefinalobject.Itisnotlikeimaginingasquarecircle.Theprima facie negativeconceivabilityofpureobjectlessconsciousnessmaynotbeidealpositiveconceivability,butitgivesthenotionenoughtractiontodotheworkitneedsinthediscussiontofollow.

Therearenoobjectsnowleftinthefieldofconsciousness,hencenothingtoimmediatelycuewitnessingintothesenseofoccupyingaperspective.Thesubjecthasvanished,butconsciousnesshasnot.35Itremainsasanactivepresence.Itisasubjectlessandobjectless“field”

34.WecanseethisassumptionatworkinHegel’scriticismoftheHindunotionofBrahman (theunconditionedgroundofallbeing)asbeingcompletelyab-stractandoutsidetherealmofpossibleexperience.HegelaccuratelydepictstheyogicmeditativepracticeaslikeaCognisensoryDeprivationTank:“agiv-ingupofallattention toexternalobjects,and theactivityof thesenses,asilencingofallinternalsentiments,desire,hopeorfear,asilencingofallten-denciesandpassionaswellasanabsenceofeveryimage,ideaanddefinitethought”(Hegel,quotedinViyagappa,1980,123).However,Hegelaccusesit of being “abstract devotion” because (quotingViyagappa) “it falls into acompletecontentlessnessofsubjectandobjectandtherebyleadstoalossofconsciousness”(1980,123–124).

35. GalenStrawsoninsists thatanyconscioussubjectiveexperience, includingthatofpureconsciousexperience,mustlogicallyimplythepresenceofasub-ject that theexperience is for.He thinks that this subjectneednotbeper-spectival,intending‘subjectofexperience’tobetakenina“minimal”,“thin”,“ontologicallynon-committal”way,namely“assomething ‘inner’,somethingmental,the‘self’,ifyoulike,theinner‘locus’ofconsciousnessconsideredjustassuch” (2011,276).However, itwouldseemthat theword ‘locus’betraysaminimalsubjectthatis implicitlypositioned,andhenceperspectival—asthattowhichtheexperiencesarepresented.(Seenote42forfurtherdiscus-sionon this point.) But it is precisely the lackof a perspectival locus thatthemysticaltraditionssaycharacterisespurenon-dualsubjectivity.If,ontheotherhand,Strawsonintendsfortheterm‘subject’toincludewithinitsscopeanaperspectivalgroundthatreflexivelyexperiencesitself,thenthedisputebecomesterminological,sincethatisnothowtheterm‘subject’isbeingusedbytheAdvaitinsorothermysticswhentheyspeakofnon-dualconsciousness.Itwouldcorrespond,instead,totheiruseofthetermĀtman (Self).

thatthedelimitingparametersor“walls”ofourlocalisedperspectiveassubjectsare,conceivablyandplausibly,immediatelybuiltbycogni-sensoryimagery:themulti-modalmentalandsensoryobjectsthatareapprehendedbywitness-consciousness.

Thissuggestsastrategyforconceivingofaperspectivalanduncon-ditioned consciousness.Witness-consciousnessminus the cognisen-sory imagery that lends to it perspectivewould be perspective-less,andhence,subject-less.Canweconceiveofascenariowhereinonecomestoexperiencewhatisanobjectlessmodeofwitness-conscious-ness,suchthatitpresentsassubjectlessandaperspectival?Andmightsuchamodeofpurewitnessingalsopresentasbeingunconfinedbyspatial,temporalandimagisticparameters,aswellashyper-realinawaythatissuggestiveofitsultimacy?Ibelievethatitcould.TothisendInowintroduceathoughtexperiment.32

Enter the Cognisensory Deprivation Tank (CDT). First, each bitofconscioussensory-perceptual imagery—sight, touch,sound,taste,smell,proprioception—winksout,onebyone.Wecan imaginewit-nessing such a wink-out. But this is no mere sensory deprivationtank. Following the disappearance of sensory imagery, each bit ofconsciouscognitiveimagery,attentiveorinattentive,goestoo:everythought,memory,desire,imaginingandfeltemotionthatlurksunderthe bonnet of “self”.With the disappearance of each successive ob-ject,itisconceivablethatwitness-consciousnessstayspresent.Finally,weget to the last remainingobject.Whathappenswhen it toodis-appears?Intuitionsherearelessclear.Thethoughtexperimentnowenters the zoneofwhatChalmers (2002) calls “prima facie negativeconceivability”.33Thosewhoholdthatconsciousnessmustalwaysbeobject-directedwillresisttheintuitionthatwiththeexitofthefinal

32. Ialsodescribethethoughtexperiment,inlesserdetail,inAlbahari(2019andforthcoming).

33. InChalmers’parlance,ascenarioisprima facie negativelyconceivableif,onfirstappearances,noobviouscontradictionsarerevealed.Thisiscontrastedwithidealpositiveconceivability,inwhichthescenariowithstandsrationalreflectionandcaninsomerobustsensebepositivelyenvisaged(ratherthansimplynotruledout).



emersion from thatmode.The reappearanceofperspective-framingobjects—arguablyexperiencedinreallifeaftertheemergencefromadeepobjectlessmeditation—maywellmarkaparadigmshiftinhowtheworld is cognised.36Ananalogywillhelp:Someone is raised inasquarewindowlessroom,tacitlyassumingspacetobeintrinsicallyconfinedtotheshapeofthatroom.Relocationtoanoutsidelandscapewilldisabusehimorherofthenotionthatspaceisintrinsicallycon-fined,makingitimpossibletoviewspaceinthatwayagainevenafterreturningtothesquare-shapedroom.

Iproposethat itmaybesimilaruponreturningto“normality”af-ter anexperienceof (or as)pure aperspectival consciousness.Mostof us haveonly ever experienced consciousness through theportalof anobject-viewing subject.Hence, it is natural to assume that itsintrinsicnature ispartofasubject-boundentity thatbeholds, inad-dition to its thoughts and perceptions, an external spatio-temporalworldofmind-independentobjects aswell asother subjects.Uponemergencefromamodeinwhichconsciousnesshaddirectlyvieweditself as appearing unconstrained by space, time, quality and per-spective, itmightwellbe that itcannevergoback toviewing itselfasdependentuponsuchparameters.Althoughtheworldofobjectsandothersubjectswouldnominallyappearagainthroughtheportalofanobject-viewingsubject,theraftofassumptionstiedupwithitssupposedlimitationmightwelldisappear.Consciousnesscouldwellcontinue,intransitivelyandreflexively,topresentitselfasintrinsicallyaperspectival,unconditioned,andhyper-real.Insodoing,itmaywellappear,quitenaturally, togroundall (conditioned)manifestation to

36.Accordingtothemanymajormeditativetraditions,theparadigmshiftthatattends truly objectless consciousness would require the permanent dis-solutionofcognitivestructuressubtendingthesenseofself—aprocessfarmorecomplexthanthatdepictedbytheCDT(seenote28formoreonthis).It isalsoimportanttokeepinmindthatIamnotpurportingtoshowherethatconsciousnessisgenuinelyunconditionedbysuchparametersasspaceandtime.(IexplicitlycautionagainstdrawingsuchconclusionsinAlbahari,2019.)AllthatI’mintendingtodemonstrateisascenariobywhichonecouldconceivably undergo an experience in which consciousness appears, andhencecouldconceivablybe,unconditioned.

ofsubjectivitywhich,intheabsenceofobjectstowitness,canbere-ferred tomoreneutrallyas “consciousawareness”.Conceivably, it isexperiencedasthoroughlyaperspectival.Now,eveninmodeswhereobjectsarewitnessed,consciousnesspresentsasanintransitivelyandreflexivelyknownsenseofpresence—anaperspectivaldimensiontoexperience thatgoes largelyunnoticedwhileobject-directed.Whenthose objects are removed, howmight conscious presence conceiv-ablymanifest?Withnoobjectstocueitintothesenseofoccupyingaspatio-temporalorpsycho-physicalperspective,consciousawarenesscouldwellpresent reflexivelyasunboundedbydefault: as timeless,spacelessandhyper-real.

Forinstance,withtheabsenceofbothalocalisedperspectiveandtheflowofobjects,consciouspresencewilllackthosecuesthatwouldphenomenallymarkthepassageoftime.Hence,itmaywellappear,initspurelyreflexiveandintransitivedefaultmode,as timelesslyever-present,justasthemysticssay.Withoutobjectsortheirdifferentiatedqualitiestoconfineittoasenseofspatialorpsychologicalboundary,thefieldofconsciousawarenesscouldalsoconceivablypresentasanundifferentiated and infinitely expansive unity, although not alongany spatial or cognisensory dimension.Conscious awareness couldfurtherpresentinitsdefaultmodeashyper-real:asaself-subsistentandpotentiallyultimategroundofbeing.Itcoulddoso,first,byvir-tueofappearingtolackthedelimitingobject-governingstricturesofspace, timeandqualitative imagery.Second, itwouldappearas thesole reality,withnoobjects to contrastively suggest its potential ab-senceorco-dependence.Third,areflexivesenseofitsindubitabilitymayaccompanythefactthatitsseeminglyaperspectivalmodeofpre-sentationwouldallowno cognitive room fordoubt as to itsnature,thusamplifyingitssenseofhyper-realityasunmediatedknowing-by-being.(Afeelingofdoubtrequiresthedualstructureofasubjectwhoisabletocogniseandhencedoubtthevalidityofitsobject.)

Itstillneedstobeshownhowconsciousness,ifappearingintheobjectless mode as inherently unconditioned, aperspectival andhyper-real, could conceivably continue to present as such upon



thosepuzzlesaroundtheelusivenatureofthesubject,suchasthosealludedtoinnote16.Otherpossibleimprintsofunconditionedcon-sciousnesscouldlurkbehindfurtherpuzzlingfeaturesthatcropupindifferentareasofphilosophy.As the intuitionsbehind themmayofcourseturnouttobemisleading,thefollowingshouldagainbeseenasjustanexerciseinconceivability.

A timeless dimension to consciousness could conceivably lie be-hindpuzzling intuitionsabout thepresentmoment, suchas thatofconsciousexperiencealwaysseemingtooccurinthepresent,orthepresentseemingmorerealthanpastandfuture,oritalwaysbeingthepresent.39Whilephilosophersoftimecommonlydescribeourexperi-enceofthepresentasdynamic,thereseemstobeanunmovingaspecttopresent-momentexperiencethatdoesnotcomeorgoandwhichinfusesexperiencewithreality.Wemightthusask:Towhichsideofexperience—subjectorobject—isthisunmoving“it’salwaysnow”as-pectseeminglyowed?Nottothediverseindividualobjectsthatfleet-inglycomeandgo.Whatabouttheobservedflowofexperienceitself,which,while diverse in its individual contents, is as awhole like awaterfall,ceaselesslypresentinitscapacityasaflow?Thatdoesnotyetexhausttheintuition.Thereseemstobeanelementyetmorestatic,throughwhich theflowofexperiencedobjectscanbeobserved.Theelementappearstoliewithinthesubjectthatobservestheflow—initsmodus operandi of witness-consciousness. The puzzling sense ofperpetualunmovingpresence,thatseemstoattachitselftoconsciousexperience and bemore real than past or future, is thus one routethroughwhichwecanidentifywhatmayturnout,inessence,tobeatimelessdimensiontoconsciousness.40

39.Even philosopherswho deny reality to the presentmoment, such asD.H.Mellor,notethat“[b]eingpresentseemsessentialtoanyexperience,i.e.es-sentialtoitsbeinganexperience”(Mellor,1998,40).Heseesexplainingtheapparentpresenceofexperience(towhichhedevotesachapterofhisbook)asoneofthechallengestohis“tenseless”theory.

40.TheAdvaitaVedantatraditionsupposesthat there isnoobviouscontradic-tionintheideaofwitness-consciousnessstayingpresentduringdreamlesssleeporanaesthesia,wherethoughtsandcognisedobjectsbecomequiescent

which itused to seemopposed.37 By appearingasgrounded in con-sciousness,“external”manifestationwouldnaturally,inturn,seemtoalteritsassumedmetaphysicalstatusfromthatofmind-independentobjecttomind-dependentimagery(moreonthisinthenextsection).Wecan thusstart tomakebettersenseofwhatmysticscouldmeanwhentheyspeak,astheycommonlydo,ofcomingtoapprehendtheunityor“oneness”underlyingallexistence.38InthewordsofChristianmysticMeisterEckhart: “Here [i.e., in this experience] all bladesofgrass,wood,andstone,allthingsareOne”(Stace,1960,16).Mostofus,lackingthisinsight,mightthusbedescribedas“unity-blind”.

Butperhapswearenotcompletelyunity-blind.Wehavejustgivenreasonsforsupposingthatconsciousnesscouldconceivablybe,initsintrinsicnature,aperspectivalandunconditioned.Supposenowthatconsciousness is indeed this way. In its being so, wemight expectsomeaspectsofittoshinethroughinourordinaryconsciousstates.Such aspects, if revealed, wouldn’t show that consciousness is un-conditioned,buttheycouldserveasfurtherevidencethatitmightbe.Andindeedthereissuchevidence,ifweknowwheretolook.Ittendstoshowupinpuzzlingobservationsorintuitionsthathavenotbeeneasytoexplainaway.Wehavealreadypointedtoanaperspectivaldi-mensionwithinourusualstates:thatofwitness-consciousnessinitscapacityasreflexiveandintransitivepresence.Thismayaccountfor

37. Thatsaid,theanalogyissilentonthemechanismoftransformation.Whereasthepersonreturningtotheroomcanremembertheexperienceofvastemptyspace,itisnotclearhowareturningsubjectcouldrememberamodeofpuresubjectlessandobjectlessconsciousbeing.Thereseemsnothingformemorytolatchonto.Andifnothingisremembered,howcouldthenon-dual“expe-rience” be transformative?This objection and a response are discussed intheStanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyentryonMysticism(Gellman,2018).ToadaptGellman’sresponse:Thepureconsciousexperiencecouldreflexivelyand intransitivelycarry itsownnoeticcharacter thatdoesn’tdependuponany dualistic structures (such asmemory), and remains unaffected by thesubsequentreappearanceofobjects.

38.Such apprehension of non-dual consciousness grounding theworld corre-spondstowhatStace(1960,15–17)callsan“extrovertive”mysticalexperience(andwhatAdvaitinscallsahaja samādhi),asopposedtowhathewouldcall“introvertive”mysticalexperiencewhileintheCDT,whichAdvaitinsrefertoasnirvikalpa samādhi.



backgroundsenseofitsrawbeingmightstillbeaportaltoitsnatureasself-subsistent.

Ourfirststepintheexerciseofconceivabilityisnowcomplete.Wehavearrivedatacoherentnotionofaperspectival,unconditionedcon-sciousnessthatcanfitthestricturesofPerennialIdealism:anexperi-ence ofconsciousness that couldconceivablyappear,andhencebe,(a)beyondsubject/objectdivision;(b)beyondspace,timeandquali-tativelimitations;and(c)theself-subsistentgroundofallbeing.

Section 4: Building the World from the Ground Up

In developing Perennial idealism, the next step is to show how agroundofaperspectival,unconditionedconsciousnesscouldconceiv-ablyyieldmanifestation:whatwetaketobeourfamiliarspatio-tempo-ralworldwithitssubjectsandobjects.Tobesuccessful,theaccountmustmeetatleastthefollowingdesiderata:

(d)makesenseofhowourfamiliarmanifestworld,withitssubjectsandobjects,couldbegroundedinaperspec-tival,unconditionedconsciousness,

(e)avoidsolipsism,theideathatwearetheonlysubject,and account for the powerful intuition that objects aresomehowpresentwhenhumanandanimalsubjectsarenotobservingthem,

(f) be compatible with scientific discoveries, such thatit accommodates law-like regularities in nature and en-ablesprediction.

While foundationalbrutefactsarepermitted, theyshouldnotpa-perovercracks thatdemandobviousexplanation, suchas theonesbetweenmindandbody,orbetweenappearanceandultimatereality.Forinstance,inrenouncingthecommon“Russellian”panpsychistsup-positionthatconsciousnessistheinnersubjectivenatureofanother-wise structurally specifiable fundament, can the idealistmetaphysicdoenough toaccount for theappearanceofourphysicalworld? In

Our experiencemight also reflect a dimension to consciousnessthat is inherently unconditioned by any spatial or cognisensory pa-rameters.Itcouldshinethroughasthesynchronicphenomenalunityof consciousness, another feature to have long perplexed philoso-phers.Inordinaryconsciousstates,suchunitypertainstothataspectinwhichdistinctobjects,nomatterhowdiverse in theirqualitativeorrepresentedspatialcharacteristics,seemsimultaneouslytoappearwithinthesameconsciousfieldofagivensubject.41Thefield,insofaras it canharbour anydiversity of cognisensoryobjects, doesnot it-selfpresentastingedwithsuchqualities.Whileouridentificationasa localisedsubjectwillappeartohiveoffourfieldofconsciousnessintoaprivate,spatiallydelineatedperspective,itsunitymayneverthe-lessbeowed toan inherentnature that lacksany spatio-qualitativedimension.

Finally, the status of consciousness as self-subsistentmay under-pinourimpressionthatconsciousnessunderliesandisnotdependentuponcognisensoryobjects in theway that itsobjectsdependuponit.ItcouldpartiallyexplainthepervasiveintuitionbehindwhatDen-nett(1991)alludestodisparaginglyasthe“CartesianTheater”.ItmayalsobearthatflintofindubitabilitywhichfedintoDescartes’famoustouchstone:“IthinkthereforeIam.”Whileidentificationasathinkingperspectivereifiesthe“Iam-ness”intoanarrowerboundedself,the

(althoughIwouldcontendthatthereisstillsubtleperipheralcognitiveim-agerysubtendingthesenseofself).Foranexcellentdiscussionofconscious-nessduringdreamlesssleep,seeThompson(2015).

41. AcleararticulationofthephenomenalunityofconsciousnesscanbefoundinthispassagebyBayneandChalmers:“Atanygiventime,asubjecthasamultiplicityofconsciousexperiences.Asubjectmightsimultaneouslyhavevisualexperiencesofa redbookandagreen tree,auditoryexperiencesofbirds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharppain in theshoulder,theemotionalexperienceofacertainmelancholy,whilehavingastreamofconsciousthoughtsaboutthenatureofreality.Theseexperiencesaredistinctfromeachother:asubjectcouldexperiencetheredbookwith-outthesingingbirds,andcouldexperiencethesingingbirdswithouttheredbook.Butatthesametime,theexperiencesseemtobetiedtogetherinadeepway.Theyseemtobeunified,bybeingaspectsofasingleencompassingstateofconsciousness”(2003,23).



alsosuggests theconverseoption,uponwhich therecanbenoper-spectivalsubjectwithouttheimagerythatlendstoittheperspective.Subjectandobject-imageryarethustwosidesofacoin:therecanbenoimagerywithoutaperspectiveandnoperspectivewithouttheim-agery.Theyco-manifest.Subjects,viz., imagery-to-a-perspective,arethusthebasicunitsofmanifestation.

Whataboutourbrute-factappearanceassubjectsfromwithinthegroundofaperspectival,unconditionedconsciousness?Isthisnotpa-peringoveracontroversialcrack?Somehavesuggested that it isatleastastroublesomeasthehardproblem,interactionproblemor(de)combinationproblem to suppose that imageryof suchorderly com-plexitycouldsimplyappearfromagroundthatsupposedlylacksit.43 Various components to thisworrywillbeaddressedat further junc-tures inthepaper,butwecanimmediatelypoint toanotableasym-metry.Evenifwecannotfurtherexplainthemysteryofhoworwhycomplexsubjectsshouldappearfromtheground,wecanatleastob-serveourownmanifestationasasubjectwhoseconsciousfieldcouldconceivably turn out, in essence, to be aperspectival and uncondi-tioned.We are, after all, a constantwitness to thefluxof changingimagerytoourconsciousperspective.Theconsciousnessinwhichtheimageryappearspresentsasdiscerniblyreflexiveandintransitiveand,to that extent, aperspectival. It bears the furtherhallmarks (suchasunity and ever-presence) ofwhat could turn out to be an uncondi-tionedconsciousness.TheCDTshowsconsciousnesstofurthermorebeconceivablyexperienceableaspurelyunconditionedandaperspec-tival. It couldconceivablycontinue tobeexperiencedassuchupon

Dualism,whichadmitsnothingbuttheexperiences.…Mentalexperiences,Iamarguing,likegrins…requiresomethingfurther[amind]tohavethem”(1968,22).Thatthemindorsubjectisperspectivalisnotexplicitlyspecifiedbythesephilosophers.Butthereisgoodreasontosupposethistobeamini-malrequirementforthenotionofanobject-experiencing“subject”tohavetractionbeyonditsjustbeingalogico-grammaticalentity.Althoughmyownaccount develops perspectivalness in relation to witness-consciousness, itneednotcarryadeepermetaphysicalcommitment.Itcan,asStrawson(2011,276)contends,be“minimal”,“thin”,an“innerlocus”ofconsciousness.

43. IthankDavidChalmersforpushingmeonthispoint.

whatfollows,Iwillsketchsomeofthefoundationsuponwhichsuchametaphysicmightbebuilt,whichnotonlyreplacesbutsubstantiallyimprovesupontheRussellianmodel.

The Cognisensory Deprivation Tank provides a mechanism notonlyforconceivingofanobjectlessandaperspectivalconsciousness,butalsoforimagining,uponbeingreverse-engineered,howourworldcouldbeconstructed.Theimagery,wesaw,canplausiblyconveyallthe complexity that cues one into the sense of occupying a qualita-tively rich, spatio-temporal world. And viewing theworld asmind-dependentimageryasopposedtomind-independentobjects,wesaw,wasthemostnaturalwaytoconstruehowsomeoneemergingfromanobjectlessmodeandapprehendingconsciousnessasultimatecouldreframetheappearanceofphenomenaasbeinggroundedinit.Thecentral proposal is thus thatwhat appears as our concreteworld isinfactbuiltfromconstellationsofcognisensoryimagerythatframeasubject’sperspective.

UnderPerennial Idealism, then, thebasicbrute fact uponwhichmanifestationistobebuiltistheappearingofsubjects,viz.,imagery-to-a-perspective, from the ground of aperspectival, unconditionedconsciousness. Just asBerkeley claimed, themetaphysicpermitsnoobjects that are not perceived by a subject. There can be no free-floatingimagery. If there isanyimagery,aperspectivewillnecessar-ily come for free (although therewill not necessarily be a sense ofidentitywithit).Thishassomesupportfromthewidespreadintuitionthatitmakeslittlesensetosupposethattherecouldbeconcretelocal-isedimagery,suchasaheadache,thoughtorsensationofredwithoutsomeminimallocalisedpointofviewtowhichitappears.42TheCDT

42. Thisprinciple, for instance,hassomesupport inStrawson(2010,166–168),whoalsocitesFregeandShoemakerasendorsingit.DavidArmstrongem-ploystheprincipleinanargumentagainstHume’sbundletheory,sayingthattosupposethattherecouldbeunownedpainswouldbelikesupposingthattherecouldbeagrinwithoutaface.“Isitmeaningful,”heasks,“toconceiveofasingletwingeofpain,asinglesense-perception,asingleafter-image,asin-glethoughtorasinglefeelingofgriefexistingbyitselfindependentlyofany-thingelse?…[T]hetwingeofpaindemandssomefurtherbackground,forsomethingtohavethetwingeofpain.Buttosaythisistogobeyond‘Bundle’



observe,signifysubjects,oraggregatesofsubjects,orpartofawidersubject.Isay“signify”aswecannotobserveothersubjectsdirectlyassubjects.Asubject,wesaw,candirectlyaccessonlyitselfinitscapac-ityasanimagery-boundperspective.Wedirectlyregisterourselvesassubjectsviathedynamicconstellationsofcognisensoryimagerythatimmediatelyframeourperspective.Ourregistrationofothersubjects,ifitoccurs,mustoccurindirectly.TheproposalunderPerennialIdeal-ism is thatour registrationofothersubjectsoccurs indirectlywhen-everwedirectlyexperienceinourconsciousfieldsomecognisensoryimagery.Whatmanifeststousasimageryisthedirectregistrationofourselvesassubjectsaswegoaboutindirectlyregisteringothersub-jects.Our imagery, inotherwords, is the inwardappearanceofourownunifiedsubjecthood,alongwiththeoutwardappearanceofothersubjectsthatmanifestfromtheground.Astheseobject-imagesmustconstitutivelybethesimultaneousregistrationofourselvesandothersubjects,therecannot,onthispicture,bealonesolipsisticsubjectthattakesintoitspurviewtheobject-images.

Whilewemayconcedethattheimagerywetaketosignifypeopleandanimalsistheappearanceofothersubjects,whataboutthatim-agerywhichappearstosignifynotsubjects,butnon-consciousobjectssuchas tables,atoms, rocksandplanets? If such imagery isactuallyalsotheoutwardregistrationofothersubjects,thenwhat,inoutwardterms,mightthosesubjectsturnouttobe?Here,PerennialIdealismcan defer to the panpsychist. The subjects turn out to bewhateverisindividuatedbythemostplausiblecriteriaforsubjecthood,bethisat themicro,macro or cosmic level. Themicropsychist argues that(sub)atomic phenomena are likely candidates; the cosmopsychistdeemsittobethecosmos.Bothallowformid-levelsubjectssuchasourselves,withroomforothersubjectiveunitiessuchascellsormol-ecules.All thatmatters forourpurposes is thatwhatwe take tobeordinaryobjects,viaourcognisensoryimagery,areinfacttheoutward

the reappearanceofobjects. It ison this raftofobservable fact andconceivableextrapolationfromitthatthemetaphysicisbuilt,withnoobviousgapsinitsinitialrendering.Bycontrast,thebrutefactsthatbuttress the foundations of materialism, dualism and panpsychism(microorcosmic)arenotonlymysterious,butunobservable.Wecan-notobserveorproperlyconceiveof theemergenceofconsciousex-periencefromnon-consciousneurologicalentities,ortheinteractionofnon-materialminds(orproperties)withmaterialbrains,orthe(de)combinationofmacro-frommicro-orcosmicsubjects.Thebrutefactsneededtobridgethegapsineachpositionareprecariouslyspecula-tive.Inthisrespect,thefoundationsofeachpositionarefarmoretenu-ousthanthoseofPerennialIdealism.

Butstillthereliesaheadaconsiderablechallenge.Anyonewhohashadvividenoughdreamswillnoteitwellwithintherealmofconceiv-abilitytosupposethatthis“waking”world,too,couldbeadream,withthedreamerbeingtheonlysubjectinexistence.Whileitmayavoidproblemsofitsrivals,itisacheapmetaphysicthatlackstheresourc-es toaccount for theapparentlystrikingdifferencebetweenwakingworldanddreamworld.Foritseems,atleastfromthewakingperspec-tive, thatobjectsandother subjects in thedreamworlddependen-tirelyontheexperiencingsubject,whereasmanyobjectsandallothersubjectsinthewakingworldare,inanimportantsense,independentofaparticularexperiencingsubject.DoesPerennialIdealismhavetheresourcestoavoidsuchsolipsismanddeclare, inlinewithcommonsense,thatthetableisintheroomwhenitleavesourconsciousness?Canthemetaphysicbebuilttobeartheapparentasymmetrybetweendreamingandwaking?Ibelieveitcan,andinawaythatdepartsfromBerkeley and thoseBritish andAmerican idealistswho relieduponGodoranAbsolutetodothejob.

Fromordinaryexperiencewesurmisethatsomeoftheitemsthatappearasobjectstoourperspective—viaimageryintheformofotherpeopleor animals—signifyother subjects.The currentproposalbe-ginsbyextendingtheordinary-experiencescenariotosupposethatnotonlyhumansandanimals,butalsoplantsandalltheotherobjectswe



Iamexperientiallyawareofanothersubject-entitysuchasaperson,oragroupofatomicsubject-entitiesintheformofatable,orapartofthecosmicsubject-entity.Myexperienceoftheperson,thetableorthecosmosdoesnotimmediatelypresentitselftomeasanyoftheirinaccessibleinteriornatures:whatitisliketobetheotherperson,thetable-formingatomsorthecosmos.Nordoesitimmediatelypresenttomeasabareabstractstructure—asifnaturewereoutwardlytoap-peartous,skeleton-like,asabookofformulae.Thesubject-entitiesdonotimmediatelypresenttomeeitherasme,viz.,asmyownfirst-per-sonimagery-framedperspectiveontheworldasasubject,althoughthisisgettingclosertothemark.45Rather,myexperienceoftheothersubjectspresentstomeintheformofstructuredarraysofcognisen-soryimagerythatappear to myperspective—afeaturecapturedcon-ciselybythemetaphysicofPerennialIdealism. Forthiscognisensoryimagerywillsimplybetheoutwardregistrationofothersubjectstomyinnersubjectiveperspectivethattheimageryisdirectlyregistering.Itisfromthisperspectivalimagery—takingtheimmediateformofnei-thersubjectsnorabstractstructure—thatwegoontomakeinferencesaboutabstractstructuresandothersubjects.PerennialIdealismisthuspreferabletoRussellianmonisminsofarasitcapturestheactualphe-nomenologicalstructureofouracquaintancewithwhatweinfertobeothersubject-entities.46

Thereisfurtherreasontosupposethatcognisensoryimagerycould,inlinewithPerennialIdealism,betheouterappearanceofothersub-jects.Manyhavenotedamysteriousbutstrikingsimilaritybetweensubjectsand the standard “secondaryqualities” suchas those listed

45. ThusRussellwrites:“Whataphysiologistseeswhenheexaminesabrainisinthephysiologist,notinthebrainheisexamining”(1927,320).

46. Innote13,IpointedtoChalmers’observationthatRussellianmonismcanbegiven(atleast)adouble-aspectedoridealistrendering.Theidealistrender-ing,whilstnotasexplicitasPerennialIdealismincapturingthephenomeno-logicalstructureofouracquaintancewithothersubjects,ismorecompatiblewithitthanthedouble-aspectedrendering.Forthegroundingofabstractablerelationsinperspectivalsubjectswouldbetterfitwiththeirpresentationtousassubjects,intheformofstructuredcognisensoryimagery.

appearanceofsomeconscioussubjectorgroupofsubjects,howevertheyareindividuated.44

Havewereturnedtopanpsychism?Certainlynot.Wecanreapthebenefitswithout the burdens. As a subjectwill inherit neither con-sciousness nor experience from that of other subjects, no hermeticboundariesarepunctured,thusgeneratingnocombinationordecom-binationproblems.As subjects,wepartake in consciousness that isendemic to the aperspectival ground; our experience is the inwardregistrationofourselvesasweoutwardlyregisterothersubjectsaris-ing from thatground.The tablewe leavebehindwhenweexit theroomdoesnot vanish. Likely it does notmanifest as a unified con-scioustable-subject,astablesarenothighuponthelistofpreferredcandidates for panpsychist subjecthood.On themicropsychist crite-rion,wewouldleavebehindaconstellationofmicro-subjectswhosecollectiveinteractionexternallyappearstous,withoutmagnification,asatable,and,undermagnification,asmicro-entitiessuchasatoms.Importantly, they would appear to one another as simple imagery,framingeachother’sperspectives.Shouldthetableturnouttobepartofawidercosmicsubject,thenitmaycontributetocognisensoryim-agerythatframesthecosmicperspective.

The position offers an improvement upon Russellian monism,whichwe can recall as being recruited in the argument for panpsy-chism. Most brands of (subject) panpsychism claim each materialfundament,alongwitharangeofotherentitiessuchasourselves,tohavebothaninteriorandexterioraspect,theinteriorbeingthatofaconscioussubject,andtheexteriorbeingthatofanabstractrelationalstructure.Icontendthatthismodelunder-describesthephenomenalstructureofouractualencounterswithothersubject-entities.Suppose44. Forexample,onthemicropsychistfront,Chalmers(1996,297)considersthe

informationalstateofathermostatorelectronasamorelikelylocusforsub-jectiveconsciousnessthanthatofarock.Morerecently,GiulioTononi’sInte-gratedInformationTheoryofconsciousnessassociatescentresofconsciousactivity(subjects)withaprecisemathematicalquantitycalledΦ(“phi”).Thisalso favours the ascriptionof consciousness to electrons, atoms andmole-culesoverrocksandtables.ForanaccessiblesummaryofTononi’stheory,seeMørch(2017a).



Suchanapproach,onthemicropsychistcriterionforsubjecthood,providesaneatwaytodistinguishwakingfromdreaminglife.Waking-world imagery iselicitedbyawiderarrayofsubjects.WhenIseeatablewhileawake, Iamregisteringnotonlyacollectionofsubjectsthatwouldvisuallyappeartomeundermagnificationasneurons—inkeepingwiththeobservationthatneuralactivity is implicatedinallperceptualimagery,notjustthatofthoughts—butalsoacollectionofsubjectsthatwouldvisuallyappeartomeundermagnificationasta-ble-atoms,photonsandsoforth.WhenIdreamofseeingatable,how-ever,Iamregisteringmainlythecollectionofsubjectsthatwould,inawakingstate,visuallyappeartomeasneuralnetworkslocatedinmyownbody.Subjectsthatwouldappearastable-atomsorphotonsarethusnotdirectly implicated in thegenerationof thedream-imagery,even though the cognisensory experiencemight, in a vivid enoughdream, be indistinguishable from that of waking experience. Thiswouldhelpexplainwhywakingstatesareusuallymorestable thandreamstates.Wakingstates registera farwidernetworkofsubjectsintheirperspective:subjects,suchasatomsandphotons,thatwouldoutwardlyappeartousasrelativelyindependentofourorganism.

(1740).Monads—similartosubjects—areextensionless,unified,perspectiv-al,simplebutqualitativelydistinctmind-likesubstances,whoseinnerchang-ingperceptualstatesvaryvastlyindegreesofcomplexity.Whatwetaketobeextensionalphysicalobjects inmotion, includingourownbodies,arealsointentionalobjectsthatarethecontentsofvariousmonadicperceptions(in-cludingourown).Theorderweperceiveinthenaturalphysicalworld—suchas that of body, organ, cell, atom—corresponds to a hierarchy ofmonads,whoseoverallplaceintheorderofthingsisreflectedinthecomplexityandclarity of its perceptions. A “dominantmonad”, such as that “had” by ourhumanbody,willsubordinatemonadsthatare“had”byourorgans,whosedominantmonadwillinturnreignoverthosethatphysicallyappeartousascells,andsoon.Unlikeonthecurrentposition,however,Leibniztreatsthemonadsasindividualsubstancesthatareemanatedbyacreator-God,fromwhichtheyarecreatedordestroyed,andwhichservetoexplainallappear-anceof law-like regularityand interactionbetween them.Theydon’t influ-enceeachother. Ifonewere toconsider themonadsashaving interactive“windows” onto each other, then Leibniz’s viewwould be closer toWhite-head’sprocessphilosophy(1929/1985),whichinthisrespectmorecloselyre-semblesPerennialIdealism,althoughhistheisticelementsareagainatoddswiththeposition.

byLocke.Subjectsandqualities(suchasredness),whilenotthesame,bothhaveadimensiontothemthatoutstripsabstractdescription,un-derpinning thekindof intuitions thatdroveFrank Jackson’s famousKnowledgeArgument(1986).Bycastingqualitiesastheouterappear-anceofsubjectstooneanother’sperspective,PerennialIdealismneat-lyandnaturallyaccountsforthissimilarity.Theyaresimilarbecausetheyaretwosidesofthesamecoin.47

Thisimagerywillberegisteringourownbrainsandbodiesunderdifferentmodesofcognitionandmagnification.Consider,forexample,thecognisensoryimagerycomprisingourinnerthoughtsandbodilysensations.Mostimmediately,suchimagerycontributestothedirectregistrationof ourselves as singleunified subjects.Yet any imagery,presentingtousasanobject,mustsimultaneouslybetheoutwardreg-istrationofothersubjects,orawidersubject.Amicropsychistcriterionofsubjecthoodcanofferanatural,scientificallymotivatedcandidateastowhatthosesubjectsmightbe.Ourthoughtsandbodilyfeelingsmaybeimagerythatregistersnotonlyourselvesassubjects,butalsoindirectlyacollectionofsubjectsthatexternallyandvisuallyappeartous,undermagnification,asneuralandcellularnetworks.Asanodewithinthenetwork,eachneuronorcellmayitselfbeasubjectwhoseconsciousinteractivecommercewithothercellsandneurons(aswellaswithwhatappear tousasexternalatoms,photons,etc.) isbeingcollectivelyregisteredinourfieldofawarenessasthefamiliarinnercognitions.Onthispicture,then,ourinnerthoughtsandsensationsare, in part, the outer unmagnified appearance to us of neurophysi-ologicalnetworks,eachnodeofwhichisitselfanawaresubjectthatwouldvisuallyappeartous,undermagnification,asaneuronorcell.48

47. The similarity between secondary qualities and subjects has motivated abrandofpanprotopsychismknownas“panqualityism”.Thissuggeststhein-trinsicnatureoffundamentstobethatofqualities,withconscioussubjectsemergingfromthem.Unsurprisingly,thepositionincursthesizeableexplan-atorygapofderivingconscioussubjectsfromnon-consciousqualities.Foradiscussionofpanqualityism,seeChalmers(2016a).

48.Onamoreabstractlevel,PaulOppenheimerhaspointedouttomethatthisaspectofthemetaphysicbearssomeresemblancetoLeibniz’smonadology



co-registeredbythesubjectintowhoseperspectivethegivensubjectimpinges.Forexample,supposethatimpingingandco-awaresubjects,whichwewouldmicroscopically and visually identify as atoms, ap-peartomeintheformofatable.Thesemicro-subjectsaredisposedtoappearinthatparticulartable-ishwayonlyintandemwiththeotherparticularsubjectsthatarecollectivelyimpingingintomyperspective,suchasthosewerecogniseoutwardlyasneurons,photonsandsoon.Thoseverysamesubjectsappearingtomeasatablearedisposedtoelicitverydifferentimagerytotheperspectiveofacat,ortoanant,ortootheratomsandsoon.

Andyetthewaythatatableoranythingelseappearstomerightnow is not determinedwholly and passively by the impinging net-workofsubjects’dispositionsthatarecurrentlymanifestingasobjectswithineachother’sandmyperspective.Myobject-imageryis—andisdisposedtobe—generatedbymyselfasa unifiedsubjectinresponsetotheco-registrationoftheothersubjects.Thisisthe“inner”sideofthedispositioncoin:thedispositionofasubject, initscapacityasaunifiedperspective, to register itselfas it takes in theentirefieldofimpingingsubjects.Inthiscapacity,itisdisposedtoelicitaparticularrangeandtypeofcognisensoryobjectimagerythattypifiesthekindofsubjectthatitis.ThewaythatIseeatable,forinstance,isanimag-isticmanifestationthatdependsnotonlyonthedispositionsofthoseimpingingsubjectsthatwouldappeartomeundermagnificationas(say)atoms,photons,neurons, etc.—andhow those subjectsare inturnregisteringtooneanotherasobject-imagery—butalsoonhowI,asunifiedsubject,amregisteringmyselfasItakeintheentirenetworkofimpingingsubjects.Insofarassuchimagerymustappeartemporally,wecansaythatasubjectisdisposedtocontinuemanifestingasthatsubject in thesameoverallway, throughgeneratingasimilar rangeofimagerytoitsperspectiveinitsregistrationofothersubjects,allofwhich are themselvesdisposed to generate, to their overall perspec-tives,similarimagery.49

49. I am inclined to suppose, in accordancewithLeibniz’s view (seenote 48),that there is top-down influence fromsubjectsofgreater innercomplexity

Object-imageryappears,toawakingsubject,toformaworldthatisorderly.Itisstructuredinspaceandtime,comprisingentitiesthatcausallyinteractinalaw-likefashion,enablingaccuratepredictionstobemade.HowmightPerennial Idealismaccount for theorderliness,whichwemightcallthe“PrincipleofRegularity”?Thisrelatesbacktotheearlier scepticalchallenge thataskedhow imagery,arising fromtheground,couldbesocomplexandorderly.Onewayforwardmightbetopositindependentlawsofnaturethatsomehowissuefromtheground in tandem with subjects they govern, ensuring predictableimagery.This isanunpromisingway togo.Thegroundwouldnowunparsimoniouslyyieldnotone,buttwosortsofmanifestation—sub-jectsand laws.Worse,itwouldundercuttheidealistunderlayoftheposition:ratherthanthephysicalworldbeinganappearancethatde-pendsuponsubjects,subjectswouldthenbeentitiesacteduponbyexternalphysicalforces.

Thereis,however,anotherwaytoconstruethePrincipleofRegu-laritywhich, rather than introducing a new and extrinsically opera-tivekindofmanifestation,keepsthePrincipleintrinsictothesubjectsthemselves.Wecanconstrue thesubjectas inherentlydispositional,pronetoelicitingorderedimagerywheneitherregisteringothersub-jectstoitselforbeingregisteredbyothersubjects.Onthispicture,anyappearanceoforderlinessissuesfromhowtheintrinsicdispositionsofsubjectsarecollectivelymanifestingtoanygivensubject’sperspective.InkeepingwithSchopenhauer,Isuggestthatthedispositionsarefeltsubjectivelyandprimallyaswill,driveordesire:thewilltomove,togetsomething,removesomething,becomesomething.Dispositionsdrivetheever-changingdisplayoftheimagery.

Itishelpfultotalkabout“inner”and“outer”sidesofthedisposition-coin.Withregardtotheouterside,everysubjectcarriesadispositiontooutwardlyelicit inanothersubjectparticularobject-imagery.Theparticularkindofimagerythatagivensubject,let’ssayanatom,elicitsinanothersubject,let’ssayahuman,dependsnotonlyonthegivensubject’sowndisposition—conferredatleastpartlybyitsco-registra-tionofothersubjects—butalsouponwhatothersubjectsarebeing



inmethevisualimageryofasquarepegarealsodisposedtoprohibitasimultaneousvisualappearancetomeofthemfittingthrougharoundholeofthesamesize.Wecanthusstarttogetasenseofhowdisposi-tionscouldintroduceadegreeoforderlinessintotheappearances,en-ablingpredictionsaccurateenoughtonavigatetheworldandconductscientificinquiry.51

There is, of course,muchmore thatneeds saying, but I hope tohave provided enough of the basics to show Perennial Idealism tobeametaphysicalsystememinentlyworthexploring.ItisonethatIbelievenotonlyavoidstheproblemsof itspredecessors,butshowsrealpromiseinactivelyaccountingfortheappearanceofourlaw-gov-ernedworld.Givenitsorigininthemysticalliterature,wemightnowwonderifanyofitissuggestiveofthisextrapolation.Indeeditis.TheAdvaiticmysticNisargadattaMaharajwasrecordedtohaveendorsedthefollowing:

Anymanifestation,anyfunctioning,anywitnessing,canonlytakeplaceinduality.Therehastobeasubjectandanobject,theyaretwo,buttheyarenottwo,theyaretwoendsofthesamething.Whenconsciousnessstirs,dual-ityarises.Therearemillionsofobjects,buteachobject,whenitseesanother,assumesthesubjectivityoftheAb-solute….[1985,76]

AnapprovedtranslatorandspokespersononMaharaj’steachings,Ra-meshBalsekar,elaborates:

51. However,asMartincautions, thecounterfactualor subjunctivestatementsin which we express such predictions and laws should be understood as“awkward linguisticgestures towards thesemultiplereadinesses”(2007,31).While useful, they are not stating essences about an independently law-governedrealitythatgroundsdispositions;itisratherthatthedispositionalnatureofeachsubjectgroundsthelaw-likestatementsastheirtruth-makers,allindexedtotheperspectiveofasubject.Suchstatements,ifunderstoodasidealisedapproximations thatconveniently isolateparticulardispositionali-ties,areusefulguidestonavigatingtheworldasasubject.(Onarelatedpoint,seealsoHeil,2017).

The intersubjective co-manifestationof dispositions, onboth “in-ner”and“outer”sidesofthedisposition-coin,ensuresanorderly,law-likeappearanceofbothasubjecttoitselfandtheworldthatappearstoit.AsC.B.Martin(2007)pointsoutinhissystemofdispositionalontology, fromwhich thisaspectof theaccount is inspired, there isanindefinite,perhapsinfinitenumberofwaysthateach“dispositionpartner”,ashecallsit,canpotentiallymanifest—dependingonwhatotherpartnersitteamsupwith.50Thesubjectsanchoringourexperi-enceofa table,aswe justnoted,willappearverydifferently to theperspectiveofanant,anotheratom,acatandsoforth.Andyetifaninfinity,itisabounded,selectiveinfinity.Forthereare,asMartinsays,alsoapossiblyinfinitenumberofmanifestationsthatagivendisposi-tionpartner,togetherwithotherpartners,isnotdisposedtoelicit,orisdisposedtoprohibit.Supposethata“neural”micro-subjectisadis-positionpartnertotheelicitedmanifestationofmyfeelingofunder-standing“there’sasquarepeg”.Itisnotdisposed,intandemwithitspartneringmicro-subjects,toelicitsuchafeelingofunderstandinginthecatortheant.Suchsubjectsthataredisposedtocollectivelyelicit

(suchasourselves)tothosewithlessercomplexity(suchasneurons,iftheyaresubjects),althoughameasureofinfluencemustalsoworktheotherway.Futureworkonthisprojectwilldevelopamodelforthinkingfurtheraboutcausalinfluence.

50.Martin(2007)proposesthesubstratum—thefundamentalbearerofproper-tiesthatisnotapropertyitself—tobespace-time,fromwhichobjectsariseaspropertiedregions.Eachproperty is“Janus-faced” inbeingontologicallyidentical tobothadispositionandaquality,whichmaybementalornon-mental.Eachobject isdisposed, togetherwithotherobjectswhoseproper-tiesMartinterms“reciprocaldispositionpartners”,to“mutuallymanifest”inapossiblyinfinitenumberofways.Everymanifestationistheconcretequali-tativecoming-into-contactofreciprocaldispositionpartners.TotakeoneofMartin’s examples, amanifestation of salt dissolving inwater is a coming-into-contact of reciprocal disposition partners that include salt and water.Prior todissolution,both thesaltandwatercarryadispositional “directed-ness”towardseachothertomanifestinthatparticularway.UnderPerennialIdealism,the“substratum”isnotspace-time,butaperspectivalconsciousness,although,forreasonsthatwillbecomeapparent,itisnottobethoughtofasastraightforwardbearerofproperties.ThebasicmanifestationsareanalogoustoMartin’s properties insofar as they are “Janus-faced” subject-dispositionidentities,asopposedtoquality-dispositionidentities.



totakeplace,spaceandtimearethenecessaryconcepts(inwhichphenomenaareextendedinvolumeanddura-tion).Phenomenon,therefore,isnotsomethingdifferentfromnoumenon, but it is noumenon itselfwhenobjec-tivized.It isnecessarytounderstand—andnevertofor-get—thisessentialidentity.[Balsekar,1990,66–67]

Thisofcourseraisesnewquestionsregardinghowwearetofurtherunderstand the interface between unmanifest ground andmanifestphenomena. It will in fact form the most serious objection to theposition.Thiswillbeaddressedinthenextsection.Iwillclosehereby reviewing three implicationsof themetaphysic so far elucidated,since these will prove important in addressing the final objection.First,althoughwhatwehavecalled“subjects”and“objects”dependuponeachother, subjectsare themorebasicunitsofmanifestation.Object-imagerycanneverexistinisolationbutmustalwaysmanifesttoa subject’sperspective.Second,as theperspectiveofa subject it-self requirescognisensoryobject-imageryto“wall it in”, the immedi-ateperspective-lendingworldarounduswithwhichwearedirectlyacquainted, andwhichwe assume to be spatio-temporal andmind-independent,is,actually,partofwhatstructuresourselvesassubjects.Notions of a spatio-temporal world have no meaning except fromwithintheframeworkofasubject.Third,astheimagerythatwallsinasubjectisitselftheoutwardappearanceofothersubjects,whichareinturnwalledinbyyetothersubjects,onesubject,likeapartitioninagianthoneycomb,implicatesallsubjects.53LikeIndra’snet,subjectsaredeeplyinterdependent.

Section 5: The Problem of the One and the Many, and a Proposed Solution

Theproblemof theoneand themany,as I refer to it, goesback toancient times. Itarises inconnectionwithanymetaphysic,whether

53. This again is resonantwithLeibniz: “…eachmonadhas features that aregiventoitinthelightoffeaturesofeveryothermonad”(Monadology,§60).

Eachoneofus,asaphenomenon, ismerelyanappear-anceintheconsciousnessofthosewhoperceiveus,and,therefore,whatweappeartobeisaphenomenon—tem-poral,finiteandperceptibletothesenses,whereaswhatwe are,whatwe have always been and alwayswill be,without name and form, is the noumenon—timeless,spacelessimperceptiblebeing.[Balsekar,1990,76]

This againbrings to the fore the critic’s puzzleofhow the timelessground,beingwithoutstructureorqualities,couldbetherepositoryofsuchrichness.Isuspectthatpartofthepuzzlestemsfromtheground’sinevitablespecificationinnegatingterms.Because it isdescribedaslacking any of the spatial, temporal or qualitative parameters thatqualifyconditionedphenomena,thetemptationistostripconscious-nessofanypositivedimensionatall,supposing it tobebarrenandvacuum-like. This ismistaken. Themystics commonly speak of thegroundasastorehouseofinfinitepotentialitythatcannotbeaddedtoortakenawayfrom.52UnderPerennialIdealism,itcanbethoughtofastheunmanifestsourceofallthemanifestingsubject-bounddisposi-tions.HereisBalsekar(summarisingMaharaj)again:

Thesubstratumisthenoumenon,whichistotalpotential-ity.Withthearisingof“I-am-ness”itmirrorsitselfintothephenomenaluniversewhichonlyappearstobeexteriortothenoumenon.Inordertoseeitself,noumenonobjec-tifiesitselfintophenomenon,andforthisobjectivization

52. Thethemeofthegroundor“Absolute”beingofinexhaustibleyetunmanifestplenitudecanbefoundinmystical literaturefrommanysources, includingthe TaoTeChing, Plotinus and theUpaniṣads. See, for example, thiswell-knownversefromtheIsha Upaniṣad:

pūrṇamadaḥpūrṇamādāyapūrṇātpūrṇamudacyate pūrṇasyapūrṇamādāyapūrṇamevāśiṣyate

“Theinvisible[Brahman]istheFullness;thevisible[theworld]tooistheFullness.FromtheFullness[Brahman],theFullness[thevisible]universehascome.TheFullness[Brahman]remainsthesame,evenaftertheFull-ness[thevisibleuniverse]hascomeoutoftheFullness[Brahman]”(Swa-miNirvikarananda,transl.2018).



by the appearance of the finite andmultitudinousworld.55 On this,Beiserwrites:

Ontheonehanditisnecessarytoexcludetherealmofthefinite from the absolute, because thefinite and theabsolute contradict one another; more specifically, theabsoluteisindependentandindivisiblewhilethefiniteisdependentanddivisible.

Ontheotherhand,however,itisalsonecessarytoin-cludetherealmofthefiniteintheabsolute,because,asthewholeofallreality,theabsolutecannotbelimitedbysomethingoutsideitself….Anabsolutethatexcludesthefinitebecomes,justbythattoken,afiniteabsolute,andsonotreallyanabsoluteatall.[2002,567–568]

Andyetthealternativeofnotconcedingrealitytothemanifest,finiteworld—inourcaseprohibitingtheappearanceofanimagery-boundworldtoourperspectives—seemstoentailembracinganaustereex-istencemonismonwhichonly theundifferentiatedgroundexists.56 Thisself-defeatinglydeniesnotonlytheveryexistenceofthesubject’sperspectivefromwhichthemetaphysicisposited,butthewholemeta-physicofsubjectsbuiltuponthefundament.SuchimplicationshavebeennotedinconnectionwiththeancientphilosopherParmenidesofElea,whoalsoinspiredSchelling.Parmenideswroteapoeminwhichayouth,takentobeParmenideshimself,travelsthroughtheheavens

570).Aretheattributesmerelythatwhichtheintellectperceives,andhencesubjectiveappearances,ordotheyobjectivelyconstituteGod’sessence?Theobjectivereadingwouldclearlynotfitwiththatofunconditionedconscious-ness.Forratherthanbeingpossessedofaninfinityofdiscernibleattributes,unconditionedconsciousnessisdepictedbymysticsasnotmanifestinganyattributes.

55. For an informative account of Schelling’s various attempts to tackle theproblemof theoneand themany inhisdifferentworks, seeBeiser (2002,565–595).

56. InExistenceMonismthereisexactlyoneconcretetoken.Intheearlier-men-tionedPriorityMonismthereisexactlyonefundamentalconcretetoken,butnotnecessarilyonlyoneconcretetoken(Schaffer,2014).

idealistornot,thatproposesagroundthatiscompletelyinfiniteandunconditioned.Tobecompletelyinfiniteandunconditionedistobeunboundedbyanyparameterswhatsoever, including those thatdis-tinguish theground fromwhatever is grounded.Thequestion thenarises:Howcantheonefundamentcoherentlyinterfacewithwhatwetaketobeourconditionedworld,oritsimagisticappearance,whichcontains its many apparently law-governed subjects and objects?Conceding any reality to a multi-faceted world enforces a bound-arybetween itandthe fundament.Thisundoes thepurelyuncondi-tioned status of the ground,which permits no such boundary. Theproblemremains, irrespectiveofwhether thefinitemanifestation istobethoughtofasoutsideoftheground,suchasitscausalproduct,orinsideoftheground,suchthatitisapartorapropertyofit.Thisproblemwas,forinstance,historicallygrappledwithbytheGermanIdealist FriedrichSchelling.Goadedby critics includingHegel,whowasalsoattemptingtotackletheproblem,SchellingmadenumerousattemptstoformulatewhatFrederickBeiser(2002)callshis“Parmeni-deanvision”.ThisevolvedfromaSpinozian-inspired“Absolute”thatwasinessenceapureindivisibleunity:infinite,undifferentiatedandself-subsistent.54Butthisgroundkeptthreateningtobecompromised

54.While strikingly similar inmanyways, the “Absolute” ofGerman Idealism(withitsrepresentativethinkersSchellingandHegel)isnotthatofPerennialIdealism,atleastifwearetoagreewiththeinterpretationofBeiser(2002).For their Absolute is not fundamentally that of consciousness. Instead, intheirscheme,ouruniverseisconceivedofasaself-sufficientorganismthatisdynamicallyevolvingalongarationaltrajectorythroughwhich,followingSpinoza, both “subjective” (e.g.mental) and “objective” (e.g.material) ele-mentsareappearancesorattributes. Itshighestdegreeofdevelopmentoc-curs throughthehumanexerciseof “intellectual intuition”.Here,oneratio-nallyandnon-discursivelygraspsone’sidentitywiththeobjectiveuniverseasawhole,withnatureapprehendedasacting through themasamodeoftheAbsolute’sself-knowledge.Thisdoesnotfitthedescriptionof“awaken-ing” that I speculatively ascribe to the earlier-citedmystics. Its immediatecontent,howeverprofound,isnotthatofpureaperspectivalunconditionedconsciousness reflexively apprehending its own nature. It does not seemthatunconditioned consciousness is thenatureof Spinoza’smonisticGod,either,atleastononekeyinterpretation.BeiserpointsoutthatthenotionofSpinoza’sGodasasubstancepossessedof infiniteattributes (ofwhichwehumanshaveonlythoughtandextension)is“notoriouslyambiguous”(2002,



aboutdenyingtheveryimagery-builtworldthatthemetaphysicwasatpainstoelaborateinthefirstplace.

TheproblemoftheoneandthemanythuspresentsPerennialIde-alismwithwhatappearstobeaviciousdilemma:Ifthemanifestworldofsubjectsisreal,itirrevocablyundercutsthepurelyunconditionednatureofthegroundbyimposingboundariesbetweensubjectsandtheground.Ifonlythegroundisreal,wehavetheseeminglyabsurdconsequence of denying reality towhat seems undeniably existent.Hence, far frombeinganinnocentbrutefact, thenotionofsubjectsarising from unconditioned consciousness seems potentially a farmoredangerouscrack topaperover than thoseof itsphilosophicalpredecessors.Itappearslikeachasm,threateningtoswallowupthemetaphysicbeforeitcangetofftheground.

I believe that Perennial Idealism has the resources to tackle theproblem.Acentralcluetoitspotentialresolutioncanbefoundinthefollowing passages from one of the celebratedmodernmystics wecited earlier, Sri RamanaMaharshi. Elaborating on a Sanskrit verse(Kārikā,ch.2,v.32)composedbyGauḍapāda(circa700CE),amuchearlierAdvaiticmystic,SriRamanasays:

Nothingexistsexcepttheonereality.Thereisnobirthordeath,noprojection[oftheworld]ordrawingin[of it]…no mumukṣú [seekerof liberation], no mukta [liberatedone],nobondage,noliberation.Theoneunityaloneex-istsever.

Tosuchasfinditdifficulttograspthistruthandwhoask, “How can we ignore this solid world we see allaroundus?”thedreamexperienceispointedoutandtheyaretold,“Allthatyouseedependsontheseer.Apartfromtheseer, there isnoseen.” [Muruganar,2008,50 (origi-nallyinMudaliar1977,149–50)]

RamanaisexpressingwhatisknowninAdvaitaVedāntaastheajāta doctrine,whichmeans“notcreated,notcaused”.59Theajātadoctrine59.TheajātadoctrineisalsoalludedtobyMaharaj(1997,26):“Thatsomething

tomeet an unnamed goddesswho reveals to him the basics of “re-ality”and“opinion”.Realityisthatwhichisuncreated,indestructible,indivisibleandcomplete,whereas‘opinion’denotestheworkingsofourordinaryworld.57WhileParmenidesseemedtoendorseonlytheexistenceof“reality”anddenytheexistenceoftheworldespousedby“opinion”,severalscholars,includingtheauthoroftherelevantentryintheInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,remainreluctanttoattributetohimthis“mad”position:

Not only is the external world experienced by mortalsensesdeniedreality,theverybeingswhoaresupposedto bemisled by their senses are also denied existence,includingParmenideshimself!Thus,thisviewresultsinthe “mad,” self-denying position that Descartes wouldfamously show laterwas theone thingwecouldneverdeny as thinkers—our own existence. If there is to beany didactic purpose to the poem overall—that is, theyouthistolearnhowtonotfall intotheerrorsofothermortals—theexistenceofmortalsmustbeagiven;sincethisviewentails theydonotexist, thepoem’sapparentpurpose is entirely undercut. Surely this blatant contra-dictioncouldnothaveescapedParmenides’notice.[DeLong,2018]

EvenscepticalHume,whodeniedtheexistenceofaCartesianthinker,didnotdoubt the realityof thefluxingbundleof sensoryandmen-talimpressionsthatappearedtohisownorothers’purview.58Thereseems toussomethingundeniably,objectivelyand indeedultimate-ly realabout theveryeventof thediverse imagesappearing toourperspective.Therealso seems somethingdisturbingly self-defeating

57. Parmenides, “On Nature” <http://platonic-philosophy.org/files/Par-menides%20-%20Poem.pdf>

58. “Butsettingasidesomemetaphysiciansofthiskind,Imayventuretoaffirmoftherestofmankind,thattheyarenothingbutabundleorcollectionofdif-ferentperceptions,whichsucceedeachotherwithaninconceivablerapidity,andareinaperpetualfluxandmovement”(Hume,1739,secVI,Bk1,Part4).



The ajāta doctrine appears, in linewith the above quotation, todenyobjectiveexistencetotheworldofsubjectsandobjects.Indoingso,itdeniesthattherecouldbesuchasituationasthegroundcausingtheirexistenceintheformofthingsorevents.Theontologicalstatusof theworldofsubjects (seers)andobjects (seen),alongwith theirimplieddifferentia,isthuscomparedtodreamitems.Asdreamitemsdon’treallyexist,therecannotbearealboundarybetweenthemandtheground.Andyetthedreamitemsdoexistwithinthedream.

Thisisaradicalclaimthatneedssomeunpacking.Withregardtothelackofarealboundary,letussupposethatJimdreamsofseeingamountain.WewouldbemakingacategoryerrorifweweretoclaimthatthemountainisgroundedinJim’sconsciousness.ThereisnorealmountaintobegroundedinJim’sconsciousness.However,mostofuswouldnotdenyJim’sexperiencetoberealenough.Hereallyseemsto see amountain. If hemerely hallucinated amountain, the samelogicwouldapply.Evenifthereisnorealmountain,thereisrealcogni-visualmountainimagery.TheeventofthisimageryappearingtoJim’sperspective,oritsbeinggroundedinhisconsciousness,isobjectivelyreal. The perspectival experiencing of the dream imagery (or a hal-lucination)isindeedjustasrealasitwouldbeifJimwereawakeandseeingamountain.However,ifwethenclaimthattheeventofJim’sperspectivalimageryliterallyarisesfromthegroundofunconditionedconsciousness,wetrigger theproblemof theoneandthemany.Assoonasweadmit theobjective realityof Jim’sperspectival imagery,whetherwaking or dreaming,we are allowing into our ontology arealeventwhoseexistenceformsaboundarywiththeunconditionedground.This iswheretheajātadoctrinecomesin.Forit ispreciselysuch“events”asJim’sexperiencingimagerytohisperspectivethatareallocatedthestatusofadreamitem.Inotherwords,tosaythatJim’s

foundations of its composite existence” (250 A.C.E, V.4.1). Yet even if wegrantPlotinusthisprinciple,itishardtoseehowhissystemadequatelyre-solvestheproblemoftheoneandthemany.Forhepresentsthefirstlevelofemanation,Intellect,asobjectivelyreal,thusimposingaboundarybetweenitandtheunboundedOne.

wasexpoundedinthemystico-philosophicalwritingsofthetwomostdistinguished early exponents of Advaita Vedānta: Gauḍapāda andŚaṅkara(Nikhilānanada,1949).Iusetheterm‘mystico-philosophical’todescribeanotableclaimmadeabouttheajātadoctrine.Unlikemostmetaphysical doctrines,which are purely speculative, the ajāta doc-trineisclaimedtobetrueofthedirectexperienceofonewhois,astheysometimesputit,establishedintheground.Thisisnolesstrueof Sri RamanaMaharshi.One of his closest disciples, the poet andphilosopherMuruganar,wrote: “ThoughGuruRamana…expound-ed numerous doctrines…youshouldknowthatwhatwehaveheardhim affirm tointimatedevoteesinprivate…ashisowntrueexperi-ence,isonly thedoctrineof ajāta [non-creation]”(verse100,48,2008).And in an additional comment on the aboveGauḍapāda verse, Ra-manasaid:“OnewhoisestablishedintheSelf[Ground]seesthisbyhisknowledgeofreality”(Godman,2005,240).WhenappliedtoPe-rennialIdealism,whichrecognisesthecentralityofdirectexperiential“awakening”toitsmetaphysic,Ibelievetheajāta doctrinecanresolvetheproblemoftheoneandthemany.60

which is born andwhichwill die is purely imaginary” [my italics]. An in-formativeanalysisoftheajātadoctrineinRamana’steachingscanbefoundinblogpostsbyMichaelJames(2016)andDavidGodman(2008),bothofwhomarerecognisedauthoritiesontheteachingsofRamanaMaharshi.

60.Fromwhat I candiscern, othermetaphysical systemspositing anuncondi-tionedground,suchasthoseofParmenides,Plotinus,SpinozaandSchelling,don’tspeakexplicitlyofan“awakening”fromthedualisticandillusorystruc-tureofselfandmanifestworldtoone’sidentityastheground.Hence,theylackthespecificresourcestoaddresstheproblemoftheoneandthemanyinthewaythatisbeingproposedhere.Plotinus’system,forinstance,proposesanultimateunityofbeing,calledthe“One”,fromwhichmultiplicitytimeless-lyemanates throughdescendingordersofunity: Intellect(Nous),Soul,fig-uresinthematerialworld.Thenatureofemanationbetweenlevelsofbeingisnotmadeclear.Thelogicisratheronethatfollowsametaphysicalprincipleheldwidely inhis time: that themoreunitysomethinghas,encompassingbeauty,goodnessandharmony,themorerealitis.Plotinususesthisprincipletoreasonthatcompositeentitiesmustowetheirexistencetoelementsthatexemplifyahigherorderofunity.Thisculminates,ultimately, in theundif-ferentiatedOneasthesourceofallbeing:“Untouchedbymultiplicity,itwillbewhollyself-sufficing,anabsoluteFirst,whereasanynot-firstdemandsitsearlier,andanynon-simplexneedsthesimplicitieswithinitselfasthevery



thegroundfromtheObjectiveStandpointistoconstruemattersfromwithinaframeworkthatdoesn’tfitthecaseathand.Wemight,touseacommonanalogy,bevisualisingsubjectsasanalogoustowhirlpoolsandthegroundasanalogoustotheoceanandthentryingtoenvisagetherelationbetween“ocean”and“whirlpools”.But this is tomakeacategoryerror.ForthereisnosuchObjectiveStandpointfromwhicheithersubjectsoruniversalconsciousnesscouldbesaidtoexist,andhencenosuchstandpointfromwhichaproblematicrelationbetweenthemcouldlegitimatelyapply.Butwhyisthis?

Consider,first,unconditionedconsciousness.Sinceitdoesn’tsus-taindistinctions,talkofaneutralpointofreferencefromoutsideofit,relatingittosubjects,isnotapplicable.Considernowasubject:acon-sciousperspectiveframedbyimagery.CanwespeakofanidealisedObjective Standpoint fromoutside any subject’s perspective,whichrelates a subject, or anetworkof subjects, to the ground?Herewedrawupontheimplicationswithwhichweclosedtheprevioussection.Theimagery,whichcuesusintothesenseofbeinginaspatio-tempo-ralworld,cannotmanifestwithouttheperspectivetowhichitappears,andtheperspectivecannotmanifestwithouttheimagerytoframeit.Asall thedistinguishing featuresofasubjectand itsworld,with itsdispositionalrelations,onlymanifestfrominsidethesubject-imagerynetwork, therearenooutwardmarkersbywhicha subject,orwebof internallyco-dependent subjects, coulddiscernibly registerasanobjectiveitemorevent.Theveryhappeningofthesubject’sexistencehasnothingtosignalitsontologicalrealitybeyondtheimagisticcon-tentavailablefrominsideagivensubject’sperspective,whetherthisbeasubject’sdirectregistrationofitselforitsindirectregistrationoforbyanothersubject(s).Subjectscanthusnotexistasobjectiverelatathatexternallyinterfacewiththeground.

Infailingtomanifestfromaneutraloutsidestandpoint,arewetosay, then, thatsubjects(or, for thatmatter,universalconsciousness)don’t objectively exist? That is not, strictly speaking, correct either.Rather,itisthattheconditionsunderwhichasubjectortheuniversalconsciousness couldbe said toobjectively exist ornot exist,which

experiencing imagery to his perspective is grounded in unconditionedconsciousnessisasmuchacategoryerrorassayingthatthe mountain is grounded in Jim’s consciousness. Bothhave the samedream-likestatus.Werethis tobethecase,wewouldn’thavetoworryaboutaboundarybetween subjects andgroundanymore thanaboundarybetweenamountainandJim’sconsciousness.Yethowcoulditbethecase?

Toanswer this,wemust lookmorecloselyat therelation that isbeingpositedtohold,problematically,betweenthesubjectsandtheground.Whenwenormallytalkabouttherelationbetweenagroundandwhat isgrounded in it (or, ifpeopleprefer, the fundamentandwhatdependsorsupervenesonit),61 fromwhatstandpointisthere-lationbeingconsidered? Insuchconsiderations there is the tacitas-sumptionofalegitimateoutsideandneutralsub specie aeternitatispointofreferencefromwhichitispossibletoenvisageandassesstherela-tionthatpertainsbetweengroundandgrounded.Evenifwerealisethatwecanneverescapeoursubjectiveviewpoint inmakingjudge-mentsabouttheworld,wetacitlyassumetheexistenceofavalidatingexternalpointofview.Thebackgroundassumptionisthatpeculiari-tiespertainingtoourpointsofview—includingtheveryfactthatsuchjudgementsarebeingmadefromaperspective—arenotenteringintothecontentsofwhatweassumetobeultimatereality.Wearemakingclaimsthatpurporttorevealfactsaboutobjectiverealitythatdon’tinthemselvesdependinanywayupontheperspectivesofthosemakingthe judgement—claims thatfit intosuch templatesas “truthsaboutthegrounded factshold invirtueof the truthsabout thegroundingfacts”or“factsaboutwhatisgroundeddependuponfactsabouttheground”.Letuscall this idealisedneutralvantage-point, fromwhichsuchstatementsaremade,the“ObjectiveStandpoint”.

TheObjectiveStandpointfailstoapplytotheframeworkofPeren-nial Idealism.To try to conceiveofa relationbetweensubjectsand

61. Readerswhodon’tlikethenotionofgroundingcan,forthesepurposes,con-struethetermsynecdochically,tocoverthegeneralsetofdependencyrela-tionsofwhichtechnicalgroundingisamember.



bysubjects,theirreasoning,ortheworldinrelationtotheground.Iwillelaborateonthislaterinthepaper.Somewhatparadoxically,eventheirstatements—totheeffectthattherearenodistinctions—wouldbe self-defeating insofar as they are expressed in terms that implydistinctions.63

Whatofour foundational “brute fact”statement thatwesubjectscanobserveourownmanifestationinaconsciousfieldthatcouldcon-ceivablyturnouttobeunconditioned?Again,wearefreetostatesucha factso longaswerecognise it tobeasubject-relativerather thanobjectivetruth,ifitistrueatall.Insofarasweappeartobeasubjectmanifestinginconsciousness,weexistbothfromwithinourownin-teriorperspectiveandfromwithintheperspectivesofthosesubjectsintowhichwe impinge.Butnosubjectsor theirnetworksexist sim-pliciter.Itisonlyrelativetooursubjectiveperspective,fromwithinthedream,asitwere,thatwecanmeaningfullyassertourownexistence,map thearchitectureofour image-boundworld64 andproclaimour-selvesandittobe“grounded”inwhatwecanconceivablyextrapolatetobeunconditionedconsciousness. It isnotanordinarygroundingrelation.Grounding relations,aswesaw,arenormallyexpressed interms that are validated from the Objective Standpoint. Such judg-mentsimplyacommensurabilitybetweenlevelsofreality,legitimisingsuchstatementsas‘Factsaboutwhatisgroundeddependuponfacts

63.Afterexpoundingontheajāta doctrine,Ramanasays,“This[explanation]isallfromthepointofviewofthecurrentconversation.Inreality,thereisonlytheĀtman. Because this is so, there isnothing toknowandnothing tobeknown”(Godman,2005,262).

64.Whatarewetomakeofthetablesleftbehinduponexitingtheroom?Again,ourstatementstothiseffecthaveanobjectivepurportwhich,underPeren-nial Idealism,doesn’tmatch reality. For evenwhenwe recast tables as co-arisingatomicsubjectsthatareawareofoneanother,thereisnoObjectiveStandpointfromwhichthisconfigurationofsubjectscouldbesaidtoexist.Themostwecansayisthateachtable-atomasasubjectexists(i)directlytoitsownperspective,and(ii)indirectlytoanyotherperspectiveintowhichitimpingesasimagery.Evensayingthismuch,asitiscouchedindistinctionsthatthemselveshaveobjectivepurport,holdstruefromneithertheObjectiveStandpoint,northeultimatestandpointthatdoesn’tadmitofrealdistinctions.Hencethestatementlacksvaliditybeyondthestandpointofasubjectwhomakesit.

would implya legitimacyof theObjectiveStandpoint, fail toobtain.Thus,thepreconditionsforanobjectiverelationholdingbetweensub-jectandgroundalso fail toobtain.That iswhy the ideaof subjectsbeinggrounded inuniversalconsciousness isacategoryerror,onaparwiththemountainbeinggroundedinJim’sconsciousness.Italsoshows that theposition cannotbedescribedas anunqualifiedexis-tencemonism,whichwouldsupposethatonlythefundament,andnotthesubjects,objectivelyexist.

Puzzlesremain. Ifwecan’tascribeobjectivereality toeithersub-jects or aperspectival consciousness, how then arewe to accommo-datethecentral“Perennialist”postulatethataperspectivalconscious-ness,ourabidingnature,istheultimategroundofallbeing?Howarewetotalkaboutthemetaphysicatall?Herewegettothesecondpartoftheajātadoctrine:theanalogytodreamitemsexistingfromwithinthedream.InrenouncingtheObjectiveStandpoint,wedonothaveto renounceall talkabout theworldand reality.Butwedohave torelativisethetruthofanysuchstatementstothestandpointofasub-ject,recognisingnoobjectiverealitybeyondthis.Thisisnotjustthetrivialclaimthatwecannotescapeourperspectiveinmakingjudge-mentsabouttheworld.Itisthefarmorerobustclaimthatpeculiari-ties pertaining to perspectives, including our status as perspectives,are entering into the contentof all our judgements and facts abouttheworld,includingeverythingbeingwrittennow.62Wecanstandbyourearlierreasoningthatattemptedtoshowtheconceivableultimacyofaperspectivalconsciousness.Butsuchreasoning,implyingdistinc-tions,canonlyholdtruerelativetoastandpointfromwhichdistinc-tionscouldlegitimatelyapply.ItcannotholdtruefromanObjectiveStandpoint,asthereisnosuchthing.Itwouldalsobeinvalidatedfromthestandpointofoneestablishedintheground,whodeclarestheretobenothingbuttheground,recognisingnorealdistinctionssustained

62.This does not, of course, licence a sloppy, anything-goes line of thoughtsuch as, ‘It seems tome subjectively to be P, therefore P.’ Perennial Ideal-ismwillhavestandardsofrelativeobjectivitythatdependonintersubjectiveverification.



today].Butforthejñānitheworldisnotthereatanytime,past,presentorfuture.Whatappearsseparatefromusiscalledbyus“theworld”.Itappearsseparatefromusdueto ego-consciousness [ahankāra]. When ahankāra goesthere is nothing separate; there is noworld. Time alsoarisesfromprāmatā, theknower.Becauseprāmatā isnotreal,timeisalsonotreal.[Godman,2005,238,252–253]

Letusberemindedofjusthowradicalthisinsightwouldbe.Itisnotjust that thedeep-seatedassumptionofan “outside”worldasmind-independentwouldbeinvalidatedasitcomestobeseen,atleastonmyextrapolation,assubject-dependentimagery.Itisalsothattheveryappearingofthediverseandtemporalimagerytoaboundedperspec-tive(“theknower”)woulditselfbeapprehendedasnon-ultimate,asnotreallyhappening.Thesewouldbeonaparwithdreamitems.Theterm‘awakening’isthusfarfromempty.Itliterallydenotesawakingupfromspatio-temporalandqualitativedistinctions,fromamultiplic-ity thatwehaveassumedallour lives tobeas realasanythingcanbe.Followingthislineofreasoning,itcanbesaidthattheordinarilyexperiencedwakingstateistothejñāniwhatthedreamstateistous.

Sohowcouldajñānibesaidtoregardtheincommensurateworld,withallitsmultiplicity,asdream-like?Thefollowingpassage,inwhichRamanaalludestotheteachingofthepre-eminentAdvaiticexemplarŚaṅkara,shedsfurtherlight:

He [Śaṅkara] said that (1) Brahman [the ground] isreal, (2)Theuniverse is unreal, and (3) Brahman is theuniverse.Hedidnotstopatthesecond,becausethethirdexplainstheothertwo.ItsignifiesthattheuniverseisrealifperceivedastheSelf[Ground],andunrealifperceivedapartfromtheSelf.[Cohen,1980,65]

Inviewofwhathasbeensaid,thismaybeinterpretedasfollows:Toperceive theuniverse,with itssubjectsandobjectsanddistinctions,apart fromSelf (theground) is toperceive it in thewaymostofus

abouttheground.’Philosophers,takingtheObjectiveStandpoint,goontoanalysevariousdependencyrelations,yieldingsuchreasoningasChalmers’conceivabilityargumentagainstmaterialism.Thesamecannotbedonehere.Onewouldbecommittingacategoryerrorbysupposingthatonecould investigatewhetherornot therecouldbeapossibleworld,identicaltothisoneinitsground,butwithdifferentmanifestationsobtaining.Somemightthereforeinsistthat‘grounding’isthewrongtermtoapplytothepseudo-relationbetweenaperspec-tivalconsciousnessandsubjects.Whilehereisnottheplacetoenterintothethornytopicofgrounding,Iwillfornowchoosetoretaintheterm‘ground’forunconditionedconsciousness,sinceitpreservesitsmostimportantelements.Theseareitsuncompromisingultimacyandthedependencythatsubjectshaveonit,insofarassubjectscanbesaidtoexist fromwithin theirownperspectives. It isanunconventionalgrounding.

WhileIhavelabouredtomakeanalyticsenseoftheajātadoctrine,RamanaMaharshididnotarriveatitbydoingphilosophy.Therere-mainstheepistemicpuzzleofhowsuchapervasiveassumptionabouttheworld’sobjective status could come to seem invalidatedbyonewho has awoken from it. In alluding to a bounded subject as “theknower”,Ramanasaid:

… onewho is properly established in the Ātman [one’sabiding nature as the ground] knows that nothinghappensinthisworld,andthatnothingiseverdestroyed.Somethingis felt tobehappeningonlywhenweare inthestateof prāmatā, theknower.Thisstateisnotone’srealnature.For the jñāni [onewhohasawakened]whohasgivenuptheideaoftheknower,nothingeverhappens.…Theworldseenonthepreviousdaywasnotreal.It

wastheknowledgeofanunrealknower.Inthesameway,theworldofthenextdayisalsoistheknowledgeofanun-realknower.Fortheajñāni[onewhohasnotawakened]theworld is experienced at these times [yesterday and



itpurportedlycutoffallthoughtandimageryatitsroot,annihilatingthe reciprocalassumptionofbeingaboundedsubject. Itwasanalo-gous to being in theCognisensoryDeprivation Tank. Ramana him-selfstressedtheimportanceofthisactofenquirywhenhewrotecirca 1913–1914abouthisawakeninginthefirstpartof Arunachala Ashtakam, versetwo:

WhenIscrutinisedwithinthemind“Whoistheseer?”theseerbecamenon-existentandIsawthatwhichremained.Theminddoesnot[now]risetosay“Isaw”;how[there-fore]canthemind[aboundedperspective]risetosay“Ididnotsee”?[2007,151]

Commentingonthis,DavidGodmanwrites:

This isa sutra-likesummaryof theexperience inwhichRamana boiled down thewhole [awakening] narrativeintoitsessence.Heaskedhimself“Whoistheonewhoseesobjects?”Hefocusedonthatentity,sawitdisappearinto its source, and from thatmoment on the individu-al perceiving “I” never roseor functioned inhimagain.[Godman,2019]

TheexperienceoccurredwhenRamanawassixteen,beforeanyaware-nessoftheAdvaitictraditionthroughwhichhisteachingscametobeexpressed.Hewentontoliveforanotherfifty-fouryears,andhislifewaswidelydocumented. Fromall accounts, thepsychological trans-formationthattookplacewasextraordinaryandpermanent,seeming-lyconsistentinallmannersofaffectandbehaviourwithonewhonolongeracceptedthatheoccupiedabodywithitslimitingperspective.67 Theideathatitwasprecipitatedbyaninsightintohisabidingnature

67. InAlbahari (2014) Ipropose that theepistemologyof awakening involves“doxasticintegration”,whereuponone’srationaljudgementsaboutnotbeingalocalisedselfbecomedeeplyalignedwithone’saffectandbehaviour.

do,assuminganultimacyofdistinctions thatareerroneouslysuper-imposedupon theground.Toperceive theuniverseasSelf is toap-prehend it asone’s abidingessence, from theawakened standpoint,asnoneotherthanunconditionedconsciousness,seeingclearlythatdistinctionslacktheirpurportedultimacyandareonparwithdreamobjects.Thewords‘perceive’and‘standpoint’shouldnotmisleadusintosupposingthatsuch“seeing”occursthroughthelocalisedpsycho-physical perspective of a distinct subject. Asmentioned previously,thejñāni,onewhohasawakened,doesnotviewconsciousnessasin-trinsicallylimitedtoaperspective.Hencethejñāni’sstandpointisnotthatofaperspective-boundsubjecthavingobject-knowledgeof theultimate;thereisonlythenon-dual(aperspectival)knowing,orjñāna, beyondthesubject/objectdistinction.65AsRamanaonceexpressedit:“Thereisnojñāni, jñānaaloneis”(Vishnu,1966,101).Itisimpossibletoimagine.Isuggestedearlierthatwemaybeunity-blindinasfarasweautomaticallyviewrealityasultimatelyconditionedanddividedratherthanasunconditionedandundifferentiated.Althoughavestigeofunitymayshinethroughinourordinaryconsciousstates,wearelikethepersonwhocannothelpassumingspacetobeintrinsicallytheshapeoftheroom.IfPerennialIdealismisright, theproblemoftheoneandthemanyonlyappearstoarise,bothexistentiallyandphilo-sophically,becauseweautomaticallyassumethedualisticperspectiveoftheunity-blindthroughwhichrealityisviewedasultimatelydiffer-entiated,reifiedandhenceestrangedfromitsground.

SupposingthatRamanawastrulyawakened,wemaywonderwhatitwasthatcouldhaveprecipitatedtheawakening.Thisisatopicforanewpaper,66but it is instructive tofinishonthis theme,as itgetstotheheartoftheajātadoctrine.AspontaneousactofenquiryintothesourceoftheperspectivalseerwassaidtobetheimmediatepriorcauseofRamana’sawakening.Itwasanenquiryofsuchpotencythat

65. InSanskrit,jñāna denotestruenon-dual(aperspectival)knowledge,andthejñāni istheonewhoknowsit.

66.ItisinfactthetopicofDavidGodman’s2019piecethatIquotefromattheconclusionofthispaper.



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68.Thispaperdescendsfrommanydraftswhichhave,overtheyears,benefitedfromtheinputofmanypeople.Aboveall,IamindebtedtoDavidGodmanand SoniaAlbahari for numerous discussions and for sharing their exper-tiseonAdvaitaVedāntaandRamanaMaharshi,whichhasimmeasurablyen-richedmy(stillgrowing)understandingofthetopic.IshouldliketothankKieranGolbyandItayShanifortheiractiveinterestintheideasfromtheirinception,andNoaLatham,JohnMaierandSimonKiddfortheircommentsonvariousdrafts.IamgratefulfortheopportunitiesthatIhavehadtogivepresentationsataNewYorkUniversityDepartmentColloquiumin2018,andat theNYUShanghai ‘Idealismand theMind-BodyProblem’workshop in2017,aswellasattheUniversityofWollongong,TheUniversityofAdelaide,TheUniversityofWesternAustralia,TheAustralianNationalUniversityandseveralAustralasianAssociationofPhilosophyconferences.Thankstotheseaudiencesforalltheirhelpfulsuggestions!Alongwithinputfromtheanony-mous referees, Ihaveparticularlybenefitted from furtherdiscussionswithDavidChalmers,SharonStreet,GalenStrawson,AndrewY.Lee,DavidRipley,ChristianLee,PaulOppenheimer,PhilipGoff,MartinLeckey,NinKirkham,ChrisLetheby,SamBaron,RebeccaCollins,BronwynFinnigan,ErickLlamas,BrentynRammandJaneMcKessar.AndthanksagaintoDavidGodmanforkindlyeditingthismanuscript.



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