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1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War Neta C. Crawford 1 Boston University Updated and Revised, 13 November 2019 2 Summary If climate change is a “threat multiplier,” as some national security experts and members of the military argue, how does the US military reduce climate change caused threats? Or does war and the preparation for it increase those risks? In its quest for security, the United States spends more on the military than any other country in the world, certainly much more than the combined military spending of its major rivals, Russia and China. Authorized at over $700 billion in Fiscal Year 2019, and with over $700 billion requested for FY2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) budget comprises more than half of all federal discretionary spending each year. With an armed force of more than two million people, 11 nuclear aircraft carriers, and the world’s most advanced military aircraft, the US is more than capable of projecting power anywhere in the globe, and with “Space Command,” into outer space. Further, the US has been continuously at war since late 2001, with the US military and State Department currently engaged in more than 80 countries in counterterror operations. 3 All this capacity for and use of military force requires a great deal of energy, most of it in the form of fossil fuel. As General David Petraeus said in 2011, “Energy is the lifeblood of our warfighting capabilities.” 4 Although the Pentagon has, in recent years, increasingly 1 Neta C. Crawford is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Boston University, and Co-Director of the Costs of War project at Brown and Boston Universities. Crawford thanks Matthew Evangelista, Anna Henchman, Catherine Lutz, Heidi Peltier, Nathan Phillips, Stephanie Savell, Adam Sweeting, Alexander Thompson and David Vine for their critical comments and helpful suggestions. Crawford also benefited from feedback at Ohio State University in April 2019 and Brown University in September 2019. 2 The previous study, released in June 2019, included calculations of emissions from Fiscal Years (FY) 1975 to 2017. This updated and revised version adds the DOD FY2018 fuel consumption and emissions data released by the Department of Energy and a discussion of trends in DOD fuel use and emissions at DOD facilities. 3 Crawford estimates that the budgetary costs of the post-9/11 wars, including Homeland Security and future obligations to care for the veterans of these wars, are more than $6 trillion dollars. Neta C. Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion,” November 2019. 4 General David Petraeus, quoted in Department of Energy, “Energy for the Warfighter: The Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy,” 14 June 2011, https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-war-fighter- department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.

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Page 1: Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War ... · 1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War Neta C. Crawford1 Boston University Updated and Revised, 13

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PentagonFuelUse,ClimateChange,andtheCostsofWar

NetaC.Crawford1BostonUniversity

UpdatedandRevised,13November20192

Summary

Ifclimatechangeisa“threatmultiplier,”assomenationalsecurityexpertsandmembersofthemilitaryargue,howdoestheUSmilitaryreduceclimatechangecausedthreats?Ordoeswarandthepreparationforitincreasethoserisks?

Initsquestforsecurity,theUnitedStatesspendsmoreonthemilitarythananyother

countryintheworld,certainlymuchmorethanthecombinedmilitaryspendingofitsmajorrivals,RussiaandChina.Authorizedatover$700billioninFiscalYear2019,andwithover$700billionrequestedforFY2020,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)budgetcomprisesmorethanhalfofallfederaldiscretionaryspendingeachyear.Withanarmedforceofmorethantwomillionpeople,11nuclearaircraftcarriers,andtheworld’smostadvancedmilitaryaircraft,theUSismorethancapableofprojectingpoweranywhereintheglobe,andwith“SpaceCommand,”intoouterspace.Further,theUShasbeencontinuouslyatwarsincelate2001,withtheUSmilitaryandStateDepartmentcurrentlyengagedinmorethan80countriesincounterterroroperations.3

Allthiscapacityforanduseofmilitaryforcerequiresagreatdealofenergy,mostofit

intheformoffossilfuel.AsGeneralDavidPetraeussaidin2011,“Energyisthelifebloodofourwarfightingcapabilities.”4AlthoughthePentagonhas,inrecentyears,increasingly 1NetaC.CrawfordisProfessorandChairofPoliticalScienceatBostonUniversity,andCo-DirectoroftheCostsofWarprojectatBrownandBostonUniversities.CrawfordthanksMatthewEvangelista,AnnaHenchman,CatherineLutz,HeidiPeltier,NathanPhillips,StephanieSavell,AdamSweeting,AlexanderThompsonandDavidVinefortheircriticalcommentsandhelpfulsuggestions.CrawfordalsobenefitedfromfeedbackatOhioStateUniversityinApril2019andBrownUniversityinSeptember2019. 2Thepreviousstudy,releasedinJune2019,includedcalculationsofemissionsfromFiscalYears(FY)1975to2017.ThisupdatedandrevisedversionaddstheDODFY2018fuelconsumptionandemissionsdatareleasedbytheDepartmentofEnergyandadiscussionoftrendsinDODfueluseandemissionsatDODfacilities.3Crawfordestimatesthatthebudgetarycostsofthepost-9/11wars,includingHomelandSecurityandfutureobligationstocarefortheveteransofthesewars,aremorethan$6trilliondollars.NetaC.Crawford,“UnitedStatesBudgetaryCostsandObligationsofPost-9/11WarsthroughFY2020:$6.4Trillion,”November2019.4GeneralDavidPetraeus,quotedinDepartmentofEnergy,“EnergyfortheWarfighter:TheDepartmentofDefenseOperationalEnergyStrategy,”14June2011,https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-war-fighter-department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.

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emphasizedenergysecurity—energyresilienceandconservation—itisstillasignificantconsumeroffossilfuelenergy.Indeed,theDODistheworld’slargestinstitutionaluserofpetroleumandcorrespondingly,thesinglelargestinstitutionalproducerofgreenhousegases(GHG)intheworld.5FromFY1975toFY2018,totalDODgreenhousegasemissionsweremorethan3,685MillionMetricTonsofCO2equivalent.WhileonlyaportionofUStotalemissions,USmilitaryemissionsare,inanyoneyear,largerthantheemissionsofmanycountries.In2017,forexample,thePentagon’stotalgreenhousegasemissions(installationsandoperations)weregreaterthanthegreenhousegasemissionsofentireindustrializedcountries,suchasSweden,DenmarkandPortugalandalsogreaterthanallCO2emissionsfromUSproductionofironandsteel.

ThispaperestimatesUSmilitaryemissionsandmilitaryfuelusagefortheUSpost-9/11

wars.ThebestestimateoftotalUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissions(includinginstallationsandoperations)from2001whenthewarsbeganwiththeUSinvasionofAfghanistan,throughFY2018,is1,267millionmetrictonsofgreenhousegases(measuredinCO2equivalent,orCO2e).TheOverseasContingencyOperations(war-related)greenhousegasemissionsportionofthoseemissions—includingforthemajorwarzonesofAfghanistan,Pakistan,IraqandSyria—isestimatedtobemorethan440MillionMetricTonsofCO2efortheperiodofFY2001-2018(summarizedinTable2).6

TheUSmilitaryispreparingforthreatsofattackfromhumanadversariesincluding

terrorists.ThethreatsofterrorismandRussian,Iranian,ChineseorKoreanaggressionareallreal,butterroristsandthesecountriesarenotcertaintoattacktheUS.Armscontrolanddiplomacycandeescalatetensionsandreducethreats.Economicsanctionscanalsodiminishthecapacityofstatesandnon-stateactorstothreatenthesecurityinterestsoftheUSanditsallies.

GlobalwarmingisthemostcertainandimmediateofanyofthethreatsthattheUS

facesinthenextseveraldecades.Infact,globalwarminghasbegun:drought,fire,flooding,andtemperatureextremeswillleadtodisplacementanddeath.Theeffectsofclimatechange,includingextremelypowerfulstorms,famine,anddiminishedaccesstofreshwater,willlikelymakeregionsoftheworldunstable—feedingpoliticaltensionsandfuelingmassmigrationsandrefugeecrises.Inresponse,themilitaryhasaddedthenationalsecurityimplicationsofclimatechangetoitslonglistofnationalsecurityconcerns.

UnlikesomeelementsofthepresentUSadministration,whichisinvariousmodesof

climatedenial,theUSmilitaryandintelligencecommunityactasifthenegativesecurity 5Theseemissionsarearesultnotonlyofwar,butalsoofon-goingnon-waroperations,exercises,wargames,andthemaintenanceofmilitaryinstallations.Foradiscussionoftheconceptofgreenhousegasequivalencies,seeAppendix1.USEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,GreenhouseGasesEquivalenciesCalculator,https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references.6SeeAppendix1.Thisisaconservativeestimate.Notincludingbiogenicsourcesorreductionsfromrenewableenergyuse;thelatterwerelessthan1percentofemissions.Inthemostrecentyearforwhichstatisticsareavailable,totalgreenhousegasemissionsbytheDODforFY2018wereabout56millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent,areductionfromthepreviousyear.

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consequencesofawarmingplanetareinevitable.TheDODhasstudiedtheproblemfordecadesandbeguntoadaptitsplans,operationsandinstallationstodealwithclimatechange.

TheUSmilitaryhasanopportunitytoreducetherisksassociatedwithclimate

change—andthesecuritythreatsassociatedwithclimatechange—byreducingtheirroleincreatinggreenhousegasemissions.Whilesomesealevelriseandmassextinctionwillcertainlyoccur—thesechangeshavealreadybegun—themostdireconsequencesofclimatechangeandtheassociatedthreatsandconsequencestonationalsecurityarenotalreadybakedintothesystem.7Thereistimetoacttoreducegreenhousegasemissionsanditisurgenttodoso.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsgreenhousegasemissions,itwouldmakethedireclimatechangecausednationalsecuritythreatstheUSmilitaryfearsandpredictslesslikelytooccur.

AbsentanychangeinUSmilitaryfuelusepolicy,thefuelconsumptionoftheUSmilitarywillnecessarilycontinuetogeneratehighlevelsofgreenhousegases.Thesegreenhousegases,combinedwithotherUSemissions,willhelpguaranteethenightmarescenariosthatthemilitarypredictsandthatmanyclimatescientistssayarepossible.

Yet,thePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisamajorcontributorto

climatechange.ThemilitaryusesagreatdealoffossilfuelprotectingaccesstoPersianGulfOil.BecausethecurrenttrendisthattheUSandindeedtheworldeconomyisbecominglessdependentonoil,itmaybethatthemissionofprotectingPersianGulfoilis,inmostinstances,nolongervitalandtheUSmilitarycanreduceitspresenceinthePersianGulf.ThePentagoncanalsoreduceUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsinotherways.ThesealternativesarediscussedmoreinAppendix2,whichsuggestsspecificmeasuresCongressmightconsidertoreduceDODfossilfuelconsumptionandsimultaneouslyreduceriskofclimatechangecausedconflict.

Reductionsinmilitaryfossilfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,theUS

wouldreduceitsoverallgreenhousegasemissions.Thiswouldtherebymitigateclimatechangeanditsassociatedthreatstonationalsecurity.Second,reducingfossilfuelconsumptionwouldhaveimportantpoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoil,whichthemilitaryacknowledgesmakesthemvulnerabletoenemyattacks.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil,particularlyinthePersianGulf,whereitconcentratestheseefforts.Third,bydecreasingUSdependenceonoil-richstatestheUScouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceinthePersianGulfandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.Finally,byspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovidesecureaccesstopetroleum,theUScoulddecreaseitsmilitaryspendingandreorienttheeconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities. 7Keepingglobalwarmingtolessthan1.5°Cyieldsamuchmorelivableplanetthaniftheclimatewarmsmorethanthat.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),“GlobalWarmingof1.5°C,”SummaryforPolicymakers,(Switzerland:IPCC,2018).

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PartIofthispaperoutlinesthescaleandpatternofUSmilitaryfueluse,includingthe

petroleumresourcesthattheUSusestoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoil.PartIIestimatesgreenhousegasemissionsbytheUSmilitaryandtheportionofthoseemissionsthatareaconsequenceofthemajorpost-9/11USwars.TheUSmilitaryhasbegungreenhousegasemissionsreductions,butthereisroomformuchsteepercuts.Forreadersinterestedinfurtherdetail,Appendix1elaboratesontechnicalissuesandsummarizesthesourcesofdataandassumptionsforthebestestimatesofgreenhousegasemissionstheUShasmadeinwarfrom2001to2018.Italsodescribesthelong-termtrendinDODemissionsfromFY1975–2018anddiscussestrendsinfacilitiesemissions.

PartIIIofthepapersummarizesthewaytheUSmilitaryunderstandsthenational

securityimplicationsofthemilitary’soildependencyandclimatechange.ThePentagonviewsclimatechangeasathreattomilitaryinstallationsandoperations,aswellastonationalsecuritywhenandifclimatechangeleadsmassmigration,conflict,andwar.

I.USMilitaryEnergyConsumptionandFuel

Warandpreparationforitarefossilfuelintensiveactivities.TheUSmilitary’senergyconsumptiondrivestotalUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.TheDODisthesinglelargestconsumerofenergyintheUS,andinfact,theworld’ssinglelargestinstitutionalconsumerofpetroleum.Since2001,theDODhasconsistentlyconsumedbetween77and80percentofallUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.Figure1trackstotalUSFederalgovernmentenergyconsumptionandDepartmentofDefenseconsumption.Figure1.DODandTotalUSFederalGovernmentEnergyConsumption,FY1975-2018,inTrillionsofBritishThermalUnits8

8InTrillionsofBritishThermalUnits.Sourceofdata:USEnergyInformationAdministration.https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/dataunits.php.

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From1975until1990,thetotalenergyconsumedbytheDODwasessentiallysteady.TherewasaspikeinUSmilitaryconsumptionduringthe1991GulfWar,evenasUSalliancepartners,namelySaudiArabia,providedmuchofthefuelusedinthatwar.Afterthe1991GulfWar,andwiththeendoftheColdWar,USmilitaryenergyconsumptiondeclineduntilthe9/11attacks.In2001,asaconsequenceofbeginningamajorwarinAfghanistan,energyconsumptionbytheDODincreased,andin2005hititshighestlevelinadecade.

Sincethe2007EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActtheUSgovernmenthas

graduallydecreaseditsoverallenergyuse.9OnlyinFY2013didDODenergyconsumptionreturntothelevelitwasin2000.TheheadlinefromtheEnergyInformationAdministrationannouncingthetransitionsaid“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”10Yet,evenasithasrealizedsignificantreductionsinfossilfueluse,thePentagon’sconsumptionremainshigh.Indeed,themilitaryannuallyconsumesmorefuelthanmostcountries.

Asthenextfigureillustrates,jetfuel,dieselfuel,andelectricityproductionarethe

largestelementsofDOD,andthereforeUSgovernment,energyconsumption.Figure2.CategoriesofEnergyConsumedbytheUSGovernmentandDOD11

WhydoestheUSmilitaryconsumesomuchenergy?First,thePentagon’sfighting“tooth”employsequipmentthatguzzlesfuelatanincrediblerate.Thelogistical“tail”and

9EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActof2007,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-110hr6enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr6enr.pdf/.SeetheDepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergyStrategy:ImplementationPlan,”March2012,https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/operational-energy-strategy_implementation-plan201203.pdf.10USEnergyInformationSystem,“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19871.11Source:U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration,“U.S.FederalGovernmentEnergyCostsatLowestPointSinceFiscalYear2004,”2October2017,https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33152.Overall,gasolineledtotalUSpetroleumconsumption,followedbydieselfuelandhomeheatingoil,andnaturalgases(HGLs)ofvarioustypes.

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theinstallationsthatsupportoperationsarealsoextremelyfuelintensive.Eventhemilitary’snon-armoredvehiclesarenotoriouslyinefficient.Forinstance,theapproximately60,000HUMVEEsremainingintheUSarmyfleetgetbetweenfourtoeightmilespergallonofdieselfuel.12InstallationandOperationalEnergyUse

TheDODtracksitsenergyconsumptionintwobaskets.Energyusageforinstallationsisabout30percentofPentagonconsumption.AlthoughthesemilitaryinstallationsintheUSandabroadnecessarilysupportoperations,theDODtracksinstallationenergyuseseparately.13But,asthePentagonnotes,“Inmanyways,installationenergysupportswarfighterrequirementsthroughsecureandresilientsourcesofcommercialelectricalenergy,andwhereapplicable,energygenerationandstorage,tosupportmissionloads,powerprojectionplatforms,remotelypilotedaircraftoperations,intelligencesupport,andcyberoperations.”14

TheinstallationtailthatsupportsUSoperationsandpowerprojectioncapability

includesmorethan560,000facilitieswithover275,000buildingsat800baseslocatedonabout27millionacresoflandintheUSandacrosstheglobe.15InFY2017,theDODspent$3.5billiontoheat,cool,andprovideelectricitytoitsfacilities,downfromthepreviousyear,whenitspent$3.7billion.16Eachinstallation,ofcourse,canproducegreenhousegasemissions.ThePentagonbuildingitself,locatedinArlington,Virginiaemitted24,620.55metrictonsofCO2ein2013.17

DespitethefactthatinMay2018theTrumpadministrationrescindedtheObama

administration’sfederalenergyefficiencygoals,theDODremainscommittedtoreducing 12DanielGouré,“TheU.SArmy’sAll-ButForgottenVehicleFleet,”RealClearDefense,22August2017,https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/22/the_us_armys_all-but_forgotten_vehicle_fleet_112116.html.ThegashungryFordF-150pickuptruckgets17milespergalloninthecity;thehungrierChevroletSuburbangets15milespergalloninthecity.13OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment,“InstallationEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_index.html.DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.15Eachinstallationconsistsofoneormoresites,whichmayormaynotbelocatedcontiguoustotheinstallation.DavidVine,"ListsofU.S.MilitaryBasesAbroad,1776-2019,"AmericanUniversityDigitalResearchArchive,2019,https://doi.org/10.17606/vfyb-nc07.AlsoseeJohnConger,“AnOverviewoftheDODInstallationsEnterprise,”HeritageFoundation,4October2019,https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/overview-the-dod-installations-enterprise. 16StatementofHonorableLucianNiemeyer,AssistantSecretaryofDefense,Energy,InstallationsandEnvironment,beforetheSenateCommitteeonAppropriations,SubcommitteeonMilitaryConstruction,VeteransAffairs,andRelatedAgencies,”26April2018,p.13.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Testimony/FY19%20EI&E%20Posture%20Statement%20-%20SAC-M.pdf;SeeOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2016,(July2017)p.15.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202016%20AEMR.pdf.17SeetheEPA,https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghg-reporting-program-data-sets.

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itsenergyconsumptionforpragmaticreasons.18ThePentagonandeachservicebranchhavemultipleprojectsunderwaytoreduceinstallationenergyuseandtheoveralltrendininstallationconsumptionoverthelasttenyearshasbeendownward.Effortstodecreaseenergyconsumptionatinstallationsincludegraduallyreplacingsomenon-tacticalfleetvehicleswithhybrid,pluginhybridandalternativefuelvehicles,reducingengineidling,developingsolarinstallationsatsomefortsandbases,andconcludingpowerpurchaseagreementsforwindandsolarenergy.19TheseeffortshavebornefruitasdiscussedinAppendix1,buttheUSmilitaryhasroomformorereductions.

Figure3belowillustratesthedistributionofenergyconsumptionatinstallationsbythe

servicebranchesandthedefenseagencies.Whilethearmyisthemostenergyintensiveatitsinstallations,energyconsumptionatinstallationsisrelativelyequallysharedbytheservicebranches.Figure3.DODInstallationEnergyConsumption,inBTUs,byService20

Theprofileoffossilfuelenergyconsumptionlooksdifferentwhenweconsider

“operational”energy.Operationalenergyuse,definedastheenergy“requiredfortraining,moving,andsustainingmilitaryforcesandweaponsplatforms”accountsfor70percentof 18ExecutiveOrder13693of19March2015“PlanningforFederalSustainabilityintheNextDecade”wasrevokedbyPresidentTrumpwithExecutiveOrder13834on17May2018.Seehttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13834/andhttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13693/.19TheDepartmentofDefenseEnergyPerformanceMasterPlanwasdevelopedinFY2011.20Source:“Figure4.1:FY2017InstallationEnergy(GoalSubject)ConsumptionbyMilitaryService,”fromtheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2017,(July2018)p.12.

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DODenergyconsumption.21Mostoperationalenergyconsumedisintheformof“bulkfuel”purchasesofjet(JP-8andJP-5)anddieselfuel.22Operationalusevaries,ofcourse,dependingonwhattheUSmilitaryisdoinginanyparticularyear—itsongoingandoccasionalmissions.WhentheUSisengagedinwar,asonewouldexpect,consumptionofjetanddieselfuelsincrease.Theirratiowilldependonthetypesofoperationsthemilitaryisperforming—whetherthewarorparticularphaseofthewarislandorairintensive.

ThefigurebelowshowsoperationalenergyuseinFY2014,whenDODoperational

consumptionwas87.4millionbarrelsofpetroleum.Jetfuelconsumptionbyallthearmedservicesaccountedformorethan70percentofoperationalenergyusethatyear.Althoughallserviceshaveaircraft,theAirForceisthelargestuserofpetroleumjetfuelamongthearmedservices.In2014,theUSwaslargelyabsentfromIraq,hadreduceditsforcesinAfghanistan,andbeganitswaragainstISISinSyria,whichstartedinAugust2014withairstrikes.

Figure4.OperationalEnergyUsebyDomainandMission,FY201423

21DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.22TheservicesmaypurchasefuellocallyandbereimbursedbytheDefenseLogisticsAgency.UnitedStatesGeneralAccountabilityOffice,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData”(GAO-16-664)(September2016),p.6.https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679682.pdf.23DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.

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Becauseoperationalfueluseisgreaterthanforinstallationfueluse,theUSspendsmoreonit.InFY2017andagaininFY2018theDODconsumedover85millionbarrelsofoperationalfueltopowerships,aircraft,combatvehicles,andcontingencybasesatacostofabout$8.2billioninFY2017and$9.1BillioninFY2018.24

Operationalfuelconsumptionvariesmorethaninstallationfueluse.Forexample,

operationalfuelconsumptioninFY2017andFY2018waslowerthaninFY2016.InMay2019,theDODreportedthatitsanticipatedOperationalEnergyDemandwouldgrowinFY2019to88.1millionbarrelsbutwouldbe87.6millionbarrelsinFY2020.25

Unsurprisinglythen,totalUSmilitaryfuelpurchasestrackUSengagementinwarsand

occupations.Alltold,from1998to2018theUSpurchasedabout2.5billionbarrelsofpetroleumfuel.26Sincethe9/11attacks,theDefenseLogisticsAgency’saverageannualfuelpurchasesbeenabout122.4millionbarrelsofalltypesoffuel.27Atthepeakofpetroleumfuelpurchasesduringthisperiod,fromFY2002throughFY2012(whichcorrespondstothepeakofUSfightinginAfghanistanandIraqwarzones),totalannualpurchasesofpetroleumproductsaveragedabout134.3millionbarrelseachyear.PurchasesdeclinedinrecentyearsastheUShasreduceditsoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,butslightlyincreasedinFY2018.28Totalpetroleumproductpurchasesaveragedabout100.6millionbarrelsayearfromFY2013–2018.

24OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment.TheDODnotesthat“Traditionally,thescopeofoperationalenergyexcludesnuclearenergyusedforthepropulsionoftheU.S.Navy’saircraftcarriersandsubmarines,aswellastheenergyusedformilitaryspacelaunchandoperations.Operationalenergydoesincludetheenergyneededtooperatethecarrier’sembarkedaircraftandhelicopters.”DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”[emphasisintheoriginal]https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.TheUSNavyusesmorethan180nuclearreactorstopowerover140submarinesandsurfaceshipsincludingall11USaircraftcarriersand70submarines.SeeDepartmentoftheNavy,“UnitedStatesNavalNuclearPropulsionProgram,”September2017.https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/migrated/nnsa/2018/01/f46/united_states_naval_nuclear_propulsion_program_operating_naval_nuclear_propulsion_plants_and_shipping_rail_naval_spent_fuel_safely_for_over_sixty_years.pdf.25InFY2016theDODconsumedabout86millionbarrelsoffuelforoperationalpurposes.OfficeofUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“FiscalYear2016OperationalEnergyAnnualReport,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/FY16%20OE%20Annual%20Report.pdf.SeetheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,“FiscalYear2018OperationalEnergyAnnualReport,”May2019,p.22,https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/FY18%20OE%20Annual%20Report.pdf.26The1999spikeinjetfuelpurchasescorrespondswiththe78-dayNATOairwarinKosovotowhichtheUScontributedmorethan500aircraft.ForstatisticsontheUSrole,seehttps://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.27 FY2002 through FY2018. 28GAO,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData,”p.9.

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Figure5.DefenseLogisticsAgencyPetroleumProductPurchasesinMillionsofBarrels,FY1998–FY201829

WhiletheDefenseLogisticsAgencyreportsthepurchasesofpetroleumproducts,the

DODdoesnotreportfuelconsumptioninformationtoCongressinitsannualbudgetrequests.Becausenotallthefuelpurchasedisnecessarilyconsumedinthatfiscalyear,anaccurateestimateofemissionsshouldbebasedonfuelconsumption.AlthoughthePentagoncalculatesfuelconsumptionforinternalplanningpurposes,thisinformationisexplicitlywithheldbytheDODinitsreportingtoCongress.30TheDepartmentofEnergy,however,doesreportthefuelconsumptiondataformobilevehicleemissionsbytheUSmilitary,andenergyproductionforfacilitiesbyfueltypefromFiscalYears1975to2018.Figure6illustratesthemixoffossilfuels,bytypefrom1975to2018.31

29SourceofData:ReportsbytheDepartmentofDefensevariousyears.ForFY2018,seeDefenseLogisticsAgency-Energy,https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Energy/Publications/E_Fiscal2018FactBookLowRes.pdf?ver=2019-03-08-101941-663.DefenseEnergySupportCenter,DESC,renamedtheDefenseLogisticsAgency-EnergyinFY2010.Alsoseehttps://www.dla.mil/Energy/About/Library/Publications/.AlsoseeThomasP.Frazier,etal,“FuelPriceEffectsonReadiness,”InstituteforDefenseAnalysis,May2014,p.C-2,https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA.../P-5087.ashx.30Actualandestimatedfuturepetroleum,oil,andlubricantsconsumptionandcostsforaircraftareanalyzedontheDOD’sOP-26Aforms“POLConsumptionandCosts,”whichexplicitlystatesthatfuelconsumptiondataisnottobesharedwithCongress:“TheOP-26AexhibitwillnotbeincludedinjustificationmaterialforwardedtoCongress.”Emphasisintheoriginal.DepartmentofDefense,Comptroller,DODFinancialManagementRegulation,Chapter3,p.3-108,https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/archive/02aarch/02a_03old.pdf.31TheUSAirForceandArmyuseJP-8fuel;theNavyusesJP-5fuel.In2017jetfuelconsumptionaccountedforabout394TrillionBTU.Thiswasaslightdecreasefromthepreviousfiscalyear,whenitaccountedforabout398trillionBTUs.SeetheUSDepartmentofEnergy,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/SiteDeliveredEnergyUseAndCostBySectorAndTypeAndFiscalYear.aspx.

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Figure6.DODVehicleFuelConsumption,FY1975–2018,inMillionsofGallons32

II.EstimatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissionsandEffectsofRecentWarsHowmuchgreenhousegasdoestheUSmilitaryemit,andhowarethoseemissions

distributedbetweenbaseandoverseascontingencyoperations?Therearesevenmajorsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtowarandpreparationforit.33IfocushereonthefirsttwosourcesofmilitaryGHGemissions—overallmilitaryandwar-relatedemissions—andbrieflydiscussmilitaryindustrialemissions.

1. Militaryemissionsforinstallationsandnon-waroperations.2. War-relatedemissionsbytheUSmilitaryinoverseascontingencyoperations.3. EmissionscausedbyUSmilitaryindustry—forinstance,forproductionofweapons

andammunition.4. Emissionscausedbythedirecttargetingofpetroleum,namelythedeliberate

burningofoilwellsandrefineriesbyallparties.5. Sourcesofemissionsbyotherbelligerents.6. Energyconsumedbyreconstructionofdamagedanddestroyedinfrastructure.7. Emissionsfromothersources,suchasfiresuppressionandextinguishingchemicals,

includingHalon,agreenhousegas,andfromexplosionsandfiresduetothedestructionofnon-petroleumtargetsinwarzones.

Becauseofthewayemissionsarereportedunderinternationalrules,USmilitary

greenhousegasemissionsmustbeestimated.AspartoftheKyotoProtocol,signedin

32DatafromtheDepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx. .33Biogenicemissionsareexcludedinthesecalculations.TheDepartmentofEnergydoestracktheseforrecentyears.SeeAppendix1foradiscussionofmethodsandthecategoriesofemissionsincludedhere.

6,386

38,629

14

592

184,228

6,329

GASOLINE

DIESEL

LPG/ PROPANE

AVIATIONGAS

JET FUEL

NAVY SPECIAL FUEL

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December1997,theUSinsistedthatfuelsoldtoshipsandaircraftforinternationaltransportandformultilateralmilitaryoperations,“bunkerfuels,”shouldnotbecountedagainstacountry’stotalemissions.34AstheUSUndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstatsaidintestimonytoCongress,theKyotoProtocoldidnotlimittheUS:

Wetookspecialpains,workingwiththeDefenseDepartmentandwithouruniformedmilitary,bothbeforeandinKyoto,tofullyprotecttheuniquepositionoftheUnitedStates as the world's only super power with global military responsibilities. Weachievedeverythingtheyoutlinedasnecessarytoprotectmilitaryoperationsandournationalsecurity.

AtKyoto,theparties...tookadecisiontoexemptkeyoverseasmilitaryactivitiesfromany emissions targets, including exemptions for bunker fuels used in internationalaviation and maritime transport and from emissions resulting from multilateraloperations,suchasselfdefense,peacekeeping,andhumanitarianrelief.

This exempts fromour national targets not onlymultilateral operations expresslyauthorized by the U.N. Security Council, such as Desert Storm or Bosnia, but,importantly,alsoexemptsmultilateraloperationsthat theU.S. initiatespursuant totheU.N.Charterwithoutexpressauthorization,suchasGrenada.35

TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangecontinuestotreatnationalmilitaryemissions,specificallyinternationalaircraftandnavalbunkerfuels,differentlythanotheremissiontypes.36

Domesticandoverseasmilitaryinstallationsaccountforabout40percentofDOD

greenhousegasemissions.37AsweseefromFigures5and6above,jetfuelisamajorcomponentofUSmilitaryfueluseandthereforeofgreenhousegasemissions.Duringeachairmission,aircraftputshundredsoftonsofCO2intheair,nottomentionthesupportactivitiesofnavalandgroundbasedassetsfortheseairmissions.TheUSwarsinAfghanistanandIraqbeganwithdaysofmassiveairstrikes.Moreover,ineachcase,materialwasflowntothewarzonesandbasesweresetuptoprosecutethewarsandoccupations.Similarly,theUSwaragainstISISinSyriaandIraq,whichbeganinAugust2014,hasentailedtensofthousandsofaircraftsortiesforvariousmissions—fromreconnaissance,toairlift,refueling,andweaponsstrikes.38AB-2Bomberonamissionfrom

34SeeRoyK.Salomon,“GlobalClimateChangeandU.S.MilitaryReadiness,”FederalFacilitiesEnvironmentalJournal,Summer1999,vol.10,no.2,pp.133-142.35UndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstat,testimony,HearingBeforeTheCommitteeonForeignRelations,11February1998,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46812/html/CHRG-105shrg46812.htm.36SeeIPCC,“GoodPracticeGuidanceandUncertaintyManagementinNationalGreenhouseGasInventories,”https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gp/bgp/2_5_Aircraft.pdf.37SenateAppropriationsCommittee,Report(S.Rept.112-168,22May2012).QuotedinMosheSchwartz,KatherineBlakely,andDonaldO’Rourke,“DepartmentofDefenseEnergyInitiatives:BackgroundIssuesforCongress,”CongressionalResearchService,10December2012,p.48.38SeeDatafromUSCentralCommand,https://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/(U)%20APPROVED%20Dec%202018%20APS%20Data.pdf?ver=2019-02-08-022732-933.

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WhitemanAirForceBaseinMissourimightberefueledmanytimes.Forexample,on18January2017,twoB-2Bbombers,accompaniedby15KC-135andKC-10aerialrefuelingtankers,madea30hourroundtripmissionfromWhitemanAirForceBasetoLibyatodropbombsonISIStargetsinLibya.39

Forpurposesofillustration,Table1,below,showsthecapacitiesandrelativefuel

efficiencyofseveralAirForceaircraftandemissionswithoutaerialrefueling.Notethatthefueleconomyoftheseaircraftismeasurednotinmilespergallon,butgallonspermile.40Table1.ExamplesofUSMilitaryAircraftJetFuelConsumptionandCO2Emissions41Aircraft Mission InternalFuel

Capacityinpoundsandgallons42

Rangeinnauticalmilesoninternalfuel

Fuelconsumption,gallonspernauticalmile

MetricTonsofCO2eEmissions,withoutaerialrefueling.43

B-2 Bomber 167,000lbs/25,692gal

6,000 4.28gallons/mile

251.4MetricTons

F-35A(CTOL)

Fighterbomber

18,499lbs/2,846gal

1,199 2.37gallons/mile

27.8MetricTons

A-10 CloseAirSupport

11,000lbs/1,692gal

500 3.38gallons/mile

17.5MetricTons

KC-135R RefuelingTanker

50,000lbs/7,692gal

1,500(loadedwith150,000lbsoftransferfuel)

4.9gallons/mile 75.3MetricTons

KC-46A44 RefuelingTankerandCargo

Estimated16,000gal

6,385(loadedwith210,000lbsoftransferfuel)

Estimated2.9gallons/mile

156.5MetricTons

ThePentagondoesnotpubliclyandregularlyreportitsfuelconsumptionor

greenhousegasemissionsandthereisnoofficialpubliclyavailableDODsourceforallmilitarygreenhousegasemissions.45Itispossible,however,toestimatetheoverall

39SeeTomDemerly,“AllWeKnowAbouttheU.S.B-2Bombers30-hourRoundTripMissiontoPoundDaeshinLibya,”TheAviationist,29January2017.https://theaviationist.com/2017/01/20/all-we-know-about-the-u-s-b-2-bombers-30-hour-round-trip-mission-to-pound-daesh-in-libya/.40Fuelusedependsontheflightprofileoftheaircraftandotherfactors,suchasload.Bycontrastwithmilitaryaircraft,acommercialBoeing747getsabout5gallonspermile,andcancarryover500passengers.41Calculatedbytheauthorfromdataabouteachaircraft.Forinstance,theB-2carries167,000poundsofjetfuel(almost25,000gallons)totravel6,000nauticalmiles(c.6.900miles)andiscapableofmid-airrefueling,takingonanadditional99,000poundsoffuelateachrefueling.TheF-35A,withacombatradiusestimatedtobeabout584nauticalmileshasaninternalfuelcapacityof2,761gallons.TheA-10hasaninternalfuelcapacityof1,642gallonsofjetfuelhasacombatradiusofabout250nauticalmiles.42Assumingeachpoundofjetfuelweighsanaverageof6.5pounds.43SeeAppendix1.Notincludingwarmingeffectsofwatervapor.44TheKC-46Acanrefuelitself.Boeinghasnotreleaseddataonitsinternalfuelcapacity.TheestimatehereforfuelcapacityandconsumptionisbasedontheBoeing767-400ERrangeandfuelcapacity.45SomehavetriedtoestimatethegreenhousegasemissionsofthePentagoninwar.See,forinstance,NikkiReischandSteveKretzman,“AClimateofWar:TheWarinIraqandGlobalWarming,”OilChangeInternational(March2008),

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greenhousegasoftheUSmilitaryusingpubliclyavailableemissionsdatafromtheDepartmentofEnergyforrecentyears,FY2008andFY2010–2018,andfuelconsumptiondatafortheperiodof1975to2018.Thisdataallowsanestimateofhowmuchoftheseemissionsmaybeattributabletowar.

WhilethePentagoncategorizesitsenergyuseintoinstallationsandoperations,the

DepartmentofEnergyusesdifferentcategories,dividinggovernmentdepartmentsCO2equivalentemissionsintothreecategories—standardoperations,non-standardoperations,andbiogenicemissions.46Becausethepaperfocusesongreenhousegasemissionsresultingfromfossilfueluse,biogenicemissionsarenotincludedintheestimates;biogenicemissionsaremuchsmallerthanstandardandnon-standardemissions.

ByDepartmentofEnergydefinition,non-standardoperationsare“vehicles,vessels,

aircraftandotherequipmentusedbyFederalGovernmentagenciesincombatsupport,combatservicesupport,tacticalorreliefoperations,trainingforsuchoperations,lawenforcement,emergencyresponse,orspaceflight(includingassociatedground-supportequipment).Non-Standardoperationsalsoincludethegenerationofelectricpowerproducedandsoldcommerciallytootherparties.”47Standardoperationsappeartobeeverythingelsethatadepartmentdoestoaccomplishitsfunctions,rolesandmissions.TheDepartmentofEnergyreportsthattheUSDODhasproducedatotal(standardandnon-standard)of593millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalentfrom2010to2018,anaverageofabout66millionmetrictonsperyearinthisperiod,roughlythesamegreenhousegasemissionsof14millionpassengercarsdrivenforoneyear.48Thisisalsoroughlyequivalenttothe15percentoftotalGHGemissionsoftheresidentialsectoroftheUnitedStates.49

DepartmentofEnergydatawereusedtoestimatethetotalgreenhousegasemissions

forstandardandnon-standardoperationsoftheDODfromFY2001–2018tobeatotalof1,267millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent.Inanyoneyear,thePentagon’semissionsaregreaterthanmanysmallercountriestotalgreenhousegasemissions.Forexample,in2018,USDODgreenhousegasemissionswere56millionmetrictons(notincludingbiogenicemissions)ofCO2e,areductionof3millionmetrictonsoverthepreviousyear.Thus,in

http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2008/03/A%20Climate%20of%20War%20FINAL%20(March%2017%202008).pdf.46DepartmentofEnergyFederalEnergyManagementProgram.EnergyInformationAgency,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.ThesecategoriesdonotcorrespondtotheEPAGreenhouseGasInventoryReports,nortotheDODcategories.47BesidestheDOD,onlytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityperformsasignificantamountof“non-standardoperations.”DepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.48Therewereabout110millionautomobilesintheUSin2017.TheEPA,whichestimatesthateachpassengervehicleproducesabout4.71metrictonsperyearCO2e.https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references#vehicles.SourcefornumberofvehiclesistheFederalHighwayAdministration.https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2017/mv1.cfm. 49Source:EPA,https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/#allsectors/allgas/econsect/current.

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FY2017,PentagonemissionsweregreaterthanFinland,whichemitted46.8millionmetrictons,Sweden,whichemitted50.8millionmetrictons,andDenmark,whichemitted33.5millionmetrictonsofCO2e.InFY2018,USDODemissionswere56millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent,greaterthantheentireemissionsofmostcountriesintheworld.50Figure7.EstimateofDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2efromTotalandNon-StandardDODoperations,FY2000–201851

HowmuchofthetotalGHGemissionsshouldbeattributedtoUSpost-9/11wars?As

discussedinAppendix1,therearevariouswaystoestimatePentagongreenhousegasemissions.TheestimategivenhereofgreenhousegasemissionsinthemajorwarsisbasedontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommand,whichisthecommandresponsibleforoperationsinAfghanistanandIraqandSyria.InFY2014(seefigure4)thiswasabout24percentofthetotalnon-standardoperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecauseUScounterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80–90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.TheportionofallgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtoCentralCommandincludingoverseascontingencyoperations,andtheGlobalWaronTerror,isestimatedtobeabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.

50M.Muntean,D.Guizzardi,etal,FossilCO2EmissionsofAllWorldCountries:2018Report(JointResearchCentre,EuropeanCommission,2018),https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/fossil-co2-emissions-all-world-countries-2018-report.51BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.MethodsaredetailedinAppendix1.https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.

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10

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90

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Mill

ions

of M

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Ton

s CO

2e

Standard Emissions Non-Standard Emissions Total CO2e Emissions

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Table2.EstimatedDODandWarRelatedOverseasContingencyOperationGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2e,FY2001–201852

TotalDODCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons

OCO-relatedCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons

Standard 466 163Non-standard(directlysupportcombat) 801 280TotalFY2001-2018 1,267 443

Figure8,below,illustratestrendsinDODgreenhouseemissionsfromFY1975toFY2018.Severaltrendsareworthnoting.First,estimatedPentagonemissionsarecorrelatedwithhotwarandcoldwar.WhentheUSisatwarorengagedinexercisesandwargamesinpreparationforwar,emissionsarehigherthanwhentheUSisrelativelylessmobilized.DuringtheReaganmilitarybuild-upofthe1980sfueluse,andthereforegreenhousegasemissions,rose.FollowingtheendoftheColdWar,apartfromaspikeinemissionsduringthe1991GulfWar,notonlywasthereareductioninmilitaryspending,therewasasignificantreductioninGHGemissionsthroughthe1990s.Followingthe9/11attacksandthestartofthewarsinAfghanistanandIraq,USemissionsrosedramatically.Fueluseandemissionscorrelatewiththephasesofoperationsinbothwarzones,trackingtroopsurgesandwithdrawalsduringthepost-9/11wars.Figure8.EstimatedTotalDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,CO2e,FY1975–201853

52RoundedtothenearestMillionMetricTon.BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.53CO2ecalculatedforCarbonDioxide,MethaneandNitrousOxide.ForFY2008andFY2010–2018,thisestimateusestheDepartmentofEnergyfigures.TheotheryearsareestimatescalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondata.“ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,”AnnualReports.

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Second,theUSreduceditsfueluseandemissionsoverallfrom1975to2018.This

correlateswith,andwaslikelycausedby,fourfactors:baseclosures,decreaseduseofgreenhousegasintensivefuelsatbasesandinstallations,fewerandsmallermilitaryexercises,andmoreefficientvehiclesandoperations.Thesearediscussedinturn.

FollowingtheColdWar,thenumberofUSmilitarybaseswerereducedinsuccessive

wavesofBaseRealignmentandClosure(BRAC)from1988through2005.Figure9showsthetrendinDODfacilitiesenergyusefromFY1975toFY2018.Energyconsumptionatmilitaryfacilitiesdeclinedmorethan50percentduringthisperiod,withthebiggestdeclinesinthe1990s.In1989therewereabout1,600USmilitarybasesallovertheworld,includingalargeconventionalandnuclearUSmilitarypresenceinEurope.Today,thereareabout800USmilitarybasesandinstallationsintheworld.54ThemostrecentBRACprocess,from2005to2011,ledtoanoveralldeclineinthenumberofDODbuildingsandotherstructures—fromover600,000individualbuildingsandstructureslocatedonmorethan30millionacresoflandbeforetheBRACinFY2003toabout585,800buildingsandstructureson26.9millionacresinFY2018.55Figure9.TotalDODFacilityEnergyUse,BillionBTU,FY1975–2018,AllFuels.56

54Vine,"ListsofU.S.MilitaryBasesAbroad,1776-2019,"AmericanUniversityDigitalResearchArchive,2019,https://doi.org/10.17606/vfyb-nc07.DepartmentofDefense,“DoDBaseRealignmentandClosure,BRACRounds(BRAC1988,1991,1993,1995&2005),ExecutiveSummary,”March2019,https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/budget_justification/pdfs/05_BRAC/BRAC_Exec_Sum_J-Book_FINAL.pdf.55Sources:DepartmentofDefenseBaseStructureReportsforFY2003andFY2018.See,respectively:forFY2003,https://archive.defense.gov/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf;andFY2018,https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf.56Source:DepartmentofEnergy,AllDODfacilitiescombined,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx.

0

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Further,overthelongterm,themixoffuelusesatmilitaryfacilities,basesandotherinstallationschanged.57InFY1975,coalandfueloil,wereasignificantportionofDODenergyuse.InFY1975,facilitiesusedatotalof439,228BillionBTUs.Figure10.DODFacilitiesEnergyUse,FY1975inBillionsofBTUs58

ByFY2018,asFigure11illustrates,USmilitaryfacilitieswere,overall,consumingmuchlessenergy,atotalof202,283BillionBTUs,areductionofmorethan50percent.

Figure11.DODFacilitiesEnergyUse,FY2018inBillionsofBTUs59

57Source:DepartmentofEnergydata.58Source:DepartmentofEnergydata.59Source:DepartmentofEnergydata.

Electricity, 87,145

Fuel Oil, 174,719

Natural Gas, 119,937

LPG/Propane, 3,564

Coal, 52,305 Purch. Steam, 1,559

Electricity, 100,603

Fuel Oil, 13,520

Natural Gas,

70,371

LPG/Propane, 913

Coal, 6,219 Purch. Steam, 4,352

Purchased Renewable Energy, 1,477 On-Site Renewables And Adjustments, 4,899 Other Facility Energy, 479

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By2018theDODwaspurchasingagreaterportionoftheirenergyneedsaselectricity.Coalandfueloilconsumption—themostGHGintensivefuels—dramaticallydecreased,whilenaturalgas,withitslowerGHGintensity,wasagreaterproportionofenergy.Coalpoweruseatfacilitieshasdramaticallydeclined,from12percentofBTUsinFY1975to3percentinFY2018.Figure12illustratesthetrendsinnaturalgasandcoalgreenhousegasemissionsatDODfacilities.60Similarly,fuelOilhasdeclinedasashareofBTUsfrom40percentinFY1975to7percentinFY2018.Renewableenergywasaddedtothemixofenergysourcesatfacilitieswithon-siteproductionin2008,andpurchasesofrenewableenergyforDODfacilitiesbeginninginFY2012.Purchasedandon-siterenewablescomprised3percentofDODfacilitiesenergyuseinFY2018.Figure12.DODFacilitiesCO2eEmissionsofNaturalGasandCoal,FY1975–2018,inMetricTons61

ThesizeandnumberofUSmilitaryexerciseswithNATOandotherallieshavedeclined

sincetheendoftheColdWarandtherewasasteepdeclineinthenumberofUSforcesdeployedinEuropeattheendoftheColdWar.62Somereductionsinmilitaryexerciseshavealsobeenmadepossibleasthemilitaryreliesoncomputersimulationsforsomeexercises.Forinstance,in2016,NATOplanned240militaryexercises.In2017,NATO 60DepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx.61CalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergydata.62SeeAngelaO’Mahony,etal,U.S.PresenceandtheIncidenceofConflict(SantaMonica:RANDCorporation,2018)p.14,https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf.

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2e M

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Coa

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conducted108militaryexercises,in2018,103exercises,andNATOplannedtoconduct102exercisesin2019.63

Therehasalsobeengreaterefficiencyandconservationinmilitaryvehiclesand

equipmentandoperations.Forinstance,therehavebeenimprovementsintheefficiencyofaircraftandothertacticalandnon-tacticalvehicles,operationalefficiencies(suchasreducingengineidlingtime),andtheretirementoflessefficientvehicles.64SincetheendoftheColdWar,theUShasretiredanddecommissionedeightnon-nuclearaircraftcarriers,sothattheNavy’sentirefleetof11aircraftcarriersisnuclearpowered.

TheestimatesabovefocusonDODemissions.Yet,acompleteaccountingofthetotalgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtowar,andpreparationforit,wouldincludetheGHGemissionsofmilitaryindustry.Militaryindustrydirectlyemploysabout14.7percentofallpeopleintheUSmanufacturingsector.65AssumingthattherelativesizeofdirectemploymentinthedomesticUSmilitaryindustryisanindicatorfortheportionofthemilitaryindustryintheUSindustrialeconomy,theshareofUSgreenhousegasemissionsfromUSbasedmilitaryindustryisestimatedtobeabout15percentoftotalUSindustrialgreenhousegasemissions.66Ifhalfofcurrentmilitaryrelatedemissionsareattributabletothepost-9/11wars,thenUSwarmanufacturinghasemittedabout2,600millionmegatonsofCO2equivalentgreenhousegasfrom2001to2017,averaging153millionmetrictonsofCO2eeachyear.Ofcourse,amuchmoredetailedanalysisofthegreenhousegasemissionsofthemilitaryindustrialsectorisrequired.Nevertheless,thisestimatemaybeconservative,sincesomemilitary-industrialapplications(suchasarmoredvehicleandjetaircraftmanufacturing)willlikely,onaverage,bemoregreenhousegasintensivethanmanyotherformsofmanufacturing.

63NATO,“KeyAlliedandNATOExercisesin2019,”https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf.Alsoseehttps://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_04/20180425_1804-factsheet_exercises_en.pdfandhttps://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_1607-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf/.64Seeforinstance,USDepartmentofEnergy,“AirForceAchievesFuelEfficiencyThroughIndustryBestPractices,”https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/10/f3/af_fuelefficiency.pdfandChristopherA.Mouton,et.al,FuelReductionfortheMobilityAirForces(SantaMonica:RANDCorporation,2015).https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR757/RAND_RR757.pdf.65In2016,839,171peopleworkedinUSDefenseIndustriesoutofatotalof12,348,100jobstotalintheUSmanufacturingsector.SeeDeloitte,“2017AerospaceandDefenseSectorExportandLaborMarketStudy,”p.13.https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-2017-us-A&D-exports-and-labor-market-study.pdfandtheUSBureauofLaborStatisticshttps://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm.LouisUchitelle,“TheU.S.StillLeansontheMilitary-IndustrialComplex,”TheNewYorkTimes,22September2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/economy/military-industrial-complex.html.In1992,about14.4percentofmanufacturingjobswereinmilitaryindustries.AnnMarkesonandS.S.Costigan,eds.,ArmingtheFuture:ADefenseIndustryforthe21stCentury(NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,1999)p.341.ManufacturingaccountsformostoftheindustrialsectorsgreenhousegasemissionsaccordingtotheannualEPAInventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.Themostrecentisfoundathttps://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.66Thisdoesnotincludeindirectjobsandthereforeindirectmilitaryrelatedemissions.

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Figure13.GreenhouseGasesAttributabletoMilitaryIndustryfrom2001–201767

Otheremissionssourcesthatarenotcalculatedorestimatedheremayalsobesignificantsourcesofwarrelatedgreenhousegasses.Specifically,itwasnotpossibletoestimatetheemissionsduetotheburningofoilbysabotageanddestructionofoilinfrastructurebybelligerents,theenergyconsumedbyreconstruction,inparticularinmakingcement,andemissionsfromothersources.Ofthese,theemissionsfromburningoilinfrastructureinIraqandSyriamaybethelargest.NATOtankerswereoftenattackedbymilitantsandburnedduringtheirtransitthroughPakistanintoAfghanistan.Inthe2003invasionofIraq,oilwellsweresetalightbytheIraqimilitaryandburnedforseveralmonths.68

Oilinfrastructurewastargetedagainin2015,whentheUSbombedoilinfrastructurein

IraqandSyriaasameansofreducingISISrevenue.AndwhenISISretreated,itsetoilwellsandpipelinesonfireinIraqandSyria.69Inmanycases,thesefiresburnedforseveralmonths.StartinginSeptember2014,theUStargetedtankertrucksandoilrefineryand 67CalculatedfromU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsbyEconomicSectorwithElectricity-RelatedEmissionsDistributed(MMTCO2Eq).EPA“InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.”68Iraqdidthesameinthe1991GulfWar,settingoilproductionfacilitiesinKuwaitalightastheyretreated.InAprilandMay1991,anestimated3millionbarrelsofoilwereburningeachday,1or2milliontonsofcarbondioxide,orabout2percentofworldwideCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelandbiomass.CongressionalResearchService,“TheEnvironmentalImpactoftheGulfWar,”fortheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonEnvironmentandPublicWorksGulfPollutionTaskForce,March1992,pp.10and24.Outofthe82millionbarrelsreleasedonlandandatseaduringthe1991GulfWar,anestimated11millionbarrelsofoilspilledintothePersianGulf,coatingthecoastlinesofnotonlyKuwait,butothercountriesintheGulf,includingSaudiArabia,andIran.Morethanadecadelater,muchofthatoilremainedincoastalareas.SeeErichR.Gundlach,JohnC.McCain,andYusefH.Fadallah,“DistributionofOilAlongtheSaudiArabianCoastline(May/June1991)asaResultoftheGulfWarOilSpills,”MarinePollutionBulletin,vol.27,(1993)pp.93-96.DagmarSchmidt-Etkin,“SpillOccurrences:AWorldOverview,”inMervinFingas,ed.,OilSpillScienceandTechnology(Amsterdam:Elsevier,2011)p.8andJacquelineMichel,“1991GulfWarOilSpill,”inFingas,ed.OilSpillScienceandTechnology,pp.1127-1132.69SaifHameedandDominicEvans,“IslamicStateTorchesOilFieldNearTikritasMilitiaAdvances,”Reuters,5March2015,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0M10Z420150305.

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storagesitescontrolledbyISISasameansofcuttingofftheirrevenuestream.InOctober2015,theUSattackedmoreoilproducingISIScontrolledoilinfrastructure.70

Inaddition,itwouldbepossible,usingthemethodsusedhereforUSmilitary

greenhousegasemissions,tocalculatetheemissionsofotherbelligerents.Morethan60countriesjoinedtheUSintheirwarinAfghanistan,37foughtwiththeUSintheIraqWar,andmorethan60werealliedwiththeUSinthewaragainstISIS.Theseemissionsmaybesubstantial.

Finally,afullassessmentoftheclimatechangeconsequencesofwarwouldincludethe

lossofactualandfuturecarbonsequestrationduetowar-relateddeforestation.Deforestationmayoccuraspeopledisplacedbywaruseforestsforshelterandfuel.Insomewars,suchastheUSCivilWarandtheVietnamWar,forestsweredeliberatelyburnedtodepriveadversariesofplacestohide.InAfghanistan,warcausedmigrationandillegalloggingappeartobethechiefcauseofdeforestation.ThecausesofdeforestationinIraqarecomplexbutalsoincludewar.71

III.NationalSecurityThreatsPosedbyOilDependencyandClimateChange

Threenationalsecurityconcernsoverlap.First,theUSgovernmenthaslongbeen

concernedaboutdependencyonPersianGulfoil.Atthesametime,someportionofthemilitary’soperationalfuelconsumptionisrelatedtomissionsassociatedwithprotectingaccesstooilandprotectingtheregimesthatassureUSandglobalaccesstooil.Somebelievethismissionisvital,whileothersquestionwhetheritisstillnecessary.

ThecentralityofoilinUScalculationswasunderscoredrecentlywhen,aftertheUS

pulledtroopsoutofSyria,USSecretaryofDefenseMarkEsperhassaidthattheUSwilldefendoilfieldsinSyriato“ensurethatwecandenyISISaccesstotheoilfields.”72PresidentTrumpexpandedonthisthenextday:

Look,wedon'twanttokeepsoldiersbetweenSyriaandTurkeyforthenext200years.They'vebeenfightingforhundredsofyears.We'reout.Butweareleavingsoldierstosecuretheoil.Andwemayhavetofightfortheoil.

70ThiswasknownasOperationTidalWaveII.SeeMatthewReed,“BlowinguptheIslamicState’sOilCompany,”ForeignPolicy,26October2016,https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/blowing-up-the-islamic-states-oil-company-isis-abu-sayyaf/.71ZabihullahGhazi,“Afghanistan’sForestCoverIllegallyStrippedAway,”EnvironmentNewService,29August2013,https://ens-newswire.com/2013/08/29/afghanistans-forest-cover-illegally-stripped-away/.UNEnvironment,“SalvagingIraq’sRemainingWilderness,”10July2018.https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/salvaging-iraqs-remaining-wilderness.72MichaelBirnbaumandMissyRyan,“U.S.DefenseSecrtaryMarkEsperSaysU.S.WillLeaveForcesinSyriatoDefendOilFieldsfromIslamicState,”TheWashingtonPost,25October2019,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-defense-secretary-mark-esper-says-us-will-leave-forces-in-syria-to-defend-oil-fields-from-islamic-state/2019/10/25/fd131f1a-f723-11e9-829d-87b12c2f85dd_story.html.

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It'sokay.Maybesomebodyelsewantstheoil,inwhichcasetheyhaveahellofafight.Butthere'smassiveamountsofoil.

Andwe're securing it fora coupleof reasons.Numberone, it stops ISIS,because ISISgot tremendouswealth from thatoil.Wehave taken it. It'ssecured....

Idon’twanttoleave1,000or2,000or3,000soldiersontheborder.ButwhereLindsey[Graham]andItotallyagreeistheoil.Theoilis,youknow,sovaluable.Formanyreasons.ItfueledISIS,numberone.Numbertwo,ithelps theKurds, because it's basically been taken away from theKurds.They were able to live with that oil. And number three, it can help us,becausewe should be able to take some also. Andwhat I intend to do,perhaps,ismakeadealwithanExxonMobiloroneofourgreatcompaniesto go in there and do it properly. Right now it's not big. It's big oilundergroundbut it'snotbigoiluptop.Muchof themachineryhasbeenshot and dead. It's been throughwars. But -- and -- and spread out thewealth.Butno,we'reprotecting theoil,we'resecuring theoil.Now thatdoesn'tmeanwedon'tmakeadealatsomepoint.73

Second,theDODhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesthreats

andchallengestothemilitaryasaninstitution,specificallytomilitaryinstallationsandoperations.ThisiscoupledwithaconcernthatfueldependencymakestheUSmilitaryvulnerable.TheUShasreducedfuelconsumptionsothatitislessdependentonfossilfuel.

Andthird,thePentagonisconcernedwiththethreatsclimatechangeposeto

internationalsecurity,namelymassivemigrationandpotentiallywar.AsUSNavyAdmiralSamuelJ.LocklearII,thenchiefofUSPacificCommandsaidin2013,climatechangecausedinstability“isprobablythemostlikelythingthatisgoingtohappen...thatwillcripplethesecurityenvironment,probablymorelikelythantheotherscenarioswealloftentalkabout.”74

However,themilitaryseemsunawareofhowmuchitseffortstoprotectaccessto

PersianGulfOil,itsothermilitaryoperations,includingwarandfuelconsumptionatinstallations,areamajordriverofgreenhousegasemissions,andthereforeultimatelyofclimatechange.

Insum,theDODassumesthatclimatechangewillbeadisasterfortheinstitutionand

theplanetnomatterwhattheydo,evenastheybelievethattheymustcontinuetoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoilsothattheUSandtherestoftheworldcanburnasmuchoilasit

73DanaFarrington,“Read:TrumpAnnouncementonBaghdadi’sDeath,”27October2019,https://www.npr.org/2019/10/27/773842999/read-trump-statement-on-baghdadis-death.74BryanBender,“ChiefofUSPacificForcesCallsClimateBiggestWorry,”TheBostonGlobe,9March2013,https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/09/admiral-samuel-locklear-commander-pacific-forces-warns-that-climate-change-top-threat/BHdPVCLrWEMxRe9IXJZcHL/story.html.

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wantsataslowapriceperbarrelaspossible.ThePentagonfocusestheireffortsonadaptingtoclimatechange,asAdmiralLocklearcallsit“consequencesmanagement,”bypreparingforclimatecausedinsecurity,evenastheycontinuetoensurethatAmericanscontinuetohaverelativelyinexpensiveaccesstoimportedoil.ProtectingPersianGulfOil:IsThisStillaVitalMission?

Theconcernaboutaccesstooilistwofold.First,atatacticallevel,theUSwantstocontrolwhohasaccesstooilandtheprofitsfromexploitingoilreserves.TheUShasbeenwillingtousemilitaryresourcestodestroyinfrastructureorblockadeoilexports.

Second,atthestrategiclevel,theUSeconomyremainsreliantonoilandisconcerned

abouttheflowandpriceofoil.Themilitaryhasdefendedagainstseveralscenariosregardingacut-offofPersianGulfoil.ThefirstscenarioisthethreatthatahostilepowerwouldgaincontrolofoilinthePersianGulf—forinstancebyoccupyingSaudiArabiaandKuwaitorbyblockingtheStraitofHormuz—andbeabletocontrolworldsupplyandincreasethepriceofoil.Inresponsetothefirstfear,theUScreatedtheStrategicPetroleumReservein1975andtheRapidDeploymentForce(RDF)in1979,whosespecificmissionwastodefendUSinterestsintheMiddleEast,includingoil.InJanuary1983,whenUScommandswerereorganized,theRDFbecameUSCentralCommand(CENTCOM).Figure14.ZonesofUSMilitaryCommands

WhenIraqinvadedKuwaitin1990,theBushAdministrationreiteratedtheimportance

ofoilintheregioninNationalSecurityDirective45.“U.S.interestsinthePersianGulfarevitaltothenationalsecurity.Theseinterestsincludeaccesstooilandthesecurityandstabilityofkeyfriendlystatesintheregion.TheUnitedStateswilldefenditsvitalinterestsinthearea,throughtheuseofU.S.militaryforceifnecessaryandappropriate,againstany

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powerwithinterestsinimicaltoourown.”75In1991,theUSevictedIraqfromKuwaitnotonlybecausetheIraqiinvasionofKuwaitwasillegal,butalsoinpartbecauseitfearedthatIraqposedathreattoSaudiArabia,andthustoAmericanaccesstooil.

Sincethen,theUShasstationedlargenumbersoftroopsinthePersianGulfatArmy,

Navy,andAirForcebases.TheAfghanandIraqwarsincreasedtheUSpresenceintheregion,aswellasUSmilitarypetroleumconsumption.Inlate2008,inadditiontotheconcernthatalocalstatemighttrytocontroltheflowofoilfromthePersianGulf,PresidentGeorgeW.BushaddedtheconcernthatextremistsmightcontroloilandtrytoblackmailtheUS:“Youcanimaginethemsaying,‘We’regoingtopullabunchofoiloffthemarkettorunyourpriceofoilupunlessyoudothefollowing.Andthefollowingwouldbealongthelinesof,well,‘Retreatandletuscontinuetoexpandourdarkvision.’"76

TheideathattheUShastoprotecttheglobalflowofoil,andmorespecificallyoilfrom

thePersianGulf,haslargelybeentakenforgrantedbytheUSmilitaryandnationalsecurityexperts.AreportbytheCouncilonForeignRelationsnotedin2006,“Untilverylowlevelsofdependencearereached,theUnitedStatesandallotherconsumersofoilwilldependonthePersianGulf.”77

AstheUShasdiversifieditsoilsourcesandoveralldemandhasdeclined,theUShas

becomelessdependentonPersianGulfoilinrecentdecades.In2018,accordingtotheUSEnergyInformationAdministration,importedoilprovidedabout11percentoftotalUSoilconsumption,thelowestlevelofimportssince1957.78Specifically,in2001,theUSimported2,664barrelsperdayfromthePersianGulf;in2018,theUSimported1,472barrelsperdayfromthePersianGulf.79Overall,in2018,PersianGulfsourcesaccountedforabout20percentofallUSoilimports.

PerhapsinpartbecausedependenceonPersianGulfoilhasdeclinedsignificantlysince

2006,someanalystshaverecentlyquestionedwhetherthelargeUSpresenceinthePersianGulfregion,andtheinfrastructureinEuropethatsupportsit,isnecessary.80Theargument

75NationalSecurityDirective45,20August1990,https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_45.htm.76PeterBaker,“BushSaysU.S.PulloutWouldLetRadicalsUseOilasaWeapon,”WashingtonPost,5November2006.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110401025.html.77CouncilonForeignRelations,NationalSecurityConsequencesofOilDependency:ReportofanIndependentTaskForce(Washington,DC:CouncilonForeignRelations,2006),p.29.https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/0876093659.pdf.78USEnergyInformationAdministration,https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=32&t=6.79Source:USEnergyInformationAdministration,https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRIMUSPG2&f=A.ThetotallevelofUSoilimportationhasalsodeclinedinrecentyears.80SeeGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy;JohnGlazer,“DoestheU.S.MilitaryActuallyProtectMiddleEastOil?”CatoInstitute,9January2017.https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/does-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil;EmmaAshford,“Unbalanced:RethinkingAmerica’sCommitmenttotheMiddleEast,”SecurityStudiesQuarterly,vol.12,no.1(Spring2018),pp.127-148.AlsoseeMiltonR.Copulos,“America’sAchillesHeel:TheHiddenCostofImportedOil,”TheNationalDefenseCouncilFoundation,(Washington,DC:October2003).

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isthattheUSislessdependentonPersianGulfoilthaninthepast,thatpriceshockswillnotnecessarilybeassevereifoilflowsweredisrupted,andthatevenifasinglecountrycontrolledsupplies,theywouldstillwanttoselltheoil.TheexceptiontothelatterisIraq,whichburnedKuwaitiOilfieldswhentheyretreatedfromKuwaitin1991andtheIslamicState,whichburnedoilfacilitiesastheyretreatedfrom2015–2018.Inanycase,theargumentgoes,eveniftheUSwerecompletelyabsentfromtheGulf,theUScouldreturntotheGulfandrestoreoilflowatsomelaterpoint.USforcesintheregionhavealreadydeclinedfromtheirpeakofabout230,000troopsin2008.81

Whatwouldhappenintheworst-casescenario—ifoilflowsfromthePersianGulfwere

curtailedorceasedforaweekorseveralmonths?TherewouldbesomedisruptiontotheUSeconomy,buttheeconomywouldnotcollapseifoilflowsfromtheMiddleEastweredisruptedforsometime.ItisarguablethatatotallossofGulfoilforuptothreemonths,wouldbe,atworst,quiteexpensive.Intheshortterm,itislikelythattheUSwouldadapt—asitdidwhentheoilimportsfromIraqandKuwaitwerehaltedafterIraq’sinvasionofthatKuwaitin1990.Theprincipalreactionofworldmarketswouldbeanincreaseinthepriceofoil.

Thiswouldnotbeadevastationforthreereasons.First,theUSislessdependenton

PersianGulfoilthaninthepast;theUShasamorediversesupplynetworkofpetroleum,includingincreasesindomesticproduction,andincreasedimportsfromCanadaandothercountries.Second,theUShasastrategicoilreservecontaining727millionbarrelsofoil,whichcouldcarrytheUSthroughseveralmonthsofshortagesinsupply.Andthird,andperhapsmostimportant,overalldemandforoilhasdecreasedintheUS.Petroleumconsumptionpeakedin2005at40percentoftotalUSenergyconsumptionandhasdeclined10percentsincethen.In2017,petroleumaccountedfor37percentofUSenergyconsumption.82ChinaismorevulnerablethantheUStoPersianGulfoilsupplydisruptions.

Nevertheless,economiststendtoassociateoilpriceshocksduetorestrictionsonthe

flowofoil(suchastheArabOilEmbargo)withrecessions.Thisistrue.Yet,becausemilitaryspendingislessproductivecomparedtootherformsofspending—sayoneducation,healthcare,infrastructure,orrenewableenergy—militaryspendingisarguablyanoveralldragontheUSeconomybecauseitproducesfewerjobsthanspendingonothersectors.Whichraisesthequestionofwhether,inprotectingagainstapotentialoilpriceincrease,theUSdoesmoreharmthanitrisksbynotdefendingaccesstoPersianGulfoil.Insum,thePersianGulfmissionmaynotbeasnecessaryasthePentagonassumes.

AstheUSdiversifiesitsenergyproductionportfolio,forexample,byincreasingrenewableenergysources,itcanfurtherdecreasedependenceonPersianGulfoil.Whetherornotthismissionisessential,operationstoensureaccesstooilareexpensive,

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=DD3F77E8166A096D9F1BB3B615199125?doi=10.1.1.186.7523&rep=rep1&type=pdf.81JoshuaRovner,“AfterAmerica:TheFlowofPersianGulfOilintheAbsenceofUSMilitaryForce,”inGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy,pp.141-165:160.82USEnergyInformationAgency,https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/?page=us_energy_home.

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nottomention,fuelintensive.Byoneestimate,theannualincrementalcostofUSoperationstoprotectagainstthreatsagainstPersianGulfoilisabout$5billion.83Byanotherestimate,ataminimumtheUSspendsabout$81billionannuallydefendingtheglobaloilsupply.84NationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange

TheUSmilitary,theintelligencecommunity,andscholarsofinternationalsecurityhave

beenwarningofthedangersposedbyclimatechangeforseveraldecades.TheUSmilitaryandintelligencecommunitytendtoclusterthenationalsecurityimplicationsofglobalwarminginducedclimatechangeintotwooverlappingareas.ThefirstishowclimatechangewillaffectUSinstallationsandmilitaryoperations,includinghowrespondingtoclimatedisasterswillstressmilitaryoperationsandpotentiallydetractfromothermilitarymissions.Second,howclimatechangeposespoliticalandnationalsecuritythreats,uptoandincludingwar.85

Themilitaryhaslongemphasizedhowclimatechangechallengesmilitarysystems,

operations,andinfrastructure.Forinstance,inMay1990,TerryP.KellyproducedapaperfortheNavalWarCollege,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”emphasizingthreatstoNavy“navaloperations,facilities,andsystems”incomingdecades.Theanalysisfocusesitsrecommendationsonmonitoringandadaptingtoclimatechange.86Morerecently,theDODoffereda“ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap”in2014thatstressedthenecessityofpreparingforandadaptingtoclimatechange.87Inearly2018,theDODreportedthatabouthalfoftheirinstallationshadalreadyexperiencedclimatechangerelatedeffects.88Ayearlater,theDODreportedthattheUSmilitaryisalreadyexperiencingtheeffectsofglobalwarmingatdozensofinstallations.89Theseincluderecurrentflooding(53installations),drought(43installations),wildfires(36installations),and

83EugeneGholz,“U.S.SpendingonItsMilitaryCommitmentstothePersianGulf,”inCharlesL.GlaserandRosemaryA.Kelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy:RethinkingtheU.S.MilitaryCommitmenttoDefendPersianGulfOil(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2016),pp.167-195.84SecuringAmerica’sFutureEnergy,“TheMilitaryCostofDefendingtheGlobalOilSupply,”21September,2018,http://secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Military-Cost-of-Defending-the-Global-Oil-Supply.-Sep.-18.-2018.pdf.85Forinstance,seetheUSNationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforU.S.NationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”21September2016.86TerryP.Kelly,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”NavalWarCollege,May1990.https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf.87DepartmentofDefense,“2014ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf.88OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“DepartmentofDefense,Climate-RelatedRisktoDODInfrastructureInitialVulnerabilitySurvey(SLVAS)AssessmentReport,”(January2018).https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-slvas-report-1-24-2018.pdf.89DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019.https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.

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desertification(6installations).Vulnerabilitywillonlyincreaseoverthenexttwentyyearsunlesstheworldbeginstodramaticallyreduceallgreenhousegasemissionsandsequestercarbondioxide.90

Themosturgentthreattomilitaryinfrastructureisthatrisingsealevelsandmajor

stormswillinundatecoastalinfrastructureandlimittheuseofnavalbases.91MeltingpermafrostintheArcticthreatensthephysicalstabilityoftheUSmilitaryfacilitiesintheArctic.KeeslerAirForceBaseisregularlyflooding.TheNationalClimateAssessmentreleasedinlate2018highlightedtheUSNavalBaseatNorfolkVirginiaasparticularlyvulnerable.HurricaneMichaeldestroyedmuchofTyndallAirForceBaseinOctober2018andOffuttAirForceBaseinNebraska,sufferedmajorfloodinginMarch2019.Figure15.USMilitaryAssetswithClimate-RelatedVulnerabilities.92

ThePentagon’sresponsetotheinfrastructuralandoperationalchallengesofclimate

changehasbeentourgemilitarypreparations.Theseincludepotentiallymovingorclosingmilitarybasesanddevelopingtrainingandequipmenttooperateinhotterandwetterordrierclimatestomeetclimatechangerelatedthreatstooperationsandresiliency.

InadditiontotheconcernthatadeclineinaccesstooilwouldhurttheUSandthe

globaleconomy,theDODhaslongbeenconcernedthattheUSmilitaryitself,byrequiring 90DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”p.5.ThawingpermafrostisalreadyoccurringatFortGreeley,Alaska.91SeeU.S.Navy“ClimateChangeRoadmap,”April2010,DepartmentoftheNavy,https://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/ccr.pdf.92Source:Figure1.9.UnitedStatesGlobalChangeResearchProgram,FourthNationalClimateAssessment:VolumeIIImpacts,RisksandAdaptationintheUnitedStates,(2018)https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.

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enormousquantitiesoffuelforitsoperations,istoodependentonoil.Specifically,highfuelconsumptionratesduringwar—forweapons,equipment,andheatingandcoolingtents—increasetheneedtotransportfueltoconflictzones,whichisitselfavulnerabilityandalossofefficiency.Further,fuelhastobeprotectedintransitandisvulnerabletodisruptionsinsupply.

Forexample,duringtheUSoccupationofAfghanistan,USandNATOforceswere

dependentonthetransitoffuelthroughPakistan.ImportingfuelintoAfghanistanthroughPakistan—whereitcomprisedbetween30and80percentofeachconvoy—madethetankersvulnerabletoattack.Between2008and2014,convoyswereattackedenroutethroughPakistantoNATObasesinAfghanistan485times,causing167deathsand450injuries.AsthethenSecretaryoftheNavyRayMabussaid,“FossilfuelistheNo.1thingweimporttoAfghanistanandgettingthatfueliskeepingthetroopsdoingwhattheyweresenttheretodo,tofightorengagethelocalpeople.”93Further,tankerconvoysthroughPakistanweredisruptedfromlate2011toearly2012aftertheUSinadvertentlykilledPakistanitroopsandPakistanhaltedthoseconvoysforseveralmonths.Figure16.AttacksonNATOSupplyConvoysThroughPakistan,2008to201494

In2003,thenMarineCorpGeneralJohnMattissaidthattheUShadtobe“unleashedfromthetetheroffuel.”In2011,whenaskedbyCongressmemberAdamSmithduringArmedServicesCommitteeHearings,Mattiselaborated.

Onthefuel,itisasignificantAchillesheelforuswhenyouhavetohaultheamountsoffuelthatwehavetohaularoundthebattlefieldforthegeneratorsandforthevehicles.WeareworkingwithDARPA[DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency],weareworkingwithanumberofcivilianorganizationstotryandfindsolutions.Thereareeffortsunderwaytomakemoreexpeditionarybaseswhichwouldactuallygenerate

93ElisabethRosenthal,“U.S.MilitaryOrdersLessDependenceonFossilFuels,”TheNewYorkTimes,4October2010,https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/science/earth/05fossil.html.94Sourceofdata:PakInstituteforPeaceStudies,annualPakistanSecurityReport,https://www.pakpips.com/publications#1512730923805-d52fde57-07fa.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Num

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f Att

acks

Incidents Killed Injured

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someoftheirownenergyrequirementsusing,forexample,solarpower.Inmanyoftheseplaces,thereisalotofsunshine.Ifwecangetexpeditionarycapabilitytocapturethatandthenbasicallyrechargeourbatteries.Imean,itisanamazinglycomplexefforttomaintainthefuellines.Anditalsogivestheenemyanabilitytochoosethetimeandplaceofattackingus.WeareengagedwithScienceandTechnology,weareengagedwithDARPA,andwearelookingatverypragmaticwaysofdoingthis.Wearealsolookingatwhatwecandotoactuallychangehowwedistributefuel,toreducetheenemy'sopportunitiestocomeafterus.95 ThePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutfuelusehasbeentotrackfuelconsumption,

andtofindwaystodecreaseconsumptionoffossilfuelsthroughconservationandincreasedinvestmentinrenewableenergy.Themilitaryeffortstoreducedependencyhaveincludedreducingenergyusedatmilitaryinstallationsandeducatingsoldiersabouttheneedtominimizeidlingvehicles—fromHumveestotankstojets.

Forexample,in2009,thenewlycreatedMarineCorpsExpeditionaryEnergyOffice

begantocollectdataonMarineCorpenergyusagefrombulkdistributiontotheunitlevel.96TheMarineshavegonequicklyfromanalysistoaction.In2009,theMarinesmadetheirfirststudyoffueluseinAfghanistanandinthefollowingyeartheMarineCorpssentsolarpanelsandchargerstotheirforcesthere.97Afewmonthslater,thesolarpanelsdeployedintheGroundRenewableExpeditionaryEnergySystem(Greens)hadreportedlycutgeneratorfuelconsumptionbynearly90percent,from20to2.5gallonsperday.98In2010,theDODestablishedaSeniorSustainabilityCouncil.Allofthisworkonefficiencyhasbeenacceleratedandwouldnotonlysavemoney,themilitaryemphasizes,butalsoincreasetheresilienceofthearmedforces.99

Inaddition,thePentagonusesotherfuelsandhascontinuedtodiversifyitsenergy

supplies.TheUSmilitaryreliesonnuclearpowerforsomeimportantuses—mostnotablytopoweritsfleetof11aircraftcarriers.Itispossibletosubstitutesomealternativefuelsformilitaryapplicationsandresearchonusingbio-fuelinmilitaryvehicles,includingjets.

ThePentagonhasincreaseditsuseofrenewableenergysince2009.Themilitaryhas

madeamassiveinvestmentinsolargenerationandotherrenewableenergy,doubling 95MattisattheCommitteeonArmedServices,HearingonNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2012,3March2011,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65114/html/CHRG-112hhrg65114.htm.96SeeMarineCorps,“UnitedStatesMarineCorpsEnergyExpeditionaryStrategyandImplementationPlan:BasestoBattlefields,”2010,https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/160/Docs/USMC%20Expeditionary%20Energy%20Strategy%20%20Implementation%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf.97SuzanneGoldenberg,“USMarinesinAfghanistanLaunchFirstEnergyEfficiencyAuditinWarZone,”TheGuardian,13August2009,https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/aug/13/us-marines-afghanistan-fuel-efficiency.98SpencerAckerman,“Afghanistan’sGreenMarinesCutFuelUseby90Percent,”Wired,13January2011,https://www.wired.com/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/.99OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense,DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilienceReport(AEMRR),https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202017%20AEMR.pdf.

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renewablepowergenerationbetween2011and2015.100Butsofar,switchingtorenewablesourceshasyieldedthesavingsinemissionsoffsetslessofthan1percentofUSDODGreenhouseGasemissions.101Takentogether,theseeffortshavebornefruit;themilitaryhassignificantlyreducedfueluse—evenwhilewagingwarinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria—andthereisenormousscopeforreducingemissionsevenfurther.In2017,themilitary’spushtoreduceenergyconsumptionranintopoliticswhentheTrumpadministrationdecidedtodenyclimatechange.ThePentagonwasputinanawkwardposition;aheadlineinFortunemagazineframedtheissuenicely:“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”102

Theotheroperationalconcernisthethreatclimatechangeposestothemilitary’s

capacitytoperformitscoremissions.Nationalsecurityofficialsanticipatingagrowingrolesupportingcivilauthoritiesindisasterreliefmissionsareconcernedthatnaturaldisasters,madeworseasaconsequenceofclimatechange,willstresstheoperationalcapacitiesoftheUSmilitary.Assealevelsrise,criticalcivilianinfrastructurewillbeatrisk.InSeptember2016,PresidentObamaissuedaNationalSecurityMemorandumthatsaid,“ClimatechangeandassociatedimpactsonUSmilitaryandothernationalsecurity-relatedmissionsandoperationscouldadverselyaffectreadiness,negativelyaffectmilitaryfacilitiesandtraining,increasedemandsforFederalsupporttonon-federalcivilauthorities,andincreaseresponse.”103FearofClimateChaosandWar

Themilitaryhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesathreattointernationalsecurity.104Inthe2015NationalSecurityStrategy,theObamaAdministrationsaid,“Climatechangeisanurgentandgrowingthreattoournationalsecurity,contributingtoincreasednaturaldisasters,refugeeflows,andconflictsoverbasicresourceslikefoodandwater.ThepresentdayeffectsofclimatechangearebeingfeltfromtheArctictotheMidwest.Increasedsealevelsandstormsurgesthreatencoastalregions,infrastructure,

100TimothyGarder,“U.S.MilitaryMarchesonTowardGreenEnergy,DespiteTrump,”Reuters,1March2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-green-energy-insight/u-s-military-marches-forward-on-green-energy-despite-trump-idUSKBN1683BL.AlsoseeReuters,“MilitaryGettingGreener,”http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-TRUMP-ENERGY-MILITARY/0100400G00X/index.html.101AnnualDataonEnergyfromhttps://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-annual-energy-reports-and-performance.102AssociatedPress,“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”Fortune,14January2017.http://fortune.com/2017/01/14/military-oil-trump-green-power/.103MemorandumfortheHeadsofExecutiveDepartmentsandAgencies,ClimateChangeandNationalSecurity,21September2016,https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/895016/download.104Forinstance,seeKurtM.Campbell,etal,“TheAgeofConsequences:TheForeignPolicyandNationalSecurityImplicationsofGlobalClimateChange,”CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudiesandCenterforNewAmericanSecurity,November2007,https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf.CenterforNavalAnalysis,NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange,CenterforNavalAnalysis2007.https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf.

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andproperty.Inturn,theglobaleconomysuffers,compoundingthegrowingcostsofpreparingandrestoringinfrastructure.”105

InthemostrecentNationalSecurityStrategy,theTrumpadministrationignored

climatechange.Inresponse,morethan100membersofCongresswrotetothePresidentinJanuary2018tounderscoretherisksandtourgethePresidenttoincludeclimatechangeintheNationalSecurityStrategy.106Andatthesametime,RetiredAdmiralJamesStavridisarguedthatclimatechangewasarguablythemostpressingnationalsecuritychallengetheUSfaced.Stavridissaid,“Whatmakesclimatechangesoperniciousisthatwhiletheeffectswillonlybecomecatastrophicfardowntheroad,theonlyopportunitytofixtheproblemrestsinthepresent.Inotherwords,waiting‘tobesureclimatechangeisreal’condemnsustoahighlyinsecurefutureifwemakethewrongbet.Weareindangerofmissingnotonlythevastforestofloomingclimatechange,buttheabilitytoseesomeofthespecifictreesthatwillcauseusthemostproblems.”107

Themilitaryisconcernedthatclimatechangewillleadtoamorechaoticanddangerous

world.Theyareconcerned,forinstance,thattheArcticSeaisnowopen,leadingtoquestionsabouttheneedtopatrolit.108NationalsecurityanalystssometimessuggestthatdroughtinSyriafrom2007to2010,andthesubsequentmassmigrationtocities,createdtheconditionsthatcontributedtotheemergenceofthecivilwartherein2011.

Indeed,somestrategistspaintnightmarescenarioswhereclimatechangeleadsto

armedconflict—suchaswhencropfailuresproducefamineanddroughtleadtoconflictsoverwaterandothernaturalresources.TheWhiteHousesaidin2016that“Thenationalsecurityimplicationsofclimatechangeimpactsarefar-reaching,astheymayexacerbateexistingstressors,contributingtopoverty,environmentaldegradation,andpoliticalinstability,providingenablingenvironmentsforterroristactivityabroad.Forexample,theimpactsofclimatechangeonkeyeconomicsectors,suchasagricultureandwater,canhaveprofoundeffectsonfoodsecurity,posingthreatstooverallstability.”109Similarly,inSeptember2016,theNationalIntelligenceCouncillistedarangeofconcernsfromincreasedmigration,tofoodshortages,togreaterconflictandwarcausedbyshortagesoffreshwaterandaccesstoarableland.110

105WhiteHouse,“NationalSecurityStrategy,”February2015,p.12,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.106Theletterisfoundathttps://langevin.house.gov/sites/langevin.house.gov/files/documents/01-11-18_Langevin_Stefanik_Letter_to_POTUS_Climate_Change_National_Security_Strategy.pdf.107JamesStavridis,“America’sMostPressingThreat?ClimateChange,”BloombergOpinion,11January2018,https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-11/america-s-no-1-enemy-climate-change.108USNavyTaskForceonClimateChange,“TheUnitedStatesNavyArcticRoadmap,2014-2030,”February2014,http://navysustainability.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/USN-Arctic-Roadmap-2014.pdf.109WhiteHouse,“FindingsfromSelectFederalReports:TheNationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange”May2015,p.3.110NationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforUSNationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”NICWP2016-01,21September2016.https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Implications_for_US_National_Security_of_Anticipated_Climate_Change.pdf.

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TheintelligencecommunityhaskeptitseyesonclimatechangeevenasPresidentTrumpdeniesthatglobalwarmingisaproblem.InJanuary2019,DanielR.Coats,DirectorofNationalIntelligencetoldtheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligencethat,“Globalenvironmentalandecologicaldegradation,aswellasclimatechange,arelikelytofuelcompetitionforresources,economicdistress,andsocialdiscontentthrough2019andbeyond.Climatehazardssuchasextremeweather,highertemperatures,droughts,floods,wildfires,storms,sealevelrise,soildegradation,andacidifyingoceansareintensifying,threateninginfrastructure,health,andwaterandfoodsecurity.Irreversibledamagetoecosystemsandhabitatswillunderminetheeconomicbenefitstheyprovide,worsenedbyair,soil,water,andmarinepollution.”111

Itistruethatsocialandeconomicstressors,suchmassmigrationandtensionsover

accesstofreshwater,thatmightleadtoorexacerbateconflictswillincreaseastemperaturesincreasebecauseofclimatechange.

Butitisnotinevitablethatclimatechangewillleadtowar.112Humanscoulduse

existinginstitutionsordevelopmechanismstocooperateinthefaceofclimatechangestressors.AndtheycouldactnowtoreducethemostdangerousanddisruptiveeffectsofclimatechangebyreducingtheiremissionsofCarbonDioxide,Methane,NitrousOxideandothergreenhousegases,andbypullingCarbonDioxideoutoftheatmospherebysequesteringcarboninforestsandsoil.Preventionwillultimatelybelessconflictualthanrespondingafterthefact.

PartofthePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutclimatechangehasbeentocreateneworganizationswithintheDODandtostudytheissue.113Forinstance,theNavycreatedthe“TaskForceClimateChange”(TFCC)in2009.Theotherresponsehasbeentorepairnavalandairbasesafterclimatechangerelatedeventsdamagethoseinstallations.Further,themilitaryispreparingforconflictinthenewlyopenArcticandpreparingotherclimateconflictresponses.114

However,thePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisasubstantial

contributortoglobalgreenhousegasemissions.NorhastheDODacknowledgedthatreductionsinPentagonfueluse,orindeedoverallUSpetroleumconsumption,areapotentiallysignificantwaytoreducetherisksofclimatecausedoperationalvulnerabilitiesandnationalsecurityrisks.ButthePentagoncouldmakethesameconnectionsthatCongressmanHenryWaxmanmademorethantwodecadesago.InMay1998,Waxman

111DanielR.Coats,“WorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheUSIntelligenceCommunity,StatementfortheRecord,”SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence”29January2019.https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf,p.23.112SeeKatharineJ.Mach,etal,“ClimateasaRiskFactorforArmedConflict,”Nature,vol.571,11July2019,pp.193-197.113Ontheotherhand,a2017GAOreportsuggestedthattheUSmilitaryhadnotconsistentlytakenthelikelybudgetaryimpactsofclimatechangeintoaccount.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,“ClimateChangeAdaptation:DODNeedstoBetterIncorporateAdaptationintoitsPlanningandCollaborationatOverseasInstallations,”November2017,https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688323.pdf.114

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said,“theKyotoProtocolwillimprovethenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesbyreducingtheriskofcatastrophicclimatechange,whichwouldcreateupheavalandunrestthroughouttheworld,includingthepotentialformillionsofenvironmentalrefugees.”Waxmanalsoarguedthat“measurestoimplementtheKyotoProtocolcanimproveoursecuritybyreducingourdependenceonimportedoilthroughimprovedenergyefficiencyandincreasedrelianceondomesticrenewableenergyresources.”115

Conclusion

EvenastheUShasbeguntoscalebackthesizeofitsmilitarypresenceinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria,theUSisengagedinamassivebuild-upofitsmilitarycapacities.TheUSmilitarybudgetislargerthanithaseverbeensincetheendoftheColdWarevenastheUnitedStateshasreduceditsfootprintinAfghanistanandSyriain2019bywithdrawals.

Thepost-9/11warmissionsandtheglobalmilitaryposturehavenotbeensystematicallyreevaluated.DespiterecentwithdrawalsfromSyria,absentastrategy,theUSmaycontinuepolicingthePersianGulfevenasitturnstowhatitperceivesisanemergingthreatfromChinaandanincreasingmilitarypresenceinAfrica.Alloftheseactivitiesdemandfuelconsumptionandarehencegreenhousegasemissionintensive.Further,despitethefacttheUSmilitaryacknowledgesthatithasexcesscapacity,therehasnotbeenapushforbaserealignmentandclosure.116 TheUShasanimportantpublicpolicydecisiontomake.Dowecontinuetoorientourforeignpolicyandmilitaryforceposturetowardensuringaccesstofossilfuels?OrdoestheUSdramaticallyreducetheuseoffossilfuels,includingthemilitary’sowndependency,andthusreducetheperceivedneedtopreserveaccesstooilresources?TheDODhasreducedsomeofitsfuelconsumption:howmuchmorecoulditreduceconsumption?

Reductionsinmilitaryfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,iftheUSweretodecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil.IftheUSfurtherreduceditsimportsofoilfromthePersianGulf,includingfuelusedbythemilitarytoprotectthoseimports,itcouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceintheregionandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.TheUSwouldreappoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoilanddecreasingdependenceonoilandthosewhoprovideit.

Second,bydramaticallydecreasingfossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywould

reduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).Therearemany

115Waxman,20May1998.CongressionalRecord,House,vol.144,part7,ProceedingsandDebatesofthe105thCongress,p.9983.116LeoShane,“PlansforaNewBaseClosingRoundMaybeRunningOutofTime:Report,”MilitaryTimes,15August2019,https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/08/15/plans-for-a-new-base-closing-round-may-be-running-out-of-time-report/.

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waystodothis,frommoremodestmeasuressuchasincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels,whichthePentagonhasbeguntodo.Somebaseclosureswillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.MoresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuringtheUSmilitaryposture,includingreducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.SeeAppendix2formodestsuggestionsforCongressionalaction.

Third,byreducingtheuseofgreenhousegas-emittingfuels(coupledwithemission

reductionsinothersectors)thePentagonwoulddecreaseitscontributiontotheassociatedclimatechangethreatstonationalsecurity.Indeed,thePentagoncouldplayamajorroleinreducingtheworsteffectsofclimatechange,andanypotentialsecurityconsequencesofglobalwarming,ratherthanreactingtoclimatechangeemergenciesorcleaningupafterthoseeffectshaveoccurred.

Fourth,asaconsequenceofspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovide

secureaccesstopetroleum,theUScould,inthelongrun,decreaseUSmilitaryspendingandreorientitseconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities.Indeed,iftheUSmilitaryconvertedmoreofitsenergyconsumptiontorenewableenergy,thiswouldstimulatetherenewableenergyindustryintheUS,withimportanteconomicbenefitsfortheentireUSeconomy.117

Insum,reducingPentagonfossilfuelusecouldhaveenormouspositiveimplicationsfor

theclimateandtheUSeconomy.Moreover,ifasAdmiralLocklearandotherssuggest,climatechangeisamorecertainnationalsecuritythreatthanmanyothers,themilitarymightmovebeyondsimply“consequencemanagement”bypreparingtoreacttoclimaterelatedconflictstoconflictpreventionbyfurtherreducingtheirfueluseandgreenhousegasemissions.

117TheauthorthanksAlexanderThompsonforraisingthispoint.

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Appendix1.CalculatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissions

DuetogapsinreportingandaccountingbytheDOD,itisimpossibletoprovideaprecisecalculationofthetotalgreenhousegasemissionsoftheUSmilitary.ThePentagondoesnotreleasepetroleumfuelconsumptiondataandmostUSgovernmentaccountingofUSgreenhousegasemissionsomitfiguresonhowmuchthemilitaryandmilitaryindustrycontributestoUSemissions.Further,asdiscussedabove,emissionsfrominternationalbunkerfuels(formilitaryaircraftandships)andmultilateralwarswereexcludedfromnationalaccountsintheKyotoProtocolnegotiationsin1998.TheUSdoesnotappeartocountmostbunkerfuelsinitsGreenhouseGasInventorynationaltotals.118WhilethereisDepartmentofEnergyemissionsdatafortheDepartmentofDefenseforFY2008,andFY2010–2018thereisnoemissionsdatafortheotheryears.

AbsentafullPentagonaccountingoftheirfuelconsumptionandemissionsbyoperation,therearevariouswaystoestimateDODgreenhousegasemissionsinthepost-9/11wars.Tofindthetotalwarrelatedemissionsfortheentireperiodofwar,oneneedsdatafortheentireperiod.Thenonecouldestimate,basedonsomecriteria,theamountoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsthatareduetothepost-9/11wars.

Onecouldbaseanestimateoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsthatshouldbeattributed

tothewarontheproportionofthetotalmilitarybudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperations.Inotherwords,onecanusetheaverageportionoftheDODbudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperationsasanapproximatemeasureofenergyuserelatedtothewareffortandassumethatsomeportionofthebasebudget,andthereforebase/non-waroperationsandinstallationenergyuse,iscorrelatedtowarrelatedspending.TheOverseasContingencyOperationsbudgetforthemajorwarzonesaccountedforanaverageof17percentoftheentireDOD(topline)budgetfromFY2001to2018.Butthisruleofthumbwouldgiveanestimateofwarrelatedemissionsthatwouldbetoolow,sincenon-standardemissionsaccountforsuchahighproportionofallDODfueluse.

AbetterwaytoestimatetotalgreenhousegasemissionsforOverseasContingency

Operationswouldbetofocusonoperationalfuelconsumption,definedinDOEparlanceasnon-standardfuelconsumption.BetweenFY2010–2018,theDepartmentofEnergyattributed63percentofallDODgreenhousegasemissionstonon-standardoperations.However,toassumethatallnon-standardfuelusewasforthemajorwarswouldyieldanestimatethatisprobablytoohigh,sincetheDODperformsother,non-post-9/11warrelatedmissions—suchasexerciseswithitsalliesorinmorerecentyears,operationsontheSouthernborderoftheUnitedStates.Table3reproducestheFY2018DepartmentofEnergyGreenhouseGasInventoryfortheDepartmentofDefense. 118SeeUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2016,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/2018_complete_report.pdfandUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2017,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.AlsoseeAnnex3,PartA,Section3.8wherethemethodisto“omitallinternationalfueltransactions/deliveries”and“alllandbasedfuels,”https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-annex-3-additional-source-or-sink-categories-part-a.pdf.

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Table3.DODGreenhouseGasInventory,FY2018119

Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Department of Defense FY 2018

Scope and Category

GHG Emissions from Standard Operations

(MT CO2e)

GHG Emissions from Non-Standard Operations* (Military

Operations, Law Enforcement, and

Other) (MT CO2e)

Total Quantity Emitted Biogenic

(MT CO2e) Scope 1: On-Site Fuel Consumption at Federal Facilities 5,403,108.4 0.0 81,754.4 Scope 1: Mobile Emissions--Vehicles, Aircraft, Ships, and Equipment 1,159,348.4 33,804,424.0 10,194.2 Scope 1: Mobile Emissions--Passenger Fleet Vehicles 420,289.1 71,354.2 33,654.2 Scope 1: Fugitive Emissions--Fugitive Fluorinated Gases and Other Fugitive Emissions 328,777.1 658,708.8 Scope 1: Fugitive Emissions--On-site Wastewater Treatment 5,636.9 1,274.0 Scope 1: Fugitive Emissions--On-site Landfills and Municipal Solid Waste Facilities 155,535.8 41,231.3 Scope 1: Manufacturing and Industrial Process Emissions 0.0 0.0

Subtotal Scope 1 7,472,695.6 34,534,487.1 168,108.2 Scope 2: Purchased Electricity 13,019,180.1 0.0 0.0

Scope 2: Purchased Biomass Energy 3,965.3 331,885.2 Scope 2: Purchased Steam and Hot Water 573,203.7 0.0 0.0 Scope 2: Purchased Chilled Water 2,300.8 0.0 0.0 Scope 2: Purchased Combined Heat and Power Electricity, Steam & Hot Water 0.0 0.0 0.0

Subtotal Scope 2 13,598,650.0 0.0 331,885.2 Scope 2: Reductions from Renewable Energy Use -199,188.5 0.0

Subtotal Scope 1 & 2 20,872,157.1 34,534,487.1 499,993.3

*Non-Standard Operations are vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other equipment used by Federal Government agencies in combat support, combat service support, tactical or relief operations, training for such operations, law enforcement, emergency response, or spaceflight (including associated ground-support equipment). Non-Standard operations also includes generation of electric power produced and sold commercially to other parties.

Another,andarguablybetter,methodwouldbetobaseestimatesofgreenhousegas

emissionsduringthemajorwarsontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommandandotherwarzones.InFY2014(seefigure4),CentralCommandusedabout24percentofthetotaloperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecauseUSpost-9/11counterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80–90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.

Theestimatederivedhereisthusbasedontheassumptionthattheportionofall

greenhousegasemissionsrelatedtotheGlobalWaronTerror,inpatrollingthePersianGulfandCentralCommandOverseasContingencyOperationsisabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.

119 Department of Energy, https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.

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Thesemethodsassumethattotalemissionsdataisavailable.Whiledataforstandardandnon-standardgreenhousegasemissionsbyUSgovernmentdepartmentareavailableforFY2008,andFY2010–2018ontheDepartmentofEnergywebsite,thereisnoaccountingofstandardandnon-standardemissionsforotheryears.120TheemissionsforotheryearswerethereforeestimatedfromcalculationsoffuelconsumptionforvehicleandequipmentusefortheperiodofFY1975toFY2018foundintheDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondataComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityAnnualReports.121

Specifically,non-standardemissionswereestimated,basedonvehicleandequipment

emissionsforthemissingyears,andthenthestandardemissionswereestimatedinproportiontonon-standardemissions.Forexample,acalculationofCO2eemissionsforUSDODjetfuelconsumptionin2017isillustratedinTable4.ThecalculationofCO2equivalentemissionsofjetfuelmakesthefollowingassumptions:eachgallonofjetfuelproduces0.135HHVMMBtu/gallon.Usingthestandardemissionfactorsforjetfuel—CO2of72.22kg/MMBtu;forCH4(methane)of.003kg/MMBtu;andforN2O(nitrousoxide)of.0006kg/MMBtu—onecancalculatethegreenhousegas,CO2equivalent,emissionsforagivenquantityofjetfuel.122TheGlobalWarmingPotential100yearvaluesaretheEPAandDepartmentofEnergyassumptionsof25formethaneand298forNitrousOxide.123Table4.CalculatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsforUSMilitaryJetFuelConsumption,FY2017. JetFuel UnitofMeasureAnnualConsumptionGHGNon-StandardOperations 2,915,738.50 thousandgallonsTotalEnergyConsumed 393,624,693.30 MMBTUCost $6,681,061.20 UnitCost $2.29 AnthropogenicCO2EmissionFactor 72.2 kgCO2/MMBtuCH4EmissionFactor 0.003 kgCH4/MMBtuN2OEmissionFactor 0.0006 kgN2O/MMBtu

120 See Department of Energy Comprehensive Annual Energy Data and Sustainability Performance, https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/Report.aspx. 121DepartmentofEnergy,“ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,”AnnualReports,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.Dataasof1June2018.EnergyconsumptionfromtheDepartmentofEnergy,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx.122CO2,MethaneandNitrousOxideemissionfactorsarefromOfficeofEnergy&RenewableEnergy,FederalComprehensiveAnnualEnergyandreportingRequirements,https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-consolidated-annual-reporting-requirements.123GWPemissionscoefficients,https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php.

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TotalQuantityEmittedAnthropogenicCO2 28,427,575,352.60 kgTotalQuantityEmittedCH4 1,180,874.10 kgTotalQuantityEmittedN2O 236,174.80 kgGWPFactorforCO2 1 CO2eGWPFactorforCH4 25 CO2eGWPFactorforN2O 298 CO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(CO2e) 28,527,477,299.80 kgCO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(MTCO2e) 28,527,477.30 MTCO2e

DOEfuelconsumptiondatafortheDODwereusedtocalculateannualemissionsforDODvehicleandequipmentcausedgreenhousegasemissionsforeachfueltype—gasoline,diesel,LPG/propane,aviationgas,jetfuel,andNavyspecialfuel—basedonfuelenergyconsumptionratesfortheyearswherethereisnopublishedDepartmentofEnergyemissionsdata.124Assumingthatnon-standardemissionsfromvehiclefuelconsumptionwereveryclosetothetotalnon-standardfuelconsumptionfortheDOD,standardemissionswereestimatedforeachyear.DuringtheyearswherethereisDepartmentofEnergydataforallDODemissions(FY2010–2018),non-standardemissionswereonaverage63percentoftotalemissions.StandardemissionswereestimatedforFY1975–2007andFY2009assumingthattheratioswereaboutthesamethroughtheentireperiod.TheresultsareshowninTable5andgraphedinFigure8,above.

Table5.EstimatedAnnualDODGreenhouseGasEmissionsofthe,FY1975–2018125

FiscalYearStandardEmissions,MillionsofMetricTons

Non-StandardEmissions,MillionsofMetricTons

TotalCO2eEmissions,MillionsofMetricTons

1975 40 69 1091976 35 59 931977 35 60 951978 34 58 921979 35 60 951980 36 61 971981 39 66 104

1982 39 67 1071983 39 67 1061984 40 68 109

124 Becausetheheatcontentandgreenhousegasemissionofthevariousproductsofcrudeoil(e.g.dieselandjetfuel)aredifferent,calculationsmustusethespecificheatcontentandemissionsprofilesforeachfuel.Theaverageheatcontentofcrudeoilis5.80mmbtuperbarrel(EPA2018).Theaveragecarboncoefficientofcrudeoilis20.31kgcarbonpermmbtu(EPA2018).Thefractionoxidizedis100percent.5.80mmbtu/barrel×20.31kgC/mmbtu×44kgCO2/12kgC×1metricton/1,000kg=0.43metrictonsCO2/barrel. 125CalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondataroundedtothenearestmetricton.Figuresinitalics,forFY2008andFY2010–2018,aretheDepartmentofEnergyreportedemissionsfigures.

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1985 39 67 1061986 39 66 1051987 40 69 1091988 35 60 951989 40 68 1091990 39 66 1051991 41 69 1101992 32 55 881993 32 55 871994 30 51 801995 28 48 761996 27 46 741997 27 45 721998 25 43 691999 25 42 662000 23 39 62

2001 23 40 632002 26 44 702003 29 49 782004 32 54 852005 31 52 832006 27 46 732007 28 48 762008 27 50 772009 28 48 772010 27 50 772011 26 49 752012 25 45 702013 24 39 642014 24 38 622015 24 39 63

2016 22 37 592017 22 37 592018 21 35 56Total 1,361 2,324 3,685

TheseestimatesofUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsareconservativeforfour

reasons.First,theimpactofmethaneandnitrousoxidegases,theirGlobalWarmingPotentials(GWP)isnotthesameasC02butsignificantlyhigher.Whencalculatingthetotal

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greenhousegasemissions,theseothergreenhousegasesarescaledintoanequivalentrelationtocarbondioxide,whichhas,bydefinition,aGWPof1.TheDepartmentofEnergyandtheEPAusetheUSEPA100yearGlobalWarmingPotentialswhichscalestheGWPofmethane,CH4,at25andnitrousoxide,N2O,at298over100years.126TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeFifthAssessmentReportusesaGWPof34forMethane’sCO2equivalent.127IftheIPCCglobalwarmingpotentialswereused,estimatesofUSDODgreenhousegasemissionswouldbehigher.Further,IhavealsonotcalculatedtheemissionsfromfluorinatedgasesfromUSvehiclesandequipment.

Second,recallthatjetfuelisthemajorsourceofvehiclenon-standardmilitary

greenhousegasemissions.CO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumptionbutjetfuelcombustionemissionsathighaltitudealsocontainwatervapor,aglobalwarminggas,whichitselfcausestheformationofcirrusclouds.TheDODalsoputsadditivesinitsjetfuelstoensurethattheyperformaccordingtomilitaryrequirements.Forinstance,becausemilitaryjetsflyatmuchhigheraltitudesthancommercialjets,theyuseadditivestoensurethatthefuellinesdonotfreeze.Anyemissionsfromthoseadditivesandwarmingfromwatervaporarenotcounted.ScientistsagreethateventhoughCO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumption,theimpactoftheseothergreenhousegasesissignificant.WhiletheDepartmentofEnergyfiguresandthecalculationshereincludenitrousoxideandmethane,itispossiblethattheadditionaleffectsofadditivesforjetfuelcombustion,whicharenotincludedinthesecalculations,issignificant.“Non-CO2impactscannotbeignoredastheypotentiallyrepresentapproximately60%oftotalclimateimpactsthatareimportantintheshorterterm(excludingcloudinessimpacts).”128Insum,thismeansthattheimpactofmilitaryaviationemissionswhenallgreenhousegasesareincludedmaybemuchhigher

126PFCs,HFCs,NF3,andSF6haveglobalwarmingpotentialsthatrangefrom7,390to22,800.Whiletheglobalwarmingeffectsofmethane,nitrousoxide,andwatervaporarewellunderstood,whentheyareemittedduringjetfuelcombustionathighaltitudestheeffectsarenotaswellunderstoodastheeffectsofCO2.SeetheUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,“EmissionsofFlourinatedGases,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#f-gasesand“UnderstandingGlobalWarmingPotentials,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials.TheDepartmentofEnergyusestheEPAGWPfactors.SeetheirEnergyManagementDataReport.https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/downloads/annual-energy-management-data-reportandCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,“FederalGreenhouseGasAccountingandReportingGuidance,”17January2016,p.4.https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/federal_ghg%20accounting_reporting-guidance.pdf.127IPCCSecondAssessmentReport100GWPSeetheIPCCFifthAssessmentReport,ClimateChange2014:SynthesisReport.ContributionofWorkingGroupsI,IIandIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[CoreWritingTeam,R.K.PachauriandL.A.Meyer(eds.)].(IPCC,Geneva,Switzerland,2014).https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.128EuropeanEnvironmentAgency,EuropeanUnionAviationSafetyAgency,Eurocontrol,“EuropeanAviationEnvironmentReport,2019”January2019,p.88.https://www.easa.europa.eu/eaer/system/files/usr_uploaded/219473_EASA_EAER_2019_WEB_LOW-RES.pdf.AlsoseeMartinCames,JakobGraichen,AnneSiemons,andVanessaCook,“EmissionReductionTargetsforInternationalAviationandShipping,”PolicyDepartmentA:EconomicandScientificPolicy,EuropeanUnion,November2015,pp.13-14.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569964/IPOL_STU(2015)569964_EN.pdf.

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thanthoseestimatedhere.Jetcontrails,leadingtothecreationofcirrusclouds,isasignificantcontributortoglobalwarming.129

Third,thefocusisonthemajoremissionsoftheDOD.Specificallynotincludedare

estimatesforwhatarecalledScope3emissions,from,forinstance,employeeairandgroundbusinesstravel,wastewatertreatment,andsolidwastedisposal.Forexample,USDODScope3emissionsin2008were7.6millionMTCO2e,andin2016,7millionMTCO2e.Norarebiogenicemissionsincluded.InFY2017andFY2018,forexample,USDODbiogenicemissionswere.57millionMTCO2eand.49millionMTofCO2e.

Fourth,therearesomesourcesofDODfacilitiesenergyforwhichthesourcefuelis

unclear.Table6showsDepartmentofEnergydataforDODsitedeliveredenergyuseinFY2018.TheDODacquireselectricityandpurchasessteamforfacilitiesfromexternalpowersuppliers,buttheDOEdoesnotprovidedetailaboutthefuelusedtoproducethatelectricity.Thesourceofelectricityorsteaminthosecategoriescouldbenuclearpower,whichwouldhavenogreenhousegasemissions,orcoal,whichcouldhaveasignificantgreenhousegasfootprint.

Table6.DepartmentofDefenseSiteDeliveredEnergyUseandCosts,FY2018130

GOAL-SUBJECTBUILDINGS

NativeUnitsQuantityUnits BillionBTU Cost(in2018$)

Electricity 27,063,119.5 Mwh 92,339.4 2,283,641,505.5

FuelOil 96,877.2 Thou.Gallons 13,370.7 233,882,141.5

NaturalGas 67,908,099.4 Thou.Cu.Ft. 69,673.7 430,165,087.5

LpgPropane 9,919.6 Thou.Gallons 912.6 14,408,118.1

Coal 287,129.1 ShortTons 6,218.9 30,425,300.3

PurchSteam 4,253.6 BBTU 4,253.6 107,141,786.9

PurchasedRenewableEnergy 1,477.0 BBTU 1,477.0 24,689,765.5On-SiteRenewablesAndAdjustments 4,409.1 BBTU 4,409.1 43,326,224.5

Other 479.2 BBTU 479.2 4,999,900.0

End-UseSectorTotal 193,134.2 3,172,679,829.8

GrossSquareFeet 1,881,714.5 Thou.GSF

GOAL-EXCLUDEDFACILITIESNativeUnits

QuantityUnits BillionBTU Cost(in2018$)

Electricity 2,421,946.6 Mwh 8,263.7 215,190,677.0

FuelOil 1,080.7 Thou.Gallons 149.1 2,007,792.0

129SeeUlrikeBurkhardtandBerndKärcher,“GlobalRadiativeForcingfromContrailCirrus,”NatureClimateChange,March2011,pp.54-58andUlrikeBurkhardt,LisaBock,andAndreasBier,“MitigatingtheContrailCirrusClimateImpactbyReducingAircraftSootNumberEmissions,”ClimateandAtmosphericScience,October2018,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-018-0046-4.130Source:DepartmentofEnergy,“ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,”byFederalAgency,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/SiteDeliveredEnergyUseandCostsbyEndUseSectorAndEnergyTypeByFederalAgencyNativeUnitsAndBillionBtu.aspx;https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/BEAReport.aspx?ef=Excel&fy=1&yo=&ag=6&au=false.

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NaturalGas 679,505.2 Thou.Cu.Ft. 697.2 2,888,397.0

LpgPropane 0.0 Thou.Gallons 0.0 0.0

Coal 0.0 ShortTons 0.0 0.0

PurchSteam 98.1 BBTU 98.1 4,296,646.0

PurchasedRenewableEnergy 0.0 BBTU 0.0 0.0On-SiteRenewablesAndAdjustments 489.6 BBTU 489.6 0.0

Other 0.0 BBTU 0.0 0.0

End-UseSectorTotal 9,697.7 224,383,512.0

GrossSquareFeet 11,718.9 Thou.GSF

VEHICLESANDEQUIPMENTNativeUnits

QuantityUnits BillionBTU Cost(in2018$)

AutoGas 90,608.4 Thou.Gallons 11,326.0 294,726,817.1

Dist-Diesel 711,014.5 Thou.Gallons 98,182.2 1,731,009,006.2

LpgPropane 5.4 Thou.Gallons 0.5 12,287.0

AviationGas 433.2 Thou.Gallons 52.0 2,804,586.9

JetFuel 2,792,639.2 Thou.Gallons 377,006.3 7,149,029,327.8

NavySpecial 0.0 Thou.Gallons 0.0 0.0

Other 1,216.2 BBTU 1,216.2 31,895,107.8

End-UseSectorTotal 487,783.2 9,209,477,132.7 DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSETOTAL(FY2018)

690,615.1 12,606,540,474.5

Figure17illustratestheDODtotalfacilityenergyuseinBillionsofBritishThermal

Unitsfromelectricityandpurchasedsteam.Notethat,whilethefacilitiestotalenergyproductiondeclinedfromFY1975toFY2018,theproportionofelectricityandsteamgeneration,sourceunspecified,increased.InFY1975,electricityaccountedfor20percentoffacilitiesenergyuse;byFY2018,electricityaccountedfornearly50percentoffacilitiesenergyuse.Figure17.DODFacilityEnergyUseFY1975toFY2018:Total,Electricity,andPurchasedSteam131

131Source:DepartmentofEnergydata.

050,000

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Appendix2.PossibleNextStepsforCongressionalActionontheDODandClimateChange

Bydecreasingfueluse,thePentagonhassignificantlyreducedDODgreenhousegas

emissionsinrecentyears.Bycontinuingtodecreasefossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywouldreduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandcouldperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).

ThereisroomfortheDODtocontinuereductions,usingmanymoremodestmeasures

includingincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels.Moresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuring,includingmakingtrainingmoreefficient,reducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Somebaseclosuresandrestructuringwillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.

Thisisawin-win-winstrategy.ReductionsinfuelusesavesmoneyandmakestheUS

militarylessvulnerabletofuelshortages;inthelongrun,reductionsinfueluseandconversionofbasesbyreforestationdecreaseclimatechangecausedimpactsincludinginsecurity;andconversiontorenewableenergysourcesandalternativefuelscouldsignificantlyboosttherenewableenergyindustryandelectriccarindustryintheUS.

Congressmightbecomemuchmoreactiveintrackingandreducinggreenhousegas

emissionsbytheDOD.Specifically,CongressmightrequirethePentagontosupplymoreinformationonfuelconsumptionandenergyuseandrequirethePentagontoincreaseitsanalysisandplanningforatransitiontoreductionsinfossilfueluseandtoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumption.Somepotentialactionsareoutlinedbelow.

1.ComprehensivereportingofDODfuelconsumptionandenergyusage.

a.Inallfutureyears,theDODshouldreportfuelconsumptiontoCongressinitsbudgetarysubmissionandinaseparateannualreportonDODfuelconsumption.Consumptionreportsshouldbebothaggregatedanddisaggregated(byfueltype,e.g.jet,diesel,andotherfuels)eachyearbynamedoperationandwar,andforotheroperationsandinstallations,foreachoperationalcommandandeachservice.ConsumptioninformationshouldalsobeaddedtotheannualDefenseLogisticsAgencyEnergyFactbooks.

b.TheDODshouldreportthesesamefiguresfortheperiodfromFY2000throughFY2019inaseparatereport.

c.TheDODshouldreportfuelconsumptionfortrainingmissionsandpublicdisplayssuchasfly-overevents.

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2.Comprehensiveanalysisandplanninga.DARPAshouldworkwiththeservicestoproduceastudyshowingcurrentDOD

non-tacticalvehiclefleetfuelconsumption,andtoidentifywaystoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumptionbeyondlevelsalreadytargeted.

b.Eachserviceshouldidentifywaystoreduceconsumptionoffuelbydecreasingthefueluseandincreasingthefuelefficiencyoftrainingexercises.

c.Eachinstallationshouldinventoryitsenvironmenttoidentify“heatislands”bytheendofFY2020.

d.Eachinstallationshouldproduceplanstoreduceoverallenergyconsumptionby10percentand20percentbythestartofFY2022.

e.Identifyinstallationsthatshouldbeclosedorreducedinsizeduetoclimatechangeimpacts(suchasrisingsealevelsorextremeweather).Developaplanforconvertingtheseinstallationstositesforcarbonsequestration.

3.Comprehensiveapproachtoreductionsinfossilfuelusage.a.SwitchingtoalternativefuelsforelectricitygenerationatallUSmilitaryinstallations

sothatallDODinstallationsare90percentreliantonrenewabletechnologies,e.g.wind,solar,geothermal,hydropower,andlargestoragecapacitybatteries,throughpowerpurchaseagreementsorlocalgenerationby2022.

b.Increasetherateofadoptionofallelectric,hybridandpluginhybridnon-tacticalfleetvehicles(NTV)basedontheresultsoftheDARPAstudyidentifiedabove.Moveto90percentelectric,orgas-electrichybrid,by2022.PrioritizefornewpurchasesthemostefficientvehiclesmadeintheUSthatmeettheDepartmentofEnergyNTVfueleconomystandards.

c.Toreducethe“heatisland”effectoflargeexpansesofconcreteandasphaltandtherebyreducethenecessityforairconditioningonbasesandotherinstallations,eachbaseshallinventoryitspercentageoftreecoverandplantshadetreessothatthepercentageofshadetreecoverageisincreasedby10–20percentbytheendofFY2021.

4.Militaryandinstallationbaseconversionsandclosuresa. Designatewhichmilitaryandnationalguardbasesandinstallationsshouldbe

closedduetoclimatechangeimpactsandwhichbasescanbeclosedforotherreasons,suchasdiminishedthreat.132Forexample,OffuttAirForceBaseinNebraska,whichsufferedfloodinginMarch2019,andTyndallAirForceBase,whichwasdamagedbyHurricaneMichaelinOctober2018,aretoreceivemorethan$1billioninfundingforrepairscontingentonproducingaplanthatincludes“anexplanationofhoweachmilitaryconstructionprojectwillincorporatemitigation

132DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019,https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.

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measuresthatreducethethreatfromextremeweatherevents,meansealevelfluctuation,flooding,andanyotherknownenvironmentalthreattoresilience.”133TyndallAirForceBase,whichisextremelyvulnerabletofuturehurricanes,mightinsteadbeclosed,saving$300,000,000inconstruction.

b. Asbasesandinstallationsareclearedoftoxiccontamination(suchaschemicalwasteandasbestos),changelandusesothatcarbonsequestrationispossible,suchasbyplantingtreesorrestoringwetlands.134

c. UseclosedDODbasesandinstallationsassitesofalternativeenergyproduction—wind,solar,orgeothermal,asismostappropriateandefficientforthatbaseorinstallation.Similarly,convertedNationalGuardbasescouldbecomesitesofalternativeenergyproductionandcarbonsequestration.

133 National Defense Authorization Bill, FY2020, House Bill, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500/text. 134 The EPA lists more than 130 clean-up sites that it cleaned up in the several rounds of Base Realignment and Closure. See EPA “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Sites by State,” https://www.epa.gov/fedfac/base-realignment-and-closure-brac-sites-state.


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