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© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Pension policy – where have we been, where are we going? Paul Johnson
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Introduction
• People living longer and incomes in retirement rising
– Incomes higher than non-pensioners on average
– Next decade likely to see continued rise in pensioner incomes
• Longer term future looks less certain
– Lower state pensions
– Collapse of private sector DB schemes
– Falling home ownership
• Policy on state pensions looks stable
– Subject to sorting out the triple lock
• We have got ourselves into a difficult place on private pensions
– No risk sharing
– Tax treatment
Good news
• Life expectancy has been rising
– unexpectedly
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Rapid, unexpected change in life expectancy Predicted life expectancy at birth
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
65
67
69
71
73
75
77
79
81
83 19
71
1974
19
77
1980
19
83
1986
19
89
1992
19
95
1998
20
01
2004
20
07
2010
20
13
2016
20
19
Pro
ject
ed li
fe e
xpec
tanc
y
1971
Rapid, unexpected change in life expectancy Predicted life expectancy at birth
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
65
67
69
71
73
75
77
79
81
83 19
71
1974
19
77
1980
19
83
1986
19
89
1992
19
95
1998
20
01
2004
20
07
2010
20
13
2016
20
19
Pro
ject
ed li
fe e
xpec
tanc
y
1979
1975
1971
Rapid, unexpected change in life expectancy Predicted life expectancy at birth
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
65
67
69
71
73
75
77
79
81
83 19
71
1974
19
77
1980
19
83
1986
19
89
1992
19
95
1998
20
01
2004
20
07
2010
20
13
2016
20
19
Pro
ject
ed li
fe e
xpec
tanc
y 2006
2002
1998
1994
1991
1987
1983
1979
1975
1971
Good news
• Life expectancy has been rising
– Unexpectedly
• Incomes in retirement have been rising fast
– And much more than for working age population
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
The remarkable catch-up in pensioner incomes
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
105%
110%
chart shows median after housing costs incomes of pensioner households as % of median for non-pensioners (HBAI income definitions)
Income by age 1978-80 to 2012-13
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Perc
enta
ge
of
ove
rall
med
ian
inco
me
(mea
sure
d A
HC
)
Age
1978–80 2007–08 2012–13
Median income by age compared to overall median income (measured AHC)
Source: Figure 3.7b of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014 http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7274 Notes: Household income is equivalised and measured after housing costs are deducted
Poverty rates by age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1978-80
Source: Figure 6.3a of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6759
Poverty rates by age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1978-80 2011-12
Source: Figure 6.3a of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6759
Pensioners doing better before the recession
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
0s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s
2001-02 to 2007-08
Annual real income change by age
...and after
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
0s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s
2001-02 to 2007-08
2007-08 to 2013-14
Annual real income change by age
Good news
• Life expectancy has been rising
– Unexpectedly
• Incomes in retirement have been rising fast
– And much more than for working age population
• Reflecting rising state and private pensions
– And also later retirement and increased earnings
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 1
97
4
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Em
plo
ymen
t ra
te
65-69 (LFS)
Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 1
97
4
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Em
plo
ymen
t ra
te
60-64 (LFS)
65-69 (LFS)
Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 1
97
4
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Em
plo
ymen
t ra
te
50-54 (LFS)
55-59 (LFS)
60-64 (LFS)
65-69 (LFS)
Chandler and Tetlow (2014) http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7384
Good news
• Life expectancy has been rising
– Unexpectedly
• Incomes in retirement have been rising fast
– And much more than for working age population
• Reflecting rising state and private pensions
– And also later retirement and increased earnings
• And our projections suggest continued improvements over the next decade
– http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7251
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Equivalised family income projections: 65+ population
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
£0
£10,000
£20,000
£30,000
£40,000
£50,000
£60,000
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Rea
l fam
ily in
com
e (
£p
a, 2
01
4–1
5 p
rice
s)
Median 10th percentile 90th percentile
Source: Figure 5.1, Emmerson, Heald and Hood (2014) http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7251
But are we doing too well?
• One way of thinking about that is to ask how well off people are in retirement relative to during their working life
• Traditionally looked at how much of gross final earnings are replaced by pensions
– This was the basis for much of the Pension Commission’s work
• But is this a good measure?
– Should be interested in net, not gross incomes
– Why just consider pensions and not other wealth?
– And aren’t we interested in incomes compared to average over a working life, not just final earnings?
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Replacement of average lifetime earnings
• For couple households born in the 1940s we define:
50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage65ageatincomerealEstimated ratet Replacemen =
Consider several definitions of income
Taking into account household size
Adjusting for inflation; considering average purchasing power
Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired? http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7358
Replacement of average lifetime earnings
Percentage of couple with:
Total pension income
<=67% replacement 20%
<=80% replacement 35%
<=100% replacement 59%
• For couple households born in the 1940s we define:
50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage65ageatincomerealEstimated ratet Replacemen =
Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired? http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7358
Replacement of average lifetime earnings
Percentage of couple with:
Total pension income
... plus annuitised non-housing wealth
<=67% replacement 20% 10%
<=80% replacement 35% 20%
<=100% replacement 59% 41%
• For couple households born in the 1940s we define:
50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage65ageatincomerealEstimated ratet Replacemen =
Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired? http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7358
Comparing ‘optimal’ and actual (private) wealth
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
For the current generation of pensioners
• A remarkable triumph
– Despite longer lives and earlier retirement incomes are higher than they were during working life for most
• Down to a combination of
– Increasing state pensions
– More generous means tested benefits
– Occupational pensions
– House prices
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
What about the future?
• For the next decade at least things still look quite positive
• Further ahead things may look less rosy
– Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Incomes are dipping
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Rea
l ho
useh
old
inco
me
(£
per
wee
k, 2
01
1-1
2 p
rice
s)
Age
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s
Source : Authors’ calculations using FES/EFS/LCF, various years
As are savings rates
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Rea
l ho
useh
old
sav
ing
(£
per
wee
k, 2
01
1-1
2 p
rice
s)
Age
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s
Source : Authors’ calculations using FES/EFS/LCF, various years
What about the future?
• For the next decade at least things still look quite positive
– We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc
• Further ahead things may look less rosy
– Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower
• The state pension is becoming less generous for many
– The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Male median earner who works continuously up to his state pension age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Perc
enta
ge
of
age-
50
ear
nin
gs
Year of birth
Basic state pension Single-tier pension
Second-tier pension Excess (single-tier transition)
Source : Authors’ calculations using earnings profiles from FES/EFS/LCF, various years
What about the future?
• For the next decade at least things still look quite positive
– We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc
• Further ahead things may look less rosy
– Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower
• The state pension is becoming less generous for many
• The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P
– Home ownership rates are declining
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Recent cohorts are also less likely to own a home
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Ho
meo
wn
ersh
ip r
ate
(%)
Age
Born 1963–67 Born 1973–77 Born 1983–87
What about the future?
• For the next decade at least things still look quite positive
– We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc
• Further ahead things may look less rosy
– Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower
• The state pension is becoming less generous for many
• The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P
– Home ownership rates are declining
• The collapse in DB scheme membership outside the public sector is huge
– A double whammy on earnings
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Declining private sector DB coverage
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 19
95
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Mill
ions
Closed
Open
© Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Occupational Pension Scheme Survey.
Active members of private sector defined benefit schemes
Employer contributions to pension funds – in constant prices terms
Source: Office for National Statistics
Pension costs have played a big role in average wages rising less quickly than productivity
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Productivity-briefing.pdf
To recap...
• The current generation at and near retirement are doing very well
• To some extent at the expense of younger generations
– Who can expect lower retirement incomes
• What about policy?
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
The recent history of state pensions
• SERPS was introduced in 1978
• Governments have spent the whole period since un-introducing it
– A long and tortuous path given the complexities around contracting out
• Any link between contributions and entitlement has effectively ended
• The single tier is the logical final step
– Very close to a flat rate “citizens’ pension” based on history of residence
– Note that it reduces expected future generosity for almost everyone
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Remaining policy issues
• Pension age
– Rising over coming decades
– We know that increasing female SPA is increasing employment • http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7323
– Commitment to raise with life expectancy so people live a third of adult life (over 20) in retirement
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Legislation to increase pension age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Age Legislated
66 2020
67 2028
68 2046
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
Legislation to increase pension age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Age Legislated Population variant
central
66 2020 2020
67 2028 2028
68 2046 2036
69 2049
70 2063
71
72
73
74
75
Legislation to increase pension age
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Age Legislated Population variant
central high
66 2020 2020 2020
67 2028 2028 2028
68 2046 2036 2031
69 2049 2034
70 2063 2037
71 2040
72 2045
73 2051
74 2057
75 2064
Remaining policy issues
• Pension age
– Rising over coming decades
– We know that increasing female SPA is increasing employment • http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7323
– Commitment to raise with life expectancy so people live a third of adult life (over 20) in retirement
• Level and indexation
– Triple lock adds £15bn to costs by 2050 relative to earnings indexation
– Introduces an element of pure randomness into pension level
– Makes no sense as a policy
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Effects of triple lock and pension age on spending
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Recent history of private pensions
• Regulation and demise of private sector DB schemes
– This looks irreversible
• Spread of DC
• Introduction of auto-enrolment
– Successful so far (but minimum default contributions very low)
• Ending of compulsory annuitisation
– Effects unknown
• Chaotic changes to tax treatment
– And continual change to tax treatment of other forms of savings
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Policy priorities for private pensions
• Risk sharing
– No risk sharing in DC schemes
– None now in retirement without annuitisation
– This CANNOT be optimal
• In my view the overwhelming priority must be to find some way of achieving more risk sharing
– Defined ambition?
• Also to limit the windfall to those with accrued rights
– Move from RPI to CPI indexation
– (note this was easily the biggest change to public service pensions) • http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2012/12chap5.pdf
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
The formula effect
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
[http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7513]
Urgent need to sort out tax regime
• Annual allowance cut in stages to £40,000 and lifetime allowance cut to £1 million
– Raising c. £5 billion a year
• From April 2016 annual allowance phased down once income exceeds £150,000 reaching just £10,000 when at £210,000
– Introducing very high effective marginal rate
• No attempt to tackle the genuinely generous parts of the system
– The tax free lump sum
– NI treatment
• And now consultation on the whole structure
• This is no way to make policy in an area where stability and certainty matter a lot
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
What should be done?
• Unambiguous conclusion about what an efficient, neutral tax treatment of pensions should be
– Contributions exempt from tax, returns free of tax, tax paid on withdrawal (EET)
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Cost of tax relief
• HMRC says £35 billion =
– Tax relief on contributions, +
– tax relief on investment returns, +
– NI relief on employer contributions, -
– Tax paid on pensions in payment
• “True cost” against an expenditure tax benchmark is closer to £16-17 billion
– £14 billion of NI relief, +
– Cost of tax free lump sum • perhaps £2.5 billion but, bizarrely, not published by HMRC
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
What should be done?
• Unambiguous conclusion about what an efficient, neutral tax treatment of pensions should be
– Contributions exempt from tax, returns free of tax, tax paid on withdrawal (EET)
• From current situation that means:
– income tax treatment makes sense (other than lump sum)
– NI treatment much too generous
• Treatment at death bizarrely generous and distorting
• Focus of consultation elsewhere entirely
– Move to TEE (unlikely to happen)
– Move to flat rate relief • Which would be redistributive but move away from rational tax system
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Policy conclusions
• State pensions
– Stick with single tier but move away from contributory fiction and make dependent on, say, 30 years residence
– Get rid of triple lock: link to earnings, raising in line with prices when they rise more but claw back later
– Raise pension age at least in line with longevity
• Private pensions
– Focus on finding a way to reintroduce some risk sharing
– Consider reducing DB benefits by enforcing CPI indexation
– Move to rational, stable EET tax system
– Over time increase employee auto enrolment contribution rates
© Institute for Fiscal Studies