Penetration Testing Biometric System

By FB1H2S aka Rahul Sasi

http://Garage4Hackers.com

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Who am I ?What is this paper about ?

• I am an Info Security Enthusiast http://fb1h2s.com Rahul Sasi aka FB1H2S working as a consultant .

http://www.aaatechnologies.co.in• Active participant of Null and other computing

groups.• A member of Garage4Hackers. http://www.Garage4Hackers.com• What this paper contains ?

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Explaining the Risk?• Finger print deployed every where, attendance and door management.• Advantages and Disadvantages of Bio-systems.• The devices hold critical information.

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Employee Details

EmployeeAttendance

Employee Salary

Why to audit them ?

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I just Hacked into Biometric Attendance Register and Changed

attendance and salary :D of mine and my @#$$

Student / Employee

Professor / Not so good co-worker

I am marked 10 days absent , what the |-|3ll is happening!

Classifying the AttacksLocal Attacks:• Finger Print Sensor • USB Data ManagerRemote Attacks:• Remote IP Management• Back End Database• Finger Print Manager (Admin Interface)

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Biometric System Attack Vectors

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Biometric Systems Common Applications

• Reliable attendance managing system.• Biometric Finger print guarded doors, implemented for keyless secure

access to doors.

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Attacks: The Non Technical part

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Local Attack: Finger print sensor

• Finger print scanners read input using two methodologies:

1) Optical scanner 2) Capacitance scanner• Finger print recognition systems are image matching

algorithms• Cloning a duplicate finger print and cheating the

image recognition algorithms

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Steeling a Finger Print

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• Your finger impressions falls any were you touch. Ex: on glass

My Approach: Finger Print Logger

• Biometric sensor looks like this.

• Placing a thin less refractive index transparent object in front of the sensor and logging finger prints.

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Building Finger print logger• Refraction:

• Use Less refractive index thin transparent sheet

• Log the victims fingerprint using the finger print logger

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Steps Building Logger

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Special Points to be Considered

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Reproducing a Fake Finger print:

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Local Attack: USB Data Manager. • Biometrics devices have inbuilt data storage, were it stores the Finger

print and user information. • USB support in order to download and upload finger prints and other log

detail to and from the device.• Most of the devices do not have any sort of protection mechanism

employed to prevent data theft, and those which uses password protection often is deployed with default password.

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Attacks: The Technical part

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Remote Attack Vectors.

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Remote Attack Vectors

• IP implementation for data transfer• Biometric Management Servers• Biometric Admin/Interface (Web Based and

Desktop based )• Back end Database• Man In The Middle Attacks

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TCP/IP Implementation for Remote Management:

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Remote Administration Implementation

Issues• The remote administration capability of this device lets

biometric servers to authenticate to it and manage remotely.• We are completely unaware of the management protocol

used as the program is embedded in the Biometric MIPS device.

Solutions • The admin application knows everything about the remote

device so if we could get a copy of that application it will tell us everything we want.

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Example AttackAttacking the remote management

protocol Example.• Situation: The remote administration implementation is unknown.• Foot printing: The label on the Biometric device will reveal which

company has marketed or build that product.• Download a copy of remote management software from vendor site

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Example AttackReverse Engineering the Application

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• Reflector used to disassemble the .Net application • Detected TCP/IP setting of device used to

communication, It uses port 4370 to communicate

Application uses COM objects which interacts with Device

• IDA used for dissembling the COM objects

• Disassembling Import function shows the communication details

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Example Device Command extracted• Commands to set the device time remotely

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Auditing Back End Database

• From disassembling we were able to find local database password file and encryption key hardcoded in the application.

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Biometric Admin/Interface (Web Based and Desktop based )

• Another possible point of attacks are on the admin interface, these are either desktop based or Web based.

• Desktop based applications are common and the possible chances to interact with them require local privileges on the Biometric server.

• But web based admin panels could be attacked form outside.

• So an application check on those modules for application vulnerabilities could also help.

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Nmap Script: Detecting Biometric Devices on Network:

How to detect these device on network for attacking?Nmap Script Output.

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Attack Videos

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Conclusion

• The risk and vulnerabilities associated with Biometric Device are explained.

• This shows the necessity of including these devices to the scope of a Network Audit.

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