Peace Negotiations

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UNITED STaTES INSTITUTE of pEacE

© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

“ [T]h bility o mny ivil

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rom th dominting rligious

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hs ld NGOs s sour

o inormtion unbholdn

to ithr th govrnmnt’s

or th MILF’s intrsts. In this

wy, NGOs hv hld to

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nd to rvnt sltions.”

April 28, 2011

Peace Negotiations in the Philippines:The Government, the MILF andInternational NGOs

SummaryIn many peace negotiations International Contact Groups have been a helpul tool in prevent-•

ing a peace process rom stalling or ailing. Members, commonly states and international

organizations, exert leverage on the parties to the conict, sustain the parties’ commitment to

a peaceul resolution o the conict and restore mutual trust.

While international nongovernmental organizations have been overlooked in this context,•

they may expedite problem-solving by contributing through their networks within civil soci-

ety, their experience rom similar peace processes in dierent countries, and their perceived

independence rom the parties to conict. With the assistance o international nongovern-

mental organizations a peace process may lead to a higher degree o eciency and legitimacy

in delivering sustainable results.

The recent negotiations between the government o the Philippines and the Moro Islamic•

Liberation Front use this potential and incorporate our nongovernmental organizations to an

unprecedented degree as part o an International Contact Group. This Peace Brie illustrates

their innovative methods and capacities during this ongoing negotiation process.

The next round o negotiations is scheduled or April 27 and 28, 2011.•

IntroductionOn February 9 and 10 o this year, the government o the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Libera-

tion Front (MILF) entered a new round o peace negotiations in an attempt to end a conict that

has been disrupting the country or more than three decades. The resumption o ormal talks in

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ended a deadlock that begun in August 2008, when the Supreme Court

o the Philippines issued a temporary restraining order against the signing o the Memorandum

o Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the government and the MILF, which

would have increased the control o the Autonomous Region o Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).1 The

decision was ollowed by MILF attacks against Christian communities in Central Mindanao and

counterattacks by the Armed Forces o the Philippines (AFP). As part o the latest negotiations, the

two Negotiating Peace Panels – representatives o the government and the MILF, respectively—are

joined or the frst time by an International Contact Group (ICG), which is intended to serve as a

guarantor o the negotiations. The ICG ormalizes the engagement o our third-party governments

Claudia Hofmann

E-mail: [email protected]

Phone: 202.429.3867

peaceBrIeF91


Peace Negotiations in the Philippines: The Government, the MILF

and International NGOs page 2 • PB 91 • April 28, 2011

and our international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the peace process. It thus opens

a national peace process to external actors to an unprecedented extent, enabling them to “exert

proper leverage” over the negotiating parties in order to sustain interest in the negotiations and

build consensus among the parties.2 With the help o the ICG, the current negotiations between the

government and the MILF show promise or moving orward more eciently and to deliver more

sustainable results than the previous rounds.

The International Contact Group in the Philippines The agreement on the participation o the ICG was signed by the Peace Panel Chairmen, Raael

E. Seguis or the government and Mohagher Iqbal or the MILF, as well as the Malaysian Govern-

ment Facilitator, Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak, on September 15, 2009. Ater the breakdown

o the peace talks in 2008, MILF Chairman Alhaj Murad Ebrahim had declared the need or an

“international guarantee rom states or association o nations” as one o the conditions or the

resumption o the peace talks in order to overcome the trauma o the “botched” MOA-AD.3 The

agreement establishes the ICG as an ad hoc and issue specifc instrument with the mandate to

attend and observe the negotiations, visit and advise the parties to conict (potentially with the

assistance o recognized experts), and meet with the parties upon request to resolve outstanding

issues.4 The consultation o the ICG is coordinated through the Malaysian acilitator. The agreement

urther expresses a preerence or the inclusion o countries rom the Organization o Islamic

Conerence (OIC) and the European Union (EU), and accredited INGOs as agreed upon and invited

by the parties in consultation with the acilitator. So ar, the parties to the conict have invited

representatives o the United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan and Saudi Arabia to join the process, as well

as representatives o The Asia Foundation (an INGO active primarily in the Asia-Pacifc region),

the Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue (an organization conducting mediations and mediation

support), Conciliation Resources (an INGO ocused on local peacebuilding), and Muhammadiyah

(an international Islamic NGO), based on their previous activities in the country. The INGOs in

particular along with their local NGO partners are expected to act as a bridge between the peace

process and local civil society.

Why INGOs? The creation o the ICG is a direct result o the engagement o a number o local and international

NGOs with civil society in the Philippines. The Philippines provide a distinct environment or local

as well as international nongovernmental organizations because o the extensive access they have

carved or themselves in conict management. For example, in the early 1990s, a systematic grass-

roots consultation undertaken by the then administration o Fidel Ramos was intended to arrive

at representative positions on all ongoing peace negotiations in the country. It signaled to NGOs

especially the need or increased dialogue not only between the government and the rebel groups

but also with civil society.5 Since then, an ever increasing number o NGOs, and eventually INGOs,

have become involved in dierent conict management activities. This has enhanced a “culture o

consultation” that now penetrates even the level o policy elites and ocials in the government and

the insurgent groups. In this context, the United States Institute o Peace (USIP) was involved in the

Philippines through its Philippine Facilitation Project (PFP), which ran between 2003 and 2007.6

The number o local civil society organizations and particularly NGOs in the Philippines engag-

ing in conict-related activities is uncountable. Although their engagement is estimated to have

had little eect on the ocial peace talks, their inuence on the broader peace process, however,

has been signifcant.7 Civil society organizations have repeatedly maintained pressure on the




parties, especially when the peace talks were stalled or temporarily discontinued. Particularly

during these stages, civil society was deeply involved in ceasefre and human rights monitoring,

in an attempt to minimize the repercussions o violent conict on the civilian population and to

sustain pressure on the parties to conict to work towards a peaceul resolution. For instance,

Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) combine a representative o the local government unit, one rom

the MILF, two NGO representatives (one nominated by the government, one nominated by the

MILF), and a religious leader mutually agreed upon by both parties.8 They monitor the ceasefre

arrangements o the 2001 peace agreement at the provincial level. Bantay Ceasefre—a network

o civilian volunteers who monitor and report ceasefre violations—joined this eort in 2003.

However, unlike the LMTs, the purely civilian Bantay Ceasefre has no constraints in making their

fndings publicly available. In the most recent example, the government and the MILF agreed

in May 2010 to an addition to the International Monitoring Team (IMT), initially composed o

Malaysia, Brunei, Libya and Japan, by including a Civilian Protection Component (CPC). 9 The CPC

consists o civil society organizations which have been charged with monitoring the saety and

security o civilian communities in conict areas as well as the commitments o the parties to

conict under international humanitarian and human rights law.

International NGOs, meanwhile, have attempted to push the peace process and generate

avenues out o deadlocks. For instance between 2005 and 2007, Conciliation Resources (CR)

has held talks between the Oce o the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process (OPAPP) and the

negotiation panel o the MILF, particularly on the reraming o issues. In July and October 2009,

CR organized visits o representatives o the MILF and OPAPP to Belast and London to exchange

experiences with individuals involved in the peace process in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the

Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue, in 2008, introduced constitutional and international law experts

to the peace process ater the temporary restraining order halted the signing o the MOA-AD to

assist in managing this legal crisis. It also organized a visit o two senior negotiators in the North-

ern Ireland talks and other experts with experiences in peace processes to the Philippines to help

in fnding a way out o deadlock.10 Geneva Call has engaged the MILF with regard to their use o

anti-personnel landmines. As a result, the MILF signed a Deed o Commitment in March 2000 ban-

ning the use o landmines as a weapon o combat and committing itsel to the provisions o the

Geneva Conventions.11 Finally, International Alert has supported the Philippine Business or Social

Progress to work on the private sector’s role in conict management, and The Asia Foundation has

supported academic institutions and NGOs throughout Mindanao to create options or a political

resolution o the conicts.12

The practical engagement o many local and international NGOs in the Philippines has enabled

civil society organizations to gather a degree o respectability that allows them to make a direct

contribution to the peace process. Particularly their work as watchdogs over ceasefre and peace

agreements between the government o the Philippines and the MILF has contributed greatly to

mitigating numerous situations.13 The involvement o organizations such as Bantay Ceasefre in

examining accusations o ceasefre violations has increased the ow o inormation between the

parties to the conict. Moreover, the ability o many civil society organizations to maintain a bal-

anced position in the conict and to present perspectives oten independent rom the dominating

religious and geographic ault lines has placed NGOs as a source o inormation unbeholden to

either the government’s or the MILF’s interests. In this way, NGOs have helped to minimize misun-

derstandings between the parties to conict and to prevent escalations. Their constant pressure

on both the government and the MILF in support o a peaceul solution to the conict and arguing

the utility o military solutions has pushed both sides repeatedly towards negotiations. Their

ormalized inclusion into the peace process in the orm o the International Contact Group is the

current culmination o their commitment.




Implications The degree o NGO involvement in the Philippines reects a culture o widespread civil society

engagement in conict management that is unique in many respects. The number o NGOs in the

country as well as their incorporation into the peace process by the government and the MILF are

unusual. This is true or local as well as international nongovernmental organizations. However,

the impact o these organizations through their involvement in the International Contact Group

is substantial. The ormal participation o INGOs along with their named local NGO partners in the

ICG allows or the inclusion o perspectives that reect broader issues than those o the two parties

to conict alone. Thereby, a process aected by distrust and strategic maneuvering ater the ailure

o the MOA-AD can be brought into ocus by introducing new perspectives on ways orward.

Through consultations with both parties, INGOs are able to express opinions, make recommenda-

tions, and oer eedback on concrete proposals. They contribute knowledge on the demands

rom civil society rom their in-country work with their local partners, insights into the interests o

other stakeholders (such as elected landowners aected by a prospective agreement on ancestral

domain), legal advice rom experts (or instance on the constitutionality o an agreement), as well

as experience and networks rom other countries that may beneft ecient problem-solving. The

process thus becomes more rooted in society and more ocused on the underlying causes o the

conict and obstacles to peace rather than on the short-term interests o the parties to conict,

which increases the process’ legitimacy, its sustainability and its eciency.

Ater the frst round o negotiations in February 2011, which resulted in a renewed mandate

rom the parties or the International Monitoring Team, the parties agreed to “ast track the peace

process”.14 While it is near impossible to ascertain how oten the ICG is being consulted by the

parties to conict due to the need or confdentiality during the negotiation process and to what

extent its recommendations enter the process, its existence and the possibilities it oers to relieve

a potential deadlock may make a decisive dierence in the negotiations. Generally, the eects o

the International Contact Group in the peace process appear to be conducive to an imminent end

o the conict, but these eects must be traced careully.

Endnotes1. The Autonomous Region o Muslim Mindanao covers the country’s predominantly Muslim

provinces on the Mindanao mainland and the Sulu Archipelago (Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Magu-

indanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Marawi). The frst elections on September 9, 1996 established Nur

Misuari as Regional Governor. Ater the Supreme Court entered the temporary restraining order,

the Memorandum o Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was later declared unconsti-

tutional on October 14, 2008 on the grounds that the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

would have required amending the 1987 Constitution. GMANEWS.TV (2008), “SC justice cites MoA

provisions ‘unconstitutional’”, GMA News, at http://www.gmanews.tv/story/114115/SC-justice-cites-

MoA-provisions-unconstitutional (accessed on June 1, 2010).

2. Framework Agreement on the Formation o the International Contact Group or the GRP-MILF

Peace Process (September 15, 2009), Section 1.

3. Edwin Fernandez. “MILF sets terms or resumption o talks,” Inquirer.net, December 30, 2008,

at http://newsino.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20081230-180653/MILF-sets-terms-or-

resumption-o-talks (accessed on March 9, 2011).


USIP provides the analysis, training andtools that prevent and end conicts,promotes stability and professionalizesthe eld of peacebuilding.

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4. Framework Agreement on the Formation o the International Contact Group or the GRP-MILF

Peace Process (September 15, 2009), op. Cit., Section 3.

5. Steven Rood. “Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role o Civil Society”, Policy Studies

17, Washington: East-West Center, 2005, p.22.

6. See G. Eugene Martin and Astrid S. Tuminez. “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines. A

Summary and Assessment o the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003–2007”, Special Report 202,

2008, at http://www.usip.org/fles/resources/sr202.pd (accessed on April 4, 2011). Most recently,

USIP co-organized an International Islamic Peace Education Workshop in Davao City in July 2010.

7. Steven Rood, op. Cit., 2005, p. 27.

8. The Local Monitoring Teams were established by the 2001 Tripoli Agreement o Peace.

9. These our countries monitor the security and socioeconomic agreements between the govern-

ment and the MILF.

10. Among them are Jonathan Powell (Chie o Sta to ormer Prime Minister Tony Blair), Gerry

Kelly (member o Sinn Fein and currently Member o the Northern Ireland Assembly), Dr. Ali Ahmed

Sabiel (ormer adviser to the government o Sudan during the peace negotiations on South Sudan),

Nyasha Masiwa (ormer liberation fghter rom Zimbabwe, adviser to the Sudan People’s Liberation

Army), Kelvin Ong (head o the United Nations Mediation Support Unit), and Ambassador Francesc

Vendrell (ormer United Nations Secretary-General’s Personal Representative and European Special

Representative).

11. The MILF rearmed its obligations under the Deed in 2002. Geneva Call was able to conduct a

verifcation mission in November 2009.

12. Steven Rood. op. Cit., 2005, p. 15-16.

13. One example among many is the most recent involvement o the international NGO Geneva

Call in 2008. During an upsurge in the conict, new allegations o landmine use were made by the

government o the Philippines against the MILF. A verifcation mission by Geneva Call—supported

by Eric David, an International Law Proessor at Brussels University and member o the International

Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, and Phil Halord, a mines specialist rom the Mines Advisory

Group—was carried out in November 2009 to shed light on the events. Although the time lapse

between the accusations and the mission made verifcation more dicult, independent reports

rom David and Halord prevented urther politicized speculation on the incidents.

14. Maria Patrikainen.“MILF Agree to Fast-Track Peace Process Ater Successul Meeting,”Global

Insight, February 11, 2011.

about tHis brief

The MILF stands for a radicalIslamic revivalist viewpoint andseeks self-determination for thetraditionally Muslim Bangsamoropeople in the southern parts of thePhilippines. The MILF was foundedafter its split from the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF)in 1977. Negotiations between thegovernment of the Philippines andthe MILF began in January 1997but have been interrupted repeat-edly. This Peace Brief seeks toshed light on the recent approachthe parties to conict have chosento overcome the difculties thathave foiled peace negotiations inthe past.

The author, Claudia Hofmann, is aJennings Randolph TAPIR fellowat the United States Instituteof Peace (USIP). This work wassupported by a fellowship of theGerman Academic ExchangeService (DAAD).

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Peace Negotiations