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Los Angeles Department of Water and PowerCraig A. Davis, Ph.D., PE, GE
Water System Resilience Program Manager
Palm Springs, California
Southern California Earthquake Center 2015 Annual Meeting
September 15, 2015
Managing Earthquake Hazards and Risks to Implement an Infrastructure
Resilience Program
Resilience by Design
• Mayor Garcetti
• Dr. Lucy Jones, USGS• Mayor’s Science Advisor for Seismic
Safety
• Address vulnerabilities in• Old buildings• Water System• Telecommunications
• Announced December 8, 2014
Water System Resilience Program
• LADWP Summary Report • Water System Seismic Resilience and Sustainability
Program• Comprehensively integrates into all aspects of water
system business• Continuous improvement building upon 100 years of
effort
• Resilience by Design - Fortify Our Water System• Water for fire fighters, protect against cascading fire hazards
• Protected fault crossings for the aqueducts• Less dependence on imported water• Seismic resistant pipes• Resilience By Design Program
http://www.lamayor.org/earthquake
Managing Earthquake Hazards and Risks to Implement an Infrastructure Resilience Program
• Utilize the LA Water System as an example infrastructure system
• Outline the resilience program
• Highlight some aspects pertinent to SCEC
• Overview the seismic hazards and risks
• Explain the challenges
• Challenge scientists to develop new tools useful for resilience program management
Presentation Contents
LADWP Water System
5
LADWP largest Municipal Utility
in USA
Founded 1902
Serves 3.9-million people
1214 km2 (465-square mile)
service area
678 billion liter (179 billion
gallon) annual water sales
Sources of Water Supply
L.A. Aqueducts (Eastern Sierra)---- 37%
Local Wells (L.A. River Area)---- 11%
Metropolitan Water District---- 51%
Bay Delta 41% Colorado River 8%
Recycled Water --- 1%
(5-year average, 2008-2013)
6
Resilience and Sustainability
Seismic resiliency and sustainability are achievable when the Water System:
• Has the systemic ability to provide waterservices in a manner allowing the community to effectively respond to earthquake events, recover quickly from them, and adapt to changing conditions, while also taking measures to reduce future seismic risks, and
• Is prepared to manage all threatening seismic hazards in a manner that minimizes and contains the hazard impactswhile continuing a comprehensive approach to natural resource conservation and maintaining environmental quality.
Water System Community
ShakeOut Scenario: gross loss in output from water
alone is sufficient to drive the region into a recession.
Water System Resilience
• A resilient water system is designed and constructed to accommodate earthquake damage with ability to continue providing services or limit service outage times tolerable for community recovery efforts.
• We cannot prevent damage! This is too costly & takes too long
• We must modify the system to provide water to the community when they need it. Which requires knowledge of:• Water needs over the recovery time• Seismic hazards and potential impacts
• Resilience Management requires new tools to handle large and complicated geographically distributed systems exposed to many different seismic hazards posing different risks to the loss of services and ability to restore them following an earthquake
WATER SUBSYSTEMS
Subsystems Description
Raw Water
Supply Systems
Systems providing raw water for local storage or
treatment including local catchment, groundwater, rivers,
natural and manmade lakes and reservoirs, aqueducts.
Treatment
Systems
Systems for treating and disinfecting water to make it
potable for safe use by customers.
Transmission
Systems
Systems for conveying raw or treated water. Raw water
transmission systems convey water from a local supply or
storage source to a treatment point. Treated water
transmission systems, often referred to as trunk line
systems, convey water from a treatment or potable storage
point to a distribution area.
Distribution
Systems
Networks for distributing water to domestic, commercial,
business, industrial, and other customers.
Water System is made up of multiple subsystems having their own characteristics
Each subsystem is critical to providing services
WATER SYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORIES
Service Categories Description
Water Delivery Able to distribute water to customers, but the water delivered
may not meet water quality standards (requires water
purification notice), pre-disaster volumes (requires water
rationing), fire flow requirements (impacting fire fighting
capabilities), or pre-disaster functionality (inhibiting system
operations).
Quality Water to customers meets health standards (water
purification notices removed). This includes minimum
pressure requirements.
Quantity Water flow to customers meets pre-event volumes (water
rationing removed).
Fire Protection Able to provide pressure and flow of suitable magnitude and
duration to fight fires.
Functionality The system functions are performed at pre-event reliability,
including pressure (operational constraints resulting from the
disaster have been removed/resolved).
Water System resilience is dependent upon the amount of service losses suffered and time to reestablish
Does water come out of tap?
Is it safe to Drink?
Can you get the amount you need?
Does Fire Dept. get what they need?
Is the water system in working order?
Los AngelesLos Angeles
Los AngelesLos Angeles
AqueductsAqueducts
CaliforniaCalifornia
AqueductsAqueducts
Colorado R. Colorado R.
AqueductAqueductElizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel
LOS ANGELES WATER RESTORATION EXAMPLES
• 1994 Northridge Earthquake
• Magnitude 6.7
• Purpose: show water service restoration multidimensional aspects using actual case earthquake
• 2008 ShakeOut Scenario• Magnitude 7.8 San Andreas Fault
• Purpose: show application in a pre-earthquake evaluation
1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE, L.A.EXAMPLE WATER RESTORATIONS
Los AngelesLos Angeles
Los AngelesLos Angeles
AqueductsAqueducts
CaliforniaCalifornia
AqueductsAqueducts
Colorado R. Colorado R.
AqueductAqueductElizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel
SAN ANDREAS FAULT EARTHQUAKE, L.A.EXAMPLE WATER RESTORATIONS
0
20
40
60
80
100
-1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Lo
s A
ng
eles
Wa
ter
Ser
vic
e (%
)
Time (months)
Sh
akeO
ut
Sce
nar
io E
ven
t
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
50% Rationing (3 months)
30% Rationing (11 months)
A. Immediately after event
B. 1-day after event, decline from pipe leaks
C. 2-days after event, open emergency storage reservoirs
D. Flow declines for 1-week due to pipe leaks and fire fighting demand
E. 1 to 4-weeks: improved from pipe repairs and ground water pumping
F. 1-month: Regional supplies are delivered
G. 4-months: California Aqueduct West Branch returned to service
H. 15-months: Colorado RiverAqueduct returned to service
I. 18-months: Los Angeles Aqueducts returned to service
Normal Service LevelI
Delivery Fire
Quality
Quantity
t0
Functionality
Seismic Hazards
• Ground Shaking
• Surface Fault Rupture
• Liquefaction
• Landslides
• Other ground failures
Earthquake Faults• 20+ active surface faults
in LA• Numerous additional
blind faults• Several areas of
significant threat to transmission pipe
• All threaten distribution pipe
Earthquake FaultsLos Angeles Aqueducts
Los Angeles
Aqueducts
Garlock
Fault
San Andreas Fault
Sierra Nevada Fault
San Gabriel Fault
Los
Angeles
Liquefaction Potential
• Large areas of LA have potential for soil liquefaction during shaking
• Liquefaction can cause large ground movements and severe pipe damage
• Combination of ground shaking, surface fault rupture, and liquefaction can result in significant LA Water System disruptions.
Granada Trunk Line, Van Norman Complex -1971
Landslides
Nimes Road Landslide – Bel AirAsilomar Landslide -Pacific Palisades
Landslide
Pipe
Landslide
Pipe
Protect Water Supply (Aqueducts & Dams)
Los AngelesLos Angeles
Los AngelesLos Angeles
AqueductsAqueducts
CaliforniaCalifornia
AqueductsAqueducts
Colorado R. Colorado R.
AqueductAqueductElizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel
~88% of LA’s water crosses the San Andreas Fault
Aqueducts Importing Water
• All major aqueducts cross the San Andreas Fault
• Water Supply Task Force• Los Angeles Department of Water and Power• Metropolitan Water District of Southern California• California Department of Water Resources
• Post-event coordinated response and restoration
• Evaluate and mitigate aqueducts• Individually• As a regional system
• Unlikely to develop or afford strategies to withstand all potential San Andreas fault scenarios
Spatially Distributed Hazards & Systems• Technologies exist to assess different hazards at a location
• It is difficult to reliably assess spatial impacts of the same hazard (e.g. fault rupture)
• Critical facilities commonly designed for rare hazard levels (e.g., max. fault movement, 2475 year ground motion)
• Will not see the rare hazard level at all locations in a system
• How do we assess fault movements at the SAF aqueduct crossings when linking them as a regional system?
• How do we evaluate other hazards (ground shaking, landslides, liquefaction, lateral spreading) along the aqueducts with same confidence as the designated fault rupture?
• Resilience also requires us to consider what happens when the extremely rare, but physically possible, hazard occurs
• e.g. SAF rupturing all aqueducts in a single event
• Science and engineering may find it to be beyond design level, but society finds it unacceptable if critical infrastructure lost beyond tolerable durations (e.g. 1000 yr return of 2011 Tohoku tsunami)
Los AngelesLos Angeles
Los AngelesLos Angeles
AqueductsAqueducts
CaliforniaCalifornia
AqueductsAqueducts
Colorado R. Colorado R.
AqueductAqueductElizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel
Los Angeles Aqueduct SupplySan Andreas Fault Crossing
Los AngelesLos Angeles
Los AngelesLos Angeles
AqueductsAqueducts
CaliforniaCalifornia
AqueductsAqueducts
Colorado R. Colorado R.
AqueductAqueductElizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel
Elizabeth Tunnel
W = 9.5’
Slip:
3.5 m =
11.5’
Los Angeles Aqueduct Elizabeth Lake Tunnel
Real Time Monitoring & HDPE Pipe Installation
GPS & Seismographs
each side SAF
Real-time information
CISN Display
Rapid assessment of
water supply damage
(near-real-time
intelligence)
Enhances regional
seismic monitoring
Elizabeth Tunnel
Instruments
Los Angeles Aqueduct Elizabeth Lake TunnelHDPE Pipe Installation
• HDPE Pipe to allow water flow after fault rupture in event of low probability small rupture at this location
HDPE Pipe
Elizabeth Tunnel
Short-term risk reduction
Investigating Engineering Solutions for Maximum Expected Movements
• Requires extensive investigations
• Expensive solutions
• May take a long-time to implement
• Need to consider as part of larger system with California Aqueduct and CRA• Especially if funds unavailable
to implement LAA mitigations
Seismic Resilient Pipe Network• Long term goal is to replace all pipes
in the City with seismic resistant pipes
• Begin with most strategic locations
• Develop funding/implementation plan
Tsunami erosion
Landslide from Monsoon
LA Seismic Improvement
Seismic Resilient Pipe Network• Seismic Resilient Network
• Designed and constructed to accommodate damage with ability to continue providing water or limit water outage times tolerable to community recovery efforts
• Identify Seismic Resistant Pipes
• Identify Seismic Hazard Areas
• Water System Resilient Strategies• Prevent damage• Post-event pipe repair, limit damage level• Redundancy• Isolation
• Responsibility to Community Resilience• Provide water to critical areas when needed by community for disaster
recovery
• Assess hazards with uniform confidence
Critical Facilities
• Earthquake hazards can damage pipes and cut off water to facilities critical for community recovery
• Need resilient back-bone network capable of withstanding damage so water can be provided soon after earthquake• Hospitals• Emergency Shelters• Firefighting• Etc.
Seismic Resilience and Retrofit Strategy Example
• 9.3 km2 (3.6 mi2) area in San Fernando Valley
• Pipes damaged in 1994 Earthquake
• Ground failure area
• 72,000 m (236,054 ft) of distribution pipe• Diameters range from 51 to 510 mm (2” to 20”)
• Hospital
• Residential
• Commercial
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Dist Pipes2468121616+
Pilot Area
$ Breaks
# LeaksStreets
0 1000 Feet
N
Roscoe Blvd. Area
Size Length(inch) (ft)
2 1635
4 119726 810268 94568
12 3409716 929220 3464
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Dist Pipes2468121616+
Pilot Area
$ Breaks
# LeaksStreets
0 1000 Feet
N
Roscoe Blvd. Area
Size Length(inch) (ft)
2 1635
4 119726 810268 94568
12 3409716 929220 3464
1994 Ground Failure Region
Re
se
da
Blv
d
Rosoe Blvd.
Seismic Pipe Improvement Concept
Northridge Hospital
Reseda Blvd. Pilot Project
Not all 1994 leaks would have been prevented, but regional reliability increased and damaged can be isolated (with installed valves) to limit service outages
Quantifying Hazards over Large Spatially Distributed Systems• The problem is how to quantify the different hazards(e.g.,
liquefaction, landslide, faulting, ground shaking) that threaten large spatially distributed systems.• People and organizations assess different hazards inconsistently
(varying confidence between locations and hazards)
• Tools, guidance documents, and standards are needed to uniformly incorporate the different hazards across these systems.
• Need deformation maps for the hazards to design pipeline systems• Faulting• Lateral spreading
• Guidance on failure of young weak soils, especially in areas not designated as potentially liquefiable
Example Water Transmission PipeGeotechnical Hazards• Transient motion
• weak soil
• firm soil
• rock
• Permanent movement• Fault movement (2)
• Different return periods
• Slope movement (2)
• Different FS
• Lateral spreading
• Shear deformation in clay
Reservoir
Transmission pipe
F a u l t 1
River
L a t e
r a l s
p r e a
d i n g
F a u l t 2
Mountains
L a n d s l i d e 1
L a n d s l i d e 2
clay
sand
System of Hazards impacting an infrastructure system
Example Water System
Water Supply & Distribution• Hospitals
• Schools
• Parks and recreation
• Residential neighborhoods
• Business districts
• Financial• Community• National & international
• Civic Centers (EOC, police, fire)
• Industrial• Hazardous & non-hazardous
• Airport
• etc.
raw water storageraw water storage
Water Treatment Plant
Hospital Complex Potable Water Tank
residential neighborhood
Park and open spacerecreational area
community banking andbusiness district
complex of major national andinternational financialinstitutions
Civic Center Complex:Emergency Operations Center,Police, Fire, City Hall
Major International Airport
Industrial Complex (hazardouschemicals and explosive mtls.)
Industrial Complex withnonhazardous mixed use
School
System of Hazards and infrastructure impacting all urban systems
ASSESSING GEOTECHNICAL EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS FOR WATER LIFELINE SYSTEMS WITH UNIFORM CONFIDENCE
Method proposed
American Lifelines Alliance (ALA), 2005 “Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines.”
www.americanlifelinesalliance.com
Davis, 2008, “Assessing Geotechnical Earthquake Hazards for Water Lifeline Systems with Uniform Confidence,” ASCE Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soil Dynamics IV, May 18-22, 2008, Sacramento, CA, paper 4291.
Much work to be done!
Fire Fighting Water Supply
• Work with Fire Department • Fire hazard areas
• Alternate water sources
• Distances they can relay water with their equipment
• Earthquake Resistant pipe grid, as part of earthquake resilient pipe network
• Use reclaimed water network to help fight fires• Use earthquake resistant pipes
Plan to Improve the Water System for Managing the Fire Following Earthquake Risks
I. A long-term plan for developing a resilient water system for firefighting.
II. An emergency firefighting water supply plan.
Water Service Loss from ShakeOut Scenario
• Could have significant losses if ignitions lead to conflagrations in water outage areas
• ShakeOut Scenario predicts significant social impacts from FFE
• Goal: keep water loss from creating a catastrophe and economic recession/depression
0 hours 24 hours
FFE Planning
FFE Risk Assessment• Hazard Assessment
• Building damage• Natural Gas System• Electric Power System• Flammable products, etc.• Urban-wildland interface• Wind
• Vulnerability Assessment• Earthquake effects on water system hydraulics and ability to meet
fire protection services
• Consequence Assessment• Critical facilities and locations• Emergency refuge and operation centers• High potential for loss of life• Economic, financial, political centers• Dangerous chemicals and fuels
System of Hazards impacting multiple infrastructure networks influencing cascading hazards effecting other urban systems
Summary – Science needed to Improve Infrastructure Resilience• Create/improve tools useful for infrastructure resilience
• Need method to assess fault movements at locations when the criticality of the infrastructure crossing is linked to other infrastructures crossing same fault at different locations.
• Need method(s) to assess hazards (ground shaking, landslides, liquefaction, lateral spreading) with uniform confidence
• Need ground deformation maps for multiple hazard types (fault, lateral spread, …)
• Tools to help assess geo-hazard impacts to multiple parts of several lifeline systems influencing cascading hazards (e.g. FFE)
• Need improved monitoring at critical infrastructure
Summary – Science needed to Improve Infrastructure Resilience• Need better collaboration between earth scientists
and infrastructure owners and operators• Strategic partnerships• Special fault studies• Special projects involving all geotechnical hazards
• Special fault studies:• North San Fernando Valley – Newhall Pass region
• Van Norman Complex critical for So. Cal Water supply and other lifelines
• East end of Ventura Basin
• San Andreas Fault in Palmdale area – Critical for water supply and other lifelines and 3 other major passes
SCEC Challenge
• Provide Earth Science applicable to topics identified in previous slides
• Identify additional needs to improve infrastructure resilience
Questions?
