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This Report has been prepared forthe exclusWe use of the Bank
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
RESTRICTEDPCR: BAN 21177
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
OF THE
MEGHNA-DHONAGODA IRRIGATION PROJECT
[Loans No. 333-BAN (SF) and No. 883-BAN (SF)j
BANGLADESH
½
March 1990
BADCBPDBBRDBBTTBBWDBC IPDABDEMDOFEAFDRHYVIRDPIDCCMD IPMIWDFCMOFPCCSSASPWAPDA
CURRENCY EQUIVALENT
Currency Unit = Taka (Tk)
Loan Number
Appraisal
Project Completion
333-BAN ( SF)
$ 1.00 = Tk 15.25
$ 1.00 = Tk 32.925(November 1977)
Tk 1.00 = $ 0.0656
Tk 1.00 = $ 0.030
883-BAN(SF)
$ 1.00 = Tk 31.06
$ 1.00 = Tk 32.925(January 1988)
Tk 1.00 = $ 0.032
Tk 1.00 = $ 0.030
The Bangladesh taka is pegged to a basket of six currencies with the U.Sdollar as the intervention currency.
ABBREVIATIONS
Bangladesh Agricultural Development CorporationBangladesh Power Development BoardBangladesh Rural Development BoardBangladesh Telegraph and Telephone BoardBangladesh Water Development BoardChandpur Irrigation ProjectDepartment of Agricultural ExtensionDirectorate of Extension and ManagementDirectorate of FisheriesExecuting AgencyFlood Damage RehabilitationHigh Yielding VarietyIntegrated Rural Development ProgramInter-Departmental Coordination CommitteeMeghna-Dhonagoda Irrigation Proj ectMinistry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood ControlMinistry of FoodProject Coordination CommitteeSpecial SuppLiementary Assistance for Selected ProjectsWater and Power Development Authority
GLOSSARY
Aman - Main rice crop, generally planted before or during themonsoon season (Kharif II).Broadcasted Aman (B. Aman) - direct-seeded normally in Marchand harvested in October.Transplanted Asian (T. Asian) - planted in June-August andharvested in November-January.
Aus - Pre-monsoon (Kharif I) rice crop generally planted in March-May and harvested in June-August. It is grown both as adirect-seeded and as a transplanted crop.
Boro - Winter (Rabi) rice crop, generally transplanted in December-January and harvested in April-May.
Upazilla - Basic administrative unit in Bangladesh, formerly known as"Thana".
Union - Unit of local self-government
NOTES
(i) In this report, $ refers to U.S. dollars.(ii) The Fiscal Year (FY) of the Government ends on 30 June.
PCR:BAN 064
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
OF ThE
MEGHNA-DHONAGODA IRRIGATION PROJECT
[LOANS NO. 333-BAN(SF) AND NO. 883-BAN(SF)]
IN
BANGLADESH
Note: This report was prepared by a Bank Mission comprising Y. Kobayashi(Project Engineer/Mission Leader), R.C. Lazaro (Water ManagementSpecialist/Consultant) and E. Ronas (Loan Administration Clerk).The Mission visited the Project during the period 26 October -10 November 1989.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
MAP (ii)
BASIC DATA
(iii)I
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A. Objectives, Rationale and Scope 1B. Implementation Arrangements 2
II. PROJECT HISTORY
A. Processing 3B. Implementation 3
III. EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
A. Project Components 5B. Project Cost and Actual Expenditures 10C. Engagement of Consultants and Procurement of
Goods and Services 10D. Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers 11E. Loan Disbursements 11F. Project Schedule 12G. Conditions and Loan Covenants 12H. Environmental Impact
13I. Project Benefits 13J. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency 14K. Performance of the Bank
14
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions 15B. Recommendations 15
APPENDIXES 18
(ii)
'5:.BANG LAD ESH
I-
MEGHNA DHONAGODA IRRIGATION PROJECT
YKallpur Muktarkandi Nabipui\Chandrakandi
KhaguriI
•_••_Galimkhan
\ singPur
---.'-j - \JThur9aPu
\ I Sujatpur
/
/
Rasulpur
Scale 1' 63400 M lies
Shibpur
Charpathalia
Baralakshmipur
I('Satnal'\
/
\ 'L
I'Ifl--II'-'fr-II
1I
I
% Mohanpur
'I \
Ekiaspur \\
Chengar Ghar
\
\\\
Dubgi
\ ,.\•,/
,
\\
Aroed Enbk't.
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çk
I' •• BANGLADESH
••-.i-• I..7
r
'-
MghnOHAKA RIi,.r
PROJECAREA I:
- / / c ThetaliaI ,/ \( (uami 'r -
I. .1,1kandi /1 MatlabBazar Sub-Station
/
/ LEGEND:/ ___ Road
\ - - - Drainage Canal•s . / Irrigation Canal/ Embankment
-. Transmission LineRiver
/Pumping Station (Primary)Pumping Station (Secondary)
/,
A. Loan Identification
1. Country
2. Loan No.
3. Project Title
4. Borrower
5. Executing Agency
6. Amount of Loan
(iii)
BASIC DATA
Bangladesh
333-BAN(SF) and 883-BAN(SF)
Meghna-Dhonagoda Irrigation Project
People's Republic of Bangladesh
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB)
Loan No. 333 Loan No. 883(Original) (Supplementary)
$24.0 million SDR 5.9 million$2.5 million (SSASP) equivalent to $8.4under Loan 626-BAN(SF)i/ million at exchange
rate prevailing inAppraisal January1988.
B. Loan Data
1. Appraisal
Date StartedDate Completed
2. Loan Negotiations
Date StartedDate Completed
3. Date of Board Approval
4. Date of Loan Agreement
5. Date of Loan Effectiveness
In Loan AgreementActualNo. of Extensions
Loan No. 333(Original)
29 Aug 197716 Sep 1977
10 Nov 197711 Nov 1977
15 Dec 1977
19 Dec 1977
19 Mar 197830 Mar 1978
1
Loan No. 883Supplementary)
3 Oct 198715 Oct 1987
5 Jan 19886 Jan 1988
4 Feb 1988
17 Feb 1988
16 May 198828 Mar 1988
None
1/ The Special Supplementary Assistance for Selected Projects (SSASP) inBangladesh was provided to finance the shortfall in local costexpenditures. MDIP was qualified as one of the five projects selected.
(iv)
Loan No. 333(Original)
6. Cisoing Date
In Loan Agreement : 31 Dec 1984Actual 30 Jun 1989No. of Extensions : 4
7. Terms of Loan
Service Charge : 1% per annumMaturity (no. of years) :
40 (includinggrace period)
Grace Period(no. of years) : 10
8. Disbursements
Date of Initial Disb. : 10 May 1979Date of Final Disb. : 17 Jan 1990Amount Disbursed $23,968,260.83Amount Cancelled : $31,739.17
Loan No. 883Supplementary)
30 Jun 198930 Jun 1989
1% per annum40 (includinggrace period)
10
25 Apr 198822 Jan 1990$7,878,211.76$8,234.87
C. Project Data
Appraisal
Actual
1. Project Cost ($million)
MDIP (Original)
(a) Foreign Exchange Cost 16.500(b) Local Currency Cost : 29.500(c) Total Cost : 46.000
S SAS P
(a) Foreign Exchange Cost -(b) Local Currency Cost : 2.500(c) Total Cost : 2.500
NDIP (Supplementary)
(a) Foreign Exchange Cost 0.050(b) Local Currency Cost : 8.886(c) Total Cost : 8.936
10. 42533. 67944.104
2.5002.500
0.0 458.2178.262
2.5002.500
2.5002.500
0.536
0.3848.400 1/
7.8788.936 -
8.262
14,793 14,793
4,731 12,957
2,082 4,213
3,469 3,469
8,604 8,604
8,226
2,131
Cv)
Appraisal
Actual
2. Financing Plan ($ million)
MDIP (Original)
(a) Borrower Financed(b) Bank Financed(c) Total
S SAS P
(a) Borrower Financed(b) Bank FinancedCc) Total Cost
MDIP (Supplementary)
(a) Borrower Financed(b) Bank Financed(c) Total
22. 000
20. 136
24.000
23.968
46. 000
44. 104
3. Cost Breakdown by Project Components ($'OOO)
MDIP (Original)
1. Irrigation & RelatedCivil Works
2. Equipment & Materials3. Agricultural Development4. Consulting Services
and Training5. Administration6. Land Acquisition7. Contingency8. Recovery of Previous
Technical Assistance
TOThL
Appraisal EstimateFX LC Total
- 6,191 6,191
9,980 8,076 18,056
36 626 662
1,750 970 2,720- 1,513 1,513- 3,980 3,980
4,672 8,144 12,816
62 - 62
16,500 29,500 46,000
ActualFX LC Total
68 - 68
10,425 33,679 44,104
1/ Currently equivalent to $7.878 million.
(vi)
S SAS P
1. Civil Works (SSASP)
Appraisal Estimate
FX LC Total
- 2,500 2,500
Actual
FX LC Total
- 2,500 2,500
MDIP (Supplementary)
1. Civil Works Completion2. Flood Damage Repair3. Agricultural Development't. Commissioning5. Construction Supervision6. Service Charge During
Construction
TOTAL
Appraisal EstimateSFX LC Total
- 4,259 4,259- 2,456 2,456- 106 106- 1,448 1,448- 617 617
__ - 50
50 8,886 8,936
ActualFX LC Total
- 3,373 3,373- 2,547 2,547
- 1,553 1,553- 744 744
45 - 45
45 8,217 8,262
4. Project Schedule
(a) Date of Contract withConsultants
(b) Completion of EngineeringDesigns
(c) Civil Works Contract
- Date of Award- Completion of Work
(d) Equipment & Supplies
- First Procurement- Last Procurement
- Completion of EquipmentInstallation
Appraisal
Aug 1978
Jun 1979
Dec 1984
Jun 1979Dec 1980
Dec 1981
Actual
Mar 1979
Mar 1980
Jul 1980Jun 1988
Feb 1981May 1988
Aug 1987
5. Data on Bank Missions
Type ofMission Dates
Review 28 Jun-19 Jul 79
Review 11 - 22 May 80
SPA 3-llNov8O
Review 9 - 24 Jun 81
SPA 4-2ODec8l
SPA 5-9Feb82
No. of No. of No. ofProjects Persons Mandays
2 2 44
2 3 36
3 1 9
2 3 48
2 1 17
3 3 15
SPA
SPA
Review
Review
Review
Review
Review
Review
Review
Review
PCR
15 - 20 Jun 82
10 - 17 Oct 82
4 - 8 Feb 83
19 - 25 Nov 83
29 May-12 Jun 84
3 - 27 Jul 85
8 - 21 Feb 86
9 - 30 Nov 86
15 - 20 Jul 87
1 - 21 Jun 88
26 Oct - 10 Nov 89
1 2 12
6 1 8
1 1 5
1 2 14
5 2 30
2 1 25
2 1 14
3 3 66
1 2 12
3 2 42
1 3 48
(vii)
Specialization ofMembers
Economist, Engineer
Economist, EngineerAgronomist
Economist
Economist, EngineerPA Assistant
Economist
Economist,Mech. EngineerAgronomist
Economist,Mech. Engineer
Economist
Economist
Economist, Engineer
Economist, Engineer
Engineer
Engineer
Engineer, PA ClerkStaff Consultant
Engineer,PA Assistant
Sr. Project RgirrProject Engineer
Project EngineerPA ClerkStaff Consultant
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A. Objectives, Rationale and Scope
1. The Meghna-Dhonagoda Irrigation Project was formulated in line withthe Government's policy on water development as elaborated in the First Five YearPlan (FFYP, FY74-FY78). The Plan accorded high priority to: (i) implementationof quick-yielding irrigation projects, including low lift pump and tubewellschemes; (ii) continuation of ongoing medium and large flood control andirrigation projects; and (iii) initiation of new projects with medium gestationperiods, mainly combined irrigation and flood control schemes. The Project wastaken up as a new medium gestation project.
2. Attainment of the country's goals in the agriculture sector dependslargely on the development of water resources. During the rainy season, morethan one third of the arable lands are flooded every year to depths greater than1.0 m. On the other hand, during the dry season, most non-irrigated cultivatedlands suffer from droughts as well as uncertainties in timing of early monsoonrains. The introduction of a flood protection and irrigation development programwith adequate drainage facilities has been viewed as the only way to overcomethese problems. The Project's principal objectives were therefore framed asproviding flood control, irrigation and drainage, in order to: (i) increaseagricultural production by shifting cropping patterns to higher yieldingvarieties and expanding dry season crop production; (ii) create employmentopportunities; and (iii) improve the living conditions in the area.
3. The Project was designed to provide flood protection facilitiescovering a gross area of about 17,580 ha (see map on page (ii)). Some 13,760ha of this was to be served by a combined pump and gravity irrigation anddrainage systems. The major components of the Project consist of:
(1) flood control and irrigation related civil works -- 65 km ofenibankments, five pumping stations with two navigation locks, 75km of irrigation canals, 160 km of drainage canals, 70 km ofinspection and access roads, and 30 km of power transmission linesfor the pumping stations with telephone lines for communication;
(ii) agricultural development -- with a pilot scheme, training center,housing and associated facilities for demonstration purposes,seven market sheds, eight godowns for storage, fisherydevelopment, and extension services; and
(iii) provision of 190 man-months of consulting services for the• preparation of detailed design and supervision of Project
• implementation as well as overseas training for seven key Projecttechnical staff.
4. On completion of the Project facilities, the beneficiary farmers wereto intensify paddy production during the rainy season and extend the cultivationof paddy and other crops during the dry season. At full development, the Projectwas expected to contribute about 59,000 mt of paddy per year and provideemployment opportunities of 6.5 million man-days during the six-year constructionperiod and 5.2 million man-days annually after completion.
2
B. Implementation Arrangements
1. Executing Agency
5. The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), established in 1972under the administrative control of the Ministry of Power, Water Resources andFlood Control, 1/ was assigned the overall responsibility of implementing theProject as the Executing Agency. BWDB's responsibility included the carryingout of all civil works and the coordination of activities with other Governmentagencies, namely, the BPDB, BTTB, IRDP (now BRDB), BADC, DEM (now DAE), DOF, andthe Directorate (now Ministry) of Food. 2/
2. Coordination Committee
6. An Inter-Departmental Coordination Committee (IDCC) chaired by theSecretary of MIWDFC was to be established for smoother implementation of theProject. At the Project level, a Project Coordination Committee (PCC), whichwas to include representatives of Unions, 3/ was also to be established tocoordinate the activities under the Project and to guide the Project Office inimplementing the various project components.
3. Implementation Period
7. Implementation of the Project was estimated at six years. Theconstruction of embankment was expected to start in late 1978 and the entireProject works were to be completed by the end of 1983.
4. Consulting Services and Train
8. An experienced foreign consulting firm was to be engaged to assistthe Executing Agency and other agencies concerned in the detailed design andsupervision. Local consultants were to be employed by the Executing Agency tocarry out surveys, soil foundation investigations, and preliminary technicaldesigns prior to the arrival of the foreign consultants. The program foroverseas training was expected to be prepared and submitted to the Bank forreview and approval by mid-1978.
5. Operation and Maintenance
9. Operation and maintenance (O&M) of the completed Project facilities,i.e., embankment, pumping stations, and irrigation and drainage facilities up
1/ Now known as Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development(MIWDFC).
2/ BPDB: Bangladesh Power Development BoardBTTB: Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone BoardIRDP: Integrated Rural Development ProgramBRDB: Bangladesh Rural Development BoardBADC: Bangladesh Agricultural Development CorporationDEM : Directorate of Extension and ManagementDAE Department of Agricultural ExtensionDOF : Directorate of Fisheries
3/ Unit of local self-government.
and Flood Control
3
to the tertiary canals, as well as the replacement of pumps was to be theresponsibility of the Executing Agency. The beneficiary farmers were to beresponsible for the maintenance of the field channels, farm ditches and drains.The Project Office, with the assistance of the Consultants and other agenciesconcerned, were to prepare an O&M implementation plan for submission to andreview of the Bank by June 1982. The power transmission lines were to bemaintained by BPDB, and the telephone line by BTTB. The Ministry of Food wasto maintain the central godown while the feeder godowns and market facilitieswere to be handled by village cooperatives or rural institutions under theguidance and supervision of BRDB. Agricultural extension services and farmdemonstrations were to be provided by DAE; agricultural input distributionthrough BADC; and credit through BRDB. These institutions were to be suitablystrengthened on a priority basis.
II. PROJECT HISTORY
A. Processing
10. The Project was first identified in early 1973 by a Bank Fact-Finding-cum-Project Identification Mission. No follow-up action was, however, taken bythe Government until September 1975 when the Bank was finally requested toprovide technical assistance to update a feasibility study that had been carriedout for the Project by M/S Pakistan Techno-Consult under the then East PakistanWater and Power Development Authority in 1964 and submitted a report in 1967.A Bank Project Identification Mission visited Bangladesh in March 1976 and foundthat reformulation of the Project as designed in 1964 was necessary. A TA Fact-Finding Mission visited Bangladesh in July 1976 and the Bank approved a technicalassistance grant 1/ to the Government for the Project feasibility study inNovember 1976. A consulting firm (Chuo Kaihatsu Corporation, Japan) carriedout the study and submitted the feasibility report to the Bank in August 1977.A Bank Mission appraised the Project from 29 August to 16 September 1977 andfound the overall approach and findings in order. A loan from the Bank's ADFresources amounting to $24.0 million was approved on 15 December 1977 and becameeffective on 30 March 1978. Physical completion was targeted for the end of 1983and the expected closing date of the loan was set for 31 December 1984.
B. Implementation
11. Start of implementation was delayed by 1.5 years due to the laterecruitment of loan-financed consultants. Signing of the consultancy servicesoccurred only on 5 March 1979. The Consultants' inception report was completedthree months thereafter. Construction of the embankment started in February1980, and a design report was submitted in February 1981. As a result of theConsultants' detailed investigations, there were several significant changes inthe design of several Project components (see Appendix 1). These changes mainlyconcerned the alignment and dimensions of the embankment (see details in Appendix
1/ T.A. No. 182-BAN:Meghna-Dhonagoda Irrigation Project amounting to$180,000.
4
2), layout of the irrigation (see details in Appendix 3) and drainage network,elimination of the two navigation locks and the access roads, reduction in thenumber of secondary pumping stations, selection of the type of communicationsystem, and plans for agricultural and fishery development as well as theprovision of storage and market sheds. These changes were designed to improvethe Project services and to effect cost savings. Some of the changes, however,together with the difficulties encountered in the Project and underestimationof lands to be acquired, contributed to the Project's cost overrun.
12. In June/July 1983, a Review Mission visited Bangladesh and confirmedthat the Project was indeed facing funding difficulties as a result of costoverruns. These cost overruns were attributed to changes during the detaileddesign phase, currency fluctuations, and unforeseen remedial works required onsome Project facilities such as the foundation design for the pumping stationsand rebuilding part of the Meghna River side embankment. The Project alsoencountered shortages of local funds for land acquisition and civil worksconstruction. To remedy these problems, additional funding in the amount of $2.5million was included in Bank Loan No. 626-BAN(SF), Special SupplementaryAssistance to Selected Projects (SSASP), approved in May 1983.
13. Project construction advanced considerably in the 1983-1985. Theconsulting services were, however, terminated in June 1985 in accordance withthe amended contract, and a final report including significant information onthe Project construction activities and major findings and recommendation wasprepared and accordingly submitted to the Bank. The services of the consultantsresumed in April 1986 and were terminated in February 1987 after completion ofthe pumping stations. Further delays in Project implementation were againexperienced due to lack of local counterpart funds and inefficiencies of thecontractors involved in the construction of the pumping stations. As early asSeptember 1986, the Government requested the Bank's assistance to meet theProject's additional funding requirement. The Bank's position then was for theGovernment to finance the cost overrun. In April 1987 the same request forassistance was repeated by the Government. A Fact-Finding-cum-Review Missionvisited Bangladesh in June/July 1987 and concluded that a supplementary loan wasjustifiable.
14. The embankment was functioning effectively; water levels on the riverside of the embankment were about 2 m higher than those within the protectedProject area. Many farms were transplanting high-yielding varieties (HYVs) ofrice in areas not previously cultivated during the rainy season. The worstflooding in 30 to 40 years occurred in 28 August 1987. A section of thecompleted embankment along the Dhonagoda River side breached. Crops weredestroyed by floodwaters carrying silt and sand and parts of the irrigation anddrainage canals were silted up. The Bank's Appraisal Mission for thesupplementary loan request was in Bangladesh from 3 to 15 October 1987 and asupplementary loan of SDR 5.9 million ($8.4 million equivalent in 1987) wasapproved on February 1988 (Loan No. 883-BAN(SF)) to repair the damages and tofinish the construction of the Project works. The supplementing loan becameeffective on 28 March 1988. A revised completion date was set for 31 December1988 and both the original and supplementary loan closing dates were reset for30 June 1989.
15. In June 1988, at the completion of the major repairs caused by the1987 flood, the Project was declared complete. Yet another unprecedented flood
5
occurred in September 1988, resulting in further embankment breach in thevicinity of the first breach. In order to supplement the Flood RehabilitationProject Loan (Loan No. 882-BAN(SF)), which was appraised for the 1987 flood'sdamage rehabilitation works, a change in Project scope and reallocation of fundsunder Loans No. 467-BAN(SF) (Tubewell Project) and No. 593-BAN(SF) (BholaIrrigation Project) was approved by the Bank, to support flood damagerehabilitation of the Bank's projects affected by 1988 floods. An amount of $5.7million to cover the civil works portion for MDIP was provided under the TubewellProject Loan. Major repair works were immediately carried out by the ExecutingAgency. The Bank then considered the Project loan closed as of June 1989. APCR was prepared by the Executing Agency and was submitted to the Bank onSeptember 1989. At the time of the Bank's PCR Mission's visit in October!November 1989 the breached point had been repaired and other minor repair workson embankment protection and tertiary canal restoration financed from theTubewell Project Loan were ongoing with a target completion date set for December1991.
III. EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
A. Project Components
1. General
16. From the late 1960s, priority in water resources development inBangladesh was accorded to flood control and drainage. Both were considered themost essential requirement to increase agricultural production. Since the mid-1970s, a gradual shift towards irrigation for dry season crops took place. TheFFYP placed a high priority on MDIP. Achievements in the Second Five Year Plan(SFYP, FY81-FY85) showed that only about 10 per cent of the realized productionincreases were attributed to flood control and drainage, but that 21 per centwas attributable to irrigation. The Third Five Year Plan (TFYP, FY86-FY9O)attempted to: (i) increase the irrigated area in the country from 2.5 millionha to 3.9 million ha; and (ii) expand the flood control and drainage facilitiesfrom 2.6 million ha to 3.3 million ha. Damages caused by serious nationwideflooding during the rainy seasons of 1987 and 1988 have decreased the actualachievements of the TFYP. As a consequence, several projects, including theProject, required additional funding to repair the flood damages. On Projectcompletion, the Project had provided irrigation and drainage facilities deemednecessary for enhanced crop production on 14,370 ha and a protective earthenembankment ring to mitigate flood damage on 17,580 ha 1/' in the Project area.
2. Flood Protection Facilities
17. The changes after appraisal in the alignment of the embankment (shownin map p.(ii) and Appendix 1) was due to erosion and siltation problems in the
1! The difference comprises settlements, i.e., homesteads, ponds and roads,and engineering rights-of-way for the embankment, irrigation and drainagecanals.
6
Project area that were far more serious than considered at appraisal. Theseriousness of the problem was not taken into account in the feasibility studybut was revealed later by a study of the recorded shifts of the coastlinepositions over 100 years, supplemented by field verifications, alignmentinspections, erosion observations, and interviews of the local population.
18. There are now several locations where the Dhonagoda River is very closeto the completed embankment. At the Meghna River side, between Mohanpur andNaobanga, the embankment was rebuilt twice and is still threatened by erosion. 1/A number of cross dams have been constructed at the Dhonagoda River side to checkthe erosion effects of the side current while emergency protective measures werebeing provided at the Meghna River side embankment.
19. The method of compaction was changed from purely manual labor, as wasoriginally envisioned at appraisal, to a method that Included mechanicalcompaction for portions of the embankment and canal dikes below the seepage line 2/and manual compaction for the portion above the line. Although the change waswell-intentioned, the machinery and equipment made available to the Project toaccomplish the work was inappropriate and inadequate in terms of size and numberof pieces, as well as operation difficulties (see Appendix 4). In the latterpart of the Project implementation there were portions of the embankment thatwere compacted by manual labor alone. These are considered to be the weak linksin the embankment ring. Since hauling and compaction were done by manual labor,with a large number of small contracts, it was difficult to manage those contractworks and control the quality of works.
20. The exact reasons for the two breaches at the Dhonagoda River sideembankment during the 1987 and 1988 floods were difficult to pinpoint. Oneexplanation is that there were many rat holes in the embankment, the paths ofwhich must have followed the seepage line as it receded or rose as a functionof increasing or decreasing river water level. These holes served as passagesallowing water to flow faster than saturated seepage flow, and in larger volumesper unit time, carrying with it the soil materials from under and within theembankment. Boiling 3/ at the country side was then followed by piping, 4/ andeventually by the collapse of the embankment itself. Lack of maintenance,possibly coupled with poor compaction and the absence of support for a floodfighting group, 5/ were considered the major contributing factors to the breachof the embankment. It is also possible that borrow pits used as source ofconstruction materials at the country side of the embankment were carried toodeep into the more sandy materials. The absence of this overburden 6/ wouldfacilitate seepage, boiling and piping. Even designated borrow pits at the river
1/ The World Bank-financed Meghna River Model Study to look at the problem andobtain appropriate solution is ongoing.
2/ Line that separates the water-saturated flow path from the dry portion ofthe earthen embankment cross-section.
3/ Boiling: bubbling, like springs, carrying soil materials, occurring behindlevees, fed by the river through or under levees or embankment.
4/ Piping: formation of passage for water under pressure in the form ofconduits through permeable materials.
5/ Surveillance party organized to inspect the condition of the embankmentduring the flood season and make emergency repairs when needed.
6/ Cover material providing additional weight against upward water pressure.
7
side of the embankment, where extended too deep and too wide, had removed theprotective, less pervious and blanket-like materials that could have preventedexcessive seepage as well.
3. Irrigation and Drainage Systems
21. An irrigation canal alongside the embankment rather than the drainagelink canal which was planned in the feasibility study was put in place based onthe inception and design reports (see Appendix 2). This change served thepurpose that the land needed for rights-of-way was reduced. Cost savings forland acquisition were achieved because the embankment itself served as one ofthe dikes for the irrigation canal. The borrow pits, as source of soil materialsfor building the dike for the irrigation canal, also served as part of thedrainage canal network. Finally, the adjustment to the irrigation canal layout(shown in Appendix 3) made the area served by the primary pumping stations closerso that the pumps could be operated more effectively. However, the increase indensity of the irrigation canal 1/ and the relocation of the embankment increasedthe land acquisition cost.
22. The existing creeks in the Project area were interconnected under theProject. They were then directed towards the main drainage ways and were finallyconducted to the primary pumping stations. The proposed seven drainage sluicescrossing the embankment and designed to serve as gravity drainage water outletswere deleted from the Project scope because it was considered that floodingduring the transition from dry to rainy season would harm neither the boro northe aus rice crop. During the rainy season the high river levels will not allowgravity flow of drainage water from the Project area to the river. The improvedlayout of the drainage network resulted also in a more efficient pump operation.
23. Observations in the field, however, revealed that: (i) an insufficientnumber of cross-drainage structures 2/ in the irrigation canals were provided,hence a number of man-made cuts in the secondary and tertiary canals were noted;(ii) most of the tertiaries, wiped out by the more recent flood of 1988, haveto be re-constructed before the farmers can put up their farm ditches; and (iii)the farmer-built on-farm level facilities below the turnouts 3/ likewise needimprovement.
4. Pumping Stations and Navigation Locks
24. The primary pumping stations are intended to drain surplus water fromthe Project area during the rainy season and supply irrigation water to the croparea during the dry season. Kalipur pumping station can drain 40 per cent ofthe Project area and irrigate 6,426 ha while Uddhamdi pumping station can pumpout excess water from 60 per cent of the area and supply irrigation water toa command area of 8,046 ha (Dubgi and Ekiaspur secondary pumping stations are
1/ Density of the irrigation canal is relation of canal length to irrigatedarea.
2/ Cross-drainage structure: A structure carrying the discharge of a drainagechannel across a canal intercepting the channel.
3/ Turnouts are irrigation water outlets usually provided at the tertiarycanals; improvements are required in canal bedslope, alignment and dikecross-section.
8
included in this area, see Appendix 3). A balanced operation and a moreefficient utilization of the pumps than originally specified at appraisal can,therefore, be achieved. Both primary pumping station sites were found to be freefrom embankment erosion and were well situated for stable pumping of irrigationand drainage water. The soil investigations at the primary pumping stationsites, however, indicated that the stratum was of soft sandy materials; pilefoundation was investigated and found to be too expensive. The raft foundation 1/was therefore adapted. The poorer and unacceptable soil material at Kalipurpumping station was also replaced by sand brought in from Syihet. A steel sheetpile enclosure below the foundation was then provided at both sides.
25. At Uddhamdi pumping station the floor slab and the walls cracked. Aconsultant was hired by the Bank in November 1986 to diagnose and prescribe asolution for the problem. Remedial measures including chemical grouting andepoxy injection were carried out in mid-April and May 1987. At Kalipur pumpingstation the foundation design had to be redone because of faulty soilinvestigation test results provided by the Executing Agency. The firstcontractor involved in the construction had left before completion of thecontract. Faulty soil investigation results, dewatering difficulties due to thefrequent electric power failures, contractor's negligence, and the need toreplace the rusted pumps' gear boxes due to lack of proper storage were the majorcauses of delay in the completion of the pumping stations. With the two primarypumping stations now operational, however, a systematic operations rule shouldbe developed. The two secondary pumping stations located in the middle of theProject area and not readily accessible by car or motorcycle require replacementof communications links with the rest of the Project facilities.
26. The navigation locks proposed to be built next to the primary pumpingstations were deleted from the Project scope because the existing roads as wellas the top of embankment and irrigation canals dikes were deemed sufficient tomeet the transport needs.
5. Power Transmission Line, Communication Line and Roads
27. The existing line, which the Appraisal Mission considered in 1977would supply the Project's electric power requirements was found to be old andoverloaded. About 48 km of a new transmission line from Chandpur to the Projectwas completed in 1984.
28. Communication between the two major and two secondary pumping stationswas meant to be established by way of telephone circuit to be installed alongwith the power line. This was later changed to a VHF-wireless radio networkwith portable mobile transceivers. The units proved to be very useful duringthe construction period. Later on, however, several units became non-operationaland have not been repaired. The maintenance of the communication system is veryimportant because it is the only means of linking the different parts of theProject facilities with one another during operations, particularly when floodingis imminent. A telephone system is planned to be installed soon.
1/ Raft foundation: A layer of reinforced concrete extending under the wholearea of the upper structure to provide a foundation in case where the groundis unduly soft.
9
29. The proposed inspection and access roads were deleted because the topof the embankment and the irrigation canal dikes can also serve as farm-to-market roads. However, construction of three new roads had already been startedby the District and upazila authorities to connect the east and west sectionsof the Project area.
6. Agricultural and Fishery Development
30. The planned pilot farm (50 ha) was to be centrally located and providedwith a training center and support facilities. Integrated agriculturaldevelopment was to be promoted through improved packages of productiontechnologies, demonstration, 1/ training, and use of small farm machines. Thisscheme was deleted from the Project scope. Instead, 20 demonstration farms wereset up throughout the Project area in the dry season of 1987/88 and another 35in the rainy season of 1988/89 in order to encourage the farmers to attain theproduction target for the proposed cropping pattern. There were 35 BlockSupervisors and five Extension Overseers fielded from DAE and the ExecutingAgency, respectively. A 500-ton capacity central godown was deleted and onlyseven small godowns were built for storage of construction materials. Buildingof the market sheds was deleted for the reason that similar facilities hadalready developed In the Project area. Thus, the loan allocations for officeaccommodations, transport, extension equipment, and training of DAE staff wasbarely used. Attainment of the objectives set for irrigated crop yields andbeneficiary farmers' net Income may drag along with such limited attention givento this component.
31. Two fishery extension workers from the Directorate of Fishery (DOF)were to be seconded to the Project Office to advise fish farmers on aquaculture.An upazila-level officer supported by the District Fishery Officer attended tothe needs of the Project. The DOF Is planning to extend at the Project the sameapproach as the subproject of the Government's Integrated Fishery DevelopmentProject being Implemented in Chandpur Irrigation Project adjacent to the Project.Meanwhile, fingerlings were stocked In the drainage canal next to Uddhamdipumping station. The result of a water quality check showed that the drainagewater is suitable for fish culture but monitoring needs to be undertaken fromDecember to April each year.
7. Consultants Services and Overseas Training
32. The Appraisal Mission estimated that 190 man-months of foreignconsultants input with about 540 man-months local consultant support in detaileddesign and supervision of Project implementation would be needed (see Appendix5). The Consultant, a joint venture firm InvolvIng a Japanese and a Bangladeshifirm, rendered services from March 1979 to January 1985. An additional 16 man-months time was awarded starting in April 1986. A total of 261 man-months and1,128 man-months, foreign and local consultants time, respectively, was actuallyutilized. The extensions of the consultants time were required due to theoverall delay in Project implementation. A slight increase in cost was incurred.
1/ Such as the construction of field channels, farm ditches and drains, watermanagement, new cropping patterns and improved farming techniques withassistance from DAE specialists in field crops, water management and paddy-based cropping systems.
10
33. The foreign consultant which carried out the feasibility study couldalso continue services for design and supervision of the Project, yet there wasa major reversal in its recommendations for the approach and methodology toachieve the Project objectives. There were indications that the ExecutingAgency, under instructions from the Government, may have insisted thatalternative ways be explored by the consultant to reduce the Project cost becauselocal counterpart funds were difficult to provide.
34. The Executing Agency drew up a program of overseas training for aboutseven key technical staff who were directly involved in Project implementation.They were to visit member countries of the Bank who have more experience inengineering, water management and institutional development. The program, inaddition to the on-the-job training provided by the consultants, was submittedto the Bank in 1981. Approval by the Government for the travel of eight keystaff was long delayed; four were eventually sent to UPLB-Philippines in 1988and four went to AlT-Thailand in 1989. In addition, three Project staff weresent to Japan for training in pump operation, repair, and maintenance sponsoredby the pump supplier. Four trained staff have been transferred to other projectsjust after the training abroad but the remaining seven staff are still in theProject. Although this is not a loss to the country as a whole, their trainingshould have been considered more relevant to the Project operation whentransferring them to other projects.
B. Project Cost and Actual Expenditures
35. The original cost estimate at appraisal was $ 46.0 million. Actualexpenditures came up to $54.9 million 1/ (see Appendix 6 and 7 for details). Acost overrun of up to $14.6 million 2/ will be incurred. The major increase incost were due to increases in the cost of civil works and the cost of landacquisition. Four factors contributed to the cost increases in the civil workscomponent are (i) design changes and revised costing during the detailed designphase; (ii) unforeseen remedial works required on embankment and pumping stationsconstruction; (iii) inflation; and (iv) damages from the 1987 and 1988 floods.P.n underestimate of the civil works at appraisal was also implied in the Bank's1988 appraisal report for the Supplementary Loan. The cost of repairs andtreatment in the foundations of the pumping stations and rebuilding part of theembankment further increased Project costs. The increase in the cost of landacquisition is a result of an underestimate of the requirements. Last,substantial damages were sustained by the Project which were caused by the floodsin 1987 and 1988.
C. Engagement of Consultants and Procurement of Goods & Services
36. The recruitment of Consultants was delayed by one and a half years.Extension of their contract was made four times because of the delays in Projectimplementation. There was a gap between the termination of the consultantscontract in June 1985 and resumption of services in March 1986 and between the
1/ This included the cost for repair of 1987 flood damages plus thecommissioning work expenditures and Service Charges During Construction(SCDC) which were not foreseen at the time of appraisal.
2/ This will include the $5.7 million provided in Loan No. 467-BAN(SF) torepair the damages caused by the 1988 flood scheduled for 1988-1991.
11
final termination of the contract and completion of the Project. The gap ofconsultant services caused the poor quality control of embankment construction,which could be one of the causes of embankment breaches in 1987 and 1988 floods.
37. No major problems were experienced in the procurement of local goodsand services. The Executing Agency, however, was not accustomed to the Bank'sprocedure in the procurement of foreign equipment and materials, which causeddelays in the procurement and hence in the project implementation. There wasa discrepancy of recommendation between Executing Agency and MIWDFC in the firsttender evaluation for the procurement of the pumps. According to the Bank'srecommendation, it was re-tendered, the processing of which delayed procurementby one year.
D. Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers
38. The Executing Agency's PCR stated that the consultants monitored theprogress and quality control of the construction work. The performance ofengineering consultants in providing technical assistance and advice to theProject officials during design and construction was generally satisfactory.They brought construction problems to the Project officials' attention andadvised on methods to improve project activities. All four reports weresubmitted by the Consultant in 1985, as follows: (1) Agricultural DevelopmentProgram; (ii) Operation and Maintenance relating to Water Management; (iii)Operation and Maintenance Manual for the Primary Pumps; and (iv) Operation Manualfor the Booster Pumps together with the Final Report !/.
39. There were about 12 major and 3,003 minor contracts for civil works fromJanuary 1980 to June 1987. The performance of some contractors, particularlythose involved in the construction of primary pumping stations, was very poor,causing prolonged delays in Project implementation. Numerous small contractsfor the embankment construction involving manual labor was extremely difficultto manage and probably affected the quality of the work. This was mainly dueto the inability of the Executing Agency to strictly comply with the consultant'srecommendation to use mechanical compaction in the embankment construction.
40. Some minor deviations in the specification and condition of someequipment and materials procured abroad were noted. The more significant itemsconcerned the gear boxes for the primary pumps that became rusty due to improperstorage in the Project site by Executing Agency, and the defective transformerfor the booster pumps at Dubgi. These were readily replaced by the supplierconcerned without any additional cost to the Project. Overall performance ofthe suppliers, therefore, were found reasonable.
E. Loan Disbursements
41. Loan disbursements proceeded very slowly during the first two yearsof Project implementation due to the delay of Project implementation in the fieldand delayed procurement (see Appendix 8). The Government's proceduralrequirements coupled with difficulties initially encountered by the ExecutingAgency in handling bid evaluations prolonged the already cumbersome procedures.
1/ Although the services of the Consultants were extended for another 16 man-months during the period 1986-1987.
12
There were no significant disbursements until 1981 when the major Project worksbegan, except for payments to the consultants and the supply of essentialequipment and materials. Project implementation accelerated considerably duringthe period 1983-1985 as indicated by disbursements of $12.6 million. By July1987, about 90 per cent of the loan ($24 million) had been disbursed. At theclosing date, in June 1989, the actual disbursements of the original loan was$23.9 million, while $2.5 million of the SSASP loan and $7.9 million from thesupplementary loan was disbursed.
F. Project Schedule
42. Completion of Project implementation was originally expected by theend of 1983. The Project was actually completed five years behind schedule in1988 (see details provided in Appendix 9). Major delays were caused by the poorperformance of some contractors, additional treatments in the primary pumpingstations' foundation, re-tendering of the primary pumps, realignment andrebuilding a part of the embankment, changes in the irrigation and drainage canalnetwork, shifting of the secondary pumping station in Eklaspur, and 1987 floodsdamage. 1/ Other causes of delay were land acquisition problems, shortage oflocal counterpart funds and skilled labor, time-consuming manual works insteadof machines, slow procurement of construction materials, and adverse weatherconditions (longer rainy season).
G. Conditions and Loan Covenants
43. The Government has complied with most of the loan covenants. Quarterlyprogress reports, audited annual accounts, and financial statements weresubmitted as required. Details pertaining to the Executing Agency's obligationsset forth in Schedule 6 to the Loan Agreement are provided In Appendix 10. Onlyminor difficulties in complying with several of the covenants are discussedbelow.
44. The Project Office was established in December 1978 (see Appendix 11),nine months after loan effectiveness which occurred in March 1978. The firstProject Director was appointed in 1978. The Project officials were frequentlychanged due to the Government's policy. Between 1978 and 1989, for example, nineProject Directors served for durations varying from 12 days to 4 years and 3months.
45. Land acquisition was very slow and costs were higher than expectedbecause required area were underestimated, the unit cost increased, and localfund releases were not sufficient to cover the cost of land required. Some of --the complaints raised by a few affected farmers included (i) compensation forthe land was Inadequate because replacement farms bought using the Project -payments were smaller in size than what was taken by the Project; and (ii) therehabilitation program for the displaced families who became landless was notprovided.
46. The Executing Agency's organizational chart for O&M was approved bythe Government in January 1988 (see Appendix 11). This division will operate
1/ After completion in June 1988, the Project was damaged by unprecedentedfloods in September 1988.
13
and maintain all facilities up to the tertiary level, whereas the farmers areexpected to build and maintain the field channels, farm ditches and drains. Forthis purpose, some 163 Turnout Committees out of a total of 387 Committeesrequired in the Project have already been organized.
47. BPDB took over and now maintains the power transmission lines, whilethe Ministry of Food maintains the 500-ton capacity central godown at Matlab,adjacent to the Project area. BRDB, on the other hand, has not taken over theseven 100-ton capacity feeder godowns constructed by the Executing Agency becausethe farmer cooperatives that will handle their operation are not yet operating.
48. The recently established rate of irrigation water charges 1/ to belevied by the Executing Agency is still insufficient to fully cover the 0&M costand a reasonable portion of the capital cost. The Government's commitment tofurther study the water charge rate/land tax system and to submit to the Banka proposal to increase the rate/tax one year before Project completion has notbeen complied with. However, a nationwide study on the rate/tax has beenongoing. Submission of this is therefore delayed and will require monitoringby the Bank.
49. An Agro-Socio-Economic Survey for the Project was undertaken by thelocal consultant in 1985. The report, released in February 1987, followed theBank's guidelines on PBME. The delay in the submission of the report was dueto the long time the Executing Agency had taken in providing its comments on theConsultant's draft report. A second survey is due at Project completion (in1989) and a third at full development in order (in 1984) to fully comply withthe stipulated PBME requirements.
H. Environmental Impact
50. The Project has changed the area from one beset with perennial monsoonflooding to one free from annual inundation. Residents are now protected fromdamage to their homes, buildings, roads, and crops against a 100 years'possibility flood. The spread of water-borne infectious diseases has beenreduced and because of the irrigation facilities, the land will be available forfood production throughout the year. Thus, the environmental impact is highlypositive.
I. Prolect Benefits
51. The cropped area is expected to expand from approximately 21,700 hato 26,600 ha under the originally assumed increases in cropping intensity, fromapproximately 147 per cent without the Project to 193 per cent at full Projectdevelopment. Average paddy yield which is expected to rise from 1.1 mt per hato 4.0 mt per ha will provide a total incremental paddy production estimated at59,000 mt.
52. Prior to the final completion of the Project facilities in the on-farm level, some areas have been served by the Project with irrigation water.The Executing Agency's PCR reported that there was an increasing trend in the
1/ Under the Irrigation Water Rate Ordinance (1983) and Water Rates Rules(1984).
14
area cropped to HYVs rice which increased crop yields and farmers' net farmincome during the initial Project operation in 1988/89. The consecutive floodsof 1987 and 1988, however, caused considerable damage to the Project (Appendix12) and also destroyed the anian rice crops. In 1989 the area cropped to amanrice was very small because farmers were afraid that another flood would occur,which may cause yet another breaching of the embankment, and would again wipeout their crops. Also, the Agro-Socio-Economic Survey scheduled has beendelayed. Thus, the available data and other information provided areinsufficient at this time to be able to evaluate the economic, financial andsocial benefits expected to be realized.
J. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency
53. Despite the constraints the Government and the Executing Agency werefacing during implementation, the Project's objective of providing floodprotection, irrigation and drainage facilities as envisaged were largelyattained. Overall performances of the contractor and suppliers were poor butsome deviations between expected and actual performances on the part of theGovernment and the Executing Agency are worth noting. In the selection of thecontractor for the construction of Kalipur pumping station, the Government'sTender Evaluation Committee and the Consultant recommended the same contractorwhereas the Executing Agency eventually selected a different contractor whofinished only 1 per cent of the work in a year's time and then abandoned thework. The same contractor was again awarded another contract for theconstruction of the Uddhamdi pumping station, which was also delayed and causedcracks in the pump house due to poor foundation treatment. For the procurementof the primary pumps, the same supplier was recommended by both the Government'sTender Evaluation Committee and the Executing Agency, but MIWDFC did not agreeand awarded the Contract to another supplier. This time, however, the Bankintervened and recommended retendering. As a result, procurement of the pumpswas delayed by about a year. Shortages of local funds, slow procurement ofsupplies and construction materials, inadequate reporting systems with lengthyclearing process in the Government, and frequent changes in the Project staffcaused undue delays in the Project implementation.
K. Performance of the Bank
54. The full cooperation and assistance rendered by the Bank during Projectimplementation, especially through the several missions, was appreciated by theGovernment and the Executing Agency. The Bank always responded quickly inresolving the problems encountered by the Executing Agency. For instance, theBank's cooperation in alleviating the financial constraints experienced by theProject was noted. The Government asked the Bank to provide supplementaryassistance in meeting cost overruns in 1983, again in 1987, and a third time in1988. Two supplementary loans were provided amounting SDR 2.4 million(equivalent to $2.5 million in 1983) 1/ and SDR 5.9 million (equivalent to $8.2million in 1988) 2/ and additional funds were provided through a change in scopeplus fund reallocation 3/ amounting to $5.7 million in 1988.
1/ Loan No. 626-BAN(SF), approved 19 May 1983.2/ Loan NO. 883-BAN(SF), approved 4 February 1988.3/ Loan No. 467-BAN(SF), approved 25 September 1980.
15
55. The Appraisal Mission, in adapting the feasibility report proposal forthe various Project components, should have included the following in theappraisal report: (i) simulation modelling of the Meghna River be carried outto firm up the required setback distance of the embankment; (ii) alternativesto the layout of the irrigation and drainage system be generated and the optimalnetwork chosen; and (iii) mechanical compaction of the embankment and irrigationcanal dikes be carried out, in lieu of manual labor, using appropriate andadequate machinery and equipment. In doing this, the cost overrun could havebeen minimized, even if not entirely avoided.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
56. Prior to the Project, annual flooding in the area was extensive. Eachyear 25 per cent of the whole area would be under 0.6-1.2 m of water for two tofour months; 50 per cent under 1.2-1.8 in for four to five months; and 15 per centunder 1.8-3.0 m for two to four months. Only 10 per cent, on man-made mounds,would not be flooded. At Project completion, this situation has dramaticallychanged; the embankment and the irrigation and drainage facilities that willenable the farmers to increase crop production are in place and functioning.The remaining activities to be implemented are those related to irrigationagriculture development after Project completion. These will assure farmers thatthe benefits will be realized. For this purpose, the Government's localorganization (district and upazila) responsible for these activities has alreadystarted to function. The prospects of increasing the Project's agriculturalproductivity are now more likely to be achieved.
57. However, the cost incurred in completing the embankment, irrigationand drainage facilities in the Project area was higher and it took far longerto finish the Project than envisaged at appraisal. A combination of factorsinvolving changes in Project scope, poor perforiing contractors, remedialmeasures taken in the construction of the embankment and the pumping stations,inflation, shortfalls in local funding, and adverse weather caused the costoverrun and the delays. A better estimate of the cost for major civil works andland acquisition could have been obtained if detailed engineering design had beendone as part of the feasibility study. The occurrence of the two consecutiveand unprecedented floods was, however, unpredictable.
B. Recommendations
1. Project-related
58. Attention must now be focused on: (i) restoring the beneficiaryfarmers' confidence in the Project as a means of protecting lives and properties;and (ii) the attainment of the Project's objectives pertaining to the irrigatedcrop yields and farmers' net income. Risk of another breaching of embankmentcan be eliminated by: (i) identifying the weak and critical sections of theperipheral embankment; (ii) providing, on a priority basis, remedial measures
16
such as dumping boulders and dredged sand as additional bank protection, a berm 1/to enlarge the embankment cross-section, a blanket 2/ of less pervious materialsat the river side, and/or cross dams to break the parallel river currents; (iii)possibly practicing afforestation 3/ as a more permanent, longer lasting firstline of defense for, and/or sodding of, the already strengthened embankment; and(iv) providing permanent river training works in the Meghna River to control theshifting erosion. A flood-fighting program must also be designed, organized andfunded, equipped, and trained, and then periodically drilled. These add-onactivities will make the farmers more confident in growing the Aman crop 4/ thatprovides them the best net income and the highest quality rice for the consumers.
59. The tertiary canal system, nearly wiped out by the 1988 flood, shouldbe repaired immediately. Likewise, provision of the following should be pursuedin an integrated fashion involving the BRDB's institution building team; BWDB'ssurvey, design, and construction engineers; DAB's extension agents; and DOF'sfishery experts: (i) on-farm level facilities such as the quaternary canalsand appurtenant structures below the turnout; (ii) irrigated crop extensionservice; and (iii) inland fishery development assistance. Without these specificinputs, full agricultural development will be slow and would depress theProject's benefits.
60. Command area development and management (CAD/CAN) may not seek its fullpotential if the required agricultural activities mentioned earlier are leftalone to the farmers with only a token technical assistance and constructionsupervision from the Project staff. The Government should assess its resourcesand capabilities to tackle the tasks under the CAD/CAN for MDIP with a view toimproving the efficiency of the Project.
2. General
61. The Government's policy of transferring Project staff every three yearsor less may not ensure the achievement of the intended purpose and does tend tocontribute to delays in Project Implementation. Senior Project management staffshould preferably be in place for the whole duration of Project execution. Forunavoidable, more frequent staff transfers, enough time must be allowed fororientation or training of the new officer and the turnover of responsibilitiesitself.
62. It would be prudent for the Bank to consider instituting additionalpre-conditions, before declaring loan effectiveness, for future similar loans.These should include: (i) a fully established and ready-to-start Project office;and (ii) Government-approved project proforma.
1/ Berm: A horizontal shelf built into an embankment to increase the thicknessof cross section of an embankment.
2/ Blanket: A cover of impervious material by layer.3/ By utilizing the facilities of the Upazila Afforestation and Nursery
Development Project, Loan No. 956-BAN(SF).4/ At present, farmers are encouraged to grow Aus crop, after the Boro rice
crop, which can be harvested before the high flood season.
17
63. The Project beneficiaries will require time to realize benefits, netof production cost and family expenses, sufficient to pay for the irrigationservice charges that will in future cover the full O&M expenses. If requestedby the Executing Agency the Bank may provide the initial cost of O&M and extendProject supervision through the development or build-up years, respectively.
64. For other similar projects, the Bank must in the future insist on anexhaustive alternative generation such as in embankment alignment, irrigationand drainage layout and selection of the optimal approach with the consequenttrade-off s such as in the use of labor intensive construction versus mechanicalconstruction. Complex projects like the Project would benefit from simulationand modeling exercises to assess proposed structures' performances againstadverse scenarios. The cost estimates for the design of major civil works shouldpreferably be based on detailed engineering design undertaken at the feasibilitystage.
18
APPENDIXES
Appendix PageI
1. Scope of the Project
19
2. Embankment Cross-section
22
3. Irrigation Canal System Network
23
4. List of Equipment
25
5. Consultancy Services and Overseas Training
28
6. Comparison of Project Cost by Component
29
7. Annual Expenditures by Component
30
8. Annual Disbursements by Component
31
9. Project Implementation Schedule: Planned and Actual
32
10. Compliance with the Loan Covenants
33
11. Organizational Charts
36
12. Estimated Damages Caused by Floods of 1987 and 1988
39
pJ'a
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II
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Scope of the Project
Caeonent Items FeasibiLity Study/AppraisaL DetaiLed Design At Project CoffpLetion
Project Area Project Area 17,580 ha. 17,995 ha. 17,584 ha.Irrigated Area 13,765 ha. 14,470 ha. 14,370 ha.
flood Entankment Length 65 km. 61.6 km. 60 km.
Crest Width W = 6.1 m (Meghna Side) W = 6.1 in (Meghna Side) W = 5.2 in (Meghna Side)W = 5.2 m (Dhonagoda Side) W 4.3 m (Other Part) w = 4.3 m (Other Part)
Side SLope River Side 1 :3.0 River Side 1 : 3.0 River Side 1 :3.0Country Side 1 2.5 Country Side 1 : 2.0 Country Side 1 : 2.0
Conaction Method ManuaL Conaction MechanicaL Cooaction MechanicaL and ManuaL
AUgment Waobanga-Nabipur 300 in. Naobanga-Wabijur 120 m. As designed(Set Back Distance) (Dhonagoda) (Dhonagoda)
Nabipur-Mohanpur 400 m. Plabipur-Mohanpur 400 m. As designed(Meghna) (Meghna)
Mohanpur-Naobanga Mohanpur-Naobanga
(Meghna) 800-1000 m. (Meghna) 800-1000 in. As designed
Primary Ptslçing Nos. & Size of Pi.ms Katipur Katipur As designedStation 1,650 nvn x 420 kw x 4 units 1,650 m x 420 kw x 4 units
Uddhani Uddhamdi As designed1,65Omx420kwx5units 1,65Omx420kwx6units1,000 em x 100 kw x 2 units
Drainage Area and Katipur 7,200 ha 28.9 cms Katipur 7,200 ha 28.8 cms As designedDischarge Uddhamdi 10.385 ha 41.6 cms Uddhamdi 1O67O ha 42.7 cins
17,585 ha 70.5 cms 17,870 ha 71.5 cms
Irrigation Area and Katipur 13,105 ha 24.3 cms Katipur 6,430 ha 11.9 cms As designedCapacity Uddhandi 660 ha 1 cins Uddhamdi 8.040 ha 14.9 cms
13,765 ha 25.5 cms 14,470 ha 26.8 cms
Booster Puing Pbs. & Size of Pus Ekiaspur Ektaspur As designedStation 1,000 nm x 80 kw x 2 units 700 nm x 70 kw x 2 units(Irrigation) Dubgi Dubgi
1,000 em x 80 kw x 3 units 700 m x 70 kw x 3 unitsNamchari1,000 nm x 80 kw x 2 units
0
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Component Items Feasibility Study/Appraisal Detailed Design At Project Completion
Booster Pumping Irrigation Area and Eklaspur 3,160 ha 5.9 cros Eklaspur 1,130 ha 2.1 cros As designed
Station Discharge Dubgi 1,950 ha 3.6 cros Dubgi 1,855 ha 3.4 cros
Namchari 1,750 ha 3.2 cros
Irrigation Canal Canal Layout Drainage link canal along the Main canals along the flood As designed
flood embankment. embankmet.
44% of the total area is Irrigation coamand area at Uddhamdi
covered by Kalipur and the Pumping Station was increased, the
rest is covered by Uddhamdi command area of booster pump was
Pumping Station. reduced, and operation frequency of
primary stations was balanced.
Canal Length Main 6 Secondary 75 km Main 33.0 km Main and secondary 97.5 km
Tertiary 1,190 km Secondary 63.8 km Tertiary 120.5 km
Tertiary 128.8 km
Farm Ditch (965.0)km
Drainage Canal Canal Layout Main drainage channels at Main drainage channels same As designed
Uddhamdi and Kalipur Khal, as F/S. Other khals are linked
other Khals to be connected by with each other and by
the link canal along the flood connecting canals to the new
embankment and drained to two main drainage khals.
primary pumping stations.
Canal Length 160 km 160 km 126 km
Drainage Sluice Seven drainage sluices at the Drainage sluices are all As designed
flood embankment. eliminated.
Navigation Locks Two navigation Locks at primary Navigation locks considered As designed
pumping stations. unnecessary.
Added cargo transfer facilities Dropped
on the flood embankment.
Agricultural Marketing and Storage Market shed - 7 As planned Dropped
Development Storage Godown - 8 As planned Storage Godown - 7
N0
ro ^wwm m
N a
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w
ColTponent Items Feasibility Study/Appraisal Detailed Design At Project Coeçletion
Roads Three trunk roads Three trunk roads DroppedD/C road Matlab - Changer charTIC road Matlab - Badarpur Same as F/ST/C road Amirabad - Satnal
Three Lateral roads - 70 km Two Lateral roads Dropped
Pilot Farm Central demonstration farm Central demonstration farm DroppedArea 50 ha Area 50 km
ha Location: Changer char
Power Transmission Tramission Line Transmission line is planned New 33 kV Line is required from As designedLine from Farajkandi to each Chandpur sub station to the
puing station. Project area.
33 kV line 1 20.0 km Chandpur-Uddhamdi L = 19.3 km11 kV Line .j.9Q km Uddhamdi-Kalipur, etc. kin
30.0 km 43.4 km As designed I = 48.35 km
Sub Stations Kalipur 2,500 KVA KaLipur 33/3.3 kV 5,000 kVA As designedUddhamdl 3000 33/0.415 500Secondary (A) 1,000 Liddhamdi 33/3.3 5,000Secondary (B) 1,000 33/0.415 500Secondary (C) L000 Dubgi 33/0.415 1,000
8,500 kVA Eklaspur 33/0.415 500ChangerChar 33/0.415 100
12,600 kVA
Telephone Line Matlab Uddhamdi . Kalipur VHF system proposed from MatLab VHF base at Piiçing Stations withKalipur . Secondary P.S. to each punping station and mobile transceivers.
Changer Char demonstrationTotal Length 24.1 km farm.
Construction Construction equipment for Construction equipment for Some portions were conpacted byEquipment construction of purping construction of purçing mechanical and manual means, others
stations. stations and conpaction of the by manuaL means only.flood enankment and canal dike.
Construction Construction Period Nov. '78 - Dec. '83 Dec. '79 - Jun. '85 Feb. '80 - Jun. '89Schedule
M
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MODIFIED IN THIS STUDY (Final Design)
RIVER SIDE
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IRRIGATION CANAL
,..' -
BOOW PIT
W2
CRcØS SECTION OF FLOOD EMBANKMENT(Original and Final Designs)
PROPOSED IN FEASIBILITY STUDY (OrigInal Design) - WI
BERM
RIVERSIDE kIWI.
BORW PIT ';
COUNTRY SIDE
DRAINAGE CANAL
CD
CD
II
CD
(D
ct
CD
rt
CD
CD
I—iI—i
Btown Sandy SINW2
Gray SINy Sand
IWI W2
MEGIINASID€ a.Im 31.5m 2.7m
LDI4ONA000A S!DE 6.2 m 31.7 m 2.1 in
Al kmsl O.3m thIckness oftopsoil should remain.
OOUNTRY SIDE
DISTANCE H Wi W2 W3-u0
PART•I 12.0 km 4.3m c H 4.Sm Cm 29.7 m 1.5 m m
z0
18.7 km 4Cm < H < 1.Cm 4.3m 30.3 in 2.4 mF)
PAR1IlI 29.3 km H c 4.3m 4.3m 26.7 in 1.0 m
23
A 342
Q 4.33
A 1.670
a = 3.09
('I,
A • 1.540 A 1.090
Q2.$9 Q2.02
APPENDIX 3
Page 1 of 2
IRRIGATION CANAL SYSTEMA. Proposed Layout
A 1.110
Q = 2.16
.-_.--. Mb:G,l.v.t RIVER
Ao.280 A'8..300 A 13 100 A'4.800
0 11.42 0 1.JO Q 2 4 .2 40 8.90
I -,
- - KALIPUR PUMPING STATION -(PUMP CAPACITY FOR DRAINAGE
23.90 "3'SCC)
A 1.380
- I a.i I a = 2.55
(
I I PA510 [SA.3
J A3.160
Q . 0.94 Q•3.l5
SECONDARYPUMPINGSTATION (A)
A6.50
SECONDARY IPUMPINGSTATION (B)
r1
SECONDARY / pPUMPING (A • 1.750STATION (C) I
Q • 3.24
SC —3
A 370
Q = 0.6$
SC —2
A•430
-________ A - 950
Q • 1.76
A (IRRIGA8LE AREA): HA. A
3 (OISCAHRGE): rn3/SEC. 1.22
UOOIIAMOI PUMPING STATION P
(PUMPING CAPACITY FOR DRAINAGE: A - 660U —1
41.30 m3/SEC)Q•1.22
w—..— .--. - -- .
(Reference in text: page 4 , para. 11)
A • 142
a - 1.37
A - 315
A - 3.475
• 1.45
A- 1450 ______________
Q2.1S II U2
A - 1114 A • 417
a • 3.44 • 1.27
Q - 1.20
A - 1104
Q • 2.04
U 11
24
APPENDIX 3
Pegs 2 of 2
IRRIGATION CANAL SYSTEMB. Modified Layout
MEGHNA RIVER
A • 434
Q • 1.1$
a'4
UDONAMOI
A .J.041
Q . 14 52
D5$ONA000A RIVER
A • IrribW i,. in M ToNI 14.4S7 M
a - in vn3INc 2683 .n31..c
2
NR V2
2
2
2
2
2
2
NR
12
8
4
4
1
NR
2
2
4
NR
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
NR
12
6
4
4
10
10
1600
1600
20
20
8
8
8
8
4
4
2
NR
2
NR
2
NR
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
4
4
2
222422622
25
Appendix 4Page 1 of 3
B. LIST OF EQUIPMENT PROCURED FOR THE PROJECT
Total BalanceItem/Description Required Required
ActuallyProcured
A. Construction Equipment
Crawler dragline 0.6 sq.m.Crawler dragline 1.2 sq.m.Tower craneDozer 19 tDozer 11 tDump truck 6 tTruck 5 tTrailer truck 15-20 tForklift truck 2 tSheep foot rollerGenerator 200 KWGenerator (25.6 KVA)/75 kwVibro hammerAir compressor 50 hpConcrete mixer D.6 sq.m.Concrete mixer 0.4 sq.m.Concrete vibratorWell pointWell point pumpsWater pump 1.0 cusecWater pump 0.5 cusecSludge pumpWinchWelding equipment, ElectricWelding equipment, dieselConcrete breaker, setsConcrete drill, setsWorkshop equipment, setsField laboratory equipment, lot
• Farm tractor with trailerPontoon 20 tBatching plant
• Tower craneTyre rollerJetting pumpTube-well pumpVibro compactorShallow Tube wellTurbine pump
122
84
332
21030
160010
4
2221
22422622
ii At appraisal, 1977.NR - Not Required, available from other projects.
(Reference in text: page 6 , para. 19)
26Appendix 4Page 2 of 3
Item/Description
B. Transport Equipment
Car4-wheel drive longbase vehicles4-wheel drive shortbase vehiclesLaunchSpeed boatMotorbike
C. Office Equipment
Furniture, setDrafting equipmentBlue print machineXerox copy machineElectric typewriterDuplicating machineCalculatorSurvey equipment, set
D. Equipment for Consultants
4-wheel drive longbase vehicles4-wheel drive shortbase vehiclesTypewriterHandy typewriterBlueprint machineCalculatorDrafting equipmentSpeed boat
E. Farm Equipment
4-wheel shortbase vehicleswith trailer
MotorbikePower tillerThresher (pedal type)Knapsack sprayerAudio-visual aid, setFarm tools
Total BalanceRequi ed Required
1
4
4
5
5
1
N
4
4
10
10
12111141
12111211
233211
50
ActuallyProcured
1
2
916
121111
106
1211
211
2
1
1
1
1
1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Teesta Project
Teesta Project
Pabna Project
Teesta Project
Dhaka Mechanical Equipment
Netrokona Project
Tire roller
Batching Plant
Batching Plant
Vibrating Pile driver
Well-point Pump
Jeep
27
Appendix 4Page 3 of 3
B. TRANSFERRED FROM OTHER IRRIGATION PROJECTS TO MDIP
Used At Used AtItem/Description Uddhanidi P.S. Kalipur P.S.
1. Crawler mounted Dragline 1(1.5 Ck Koehring)
2. Crawler mounted crane
1
1(Neal unit)
3. Crawler Tractor with dozer
2
1(Komatsu D-60A operationload 16 tons)
4. Crawler Tractor(Komatsu D-50A operationload 12 tons)
5. Vibrating Roller
16. Sheep's Foot roller
27. Well point pump 5 cu. 3
(stang diesel engine driven)8. Well point pump 5 cu. 2
2
(EBRA diesel engine driven)9. Well point pump 4 Cu. 2
(Kobuta diesel engine driven)10. Ferryman Water pump 1.5 Cu. 1
1
11. K.S.B. Water pump 2 Cu. 112. K.Y.C. Mixer machine
2
213. Portable Mixer machine
214. Arc welding machine
1
115. Diesel engine driven Arc
welding machine
116. Russian Tractor
117. Mixer machine
118. Tractor D-7
2
C. TRANSFERRED FROM MDIP TO OTHER PROJECTS
Item/Description Number Project Name
28 Appendix 5
CONSULTING SERVICES AND OVERSEAS TRAINING
Designation At Appraisal
A. Consulting Services
1. Foreign Consultants
Detailed Design
Team Leader (Irrigation Engineer) 10Design Engineer 10 )Design Engineer 4 )Mechanical Engineer 3So il/Foundation EngineerOffice Engineer
Sub-Total 27
Supervision of ProjectImplementation
Team Leader (Irrigation Engineer) 46Construction Engineer 44Construction Engineer 16Soil/Foundation Engineer 3Mechanical Engineer 12Electrical Engineer 6Water Management Expert 18Agronomist 10Agro-Economist 3Institution Expert 5
Sub-Total 163
Actual
10.5
293.516
50
7266219
106
10935
211
TOTAL
190
261 mm
2. Local Consultants
Detaile4 Design
180
341Supervision
360
787
TOTAL 540
1128
B. Overseas Training
Trained Project Staff 7
8
(Reference in text: page 9 , para. 32)
(DI-ti
(D
P1
(D
C)CD
I-..
CD
xrf
0)
(0
I-.
0
0)
P10)
1.)
Ui
COMPARISON OP PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
(8'000)
Original Estimates (1977) Revised Estiiates (19871 Actual Cost.Component F! LC TOTAL F! LC TOTAL F! LC Ti)TAL
I. Irrigation & Related
Civil Works - 6,191 6,191 - 19.916 19.916 - 21,410 21.410
2. Equin.ent & Materials 9.980 8,076 18,056 8,310 5,513 13,823 8.226 4,731 12,957
3. Ag ricultural Development 36 626 662 34 106 140 - - -
4. lflfl5)jjfl( Services
& Trainin g1,750 970 2,120 1,940 1.645 3,585 2.131 2.082 4.213
. Administration - 1.513 1,513 - 5,752 5.752 - 3,469 3.469
6. Land Aconisition - 3,980 3,980 - 9,835 9,835 - 8,604 8,604
7. Flood Damage Repair - - - - 1,888 1,888 - 2,547 2,547
A. Commissioning - - - - 1,448 1,448 - 1,553 1,553
9. Contingencies 4,672 8,144 12,816 - 937 937 - - -
10, Recovery of Previous T.A. 62 62 68 - 68
ii. Service Char ge (luring
Construction (SCDC) - - - 1,100 - 1,100 a! 45 - 45
bI c/ d/TOTAL 16,500 29,500 46,000 11,384 47,040 58.424 10,470 44,396 54.866
a! For purposes of completing the revised cost estimates, an amount of $50,000 was allocated for SCDC in the suoplementary loan of
$8.4 million (Loan 883-BAN(SF) in accordance with current Bank's practice and $60,000 for the original loan of $24.0 million
ILnan 333-BAN(SF) which was not provided in the ori g inal estimate,
bf Including taxes and duties of about $10 million
c/ Including taxes and duties of about $4.5 million
df Incloding taxes and duties of about $3.9 million
M
'.0
CD
I-,.
x
a"
CD
P-h
CD
P-C
CD
0
CD
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rt
CD
CD
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0
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P1
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()(-n
ANNUAL HPRNDITURES BY PROJECT CONPONENTS
(8' 000)
1977 197$ 1919 19*0 19$) 10*2 19*3 1984 1985 1986 1987 19*8 TOTAL
Co.poseat VI S.0 VI S.0 P2 S.0 U S.0 VI S.0 LI S.0 LI S.0 LI S.0 LI S.0 VI S.0 LI S.0 LI S.0 LI S.0 F! + S.0
1. Irrigatioa B Related
Cmi locks - - - - - 29 - 339 - 984 - 1007 - 2141 - 2203 3779 - 1*86 4167 - 3376 - 21410 21410
2. Iquipuent & Naterials - - - - II 156 119 - 18 1384 2174 3217 289 3186 1196 259 424 - 246 64 102 - 158 8228 4731 12957
3. Airicultural Deveiop.ent ....................... . -
4. Coasultiag Services
B Training - 54 - 113 433 1*5 169 15* 189 26 291 *3 - 516 672 52 255 60 113 359 7! 430 - 17 2131 2082 4213
5. Adiinjstntjo - 17 - 11 . 249 - 133 437 421 - 2*9 - . - 759 953 - ZOO - 3469 3469
6. Land £cqeisitio - 21 - 116 - 326 - 517 34* - 362 - 3244 - 1129 - 1540 - 370 /34 - 8604 8104
7. V10 Osaige Repair........................2547
- 2547 2547
I. Co..luiioitag ----------------------- 1553 iss 1553
1. Recovery of Previoias T.* - - ......................
6$ -
10. Service Cbsrg. Dicing Coast• 45 - 45 - 45
TOTAL 92 0124 50! 513 325 1073 189 19*2 1483 4030 3211 4097 3118 6695 514 5992 143 5790 135 6022 45 1901 10470 44396 54*61
L)0
Note; Ezc&ange rate ssed: 1977 II 10. 15.250
1918 15,552
1919 15.454
1100 17.987
1981 22.11$
1982 24.615
1903 25.354
19*4 27.995
19*6 28.000
1906 30,000
1!81 31.400
198$ 31.100
CD
I-..
-J
ANNUAL DIBIURSINBNTB BY CONPONONTS
2,500,000
2,500,000
rg
I-..
x
OD
2* Pup. and GatesZF Construction Equip3 Consulting $erv & Trng6C Civil Works Coupletion
Uucludtng Co..issiosingl60 Flood Da.age Repair68 Agricultural Developuent6F Incresental Cost For
Construction lupervision
8 Service Chrge During
0 145,104 185,104
0 0 0
0 53,750 53,750
4,118,353 282,388 4,460,141
1,107,838 515,721 2,423,559
0 0 0
719,499 30,767 750,266
CD
CD
CD
CD
I-..
rt
CD
x
Loan
Cat. &'onoonent 1919 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1986 19$? 198$ 1988 Total
A. Loan No. 333BA8lSF)
IA Civil Works 328,569 951,047 740,281 741,152 1,283,620 1,180,959 722,282 1,548,893 144,3?? 28,07? 8.170,765ID Civil Works ISSAP) 164,166 878,812 538,332 215,016 632,647 58,971 11,468 2,678,4122* Pups A Gates 612,658 1,622,815 511,680 28,119 118,140 80,447 268,256 4,242,11520 Ce.ent & Steel Bars 23,207 44,753 16,615 459,681 0 20,863 27,509 59,152 180.524 0 0 832,3042C Steel Sbee Piles 1,544 0 0 0 1,54420 Transaission Linis 980,797 23,631 12,553 0 0 0 0 0 1,016,88920 Telepkoae Lines 33,140 1,486 0 0 0 0 34,626ZF Construction lquip 1,725,988 6,073 13,O1$ 65,712 32,712 0 0 0 0 1,844,58120 Transport A Office Iquip 13,003 9,221 3,698 8,111 14,019 16,908 48,248 3,546 0 0 111,41420 Pars Oquip 6,625 0 0 0 0 6,6253 Consulting Sery & Trig 311,886 186,424 184,108 118,164 0 346,439 368,673 197,756 84,514 0 0 1,938,8444 1* Recovers 18,413 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 68,413S Unallocated 06A Loc Sip- Iquip tHat 27,667 471,321 118,081 302,209 0 0 125,28668 Leo lip - Co psaltaucy 61,023 141,357 30,395 42,215 4,411 0 293,4017 Civil Works - l.g'g (SAP) 1,110,431 26,011 0 0 0 0 0 1,196.042
Tearly Total 483,506 572,749 2,888,659 2,308,894 2,834,373 8,401,422 3,409,510 1,500,593 2,912,688 188,206 311,801 23,968,261
Cu.ulative £nouat 483,506 1,056,255 3,944,114 6,313,608 9,147,181 16,541,403 18,958,973 20,451,566 23,371,254 23,680,460 23,168,261 23,968,181
B. Loan No. 626-IAN(SF)CD
I-,
p.'
p.'
I-,
2 Civil Works' - Isg'g Seer 1,000,000 631,000 0 $69,000
Cuulative A.iit 1,000,000 1,631,000 1,631,000 2,500,000
C. Loan No. 8$3-BANISP)
Construction 19,563 15,230 44,793
Yearly Total 6,025,253 1052,950 7,878,213
Cu.ulative Total 6,825.253 . 7,878,213 1878,213
Loan Effectiveness Procurement
Construction Equipment
Pumps & Gates (Main)
Pumps & Gates (Booster)
Transmission Line
Telephone Line
Land Acquisition
Project Facilities
Civil Works
Embankment
Main Pumping Stations
Booster Pumping Stations
Irrigation Canals
Drainage Canals
Irrigation Drainage Structure
Bridge
Transmission & Telephone Line
Agricultural Development
Consulting Services
Foreign: Detailed Usign
Supervision
Local: Survey & Detailed Design
Supervision
CD
CD
CD
C)CD
Cf
CD
Cf
I-C)
CD
t)
II
NJ
NJ
I,.
CD
I-..
x
MEGHNA-DHONAGODA IRRIGATION PROJECT Pann.dIMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE (PLANNED & ACTUAL) Aclual -
L is: TJ:yii )JA11:r. :!i!i:l :: Ii:f71:_Il: : •: _________
-n.- __ I
flh1111P
IHIIIIII"AHhlnu',Hill ii Iliii I II I11111111i 1 1 111111 I I
I I I
1111111 FIII' 111 111111111IllHIHhIIIIIIIuhluhIII IIIiiiEiiiiiRUIIIIUU
Tind., Iuu. 0 Contrsct
iddiflg • Anivil
0 Retender
Built by Ministry.
Godowns built; marketswere dropped as therewere similar facilitiesalready developed.
Complied
Ministry proceededby its own.
33
Appendix 10Page 1 of 3
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LOAN COVENANTS
Loan Covenants Status of Compliance
1. Establish a Project Office to be headedby a Project Director. Sch. 6.1.a Comp lied
2. Provide adequate staff from BWDB andseconded staff from other concernedagencies. Sch. 6.1.b
3. Review organizational structure, includingpractice of seconding other agencyrepresentative, and Project Budget System.Sch. 6.1.c
4. Ensure timely preparation of specifications,calling for and evaluation of tenders, andnegotiations and execution of contracts withassistance from the consultants. Sch. 6.1.d
5. Maintain central coordination of inter-departmental issues in Dhaka and decidepolicy matters. Sch. 6.2.a
Complied
Complied
Complied
Complied
6. Maintain project coordination at field level.Sch. 6.2.b
Complied
7. Construction of all Project Facilities Partially complied.
(a) 500-ton capacity central godown inclose consultation with Ministry ofFood. Sch. 6.3.a(i)
(b) 7-feeder godowns and upgrading orconstruction of 7-selected primarymarkets in close consultation withIRDP (now BRDB). Sch. 6.3.a(ii)
(c) power transmission lines, sub-stationsand other associated facilities thruBPDB. Sch. 6.3.a(iii)
8. Ministry of Food prepares plans and speci-fications for central godown and deliversto BWDB 6 months prior to construction.Sch. 6.3.b
9. BRDB prepares plan and specifications for(a) construction of feeder godowns, and(b) primary markets and delivers to BWDBsix months prior to construction. Sch. 6.3.c
Godowns built by BWDBfor storage of construc-tion materials initially;markets were dropped.
(Reference in text: page 12, para. 43)
Complied
Complied but delayeddue to local fundsproblem.
Dropped; demonstrationfarms were establishedinstead.
Complied
Complied
Appendix 10Page 2 of 3
34
Loan Covenants
10. BPDB prepares or cause consultants to preparedesigns, plans and specifications for thepower transmission lines and appurtenantfacilities and delivers to BWDB within sixmonths after delivery of requirements.Sch. 6.3.d
11. BWDB draw-up a program for training ofProj ect staff for engineering and watermanagement and submit for review and approvalto the Bank by mid-1978. Sch. 6.4
12. Acquire all land, rights-of-way, and otherproperty rights for expeditious Projectimplementation. Sch. 6.5
13. Establish a pilot scheme, consisting of atraining center and about 50 ha. pilot farmwith office facilities, housing and farmequipments upon completion of embankmentand pumping stations. Sch. 6.6.a
14. Demonstrate to farmers (a) construction offarm ditches and draining, (b) watermanagement, (c) new cropping patterns, and(d) modern farming techniques. Sch. 6.6.b
15. Operate the pilot scheme under the guidanceof District level extension officer withspecialists in field crops, water managementand paddy-based cropping systems and assistancefrom the Consultants; provide motor bikes forthe specialists and jeep-type vehicle forDistrict officer. Sch. 6.6.c
16. Increase number of village extension workers(now Block Supervisor), on a priority basisto 1:400 ha. or 1:700-800 farm families.Sch. 7.a
17. Provide adequate office-cum-housing facilitiesand bicycles to Block Supervisors and motorcycleto Upazilla Agricultural Officer. Sch. 7.b
18. DOF assigns two fisheries extension officersto advise fish farmers. Sch. 7.c
Status of Compliance
Complied
Partially complied.
Partially complied.
Partially complied.
19. Provide (a) extension and demonstration servicesthrough DEM( now DAB); (b) agricultural inputsthrough BADC; (c) credit through BRDB and othersources; these agencies to be suitably strengthenedon a priority basis. Sch. 7.d Being complied.
Status of ComplianceLoan Covenants
Being complied.
Partially complied. SeeNos. 7(1) and (ii); 8and 9.
On-going
Partially complied; agro-socioeconomic surveydone in 1985 reportsubmitted in 1987. Plansto conduct another atfull development period.
Comp lied
Complied but releaseswere delayed.
Appendix 10Page 3 of 3
35
20. Make available adequate and timely farm inputsupply with appropriate credit arrangements.Sch. 7.e
21. Operation and maintenance of feeder godownsand market facilities by Ministry of Food,central godowns by village cooperatives orrural institutions; power transmissionlines by BRDB and telephone system by BTTB.Sch. 8.a
22. Project office to remain for a period of notless than 2 years for initial O&M and withassistance from consultants and otherconcerned agencies prepare implementation planfor 0&M including water management, agriculturalsupporting services and farmers' organizations,a year before Project Completion and submittedto the Bank for its concurrence, by June 1982.Sch. 8.b
23. BWDB takes over 0&M of embankment, pumpingstations and irrigation and drainage facilitieswhile beneficiary farmers handles O&M of farmditches and drains. Sch. 8.c
24. Review and improve rates and system ofcollecting charges on irrigated agriculturalland serviced by irrigation and drainagenetworks (a) to recover all O&M costs andreasonable portion of capital cost and (b) toensure that the proceeds be used to cover O&Mcost and capital cost one year prior to ProjectCompletion. Sch. 9
25. Provide the Bank adequate data on cropproduction, farm income and water managementand income distribution for post-evaluationas well as baseline data on socioeconomicaspects for the ongoing assessment and post-evaluation. Sch. 10
26. Any other external financing for the Projectshall be on terms and conditions acceptableto the Bank. Sch. 11
27. Make available all local currency fundrequired from Borrower's budget as andwhen required. Sch. 12
Being complied.
Being complied.
A Piopos.d at Appraisal
Inter Departmental CoordinationCommittee (10CC)
Secretary of MPWF (Chairman)Chairman of BWDBSenior Officials of concrned
aqencies
Pro4,c t CoordinatIonCommits.. (PcC)
PrnIpct Director (ChairmantAsit Deputy Comml.sfon,rOf lu-era In chug, of conc.rn,d
agenciesReprirsantativet of Unions
_______ Admini i trstsv Control
- - - - Techiiicst Control
— .....Coordination
r Q•iik Financing) uotlei the Pio(ect
IOther ResourcesFinancing
CD
t)
CD
N
CD
U
CD
i-j.
CD
Cf
CD
NJ
N
C.'
'Ix
ORGANIZATION CHART
. r
ORGANIZATION CHART
Ministry of
Planning
PlanningCommission ERD
B. During Project Implementation
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLESREPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
Ministry of
Ministry of
Ministry of Ministry of
Food
Agriculture
LGRD IWDFC
Directorate I I
of Food ` BADC DAE DOF IRDP BWDB
Ministry of
Energy Inter-Departmental CoordinationCommittee (IDCC)
Secretary of IWDFC (Chairman)Chairman of BWDBSenior Officials of Concerned
AgenciesBPDB
Officerin charge
' I i Project Coordinationf Chief Engineer Committee (PCCI
' South East ZarwSupt. Engineer (Chairmen)Add. Deputy Commissioner
Officer Officer Officer Officer Supt. Officer 01(icers in chsrge of concernedin charge in charge in charge in charge Engineer in charge """""""' Agencies
1 iiRepresentatives of Unions
Consultants
wJ
Input I DemonstrationSupply Farm
ExecutiveEngineers
_`
Powermbankment Transmission
e^ r IrrigationGO-downs 9++ LinesDrainage
Extention Co-operative RoadsCredits
Administrative Control
-----^ Technical Control
Co-ordination m
Bank Financing NI under the Proiect p d
GJ^^ Other Resources '+r
Financing
RURAL 0EV. OFFICERBRDB
Total Staff 16
INSPECTORS
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER(MECH)
Total Staff = 130
OD
SECTIONAL SECTIONAL SECTIONALOFFICERS OFFICERS OFFICERS
SAE (Ml SAE (C)
SDE Sub-DIi4s4on.J EnIn..rSAE Sub-MsIsIan Englnssc(U) M.ctisnlcaj Engln..r(C) CMI Engni
SAE IM) I I SAE (Ml
ORGANIZATION CHARTC. Propoe.dforO&M
PROJECT DIRECTORTotal No. of Staff (TS) 336
DEPUTY DIRECTOR ACCOUNTS OFFICER
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER(CIVIL)
Total Staff = 103
-!i
IRRIGATION u CANALCOLLECTORS (2)BLOCKING AND I READERS (2)
LAND ASSESSMENT ZILLADARS (8)
TS 42 !i J PATMARY (30)
SDE/MATLAB I I SDE/CHANDPUR I I SDE/KALIPUR
SDE/MATLAB
SOE/KALIPUR
UDDAMDI PPS
EKLASPUR PBS! I DUBGI BPS
KALIPUR PPS
_I _____ -a
SAE(M)J] [ SAE(C)2.
____ I
39Appendix 12Page 1 of 2
ESTIMATED DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE FLOODS OF 1987 AND 1988
1. Bangladesh is situated on the delta through which most of the excess rainfalland snowmelt emanating from the Himalayan mountains drains through three major rivers intothe Bay of Bengal. The Ganges River, about 2,570 km. long, enters from the west anddrains almost the entire southern side of the central Himalayan range through the plainsof north-central India. Its drainage area outside of Bangladesh represents 95 per centof the total catchment of 1.03 million sq km. The Brahmaputra River, about 2,900 kmlong, enters Bangladesh from the north and drains the northern side of the Himalayan rangeas well as the Indian States of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, and 92 per cent of its totaldrainage area of 0.6 million sq km is outside of Bangladesh. The Meghna River, about 950km in length, enters from the north-east and drains the Indian States of Meghalaya andTripura whose watershed is 55 per cent of the total drainage area of about 0.08 millionsq km and which receive the highest rainfall in the world. Bangladesh is predominantlyflat and low-lying and more than 60 per cent of the 144,000 sq km total area is 6 m orless above mean sea level.
2. Monsoon failure for most of the South Asian sub-continent did occur in 1987.Depressions from the Bay of Bengal usually travel north westward extending up to thewestern India. This typical course drastically changed in 1987. Almost all thedepressions at that time, with the exception of one or two, travelled northwards producingexcessive rainfall in Bangladesh, Assam, Bihar, West Bengal, Bhutan and Nepal. As aconsequence these areas were flooded. The recorded rainfall in Bangladesh during themonths of July and August, in particular, were two or three times as much as the normalvalue. On the other hand, the devastating flood of 1988 was caused largely by rainfallin the catchment area lying outside of Bangladesh. The situation was aggravated byexcessive local rainfall in some northern areas of the country during the latter part ofAugust. Rainfall in these areas was caused by a stationary low pressures that was formedin the foothills of the Himalayas adjoining the country. Thus, climatic variability playsa dominant role in the creation of the floods.
3. The comparative statistic for the 1987 and 1988 floods were as follows:
A. Flood Peak (Return Period, Years) 1987 19881. Brahinaputra at Babadurabad 74,000 cms (6 yrs) 99,500 cnis (97 yrs)2. Ganges at Harding Bridge 113,000 cms (8 yrs) 132,000 cms (39 yrs)3. Padma at Baruria 76,000 cms (50 yrs) 72,300 cms (31 yrs)4. ghna at Bhairab 15,100 cms (4 yrs) 19,800 cms (30 yrs)
B. Area Inundated 1/ 57,270 sq kin 81,831 sq km
C. Flood Levels1. Meghna, Chandpur (HWL)
HFL Peak Level 4.70 m on 22/8/87 in on 29/8/882. Meghna, Chandpur (LWL)
HFL eak Level 4.32 m on 21/8/87 4.86 in on 03/9/88
Sources: UNDP (1989) Bangladesh Flood Policy Study, Final Report.Abmad, M. (1988) Deluge in the Delta in Flood in Bangladesh.Matin, M.A. & M. A. Husain (1988) Hydrological Aspects of the 1988 Flood in
Flood in Bangladesh.
1/ Both flood events exceeded the highest recorded area damaged in 1974 which was 52,000sq.km.
(Reference in text: page 14, para. 52)
40
Appendix 12Page 2 of 2
4. The 1987 floods inundated 36 per cent of the country and caused widespreaddestruction. Even before repair could be fully completed, the other unprecedented floodof 1988 occurred and affected 84 per cent of the country involving more than 40% of thetotal population of 110 million. The flood extended across 53 of the 64 districts of thecountry, covering 323 of the country's 460 IJpazilas (sub-district). Official death tollas a direct result of the flood was 1,644 persons while more than 735 deaths were causedsubsequently by diarrheal diseases. Mre than 2 million hectares of crops were damaged,as were extensive parts of the flood control, drainage, and irrigation schemes, transportand communications system, and social infrastructure.
5. The damages on some sample specific sectors of the country caused by the 1987 and1988 floods, as reported by the United Nations were: (a) on Agriculture - $87.1 millionin 1987 and $168.0 million in 1988; (b) on Flood Control and Irrigation - $25.7 millionin 1987 and $126.0 million in 1988; and (c) on Roads and Highways - $81.0 million in 1987and $164.8 million in 1988.
6. BWDB's (1988,1989) assessment of flood damage to flood control, irrigation anddrainage facilities country-wide and project-wide basis were as follows:
Country-Wide MDIP
ITEMS Unit 1987 1988 1987 1988
a. Embankment
Km 1179.0 2314.5
37.2 47.1
b. Canals
Km 165.0 993.4
67.5 208.2
c. Protective rks
Km 80.0 357.7
4.6 12.5
d. Structures
Nos. 692.0 1956.0
19.0 399.0
BWDB (1989) Assessment of Flood Damage Under BWDB Projects During 1988BWDB (1988) 1987 Flood Damage Estinates
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