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Walter Conway, QSA 403 Labs, LLC PCI DSS Gap Analysis Briefing The University of Chicago October 1, 2012

PCI DSS Gap Analysis Briefing - University of Chicago · PCI DSS Gap Analysis Briefing ... UofC’s PCI Gap Analysis . ... Reporting - Debriefing session at conclusion of onsite

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Walter Conway, QSA

403 Labs, LLC

PCI DSS Gap Analysis Briefing

The University of Chicago

October 1, 2012

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 2

Agenda  The PCI DSS ecosystem

-  Key players, roles -  Cardholder data - Merchant levels and SAQs

 UofC’s PCI Gap Analysis

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 3

Walt Conway and 403 Labs  PCI QSA, consultant, blogger, trainer, speaker, author

-  Former Visa VP -  Consult with schools to become PCI compliant

 403 Labs: Information security consulting firm -  PCI QSA and PA-QSA, ASV, and PCI forensic investigator (PFI),

P2PE (QSA and PA-QSA)

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 4

Some PCI DSS Basics  Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

 Goal is to protect Cardholder Data -  And to keep UofC out of the headlines -  PCI does not make you secure

 If you take plastic, PCI applies to you

 PCI Scope includes people, processes, and systems -  “Store, process, or transmit” cardholder data (UofC’s

Cardholder Data Environment) -  And all connected systems

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 5

Some PCI DSS Basics  PCI is a program, not a project

 Two things you need to accept about PCI -  Your costs have gone up -  You will change the way you do business

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 6

The PCI Ecosystem

Manufacturers

PCI PTS Pin Entry Devices

Ecosystem of payment devices, applications, infrastructure and users

Software Developers

PCI PA-DSS Payment

Applications

PCI Security

Merchants & Service

Providers

PCI DSS Secure

Environments

P2PE

P2PE

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 7

PCI DSS: 6 Goals, 12 Requirements

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 8

Key Players

 PCI Security Standards Council - Global forum to enhance global payment security - Multiple standards: PCI DSS, PA-DSS, PCI PTS, and

P2PE -  Approve assessors (QSAs) and scan vendors (ASVs) -  Develop Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) -  Develop and publish PCI documentation

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 9

Key Players  Five Payment brands

-  Track compliance and enforce standards (fines, sanctions)

-  Determine event response (forensics)

-  Define merchant levels

 Acquirers (Merchant Banks) and processors -  Set UofC’s merchant level -  Determine UofC’s compliance -  Approve compensating controls

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 10

PCI Compliance is Widespread U.S. PCI DSS Compliance Status

Merchant Level Estimated Population

Size

Estimated % of Visa

Transactions

PCI DSS Compliance Validation

Validated Not Storing

Prohibited Data

Level 1 Merchant (>6M) 403 50% 97% 100%

Level 2 Merchant ( 1-6M) 1058 13% 93% 100%

Level 3 Merchant (>6M) 3,218 < 5% 60% N/A

Level 4 Merchant (<1M) ~ 5,000,000 32% Moderate** TBD

* As of June 30, 2012 **Level 4 compliance is moderate among stand-alone terminal merchants, but lower among merchants using integrated payment applications

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 11

Who are the High Risk Merchants?

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 12

Who are the High Risk Merchants?

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 13

Merchant Level Determines Validation Level Visa and MasterCard Amex

1 >6 Million trans/yr, by brand

•  Annual on-site assessment •  Quarterly network scan by Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) •  Report on Compliance (ROC)

•  Annual on-site Security Audit •  Quarterly network scan by ASV

2 >1 Million trans/yr, by brand

Visa: •  Annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) •  Quarterly network scan by ASV MasterCard: •  Same as Level 1

•  Quarterly network scan ASV

3 >20K

ecommerce

•  Annual SAQ •  Quarterly network scan by ASV

•  Recommend quarterly network scan by ASV

4 Determined by acquirer: •  Annual SAQ •  Quarterly network scan by ASV

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 14

Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ)  Level 3 and 4 merchants self-assess

 Shortened SAQ only if no electronic cardholder data

Card-not-present merchants, all cardholder data functions outsourced, no electronic cardholder data storage

A

Imprint-only merchants, no electronic cardholder data storage B

Stand-alone terminal merchants, no electronic cardholder data storage B

Merchants with POS systems connected to the Internet, no electronic cardholder data storage

C

Merchants who process cards on isolated virtual terminals connected to the Internet

C-VT

All other merchants and service providers D

13 Items

29 Items

80 Items

280+ Items

51 Items

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 15

Cardholder Data

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 16

Cardholder Data

  PAN: OK to store first six and/or last four digits

Source: PCI SSC

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 17

Why Store Cardholder Data?  Policy: No electronic card data stored on any

UofC device

 But what about …? -  Recurring payments – acquirer has alternatives -  Chargebacks, refunds – let acquirer store PAN -  Legal requirements – these apply to banks -  Paper receipts – reprogram/upgrade terminals to

truncate both receipts -  Payment applications – confirm with vendor or

acquirer that software does not store sensitive data

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 18

SAQ A  Card-not-present merchants only

-  E-commerce, mail order/telephone order (MOTO) -  Never applies in a face-to-face POS environment

 Card processing is outsourced -  No cardholder data stored, processed, or transmitted

on your systems

 Service provider is PCI compliant

 Only paper records, not received electronically

 No electronic cardholder data

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 19

SAQ A Merchant

Payment card data are entered and processed

on PCI compliant service provider’s site.

Students log into school site, and are redirected to PCI compliant

service provider to enter payment. No payment data are stored, processed, or transmitted on

school’s systems.

PAY

School

Website Secure

Third-Party Website

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 20

SAQ B  For merchants with stand-alone dial-up terminals

or imprinters (aka, zip-zap machines) -  Brick-and-mortar, MOTO, or e-commerce

 Dial-up terminals -  Not connected to any other systems -  Not connected to Internet

 Paper records, not received electronically

 No electronic cardholder data

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 21

SAQ C

 Payment application and Internet connection on the same device -  Card-present or card-not-present merchants -  Can be POS or shopping cart application

 Device not connected to any other system

 Store only paper records, not received electronically

 No electronic cardholder data

 Payment application vendor provides remote support securely

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 22

SAQ C-VT  Merchant uses a virtual terminal

-  Web browser connected to processor that hosts payment processing function

-  Enter card data manually (no mag stripe reader), via a secure connection, one transaction at a time

-  Brick-and-mortar or MOTO

 Single payment terminal, isolated, fixed

 Other requirements same as SAQ C

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 23

SAQ D  Everybody else

 280 questions

 All 12 PCI requirements

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 24

SAQ A, Outsourcing OMG!  “Customer Service”

- Merchant outsources e-commerce payments (hosted) - MOTO, fax orders persist -  Staff enter transactions on their workstations - Workstations are not isolated -  Result: staff workstations and all connected systems

are in PCI scope

 Result: SAQ D -  280+ questions -  Full PCI DSS including scans and pen testing

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 25

Other SAQ OMG!  Dial-up POS terminal (SAQ B)

-  Card numbers on daily batch tape -  Non-compliant PIN entry devices -  Solution: upgrade or replace device

 Virtual terminal (SAQ C or C-VT) -  Not isolated – device connects to other systems -  Not dedicated – device used for other purposes -  Solution: segment network, restrict terminal use

 Result: SAQ D

 Conclusion: Not easy to qualify for a shortened SAQ

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 26

“Requirement 0” – Minimize Scope  What it says:

-  Stop and take a breath -  Don’t accept status quo as fixed

 What it means: - Minimize scope to reduce PCI cost and effort -  Your mantra: “If you don’t need it, don’t keep it”

 How to comply: -  Accept the two “Laws of PCI”:

Your costs will go up. You will change the way you do business.

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 27

UofC’s PCI DSS Gap Analysis   Identify compliance gaps: “no harm, no foul”

-  Meet with all UofC merchants and IT -  Understand business needs, processes, technology -  Identify gaps and recommend remediation options -  Provide options so merchants can meet business requirements

 Goal: minimize UofC’s PCI scope (and risk) -  Simplify PCI compliance validation -  Identify business process changes (often hard!) -  Identify infrastructure changes (expensive)

 Reporting -  Debriefing session at conclusion of onsite -  Written report

University of Chicago PCI DSS Overview | Walter Conway, QSA, | 403 Labs, LLC | © 2012 28

Thank You Your comments? Questions? Thoughts?

Walter Conway [email protected] 877.403.5227, ext. 223 (or: 415.690.6876) www.403labs.com

 Follow my PCI column at storefrontbacktalk.com

 Higher Education PCI blog (Treasury Institute) treasuryinstitutepcidss.blogspot.com