Paul Thompson University of KwaZulu-Natal

Journal of Natal and Zulu History Vol. 29, 2011

20

The Natal Militia: Defence of the Colony, 1893-1910

Paul Thompson

University of KwaZulu-Natal

In no part of the British Empire is the subject of Defence of more importance than in the Colony of Natal, a Colony that I am justified in describing as one of the most dangerous corners of the Empire. In the past it has been the cockpit of South Africa, and it may yet keep up its unpleasant reputation.

- Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Leader, Commandant of Natal Volunteers, 19021

[...]With the large semi-barbarous and warlike Native races of South Africa, wars have been frequent in the past, and war in the future is a contingency that must be provided for. It is the most natural way of asserting himself which the Native has, and if the white man is to remain master here, he must not only govern wisely and humanely, but be always ready to meet force with superior force if necessary.

- Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Bru-de-Wold, Commandant of Natal Militia, 19072

Introduction

The British Colony of Natal became self-governing in 1893. “Responsible

government”, as self-government was called at the time, required a polity of British settlers

sufficiently mature to organize and maintain a society in normal circumstances. It was part of

the evolution of settlement in the British Empire, but there were wide differences between

British colonies in America, Africa and the Antipodes, especially in respect of the indigenous

populations upon whose living space the Europeans intruded. The population of Natal was

estimated at 584,326 in 1894, of which 503 208 were Africans, 35,411 were Indians and only

45,707 were Europeans.3

1 Colony of Natal, Report of the Commandant of Volunteers for the Year 1902 [Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1903], p. 1. 2 Natal Government Gazette (hereafter cited as NGG) 3625A (Supplement No. 17, Oct. 1, 1907), Government Notice 56 of 1907 (Sept. 24, 1907): Annual Report of the Commandant of Militia for 1906 (hereafter cited as CR 1906), p. 1033. Commandant’s Reports will be cited as CR with the appropriate year and as CGR for 1908 and 1909. 3 Colony of Natal, Statistical Year Book for the Year 1901 (cited hereafter as SYB; Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1902), p. 3.

It was unusual for so few Europeans to have charge of other

groups, and indeed the British Crown reserved the right to approve Colonial legislation


21

governing them or not.4

Responsible government entailed self-defence. A colony was expected to establish a

defence force of its own on a sound footing. Of course, it was not expected to repel strong

foreign enemies single-handedly – Imperial forces would do that and the colonial ones would

assist them – but it was expected to deal with internal troubles. There was an Imperial

garrison at Fort Napier, in the colonial capital of Pietermaritzburg, but it was understood that

this would be withdrawn in five years, during which time the Colony would make its

defensive arrangements.

5

It is the purpose of this article to describe the establishment of Natal’s defence force

and its career from 1893 to 1910, the period in which the Colony enjoyed responsible

government. The article stresses that Natal was a frontier society, and the settler population

had the two-fold duty of protecting themselves against a large indigenous population which

they perceived increasingly as inimical to their regime, and of cooperating with Imperial

authorities in securing South Africa and the Empire. These duties led rapidly to a

militarization of settler society and the modernization of military structures and matériel.

6

The Colony had a variety of small military corps based in the few towns and scattered

country centres. They consisted of men who had volunteered for service. They were armed

and uniformed by the government, but their tours of duty and military training were limited,

and they were greatly inferior compared to the regular troops of the Imperial garrison. In

1895 there were eight corps – four of Mounted Rifles (940 officers and men), two of infantry

The Volunteer Force

4 See Edgar H. Brookes and Colin deB. Webb, A History of Natal (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1965), pp. 176-180; and Bill Guest, “Towards responsible government,” chapter 9 in Natal and Zululand From Earliest Times to 1910: A new history (edited by Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest; Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press and Shuter & Shooter, 1989), pp. 245-246. 5 Sir Henry McCallum, quoted in The Natal Mercury, Jan. 28, 1905: “The Colony’s Defences,” cutting in Archives of the Lieutenant-Governor and Governor of the Colony of Natal (1842-1910), hereafter cited as GH (for “Government House”), Volume 510, Minute G179/1905, p. 155. This and other records groups are in the Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository of the Natal Archives. Documents are cited by volume, minute, and page, as applicable. 6 Contemporary terminology which is used in this article is intended simply to preserve an historical context. This is necessary for an accurate understanding of legal (such as “Native”, “Location”, and “tribe”) and military terms (such as “departmental corps”, “special service”, and “magazine rifle”). The author is aware that some contemporary terms may be jarring to readers unaccustomed to them, and seeks to avoid those which may be offensive.


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(422), one of field artillery (84 and four guns) and one of coastal artillery, but was called a

naval corps (86 and two guns). Altogether they numbered 1,532 officers and men.7

The responsible government put these on a firm footing by the Volunteer Act, No. 23

of 1895. The existing corps could be combined or disbanded, and new corps could be

formed, at the discretion of the Governor, the Crown’s representative in the Colony, who was

commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Force; however, he was to appoint a Commandant

(who would actually command it) and the officers of the Permanent Staff, with headquarters

in the capital. The Commandant could nominate staff and field officers for the Governor’s

approval. The officer commanding a corps could appoint officers in it, but only if they were

first elected by at least half of the members of the corps. Service in the corps was for three

years. A Volunteer had to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen, and could not be a

member of any other corps. The Governor could order out all or part of the Volunteer Force

“for military service in aid of the civil power, or against an enemy or to repel invasion”, in

which event they might be placed under the Imperial officer commanding Her Majesty’s

Forces in the Colony.

8

Colonel John G. Dartnell, an officer of energy and experience, was continued in

office. He had been commissioned in the 86th Regiment in 1855, distinguished himself and

received promotion during the Indian Mutiny, and retired as a Major. In 1872 he had come to

Natal, where he organized the Colony’s Mounted Police in 1874, and also was appointed

Commandant of Volunteers.

9

The bulk of the Volunteer Act dealt with administration and discipline, which were

embodied in a set of regulations. The Act came into force at the beginning of 1896,

10

7 Colony of Natal, Departmental Reports 1895, Report of the Commandant of Volunteers for the Year 1894-95: F51 (Annexure B). The total had been 1490 at the end of 1893 (ibid. 1893-4: F1). The Commandant’s Reports for 1895-1900 appear in the annual compilations Departmental Reports and thereafter as separate publications. 8 Colony of Natal, Acts of the Parliament of the Colony of Natal, passed in the Session of the Year 1895, being the Third Session of the First Colonial Parliament (Pietermaritzburg, William Watson, 1895), pp. 49-59: Act No. 23 of 1895. The Act is also reproduced in Eric Goetzsche, “Rough but Ready”: An Official History of the Natal Mounted Rifles and Its Antecedent and Associated Units 1854-1969 [Durban, Natal Mounted Rifles, 197], pp. 96-101. 9 See and cf H.P. Holt, The Mounted Police of Natal (London, John Murray, 1913), pp. 13-15; J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion 1906 and of Dinuzulu’s Arrest, Trial and Expatriation (London, Macmillan, 1913), pp. 38-39. Darrell Hall, The Hall Handbook of the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (edited by Fransjohan Pretorius and Gilbert Torlage; Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1999), p. 94. 10 CR 1896: F45.

and


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during the next few years Dartnell organized the Volunteer Force on modern lines. The

individual corps uniforms were replaced by the standard khaki of Imperial units.11 District

Adjutants were appointed for the mounted troops. They made house-to-house inspections in

the towns but also increased contact in the country districts. They gave special attention to

drill, care of equipment and care of horses, and checked irregularities that corps officers

failed to notice. An ‘undesirable element’ existed especially in the mounted corps, and these

‘wasters’ were weeded out and turned away. By 1899, the failure to maintain horses properly

was largely confined to the towns, notably Durban, where men knew little about horses

because very few owned them.12

Recruits were assisted to buy uniforms and equipment from Corps Funds, but these

proved inadequate, and in 1897 the government increased the capitation grant to corps from

£2 to £3 which enabled them to provide these items without further cost from their funds. In

1897 the government made a special grant of £2,500 and in 1898 increased the Remount

Fund so that mounted corps could make loans to young men who needed to buy horses in

order to join.

13

Men in the mounted corps provided their own horses, which the government insured

for service, and there had been many abuses, especially in the towns, where men would

borrow or rent them, and these were now checked. Volunteer Headquarters took charge of

the Insurance Fund in 1896. This was important in 1897 when there was a severe wave of

horse sickness in the coastal districts. Twenty-six percent of the horses of the Durban-based

Natal Mounted Rifles died. Practically all the Port Shepstone troop of the Border Mounted

Rifles had to be remounted.

14

Marksmanship was vital, and regular practice was encouraged to improve shooting.

There was an annual Volunteer Central Meeting in May, where teams of Volunteers

competed for Government Challenge cups. Most represented mounted and infantry units, but

even the naval corps sent a team. The infantry and naval corps were rearmed with Martini-

Metford carbines and rifles in 1894 – the first colonial units to get them – but they were

11 Ibid. 1895: F46-48; 1897: F1. 12 Ibid. 1896: F45-46; 1897: F42; 1898: F1. 13 Ibid. 1896: F45; 1897: F1; 1898: F1. 14 Ibid. 1896: F45; 1897: F2.


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heavy for the infantry, and in 1898 Martini-Enfields were issued to them. The mounted men

were armed with Swinburne-Henry carbines, many going back to 1876, and Martini-Henrys,

which were more recent but whose barrels corroded badly because of the new smokeless

powder. The Swinburne-Henrys were replaced by Martini-Metfords, and the Martini-Henrys

had their barrels replaced.15 Perhaps because of these changes, musketry remained

indifferent, but Dartnell put the responsibility on corps officers. The field artillery’s

cumbersome 9-pounder guns were replaced in 1897, and the corps became a full six-gun

battery in 1898. An officer was appointed District Adjutant for artillery and it was arranged

that he receive training at Woolwich.16

The corps were in the habit of having annual ten-day encampments at convenient

times (but most preferred Easter time) and places in their districts. Performance depended

largely on the local community, e.g. the Midlands corps generally drilled well and looked

smart, but those in the South, while they drilled well, were “somewhat slovenly”. Dartnell

was particularly concerned at the attitude of employers and employees in Durban who did not

like taking so much time off work for infantry and naval training. The camps went well

enough in 1895, but Dartnell wanted corps commanders to learn to handle larger units, and in

1896 he organized the mounted units in the Midlands into “flying columns” and ordered the

leaders to manoeuvre them together in accord with a “special idea”, and the Durban corps fell

in with them. In 1897 the corps were diverted by duty as Rinderpest Guards, and not all

could attend camps, which were held separately again. In 1898 he held a general

encampment near Richmond for all the corps, at which “field firing under service conditions

was carried out to a large extent”. The officer commanding Imperial forces in Natal was

invited to attend, and reciprocated by inviting Volunteers to attend the Imperial manoeuvres

near Ladysmith. In 1899 the general encampment at Balgowan was visited by the Governor.

There were field days with the Imperial troops at Nottingham Road. “Besides the usual

Regimental, Squadron, Battery, Troop, and Company drills, the ‘attack formation’ was

practised and carried out satisfactorily.”

17

15 Ibid. 1896: F46, F48; 1897: F2; 1898: F2-3. 16 Ibid. 1896: F46; 1897: F2; 1898: F1-3.

17 Ibid. 1893-4: F1-4; 1895: F45-47; 1896: F46; 1897: F1-2; 1898: F2; 1899: F1. The Act (Section 3) defined Corps as “a Naval Corps, a Troop of Mounted Rifles, Battery of Artillery, a Company of Infantry, Medical Staff, or Ambulance Volunteers; also any Corps, Troops, companies, when formed into Contingents, Regiments, or Battalions”; a Contingent as “two or more Troops or Companies combined for administrative purposes”; and


25

Dartnell was pleased with the results. He recalled in 1898 that “many persons

foretold the ruin of the [Volunteer] Force”, but the reverse had happened, and he considered

the Natal Volunteers “very far ahead in Equipment, Armament, Organization and general

fitness to take the field”.18

The strength of the Volunteer Force at the end of 1896 was 1,454 officers and men

and at the end of 1898, 1,551 officers and men

In 1899 they were ready for the South African War.

19

The Volunteer Act provided for a Reserve Force, but none was organized. Instead the

Volunteer Force depended for augmentation and back-up on the Colony’s School Cadet

Corps and Rifle Associations. Regulations for the organizing of boys in government and

government-aided schools into Cadet Corps were approved in 1895, and a capitation grant

was made to allow the purchase of uniforms and ammunition and other needs. A standard

uniform was adopted; each school had its badge. The boys were issued the old Snider

carbines and fifty rounds of ammunition a year.

– hardly enough to repel an invasion or

confront an enemy in large numbers. Obviously in 1898, the Colonial government was

thinking of fighting in collaboration with Imperial forces against the Boer Republics. In his

annual reports the Commandant mentions no particular enemy, but the thrust of his

programme was to provide a defence force for European-style warfare, which suggests

fighting the Boer, not the Zulu. But before describing the Volunteers in the war, it is

necessary to describe more fully Natal’s defence system, for there were other units which

were part of it, and the Volunteer Force cannot be considered apart from them.

20

The Commandant did not envisage attaching the Cadets to the Volunteer Corps, but

a Regiment or Battalion as “a combination of any of the above in a body not exceeding an establishment fixed by regulations under the Act for the regiment or battalion”. It is not surprising that the terms are used fairly freely in reports and correspondence, and in time an increasing switch from “corps” to “regiment” as units became larger. In this paper I try to be consistent with the use of “corps”, but admit to not being quite satisfied with it. 18 CR 1897: F3. “I know the rooted objections of the average Englishmen to anything approaching military service, as it is styled ‘being a soldier’,” (1896: F47.) He complained about the “great ignorance” about Volunteer service in the Colony, which he attributed to officers not providing more information about it (and thus attracting new men) at troop meetings (1897: F3). 19 Ibid. 1896: F49 (Annexure A); 1898: F13. 20 Ibid. 1895: F49.


26

regarded them as “a most valuable ‘nursery’ for the Volunteer Force”,21,22

In 1898 the camp was at the Agricultural Society’s Show Grounds in

Pietermaritzburg, attended by 920 Cadets representing twenty-six corps. Nineteen schools

competed for the Shield (Maritzburg College won), and there was “White” Cup for the Junior

Cadets (Estcourt School won it). The march past took place at the Garrison Polo Ground.

The Administrator of the Colony

I consider the Cadet movement worthy of every encouragement, as I believe it will prove a valuable factor in fostering a military spirit in the rising generation, as well as providing a feeder to our Volunteer Force. The lads are at an age when the principles of discipline and drill once taught are never forgotten, and I feel sure the Colony and Empire will, in the near future, receive full value from what is now being done.

Aided and abetted by the Natal Education Department the Cadet movement

burgeoned. At the first general encampment in July 1896 in Pietermaritzburg, 1,116 Cadets

representing twenty-two corps gathered for four days under the supervision of Volunteer

Staff, assisted by instructors from the schools. There was a rifle competition held for a

challenge shield provided by public subscription (Hilton College won), and on the last day

there was an inspection and a march past before the Governor. Next year’s encampment was

at Lord’s Grounds in Durban over five days, with 940 Cadets representing twenty-four corps.

There were a signals detachment, an ambulance detachment, a bugle band, and seven drum

and fife bands. The boys had Martini-Metford carbines now. Twenty-three schools

competed for the Challenge Shield (Hilton won again). Besides the inspection by the

commanding officer of the Imperial forces and marched past, there was a “miscellaneous

concert” by the boys which approximately 3,000 people attended, and a church service.

23

21 Ibid. 1898: F4. 22 Ibid. 1896: F48. 23 In the absence of the Governor from the Colony an Administrator was appointed in his stead.

made a speech and presented the shield and medals. The

miscellaneous concert was held in the Town Hall, and the Natal Carbineers band played

another evening at the Show Grounds. The Cadets also went to Fillis’ Circus, and the 7th

Hussars gave a grand Wild West Show for them. At the end of 1898 there were 2,081 Cadets

(1,304 under fourteen, 777 over fourteen) in twenty-seven corps, with twenty-six instructors.

The 1899 encampment, again at Lord’s in Durban, had 995 Cadets of thirty-one corps.

(Hilton College won the Shield and Dundee School the Cup.) The mayor took the review and


27

made the presentations at the race track (presumably the military was occupied elsewhere).24

The Volunteer Force had to wait a while to reap the full benefits of the Cadet

movement, but it had a ready back-up in the Rifle Associations. These had been established

in 1862 to organize shooting for the purpose of defence.

25 There were sixty-two associations

in 1898.26 Members of the associations could buy rifles and ammunition at cost from the

government; however, the government had little control over the associations, and one could

decide for itself whether or not to defend its locality in an emergency.27

Dartnell had little use for the Rifle Associations until new regulations for them were

adopted in 1898. These required members of an association to live in the magisterial division

in which it was registered and forbade multiple memberships. A capitation grant of £1 was

made to an association for every member who owned a good rifle and made himself efficient

in shooting. In the event of war or disturbance the local magistrate could call them out for

service.

28 Dartnell encouraged marksmanship by competitions, most notably the Annual

Central Bisley sponsored by the Natal Rifle Association in Pietermaritzburg.29

The existing associations did not have to accept the new regulations, but most of the

important ones did. Dartnell wanted those which did not disbanded. He especially wanted

all members to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen,

30 and he was concerned that Boers in

the northern districts refused to do so – many said that they would go with the South African

Republic in the event of war. Those in the Biggarsberg seemed to be buying an unusually

large amount of ammunition. (A police search also discovered some Mauser rifles, but all of

them had been registered).31

24 CR 1895: F49; 1896: F47-48; 1897: F3-4; 1898: F4; 1899: F2. 25 [Colony of Natal.] Natal. Laws. 1862 [n.d., n.p.], No. 19, 1862. 26 Natal Almanac, Directory, and Yearly Register 1898 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1989), p. 589. 27 CR 1896: F47; 1987: F3; 1898: F3. Also, the Natal Rifle Association, the parent body, distributed a government grant of £200 each year to promote shooting generally; however, it tended to reward top marksmen (ibid. 1894: F5), and Dartnell insisted that it open up competitions to encourage the others to do better (ibid. 1895: F48). 28 Ibid. 1898: F3. 29 Ibid. 1895: F48; 1896: F46: 1899: F1, 47. 30 Ibid. 1899: F2. 31 Departmental Reports 1899, Annual Report of the Chief Commissioner of Police for the Year ending December 1899: F9. The Chief Commissioner’s Reports are cited CCP in the same manner as the Commandant’s (see n. 6).

Nonetheless, Dartnell believed that the Rifle Associations now

“formed a most valuable home defence force”, which could be called out to protect life and


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property and to prevent panic in an emergency when the local Volunteer Force Corps were

called away.32

There was also another body, which complemented the Volunteer Force – the Natal

Police, of which Dartnell was Chief Commissioner. The various police forces in the Colony

had been amalgamated and their functions rationalized by the Police Act of 1894, and the

Colony had been divided into eleven policing districts. The Mounted Police, which had been

the closest thing Natal had to a standing army, was retained in the guise of an efficient

Reserve or Field Force of about 150 men. It was based at headquarters in Pietermaritzburg,

and could be despatched to a trouble spot immediately.

33

Thus on the verge of war in 1899 Natal had, in the event of an emergency, a police

field force which could react at once, a Volunteer Force which could be mobilized quickly

and deployed, and Rifle Associations which could keep a degree of order in their absence.

There was a strong police force stationed in Zululand,

34

The Volunteer Force was called into service when Natal was invaded by Boer forces.

All of the corps, except the Umvoti Mounted Rifles which was on duty at Greytown, were

involved in the fighting around Ladysmith between October 1899 and June 1900. Twenty-

five Rifle Associations were called out. The campaign in Natal having ended, the Volunteers

were disbanded in October 1900, but a Volunteer Composite Regiment of 300 men was

formed for further service. The Volunteer forces were remobilized for a month and joined

“Mills’ Mobile Column”, and the Rifle Associations were again put on alert to meet another

Boer invasion through Zululand in the spring of 1901. There were no Cadet encampments

which had been annexed to Natal in

1897. The enemy at this time was perceived to be the South African Republic. The danger

was outside the Colony, although there was a potential fifth column of local Boers within.

The South African War and its lessons

32 CR 1898: F3. 33 CCP 1895: F1-2; 1896: F1; 1897. The Mounted Police had been established in 1878 (Act No. 6) as a semi-military unit – although it never got the artillery troop for which the law provided – and then frequently criticized by those who did not like this military aspect. It was later overextended by various government duties, ranging from the suppression of local disorders to the manning of quarantine stations against smallpox. (Ibid. 1803-4: F23-24.) 34 Ibid. 1898: F18-19, 23.


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and no Bisleys in 1900 and 1901.35

The Natal Police was also involved in operations around Greytown and Ladysmith,

where the northern districts’ units were besieged along with the Imperial and other Colonial

troops. The Native Police in Zululand was augmented and had several skirmishes with small

Boer forces. The Field Force remained in reserve, and otherwise the police had their hands

full with security, handling refugees, and then ferreting out enemy collaborators.

36

The Volunteers lost 181 officers and men in 1899-1900, most of them in the

operations around Ladysmith.

37 In disbanding them, Field Marshal Lord Roberts telegraphed

the Governor: “Please convey to the Prime Minister and Government of Natal my high

appreciation of the conduct of the Volunteers, and the spirit of the Colony in maintaining

them so long”.38 This was less than effusive praise, and, on reflection, Natal’s contribution to

British victory does seem rather modest. Major A.T.G. Wales of the Staff wrote the

Commandant’s report for 1901. Almost parenthetically, he added to it: “When the country is

again on a peace footing, it will be necessary to make a general re-organisation of the

Volunteer forces of Natal, past experience proving of great value in the preparations for the

future”.39

Dartnell had resigned as Commandant of Volunteers, but remained Chief

Commissioner of Police. Lieutenant-Colonel William Royston, commander of the Natal

Carbineers from 1881 to 1889, and Staff Officer of Volunteers since 1889, succeeded him as

Commandant in 1898.

40

35 CR 1899: F3; 1900: F1-8; 1901, pp. 3, 15-17. 1902, p. 3. 36 CCP 1899: F9-11; 1900: F12-13, 17; 1901, pp 4-6. 37 CR 1900: F3-7. 38 Ibid. F2. 39 Ibid. 1901, p. 4. 40 Colony of Natal, The Natal Civil Service List, corrected to 13th June 1899 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1899), p. 189.

Both Dartnell and Royston had been besieged in Ladysmith.

Royston died soon afterwards, and Dartnell resumed the commandantship. This it was

largely nominal, since he was away in the field, first as leader of the Volunteer Composite

Regiment in northern Natal, then of different Imperial units in the Transvaal and the Orange

Free State, and, finally, again in Natal. When the war ended in 1902, Dartnell was sixty-four.

He resigned, took leave, and retired to England in 1903. Major George Mansel, long-time


30

commander of the Zululand police, succeeded him as Chief Commissioner of Police.41

Dartnell’s successor as Commandant was an Imperial officer, Lieutenant-Colonel

Henry Peregrine Leader, 6th Dragoon Guards. The government took some time and care with

the appointment, which took effect on July 1, 1902.

42 The Imperial authorities wanted a re-

creation of the Colony’s defence force; Leader would oversee it and “institute such other

radical changes as might appear imperative”.43

In his first annual report, Colonel Leader expressed his surprise on discovering that

Natal was “entirely dependent on the Mother Country” for its defence. If Imperial troops left

the Colony, it would be “practically undefended”. He estimated that Natal had 12,000 men

available to defend it, but only 2,000 Volunteers were liable to do so. “Nine thousand able-

bodied men were content to have their Colony invaded.” If they had been embodied and put

on the border before the ultimatum, the result, he implied, might have been different.

44

The organisation of the Volunteer Force was perhaps the best suited for the past, when Imperial obligations were less pressing than they are at present; when, too, Imperial Troops [were] counted upon for any emergency that might arise. The test for War, however, has [proved] this organisation a failure, a failure as far as self-defence is concerned.

It was

time for a change:

45

The feeling among Volunteers cannot be gauged, but Wales’ remark above suggests

an awareness of the need for change. Lieutenant-Colonel Hilmer Theodore Bru-de-Wold,

District Adjutant in the South, who had led the Volunteer Force at the border in the spring of

1901, delivered a bitter post mortem on the Volunteer system a few years later, after he

became Commandant:

41 Holt, Mounted Police of Natal, pp. 149, 167-168, 174, 181. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 39. CCP 1901, pp.3-4; 1903, p. 3 42 CR 1902, p. 1. GH 511: G313/02, Governor to Prime Minister and reply, Mar. 21, 1902. There were several applicants for the position, but Col. E.M. Greene, of the Natal Carbineers, persuaded the Prime Minister and retiring Commandant that another Imperial officer, Lieut.-Col. W.R. Birdwood, should be appointed; however, Birdwood declined, but he recommended Leader, then commanding the 1st Battalion, Scottish Horse, “in De la Rey country”: “a 1st rate officer in the field, popular with officers and men”, who “will suit you in every way” The Prime Minister wrote to Lord Kitchener, requesting his secondment for five years. At the time Leader was thirty-seven years old and had been in service seventeen years. (See correspondence in GH 497, pp. 41-44: G196/20; and 543, pp. 52-89: G1378/01.) Leader was also appointed Controller of Arms from July 1, 1904. (Colony of Natal, The Natal Civil List, 1904 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1904), p. 213.) 43 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 41. 44 CR 1902, p. 2. 45 Ibid.


31

The Boer War killed Volunteering in Natal. Undoubtedly our Volunteers turned out with alacrity in 1899, eager to defend their country against the invader; but, having spent over a year in the Field, patiently and cheerfully, performing duties of the most arduous, and sometimes the most distasteful, nature, many of them returned to their homes to find business ruined, occupations gone, and future prospects nil; whilst their neighbours, who had remained behind, even when the Colony was in the clutches of the enemy, and practically at its last gasp, were prosperous, with extended business and bulging purses, having lived in health and comfort, while the Volunteers defended them and their interests. The Volunteer pondered over this, and learned his lesson, with the result that, after the War, our Regiments dwindled to half size. 46

In 1902 the Utrecht-Vryheid district of the Transvaal was annexed to Natal. The

Natal Border Police, a temporary unit, was established to keep the peace in the new

territory,

In 1893, the Colony of Natal had been given five years in which to put its defences in

order before the Imperial garrison was withdrawn. At the end of that time an Imperial crisis

upset all plans and the South African War showed that not nearly enough had been done. The

Colony’s time was up, but it seemed it would have to start all over again.

47 and a Burgher Bill was introduced in parliament to comprehend the greater

defence of the Colony, enlarged since 1895 by the addition of the “Northern District” and

Zululand. The bill was crude, and was withdrawn. An ad-hoc defence commission was set

up which took evidence and reported “upon the general measures proper to be taken for the

defence of the Colony, and also to advise as to the most suitable mode of constituting a

defence force”. The commission consisted of two members of parliament, two Imperial

officers, and three Colonial ones – Bru-de-Wold, Mansel, and Colonel Duncan McKenzie of

the Natal Carbineers.48 Of course, there was much input from Colonel Leader.49 The upshot

was a bill “to create a Militia Force” in the 1903 session. The bill was discussed and debated

thoroughly and passed by a large majority. It was gazetted in July, but it only came into force

the following March, and regulations were issued in December.50

46 CR 1906, p. 1038. Leader also found it “incredible” that several large and wealthy business firms refused to let their employees be members of the Active Militia. (Ibid. 1904, p. 9.) 47 CCP 1902, pp.3; 1903, p. 3; 1904, p. 2. 48 Colony of Natal, Debates of the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Natal. First Session of the Fourth Parliament (Pietermaritzburg, Times, 1903), XXXIII, 100. Hereafter this source is cited as Debates, with volume and page numbers. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 41. NGG 3304 (Feb. 17, 1903): GN 235/1903, Report of the Colonial Defence Commission, Oct. 31, 1902, pp. 168-175. GH 536, pp. 39-40: G670/02, Gov. to PM, June 14, 1902, and reply, June 25, 1902. 49 CR 1902, pp. 2-3. 50 NGG 3315 (May 14, 1903), pp. 473-478: GN 272/1903; 3337 (July 7, 1903), pp. 1063-1069: “Legislative Assembly, Natal. Bill No. 2, 1903 (as read a third time, and passed) ‘To Create a Militia Force’.” Debates, pp. 100-559 passim; 3440 (Nov. 20, 1904): GN 872/1904 (Dec. 10, 1904), pp. 1693-1729.


32

The Militia

The Militia Act, No. 36 of 1903 marked a radical change in attitude and policy. It

embraced the idea of compulsory military service, which is the basis of a true Militia. It

preserved the administrative structure of the Volunteer Force, but necessarily added much to

it.

Every male of European descent between the ages of eighteen and fifty was liable for

military service “for the repression of civil disturbance, rebellion or invasion”. The

Volunteer Force was now called the Active Militia. It comprised men who volunteered (or

were balloted to fill up the ranks) and were accepted in the various corps. The peacetime

establishment of the Active Militia could not exceed 4,000 officers and men, but the

Governor-in-Council could increase the strength in wartime. When called into active service,

the Governor-in-Council might place it “under the orders of the Commander of His Majesty’s

Regular Forces in the Colony, provided such officer shall not be below he substantive rank of

Major-General in the Army”.

The old Act’s Reserve, which had never been formed, now appeared as the Militia

Reserves. There were three classes – First Reserves, comprising unmarried men between

eighteen and thirty who were not in the Active Militia; Second Reserves, married men

between eighteen and thirty and all men between thirty-one and forty; and Third Reserves,

men between forty-one and fifty. The Reserves were to be organized in their districts and to

elect their officers, although they would be subject to District Commandants (as the District

Adjutants were now called) or other designated leaders if they were embodied and took the

field. The Governor could call out the Militia, Active and Reserves, for service when and

where they might be needed; only the Third Reserves were guaranteed service in their own

districts.

The clauses of the bill pertaining to Militia Reserves had elicited sharp debate in the

Legislative assembly over whether or not they should be called up at regular intervals for

training and instruction in shooting. Without training they would practically useless, but the

government would not have it, ostensibly because voters were not expecting it and would


33

react against it. Such was the opposition in the Assembly that the bill might be lost.51

Cadets and Rifle Associations continued, but the importance of the latter to home

defence would diminish when members were enrolled in the Reserves. The Act also allowed

the Governor to call out and organize Africans and Indians.

52

Leader was an Imperial regular officer, and seems to have been in tune with the

reformist impulse in the army following the South African War. He began his first annual

report to the Minister with a lecture of several paragraphs on “Imperial Defence” as a

collaborative venture of Mother Country and daughter Colonies, leading in due course to the

latter’s providing Imperial Reserves for the Empire. He stressed the importance of Durban as

the lifeline of Empire in the event the Suez Canal closed, and in November 1901, he

produced a plan for defence of the port which the Defence Commission approved.

Indeed, nothing much in fact

changed with the passage of the Act. Change depended on what was done in terms of it, and

the new Commandant had much to do with that. He started immediately, and did a lot even

before the Act came into force.

53

The Active Militia blossomed under his intense cultivation. At the end of 1902 its

strength was 1,864 officers and men. It was 3,197 at the end of 1903, and 3,449 at the end of

1904.

54 There was one general encampment for the Mounted Rifles, Field Artillery, and the

composite Natal Royal Regiment, and another for the Durban Light Infantry in 1903. They

went well, but there were so many recruits by 1904 that the annual general encampment had

to be abandoned in favour of more manageable regimental ones.55 Corps borrowed from

banks to buy uniforms, and Leader got the government to make grants for them.56

51 Debates, XXXIII. 226-227, 351-356, 585. 52 Colony of Natal, Acts of the Parliament of the Colony of Natal, passed in the First Session of the Fourth Colonial Parliament, 1903 (Pietermaritzburg, Times, 1903), pp. 108-124. See Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, chapter III for a review and critique of the Act and the reorganization under it. Sections 80 – 84 of the Militia Act provided that the Governor (who was also Supreme Chief) could call out Native, Indian, and coloured contingents, which would form part of the Militia when it was in service, and be utilized as scouts, drivers, &c, and be armed only in special cases; however, the Regulations contained no provision for such contingents. In 1904 the Imperial authorities fleetingly considered the raising of a permanent Zulu levy, under British officers, but dropped it because the proposition would agitate the settlers – as it had in 1886, 1890 and 1892, and would do so again, especially in present circumstances. (GH 494, pp. 189-192: G713/04, Chief of Gen. Staff, War Office, to Gov., Sept. 1, 1904.) 53 CR 1902, pp. 1, 3, 4; 1902, p. 1. 54 CR 1902, p. 7; 1903, p. 34; 1904, p. 39. SYB 1902, p. 212; 1903, p. 256; 1904, p. 252. 55 CR 1904, p. 3.

They were

56 Ibid.1903, p. 4. NGG 3368 (Dec. 8, 1903), p. 1727: Volunteer Notice 92 (Nov. 17, 1903); and 337 (Feb. 2,


34

rearmed with Lee-Enfield magazine rifles.57 Leader was anxious to increase the number of

mobile columns, and mounted corps were organized in the Northern District and Zululand.58

He worried about getting good horses, and recommended that the government import Arab

stallions from India to breed with horses in the Native Locations, presuming the people there

would gladly sell the offspring at reasonable prices.59 He was sceptical of townsmen’s

horsemanship, but authorized mounted companies in the infantry corps.60 The field artillery

expanded to four batteries, including a section of pompom guns.61

The Permanent Staff and Departmental corps at headquarters were augmented, and a

Service Corps, a Telegraph Corps and a Veterinary Corps were added.

62 The Staff was still

too small for more than routine tasks and it lacked specialists.63 Leader desired that staff

officers be sent to England or to India for training – if they could be spared – and that

younger officers be exchanged with Imperial ones for two or three years. He believed that

trained officers were essential, and in 1903 he held a camp of instruction which was attended

by seventy officers and non-commissioned officers, but the course was discontinued in 1904

for want of funds.64

It is most unfortunate that so few of the young men of the colony – whose social and financial positions and general abilities point to their suitability for Commissions – come forward to offer their services. It can only be that they do not realise that their first duty as citizens is to take their share of defence.

The matter of obtaining officers was a sensitive issue. Leader complained of “a want

of patriotism” amongst those of the appropriate social status:

65

“Patriotism appears better understood” among those in the non-commissioned ranks, he

1904), p. 153: VN 8 (Jan. 25, 1904). 57 Ibid. 1903, pp. 3, 9. 58 Ibid and 1904, pp. 12, 39. 59 Ibid. 1904, pp. 6-7. Bru-de-Wold also recommended this (CR 1906, p. 1035). 60 CR 1903, p. 3; and 1904, p. 4. 61 NGG 3407 (Aug. 1, 1904), p. 980: Militia Notice 82/1904 (June 25, 1904); and 3457 (Mar. 14, 1905), p. 390: Militia Order 50 (Mar. 14, 1905). 62 CR 1903, pp. 1, 3, 34. 63 Leader complained in March 1904 (CR 1903, p. 8) that the Permanent Staff’s time was taken up by routine work, made more burdensome by the large increase in enrolments and the inclusion of the Northern District and Zululand in its range,. There was no one to deal with Intelligence, Mobilization, Operations, Supply and Transport. (Indeed, Dartnell had asked for six years before he was given an office clerk! CR 1893-4: F6.) 64 CR 1904, p. 5. 65 Ibid., p. 8.


35

observed.

Rifle Associations flourished. There were sixty-eight (with 3,185 members) by the

end of 1903, and seventy-six (3,669) at the end of 1904. Leader was anxious to improve

marksmanship, and pushed the building of a large new Bisley Range at Mount Rule, outside

Pietermaritzburg. Transvaal teams competed with (and lost to) Natal teams, and Natal teams

went to English Bisleys.66

The School Cadet programme also flourished. There were thirty-two corps with

2,232 boys over ten at the beginning of 1903, forty with 2,656 at the end of the year. “The

progress Natal has made in this matter is being watched with the greatest interest in all parts

of the British Empire”, Leader reported.

67 He believed that training should be compulsory

for all boys. A Senior Cadet Corps was established for school leavers who were still too

young to join a Volunteer Corps (Leader wanted them to be paid a nominal amount so they

would not be “lost” to the Militia). Earl Roberts reviewed the Cadets at the 1904

encampment and commended the Superintendent of Education and Headmasters for their

“hearty support” of the movement. A number of corps had mounted drills and trained with

Maxim guns, while others received instruction in the work of ambulance, service, and signals

corps. New regulations in 1904 provided for the compulsory training of boys under ten and

the arming of those over twelve in the state schools. Every private school had its corps.

There were forty-four corps – and ten drum and fife bands, five bugle bands, and one pipe

band – by the end of 1904.68

All this had a price. Defence expenditure rose annually from £298,344 in 1901-1902

to £460,050 in 1902-1903; to £460,762 in 1903-1904 and £502,845 in 1904-1905. Most of

the money – about two-thirds of it (four-fifths in 1902-1903) – went to the police,

69 in which

Mansel struggled to maintain the Field Force. However, it demonstrated its usefulness in

suppressing disturbances in the South and Umsinga.70

66 Ibid., pp. 3, 4, 5, 7; 1904, p. 41. 67 Ibid. 1903, p. 6. 68 Ibid. 1903, pp. 19-20; and 1904, pp. 20-21. 69 SYB 1902, p. 209; 1903, p. 249; 1904, p. 253; 1905, pp. 7, 249; 1906, p. 65. The amounts are given omitting shillings and pence. 70 CCP 1902, p. 6; 1903, pp. 3, 20; 1904, pp. 4-5.

The Volunteer Force and Militia


36

annual budgets were £51,306; £71 871; £124,254, and £145,490 during this period.71

Meanwhile, the Colony’s revenue rose from £3,439,220 to £4,334,175 between 1901 and

1903, fell slightly to £4,150,145 in 1903-1904, and fell drastically to £3,384,849 in 1904-

1905.72 With this Natal plunged into economic depression. At the end of 1904 the

government capped the peacetime establishment of the Active Militia at 3,500 officers and

men. Leader did not like the bureaucrats who had been niggling about his office

expenditures.73 Now he had to shelve plans to establish new units in the countryside and the

formation of an Engineer Corps, as well as building operations at the various headquarters.74

And nothing at all had been done about the Militia Reserves, which Leader would have liked

to organize in connection with the Rifle Associations.75

If there ever is a time when this Colony can curtail expenditure on defence, it will only be when every man in the Colony has been trained, and when Mobilization stores are complete, but to neglect any preparation at this stage when organisation is just commencing must be to court disaster.

In his (last) annual report for 1904 Leader sounded a warning:

[T]he Defence Forces of the Colony are not in a sufficiently forward state of organisation to justify the economies that have been enforced during the last year, and are contemplated for the coming season.

The Colony is under obligation to put its defences in order. We are without transport, we have not trained Reserves to back up our small Active Force; our Officers are insufficiently trained, and to remedy this some sort of Permanent Training Establishment is required...

76

There was a new outlook in Imperial military circles. The South African War had

exposed the military deficiencies of the British Army in modern warfare. A Royal

Imperial Intervention

71 See n. 61. It had been estimated in 1903 that implementation of the new Militia Act would cost £149 047 compared with the Volunteers £76 378. (NGG 3341, Aug. 28, 1903, p. 1144: Return shewing Estimated Expenditure, July 21, 1903.) 72 SYB 1905, p. 7. Meanwhile Ordinary Expenditure went from £3 097 601 (1901-1902) to £5 039 003 (1902-1903), £4 071 469 (1903-1904) and £3 829 588 (1904-1905) (ibid.). 73 CR 1903, p. 6. 74 Ibid., pp. 3-4, 5, 6; 1904, pp. 4,7,9. 75 Ibid. 1903, p. 5. Leader believed that the Militia Reserves should be organized in connection with Rifle Associations, and wanted the rules of the later changed so that they could be ordered to serve outside their districts when necessary. (CR 1903, p. 5.) 76 CR 1904, p. 4.


37

Commission investigated its failures in the conduct of the war and reported critically in 1903.

A War Office (Reconstitution) Committee reported in 1904, and, as a consequence, the

Office of the Commander-in-Chief was abolished and an Army Council was established, with

a General Staff in 1904. The object of these reforms was to modernize Army organization

and operations. The Staff College adopted a more practical and up-to-date curriculum in

1904, tours of Franco-German war battlefields were resumed and the South African and

Russo-Japanese wars were studied. A diplomatic revolution was also under way following

Germany’s challenge on the High Seas, and in 1902 a Committee of Imperial Defence was

established with a view to “the strategic military needs of the Empire”, and remodelled with a

permanent secretariat in 1904. Thus, the modernizing of Natal’s defence system in 1903 did

not owe to unique local experience and was not taking place in isolation.77

Defence matters were a subject for combined effort on the part of the civil and

military authorities. A Colonial Defence Committee had been in existence since 1886, and

the first colonial defence scheme had been framed in 1887, and been revised continually

thereafter.

Leader’s special concern with Imperial Defence has been noted in respect of Durban

harbour. The Natal government was not unaware, of course, of the Colony’s unique strategic

place in the Empire. Leader typified the post-war outlook of the Army, which was reflected

in the importance he attached to trained Staff and the structure of the Militia. He had the

sympathy and support of Colonel Sir Henry McCallum, Royal Engineers, who was Governor

from 1901 to 1907.

78 In 1897 the plan integrated Imperial and Colonial forces with a view to the

forthcoming war.79

77 See Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London, Eyre Methuen, 1972), pp. 189-199, 213-230, 334-335; C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas: Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers (Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 856-859; Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (2nd edition; London, Macmillan, 1993), pp. 259-262; and David Killingray, “Imperial Defence”, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V. Historiography (edited by Robin W. Winks; Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 34-345. 78 See the lists of Colonial Defence Committee documents, dated March 8, 1905, in GH 510, pp. 165-171 (G179/1905). 79 GH 541: G156a/1897, General Officer Commanding to Gov., Apr. 21, 1897.

The Militia Act provided that the Governor-in-Council could appoint a

Committee of Defence for the purpose of advising him on all matters of defence. Members

held office at his pleasure. The committee in 1903 comprised of three Imperial officers

stationed in Natal (those commanding troops, artillery, and engineers), as well as a naval

officer; the Commandant of Militia (also an Imperial officer); the Commissioner of Police;


38

two Militia officers; and two members of parliament. This arrangement remained until

1905,80 but then the withdrawal of Imperial troops from the garrison reduced the number of

Imperial officers and gave the Colonials preponderance.81

Leader held the regimental rank of major, but he had been brevetted to colonel for his

service in the field, and was given the local rank of brigadier-general in 1904. Even so the

Militia Act stated that only an Imperial officer with the rank of major-general could

command the Militia if it were called into Imperial service. There were only two major-

generals in South Africa, and neither of them could be spared from their present duties. The

Governor therefore informed the Minister of Defence that the Imperial authorities could not

send troops to Natal to quell a disturbance, because they could not control the Natal Militia,

and a divided command would be fatal to operations. Natal would have to look after itself.

The Natal government responded by passing a bill which changed the rank from major-

general to colonel, as indeed it had been under the old Volunteer Act.

This symbiosis of Imperial and Colonial military produced a new spirit and a distinct

improvement in the organization of local defence, but the Imperial factor had another aspect,

which put great strain on the relationship in Natal. This was the demand on the part of the

Army Council for combined planning, unity of command in combined operations, and

colonial compliance with Imperial standards.

82

The prospect of withdrawal of the Imperial garrison was constantly held up to Natal

as an inducement to complete the organization of the Militia system as soon as possible. In

May 1904 the Imperial forces in South Africa were reorganized. Natal ceased to be a

separate military district and was consolidated with Harrismith in a sub-district, with

headquarters in Harrismith. The office of the officer commanding troops in Pietermaritzburg

was closed in August.

83

80 Natal Civil Service List, 1903, p. 168; 1904, p. 171; 1905, p. 176. 81 GH 513, p. 98: G836/05: GOC to Gov., Oct. 14, 1905. To date I have not been able to find the records of the Defence Committee. 82 GH 512, pp. 141-144: G735/04, GOC to Gov., Oct. 15, 1904 and reply Oct. 25, 1904; 542, pp. 55-59: G682/04, correspondence Oct. 11-Nov. 11, 1904. 83 Or possibly in September. GH 506, p. 5: G367/04, GOC to Gov., May 13, 1904; 551, pp. 158-161: OC to Administrator, July 22, Aug. 3, Sept. 9, 1904. Cf 1283, p. 20: Gov. to S/S, Feb. 4, 1905.

The Chief of the General Staff at the War Office wrote to the

Governor in August 1904 that the opinion there was that if Natal wanted Imperial troops to


39

remain then Natal should pay the cost of keeping them there.84

Meanwhile the Imperial garrison shrank, from two mounted regiments and three of

foot, a field artillery brigade, and a company of engineers in 1903, to a battalion of infantry

and a field artillery brigade in 1905.

85 At the end of the year “a mere handful of men

remained”.86 In January 1905, the General Officer Commanding agreed to leave the 1st

Battalion of the Royal Garrison Regiment with about 200 men at Fort Napier; but it was so

reduced in 1905 that in November it could no longer provide a sentry for Government House

and the Natal Police had to do so.87

Then there was the Natal Defence Scheme. In 1903 the War Office in London

required Major-General Sir Henry J.T. Hildyard, the General Officer Commanding His

Majesty’s forces in South Africa, to produce a defence scheme for the event of a Boer

uprising. It was not that an uprising was actually expected, the Chief Staff Officer in Pretoria

explained to the Officer Commanding Sub District Natal, but it was “in accordance with the

customs of the service wherever troops are stationed”.

88 The local commander passed the

order on to the Commandant (and of course the Governor), and together they put together a

Mobilization Scheme and submitted it in May 1904. In an emergency the Natal Militia and

Rifle Associations could secure the vital railway line from Durban to the Reef and little

else.89

There were reports of trouble in Zululand in 1903, centring on the former king,

Dinuzulu. The Natal Defence Scheme did acknowledge the possibility of a Native

complication to a Boer uprising, but the Prime Minister dismissed the prospect of a Zulu

uprising in June 1904. The next month the General Officer asked for a Mobilization Scheme

to deal with one, and in December one was submitted. The Active Militia would invade

Zululand from Greytown and the Lower Thukela, but Imperial forces would assist it in the

84 GH 495, pp. 2-8: G275/04, CGS to Gov., Aug. 16 and 28, 1905. 85 See the annual Natal Almanac Directory and Yearly Register (Pietermaritzburg, Davis) for 1903, pp. 326-327; 1904, pp. 325-326; and 1905, p. 242. 86 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 63. 87 GH 512, pp. 162-163: G260/05, GOC to Gov., Aug. 15, 1905; 516, p. 47: G952/05, Gov. to Min. of Just., Jan. 6, 1905; pp. 56-58: G158, GOC to Gov., Feb. 21, 1905. See also correspondence in 553, pp. 66-77: G873/05. 88 GH 511, pp. 13-15: G205/1905, Chief Staff Officer, S. A., to GOC, Natal, Jan. 2, 1904. 89 See the correspondence in ibid., pp. 2-84. There is a typescript copy of the scheme on pp. 58-84.


40

Northern District.90

The preparation of the Mobilization Schemes – or the Natal Defence Scheme as they

became collectively and interchangeably to be called – laid a heavy additional burden on the

staffs of the Militia and the Imperial garrison. Naturally they were imperfect in many details,

and Army Headquarters in Pretoria wanted clarifications and corrections. Thus the schemes

were not really complete when Natal was overtaken by the Zulu Rebellion in 1906.

91

The differences brought the Governor and his Ministers into confrontation early in

1905. The Governor had pressed the Imperial authorities, who agreed to keep the garrison in

Natal, and the Natal government apparently understood that it should complete the Colony’s

defence arrangements to their satisfaction; however, the government in Natal changed three

times between 1903 and 1905,

Worse,

they seem to have strained relations between the Imperial and Colonial authorities, who did

not see eye to eye on the need for improvements.

92

There had to be transport – animals, wagons, equipment – to hand to move the troops,

especially First Line Transport to accompany the Active Militia in initial operations. Yet the

Act provided nothing. In an emergency martial law would be proclaimed and what was

and Ministries suffered short-term memory problems with

their predecessors’ undertakings on defence.

Perusal of the Mobilization Schemes revealed two weaknesses which, in the opinion

of the General and the Governor, had to be rectified. The defence arrangements could not be

considered complete until they were. The Natal government did not agree and declined to

act, or at least to act timeously.

The first of the two weaknesses was inadequate provision for transport and reserves.

90 See correspondence and reports in GH 542: G507, 644, 799, and 803/1904. There is a typescript copy of the scheme in G799, pp. 95-109. 91 See later correspondence in the Minutes cited above. 92 George M. Sutton succeeded Sir Albert Hime as Prime Minister in August 1903, followed by Charles J. Smythe in May 1905 and Frederick R. Moor in November 1906. Thomas Watt was Minister of Defence in Sutton’s and Smythe’s cabinets, and W.A Deane was Minister in Moor’s. “The absence of strict party divisions in the Natal Parliament meant that changes of ministry occurred frequently owing to personal issues, or the ill-health of the Prime Minister, and had no great political significance.” (Brookes and Webb, History of Natal, p. 212.)


41

needed, if it could not be bought at once, would have to be commandeered. Imperial officers

– Governor, General, Commandant – foresaw confusion and disaster in this event. They

wanted a requisition plan in advance, so that Militia and Transport would come together at

the same time and take the field without mishap.

The other weakness was the lack of Militia Reserves, especially the First Reserves of

young, able-bodied men. The Act provided for their organization and the election of leaders,

but for peacetime training. It might be that training as Cadets or previous service in the war

or in the Active Militia or practice in the Rifle Associations would stand some of the men in

good stead in an emergency, but even so they were not organized yet, and ad hoc units would

lack discipline and cohesion. Again, the Imperial officers foresaw confusion and disaster.

The government recognized the weaknesses, but thought the military exaggerated

them. The Militia Act was muted on them because the bill to reform might have been lost if

they had amplified their concerns. There still was opposition. Most of it seems to have been

upcountry, especially in the Northern District, where there was a strong Boer element. Now

there was a problem of cost, which the Colony could ill afford.

In March, General Hildyard wrote to the Governor that the defence schemes of the

other colonies in South Africa were practically complete. The Natal scheme had been

referred for revision, but the Natal Defence Committee apparently did not think it needed to

be revised. Sir Henry decided to bring the weight of his office to bear on the government.

He warned the Prime Minister that he would have to inform His Majesty’s government that

his Ministers refused to provide the “absolute essentials” of defence, and therefore Imperial

forces must be withdrawn from the Colony. The government would not budge. The

Commandant provided two reports for the organization of transport. The General warned

that the Natal Militia was of great importance to the defence of all South Africa. At the

beginning of April, the Governor informed his Ministers that he was going to lay the

complete correspondence with them before the General for the information of His Majesty’s

government. “I concluded the same minute by warning them that by inaction and

incompletion they were courting disaster in the event of a serious uprising.”

The government yielded on transport. At the end of the month the General visited the


42

Governor in Pietermaritzburg, and they haled the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence

(who was out of town, but another stood in for him) to a meeting on the 29th. Together they

thrashed out Colonial preparedness. The two Ministers said they were having trouble with

parliament. The best they could do was to push through legislation on transport now, and

leave Reserves until the next session. The General said he thought the garrison could be kept

another two years, while the organization of defence was completed. The Governor was

satisfied he had got the best he could in the circumstances.93

The financial crisis brought an election and another change of government in May

1905, but the new one honoured the agreement with Governor and General, and at last things

began to move. In July the Militia Act was amended to enable the Commandant to prepare a

register of all animals and vehicles suitable for transport, and, when the militia was called

out, to requisition them (up to half of what an owner had).

94

The government considered it impolitic to propose an amendment for the organization

of the Reserves, and denied an undertaking on that point, whereupon the Governor produced

two years correspondence, and the Ministers backed down.

95 In November, the government

published notices of meetings in the northern part of the Colony for the election of officers in

December and January. There were delays, and the meetings took place in January and

February, but at least the first step was being taken.96

Leader’s regiment had been transferred to India, and he wished to rejoin it and take

command. The Natal government, one may imagine, had had enough of Imperial officers

The Colonial Commandant

The Governor and General at last got their way with reserves and transport, but not

with the command of the militia. Against their wishes the government appointed as

Commandant a Colonial officer, not an Imperial one.

93 See the Governor’s summary of events in GH 1283, pp. 45-49: Gov. to S/S, May 5, 1905; and other correspondence in 542, pp. 79-87, 115-121: G799/04. 94 NGG 3491 (Aug. 22, 1905), p. 1522: Act 30 of 1905 (Aug. 18, 1905). 95 See correspondence in GH 542, pp. 78-87: G799/1904. 96 NGG 3505 (Nov. 21, 1905), pp. 1904-1905 and 1964 and 2031: Militia Notices Nov. 16, and Dec. 4 and 23, 1905, respectively; and p. 2025: GN 812/05 (Dec. 21, 1905). GH 542, p. 117: Gov. to GOC, Nov. 10, 1905.


43

telling them what to do. In any case, it did not approach the Governor about the appointment

of Leader’s successor; but the General Officer Commanding forwarded applications of three

Imperial officers, stating which one he preferred, and the Governor passed them on to the

Prime Minister. He also stated his opinion that to appoint a Colonial Militia officer as

Commandant would be a mistake, since such an officer would lack professional

qualifications for the position, be accused of partiality towards his old unit, and become “the

creature of the Ministry of the day, liable to instant dismissal if he did not make his mind

coincide with that of the Minister”.97 The government changed and the matter dragged on.

At the beginning of July Colonel Bru-de-Wold, District Commandant in the South, was

appointed acting Commandant. In August, Leader asked the General who would replace him.

He issued a “farewell order” on September 19th. Bru-de-Wold was appointed only on

October 5th, and took office on the 15th.98 The Governor wrote to the General that the

government had made a mistake and the appointment was “a retrograde step”.99

The General expressed his concern that there was no Imperial staff officer in Natal.

Those with the garrison at Fort Napier did not have the special training to qualify them to

advise the Defence Committee. He asked the Governor to urge the Ministers to appoint an

Imperial officer to the staff of the Commandant or to be the secretary of the committee. The

Governor did so. The Minister of Defence replied that there was no vacancy on the staff, but

if one occurred they would consider such an appointment.

100

Lieutenant-Colonel Bru-de-Wold was the commanding officer of the Border Mounted

Rifles and the District Commandant for southern Natal. A Norwegian immigrant in 1862, he

had begun his career in the Colony as a labourer and he ended it as a coffee planter. He had

begun his military career in the Volunteers in 1866, had risen from the ranks to officer and

served in the Anglo-Zulu and South African wars – in the latter he had received a severe face

wound. He had served on the Defence Commission in 1902 and then on the Defence

97 GH 512, pp. 145-1446, 149-150, 160-163: G260/1905, GOC to Gov., Mar. 30 and Aug. 15, 1905; Gov. to PM, Apr. 3, 1905, respectively; and 525, p. 57: G313/05, CSO to Gov., May 14, 1905. 98 Ibid. GOC to Gov., Aug. 15, 1905. NGG 3494 (Sept. 12, 1905), p. 1663; 3495 (Sept. 19, 1905) p. 1666; 3501 (Oct. 31, 1905), p. 1815: Militia Orders 157 (Sept. 12, 1905), 167 (Sept. 19, 1905) and 192 (Oct. 31, 1905). 99 GH 512,: G260/1905, Gov. to GOC, Oct. 9, 1905. Returning the papers to the Governor, the Prime Minister remarked that, with respect to their alleged mistake, the Ministers “regret the expression of Your Excellency’s view”, to which the Governor replied: “I equally regret the necessity of expressing a view which differs from those of Ministers”. (Ibid., p. 148: Oct. 13, and 20, respectively.) 100 Ibid. 513, pp. 98 -100: G836/05, GOC to Gov., Oct. 14, 1905, and reply Oct. 26, 1905; Min. of Def. to Gov., Oct. 24, 1905.


44

Committee. There was no doubt about his diligence, energy and intelligence, but there was

no denying that his experience had been confined to Natal and he lacked the professional

qualifications of a regular officer.101

It is essential that a highly-trained and mobile force should be in existence, lightly equipped with the minimum of transport, to patrol the country, particularly the large Native Locations, appearing and disappearing suddenly, and showing the Native, who is the only enemy we contemplate, that there is a force of the Government ever on the alert.

There were other important differences between Bru-de-Wold and Leader, reflecting

very different backgrounds. Bru-de-Wold was not obsessed with a large and variegated

Permanent Staff, and he did not like the system of District Commandants. He recognized the

need to organize transport and reserves, but he had nothing to say about the Imperial

Reserves or a Native Corps of which Leader spoke. But the most significant difference was

in outlook. Leader thought in terms of Empire, Bru-de-Wold in terms of Natal:

The man who is content to leave the defence of his country, and family, to hired mercenaries, is not a desirable citizen of any country, and must be utterly ignorant of South African history and South African Native Wars. [...]

102

Bru-de-Wold’s position was unenviable. The Colony was still very much a frontier

settlement, and the position of the settlers was precarious.

103 The government provided

£453,122 for defence in the 1905-1906 budget, of which the Militia’s share was £118,558104

– 25% less than the previous year. Bru-de-Wold was ordered to stop recruiting and reduce

the Active Militia from 3,335 to 2,500 officers and men.105 The Active Militia was not

reduced instantly, of course, but Bru-de-Wold could not put off the process. When Army

Headquarters asked about progress with the Defence Scheme, he answered that it would now

have to be considerably revised and in effect he had not the time or staff to do it just then, and

deferred to the less than effectual Defence Committee.106

101 Natal Civil List 1906, p. 196. H.C. Lugg, Historic Natal and Zululand (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter & Shooter, 1949), p. 1. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 46n and 48. Goetzsche, “Rough but Ready,” p. 45. 102 Bru-de-Wold in CR 1906, pp. 1038 and 1037, respectively. 103 According to the 1905 Census there were 97 109 Europeans, 100 918 Asiatics, 903 041 Natives, and 6 686 Mixed and Others.(SYB 1904, p. 3). 102 494 Europeans lived in the five towns (p. 14). 104 SYB 1906, p. 65. 105 Ibid. 1905, p. 68. CR 1906, p. 1033. 106 See the correspondence in GH511, pp. 2-9: G205/1904, and GH 542, pp. 18-27: G644/1904.

Departmental corps were stunted,

just when Bru-de-Wold would have liked to increase them by 500. He could not afford an


45

Intelligence corps, and once again the creation of an Engineer corps was put off.107

Yet, Bru-de-Wold was a driven man. He was convinced, partly from his own

experience in the turbulent south of Natal and partly by recent confidential reports from

various quarters, that a Native rising was imminent. He thought it would occur in late May or

June of 1906. He did his best to prepare for it. He reduced his staff by one officer, but did

away with the District Commandants and centralized functions at headquarters. He called the

corps commanders to headquarters and discussed reduction to a peacetime establishment in

terms of the budget, and got them to agree to a plan to expand in an emergency by drawing

on supernumeraries and special servicemen. He also set about organizing the Reserves,

attending several meetings and then turning the task over to Colonel Wales and the

magistrates. The Departmental corps, such as they, were made ready for the field. The

registration of transport was begun, and the government was persuaded to allow orders for

additional arms, ammunition and equipment.

108

The Zulu Rebellion

109

On February 9, 1906 the Governor proclaimed martial law in the Colony, and

authorized the Commandant to call out the Active Militia for service. Colonel Bru-de-Wold

at once ordered the Natal Carbineers, C Battery of the Natal Field Artillery, and detachments

The Native Rebellion which Bru-de-Wold anticipated occurred as a result of violent

protests against the government’s imposition of a poll tax – an ill-conceived measure to

rescue the Colony from its debts. A clash between protesters and police occurred near

Richmond on February 8th.

107 CR 1906, pp. 1033, 1035, 1036. 108 CR 1906, pp.1033-1034. Archives of the Colonial Secretary’s Office (hereafter cited as CSO). 2599: C147/1906, INTERIM REPORT By Commandant of Militia Natal on THE NATIVE REBELLION, 1906 (hereafter cited as IR), pp. 1-2. See also Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 48. 109 The account here follows IR in its sequence of events, but is also based on other works which deal largely with the military aspects of the rebellion, viz. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion; Walter Bosman, The Natal Rebellion of 1906 (London, Longmans, Green, 1907) and P.S. Thompson, An Historical Atlas of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, private, 2001). Also with IR in CSO 2599: C147/1906 are the reports of the independent column commanders, notably McKenzie, Leuchars, Mackay, and Mansel, as well as Special Service (Irregular) and Departmental officers. Stuart’s and Thompson’s narratives are based on these reports. The violence in Natal and Zululand in 1906 has been variously described in the literature as a rebellion, insurrection, rising or uprising, disturbance(s) and isidumo, and been called the Zulu Rebellion, the Natal Rebellion, the Natal Native Rebellion, the Bhambatha Rebellion or Bhambatha’s Rebellion. I prefer the term Zulu Rebellion for its comprehensiveness.


46

of Departmental corps to mobilize at Pietermaritzburg. The Natal Police Field Force and

later part of the Border Mounted Rifles were attached to the column, which was placed under

the command of Colonel Duncan McKenzie of the Carbineers. All other corps were alerted

to make arrangements; also the Natal Government Railways, and transport arrangements

were put into effect.110 A battalion of Imperial troops was sent from the Transvaal to Natal to

show that Britain supported its Colony, but it did not leave Fort Napier.111

McKenzie was given a free hand to scour the Richmond district and punish the rebels

who had attacked the police, which he did, and then his Field Force moved on to Ixopo and

Umzinto and overawed restless tribes in the south of the Colony. Meanwhile, other corps

were mobilized under Colonel George Leuchars of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles and took the

field for the same purpose in Mapumulo. Both field forces were demobilized in late March.

Leuchars made arrests and destroyed a chief’s kraal with artillery fire.

112 McKenzie also

made arrests, and laid on court martials which sentenced the ringleaders of the unrest to

death. The Governor quickly intervened to commute the sentences. As a result, McKenzie

tendered his resignation in protest, but it was refused. The original rebel band which had

attacked the police in February was caught, tried, sentenced and executed. The British

government tried to intervene, which created a political furore, and it backed off and let the

executions take place.113

Early in April a deposed chief in Umvoti named Bhambatha tried to retrieve his

chieftaincy. He and his followers attacked the magistrate and then the police. The local

Militia were remobilized under Leuchars, but the rebels escaped to Zululand, where several

tribes joined them.

114

Thus began the Zulu Rebellion of 1906, which took many turns and lasted three

months (five, if mopping-up operations are counted). In April and May the Colony of Natal

110 IR, pp. 2-3. 111 Bosman, Natal Rebellion, p. 3. Colony of Natal, The Natal Native Rebellion as told in Official Despatches From January 1st to June 23rd 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1906), pp. 18 and 32, Gov. to Secretary of State, Feb. 16 and Mar. 2, 1906, respectively. 112 IR, pp. 4-9A. Bosman, Natal Rebellion, pp. 5-17. 113 Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-1908 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970), pp.189-195. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 141-147. Thompson, Historical Atlas, pp. 14-15, and Incident at Trewirgie: First Shots of the Zulu Rebellion 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, private, 2005), pp. 51-58. 114 IR, pp. 9A-11. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 167-203 passim. Bosman, Natal Rebellion, pp. 18-25. P. S. Thompson, Bambatha at Mpanza: The Making of a Rebel (Pietermaritzburg, private, 2004), pp. 87-118.


47

had a full blown crisis and its capacity for self-defence was strained beyond its power. What

is of concern here is the government’s military initiatives, especially of a strategic nature,

which reveal the efficacy (or not) of the Militia organization. The government knew that the

rebellion must be crushed as soon as possible in order to minimize costs and interventions,

and, of course, to prevent its spread. The rebels, in so far as they were armed and in the field,

were confined to the Nkandhla Division of Zululand, but they had many sympathizers all

around and further afield. It was necessary to take these into account, too. Dinuzulu,

whatever his real intentions, publicly supported the government against the rebels. The

Zululand Mobilization Scheme of 1904 became irrelevant.

In the first instance, the government was guided by the counsels of the Commissioner

for Native Affairs in Zululand, Charles Saunders, who wished to avoid bloodshed and tried to

negotiate with the rebel chief Sigananda. Thus Leuchars’ field force remained on the

defensive in Natal, and the Zululand Mounted Rifles and the Natal Police Field Force secured

the Commissioner’s position at the Nkandhla magistracy. Negotiations failed and Saunders

panicked; both he and Mansel (who was in charge of the forces at the magistracy) urged that

Imperial forces be called in, but the government refused until it could be shown that Natal

forces could not suppress the rebellion.

On April 17th the Ministers met to discuss the crisis. Bru-de-Wold, Leuchars and

McKenzie were in attendance. It was decided that a strong mounted force with ample

supplies should be sent to Nkandhla; however, Natal should not be denuded of all of its

Active Militia lest this encourage rebellion there. Therefore, Irregular corps must be raised to

operate in Zululand, and one, of 600 mounted men under command of Lieutenant-Colonel

J.R. Royston of the Border Mounted Rifles, was authorized. Bru-de-Wold’s plan was to draw

a cordon of posts manned by Militia (including some of the Reserves which had just been

organized) around the rebel stronghold and then to send in strong forces to strike the rebels.

During the next few weeks Bru-de-Wold applied himself to this. Meanwhile, the Transvaal

government offered gratis the assistance of a mounted corps, which the Natal government

gratefully accepted, and Bru-de-Wold brigaded it with Royston’s Horse and a few bits and

pieces of Active Militia to form the Zululand Field Force, under the command of Colonel

McKenzie. By early May there were almost 4,000 troops in the field.


48

The Zululand Field Force, with a large train of supplies, marched via Dundee to

Nkandhla. Saunders did not think this was enough, and the government raised another

Irregular corps, the Natal Rangers. It was infantry – which was more suitable for garrisons

along the lines of communication and just as useful as dismounted mounted men were in the

Nkandhla forest. Also, horses were in short supply, as the government found when it also

authorized the raising of a corps of Natal Native Horse. Saunders reported that the rebellion

seemed to be spreading. So the government decided to raise the mounted corps of the Active

Militia to war strength. Another large convoy was despatched under escort to the

beleaguered magistracy.115

Disaffection in Umsinga had led to the establishment of a small field force at

Helpmekaar in late April, which was augmented in early May. There were skirmishes and

the rebels fled to Zululand. Colonel Mackay, with the Natal Carbineers, and an assortment of

other Militia was to secure this area, but when the Zulu chief Mehlokazulu rebelled, he

disobeyed orders and took the Carbineers across the border after him. Leuchars tried to help,

crossed into Zululand and defeated part of Mehlokazulu’s force in a sharp battle at

Mpukunyoni. Thereafter, Mackay conducted a leisurely advance into Nkandhla, looting

many cattle but letting the rebels escape to Qudeni. Bru-de-Wold’s patience was wearing

thin, and Umsinga was added to Leuchars’ command. At the end of May there were more

rebels in the field than ever before.

116

Bru-de-Wold’s strategy apparently was not working. Leuchars was guarding the

Thukela border against the rebels breaking back into Natal, Mackay was doing more or less

as he pleased in Nqutu, and McKenzie was striking hard in Nkandhla but missing the rebels

every time. It was at this juncture that Sir Henry McCallum decided to bring a governor’s

weight to bear again. Through Bru-de-Wold, he instructed McKenzie to change his tactics –

that was to drive the forests to flush out the elusive enemy and destroy his resources.

117

115 IR, pp. 13-21. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 211-228. Bosman, Natal Rebellion, pp. 27-39. Thompson, Historical Atlas, pp. 16-17. 116 IR , pp. 21-22. and see Leuchars’ and Mackay’s reports, also in CSO 2599: C147/1906. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 318-332. Thompson, Historical Atlas, pp. 24-29. 117 Natal Native Rebellion, pp. 123 and 129: Gov. to S/S, June 1, and Cdt. to OC ZFF, May 28, 1906, respectively.

Bru-

de-Wold’s health gave way, and he was ordered to take sick leave. Sir John Dartnell, who

was visiting Natal to bring some Rexer guns, which were new weapons that some Natalians


49

living in London had bought as a gift to the Militia, was appointed acting Commandant.118

There was another meeting of Ministers and commanders on June 6th and 7th, and it

was decided to augment the Natal Rangers and Royston’s Horse, to accept the Cape Colony’s

offer of a Maxim battery, and to ask it for a signals company. A Transvaal magnate supplied

another infantry battalion.

119

Meanwhile, McKenzie drove the Nkandhla forest until he felt the rebels had gone,

and then turned to the combined rebel forces at Qudeni. Intelligence revealed that the rebel

army was moving eastward, and he was determined to intercept it. For once things went right

for McKenzie, and he practically destroyed the rebel impi at the mouth of the Mome gorge on

June 10th. Thus organized resistance ceased in Nkandhla. McKenzie was quick to follow up

his victory, and the rebellion in Zululand collapsed.

120

The outbreak of the rebellion in Mapumulo in mid-June was a contretemps which has

never been satisfactorily explained. The rebels had none of the advantages of those in

Nkandhla. The Zululand and Umvoti Field Forces moved speedily to Mapumulo and

destroyed the rebel forces with much bloodshed and destruction of property. The Militia was

demobilized and the Irregular corps disbanded by the end of July, except Royston’s, which

made a thorough search of Nkandhla in August, and several small composite corps remained

in the field to mop up and police until early September. Martial law was lifted on October

2nd.

121

The rebellion was over. The government had fielded more than 9,000 troops (and

5,000 Native levies) in the rebellion, but casualties were small – Active Militia: six killed and

nine wounded, Militia Reserves: one killed and four wounded, Natal Police: six killed and six

wounded, Irregular corps: seventeen killed and eighteen wounded, and Native levies: six

118 IR, p. 23. Natal Native Rebellion, p. 159: Gov. to S/S, June 8, 1906. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 65, 285. 119 IR, p. 24. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 223, 329. 120 IR, p. 26. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 295-317, 333-338. Bosman, Natal Rebellion, pp. 65-108. Thompson, Historical Atlas, pp. 36-41. 121 IR, pp. 26-31. Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp.343-405. Bosman, Natal Rebellion, pp. 119-165. Thompson, Historical Atlas, pp. 42-61. See also Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo uprising: War, law and ritual in the Zulu rebellion (Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005). The Native levies, which were attached to Militia columns, retained their tribal organization and traditional methods of warfare. See John Laband and Paul Thompson, “African levies in Natal and Zululand, 1839-1906,” in Soldiers and Settlers in Africa 1850-1918 (edited by Stephen M. Miller; Leyden, Brill, 2002), pp. 49-84).


50

killed and about thirty wounded.122 The cost was £676,613.123

Bru-de-Wold returned to duty when the rebellion was almost over, and subsequently

wrote two reports. The first focussed on military operations and concluded with comments

on the Militia’s performance in the field. The comments generally were echoed in the reports

of Colonel McKenzie on the field forces’ operations and of the Imperial observer, Major-

General F.E. Stephenson, who spent several weeks with the Zululand Field Force. Bru-de-

Wold’s second report (the Commandant’s annual one) repeated much that he had said about

performance in the field, but focussed on the organization of the Militia and made

recommendations for its improvement.

Lessons of the Rebellion

124

The Mounted Rifles were the backbone of the defence force, and all the corps had

performed well; however, the operations in rugged Nkandhla had taken a heavy toll of horses

and it was not easy to get remounts. In the first month the government bought up all the extra

horses in the Colony; in a few more months all those in the neighbouring colonies, and finally

it had to import ones (some of them unbroken) from South America. Infantry worked well

driving the forest, but artillery moved with difficulty and found few targets. Bru-de-Wold

suggested more use of infantry, if mule transport moved them from point to point, and the

Staff work had been good, although this owed in part to supernumeraries coming

forward to do much of it. The Departmental corps functioned very well, and an Intelligence

section had been improvised. Mobilization had gone very well thanks, in part, to full

cooperation of the Natal Government Railways, and, in part, to the Transport officer’s

planning and organization in the short time before the rebellion. The government’s Auditor

General helped materially by cutting through much paper work. Nonetheless, some of the

problems which had been forecast occurred. The most apparent being that the forces needed

pack horses in the first instance and mules in the First Line. The use of oxen had generally

slowed and sometimes prevented important movements in the field.

122 Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 522, 540-542. 123 SYB 1906, p. 156. Cf Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, p. 406. 124 Bru-de-Wold’s reports have been cited above as IR and CR 1906, respectively. McKenzie’s report is with IR in CSO 2599: C147/1906. Stephenson’s report is GH 569, pp. 147-163: G585/1906.


51

replacement of one field artillery battery with a mountain battery.

He was pleased with the work of the Militia Reserves, which had been organized in

the magisterial divisions bordering Zululand. On occasions, they had reinforced the Active

Militia and even been engaged in the field, notably in Umvoti and Krantzkop divisions.125

The number of Rifle Associations increased from 89 to 117 in 1906, and membership

(less police and militia) increased from 3,004 to 5,774.

Elsewhere, they gave a sense of security to the people, settlers and Natives alike, in disturbed

areas. During the rebellion, Colonel Wales met with chiefs in Pietermaritzburg to draft

regulations, and parliament amended the Militia Act so that the Commandant could call up

Reserves for training. Bru-de-Wold speculated that the First Reserves might become part of

the Active Militia corps, adding their cadres and trained men to expand the latter when the

need arose.

126

[...]They are now really Government Aided Rifle Clubs, somewhat on the same lines as Government Aided Libraries or Book Clubs, and I therefore consider, as I have stated in other papers, that ladies should be allowed to join these Clubs or Associations on the same terms and conditions as men. It would be of the greatest advantage if the women of the Colony, particularly in country districts, would take up rifle shooting as a recreation. It would encourage the young men to become [better] rifle shots, and, in times of Native unrest, would be of inestimable value, in giving the ladies more self-reliance, infusing confidence, while if the homestead should be attacked, there would be so many more rifles to defend it. It is well known that the Native has a wholesome dread, and fear engenders respect, of a woman who can use a firearm.

Bru-de-Wold valued them for

shooting practice rather than defence, because the men would now be drawn into the

Reserves. He speculated on their future:

127

The Militia had performed well in the field, but it was obvious that reinforcements

from outside the Colony had been needed to quell the rebellion. Yet, with the passing of the

crisis in 1906 the Active Militia was again subject to reduction to a peacetime strength of

2,500. It numbered 2,739 at the end of 1907; 2,432 at the end of 1908, and 2,580 at the end

The Active Militia reduced and streamlined

125 Mackay dissented, saying that most were “simply a rabble” (report, in CSO 2599: C147/1906). 126 SYB 1906, p. 65. (CR 1906, p. 1038, gives 117, SYB 119.) 127 CR 1906, p. 1038.


52

of 1909 – the slight increase owed to additional Departmental corps.128 McKenzie, who was

acting Commandant vice Bru-de-Wold (who was on leave from February 1907) and then

Commandant from August, deplored this reduction,129 and stated that the Colony’s defence

force was insufficient to protect the Colony and maintain law and order.130 The mounted

regiments consisted of skeleton squadrons and troops, which made training in country

districts very difficult.131 In 1907, he recommended the formation of Military Districts and

Regimental Recruiting Areas with a view to making units more “compact” and efficient.132

For all this the government continued to economize. Defence spending was cut to

£371,001 in 1907-1908 and to £332,088 in 1908-1909, exclusive of contributions to Royal

Navy (£35,000) and customs rebates for the Imperial forces (£3,940 and £3,925). £54,839

was spent on the Active Militia and £2,386 on arms and ammunition in 1907-1908 (including

the Zululand expedition) and only £39,361 and £206 in 1908-1909.

133

There was no need of an annual encampment in 1907 because of the practical

experience in 1906,

134 but financial constraints prevented any in 1908. Quarterly parades

continued, but men were not paid to attend them; the Commandant wanted firing practice to

continue, and so allowances were provided for ammunition.135 When encampments resumed

in 1909, attendance was voluntary and required for only two days, and the Commandant

observed that a number of young men lacked proficiency.136 Attendance was set at seven

days in 1910, but quarterly parades continued to be without pay,137

New manuals for the infantry and combined training were issued in 1907. Officers

had to buy the combined training manual (15s.2d), and one may suppose the infantry one as

well. The British Army’s Officer’s Field Note Book was also for sale at the Ordnance office,

and after May 31st control

passed from Colonial into Union hands.

128 CGR 1908, p. 1, and 1909, p. 1. 129 NGG 3594 (Feb. 12, 1907), p. 144: M.O. 48/07; 3598 (Mar. 12, 1907), p. 236: M.O. 75/07; 3644 ((Nov. 26, 1907), p. 1370: M.O. 260/07. 130 CGR 1908, p. 1. 131 CR 1907, p. 1. 132 Ibid., p. 4. 133 SYB 1908, p. 65, and 1909, p. 69. 134 CR 1907., p. 1. NGG 3595 (Feb. 19, 1907), p. 178: M.O. 53/07. 135 CGR 1908, p. 1. NGG 3664 (Mar. 24, 1907), p. 235: M.O. 54/08. 136 CGR 1909, p. 1. NGG 2772 (Aug. 17, 1909), p. 731: M.O. 126/09. 137 NGG 3813 (Feb. 10, 1901), p. 309: M.O. 16/10.


53

but the number was limited.138

McKenzie was as keen as Leader had been about inspiring a martial spirit. In his

report for 1907 he stated that two-thirds of men twenty-five and under were shirking their

duty to the State by avoiding service in the Militia.

139 When the peacetime strength fell

below 2500 in 1908, he blamed it on a lack of interest and a decline in the volunteering spirit,

and on reduced inducements and employers’ opposition to joining the units. He urged

compulsory military training on an equal basis, citing the Australian example. This way there

would be no discrimination based on employment; employers would accept it when they

could not deny it. Of course, for McKenzie this basic training should take place in the Active

Militia, and afterwards the great majority would pass into the Reserves.140

The Militia Act had provided for a Permanent Militia corps, but one had never been

established. In August of 1907 it seemed as if the government would introduce a bill for one,

but then it declined to do so, ostensibly waiting to see if other colonies would undertake a

joint effort. However, it did not let go of the matter.

141 The Natal Police Reserve Force was

practically such a force, and in 1907 the government sought to transfer command of it to the

Militia. McKenzie professed not to desire this, and said that the initiative was entirely the

government’s.142 In his reminiscences, the Chief Commissioner of Police, W.J. Clarke, tells

otherwise.143 “It is no secret that there is a great deal of jealousy between the Militia and the

Police”, the Minister of Justice, T.F. Carter, told the Legislative Assembly when, in late

September, he moved the passage of a bill to allow the transfer of command of the Reserve

Force to the Commandant when it was in the field.144 Both sides had their partisans, and

there was a sharp debate. The Police Reserve Force was already in Zululand, and more

trouble was looming, so the measure appeared to be a practical one for operational unity of

command.145

138 Ibid. 3624 (July 30, 1907), p. 831: M.O. 186/07); 3635 (Oct. 1, 1907), p. 1150: M.O. 227/07; 3649 (Dec. 10, 1907), p. 1421: M.O. 268/07. 139 CR 1907, p. 3. 140 Ibid., pp. 2-3. CGR 1908, pp. 1 and 5; and 1909, p. 1. 141 Debates, XLIII, 534, 652, 657, 660. The Commandant’s annual report for 1907 was presented to the Legislative Assembly only in July, delayed by a question of its confidentiality, and members were obliged to read it and give their approval before it could be published. (Ibid XLII, 171-172.) 142 CGR 1908, p. 5. 143 W.J. Clarke, My Career in South Africa, II, 21-22, 27. A copy of these reminiscences is in the Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, but there are others elsewhere. 144 Debates, XLIII, 650.

In December 1907 martial law was proclaimed and Active and Reserve Militia

145 Ibid., 641-663. See Act No. 22 of 1907, in Colony of Natal, Acts of Parliament of the Colony of Natal


54

forces, under McKenzie, invaded Zululand to ensure the arrest of Dinuzulu. There was no

fighting and the crisis soon ended.146 A year after its passage, the Act consolidating

command was narrowly repealed.147

The government was intent on clipping the wings of the Police in favour of the

Militia, and did so. The strength of the Police was cut by 126 men which, in effect,

eliminated the Reserve Force;

148 and a Militia force, the Southern District Scouts, was

formed to watch the border which had attracted much attention from the Police.149 This was

no substitute for a permanent Militia force, but it was a regional one for the former Police

Reserve. McKenzie was appointed Commandant General, Natal Colonial Forces, with effect

from November 17, 1908.150

McKenzie had modest success with the Departmental corps. In 1907 the government

authorized increases in the strength of the Medical, Service, and Telegraph corps.

151 In the

same year government postal and telegraph employees were only allowed to join the

Telegraph Corps, and qualified men in the Field Artillery were allowed to transfer to it.152 At

the end of the year a Remount Corps was established, and early in the next amalgamated with

the Veterinary Corps.153 In 1908 an Intelligence corps was established, and the Colony was

covered by a network of voluntary ‘assistants’ or officers.154 Transport was centralized under

a Transport officer at headquarters, and requisitioning officers were appointed in December

1907, which facilitated McKenzie’s Zululand expedition.155 However, a Transport corps was

formed only in early 1910, and, at the same time, an Engineers corps was also formed.156

passed in the Second Session of the Fifth Colonial Parliament 1907 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1907), p. 43. 146 McKenzie’s report of the expedition is in CR 1907, pp. 5-7. NGG 3646 (Dec. 2, 1907), p. 1379: GN 668 and 669/07; 3648 (Dec. 3, 1907), p. 1408: Proclamation 61/07; 3648A (Dec. 9, 1907), p. 1409A: Proc. 62/07; 3649 (Dec. 10, 1907), p. 1420: Notification by Commandant; 147 Debates, XLV, 33-35, 150-153, 449-453. Cf Clarke, My Career in South Africa, II, 27-28. 148 Ibid., 27. Holt, Mounted Police, p. 219, says 226. Cf SYB 1908, p. 66 , and 1909, p. 70, which give 719 and 563 European mounted constables, respectively.. 149 NGG 3709 (Oct. 6, 1908), p. 388: M.O. 162 and 163/08. 150 Ibid. 3721 (Nov. 24, 1908), p. 1174: M.O. 181/08. Hence CR becomes CGR in the notes. 151 CR 1907, p. 1. 152 NGG 3605 (Apr. 30, 1907), p. 375: M.O. 120/07. 153 Ibid. 3661 (Mar. 3, 1908), p. 179: M. ). 33/08; 3662 (Mar. 10, 1908), p. 204: M.O. 44/08). 154 CGR 1908, p. 6. 155 CR 1907, p. 2. NGG 3649 (Dec. 10, 1907), p. 1422: M.O. 282 and 283/07. 156 NGG 3813 (Feb. 15, 1910), p. 310: M.O. 29/10. See also CR 1907, p. 1, and CGR 1908, p. 4.

For

the three preceding years a Searchlight Detachment, which was intended to be part of it,


55

functioned as a group of volunteers.157

A significant achievement was the centralization of procurement, care, storage

and issue of arms and munitions, which Bru-de-Wold had urged earlier on. In 1907 the

Militia Ordnance and Controllership of Arms were merged, but the Police held out another

year.

158 In 1908 the Militia’s firearms, ammunition and equipment were stored in designated

government buildings in Pietermaritzburg and Durban under the control of a Chief Ordnance

Officer.159 The next step was to overhaul the stocks in local depots throughout the Colony.

Firearms were sent into the central store and repaired and serviced and a large quantity of

obsolete firearms was destroyed. The intention was to send the serviced weapons back to

local depots. These were usually country gaols under the magistrates’ control, and the

magistrates objected. The return was stopped, but then people in the country districts

objected on grounds of security.160

There were complaints from units that they were being issued second-hand equipment

from Ordnance, but the Commandant insisted that it was perfectly serviceable and should be

used up before new items were issued.

Apparently the problem was still unresolved at the time

of Union.

161 For reasons of economy, corps officers were

ordered to have their units collect empty cartridge cases and take care not to damage

ammunition boxes so that they could be returned to stores162 for re-use – or perhaps not. In

April 1910 the Ordnance department put to tender the purchase of cases of brass scrap,

cartridge cases, ammunition and other boxes at the magazines at Pietermaritzburg and

Durban.163 Men who damaged their equipment were to pay double for it.164 Only in 1909

were items issued from Ordnance stores given an official government mark,165 and in 1910

were detailed Ordnance Regulations and Equipment Tables published.166

157 CGR 1909, p. 4. 158 CR 1907, p. 3. CGR 1908, p. 4. 159 CGR 1908, p. 4. 160 Ibid. 1909, pp. 3, 5. 161 NGG 3668 (Apr. 21, 1908), p. 310: M.O. 77/08. 162 Ibid. 3610 (June, 1907), p. 481: M.O. 152/07; 3629 (July 27, 1907), p. 988: M.O. 200/07; 3735 (Feb. 9, 1909), p. 129: M.O. 24/09; 3772 (Aug. 17, 1909), p. 731: M. O. 129/09. 163 Ibid. 3822 (Apr. 12, 1910), p. 449: Tender, Apr. 6, 1910. 164 Ibid. 2270 (Apr. 21, 1909), p. 800: M.O. 141/09. 165 Ibid. 3750 (May 4, 1909), p. 378: GN 221/09. Cf CGR 1908, p. 4, which suggests earlier. 166 Very detailed. See NGG 3804 (Jan. 13, 1910), pp. 99-125: GN 27/10.


56

In May 1910 the government generously fixed the peacetime establishment of the

Active Militia at 4,680 – 4,341 in the field corps and 339 in the Departmental corps,

exclusive of the Permanent Staff. This remarkable increase (84 % on strength at the end of

1909) was probably a wishful projection on the budget of the new Union.167

“The Government has decided that the Reserve organization is the best suited for the

defence of the Colony”, McKenzie stated in the Commandant General’s annual report for

1908.

The Reserves as the mainstay of the Militia

The danger of a Boer insurrection and invasion receded. The Zulu Rebellion had

been suppressed, but it left an imprint of danger in the settler mind. Against Native unrest

and violence, the settlers found an ideal home guard in the Militia Reserve. Of course, it had

to be properly organized and supported and, also, it had to be inexpensive.

168 His oft-expressed concern for the Active Militia and comparative reticence

regarding the Militia Reserves in reports seem to cloak a personal disappointment.

Henceforth, the Militia Reserves would be the mainstay of Natal’s defence force. At the end

of 1909 the Reserves numbered 17,770: 5,938 men in the First class; 8,086 in the Second;

and 3,749 in Third.169

The new emphasis on the Reserves appears to be the result of a combination of

political and economic pressures. The record of the Reserves called out during the Rebellion

had been a mixed one, and in the midst of the crisis the government honoured its earlier

undertaking to the Governor to introduce their training in peacetime. In July of 1907,

Thomas Watt, the member for Newcastle and a former of Minister of Defence who had

resisted the amendments to the Militia Act, moved in the Legislative Assembly that the

government not exercise the power to call them out for training. The government made it

clear that this was not its policy, and he withdrew the motion.

170

167 Ibid. 3837 (May 30, 1910), p. 629: M.O. 72/10. See the number for 1909 in SYB 1909, p. 74. 168 CGR 1908, p. 3. 169 Ibid. 170 Debates, XLII, 255.

A month later, T.P.

O’Meara, member for Pietermaritzburg, moved the repeal of the Militia Act and a return to


57

the old Volunteer Act. The motion was defeated in a three-to-one vote.171

This happened when the Colony was between Governors in the winter of 1907, and

the Administrator W. H. Beaumont remarked, in connection with the revised defence scheme,

that the mobilization of the Reserves was still a matter of uncertainty; however, McKenzie

disagreed.

172 In fact, the Rebellion had demonstrated that the Colony could not do without

the Reserves in a full blown crisis, and there could be no going back. If anything, they were

more needed than ever. The Imperial garrison was too small to be effective in operations,

and there was no guarantee neighbouring colonies would be so generous in despatching

volunteers to help again. They were also cheaper. Government expenditure on Militia

Reserves amounted to just £1,232 in 1907-1908 and £1,616 in 1908-1909.173

At the time of the Zululand expedition in December 1907, units were called out in

fourteen districts. The Commandant was pleased with the response, but again observed that

they were handicapped by lack of training. Of course, they could not be trained in the same

way as the Active Militia, and therefore would never attain parity with those corps, but they

received at least some training on a regular basis.

174 Some units seemed to fare better than

others, notably the Pietermaritzburg City Reserves, which employed a sergeant of the Natal

Carbineers as their sergeant major and instructor.175 The units in Greytown and the Umvoti

and Krantzkop divisions were consolidated in a single district organization, as were those in

the Lion’s River and Impendhle divisions.176 Even the Natal Government Railways had a

unit.177

There was much chopping and changing of leaders, and Militia orders for the period

are replete with appointments and resignations. In Pietermaritzburg and Weenen, leaders

were appointed practically en bloc.

178

171 See ibid., 586-611. 172 GH 511, p. 140: Formation of a Local Defence Scheme for Natal (undated memorandum) 173 SYB 1908, p. 65, and 1909, p. 69. No Militia Order regarding uniform has been found, but there is a quite singular one (6/07 in NGG 3589, Jan. 8, 1907, p. 33) giving colours (dark blue with white stripes) to the Underberg Militia Reserves. See n. 184. 174 CR 1907, p. 2. 175 Ibid. CGR 1908, p. 3. NGG 3612 (June 11, 1907), p. 532: M.O. 164/07. 176 NGG 3642 (Nov. 12, 1907), p. 1330: M.O. 253/07. 177 Ibid. 3780 (Oct. 12, 1909), p. 876: M.O. 148/ and 149/09. 178 See ibid. 3664 (Mar. 24, 1908), p. 235: M.O. 50/08; 3665 (Mar. 31, 1908), p. 249: M.O. 58/08; 3733 (Jan. 26, 1909), p. 75: M.O. 19/09; 3735 (Feb. 9, 1909), p. 129: M.O. 29/09.

In Durban, they resigned in like manner just before the


58

December 1907 crisis,179 suggesting that they had no intention of making themselves

available for duty in Zululand. Leaders continued to be elected by the men and then

appointed by the government, but there was a growing feeling that elections should be

dispensed with, and McKenzie made recommendations accordingly.180 An increasing

number of leaders also took the same examinations as Active Militia officers seeking

promotion, and wished to be commissioned. An unsuccessful bill in the Legislative

Assembly in September 1909 tried to provide for it.181 At this stage the government was

willing to leave such matters for the Union to deal with.182

The transformation of the Militia was reflected in a transformation of Rifle

Associations. Most of the Active Militia corps had their Rifle Clubs,

183 and the Militia

Reserve units followed their example. Reserves rifle teams appeared at the 1908 Bisley for

the first time.184 McKenzie hoped that the clubs would “prove a better means of organising

the Reserves”,185 and their rules would “provide for giving each man plenty of practice in

shooting”.186 Indeed, members were obliged to attend at least one parade of six hours or

three of two and fire a prescribed course with a minimum score in order to qualify as

efficient.187 The Rules were gazetted at the end of 1908,188 and twenty-four clubs were

formed in 1909.189

Since all able-bodied men were enrolled in the Reserves and the Reserves could, and

now officially should, have their Rifle Clubs, the Rifle Associations were superfluous as

defence organizations. According to the Rifle Club Rules, a man could not belong to a Rifle

Club and a Rifle Association. In 1907 there were 129 Rifle Associations with 5,567

efficients, not counting Natal Police and Militia. The government reduced its grants to them

in 1907 when it was found that that two thirds of their members had lost or could not account

179 Ibid. 3649 (Dec. 10, 1907), p. 1422: M.O. 280/07. 180 CGR 1909, p. 3. 181 Debates, XLVIII, 404, 479-481. Whatever their scores on paper, Reserve leaders did not have the training and practical experience of officers in the Active Militia. 182 Ibid., 480. CGR 1909, p. 3. 183 CR 1907, p. 4. 184 CGR 1908, pp. 2-3. 185 Ibid. 1909, p. 3. 186 Ibid. 1908, p. 3. 187 NGG 3726 (Dec. 22, 1908), p. 1243: GN 723/08. If they wished, clubs could adopt uniforms (p. 1245). 188 Ibid. pp. 1243-1246. CGR 1908, p. 4. 189 CGR 1909, p. 3.


59

for their ammunition.190 In 1909 there were 110 with only 3,962 efficients.191 The

government gave notice that from January 1, 1910 it would no longer provide free

ammunition or money grants to Rifle Associations, nor would it sell rifles and ammunition to

them at cost.192 Existing associations were encouraged to convert to Rifle Clubs,193 which, in

essence, meant becoming an adjunct of the Militia Reserves. Most of them did so, but

naturally there was some dissatisfaction.194 There were exceptions. The Natal Rifle

Association enjoyed the prestige of managing the Annual Prize Meeting, the so-called Natal

Bisley, but even it had to change its constitution.195 It remained based at Pietermaritzburg,

and it is not surprising that four of the seven Rifle Clubs first gazetted were formed in the

City and its immediate vicinity.196

Then there were the new Miniature Rifle Clubs which appeared in 1908. The rifles

and ammunition were light and inexpensive and suitable for the short ranges at drill halls and

schools. McKenzie thought they would be good not only for School Cadets but for young

men too busy with sport on Saturday afternoon who would do some shooting in the

evening.

197 (Perhaps he was thinking of attracting recent school leavers in the towns, for

Senior Cadets had dwindled in number due to disciplinary problems.)198 In 1909 Miniature

ranges were erected in Pietermaritzburg and Durban, and improved at twenty-two schools

throughout the Colony.199

Like Bru-de-wold, McKenzie championed women’s use of firearms. “I am strongly

of the opinion that every woman in the Colony should learn to use a rifle”, he reported in

1909.

200 If a district went into laager, they would add to the firepower of the defence.

Women could join an existing Rifle Club – the Rules were amended in March 1909201

190 CR 1907, p. 3. 191 SYB 1909, p. 69. 192 CGR 1909, p. 3. NGG 3814 (Feb. 26, 1910), p. 330: M.O. 33/10. 193 NGG 3729 (Jan. 5, 1909), p. 8: M.O. 4/09. 194 CGR 1909, p. 3. 195 NGG 3728 (Dec. 29, 1908, pp. 1265-1266: Notice. 196 Ibid. 3743 (Mar. 23, 1909), p. 256: M.O. 55/09. There evidently was tension between Pietermaritzburg and Durban members, who wanted to alternate meetings between centres. See Debates, XLIX, 242-246. 197 CGR 1908, pp. 3-4. 198 Ibid., pp. 2-3; 1909, p. 4. There were 453 Senior Cadets enrolled at the end of 1906, 241 at the end of 1908, and 89 in 1909. The Commandant considered disbandment, but left the matter for Union authorities to deal with. 199 Ibid., 1909, p. 4. 200 Ibid. 1908, p. 4. 201 NGG 3744 (Mar. 30, 1909), p. 268: GN 155/09.

– or


60

form one of their own. McKenzie reported that Miniature rifles were suitable for girls over

fourteen. Ranges were to be built at girls’ schools where possible, and the government would

provide for instruction.202 According to the Commandant, the first course in shooting, held at

the Drill Hall in the City, “met with the greatest success”.203

Imperial intervention in Natal’s defensive arrangements continued after the Rebellion,

but events in Europe were turning the attention of the British government, the Army Council

and the reorganized General Staff more and more towards the impending conflict there.

Inevitably, if not immediately, the attention of colonial politicians and officers was drawn

thither as well. The diplomatic revolution in Europe was practically completed when Britain

reached an understanding with Russia in 1907. At the Colonial Conference in 1907 it was

apparent that Britain was preoccupied with the possibility of a major war in Europe and

interested chiefly in finding out what help it could expect from the Empire.

The Imperial factor again

204 In October

1908, on the initiative of the Imperial authorities, a Defence Conference was held in Durban.

The commandants of the South African colonies attended. “The general idea [...] was to

assimilate as far as possible the organization and training of the South African Colonial

Forces”, reported McKenzie, “and as far as possible this is being done”.205 In early 1909, at

the height of the Dreadnought crisis, the Imperial authorities held a special naval and military

conference,206 whose proceedings were confidential and secret. Colonel E.M. Greene, of the

Natal Carbineers and a member of the legislative assembly, attended on behalf of Natal, but

he would only tell members of the Legislative Assembly that Natal had not agreed to do

anything which it was not doing already.207

In early 1907 the Prime Minister, Frederick Moor, called at the War Office while on a

visit to London, and asked about an exchange of Imperial and Colonial officers and

admission of the latter to the Staff College at Camberley. He also asked for information

about the General Staff, which had been established in September 1906. The Director of

202 CGR 1908, p. 4. 203 Ibid. 1909, p. 4. 204 Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, p. 167. Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 237. 205 CGR 1908, pp. 5-6. 206 Carrington, British Overseas, p. 858. 207 Debates XLVIII, 241-245.


61

Staff Duties, Major-General Hutchinson, consequently sent him copies of the Special Order

for the Organization of the General Staff (and Viscount Haldane’s expository memorandum),

Staff College Regulations, and Revised Regulations under which Colonial officers might

obtain commissions in the British Army. These papers the Prime Minister forwarded to the

Commandant.208

The Militia Staff seems not to have been much affected, at least in form. District

Commandants had been dispensed with, but a Commandant of Reserves was appointed, and

officers were appointed in the new Departmental corps. There certainly was an effort to

improve regimental officers’ qualifications. In January 1907 Militia Orders offered Imperial

military publications at reduced rates.

Evidently they had some impact.

209 From February 1906 until July 1908 Militia Orders

listed new accessions to the library,210 although early in March 1907 “the Commandant

observe[d] with regret that officers had not availed themselves [of the Militia Library] to the

extent which he could have desired”, and he reminded them that catalogues could be obtained

at Militia Headquarters.211

The regulations for obtaining commissions in the British Army, with detailed

appendices, were gazetted in July 1907, January 1908, and February 1909.

212 The

qualifications were strict. Annually, there were fifteen commissions available to colonials,

three of which were reserved for South Africa.213 Admission to the Royal Staff College was

also restricted.214 The first Natal officer to enter was Captain W.E. Tanner, of the Militia

Staff, in 1909.215

Colonial officers and detachments were invited to take part in the Imperial forces’

208 Natal Defence Records 5/2: V3228/07, Maj.-Gen. to PM, May 29, 1907, and reply, June 26, 1907. The commission regulations were forwarded separately by the Agent-General in London (V4097/07). 209 NGG 3589 (Jan. 8, 1907), p. 33: M.O. 5/07; also 3635 (Oct. 1, 1907), p. 1150: M.O. 229/07. 210 See NGGs between those dates for the lists. Military intellectuals may have found some satisfaction later in the founding of a Military Society in June 1909. (Ibid. 3913 (June 22, 1909), p. 592.) 211 Ibid. 3597 (Mar. 5, 1907, p. 231: M.O. 67/07. 212 NGG 3630 (Sept. 3, 1907), p. 101: M.O. 209/07; and 3734 (Feb. 2, 1909), pp. 96-103: M.O. 21/09. See also Regulations in NDR 5/2: V4097/07 (see n. 81). 213 Ibid. 3734, p. 96. 214 Ibid. 3656 (Jan. 28, 1908), p. 88: M.O. 12/08. See also Regulations in NDR 5/2: V3228/07 (see n. 84). 215 CGR 1909, p. 2, which also mentions that Lieut.-Col J. Hyslop, Principal Medical Officer, was granted extra leave while in England to study military medical administration. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 238, states that two Natal officers passed through the Staff College between 1903 and 1911, and mentions no other South Africans.


62

annual camps in the Transvaal in September 1907,216 and the Commandant, Chief Staff

Officer and Natal Field Artillery commander did so in August 1908.217 In July 1909 a Natal

Colonial Forces Military Tournament was held in Durban for the purpose of encouraging and

developing “skill at arms” among all ranks.218 The tournament was opened by the General

Officer Commanding and Acting Governor of the Transvaal, Lord Methuen. Imperial and

naval units were also invited, and all participated “in friendly rivalry”, according to

McKenzie, who hoped that the event would become an institution.219

Shooting was all-important to defence, and every endeavour was made to promote

and perfect it. New ranges were laid out in Pietermaritzburg and Durban in 1907, and

whatever else he had to say about the Active Militia, McKenzie reported that its standard of

shooting was very high.

220 Militia units, Cadet Corps, Rifle Associations and Rifle Clubs all

had their regular shoots, with appropriate prizes for individuals and for teams. Empire-wide

competitions were introduced on Empire Day.221 Sir Henry McCallum and his successor Sir

Matthew Nathan (1907-1909) offered special prizes. Sir Matthew (also a Royal Engineer)

laid down that his prize should be awarded for shooting in approximate field conditions.222

Lord Methuen, the last governor (1910), had introduced a South African cup in early 1909,

when he was in command of the forces.223 In 1907 the Militia and the Natal Rifle

Association combined their annual shootings in one annual Natal Bisley.224

The Militia was introduced to a new course of musketry, based on the standards of the

Imperial service, in 1907,

School Cadets

were allowed to participate in it in 1909, after the shooting age for Cadets was raised from

thirteen to fourteen.

225 but the regulations were amended at the beginning of 1908.226

216 NGG 3620 (July 9, 1907), p. 690: M.O. 177/07. 217 Ibid. 3698 (Aug. 25, 1908), p. 799: M.O. 140/08. 218 Ibid. 3766 (July 13, 1901, p. 649: M.O. 116/09; and 3767 (July 20, 1909), p. 674: M.O. 120/09. 219 CGR 1909, p. 2. Apparently it was not such a financial success, for the government had to pay £400 in costs when Durban could not. See Debates XLIX, 244. 220 CR 1907, p. 2 and 4. 221 See NGG 3669 (Apr. 28, 1908), pp. 322-323: M.O. 85/08. 3743 (Mar. 23, 1909), pp. 256-257: M.O. 57/09; 3750 (May 4, 1909), pp. 384-385: M.O. 83/09. 222 CR 1907, p. 2, and CRG 1908, p. 2. 223 NGG 3730 Jan. 12, 1909, p. 212: M.O. 9/09. 224 CGR 1908, p. 2, and 1909, p. 5 225 CR 1907, p. 4. 226 NGG 3654 (Jan. 14, 1908), pp. 34-36: M.O. 10/08.

In mid-1909, a new course for South African Local Forces, incorporating the recent


63

experience of Imperial and European armies, was introduced.227 It was too complicated for

Militia in the country districts,228 and the regulations were amended early in 1910.229 In

October 1909 a Combined Senior Officers and Refresher Musketry Course, for Imperial and

Colonial officers, was held at Bloemfontein.230 Officers in the Field Artillery and

Departmental corps were armed with pistols, and from 1907 were required to take a revolver

course.231 That year mounted revolver shooting was introduced at the annual Bisley.232

The contentious post-war issues of defence between the Colony and the Imperial

authorities faded after the Rebellion. For one thing, the Rebellion pointed to the wisdom of

maintaining an Imperial garrison in the Colony, as much to show moral and political support

as military strength. No longer was Fort Napier manned by the expedient Royal Garrison

Regiment, but by a succession of battalions of regular regiments.

233

The duality of policy, which had characterized the Defence Committee before

Leader’s departure and the reduction of Imperial strength in 1905, was gone. The Imperial

viewpoint was represented by the Chief Staff Officer, South Africa, but he was stationed in

Pretoria, and the rest of the members of the committee were Colonial officers and

politicians.

Ironically, their presence

was rendered less urgent by the completion of the Natal Defence Scheme which General

Hildyard and Sir Henry McCallum had sought in 1905.

234

The Natal Defence Scheme was updated to meet changed circumstances. In July

1907 Administrator W.H. Beaumont read the draft of Bru-de-Wold’s revised scheme, which

provided for the fielding of 4,356 men of all ranks and the manning of fifty-six blockhouses.

He remarked that a Boer rising now seemed very unlikely, and asked after a new scheme to

In the absence of surviving records of the committee one is left to guess at the

opinions and actions of its members, but Sir Henry’s fear that a Colonial Commandant would

not be able to resist the politicians seems to have been borne out by McKenzie’s frustration

seeking to augment the Active Militia and mould the Militia Reserves as he wished.

227 Ibid. 3737 (Feb. 16, 1909), p. 171: M.O. 33/09. 228 CGR 1909, p. 2. 229 NGG 3805 (Jan. 18, 1910), p. 161: M.O. 9/10. 230 Ibid. 3732 (Aug. 17, 1909), p. 730: M.O. 124/09. 231 Ibid. 3591 (Jan. 22, 1907), pp. 89-90: M.O. 24/07. CR 1907, p. 4. 232 CR 1907, p. 2. 233 See GH 520, p. 17:G24/07, Maj.-Gen. i/c Admin. to Gov., Mar. 26, 1907; and for succeeding regiments, Natal Directory 1908 and 1909, pp. 38 and 38, respectively, and Brookes and Webb, History of Natal, p. 207. 234 See Natal Civil List 1906, p. 182; 1907, p. 169; 1908, p. 174; and 1909, p. 181.


64

meet a Native one. McKenzie replied that the Boer one he had to hand was what the Army

Council wanted. There was in fact another scheme for a Native rising, and several others

were under consideration.235

In 1908 the Imperial authorities desired the colonies to prepare new schemes to deal

with a general Native uprising in South Africa. Militia devised one, which assumed that

Imperial forces and loyal Native levies would not be available to assist in Natal. The Colony

was divided into nine districts under commandants, with seventy-six laagers and rallying

points under laager commandants and leaders, respectively. These places were to be

surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and supplied with ammunition and provisions.

Settlers’ families would resort to these defences, which would be manned by the Third

Reserves and some of the First and Second. Railways staff and employees would form

laagers and erect blockhouses along the rail lines. The Active Militia and the bulk of the First

and Second Reserves would mobilize and form mobile columns at Durban, Pietermaritzburg,

Greytown and Ladysmith. Each column would number 2,500 mounted and 1,000 unmounted

men. The columns would seek out and destroy the enemy according to circumstances. The

duties and purposes of the various units and the responsible officers were spelt out in

detail.

Even so, the Zululand expedition in December reflected

elements of the 1904 mobilization scheme.

236

Lord Methuen asked for the scheme in March 1909, and in July, Nathan forwarded

the draft – although the Defence Committee had not approved it yet. The General wrote that

the scheme was “very lucid and valuable”, and made only a few minor suggestions for its

improvement.

237 He had also requested the other scheme which Militia was preparing, and it

was sent to him in September. It was a plan for war with Germany.238

235 GH 511, pp. 139-141: G116/07, Formation of a Local Defence Scheme for Natal (undated memorandum), and comments. McKenzie evidently was referring to Mobilization Schemes, which were components of the Defence Scheme. 236 Ibid. 512, pp. 2-4: G826/09, Gov. to GOC, July 15, 1909. 237 Ibid., pp. 5-6: GOC to Gov., Aug. 3, 1909. 238 Ibid., pp. 2,4: Gov. to GOC, and p. 7: Admin. to GOC, Sept. 19, 1909. See also GH 1284, p. 22: Gov. to S/S, Mar. 26, 1910.


65

Conclusion

In seventeen years of self-government the Colony of Natal had established a system

of defence against indigenous enemies and foreign enemies. In comparing the states of

defence in 1893 and 1910, one is struck by the remarkable difference. In 1893 there were no

major enemies immediately threatening the British Empire or the Colonial regime, and the

legislation organizing the Natal Police and Volunteer Force in 1894 and 1895 seemed quite

adequate. The unexpected and sudden onset of war and then rebellion destroyed

complacency, and tested the capacity and will of the settlers to fight foes without and then

within.

From 1902 a major reassessment of defence took place. The Militia Act of 1903

provided for compulsory military training, but financial constraint inhibited the expansion of

the Active Militia and popular suspicion delayed the formation of the Militia Reserves.

Imperial authority had to be brought to bear on the Colony to complete the organization of

the Militia. The process was marked by an unprecedented militarization of the settler

population and sustained by an intensified patriotism (or nationalism) among them.

By the time of Union, the Colony was prepared to deal with an internal enemy, but it

was not so well prepared to deal with an external one. The threat from outside the Colony

had receded. Former Boer enemies were now compatriots, and potential German ones were

far away. The efficient Militia organization remained in being under the Union, and provided

a model for the Union Defence Force established in 1912.