Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos

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The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Imre LakatosAuthor(s): Paul FeyerabendSource: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 1-18

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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 26 (I975), I-i8 Printed in Great Britain I

Imre Lakatos*

by PAUL FEYERABEND

x Imre Lakatos, who died suddenly and quite unexpectedly in February

1974, was a fascinating person, an outstanding thinker and the best

philosopher of science of our strange and uncomfortable century. He was

a rationalist, for he thought that man had the duty of using reason in

his private affairsas well as in any inquiry concerning the relation between

himself, nature, and his fellow man. He was an optimist for he thoughtthat reason was capable of solving most of the problems arising in the

course of such an inquiry. He had realistic ideas about this capabilityof reason for he emphasised that it cannot always be expressed in the

form of rules, and that a mere abstract comparison of rules is quiteinsufficient for improving it even if the comparison should be guided by

general principles of the most profound nature: if reason is to have a

point of attack in this world with its complicated episodes and its hair-raising ideas and institutions, then it must be both sly and sophisticated.In the sciences, for example, reason must not be more primitive than

the theories which it is supposed to evaluate; but reason must not be

too strict either, otherwise it becomes impossible to build up science or

else to improve ideas, experiments, institutions which are already in

existence. We need a type of reason that keeps a sane balance between

the inactive (though by no means silent) contemplationof science, and

reformatoryzeal. The demands of reason have to be

adaptedto the

(historical, psychological, physical, financial) properties of the material

to be changed.This side of methodology has hardly ever been examined by philosophers

of science. The standard procedure here is first to invent a very simple-minded model of knowledge and then to evaluate rules by comparingthem with the model. Popper s theory of falsification, for example, arose

from the trivial observation that while a singular statement may entail

the negation of a universal statement it never entails any universal state-

ment. One soon realised that the suggested rules were either useless or

[Editors Note]: Imre Lakatos, then Editor of this Journal, died suddenly on 2 February1974. Shortly afterwards Professor Feyerabend was invited by the then Acting Editorto write an appreciation of Professor Lakatos.* An earlier version of this article was extensively criticised by Professor J. W. N. Watkins

and Mr John Worrall. I have accepted some of their suggestions.

A



2 Paul Feyerabend

devastating. The material of the scientist is much too incoherent and

unwieldly to survive an out and out Popperian attack.

On the other hand, this material is not beyond the reach of every

epistemological criticism. Analysing methods of mathematical proof,1Imre

Lakatos found that complicated theories are often attempts to cover updifficulties that arise in the course of a discussion of simple and even

quasi-empirical problems. Some problems are solved, and additional

problems that arise in the course of this solution are covered up by

complicated machinery. On the other hand it is possible to suggest solu-

tions which lead to new and unexpected problems and which make us

discover new and unexpected (mathematical) facts. If theories of the latterkind are preferred despite all the difficulties they create, if they are giventime to develop then one has a criterion that is strict without being fatal,that has a point of attack in scientific practice without restricting the

freedom of the scientist, the freedom of daring intellectual enterprisesincluded. Lakatos has extended the criterion to the empirical sciences

and has explained it in detail in his epoch making essay Falsification

and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes .2 The theoryof science that underlies the criterion combines strict criticism with free

decision, historical accident with rules of reason. It is one of the most

important achievements of twentieth-century philosophy. It is importantbecause it solves almost all the problems created by the first rise of

Western Rationalism (the Presocratics) and by the repeat performancein the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

But Imre Lakatos was not merely a theoretician. He was also a crusader,

journalist, politician. He combined arguments with brilliant performances

during his lectures, biting humour in discussions, charming persuasiveness

in private conversation. Very soon there arose a circle of people of similarintellectual tastes-I advisedly do not use the word thinkers , for mere

thinking-machines were a horror to Lakatos-who were interested in

removing that endless and conceited boredom which today seems to be

the prime characteristic of scholarship. The circle was not restricted to

rationalists, for Imre Lakatos was anything but narrowminded, and even

a Dadaist like myself could work with him and profit from his advice.

Then students and older colleagues joined this new intellectual com-

munity,founded on

friendshipand

scepticalinterest rather than on slavish

subservience. This was possible, for Imre Lakatos was above all a kind

and warmhearted human being, deeply concerned about the increasing

irrationality and injustice in this world, about the almost insurmountable

power which mediocrity possesses in all fields and among all people,1 Lakatos [I1963-41.

2 Lakatos [11970].



Imre Lakatos 3

including the so-called youth ; prepared to defend his ideas and his

attitude even under uncomfortable and dangerous circumstances; not to

be silenced and yet not without being aware of the ultimate absurdity of

all human enterprise. A man like him can never be completely understood

on the basis of his written work alone. And this work will survive only

in the hands of those who possess similar freedom, similar joy of life, and

a similar abundance of ideas.

My own evaluation of Imre Lakatos s work will be decidedly sub-

jective. I shall look at some aspects of his theory in a rather personal

way, as one looks at the work of a friend and not as one looks at the

work of a faceless scholar of an age long gone by. I shall emphasiseelements which are not apparent from the published accounts and

whose existence is denied by his more rationalist colleagues. I shall

also give a brief sketch of some historical developments which at first

sight don t seem to have anything to do with the methodology of research

programmes. I do this because I believe that these developments have

created problems which were not solved before but which Imre Lakatos

has brought much closer to a solution. I start my historical sketch with

an account of the Presocratics.

2 Science started in the West when some extraordinary people preferredthe results of certain intellectual games to what they could learn from their

senses and from tradition. (When I speak of games rather than of rules

of thinking or intellectual discoveries I do this to emphasise the often

quite arbitrary character of the principles then introduced. The Preso-

cratics only rarely argued with their predecessors, they started a new form

of life and measure of excellence. ) We do not know how the games that

constituted this measure came into being and we can only be surprisedat the way in which they soon affected perception, thought, social relations.

Epistemology and the philosophy of science arose from the many diffi-

culties created by this development. Xenophanes,for example, had pointedout that God cannot be many and that he cannot be created. If he is

many, then the many are either equal or unequal; if equal, then they are

one, if unequal, then those different from the one that is cannot be, so

there will again be only one. On the other hand, if God is created, then

he comes either from the same, or from what is different. If he comes

from the same, then he is not created; but the different is what is not,and nothing can come from what is not. These arguments contradicted

both tradition (Homer, Hesiod) and direct experience(which at the time

1 For example, the older thinkers are criticised for their roAvtLaOGiqut nobody explainswhy a unified account is preferable to a list.



4 Paul Feyerabend

in question included the experience of divine intervention brought about

by a great variety of partly helpful, partly mischievous gods),1 they

introduced entirely new tales claiming to contain superior truth, and theycalled for a new kind of investigation dealing with the relation between

the tales and the conventional accounts.

Starting the new kind of investigation in a straightforward and rather

dogmatic manner Xenophanes declares that his arguments overrule

whatever is in conflict with them. The feeling, so characteristic for the

early Greeks, that nature is the playground of the gods and that it is full

of intelligent life is mistaken, even if it should find support in experience

and language.2 On the other hand, it is possible to reform experiencebyeliminating its theological ingredients. Such a reformed experience no

longer tells us that the sun rises (speaking in this way one assumes a

permanence for which no reason can be found, which is suspiciously close

to the older theology and which, moreover, is contradicted by phenomenasuch as the increasing shapelessness of the sun as it approaches haze and

clouds on the horizon), or that there is a sky (the idea of a sky is a remnant

of older views3 found unacceptable by the argument). Nor is this reformed

experience a natural process. It is an artifact, both phenomenologically

(the observer has to be trained not to project too much life into the

external world; he must learn to see the sun as a stone and the sky as a

complicated mechanical system) and theoretically (he must not use the

wrong concepts either; for example, he must no longer use the customary

concepts of hot and cold). Introducing this artifact into cosmological

speculation Xenophanes creates empiricism with its dichotomy between

evidence(parts of the new type of experience just invented) and views that

go beyond it but are in need of evidential support, and the quite different

dichtomy between our natural experience and the manufactured processesthat alone can count as evidence. And we have now the problem how the

right kind of support can be found, i.e. we have now a problemof evidence

and a problemof induction.4

Xenophanes s proof also shows that cosmologies that explain how the

world arose from simpler forms are basically incorrect. We can say

what the world is, we cannot say how it has becomewhat it is. Historical

accountssuch as those of Hesiod, and of Anaximander must therefore be

replaced byrecitation of basic

principles.Professor Szab6 has shown5

how this leads directly to the axiomatic approachwhich was to dominate

western thought down to our own times.

xNietzsche [1873]; Wilamowitz-Moellendorf [1955]; Dodds [1957]; Nilsson [1949] etc.2 Terms such as hot and cold included the heat of love and the coldness of anger and

hatred. 3 Such as the old idea of a separation of heaven and earth.

4 This is a first approximation only. 5 Szab6 [1969].



ImreLakatos 5

Aristotle proceeds on the path that had been opened by Xenophanesand Parmenides, but he modifies it in a most interesting way. He retains

the idea that knowledge proceeds from principles. He also retains the

first of the two dichotomies mentioned above but he does not retain the

second one.1 He returns to the earlier view that man s natural experienceand his natural ways of talking are basically correct and he tries to

harmonise them with the newly found machinery of abstract argument.He knows quite well that our senses are not perfect and he discusses

numerous instances where error is likely to occur. But there are conditions

and contents of perception that can be trusted. It is these conditions and

these contents that lead to the principles of our sciences as well as to ageneral theory of motion and causation. They lead to them in two ways,

logically, by excluding extravagant views (Aristotle has a principle of

falsification) and causally, by giving rise to the ideas that constitute the

principles (evidence and principles are manufactured by the organismitself who receives the forms inherent in nature, retains them through a

process of gradual imprinting and finally imposesthem on material more

chaotic than what happens under normal conditions, leading to clear

perceptions

even in this case: theproblem

of evidence and theproblemof induction disappear from philosophy and are solved in physiology).

Perceptions are not changed and castrated in the way suggested by

Xenophanes. But they are not regarded as being given either. Each single

perceptual occurrence can be explained on the basis of a general theory of

motion that comprises locomotion, sensation, biological growth etc.

and that indicates when and under what physical circumstances error

is going to arise (perceptual error is not a result of wilfulness, it is simplya case of physical malfunctioning).

This fantastic and unique cosmology which gives abstract speculationits due without permitting it to throw doubt on the basic abilities of man

and which makes knowledge part of the physical universe was overwhelmed

and pushed aside by the rise of modernscience.In the past few years it has

been made clear (by Burtt, Koyre and others) that modern science did

not arise because of empirical problems created by the inadequacy of

earlier forms of thought; it arose because a new ideology was imposed

from the outside.2In a way the situation was identical with what happened

at the time of the Presocratics but the lines were not drawn as clearly as1With Parmenides, Zeno and Plato other problems are added to those two: Western

rationalism starts with an attempt to solve the problems it has created by its appearance(and which were absent from the earlier world views).

2 Cf. for example Gingerich [1974]. For a fascinating account of how the new views

gradually crept in, insinuated themselves and so took over without argument cf. Kocher

[I9531].



6 Paul Feyerabend

in the earlier instance. The proponents of the new views were not justcontent to present their ideas and to let history take its course, they tried

to get support from the opposition as well, and so they embarked on one

of the most successful propaganda campaigns in the history of thought.In consequence the new cosmology appeared less radical and common-

sense more sophisticated than they actually were. As modern science

developed one realised that the following conflicts with the Aristotelian

point of view had arisen.

(I) Modern science contradicts Aristotle s claim that natural man is in

harmony with the world in the sense that his natural powers (sense

perception; language etc.) do not deceive him about its basic structure;(2) it contradicts Aristotle s claim that the basic principles are, and must

be, necessary; (3) it uses a new theory of motion that is restricted to

locomotion promising that other forms of motion will eventually be

reduced to it, but it never keeps the promise (this procedure and this

development are partly responsible for the renewed appearance of a gulf

between the evidence of our senses and the creatures of pure thinking);

(4) modern science also brings with it a new aim for scientific research.

Beforethe aim had been to

developa

cosmologythat could in principle

accommodate any fact. Failure to accommodate a fact indicated either that

the correct cosmology had not yet been found, or threw doubts on the

methods used in the discovery of the fact. Now the constant expansion

of the horizon of facts becomes a necessary condition of acceptable

science. The new aim is realised only very gradually and we are not too

far from the truth when saying that the first explicit formulation of it is

found in Lakatos (or, if one wants to quibble, in Popper, as reformulated

by Lakatos).

3 It is clear that radical changes such as these could not be explained by

the traditional epistemologies that often excluded them, and new views

were proposed to cope with the situation. The development that had

started with the Presocratics and that had given rise to so many problems

now continued, after a temporary halt. In a way we are still in the middle

of this development, we are still trying to understand science and the

kind of rationalism that was invented by the Greeks. This is the reason

why I have started my sketch with Xenophanes.The new views were

either comprehensive, or more restricted. The more restricted views

describe an ideal of knowledge and indicate how science fits the idea. The

comprehensive views give an account of the changes that are needed to

transform Aristotelianism, or any other non-scientific ideology into

(modern) science. Most of the time the ideal is taken for granted, it is



ImreLakatos 7

not discussed (this applies even to a sophisticated thinker such as Imre

Lakatos).

Among the comprehensive views the most interesting and most in-

fluential one is that of Bacon. Bacon realises that a new science must be

based on a new experience and on new ways of thinking. And as a new

experience and new ways of thinking can only arise in a new man, he

wants to rebuild man so that he may become a plain and undistortingmirror of the world.1 The activity that brings about this great reconstruc-

tion cannot be based on experience: the old experience is worthless, the

new experience has not yet arrived. The activity is therefore without a

foundation: Bacon is the first modern thinker to conceive the idea ofa science without foundations (but he ascribes to it a transitory function

only: it leads up to a future science that again rests upon a foundation,

but this time the foundation is trustworthy, and agrees with the world).For a long time Newton s science was thought to be the new and well

founded science that Bacon had promised. The phenomena on which

it rests are neither sensations, nor normal experiences. They are simplelaws of nature, somewhat idealised, expressed in mathematical terms, and

occasionally capable of direct experimental demonstration.2 Newton also

developed a methodology and philosophy of science. It belongs to the

restricted type and has been the model for almost all later thinking on

the matter. According to Newton, science is built up by first finding

phenomena, then deriving laws, then generalising these laws, always

testing the generalisations with the help of new experiments, and by

finally framing hypotheses for their explanation. Phenomena, laws,

hypotheses are corrigible by further research. For example, a law that

has been obtained by generalising a statement derived from phenomena

may be restricted as a result of further observations. But such correctionscan only come from the same level, or from a lower level; they cannot

come from above . For example, hypotheses may not correct phenomena.Newton s faith in having found the correct method for discovering and

justifying general statements was supported by his apparent success in

deriving his law of gravitation from phenomena . Newtonianism dominated

science and the philosophy of science down to the twentieth century.3Of course, Hume showed that justification can be neither by derivation

from experiencenor

by probabilification-but his objections had onlylittle immediate influence. They were not formulated in mathematical

x Bacon [I6o8], aphorisms 41, 50, 95, II15. When Bacon speaks of unprejudiced senses

(97) he does not mean sense data, or raw feels ; he means the perceptions of the manof the future who is attuned to reality.

2Cf. my [I970].

*Cf. Born

[9491].



8 Paul Feyerabend

terms and, besides, they seemed to deny Newton s achievements, or turn

them into a series of accidents. Nor was Hegel more successful when he

compared Newton s theory of perturbations with his derivation pointingout that the latter was a mere transcription of Kepler s formulae. And

even in the twentieth century, and after Duhem,the effort was continued

to find ways of using evidence in a positive way, i.e. to define methods

that would select theories, without any interference from above by

showing that they were well supported by the evidence, or at least better

supported than their rivals.2 There were only two philosophies that tried

to give a different account of the relation between evidence and theories,

Kant s transcendental idealism, and the philosophy of conventionalism.Conventionalismagrees that theories cannot be justified in the way

imagined by simple forms of inductivism. They are justified because of

the order they bring into the known facts and because they provide

concepts and ordering principles for things as yet to be discovered. The

order is never complete, for there are always recalcitrant phenomena.This does not invalidate the chosen scheme, but challenges its defenders

to rebuild the phenomena until they fit into it. The scheme is chosen

either because it easily accountsfor

some empirical regularities (empiricallymotivated conventionalism), or because it follows from certain theoretical

postulates (Dinglerian version). Once the scheme is accepted and in-

corporated into scientific practice, it quite automatically transforms the

facts and thus removes any criticism on the basis of experience . Trans-

cendental idealism assumes that man classifies data automatically, without

having made a conscious decision to adopt an ordering scheme. The laws

which underlie his classifications are found and proved, by transcendental

deduction.

Neither transcendental idealism nor conventionalism (of the empirically

motivated kind) are universal theories. They offer means of justification

for some very general views, but they become inductivist when dealing

with simple regularities. And even in the case of the preferred views, the

solution depends on empirical laws: Kant assumes that the human mind

does not change, the conventionalists (and this now includes the Ding-

lerians) assume that the decision of the scientist to stick to certain forms

of thought will keep these forms of thought imprinted on his material

forever. The problem of justification moves from one place to another, itis not solved.

1 Hegel [1817], section 270.

2 For the strange story of the theories that arose in this way and their progressive

degeneration cf. Lakatos [1968]. Duhem s result, incidentally, when translated into

the lower predicate calculus reveals the need for a logic of confirmation where all

ravens are black can be highly confirmed by grey ravens.



imre LRanatos 9

4 It remains unsolved in yet another theory that was formulated twice

in the nineteenth century, first by Mill, in his immortal essay On Liberty,

and then by thinkers such as Boltzmann who extended Darwinism to the

running of science itself. This theory takes the bull by the horns: theories

cannot be justified, and they need not be justified. There is no positive

explanation of the success of scientific hypotheses, theories, laws, except bymeans of other hypotheses,theories, laws. And there are no positive reasons

for accepting hypotheses,theories, laws. We cannot derive them from facts,

we cannot guarantee that they will remain successful after their first

successes, we cannot guarantee that the facts are as described, we cannot

even guarantee that the theories we have chosen are in agreement withthe demands of formal logic. But all that is not necessary. The procedureof science is not to praise the good, but to eliminate what is bad, or

comparatively inferior. The fundamental difference between [this]

approach and [inductivism, or other types of justificationism] is that [it]

lays stress on negative arguments,such as negative instances, or counter-

examples, refutations and attempted refutations-in short criticism while

empiricists of the Newtonian tradition usually emphasise positive argu-

ments,positive

instances and thelike.1

So essential is this[critical]

dis-

cussion to a real understanding of moral and human subjects that, if

opponents of all important truth do not exist, it is indispensable to imaginethem and to supply them with the strongest arguments which the most

skillful devil s advocate can conjure up .2 The theory that survives the

debate is of course not free from fault. It dominates the field not because

it has been proved (or because it is highly probable), or because it possessessome other desirable feature such as consistency. Even the best scientific

theory is usually in a pretty sorry state. What is decisive is that its faults

are smaller than the faults of the rivals-for the time being. Thus thebeliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on but

a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded that

is, to find reasons for rejecting them. If we use every opportunity for

contesting it (a certain hypothesis) has not been refuted then we shall

regard it as better than an alternative which, while supported by all the

available evidence has not gone through a similar process . If even the

Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind

could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they do now .3 Thusthe edifice of our knowledge does not consist of. . . well established truths

... It consists of largely arbitrary elements... so-called hypotheses .41 Popper [I972], p. zo. Popper, of course, says my instead of this .2 Mill [1859], quoted from Cohen [196I], p. zz8. Mill does not restrict his method

to moral and human subjects , he applies it to scientific theories as well. See below.3

Mill, op. cit. pp. 209, zo8, again 2o9. 4 Boltzmann [1905], chapter 8.



Io Paul Feyerabend

Or, in Popper s repetition: . . all that can possibly be positive in our

scientific knowledge is positive only insofar as certain theories are, at a

certain moment of time, preferred to others in the light of our critical

discussion.... Thus even what may be called positive is so only with

respect to negative methods .1The analogy with Darwin is obvious. Before Darwin it was customary

to view organisms as divinely created and thereforeperfect solutions to

the problems of life on this planet. During the nineteenth century one

became aware of the numerous failures of the life process. This processis not a carefully planned and meticulously performed attempt to realise

an aim that has been thought out in advance. It is unreasonable, wasteful,it produces an immense variety of forms and leaves it to nature to eliminate

the duds. The remaining forms are surprisingly efficient, as if they had

been planned with a definite aim in mind. However, there was no aim,

there was no method of justification , and it is doubtful whether conscious

planning could ever have produced a comparable result.

The analogy does not solve methodological problems, it only shows

what kinds of solution are possible.The world of the organism is a natural

world,it acts

blindly.The world of

theoryis a social

world,it is built

up by scientists who have to decide what to keep and what to eliminate.

Is the decision to be completely arbitrary, is it supposed to proceed

according to explicit rules and, if the latter, which rules shall we choose?

These are the questions which arise once we start relying on methods of

elimination instead of looking for methods of justification.Mill dispenses with general rules and judges every case on its own

merit, and in the concrete historical situation in which it occurs.2 He

seems to think that the shape of the rival theories and the historical

situation in which they compete should have an influence on our judg-

ment, and he seems to believe that our ingenuity will and should beper-mitted to react differently to different types of influence: The human

faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity,and even moral [and, so we might add, methodological] preference are

exercised... in making a choice and they are improved by such an

exercise.3 Should the improved facilities not be given the chance to make

improved judgments on the basis of improved standards?

5 This reasonable and rather sophisticated question which makes

methodology part of the historical process did not survive. It certainly1

Op. cit., p. 20.2 Mill always means the Mill of On Liberty-not the Mill of the Logic: Mill was one of

those rare individuals who can be persuaded by argument to completely change their

point of view. IPopper [1972], p. 252.



ImreLakatos II

was not raised by the logical positivists, those pugnacious championsof clean living in the sciences. Quite the contrary, they implicitly denied

that the development of methodology had anything to do with the develop-ment of human talents. They set up rules of procedure that treat all

theories in the same manner, independently of the historical situation in

which they arejudged, independently of any development in our methodo-

logical imagination that might take place. History which had started

playing a role in the evaluation of theories is now again ignored. Comparedwith Mill (and Hegel) this is a tremendous step back and, mind you, this

step is not the result of arguments, it is the result of an uninformed

allegiance to earlier non-historical methodologies. Karl Popper shares thebasic ideology of logical positivism. This is why the story can from now

on be told in at least two different ways.The one way is the way in which Imre Lakatos has told it, in his essay

Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes .Lakatos relates his ideas to the ideas of Karl Popper. He accepts the

general fallibilistic framework of Popper s philosophy. The changes he

introduces are: (a) standards are separated from rules of acceptance and

rules ofrejection; (b) they

are notapplied

to individualtheories,

but to

sequences of theories which are connected by certain techniques of

modification, so-called research programmes; (c) the elements constitutinga research programme need not be rewritten, or reconstructed in accord-

ance with the rules of a particular logical system, they can be used in the

form in which they occur in science, leaving unchanged all the logical and

empirical faults they possess; in this way both theories and the forms of

life of which they are part can be examined; (d) the standards judge the

evolution of a research programme over a period of time, not its shape at

a particular time; and they judge this evolution in comparison with theevolution of rivals, not by itself; it is therefore possible for a research

programme to remain within science even if all the theories it producesare self inconsistent and beset by oceans of anomalies; a researchprogrammeis called progressive if it makes predictions that are confirmed by sub-

sequent research and thus leads to the discovery of new facts. It is called

degenerating if it makes no such predictions but is reduced to absorbingthe material discovered with the help of the rivals. It is important to repeat

that the theories which constitute progressive research programmes maybe full of anomalies, they may contain hidden assumptions, they may be

imperfectly formulated-all this does not matter; if the sequence of theories

produced by the techniques of the research programme, by its so-called

heuristic leads to new discoveries, then the whole sequence leads to1 Lakatos [I970].



Iz Paul Feyerabend

progress, and that alone is decisive (this is why Copernicanism can be said

to be progressing over Ptolemy despite the fundamental dynamical and

optical difficulties of the theory); (e) the standards judge research pro-

grammes, they do not tell the scientist what to do. This feature of the

methodology considerably reduces the Puritanism and self-righteousnessof a scientific debate. There is no rule that tells a scientist to remove a

degenerating programme-and rightly so, for a degenerating programme

may recover, and come out on top. (Such developments occurred in the

case of atomism, the temporal finitude of the world, the moving earth.

All these programmes advanced and degenerated numerous times, and

all of them are now solid parts of science.) It thus may be rationalto pursuea research programme on its degenerating branch even after it has been

overtaken by its rival. But it is also rational to build institutions which

inhibit the pursuit of degenerating programmes unless they show some

promise in the form of new predictions. In this field everyone can choose

freely and rationally. Imre Lakatos chooses the second way and getsmuch propagandistic mileage out of calling the second way and the

further restrictions it implies also rational ; (f) the standards can be

evaluated in away

that isvery

similar to the evaluation ofempiricalresearch programmes: we regard them as historical research programmes

and the predictions that decide their progressiveness and their degree of

degeneration are predictions about basic value judgments (such as

Einstein s theory of general relativity of 1915 is better than Newton s

celestial mechanics in the shape in which it was available at the same time ).

Comparing these points with Popper we see that some elements have

been added (such as the procedure for the criticism of standards), overly

strict rules, such as the rule of falsification have been removed and the

discussion has been brought much closer to scientific reality than it was

in the Logic of Scientific Discovery (research programmes instead of

theories; scientific rather than logical formulation of research programmes

however great the faults ; standards judge developments rather than the

situation at a particular time; and so on). Comparing them with Mill, we

notice a very different kind of change. Mill provides an open framework

that mirrors some decisive features of science and that can be supplemented

with the results of concrete historical research. Nowhere is it necessary

to correct Mill, or to soften some formulations. The route from Mill toPopper to Lakatos is a circuitous route, it involves a step back from

scientific reality whereas the route from Mill to Lakatos is a direct route,

one comes closer and closer to science. It is therefore more natural, from

the point of view of ideas (from the point of view of the third world, as

Lakatos would say) to see Lakatos as a development of Mill than to see



Imre Lakatos 13

him as a development of Popper. And this is the standpoint I have adopted.The reason why Popper is a step back is, of course, that he has been influ-

enced by the philosophy of logical empiricism.

6 Mill and the Darwinists evaluate a theory-and that for them is

something very similar to what Lakatos calls a research programme-by

comparing it with the historical background in which it is embedded.

The logical positivists evaluate a theory-and that is now a statement

expressed in a language that differs decisively from the language of most

scientists-by comparing it with some elements of this background,

so-called observations which, moreover, have been separated from historyand have been made to conform to some abstract demands. LogicalPositivists restrict their framework of research, they make it more narrow,

they move away from actual scientific practice. The historical under-

standing of the sciences that had advanced so far with Mach and Duhem

diminishes and becomes almost non-existent (in the enlightenment the

situation was pretty much the same). But modern science, and for that

matter any kind of science, is too complex and too problematic to be

aidedby

thesimple

models of thephilosophers.

So theattempt

toactively

participate in its development,to anticipate future stages, to contribute to

the solution of pressing problems which played such a large role in each

is gradually replaced by the more traditional attempt to understandwhat

exists. But understanding now no longer means a relation to the sciences

that enables the person so related to make discoveries. It means dealingwith the problems that arise when a special set of abstractions is chosen,so that it is now this set and not science that is being discussed: instead

of a scientific philosophy we have another school-philosophy that borrows

the name from science but has almost nothing to do with it. Poppershowed how a model formed from this set can be made to work smoothly,i.e. without violating demands of logic together with another demand

which seemed to come from science, viz. the demand of non ad-hocness.

But, of course, the fact that the model runs smoothly does not mean that

one has understood science, for the model and sciencehave little in common.

Mill, on the other hand, is much closer to science for although his theoryis very general it deals with events and elements that actually do occur in

science and he tells us, correctly, though in a general way, how they arearranged. He also provides for a criticism of standards though he does

not specify the particular way in which the criticism is to be carried out.

He specifies some general features of the criticism, the presence of a

multiplicity of theories and facts rather than of one theory and of factsrelevant to it. He also allows us to evaluate elements of science that



14 Paul Feyerabend

cannot be neatly written down on paper. We are on the right way, all we

need are more details. Imre Lakatos gives us the details and brings Mill

closer to science. He also corrects Mill, slightly, for while Mill had

excluded mathematics from his account, Lakatos shows that informal

mathematics, which is that part of mathematics that is responsible for its

growth, can be incorporated into the fallibilistic scheme. He removes the

last Aristotelian element, the element of necessity, from modern science.1And he corrects the idea, originated by Xenophanes and Parmenides that

knowledge deals with unchanging entities and must be presented in the

form of principles describing such entities. He reverses a trend that has

dominated western thought for more than two millennia. What can we sayabout his account?

7 It is definitely preferable to Newtonian accounts up to, and includingthose introduced by logical empiricism. It leaves it to the scientist to

formulate his theories and to invent ways of criticising and of improvingthem. It assumes that the scientist, being in touch with the concrete

reality of research will have developed his talents to a sufficient extent to

know how to deal with theproblems

that arise and how tochange

his

theories to solve them. On this point Lakatos agrees with Mill s expectationthat our faculties of judgment are improved by being exercised in makinga choice. He also agrees with the idea that there is something like an

instinct for right and wrong which is developed by the concrete interaction

with the historical material and which cannot be fully articulated. Even

external demands, such as the demands of logic, or the demands of

theology may influence the activity of the scientist but neither they, nor

instinct are evaluated by themselves,it is not automatically assumed that

a science that is run by instinct, that is logically acceptable and theologicallysafe is better than a science that does not agree with such conditions.

Whatever influences science is evaluated. It is evaluated by the amount

of progress it brings about, in accordance with the standards.

The standards themselves are defended historically, as guiding modern

science at its best.This being the case they can be directed against develop-ments in science itself as not agreeing with what is best in it. Alreadythis possibility shows that basing the standards on history is not a circular

procedure. On the other hand we see now also that we cannot turn thestandards against magic, or against Aristotelianism for all we can sayis that Aristotelianism is different from what is best in modern science,

1Cf. Lakatos [1963-4]. In a way Lakatoshere seems to arrive at a position similarto

Quine s. It is similarto Quine in the same way in which Newton s account of his lawof gravitation s similar to Hooke s.



Imre Lakatos 15

not that it is worse. Here Mill s point of view is definitely preferable to

that of Lakatos. Mill chooses his method not because it fits a certain

subject. He chooses it because he believes that acting in accordance with

it will improve the individuality of the man so acting, will make him a

better thinker and a happier man.

There is one feature of the methodology of research programmes that

distinguishes it decisively from all other methodologies and that is: to

apply it we must study history in considerable detail. A naive falsificationist

who wants to judge a particular theory will either study the theory itself

(or, in most cases, a distorted image of it in some pidgin logic, a so-called

reconstruction of the theory), or he will study the relation of the theoryto the evidence . Once he has found a particular piece of evidence,

no matter in what historical surroundings, hat contradicts the theory, the

theory must go. The methodology of research programmes does not ex-

amine theories, it examines research programmes which are sequences of

theories connected by certain hard cores, heuristics and intuitive attitudes

not all of which need to be formulated explicitly. Already at this pointresearch must go much deeper than the research of a Popperian ever

would.Secondly,

themethodology

of researchprogrammes

does notonlyexamine research programmes by themselves, it also examines them in

comparison with rivals. So the investigation spreads and must reach,

ultimately, every research programme that competed at the period in

question. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this includes research

programmes which we today would regard as non-scientific (theological,

etc.). Thirdly, we must examine whether the predictions made were novel

predictions ratherthan repetitions of what was alreadyknown. This means,

we must also know something about the expectations of the age and about

the accepted facts . To be able to make a judgment we must know a

large amount of material that belongs to the history of ideas and that is

often absent even from the customary historical accounts. All this taken

together leads to the judgment that the research programme progressed,or degenerated in a certain period, and that its heuristic was barren, or

fruitful, in this period. Nothing else can be said. The research programme

may have been excellent before the degeneration set in, and it may recover

immediately afterwards. It is evident that standards such as these will

throw an entirely different light on subjects such as astrologywhich up tillnow have been condemned either out of sheer prejudice, or on the basis

of naive criteria. It may well turn out that astrology, despite all its internal

contradictions and despite all the known anomalies, progressed in the

fifteenth century, and degenerated afterwards, and has not recovered

since. It is quite possible that we shall make this discovery. But to make



16 Paul Feyerabend

it, we need much more material than is known about astrology today,when the general belief is that the case has been settled long ago, bynaive falsificationist standards.

8 So far I have compared the theory of research programmes with

theories of science which assume that scientific achievements can be

evaluated, that some achievements are better than others and which also

assume that the standards of evaluation can be openly discussed and

criticised. Knowledge, for such theories, is an objective process to which

every generation makes its contribution, it is constantly improved and

modified. This view of knowledge was first stated with brilliant clarityby Aristotle and it explains why Aristotle starts the discussion of every

problem with the ideas of his predecessors. It has emerged that Lakatos

gives by far the best account of such an objective knowledge yet in exist-

ence. The account is not free from fault, it can be improved, but so far

it is the best. But there are other theories of science which drop one or

the other of the assumptions of the objectivists. Skepticism, for example,assumes that theories and world views are all equally good or equally bad

and thatany attempt

to distributepraise

and blame is sooner or later bound

to run into difficulties. Another school, called epistemological Stalinism

by Lakatos (in some of his talks, not in any one of his publications)assumes that the evaluation of theories depends on the judgment of some

Great Man or of some Great Group: good theories are those theories

which great scientists, or groups of great scientists say are good.

Science, according to this view, is a complex adaptive mechanism run by

complex beings, scientists, who often do not know what they are doingbut who have developed a kind of instinct, a Fingerspitzengefiihl that

enables them, singly, or collectively, to do the right thing and who

therefore succeed in the end. The reply to the Stalinists is simple. The

methodology of research programmes does not deny that scientists often

use procedures of which they cannot give an explicit account, nor does it

want to eliminate such procedures from science, as we have seen. But it

asserts that there is a way of evaluating their effects, with the help of the

standards, and it adds that this is the way in which science has been run,

consciously or unconsciously, in the past. To remove this assertion, one

has to criticise the standards. So far no Stalinist has offered the requiredcriticism. A different point, made by Kuhn, cannot be answered so brieflyand it seems that it cannot be answered at all. Kuhn, according to

Lakatos, has to use mob psychology to explain revolutions, but the

methodology of research programmes can give a rational account. One

does not see how this can be true. The revolution that introduced modern



Imre Lakatos 17

science also introduced the standards, and so it cannot be judged by them

(remember that the only reason Imre Lakatos gives for the standards is

that they underly what is best in modern science). Subsequent revolutionsalways involve various parties. Given the standards the actions of any

party are as rational as the actions of any other party. The fact that one

party succeeds and the other fails is therefore a purely sociological

phenomenon, inexplicable on the basis of the standards-and this is

what Kuhn tries to say. The Skeptic, on the other hand, will be utterly

unimpressed by standards which are compatible with any action. For

him such standards are standards in appearance only and he will claim

that in actual fact one research programme is now admitted to be as goodas any other research programme. It seems that Imre Lakatos was some-

what impressed by this point and towards the end of his life he tried to

beat skepticism not by an appeal to argument, but to commonsense:

where is the skeptic who walks out of the window instead of taking the

elevator? But this reply will not do. First of all, because it is very doubtful

whether this difference in behaviour has been brought about by a com-

petition of research programmes, evaluated in accordance with standards

of progressiveness: in some species reactions against the appearance of

hight are innate. Secondly, no skeptic has ever held that skeptics arebrave men and free of prejudice. The question is: are they right-and to

this question the methodology of research programmes does not seem to

give an answer.

9 We see that the methodology of research programmes, despite the

tremendous progress made, is still full of faults and has not overtaken its

rivals in all points. For a follower of Mill this is not surprising. Nor will

such a fallibilist now turn to Kuhn or to the Skeptics. The reason isobvious. Kuhn gives a very general account of scientific (and other)

developments while Lakatos forces the researcher to look for specificdetails: what is the hard core; what is the protective belt; what is the

heuristic; how are these elements used in the explanation of a particular

phenomenon; and so on. As an instrument for carrying out research in

the history of ideas Lakatos s theory is vastly more sophisticated than

Kuhn s, and so it will lead to more detailed research, and to more dis-

coveries. The discoveries may in the end turn against Lakatos, but that

does not discredit him today, when no other theory provides an equallydetailed inventory of suggestions. This is also how the issue with skepticism

may be resolved. Speaking in an abstract mannerthe skeptic seems to be

right. But he may be wrong in this world, for this world may be opento inspection to such an extent that we can indeed separate better and

B



18 Paul Feyerabend

worse theories and give reasons for our preference. The material which the

followers of Lakatos will discover in the course of their research is relevant

to this question. It is difficult to see how the skeptic, following his own

philosophy, could ever unearth it. He needs the methodology of research

programmes to give him those facts that might show that the world is not

as orderly as assumed and that Skepticism is the correct position to take

in it.

University of California, Berkeley

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Documents

Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos