7/17/2019 Patrice Manglier: The Others' Truths http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/patrice-manglier-the-others-truths 1/1 The McGILL DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY – VISITING SPEAKERS SERIES with funding provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, presents PATRICE MANIGLIER Départment de la Philosophie, l’Université de Paris Ouest/Nanterre “THE OTHERS’ TRUTHS: LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE KNOWLEDGE ” Tuesday December 2, 12:30-2:00pm, Peterson Hall, Room 116, 3460 rue McTavish Abstract: My aim is to interrogate the assumption that relativity undermines the very idea of truth. But I am not so much interested in arguing in favour of what I will call the relativist thesis that there is no ultimate criteria of what is right and wrong, but only a plurality of assessments of the right and the wrong depending on conditions which cannot be themselves assessed from an impartial standpoint. I am more interested in arguing that the relativist postulate, far from dismissing the very idea of knowledge, is, on the contrary, an instrument for the production of a certain form of knowledge: comparative anthropological knowledge. I will argue that relativism is not so much an epistemological thesis as a methodological postulate, and I must confess immediately that I am more interested in the productivity of such a postulate in terms of its consequences than in its intrinsic absolute validity or in the question of whether the consequences themselves can be proved to be “absolutely valid.” I will be happy if I find a standard of assessment of the right and the wrong which results uniquely from the assumption that there is nothing but a variation of assessments of the right and the wrong. But it must be said from the beginning that I will argue that relativism is not the idea that truths are relative to different contexts which would exist in themselves and be independent, but rather the redefinition of everything that seems to be, and in particular of these contexts, in terms of how they relate to one another and can be seen as variants of one another. I would like to call this form of relativism affirmative or active relativism, and oppose it to what could be called negative or reactive relativism. Patrice Maniglier is the author of La vie énigmatique des signes: Saussure et la naissance du structuralisme , La Perspective du Diable: Figurations de l’espace et philosophie de la Renaissance à Rosemary’s Baby , and, with Marcela Iacub, Antimanuel d’éducation sexuelle. He is also the editor of the collected volume Le Moment Philosophique des années 60 en France and a member of the editorial board of Les Temps Modernes. [lunch/refreshments provided]

Patrice Manglier: The Others' Truths

Download PDF Report

Upload
simon-barber
View
1
Download
0

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

abstract for a talk

Citation preview

Page 1: Patrice Manglier: The Others' Truths

7/17/2019 Patrice Manglier: The Others' Truths

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/patrice-manglier-the-others-truths 1/1

The McGILL DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY – VISITING SPEAKERS SERIES

with funding provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, presents

PATRICE MANIGLIER

Départment de la Philosophie, l’Université de Paris Ouest/Nanterre

“THE OTHERS’ TRUTHS: LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE KNOWLEDGE ”

Tuesday December 2, 12:30-2:00pm, Peterson Hall, Room 116, 3460 rue McTavish

Abstract: My aim is to interrogate the assumption that relativity undermines the very idea of truth.But I am not so much interested in arguing in favour of what I will call the relativist thesis that there isno ultimate criteria of what is right and wrong, but only a plurality of assessments of the right and the

wrong depending on conditions which cannot bethemselves assessed from an impartial standpoint. Iam more interested in arguing that the relativistpostulate, far from dismissing the very idea ofknowledge, is, on the contrary, an instrument forthe production of a certain form of knowledge:comparative anthropological knowledge. I willargue that relativism is not so much anepistemological thesis as a methodologicalpostulate, and I must confess immediately that I ammore interested in the productivity of such apostulate in terms of its consequences than in itsintrinsic absolute validity or in the question ofwhether the consequences themselves can beproved to be “absolutely valid.” I will be happy if Ifind a standard of assessment of the right and thewrong which results uniquely from the assumptionthat there is nothing but a variation of assessmentsof the right and the wrong. But it must be said fromthe beginning that I will argue that relativism is notthe idea that truths are relative to different

contexts which would exist in themselves and be independent, but rather the redefinition ofeverything that seems to be, and in particular of these contexts, in terms of how they relate to oneanother and can be seen as variants of one another. I would like to call this form of relativismaffirmative or active relativism, and oppose it to what could be called negative or reactive relativism.

Patrice Maniglier is the author of La vie énigmatique des signes: Saussure et la naissance dustructuralisme, La Perspective du Diable: Figurations de l’espace et philosophie de la Renaissance àRosemary’s Baby , and, with Marcela Iacub, Antimanuel d’éducation sexuelle. He is also the editor ofthe collected volume Le Moment Philosophique des années 60 en France and a member of theeditorial board of Les Temps Modernes.

[lunch/refreshments provided]